[G.R. No. 130644.

October 27, 1997]

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his mother
MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor
son, Francisco Juan Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the
warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for
the annulment of the order[2] of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranaggas
motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors
from the office of the State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her
son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for
Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest
Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated
against the warrantless arrest. The, police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that
Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary
investigation.
On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a
regular preliminary investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in
support of the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of
twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the
city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence
entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in
person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his clients right to a
preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivits verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing
the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus.[3] However, Larranagas effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against
him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information
with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The

prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition
with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioners arrest. The
move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the
Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranagas counsel in
the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the
Court of Appeals dismissed Larranagas petitions, hence, the case at bar.
On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we temporarily
restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to
prevent the issues from becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and motion in
lieu of Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that x x x it is within petitioners
constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a
mere inquest be conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations
against him. He asked that x x x the petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his
right to preliminary investigation. He further recommended that x x x during the pendency
thereof, petitioner be released from detention.
We agree.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioners inquest
investigation. Said section clearly provides that when a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or information may
be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested. For one, the petitioner was
not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would
instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September
17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of
the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of
Appeals, viz:[4]
Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan.Neither could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunmans cars plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That
information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x
x When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should
have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable
cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier,
the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded
him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to
section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital
offense kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and
incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him
face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioners counsel was fart from being unreasonable
when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished copies of the affidavits
supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days to
submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion x x x prevented petitioner from preparing
and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and security
guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify that:

- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates were all in
their school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his
classmates took their mid-term exams;
- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioners Quezon City
apartment until about 9 o clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at
Katipunan Avenue where they stayed on until 3 oclock in the morning of July 17; they even had
pictures taken of their party;
- indeed petitioners July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are ready for submission
as evidence, along with petitioners grades for the terms end in September 1997;
- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing petitioner at
their Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;
- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until terms end in
September 1997;
- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June 1997,
particularly including July 16 and 17;
- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833, as
shown by his plane ticket and boarding pass.
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense
case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we
emphasized that attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of
preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary
investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this Court
emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, the right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of
petitioner and to order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary
investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for
Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against
the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order the immediate release of
petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII,
RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of
petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result of petitioners
preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.