Severino M. Manotok IV, Froilan M. Manotoc, Fernando M. Manotok, et. Al.

,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer L.
Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez
[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 12, 2005.]
Facts:
Respondents as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the
LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the
name of Homer Barque which was destroyed in a fire. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, tax receipts, and tax declarations
and the Plan covering the property. Upon being notified of the petition,petitioners filed their
opposition claiming that the lot under the title of Barque forms part of their land and that the
TCT in the name of Barque was spurious. Atty. Benjamin Bustos, as reconstituting officer,
denied the petition on the grounds that:
a. The lots covered by TCT No. 210177 appear to duplicate the Lot of Piedad Estate
covered by TCT No. 372302 registered under the name of Severino Manotok
b. The submitted plan is a spurious document
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos should not have required the submission of other documents
other than the owners duplicate copy as bass in denying the petition and that based on the
documents presented, petitioners established that their TCT was, at the time of the
destruction, was valid, genuine, authentic, and effective. It is also noteworthy that the
technical description covered by TCT No. 210177 conforms to the description of the lot
covered by TCT No. 372302. It therefore becomes evident that the existence of TCT No.
210177 was established irrefutably by the petitioners and that the recounstruction must be
given due course. The LRA ruled that the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 be given due
course upon the cancellation of the TCT of Manotok upon order of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the respondents.
Bother their motions were denied. Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA
praying that the LRA be directed immediately to reconstitute their TCT. Petitioners also filed
a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition of respondents. Respondents
moved for reconsideration which was reconsidered by the CA.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. In so ruling, the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course
to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling
respondents' title. From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed
separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R.
No. 162335, respectively. Both petitions were consolidated.
Issue:
a. WON the LRA has no authority to annul their title
b. WON the reconstituition of Respondents Title would be a collateral attack on
petitioners existing title

c. WON they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to
defend the validity of their Torrens title
d. the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to
order the cancellation of petitioners' title
Ruling:
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to
the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. When respondents filed
the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have
more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution. Since respondents' source of
reconstitution is the owner's duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on
the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic, genuine, valid, and
existing, while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the
Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property"
without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their
Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no
need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of
respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and
affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting
their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and
jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized
their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly
considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due
process.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which
was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. In this case, petitioner anchors her
arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of
the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is
overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report . . . that TCT No. T-320601
was issued without legal basis
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears
emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records
one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land
registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of
title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as
to the authenticity of the certificate.