MARCH 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 195032

FEBRUARY 20, 2013

ISABELO A. BRAZA V. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (1ST DIVISION)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; offenses under section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Braza challenges the sufficiency of
the allegations in the second information because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered
by the government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate to support a valid
indictment for violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that
there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.The accused may be charged under either mode or under
both. The disjunctive term or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction. It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation
of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 under the second mode. To be found guilty under the second mode,it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official,administrative and judicial
functions. The element of damage is not required for violation of section 3(e) under the second mode.In the case at
bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public officers and employees, discharging official
or administrative function, together with Braza, confederated and conspired to give FABMIK Construction and
Equipment Supply Company, Inc. unwarranted benefit or preference by awarding to it Contract J.D. No. 06H00050
through manifest partiality or evident bad faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and compliance with the
requirement for qualification contrary to the provisions of R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.
Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A. 3019. Considering that all the elements of the
offense of violation of section 3(e) were alleged in the second information, the SC found the same to be sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction. .

AUGUST 2013
R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
G.R. NO. 187340,

AUGUST 14, 2013.

ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime charged under section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: 1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted

with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury
to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly found the
concurrence of the three elements. First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public officer.
Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built because of
his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. In his own testimony,
petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to check the ownership of the land with the
Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e. that
it looked swampy. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established. The cutting down of her palm
trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income
from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private
complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the
canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and WASTE DISPOSAL site.

SEPTEMBER 2013
R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
G.R. NO. 187268,

SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For
the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident
bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.
G.R. NO. 187268,

SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan,
certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local
Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled
CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the SCHOOL DESKS

and armchairs, despite non-

delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any
procurement or acquisition of supplies or property by local government units shall be through competitive public
bidding. The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just
the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiated contract
a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must
know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public
bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to
protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that
petitioner acted on his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board.
G.R. NO. 187268,

SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act of
petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal
by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It
must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be accompanied by the
appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for
CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records
would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused as customer.
Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and accepted the above items in good condition. The
significance of the customers signature on the invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the
seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to release the MONEY alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately,
despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basissome of which were even defective. The Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be
exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

NOVEMBER 2013
R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
G.R. NO. 168951 & G.R. NO. 169000,

NOVEMBER 27, 2013.

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS AND DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

R.A. 3019; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; causing undue injury. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 requires the
prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused undue injury to the government or gave him
unwarranted benefits. The Supreme Court has always interpreted undue injury as actual damage. What is
more, such actual damage must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. A finding of undue injury cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed
wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime. Here, the majority assumed that
the payment to Dr. Posadas of P30,000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to the Government.
The record shows, however, that the P247,500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed was
deducted from his terminal leave benefits.

DECEMBER 2013
R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 188165/ G.R. NO. 189063,

DECEMBER 11, 2013.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION AND THIRD DIVISION
HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO AND ENEST ESCALER
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION AND THIRD DIVISION
HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO, ENEST ESCALER AND RAMON
CASTILLO ARCEO, JR.,
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; in connection with a contract or transaction. In issuing the questioned
resolution, the Sandiganbayan applied the restrictive meaning of the term transactionas used in section 3(b) of R.A.
3019 adopted in Soriano Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. In Soriano Jr., the Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that the
investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be
construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by
the petitioner. The State here argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the term transaction inSoriano Jr. considering that the
term transaction should be construed more liberally. The SC did not give credence to the States position. It held
that it does not help the State any that the termtransaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is susceptible of
being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and
laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to

enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged. Hence, the SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan did
not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth element
of the violation of section 3(b) of R.A. 3019.

MARCH 2013
R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
G.R. NO. 168539,

MARCH 25, 2014.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY T. GO,

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted: The only question that needs to be settled
in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper. The
Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held that, it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile s death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should
have been charged.

G.R. NO. 168539,

MARCH 25, 2014.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY T. GO,

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted: The requirement before a private person
may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged
to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer
be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.