Cognitive Linguistics Research

13

Editors
Ren Dirven
Ronald W. Langacker
John R. Taylor

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin . New York

Historical Semantics
and Cognition
Edited by

Andreas Blank
Peter Koch

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin . New York 1999

Mouton de Gruyter (forrnerly Mouton, The Hague)

is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin

@ Printed on aeid-free paper

whieh falls within

the guidelines of the ANSI
to ensure perrnanence and durability.

Library 01 Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Historieal semanties and eognition I edited by Andreas Blank,

Peter Koeh
p. cm. - (Cognitive linguistics researeh ; 13)
Ineludes bibliographieal references and indexo
ISBN 3-11-016614-3 (c1oth ; alk. paper)
l. Semantics, Historieal - Psyehologieal aspeets.
2.
Cognition. l. Blank, Andreas. 11. Koeh, Peter, 1951- .
III. Series.
P325.5.H57H48 1999
401'.43-de21
99-32695
CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Historical semantics and cognition I ed. by Andreas Blank ; Pe-

ter Koeh. - Berlin ; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999

(Cognitive linguisties researeh ; 13)
ISBN 3-11-016614-3

Copyright 1999 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-I0785 Berlin

AlI rights reserved, including those oftranslation into foreigo languages. No part ofthis book
may be reproduced or transmitted in any forrn or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
ineluding photoeopy, reeording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without
perrnission in writing from the publisher.
Printing: Werner Hildebrand, BerHn
Binding: Lderitz & Bauer, Berlin
Printed in Germany

Preface

The papers collected in this volume evolved frorn a symposium that

was held Septernber 19-21, 1996, at the "Clubhaus" of the Freie
Universitat Berlin. The syrnposium was organized with the double
intention of providing a forum in which synchr<;>nically and diachronically oriented scholars would have to exchange their ideas and
where American and European cognitive linguists would be confronted with representatives of different directions in European
structural sernantics. While the confrontation indeed happened as
planned, the expected synergetic effects were perhaps not as intensive as we had hoped. However, we are convinced that sorne of the
discussions we had will bring long-tenn results, thanks to the opponents' rnodified perception of each other generated by this encounter.
We would like to express our gratitude to the "AuBenamt" of the
Freie UniversWit Berlin for all its various forms of support, and especially to the Volkswagen-Foundation, without whose grant this
symposium would not have been possible.
All the work, the preparations ineluding the program and the
schedule of rneetings, the duplication and distribution of hand-outs
and papers, as well as the organizing of coffee-breaks, restaurants,
accomodations and transfer from airports to hotels, could not have
been done without a devoted team of co-workers. We take this opportunity to thank once again Mary Copple, Genevieve Gueug, Paul
Gvaudan, Richard Waltereit and especially Sigrid Kretschmann
whose experience and readiness were an enonnous support and contributed to the success ofthe symposium.
Ideas of how the proceedings could best be published were discussed during the Berlin symposium itself. Due to changes in both
our acadernic affilations, sorne time went by until it was decided that
a greater part of the papers read at the Clubhaus should be published
in a volume rounded off with two artieles that tit the volume's the-

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics

John R. Taylor

This contribution is not specifically about historical semantics. My

focus, rather, is sorne basic issues in semantic theory, especially as
these arise from a confrontation of Structural Semantics and Cognitive Semantics.
By "Structural Semantics" 1 refer to the well-established continental European tradition, represented aboye alI by Coseriu (e.g.
1977). Structuralist approaches are also evident in Lyons (1968) and
Cruse (1986). Structuralism has profoundly influenced historical linguistic studies, especially as these have pertained to the familiar
European languages (e.g. Coseriu 1974).
By "Cognitive Semantics" 1 refer to the study of semantics within
the framework of "Cognitive Grarnmar", as developed aboye aH by
Langacker (1987, 1991). The work of Lakoff (1987), Ta1my (1988),
and many others, is broadly compatible with Langacker's approach.
Studies of grammaticalisation, e.g. Reine (1993, 1997), can also be
assimilated to the Cognitive Grarnmar prograrnme. For lexical historical semantics within the Cognitive Grarnmar frarnework, especially
important is the work ofGeeraerts (e.g. 1985, 1997).
Coseriu (1990) sees a profound gulf between Structural Semantics and the Cognitive Grarnmar approach to semantics. In recent
years, however, others (e.g. Koch 1995, 1996) have been keen to incorporate insights of Cognitive Grarnmar into historical linguistic
studies, without, however, wanting to give up sorne of the basic assumptions of Structuralism. In this connection, it should be noted
that the aspect of Cognitive Semantics that has been most cornmonly
seized upon, has been the idea of categorisation by prototype. Although "cognitive semantics" appears in the title of Coseriu (1990),
the only aspect of Cognitive Semantics that is dealt with in any depth
in the artiele is categorisation by prototype. This emphasis on proto-

I S John R. Taylor

types is unfortunate, in that there is much more to Cognitive Grammar than categorisation by prototype!
1 have several aims in this chapter. One is to dispel what appear to
be sorne current misunderstandings about Cognitive Grarnmar. 1 also
question sorne of the assumptions underlying Structural Semantics ,
arguing that sorne of the postulated distinctions may be unnecessary,
and, to the extent that these distinctions do have validity, they can be
incorporated unproblematically into the Cognitive Grarnmar model. 1
also tentatively point to sorne aspects of the Cognitive Semantics approach that 1 believe are likely to be especially relevant to historical
semantic investigations.
1 begin by observing that although Cognitive Grarnmar and Structuralism have developed independently, with little mutual interaction, the two approaches can be seen to have a cornmon origino Both,
namely, have developed, albeit indifferent ways, sorne basic insights
of Saussure.

1.

The Saussurian heritage

Not the least of the achievements of Ferdinand de Saussure was to

have established Linguistics as an autonomous academic discipline.
Contrary to the naive view ofthe matter, it is not, according to Saussure (1916: 23), the existence ofa certain subject matter (in our case,
language, and languages) that justifies and circumscribes a discipline, but rather a "point of view", a distinctive way of treating the
subject matter. Scholars with all manner of interests have had things
to say about language. Yet if it is to achieve disciplinary autonomy,
Linguistics cannot simply be the grand sum of whatever literature
students, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, etc. say about
language. Paradoxically, the very centrality of language to human
existence sharpens the need to define the proper object of Linguistics. As is well known, Saussure's proposal was that the distinctively
"linguistic" study of language had to treat language as a semiotic
system. The proper object of linguistic inquiry is therefore the "lin-

Cognitive Semantics and Structura/ Semantics 19

guistic sign", the symbolic association of a signifier (an "acoustic

image") and a signified (a "concept").
Cognitive Grarnmar is strongly cornmitted to the symboIic nature
of language, and in this respect is profoundIy Saussurian in spirit. 1
On the Cognitive Grarnmar view, a Ianguage is essentialIy a vast inventory of"symbolic units", each ofwhich associates a phonological
representation (analogous to Saussure's "acoustic image") with a semantic representation (Saussure's "concept"). But whereas Saussure
had illustrated his notion of the linguistic sign maily on the exampIe of lexical items (such as arbor 'tree'), Cognitive Grarnmar takes
patterns ofword formation (morphology) and phrase formation (syntax) to be also inherently s"ymbolic in nature. Although sentences,
phrases, and words may differ in their degree ofinternal complexity,
in their status as symboIic units sentences, phrases, and compIex
words form a continuum with the morphemes of a Ianguage.
In order for the symbolic enterprise to be feasible, it is obviously
necessary to allow phonological and semantic representations of
considerable internal complexity, in a manner that was probably not
foreseen by Saussure, also to postulate various kinds of relations between linguistic units, i.e. between signs, between their phonoIogical
poles, and between their semantic poles. After all, if the symbolic
thesis is to be taken seriously, symbolic units and their properties
have to bear the fulI weight of what in other linguistic theories is
carried by various modules ofthe grarnmar (phonology, morphology,
syntax, pragmatics, etc.). Thus, a crucial notion in Cognitive Semantics is that the meaning of an expression is not exhausted by the expression's designation. Designation (or "profiling", in Langacker's
terminology) always takes place against a (more or less compIex)
network of background knowledge. (1 return to this point in section
4.) Concerning the relations between linguistic units, three kinds
need to be recognised. One is the "is-a" relation. One unit instantiates (can be regarded as a more fulIy specified instance of) a more
schematically characterised unit. A second relation is the "part-of'
relation. One unit is part of a larger, more complex unit. A third relation is the "is-like" relation. One unit resembles another unit, in

20 John R. Taylor

sorne respect(s), and can thus be assimilated to it, as a marginal

instance to a prototype.
A special case of the "is-a" relation obtains between the use of an
item on a specific occasion and the item as stored in a speaker's
memory? When the word free is uttered with reference to a specific
tree, the semantic pole of the utterance (the specific tree referred to,
or, to be more precise, the speaker's conceptualisation ofthe tree) is
an instance of the more abstractly characterised tree-concept associated in the speaker's mind with the stored lexical item. In parallel
manner, the pronunciation of the word on a specific occasion is an
instance of the more abstractly characterised phonological representation stored in the speaker's mind. Note that the properties ofthe instance may not fully match the more abstract schema. (Suppose that
the word free is applied, not to a "prototypical" tree, but to a date
palm, or that the word is pronounced in a non-standard way.) In such
cases, the instances may still count as instances of the symbolic unit
[TREE] in virtue of the "is-like" relation; the usage would count as
"marginal", but would still be attracted to the stored unit in virtue of
its similarity to it.
A related point, is that there is no need to make a principled distinction between "Iinguistic meaning" and "encyc1opedic knowIedge".3 Consequently, Cognitive Grarnmar does not draw a distinction in principIe between "sentence meaning" and "utterance meaning". Traditionally, sentence meaning is the meaning that a sentence
has in virtue of the "linguistic meaning" of its parts, whereas utterance meaning is the meaning that an utterance acquires in a particular cornmunicative context. Both kinds of meaning properly belong
in the semantic representation associated with the symbolic unit, and
both need to be characterised reIevant to appropriate background
knowledge. Naturally enough, "utterance meaning" may need to be
characterised against a much richer array of background assumptions, which appeal to specific aspects of the speech situation. But
this fact is fully consistent with the view that utterance meaning
stands in an "is-a" relation to sentence meaning. Sentence meaning,
to the extent that the notion is valid at aH, is schematic for the range

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 21

of utterance meanings that an expression lllay have on specific occasions of its use.
1 have emphasised the Saussurian roots of Cognitive Grammar, in
order to better contextualise a comparison with Structural Semantics.
Structural Semantics has al so drawn its inspiration from Saussure,
albeit with an emphasis on other aspects of Saussure's thought.
Saussure, as we all know, asserted that the link between the signifier
and the signified is arbitrary (Saussure 1916: 100-102). There are, to
be sure, slightly different (though not incompatible) ways of understanding "the arbitrariness of the sign". In the rust place, the sign is
arbitrary in the sense that there is no inherent association between
sound and meaning. On this view, arbitrariness contrasts with motivation. A sign may be motivated, to the extent that the language user
can perceive sorne reason why the signifier should have the meaning
that it does (and vice versa). Intemally complex signs are usually
motivated, to varying degrees. On a slight1y different understanding
of arbitrariness (and it is this understanding that is especially emphasised in Cognitive Grammar), the linguistic sign is arbitrary in
the sense that it is the product of conventionalisation. Speakers act in
the belief that the signifier-signified relation (at least for established
units, cf. footnote 3) is shared by other members of a speech community. And, as Saussure (1916: 104) pointed out, a speaker is unable to single-handedly modify the established and shared conventions.
Saussure (1916: 155-157) goes further, and maintains that it is not
onIy the signifier-signified relation that is arbitrary, the signifiers and
the signifieds in any given language are themselves arbitrary, in the
sense that there is no intrinsic reason why just these meanings should
receive syrnbolic expression, nor why just these phonological forms
should serve as signifiers. Saussure emphasised that the signs that
make up a language do not constitute a nomenc1ature, i.e. they are
not labels for an independent1y given list of concepts. It is the language itself that structures cognition, thereby creating the concepts
through the very process of syrnbolising them. Likewise, there is nothing intrinsic to a sound that renders it suitable to function as a linguistic signifier. Sounds have the status of speech sounds only in

22 John R. Taylor

virtue of the structuring of sound by the semiotic system that is a

language.
If pursued, Saussure's views on the arbitrariness of concepts and
sound pattems must inevitably lead to a position of radical relativism, of a fonn that perhaps not even Whorf would have wanted to
endorse!4 Research on semantic and phonological universal s has, of
course, revealed rather severe constraints on the concepts and sound
pattems that may come together in symbolic association, while still
allowing, within the boundaries set by these constraints, considerable cross-Ianguage diversity.s But perhaps the most challenging
component of Saussure's thought, and one that has fired the imagination of generations ofhis readers, Hes in his thesis that units on the
phonological and semantic levels have a status within the language
only by virtue of the relations which they contract with other units
on the same level (phonological or semantic). Saussure (1916: 158160) introduced the tenn "value" to refer to this aspect of the linguistic signo A "concept" receives its "value", not in virtue of any intrinsic semantic content, but in virtue of the relations (syntagmatic
and paradigmatic) which it contracts with other symbolised concepts. Likewise, sound units have a value in the language system in
virtue of the sound units they contrast with, and combine with. Paradoxically, the value of a linguistic unit is detennined, not by its intrinsic content, but by what it is not, by "ce qui existe en dehors de
lui" [what exists outside ofitself] (1916: 160).
In proposing the notion of "value", Saussure is not denying the
obvious fact that signs do have a positive content, alongside their
contrastively defmed value. Structuralist Semantics captures this distinction by the tenns "signification" and "designation" (or, in German, "Bedeutung" and "Bezeichnung,,). 6 The "signification" of a
sign is the concept understood contrastively i.e. in tenns of its relations to neighbouring concepts; the "designation" is the concept understood in its positive aspects, i.e. in tenns of its potential to refer
to actual states of affairs in the world. To give a simple example: the
morphophonemic category [SINGULAR] has the same designation,
both in a language which has a simple two-way contrast between
singular and plural, and in a language which has a three-way contrast

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 23

between singular, dual, and plural. Yet the signification (''value'') of

[SINGULAR] is different in the two cases. In the one, [SINGULAR] enters into a simple binary contrast with [PLURAL], in the other, it enters into a temary contrast with [DUAL] and [PLURAL].
We can make a further distinction, between "signification" and
"designation" on the one hand, and "reference" on the other. Here,
we need to return once again to Saussure. Saussure (1916: 98) made
it very clear that for him, the linguistic sign was a mental entity. The
linguistic sign [TREE] did not associate a particular tree growing in
the yard with a specific utterance [tri:]. The semantic content of the
sign was a "concept" in the mind ofthe language user. Saussure likewise insisted that the acoustic image was a mental representation,
distinct from any physical manifestation, and thus neutral with respect to pronunciation and perception. But in any particular act of
speech, there is, obviously, a specific articulatory/acoustic/perceptual
event, probably (though not necessarily) associated with reference to
a particular entity in the real world. Thus, it is easily possible for two
signs to be used with the same reference, but having different designations (and eo ipso, different significations). To extend on the earlier example: The category [PLURAL], in the two kinds of languages
mentioned above, has the same reference when used of a group of
three entities. But the designation (and signification) of [PLURAL] is
different in the language which on1y has the two-way contrast between singular and plural, from the designation that it has in a language which knows a three-way contrast between singular, dual, and
plural.
Saussure represented the sign as a simple bipartite entity (Fig. 1).
More elaborate schemas have been proposed; the "semiotic pentagon" in Fig. 2 has been adapted from Koch (1996), who attributes it
to Raible (1983). As mentioned, the sign for Saussure was a purely
mental entity. In order to link the two elements ofthe sign to entities
outside the mind (i.e. to an acoustic-phonetic event on the one hand,
and, on the other, to a referent in the world), the bipartite sign is extended to include a "name" and a "referent". A fifth element is introduced, in order to capture the distinction between signification and
designation.

24 John R. Taylor

Figure l. The Saussurean sign

signified
(linguistic sigo)

sigoifier

,,

designation

~---

----------------(act of speech)
name

referent

Figure 2. The "semiotic pentagon" (after Raible 1983/ Koch 1996)

1 have already hinted at what might be the Cognitive Grammar

approach to the issues touched on above. The distinction between an
acoustic-phonetic event and a signifier (Saussure' s "acoustic image") is an "is-a" relation, Le. the relation between a fully specified

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 25

instance and a more abstractly characterised schema. The sarne goes

for the relation between a referent and the designationlsignification
of a linguistic unit. A further point is that the distinction between the
extra-linguistic, extra-conceptual aspects ofthe sign as used in a specific cornmunicative context and its linguistic-conceptual aspects
(the distinction is represented by the broken line in Fig. 2), also falls
away. It is an error to suppose that people use language in order to
refer directly to ''things in the world", Le. to things outside of the
mind. Language is used to refer to mental "projections" of the world
(Jackendoff 1983: 29), or, to put it more generally, to elements in
what Fauconnier (1985) has called "mental spaces". A mental space
may purport to be a model ofthe world as it is. But equally, the model may be of a world that is imagined, drearnt, represented in a picture, novel, film, and so on. There is no linguistic difference between
a fictional narrative and a narrative which purports to portray events
that "really" happened. Concerning the phonological pole of the
sign, it is also an error to suppose that acoustic-phonetic aspects of
an utterance are any les s "cognitive" than a phonological (or semantic) representation. Sounds, as categorised by a speaker/hearer,
are also conceptual entities.
What all this means, is that, from a Cognitive Grarnmar point of
view, the bipartite structure of the linguistic sign, as depicted in Fig.
1, is perfectly adequate as it stands, it is in no need of further
elaboration along the lines of Fig. 2. Given the austerity of Fig. 1,
the challenge of Cognitive Grarnmar is to describe languages in all
their complexity and variety - including aspects of their use and
their variation over time - in terms of the essentially Saussurian notion of the bipartite "signe linguistique".

2.

Signitication vs. Designation, or: Where are prototypes?

A major point of disagreement between Cognitive Semantics and

Structural Semantics concems the special status accorded in the
latter to "signification" in contrast to "designation" and "reference".
What is at issue here, essential1y, is whether it is justified to postu-

26 Jhn R. Taylor

late a level of purely "linguistic" meaning, in contradistinction to a

level of encyclopedic knowledge, between "una semntica lingstica" [a linguistic semantics] and "una semntica de las cosas" [a semantics ofthings] (Coseriu 1990: 281).7
For Coseriu (1990: 267), Cognitive Semantics cornmits "el error
ms grave y ms elemental que pueda cometerse en semntica" [the
most serious and most error that it is possible to cornmit in semantics]; this is the capital error of confusing linguistically structured
meaning with experientialIy derived knowledge about the states of
affairs that linguistic expressions refer too The confusion manifests
itself, according to Coseriu, in the treatment of prototype effects. On
the Structuralist view, prototype effects lie outside the language system proper; they have to do with difficulties a person may encounter
in properly applying a word to a state of affairs, i.e. they are matters
of designation and reference, not of signification. That it might be
difficult to detennine, at a given time and place, whether it is
"night", or "day", in no way entails that the significations of the
words night and day are "fuzzy" or indeterminate, or structured
around a prototype. On the contrary, Coseriu argues, prototype effects arise precisely because the linguistic meanings of night and day
are absolutely clear-cut; were this not the case, we could have no
confidence in asserting that a certain state of affairs constitutes a
good example, or a less good example, of the application of the word
(Coseriu 1990: 258). Likewise, penguins and ostriches can only be
recognised as "marginal" examples of the bird category if the category is already clearly defined. In order for a bird to be a "less good"
example of the category, it must already have been categorised as a
bird (1990: 279). And the clear-cut concept of what a bird is, is a
matter of signification, not of designation, or of associating exemplars with a prototype. Whether birds, as entities in the world,
constitute a clear-cut category or not, is a matter of biology, not of
linguistics.
Coseriu (1990: 268) observes that Cognitive Semanticists have
selectively focussed onjust those words (such as to lie, and names of
natural kinds) whose real-world applications tend to give rise to prototype effects, whilst ignoring linguistic-semantic contrasts which

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 27

are c1ear-cut, not only on the level of signification, but also on the leveIs of designation and reference. He mentions the example of motion verbs. Spanish venir and ir contrast with respect to 'motion to
the place of the 1st person' vs. 'motion to the place of the 2nd/3rd
person'. In Italian and Catalan, the contrast between venire/andare,
venir/anar, is drawn differently, between 'motion to the place of the
1st/2nd person' vs. 'motion to the place of the 3rd person'. (Hence,
Catalans, speaking Spanish over the telephone, will tend to make the
error of saying *Maana vengo a verte 'Tomorrow I come to see
you', instead of the correct Maana vaya verte 'Tomorrow 1 go to
see you'.) Moreover, the notion of "structure", and of a "structured
lexicon", suggests that a semantic contrast might serve to differentiate more than one word pairo And indeed, the above mentioned contrast in Spanish shows up with verbs of carrying: traer vs. llevar. (In
Italian, though, the contrast is not made: portare serves for both
senses.) It is difficult to imagine, Coseriu remarks, what "prototypes" could be associated with these c1ear-cut meanings, and what
deviations therefrom could look like. There is a further point. This is
that the distinctions in question are language-specific, and therefore
cannot plausibly arise from any natural categorisation of non-linguistic reality. By focussing on the referential possibilities of lexical
items, and on the naming ofreal-world (and therefore universally accessible) categories, Cognitive Semantics has ignored the structured,
language-specific relations that exist between significations. In brief,
Cognitive Semantics falls into the trap that Saussure wamed us
about, of viewing a language' s lexicon as a nomenc1ature, a list of
names for pre-existing categories.
With respect to its allegedly onomasiological orientation, Coseriu
brings in a third player, in addition to Structural Semantics and Cognitive Semantics, namely the theory of word definition by necessary
and sufficient conditions. Although FiUmore (1975) presented prototype semantics in opposition to "check-list" theories of meaning, Coseriu groups both together as examples of onomasiologically oriented approaches, and both stand in contrast to Structuralism, which
looks in the [ust place at relations of contrast between linguistic
units, not at states of affairs in the world. Thus, for Coseriu (1990:

28 John R. Taylor

245), the Katz and Fodor (1963) analysis of bachelor, which defines
the word as a conjunction ofthe features [HUMAN], [ADULT], [MALE],
[NEVER MARRIED], suffers from the same fault as prototype theories,
in that it defines the word in terms ofthe conjunction of(real-world)
features of its potential referents (i.e. in terms of the word's
designation), rather than in terms ofthe word's linguistic value.
In evaluating Coseriu's critique, let us first consider the content of
the proposed contrasts at the level of significations. Let us accept
that day and night stand in a simple two-way contrasto The contrast
has to do, presumably, with the presence vs. absence of sunlight (assuming an open-air environment). Note that the contrast appeals intrinsically to a real-world phenomenon, one that can only be apprehended empirically, through experience of the world. Coseriu, generally, is quite happy to give natural language glosses (in French,
German, Spanish, or whatever) to the content of distinctive semantic
features. Now, Jackendoff (1990: 33) has remarked that one cannot
create a semantic feature simply by taking any old expression and
putting a pair of square brackets around it. Behind JackendofI's quip
is the idea that if linguistic meanings are to be distinct from encyclopedic knowledge, the features that go into the linguistic definitions
must be ontologically distinct from attributes ofthe real world. For if
there is no such distinction between linguistic-semantic features, and
attributes of extra-linguistic reality, the methodological basis of the
distinction becomes vacuous.
And indeed, a cornmon strategy of many two-Ieve! theorists (see
footnote 7) is to propose that semantic features have the special
status of semantic primitives, presumably innate to human cognition,
and that are independent of experience. Jackendoff, for example,
postulates a set of "conceptual constituents", of the kind [THING] ,
[PLACE], [GO], [STAY], [MOVE], [CAUSE], etc., which are combined in
accordance with "conceptual weIl-formedness rules". These generate
the general architecture of all possible concepts, whose substance is
filled in by information derived from acquaintance with the world.
Such an approach wiIl tend to emphasise the universality of semantic structures, at least at a certain level of abstraction. Coseriu,
on the other hand, makes no pretence that distinctive semantic fea-

Cognitive Semantics and Structura/ Semantics 29

tures ("semes") might be, or might be built up out of, universal semantic primitives. 8 Distinctive semantic features have to be determined case by case, according to the structural relations obtaining in
a given language, and are as simple or complex as the data requires.
Furthennore, significations are not "built up" out of features; it is the
features that emerge from the contrasts, not vice versa (Coseriu
1977: 17). Coseriu (1990: 261) cites with approval Pottier's (1964)
well-known analysis of seating objects in French, which lists such
real-world features as "avec pieds" [with feet] , "vec bras" [with
arms], "avec dossier" [with back]. Note here that the very notions of
a "(chair)-leg", "(chair)-arm", and "(chair)-back" already presuppose
(encyc1opedic) familiarity with the domain offumiture, and with the
conventional practice of naming parts of fumiture metaphorically in
terms ofanimal (or human) body parts. 9 It would indeed be "patently
ridiculous" (Jackendoff 1990: 33) to propose "avec dossier" as a universal semantic feature. But it is also difficult to imagine what the
"linguistic" meanings of chaise, fauteuil, tabouret, etc., could be, if
not knowledge of what these kinds of objects actually are, and how
they are to be differentiated one from the other. 10
Since, for Structuralist Semantics, the distinction between the linguistic and encyc10pedic levels does not reside in the content of the
distinctive features, we need to ask whether there are other characteristics of significations, which render this level of description ontologically distinct from designation and reference. Two aspects appear to be relevant for Coseriu. The first 1 have already mentioned.
This is that significations (within a given semantic field) are c1early
contrastive, and betray no "fuzziness" or prototype effects. A corollary of contrastiveness, which 1 shall address in the next section, is
that significations are taken to be unitary entities, i.e. betray no polysemy. The second aspect is the possibility of neutralisation (Coseriu
1977: 17-18). The notion is familiar from phonology. In certain environments, the contrast between two otherwise contrastive phonemes is suspended. A well-known example concems the neutralisation of the voicing contrast in word-final obstruents in Gennan and
Russian. Coseriu (1990: 260) views neutralisation as a specifically
linguistic (not a conceptual) phenomenon; consequently, the possibi-

30 John R. Taylor

lity of neutralisation can serve as a diagnostic, as it were, of a

contrast at the level of significations. Thus, the contrast between day
and night can be neutralised, as when day is used, not in opposition
to night, but to cover the 24 hour period comprising both day and
night. (It do es not follow, therefore, that day is polysemous between
two meanings.) The possibility of neutralisation must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Whereas Spanish allows neutralisation of
the gender contrast between hermano and hermana (in that hermanos can mean 'brothers andlor sisters'), no comparable neutralisation
is posssible between brother and sister in English, and this in spite
of the fact that English does allow (or at least, used to!) gender neutralisation between he and she, man and woman (as when he and
man are used as gender neutral items).
Let us take the second point frrst. 1 suspect that semantic neutralisation, as described by Coseriu, is in fact a multifaceted phenomenon, and which therefore cannot be explained in terms of a single
mechanism. In many cases, established polysemy cannot be ruled
out. The fact that Spanish hermanos can have a meaning which is
not simply the plural of hermano, indeed suggests this. On the other
hand, the use in English of he as a gender-neutral pronoun (as feminist critics never tire of reminding us!), arguably do es represent a
conceptual bias, which views "male" as the default value for human
beings (females simply do not count); it is therefore not just a "structural" fact about the language system. Concerning the day and night
example, this plausibly represents an instance of metonyrny; the 24
hour period is designated by its (for most people) most salient component. (Hoteliers calculate the duration of a guest's stay in terms of
so many nights.)
The other aspect of significations that Coseriu emphasises, is their
clearly contrastive character. The first point to make here, is that
there is absolutely nothing in the Cognitive Grammar framework
that precludes the proper characterisation of the clear-cut contrast
between e.g. the motion verbs venir/ir in Spanish, or venire/andare
in Italian. (What a Cognitive Semanticist would be inclined to look
at, though, would be extended uses of these verbs, uses which do not
literally denote motion to the place of a person, but which can never-

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 31

theless be conceptually related to the "basic" motion sense.) Furthermore, there is no inherent conflict between prototype categorisation
and semantic contrasto On the contrary, Rosch (1978) argued that
"basic level" categories achieve salience largely because their prototypes maxirnise the distinctiveness of the categories (cf. Taylor
1995: 50-51). Neither is it fair to charge Cognitive Semantics with
undue concem with real-world, and hence "universal" (Coseriu
1990: 252) categories, for which a language merely supplies a list of
names. From its very inception, Cognitive Granunar has emphasised
the role of "construal" in semantics; linguistic expressions do not
refer "directly" to states of affairs in the world, but to speakers'
conceptualisations of these states of affairs (Langacker 1987: ch. 3).
Furthermore, it is fully accepted that different languages may make
available to their speakers different sets of "conventionalised"
modes of construal.
Secondly, it is not always the case that words contrast so c1early
as in the examples that structuralists like to quote. This is most obvious in the case of (near) synonyms. Cruse (1986: 266) characterises (near) synonyms as items which have "a low degree of implicit
contrastiveness". Thus, in declaring that a building is "high", one is
not implicitly denying that it is "tall" (and vice versa). Although high
and tal! do not share exactly the same meamng, the difference can
hardly be stated in terms of the presence vs. absence of sorne distinctive semantic feature. II Cruse (1986: 285) also drew attention to
what he called "plesionyms" - sets of words that are only weakly
contrastive, and which stand mid-way, so to speak, between (near)
synonyms on the one hand, and fully contrastive word sets on the
other. Take Cruse's examples fog, mist, haze. Whereas other words
for meteorological phenomena, such as rain, snow, hail, arguably do
form a clearly contrastive set, this is certainly not the case withfog,
mist, haze. Precisely because the words are only weakly contrastive,
the boundaries of their meanings are not clearly defined - either conceptually, or referentially. Even so, 1 still have a fairly clear conception of what a prototypical fog etc. is like. Consequently, if 1 attempt
to apply one of these words to a specific state of affairs, 1 can do no
other than appeal to a conception of a prototypical fog, etc., and as-

32 John R. Taylor

sess how well the actual situation conforms to the prototype(s), and
on this basis, decide which of the three words might be most appropriate. But if this is the case, there is no reason to suppose that a
similar process does not apply when 1 use the words snow and hail,
day and night. The onIy diffe:nce is, that in the Iatter case, the prototypes are c1early distinct, and characterisable in terms of the presence vs. absence of sorne easily statable attribute, whereas the
prototypes ofjog, mist, haze are not.

3.

The question of polysemy

For Structural Semantics, as for other "two-level" approaches, it is

axiomatic that the linguistic meanings ("significations") of words are
unitary entities, i.e. that at the level of significations, polysemy does
not exist. It is not denied that a word may be used in a variety of
senses. 12 But these senses onIy arise when uniquely specified values
get filled out with semantic content, either as a matter of conventional usage, or in a specific discourse context. In this connection,
we may refer to Coseriu's well-known distinction between "system",
"norm", and "discourse". The "system" is specified at the level of
the language-determined significations, the "norm" comprises established elaborations of significations, while "discourse" pertains to
specific readings that emerge within a text. (The phonological artalogy should be obvious. Phonemic contrasts pertain to the "system",
while the "norm" comprises ~stablished allophonic realisations.) Coseriu's position is that Cognitive Semanticists are inclined to find
polysemyeverywhere, because oftheir fixation on "norm" (and even
"discourse"), and their neglect of the "system".
As with prototypes, there is unfortunately sorne misunderstanding
of what the Cognitive Grammar position is with regard to polysemy.
It is certainIy true that Langacker (1988: 50) has asserted that the
normal, expected state of affairs in lexical semantics is that a word
(especially a word in frequent use) wiIl be polysemous, i.e. wiIl have
a range of established senses. Thus, the semantic pole of a symbolic
unit may need to be represented as a network of units, linked by rela-

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 33

tions of schematicity and resemblance to a prototype. Although the

matter has not been as extensively studied in Cognitive Grammar,
the phonological pole, to the extent that a unt may receive a variety
of pronunciations, may also need to be represented as a network of
13
possibilities.
A number of "case studies" of individual lexical items pursued
within the Cognitive Grammar tradition, have portrayed these as
sometimes highly polysemous, and this fact may well have contributed to the perception that Cognitive Grammar encourages the proliferation ofpolysemy.14 On the other hand, whether or not an item is
to be regarded as polysemous is an empirical question, to be deterrnined case by case. There is certainly nothing in the Cognitive
Grammar framework which excludes the possibility that a linguistic
unit may have a constant, invariant value. And sorne analyses have
indeed ernphasised the untary value of sorne linguistic signs. This is
especia1ly the case with respect to grammatical categories. Thus,
Langacker (1987) argued that the lexical categories [NOUN] and
[VERB1 can be associated with a single, highly abstract (schematic)
value. s
With regard to many lexical items, however, polysemy is surely a
brute fact, which simply cannot be argued away.16 Consider Fillmore's (1982) well-known analysis of climb. FiUmore, it will be recalled, postulated a prototypical sense, which involves the features
"c1ambering (with the limbs)" and "ascending". Both are present in
climb a tree. But in climb down a tree, the feature "ascending" is defeated. Coseriu (1990: 256-257), addressing Fillmore's analysis,
observes that the very possibility of "climbing down" a tree demonstrates that Fi1lmore's anaIysis was incorrect; the proper characterisation should be, not "ascend", but "(move) in a vertical or inclined
plane" (sobre un plano vertical o inclinado). Concerning the feature
"c1ambering", given that monkeys, snails, and even plants can c1imb,
the proper characterisation should be "keeping hold with the extremities" (agarrndose con las extremidades). The fact that, in the absence of specifications to the contrary, "climbing" is taken to be in
an upward direction, is a default interpretation, associated with the
"norm", not with the "system".17

34 Jahn R. Taylor

Unfortunately, this proposal fails to cover sorne further uses of

climb (which Coseriu does not address). The plane climbed lo
30,000 feet is fine (even though a plane has no extremities with
which to hold itself in place). But we can not say that the plane
climbed down to 20,000 fiet. With reference to an airplane, upward
motion is paramount, contrary to the conc1usion drawn with respect
to "c1imbing down a tree". As 1 see it, there is simply no way in
which these various senses can be brought under a single semantic
formula. The only feature that all the uses of climb have in common,
is probably "move". But at this level of abstraction, it would not be
possible to differentiate climb from other verbs of motion in English
(inc1uding move).18 Neither is it plausible to c1aim that climb is homonyrnous. The various readings overlap, and are therefore not independent of each other.
As mentioned, Coseriu is inc1ined to locate the specific readings
of a lexical item on the level of "norm", while general meanings belong on the level of "system". It is not disputed that to be proficient
in a language, a speaker needs to be familiar with the norms prevailing in that language (Coseriu 1990: 281). But if this is true - which
it surely is! - the question arises, whether a person could be proficient in a language, knowing only the "norm", but remaining ignorant of the "system". Suppose a person has leamed to use the verb
climb (or any other word, for that matter) in its full range of established readings. Would not this fact, ofitself, guarantee the speaker's
full mastery ofthe word? Values and contrasts at the level of signification need play no role whatsoever in a speaker's performance.
In Structural Semantics, however, the unity of meanings at the
level of signification is a logical necessity, rather than an emprical
matter. Coseriu (1977: 8-10) writes that meaning variants can be derived from meaning invariants (significations), but not vice versa; it
is only on the basis of unitary meanings that meaning variants can be
established at all (Coseriu 1990: 270). The very fact that different
readings are recognised as such, rests on the prior knowledge of the
invariant meaning. Furthermore, it is the unitary meaning that sets a
limit on the extent of meaning variation; a word cannot end up
meaning "n'importe quoi" [anything at all] (Coseriu 1977: 10).

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 35

These are curious arguments. We can surely recognise that climb

has a range of different readings, and we can state them quite precisely, and point to their similarities (as Fillmore did), irrespective of
whether there is (or whether we recognise that there is) a unitary
meaning. However, to the extent that a speaker is creatively extending the usage range of a word, it may weIl be true that the speaker
does need to recognise sorne cornmonality between an accepted
usage A and the new usage situation B. 19 (Still, the pertinent meaning invariant cornmon to A and B need not coincide with the invariant which justifies the extension of the word from A to another situation C, which is tantamount to c1aiming that there wiIl be no invariant that unifies aH three readings.) In Cognitive Grarnmar terms,
these cornmonalities would be captured by meanS of low-Ievel schemas that cover the relevant cases. But with respect to a range of already established (and conventionalised) uses, nothing exc1udes the
possibility that these uses are simply learned, on the basis of input
data. Indeed, without sorne such assumption, it would be difficult to
explain how different readings of a word can drift so far apart over
time. A speaker ofmodem English probably no longer perceives anY
relationship at all between type 'kind' and type 'printer's character'
(cf. Geeraerts 1985), or between buff 'dull pale-brown' and buff
'amateur enthusiast'.
Not on1y is the structuralist level of signification not strictIy necessary in order to guarantee a person's adequate use of a language,
it is difficult to imagine how significations, as understood by Coseriu, could be leamed in the frrst place. Recall that significations do
not emerge from usage events: "le relev des procds employs
dans la production des phrases ne pourrait jamais amener a la dlimitation du signifi" [listing the procedures employed in the production
of sentences could never lead to the delimitation of significations]
(1977: 12). A little further down, we read that from "des acceptions
ou des variantes isoles", "on ne peut pas, en principe, dduire d'une
falfon irnmdiate le signifi" [from isolated readings or variants, it is
not possible, in principIe to directIy deduce the signification]. Significations, in fact, appear to inhabit an idealist world, distinct from
the world in which and of which language is used: "el mundo de los

36 John R. Taylor

significados es un mundo ordenado; no es el mundo catico y continuo de las 'cosas'" [the word of significations is weIl-otdered; it is
not the chaotic and continuous world of 'things'] (Coseriu 1990:
277). And even if we do succeed to bring sorne structure into the
chaotic world of things, there is no assurance that the categories thus
derived wiIl match up with the categories provided by language, for
"las clases de 'cosas' no coinciden con las categoras mentales" [the
classes of 'things' do not coincide with mental categories] (1990:
262); Coseriu (1977: 12) doubts whether 1inguistic structures can be
based at all on the "structures des contenus d'une pense prlinguistique" [structrures and contents ofprelinguistics thought].
In other theories that postulate a special level of linguistic semantics, such as Jackendofrs, the problem of acquisition does not arise;
if linguistic-conceptual categories (or at least, their basic building
blocks and skeletal structure) are innate and universal, they do not
have to be learned on the basis of experience. Coseriu, however, emphatically rejects the idea of the universal, or even the non-linguistic
basis of linguistic-semantic structuring. He speaks merely of a person coming to recognise the "unidad intuitiva" (1990: 278) of a mental category, while the linguist's task is to "reveal" (revelar), to
"make manifest" (poner de manifesto) the intuitive unity?O While it
might make sense to suppose that a person do es have (or may come
to have) an intuition about the unity of, say, the bird-category, this
probably has as much to do with beliefs about natural kinds as with
the supposedly linguistic meaning of bird. But with respect to vast
areas ofbasic vocabulary, it is surely a nonsense to claim that speakers become intuitively aware of the linguistic-semantic unity of the
items in question, or even to suppose that they need to do so. Different uses of e.g. climb certainly stand in a family resemblance to each
other, and speakers ofEnglish can readily generate mental images of
a person "climbing (up) a tree", "climbing (down) a mountain", or a
plane "climbing into the sky". But the only cornmon denominator to
these states of affairs is the fact that they are designated by the same
phonological form, not that they elaborate a unique semantic content!

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 37

Any linguistic theory has to be evaluated, not on1y in tenns of its

theoretical postulates and inherent plausibility, but also in tenns of
the research results which it generates. In spite of the reservations
expressed aboye, it might be objected that Structuralist Semantics
has indeed pro ved an invaluable tool in explicating semantic change.
The distinctive contribution of Structuralism is to have pointed to
changes in the "system"; for example, contrasts at the level of signification are abandoned or created, a distinctive feature is lost or
comes into being. If we take a long-tenn perspective, we can indeed
note a drastic change in the "value" of Latin passer 'sparrow' as it
evolves into Spanish pjaro '(small) bird'. Such changes are as
clear-cut as the significations themselves are claimed to be. But precisely for this reason, focus on structural relations alone can say tittle
about the mechanics of language change. For this, we need to focus
again on the "nonn" and on "discourse", i.e. on speakers' conceptualisations and categorisations. Coseriu (1990: 260) certain1y allows
the possibility of "categorizacin de emergencia" - the one-off application of a word to a novel situation. With increasing frequency, this
designation can enter the "nonn", and can even effect a change in the
signification. But not, Coseriu insists, by adding a new nuance to the
signification, or, even less, by introducing an element of polysemy.
Rather, the change will effect "todo el significado" (original emphasis). But at what point in historical development does the change in
signification occur, and on what basis can one state with confidence
that the change has occurred? Coseriu (1990: 260) suggests that
sorne residual problems with his analysis of English c/imb, e.g. the
fact that the word can be used of a snail (which lacks "extremities"),
might be "exceptional", or even metaphorical, and thus betray a designation "de emergencia". But given this loophole, the theory of invariant significations becomes vacuous?1

18 John R. Tay/or

4.

Concepts

Although Saussure used the word concept to designate the semantic

pole of the linguistic sign, many semanticists have been reluctant to
appeal to concepts at aH. Concepts, by definition, are private, mental
entities; a person can have no access to another person's concepts except, of course, through the medium of language. But if language
is defmed as a means for symbolising concepts, there is no methodology for independently establishing the nature of another person's
concepts. Appeal to concepts, therefore, could be circular (cf. Lyons
1977: 113). Interestingly, Lyons (1968: 443) favoured a structuralist
approach to semantics precisely because it frees the linguist from the
need to refer to "concepts". The meaning of a word becomes nothing
other than the set of relations that the word contracts with other
lexical items. 22
1 do not think that "concepts" need be such mysterious entities as
Lyons and others make out (cf Taylor, in press a). A common view
amongst psychologists is that a concept is a principIe of categorisation (Komatsu 1992). To "have" a concept, is to have the means to
categorise entities as examples of that concepto Put crudely, to have
the concept TREE, is to have the ability to recognise a tree when one
sees one. Understood as schemas for categorisation, concepts are by
no means restricted to nominal entities. One of Langacker's major
achievements is to have proposed a theoretical apparatus for the elucidation of the conceptual structure, not only of various relational
units, such as verbs, prepositions, and adjectives, but also of "functiona!" morphemes such as the artieles and case categories.
What goes into a concept? Coseriu (1990: 261) - rightly - criticises the view that concepts might be "imgenes de las cIases" mental representations ("pictures") of categories. A crucial notion of
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987: 183-185) is that the meaning
of an expression involves the "profiling" (or designation) of an entity, against background assumptions. (These latter are referred to
variously as domains, frames, idealised cognitive models, etc.) The
(by now) e1assic example is the word hypotenuse (Fillmore 1985).
The word designates a straight line, no more, no less. A hypotenuse,

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 39

however, is eategorised (recognised) as such, in virtue of the fact

that the straight line functions as part of a non-designated (non-profiled) entity, namely, a right-angled triangle. It is not the straight line
as such, nor the right-angled triangle, that constitutes the coneept
HYFOTENUSE, but the profiling of the straight line against the notion
of a triangle.
The example of hypotenuse is relatively simple, in that the eoneept presupposes a fixed, and easily eircumseribed domain of knowledge. Most eoneepts need to be eharaeterised aganst multiple domains, of varying eentrality, whieh may be seleetively aetivated on
particular oeeasions of their use. (Thus, read a book, print a book,
drop a book, etc., eonstrue BOOK slightly differently in each case,
and high1ight different background domains, even though the profiled entity arguably remains the same.) Concepts, therefore, turn out
not to be fixed entities, but rather "emerge" in the aet of conceptualisation. By the same token, complex expressions are rarely fully compositional, in the sense that their meaning can be eomputed from the
fixed meanings of their component parts. Combining concepts is not
just a matter of combining the profiles, it also involves the integration of background knowledge.
Coseriu accuses Cognitive Linguists of exaggerated eoncem with
"objective" categories; there are classes of things out there in the
world, which the words of a language piek out. This view, 1 think,
seriously misunderstands the Cognitive Grarnmar programme. Objeetively speaking, 1 dare say there is much in common between
writing (with a pen) on a piece of paper and drawing (with a peneil)
on a piece of papero Both involve a person holding a slim instrument
and making marks on a surface. Why do we not categorise the two
kinds of events in the same way? The Structuralist view would be
that it is the language system itself that presents us with the structured opposition between write and draw. But there is surely more to
it than this. Writing and drawing are understood against broader eonstellations ofknowledge. Murphyand Medin (1985), not inappropriately, speak of "theories", which serve to give coherence to categories?3 Writing is understood against a theory of written linguistic
cornmunication, drawing against a theory of visual representation. It

40 Joh" R. Taylor

is in virtue of the background theory, that writing (with a pen) and

writing (with a word processor) - two very different kinds of activity, objectively speaking - are nevertheless both categorised as instances of "writing".
Changes in word meaning are likely to have as much to do with
changes in background assumptions, i.e. domain-based knowledge
configurations, as with designation ("profiling"). Indeed, the aspect
of Cognitive Semantics that promises the greatest scope for insightfui studies of meaning change, could well be the importance attributed to background assumptions. The development of Latin scribere
from 'make marks on a surface' to 'write', and the development of
legere from 'pick out' to 'read', are not just a matter of "restriction"
or "specialisation" of meaning (nor of the addition, or subtraction, of
semantic features). In each case, the profiled activity remains much
the same. What has changed are the background assumptions (the
"theories") against which this activity is profiled.

s.

Conclusion

Let us return to Saussure's original insight that a "concept" needs to

be characterised both positively (in terms of its actual content), and
negatively (in terms of what it is not). Structuralist Semantics chose
to separate out these two aspects, proposing a level of designation
(the positive content of the signified), and a level of signification
(the signified in contrast to other signifieds). This, 1 think, was an error. Just as the Saussurian sign resided in the integration ofthe signified and the signifier, so too the signified resides in the integration of
designation and signification. Cognitive Grammar achieves this integration by means of the notion of profile and base. The profile is the
concept in its positive aspects, i.e. the entity (or category) actually
referred too The base comprises background knowledge that is not
specifically designated. But without the base, there can be no profile,
and the base, without profiling, lacks structure.
The major achievement of Structuralist Semantics is to have emphasised the semantic relations between lexical items. Sorne of the

Cognitive Semantics and Structural Semantics 41

earlier studies of lexical items within the Cognitive Semantics tradition (e.g. Brugman 1981; Coleman and Kay 1981) probably did tend
to study words in isolation from other lexical items with which they
stand in contrasto But it would certainly not be fair to say that Cognitive Semanticists have in general been insensitive to matters pertaining to lexical fields, and to implicit contrasts between lexical
items. These implicit contrasts belong in the domain-based knowledge against which an entity is profiled. The background knowledge
against which a concept is profiled may comprise riot just "encyc1opedic" knowledge pertaining to a conceptual domain, but equally,
"linguistic" knowledge pertaining to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that the linguistic unit contracts with other linguistic
units.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

Cf. Langacker (1987: 11): "Language is symbolic in nature. It makes

available to the speaker - for either personal or comrnunicative use - an
open-ended set of linguistic signs or expressions, each of which associates
a semantic representation of sorne kind with a phonological representation"
[hold in original]. Lakoff's (1987: 473) characterisation of constructions as
"pairings of form and meaning" can also be taken as an endorsement of the
symbolic nature of language.
Whether or not an item is stored in memory is a function of"entrenchment"
(in tum a function of frequency of successful use; Langacker 1987: 59).
Obviously, entrenchment is a matter of degree. There is therefore no clean
cut-offpoint between "stored" units and ad hoc coostructed units.
This is not to deny that certain facets may be more intrinsic to an expression's meaning, and relevant to just about all its uses; nevertheless, even
highly central aspects can sometimes be defeated, and outweighed by other,
more circumstantial aspects. See Langacker (1987: 158-161).
As a matter of fact, Saussure (in the representation of his thought that has
come down to us) appears to shy away from the full implications of his
theory. Thus, he observes (1916: 160) that if, ofthe three "synonyms" redouter, craindre, and avoir peur, redouter did not exist, its meaning would
be shared out amongst its competitors. Saussure, therefore, appears to presuppose the existence of a conceptual content, which is independent of language, and which has to be lexicalised, sorne way or other.

42 John R. Taylor

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

This was the principal theoretical import of Berlin and Kay's (1969) work
on colour categories. Essentially, Berlin and Kay demonstrated for a semantic domain (colour) the same kinds ofuniversal constraints that Jakobson (1968) had claimed for phonology.
Terminology, however, is far from uniformo
In maintaining this distinction, Structuralist Semantics aligns itself with a
number of other "two-Ievel" approaches to semantics (e.g. Searle 1980,
Bierwisch 1981, Kirsner 1993, Wunderlich 1993). Although these approaches may differ in their details (especially conceming the manner in
which "linguistic" meanings are represented and get projected onto encyclopedic meanings), a common theme is tbe assumption that linguistic
meanings are unitary, clearly-defined entities, which lack the rich detail derived from experience ofthe world. For discussion, see Taylor (1994; 1995:
ch. 14).
.
For Coseriu, "universals" are to be found, if anywhere, in extralinguistic
reality and its categorisation, not in significations. Thus the label "semntica 'universal''' is applied to both prototype theories and theories of necessary and sufficient conditions (Coseriu 1990: 252). Coseriu (1977: 10-11)
even charges generative grammar with an exclusively onomasiological (and
therefore universalist) perspective: "la grarnmaire gnrative part de la
ralit extra-linguistique dsigne, ou bien d'une pense prlinguistique
'universelle' (c'est-a-dire non encore structure par telle or telle langue), et
passe pour ainsi dire a travers et par-dessus les langues pour aboutir a la
parole." [generative grarnmar stars from designated extra-linguistic reality,
or from 'universal' prelinguistic thought (Le., from thought which is not yet
structured by a particular language), and by-passes, so to speak, the language system, in order to arrive at the utterance.]
The proverbial linguist from Mars, on learning that afauteuil is an object
for sitting on, which has arms, legs, and a back, could be excused for supposing tbat a man giving a piggy-back to his young son, is a fauteuil. The
point of this flippant example, of course, is that word meanings are not the
''minimalist'' (cf. Coseriu 1990: 263) constructs envisaged by Structuralist
Semantics, but are likely to be extremely rich in detail and background
(encyclopedic) assumptions. E.g. knowledge of seating objects pertains not
only to the pars of which they are composed, but also to how humans typically interact with these objects.
Conceming Pottier's analysis, Coseriu and Geckeler (1981: 42) do indeed
raise the question whether we are here dealing with "an analysis of linguistic content" or "a description of a series of ... objects, which is to say, of a
part of extralinguistic reality". The authors. maintain that although Pottier
begins his analysis by considering the objects as such, and the real-world

CognWve Semantics and Structural Semantics 43

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

features that distinguish them, he proceeds to eliminate the linguistically irrelevant features, thereby arriving at the (linguisticaIly) "pertinent features".
Still, it is legitimate to ask what these "pertinent features" are supposed to
be, if not the necessary and sufficient features of check-list theories.
For discussion of high and tall, see Dirven and Taylor (1988) and Taylor
(in press b).
Cf. Coseriu (1977: 10): "Poser l'existence des units fonctionneIles ne signifie nuIlement qu'on n'admette dans chaque cas qu'une seule 'signification' (= acception), mais au contraire qu'on s'efforce justement de dfinir
les limites, donnes par la langue, a I'intrieur desqueIles une infmit d'acceptions peuvent se prsenter." [To postulate the existence of functional
units by no means entails that we aIlow, in each case, only one 'signification', or reading; rather, we attempt to circumscribe the limits, set by the
language system, within which an infinity of readings are possible.] (Note
that in this passage, "signification" appears to be used in the sense of "designation", while ''unit fonctionneIle" corresponds to my"signification".)
For sorne observations, see Taylor (1995: 223ss.).
Particularly influential has been Brugman' s (1981) analysis of over, sub sequently elaborated by Lakoff (1987).
In Taylor (1996), I argued, within the Cognitive Grammar framework, for a
unitary, schematic account of the possessive morpheme in English, and
against the adequacy of prototype accounts.
Sirnilarly, for many grammatical categories, it would be fruitless to search
for a unitary phonological representation. In this connection, it is noteworthy that while Jakobson (1936) insisted on the methodological necessity to
assign a constant, albeit highly abstract, semantic value to each of the Russian cases (otherwise, he argued, the linguistic sign would fracture into numerous fonn-meaning relationships), he was quite unperturbed by the absence of a unique phonological representation for each of the cases. If the
absence of a unique representation can be tolerated with regard to signifiers, one wonders why polysemy should be outlawed with signifieds?
Coseriu notes that the phenomenon is not unknown in other languages, cf.
Gennan steigen. Or consider the English verb grow. His debts grow day by
day would be understood to mean that his debts get bigger (Le. that they
grow "upwards"). (The example is mine, not Coseriu's.) But it is equaIly
possible to defeat the default interpretation: His debts are growing smaller
day by day. Coseriu would probably argue, therefore, that "upward motion"
is not intrinsic to the semantics of grow - the word "reaIly" means 'change
in the vertical extent of an entity'. However, still other uses, e.g. The sound
01 the music grew less as the band marched away (LDCE) suggest an even
more schematic sense, i.e. 'become', 'change in state'. But now, the seman-

44 Jo.hn R. Taylor

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

tic content of grow has become so impoverished, that it is scarcely possible

to differentiate the word from other change-of-state verbs, such as become.
It is noteworthy that in addressing the linguistic value of c1imb, Coseriu
proceeds by abstracting what is common to a range of specific uses. Curiously, he fails to implement what is surely the central idea of a structuralist
semantics, namely, the possibility of semantic contrasts between c1imb and
other items in the same lexical field.
But note that metonymic extensions are not based on similarity at aH, but on
contiguity (within a conceptual domain). The development of English bead
had nothing at all to do with the "similarity", at any level of abstraction, between a prayer and a spherical object on a string.
Cf. Coseriu (1977: 17): "Les units fonctionnelles correspondent d'une faIfon immdiate a des intuitions globales unitaires." [Functional units correspond immediately to global unitary irituitions.]
No doubt, the use of mouse to refer to the computer gadget, was once a "categorizacin de emergencia". Now, however, mouse is the standard termo
(What else is one to call the thing?) Do we therefore say that the "value" of
mouse as a name for the small mammal has changed? Surely not. Mouse
has simply acquired an additional meaning, and the two meanings (which
are related in a fairly transparent way) happily coexist.
Structuralism is not the only conceivable alternative to a conceptualist semantics. On a behaviourist semantics, knowledge of a word resides in following the rules for using the word correctly. This is the essence of Wittgenstein's (1978: 43) aphorism that "the meaning of a word is its use in
the language".
The notion of''theories'' can help explain the conundrum touched on at the
beginning of this section, viz., by what right can we base a theory of language on such irredeemably, subjective entities as "concepts"? One answer
is, that each of us attributes to other people a mental life (replete with
"concepts") which is very much of a kind with our own, precisely on the
basis of a "theory" that other human beings function in much the same way
as we do. Cf. Fodor (1980).

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