Limitations on the appointing power of the president

1. Relatives- Art VII Sec 3 par. 2

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman,
or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
2. Midnight Appointment- Art VII, Sec 15
Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
a. In Re: Hon Mateo Valenzuela and Hon
Placido Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408, November
9, 1998
b. De Castro vs JBC GR No 191002, April 20,
2010 Relate with Art VIII Sec 4 (1), 3rd
sentence
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
c. De Rama vs CA, 353 SCRA 94, February 28
2001
3. Losing Candidate- Art IX-B, Sec 6
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the
Government or any Government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
4. Military- Art XVI, Sec 5 (4)
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active
service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position
in the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries.

Limitations on the appointments extended by an

Acting President- Art VII Sec. 14
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting
President shall remain effective, unless revoked
by the elected President, within ninety days from
his assumption or reassumption of office.
Military powers or the Commander- in-Chief
Clause- Art VII Sec 18
Section 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
1. Subject to judicial review- Art VII, Sec 18
3rd paragraph and Art VIII Sec 1 par 2
Art VII, Sec 18 3rd paragraph
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
Art VIII Sec 1 par 2

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
IBP vs Zamora GR No 141284 August 15, 2000
Powers of the Commander in Chief of all AFP
1. Calling out Powers
a. Requisite?
Commander-in-chief powers [Art. VII, Sec. 18]
(1) He may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(2) He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,
or
(3) He may proclaim martial law over the entire
Philippines
or any part thereof.

David vs Macapagal-Arroyo GR 171396, May 3,

2006
Kulayan vs Tan GR 187298 July 3, 2012
2. Power to Suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
"Writ of habeas corpus"
Is an order from the court commanding a detaining
officer
to inform the court
(1) if he has the person in custody; and
(2) his basis in detaining that person

a. Requisite
The requisites for the suspension are:
(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
(2) The public safety requires the suspension.
Duration: Not to exceed 60 days unless extended by
Congress.

b. Effects of the suspension of the privilege

-Art VII Sec 18 par 5
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

-Art III Sec 2; Art VII Sec 18 par 6

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Art VII Sec 18 par 6
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
Art 125 of the Revised Penal Code
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to
the proper judicial authorities. The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who
shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties,
or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed
of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed
upon his request, to communicate and confer at any
time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by
E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25,
1987, respectively).
Art III Sec 13
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Effects of the suspension of the privilege:

(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ

applies only
to persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or
offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion
(art. VII,
sec. 18[5]).
(a) Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be
arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The suspension of the privilege does not make the
arrest
without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect,
enabled to make the arrest anyway since, with the
suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy
available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary
detention).
(c) The arrest without warrant is justified by the
emergency
situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant
considering the time and the number of persons to be
arrested.
(d) The crime for which he is arrested must be one
related
to rebellion or invasion. As to others, the suspension of
the privilege does not apply.
(2) During the suspension of the privilege of the
writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially
charged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be
released. (art. VII, sec. 18[6])
(a) The effect therefore is only to extend the periods
during
which he can be detained without a warrant. When the
privilege is suspended, the period is extended to 72
hours.
(b) What happens if he is not judicially charged nor
released after 72 hours? The public officer becomes
liable under RPC Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery of
detained persons."
(3) The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
(art. III, sec. 13)

Power to proclaim Martial Law

1. Requisites
The Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law are:
(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
(2) Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law
all over the Philippines or any part thereof.

2. Effects of the Proclamation

A State of martial law does not:
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution
2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies
3. Authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over where civil
courts are able to function
4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
(Section 18)

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to

person judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Suspension of privilege does not suspend right to bail [Sec.
13, Art. III].

c. Limitations- Art VII, Sec 18 4th par.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Open Court Doctrine

"Open Court" doctrine. Civilians cannot be tried by

military courts if the civil courts are open and
functioning.If the civil courts are not functioning, then
civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial law
usually contemplates a case where the courts are
already closed and the civil institutions have already
crumbled, i.e. a "theater of war." If the courts are still
open, the President can just suspend the privilege and
achieve the same effect.

Olaguer vs Military Commission No 34, 150 SCRA

144
d. Role of Congress
The Role of Congress (See art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1,2)
(1) Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law
or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
before the lapse of 60 days from the date of
suspension or proclamation.
(2) Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress
shall
convene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call
within 24 hours following the proclamation or
suspension.
(3) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the
suspension, the President shall submit a report, in
person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint
session of the action he has taken).
(4) The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute
majority. It has two options:
(a) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.
When it so revoked, the President cannot set
aside (or veto) the revocation as he normally would
do in the case of bills.
(b) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.
Congress can only so extend the proclamation or
suspension upon the initiative of the President.

The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as

Congress
would determine, based on the persistence of the
emergency.
Note: If Congress fails to act before the measure expires,
it
can no longer extend it until the President again
redeclares
the measure.
Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or
suspension, because it is already valid. (see Carpio,
dissenting, in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, infra)
If Congress extends the measure, but before the period
of
extension lapses the requirements for the proclamation
or
suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the
extension,
since the power to confer implies the power to take
back.

e. Ways to lift the proclamation

1.
2.
3.
4.

Lifting by the President himself

Revocation by Congress
Nullification by the Supreme Court
By operation of law after 60 days

Delegated Emergency Powers- Art VI Sec 23 (2)

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
1. Conditions of granting emergency powers
1. Requisites for the delegation: (1997 Bar Q)
(1) There must be a war or other national
emergency
(2) Law authorizing the president for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as
Congress may prescribe
(3) Power to be exercised must be necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
2. Duration of the delegation:
(1) Until withdrawn by resolution of Congress
(2) Until the next adjournment of Congress

2. Grant of Emergency Power vs Commander-inChief Clause

Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary GR 159085,
February 3, 2004

3. Relate with Art XII, Sec 17

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.
David vs Macapagal Arroyo GR 171396, May 3,
2006
4. Relate with Art XVI Sec 5 (7)
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed
forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times
of war or other national emergency declared by the
Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.
Executive Clemencies- Art VII Sec 19
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
Non-delegable power and must be exercised by the
President personally.
Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is an
executive function. The exercise of the pardoning
power is discretionary in the President and may not be
controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts,
save only when it contravenes its limitations.
Forms of Executive Clemency (1988 Bar Question)
Reprieves- a postponement of a sentence to
a date certain, or a stay in the execution.
2. Commutations- reduction or mitigation of the
penalty.
3. Pardons- act of grace which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed form the
punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he
has committed.
4. Remission of fines
5. Forfeitures
6. Amnesty- commonly denotes the general
pardon to rebels for their treason and other high
political offenses.

1.

1. Limitations: Art IX-C, Sec 5

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension
of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

Pardon- Act of grace which exempts the individual on

5. Pardon vs Amnesty

whom it is bestowed from the punishment which

the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

Amnesty- Grant of general pardon to a class of political

offenders either after conviction or even before the
charges are filed. It is the form of executive
clemency which under the Constitution may be
granted by the executive only with the concurrence
of the legislature.

2. Kinds of Pardon
Classification of Pardon
1. Plenary- Extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including
accessory disabilities.
2. Partial-Does not extinguish all the
penalties.
3. Absolute- One extended without any
strings attached.
4. Conditional- One under which the convict
is required to comply with certain
requirements.
a.Pardonee may reject conditional
pardon. Where the pardon is conditional,
the offender has the right to reject the
same since he may feel that the condition
imposed is more onerous than the penalty
sought to be remitted
b. Condition, lawful. It is necessary
that the condition should not be contrary
to any provision of law.
c.Condition, co-extensive. The
condition of the pardon shall be coextensive
with the penalty remitted.
Hence, if the condition is violated after the
expiration of the remitted penalty, there
can no longer be violation of the
conditional pardon.
d. When the condition is that the
recipient of the pardon should not violate
any of the penal laws, who determines
whether penal laws have been violated?
Must the recipient of pardon undergo trial
and be convicted for the new offenses?
The rule that is followed is that the
acceptance of the conditions of the
pardon imports the acceptance of the
condition that the President will also
determine whether the condition has been
violated. (Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA
272 (1987)) (1997, 2005 Bar Question)

3. Pardon vs Probation
Probation - disposition where a defendant after
conviction
and sentence is released subject to (1) conditions
imposed
by the court and (2) supervision of a probation officer.
(PD
No. 968, sec. 3[a])

4. Pardon vs Parole
Parole- suspension of the sentence of a convict granted
by
a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a
pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence
shall be suspended. (REYES)

Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96,

January 19, 1999
Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190
Garcia vs Chairman GR 75025 September 14, 1993
In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709,
December 29, 1995
Risos Vidal vs COMELEC GR 206666 January 21,
2015
The diplomatic /treaty making power- Art VII Sec
21; Art XVIII, Sec 25
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning military
bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State.
Bayan vs Zamora GR 138570, October 10, 2000
Treaty vs Executive Agreement
- Abaya vs Ebdane GR 167919 February 14,
2007
Power of Impoundment
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August 9,
1994
Power of Augmentation- Article VI, Section 25
(5)
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President

of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287, February 3, 2015
(Reso on the MR to the July 1, 2014 Decision)

that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that

the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on
appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the prohibition
relating to appointments. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban

__________________
CASE DIGESTS
__________________
De Castro vs JBC GR No 191002, April 20, 2010
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta[A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
November 9, 1998]
Facts:
1. Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments
signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as
judges of the RTC of Bago City and CabanatuanCity,
respectively.
2. These appointments appear prima facie
, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional
provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on
appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to
fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1)
and 9 of Art. VIII
Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010
decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial
and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees
and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue
that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15
and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the
Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare
decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary
the ban on presidential appointments during the period
stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the
dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records
of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either
Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art.
VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the
Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010
decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of
the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up

to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not

apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.
De Rama vs CA, 353 SCRA 94, February 28 2001
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.

Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief

of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the

allegation that the appointments of the said
employees were midnight appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next

presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Issue:
Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution applies to appointments in LGU.
Held:
Constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight
appointments, specifically those made within two (2)
months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President.
In the absence of any showing that these alleged
midnight appointments were defective in form and in
substance, nor is there evidence presented to show
that subject appointments were issued in
contravention of law or rules, these appointments are
deemed valid and in effect.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review;
Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute
a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the

deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not

unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.

David vs Macapagal-Arroyo GR 171396, May 3,

2006
Facts of the Case
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of
ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA
whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those
petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging
that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress
and it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal
standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
3.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?
Held:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
2.) This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result. Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi (right to be heard in court), for
they suffered direct injury resulting from illegal
arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
3.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
President may temporarily take over a privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest only if there is congressional authority or
approval. There must enactment of appropriate
legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will
serves as the best assurance that due process of law
would be observed.
Kulayan vs Tan GR 187298 July 3, 2012
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres
Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were
purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by

three armed men who were later confirmed to be

members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local
Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis
Management Committee (Committee) was
then formed to investigate the kidnapping
incident. The Committee convened under
the leadership of respondent Abdusakur
Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of
Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation
No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu. The
Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist
act pursuant to the Human Security Act
(R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of
the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor
the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon
the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies
to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the
PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.
claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09
wasissued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article
VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers
as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can
exercise the calling-out powers of a
President
HELD:

It has already been established that

there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the
Republic. This means that when Section1,
Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is
only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI,
of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
While the President is still a civilian,
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making
the civilian president the nations
supreme military leader. The net effect of
Article II, Section 3, when read with
Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian
President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed
forces. The Constitution does not require
that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not
endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority
when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local
Government Code.

Olaguer vs Military Commission No 34, 150

SCRA 144

Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary GR 159085,

February 3, 2004

FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were
detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Ologauer and his group are all civilians.
They were charged with (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate
President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy
to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente
Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings;
(6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo
Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals
Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.

On July 27, 2003, some three hundred

junior officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed
into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City demanding, among others, the
resignation of the President, the Secretary
of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police.

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation,

the President issued Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4, both declaring a
state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the

Oakwood occupation had ended. After
hours-long negotiation, the soldiers
agreed to return to barracks. The
President, however, did not immediately
lift the declaration of a state of rebellion
and did only on August 1, 2003 through
Proclamation No. 435 DECLARING THAT
THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO
EXIST.

jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the

Issue:

ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal

has the jurisdiction to try civilians while
the civil courts are open and functioning.

military courts or tribunals during the

period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission

WON the President have the power to

declare a state of rebellion?

or tribunal cannot try

and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.

Held:
Yes. The President, as Commander-inChief, has a sequence of graduated
power[s]. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires
the exercise of such power. These
conditions are not required in the exercise

of the calling out power. The only criterion

is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
David vs Macapagal Arroyo GR 171396, May 3,
2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives
of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures,
and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were
stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as
well as outside the building. A few minutes after the
search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another proopposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication,
the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would
take overany media organization that would not
follow standards set by the government during the
state of national emergency.
Issue:
Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
Held:
No. PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo
during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency

powers. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus: (a)there must be a war or other
emergency; (b)the delegation must be for a limited
period only; (c)the delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and
(d)the emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The
taking over of private business affected with
public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states that
the the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest, it refers to Congress, not the President.
Whether or not the President may exercise such
power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to her pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.
There is a distinction between the Presidents
authority to declare a state of national emergency
and her authority to exercise emergency powers. Her
authority to declare a state of national emergency is
granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. The exercise of emergency powers, such as
the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of
privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can she determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over.
Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96,
January 19, 1999
Facts:
On January 4, 1999 , the SC issued a TRO staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice

Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing

that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.

suspension and a back pay. The basic theory of the

petitioner is that having her case pending final
judgement during the extension of executive
clemency, her employment was therefore not
terminated or forfeited.

Issue:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in
granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the
finality of judgment has already been rendered that
by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.

ISSUE :
Whether or not absolute pardon granted by Chief
Executive entitles Monsanto reinstatement to her
former position without the need of a new
appointment.

Held:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches
of our government.
Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190
FACTS
In 1983, Salvacion Monsanto, the petitioner, who
was assistant treasurer of Calbayog City was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex
crime of estafa and was sentenced for imprisonment.
Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme
Court which affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration which during the
pendency of that motion, she was extended pardon by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of the
said pardon, Monsanto requested the Ministry of
Finance that she be restored to her former post, being
vacant and stressing that the absolute pardon has
wiped out the crime implying that her service to the
government has never been interrupted thus entitling
her to reinstatement from the date of her preventive

HELD :
The Ministry of Finance referred the request of
Monsanto to the Office of the President which gave a
statement through its Deputy Executive Secretary
that it is only during an acquittal, not absolute
pardon, as the only ground for reinstatement of
previous position and entitlement of salary payment
of a public officer. The petitioner, being convicted
for the crime of estafa with a penalty of prision
correccional carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office. The Supreme Court
affirmed the resolution of Deputy Executive
Secretary stating that the pardon granted to the
petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but
that cannot go beyond it. That to regain her former
post, she must reapply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment. That in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be
and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be
entrusted with public funds.
Garcia vs Chairman GR 75025 September 14,
1993
Effects of Presidential Pardon
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER,
LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO.
IV, respondents.
Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a
Supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was accused

of stealing telegraph poles from the company. Thus,

public respondents filed a criminal case against him
for qualified theft before a court and on the same
ground respondents also filed an administrative case
in which petitioner was found guilty and was later
dismissed from the service. With respect to the
criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the
court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was
then reinstated from his work and is now claiming
before the COA for his back salaries from the time of
his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other
hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile,
petitioner was extended an executive clemency
(absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent
COA strongly refused to give due course to
petitioners claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment
of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency.
Held:
Yes. Petitioner's reinstatement in the instant case which
was ordered pursuant to a grant of executive clemency
was effected not because of lack of sufficient proof of his
commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he
did not commit the offense charged. Verily, law, equity and
justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for
the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice
caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal.
This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that
must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity
and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit
wrongfully, a dishonest man, and worse, a thief.
Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award
petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was
illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was
reinstated. The payment shall be without deduction or
qualification.

In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709,

December 29, 1995
Held: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a
contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect
that the former will release the latter subject to the
condition that if he does not comply with the terms of
the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve
the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional
one (Alvarez v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 50). By
the pardonees consent to the terms stipulated in this
contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself
under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his

delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the

pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of
the pardon. Under Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is
authorized to order the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. It is now
a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this
exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial
scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the
conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee,
having consented to place his liberty on conditional
pardon upon the judgment of the power that has
granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which
his recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that the pardonee has allegedly been
acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed
against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and
that the third remains pending for thirteen (13) years
in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who
in the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the
corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his
own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the
subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the
grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee
is not a requirement for the President to determine
whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for
the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a
conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
exercise of powers undisputably solely and
absolutely in his office. (In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong
Torres, 251 SCRA 709, Dec. 29, 1995
[Hermosisima])
Risos Vidal vs COMELEC GR 206666 January
21, 2015
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S.
LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and
setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En
banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S.
Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in
view of private respondent former President
Joseph Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to
run for and hold public office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada explicitly states
that He is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy [7] for
the position of President but was opposed by
three petitions seeking for his disqualification.
None of the cases prospered and MRs were
denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest
number of votes on the May 10, 2010
synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada
once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, [10] this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President
Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the

Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual

Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code
(LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the
COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the
petition for disqualification holding that
President Estradas right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13,
2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo
Lim garnered the second highest votes
intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for
the same ground as the contention of RisosVidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. The arguments
forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to
prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law or were so patent and
gross as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted
an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language

of the pardon is that the same in fact

conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President
Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the
absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription
in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition
a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words,
the latter provision allows any person who has
been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for
and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.

Petition was dismissed.

Bayan vs Zamora GR 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS :
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United
States of America forged a military bases agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by the US
military personnel. To further strengthen their
defense and security relationship, the Philippines and
the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed

to respond to any external armed attack on their

territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.
In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, the periodic military exercises between
the two countries were held in abeyance. However,
the defence and security relationship continued
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18,
1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by
both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text
and a series of conferences. Eventually, President
Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA.
On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada
ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting
thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially
transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of
Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for
approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote
of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially
entered into force after an exchange of notes between
Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating
the circumstances and conditions under which US
Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present
in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the
VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to
respondents in ratifying the agreement.
ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING :
Petition is dismissed.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two
provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII,
which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members
of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After
the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in and when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a

national referendum held for that purpose, and

recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other
contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of
treaties and international agreements in general with
a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and
international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or
particular designation requires the concurrence of the
Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to
treaties which involve presence of foreign military
bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both
constitutional provisions share some common
ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA
to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision is
immaterial.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases
and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence,
for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet
the following requisites :
a) it must be under a treaty
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate,
and when so required by Congress, ratified by a
majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum

FACTS :
This a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside and nullify Res. No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated
May 27, 2004 issued by the Bids and Action
Committee (BAC) of the DPWH. This resolution
recommended the award to private respondent China
Road and Bridge Corporation of the contract which
consist of the improvement and rehabilitation of a
79.818-km road in the island of Catanduanes.
Based on an Exchange of Notes, Japan and the
Philippines have reached an understanding that
Japanese loans are to be extended to the country with
the aim of promoting economic stabilization and
development efforts.
In accordance with the established prequalification
criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or
considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC.
Prior to the opening of the respective bid proposals, it
was announced that the Approved Budget for the
Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67. Consequently, the bid goes to
private respondent in the amount of P952,564,821.71
(with a variance of 25.98% from the ABC). Hence
this petition on the contention that it violates Sec. 31
of RA 9184 which provides that :

c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting

State

Sec. 31 Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be

the upper limit or ceiling for the bid prices. Bid
prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified
outright from further participating in the proceeding.
There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the
award.

There is no dispute in the presence of the first two

requisites. The third requisite implies that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential
whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They
are equally binding obligations upon nations.
Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with
the mandate of the constitution.

The petitioners further contends that the Loan

Agreement between Japan and the Philippines is
neither an international nor an executive agreement
that would bar the application of RA9184. They
pointed out that to be considered as such, the parties
must be two (2) sovereigns or states whereas in this
loan agreement, the parties were the Philippine
government and the JBIC, a banking agency of
Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from
the Japanese government.

The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the executive department as
to their power to ratify the VFA.

ISSUE :

Abaya vs Ebdane GR 167919 February 14, 2007

Whether or not the assailed resolution violates RA

9184.

RULING :
The petition is dismissed. Under the fundamental
principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda,
which is in fact, embodied is Section 4 of RA9184,
any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the
Philippine government is a signatory, shall be
observed. The DPWH, as the executing agency of
the project financed by the Loan Agreement
rightfully awarded the contract to private respondent
China Road and Bridge Corporation.
The Loan Agreement was executed and declared that
it was so entered by the parties in the light of the
contents of the Exchange of Notes between the
government of Japan and the government of the
Philippines dated Dec. 27, 1999. Under the
circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an
adjunct of the Japanese government. The JBIC
procurement guidelines absolutely prohibits the
imposition of ceilings and bids.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August 9,

1994
Held: Impoundment refers to the refusal
of the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress.
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked
at least three principal sources of the
authority of the President. Foremost is the
authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress.
Second is the executive power drawn from
the Presidents role as Commander-inChief.
Third is the Faithful Execution
Clause.
The proponents insist that a faithful
execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the
law if doing so would prejudice public
interest.
An example given is when
through
efficient
and
prudent
management of a project, substantial

savings are made. In such a case, it is

sheer folly to expect the President to
spend the entire amount budgeted in the
law.
(PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235
SCRA 506, Aug. 9, 1994 [Quiason])
Araullo v. Aquino III, G. R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014
The Araullo v. Aquino III, G. R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
on the other hand assailed the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
implementing the DAP of the Executive Department. The
Supreme Court decided that use of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of the Legislative
Department and the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) of the Executive Department are both
unconstitutional. Plunder cases relating to the use of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) have been
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman at the
Sandiganbatan against three incumbent Senators,
Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Ramon Revilla, Jr. and Jose
P. Ejercito-Estrada. All the three incumbent Senators are
under detention.