1. ESALYN CHAVEZ vs. HON.

EDNA BONTO-PEREZ
G.R. No. 109808 (March 1, 1995)
FACTS: Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement &
Promotions Corporation to perform in Japan for 6 months. The contract was
for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA. After the approval of said
contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary with her
Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents
Promotion). The salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz
Talents. In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract),
Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of
wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered
into by Chavez with her Japanese employer superseded the Standard
Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of such side agreement
being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping on her right
for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by
Chavez to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot
supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with
the following stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment
Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for
Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract
without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void for
violating the POEAs minimum employment standards, and for not having
been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum Placement and Jaz
Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim
well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set
forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this reason, laches is not
applicable.

2. JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY

INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120095
August 5, 1996
FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing
artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an
Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel,
abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual
rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court
ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid
exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments
which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order
enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The
welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount
in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new
scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing
artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be
gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
3. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. HON.
UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPANOL
G.R. No. 155903 (September 14, 2007)
FACTS: The petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp)
appeals by certiorari the April 30, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53747 and the November 5, 2002 Resolution2
denying its reconsideration.

Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement3 with
Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed
private respondent
Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the
Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs vessel.
LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect on
December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the
Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation as the new manning
agency of LCL with the (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground that its
accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996.
Pending approval of the accreditation, two (2) principals of LCL arrived in the
Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps
office. Rizal reported LCLs recruitment activities to the POEA on December
9, 1996, and requested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.
On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and
found the two (2) principals C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting. The
Inspection Report signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned
by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to the
POEA.
On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint6 for illegal recruitment,
cancellation or revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F.
Sharp with the POEA
For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that the two principals conducted interviews
at C.F. Sharps office, but denied that they were for recruitment and selection
purposes but for LCLs ex-crew members who had various complaints
against Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team
claiming that it simply stated that interviews and recruitment were
undertaken, without reference to who were conducting the interview and for
what vessels.
The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for
illegal recruitment and ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months or in
lieu thereof, it is ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00 for violation of Art. 29 of
the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Sec. 6(b), Rule II, Book II of the
Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment in accordance with
the schedule of penalties. Further, the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby
ordered suspended for another period of [eighteen] (18) months or to pay the
fine of P180,000.00 for committing 9 counts of violation of Article 29 of the
Labor Code as amended in relation to Sec. 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules
and Regulations governing Overseas Employment.

C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrators ruling to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), but the AFFIRMED the decision.
A supersedeas bond was posted by the CF Sharp for payment of the fines as
imposed above should the CF Sharp opt to pay the fine instead of
undergoing suspension of its license. However, the suspension shall remain
in force until such fine is paid, or in the event that the petitioner-appellant
further appeals this Order.
C.F. Sharps motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5,
1999 by the then Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,
It elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, DOLE Resolution,
this Court referred the petition to the CA.
The CA denied C.F. Sharps petition for certiorari, holding that C.F. Sharp
was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labors ruling because
it had manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the
alternative fines imposed upon it. By paying the adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp
effectively executed the judgment, the CA also agreed with the POEA
Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that LCL, along with C.F. Sharp,
undertook recruitment activities without authority.. Finally, it affirmed both
labor officials finding that C.F. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code
and Section 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry
Desiderio as agent, without prior approval from the POEA. Thus, the
appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within his
discretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment.
C.F. Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on
November 25, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment.
HELD:
C.F. Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December 1996.
It posits that the interviews undertaken by the LCL principals do not amount
to illegal recruitment under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the
Migrants Workers Act. Further, it contends that the interviews conducted
were not for selection and recruitment purposes, but were in connection with
the seamens past employment with Rizal, specifically, their complaints for
non-remittance of SSS premiums, withholding of wages, illegal exactions
from medical examinations and delayed allotments. It claims that it was only
upon approval of its application for accreditation that the employment
contracts were entered into and actual deployment of the seamen was made.

C.F. Sharp, thus, concludes that it cannot be held liable for illegal
recruitment.

offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration

of a fee.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to
portray - the conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.
This Office cannot conceive of a good reason why LCL should be interested
at the time in unearthing alleged violations committed by Rizal Shipping
whose representative status as manning agency was to be terminated in just
a few weeks thereafter, spending valuable time and money in the process.
They stood to gain nothing from such taxing exercise involving several
hundreds of ex-crew members, which could be handled by government
agencies like the POEA, NLRC, SSS. The observation of the POEA
Administrator that the complaints of the crewmen were filed only after Rizal
Shipping filed its complaints with the POEA merely to bolster the defense of
CF Sharp, is telling and was just an afterthought.

ISSUE:

4. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis

GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990
FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein
private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and
expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate
individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be
charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or
more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a
fee.
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the
Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In
the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute
recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should
involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more
persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an

Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or
guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four
information filed against private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a
presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide
an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment
to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The
words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.
5. Darvin v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125044 (July 13, 1998)
FACTS: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo
who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit
workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection
thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly
intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment.
HELD: Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and
placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner,

offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be

deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

had the capacity to send the victims abroad for employment. We quote its
version of the facts as follows:

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Melchor Degsi and

Perpetua Degsi (Complainants for brevity) and Priscilla Marreo (or Priscilla
Marelo).

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated

under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant,
two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must
have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not
have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accusedappellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave
the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent
work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent
gave accused-appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for
another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities.
Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that
appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to
create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But
suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof
beyond reasonable doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably
prove the accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then
it is the Courts duty, and the accuseds right, to proclaim his innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her
confinement.
6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS,
[G.R. Nos. 145734-35. October 15, 2002]
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates how appellants, despite
their lack of authority or license, represented themselves as persons who

The prosecution and appellants stipulated that appellants are not licensed or
authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad, in lieu of the testimony
of Senior Labor Researcher Johnson Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
Complainants are husband and wife, residents of Baguio City. They made a
living earning an average of P20,000.00 a month by selling fish and
vegetables in a rented stall in said City, at least until March 24, 1998 when
they closed shop for reasons of attending to the demands of the promised
jobs for them in Japan. Both categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or Jean
Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City Market, as the person who
approached them and assured them that she knew a legal recruiter, an exPOEA employee, who had the capacity to send them both abroad. Jane Amamlaw (or Am-amlaw for brevity) recruited complainants and personally
accompanied them on March 24, 1998 to meet the person she earlier
referred to, or Aida de Leon (or Alma de Leon), in the latters apartment at
No. 7280 J. Victor St., Pio del Pilar, Makati.
Complainants likewise categorically identified Aida de Leon (de leon for
brevity) as the person who arranged a meeting in her apartment on March
24, 1998 between complainants and appellant Angel Mateo (Mateo for
brevity) whom de Leon introduced as their contact person for Japan-bound
workers. In said meeting, Mateo represented himself as having the capacity
to send people abroad and showed complainants various documents to
convince them of his legitimate recruitment operations. Convinced that Mateo
had indeed the capacity to facilitate their employment as an office worker and
as a cook or mechanic in Japan, complainants, on that same day, handed
Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo required them to pay for their processing
fees. This was to be the first of a series of sums of money to be extracted
from complainants.
Complainants were able to positively identify Mateo in court as the contact
person of de Leon and who collected from them, from March 24, 1998 to
June 23, 1998, sums of money for the alleged necessary expenses relative
to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan in the total amount of
P158,600.00. Complainants likewise categorically identified Mateo as the
same person whose authorization was needed for the recovery of
P40,000.00 of the P45,000.00 they gave Mateo who in turn deposited it to
Sampaguita Travel Agency under his own name.

Complainants likewise positively identified appellant Vicenta Vicky Lapis

(Lapis for brevity) in Court as the person introduced to them by Mateo as his
wife on April 29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when Lapis required
complainants to pay P49,240.00 for their plane tickets and travel taxes. Lapis
is, in fact, only the live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis told complainants that she
was helping to speed up the process[ing] of their papers relative to the
promised jobs awaiting them in Japan.
Complainants met again Lapis, who was with Mateo on May 2, 1998 at the
Makati Restaurant, annex of Maxs Restaurant, when Lapis assured them
that Mateo could really send them abroad and even wrote in a piece of paper
appellants address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk 13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite.
On May 17, 1998, complainants once more met Lapis who was with Mateo,
de Leon and de Leons husband in Baguio City at the house of Priscilla
Marreos daughter. Both appellants updated complainant as to the status of
their paper and reiterated their promise that complainants would soon be
leaving for Japan, then collected from complainants unreceipted amount of
P20,000.00. Complainants met again with Lapis, who was again with Mateo,
on May 19, 1998 at the Sampaguita Travel Agency. Mateo extracted
P45,000.00 from complainants and deposited it under his name. On that
occasion, Perpetua wanted to ask from the Sampaguita Travel Agencys
employees where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so because Lapis
took her attention away from asking while Mateo asked Melchor to hand over
to him said sum.
Priscilla Marreo (Priscilla for brevity) is the sister of Melchor who loaned
complainants part of the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from
complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself present in most of the meetings
between complainants and appellants together with the two other accused
where she witnessed the assurances and promises made by appellants
relative to complainants immediate departure for Japan and their
corresponding demands of sums of money. The testimony of Priscilla
underscored the testimony of complainants showing that Am-amlaw, de
Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed corroborated and confederated in the
commission of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented documentary evidence, such as varied unofficial
receipts all bearing the signature of Mateo; Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Perpetua L. Degsi executed on July 21, 1998; Affidavit executed by
complainants on July 21, 1998; Requirement for Guarantee Letter of Visa
bearing the names of both private complainants; Request for Certification of
POEA-CIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch
of POEA as represented by Johnson Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of
POEA, and the various documents that complainants alleged to have been
shown to them by Mateo to prove the legality of his recruitment operations.
(Citations omitted)

Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they were engaged in recruitment
activities, and that they promised foreign employment to the victims. Below is
the version of the facts presented by the defense:
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the live-in partner of her coaccused Mateo. They have been living together for almost three (3) years.
According to her, she first met both complainants at Maxs Restaurant in
Makati when they talked to accused Mateo. She was there only to
accompany her live-in partner. The subject of the conversation between the
complainants and accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio City. She did not
see complainant deliver money to accused Mateo while they were in that
meeting. She also has no knowledge about the transaction between
complainant and accused Mateo. She admitted that she went to Baguio City
together with accused Mateo to talk to the City Mayor. She likewise admitted
that the handwriting appearing in Exhibit F is hers but the reason why she
gave it was only to comply to the request of the complainant Perpetua Degsi
regarding a matter to be followed up at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). The result of her follow-up rendered was that complainant Perpetua
Degsi has a pending case of estafa.
ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the importation of heavy
equipment and containers but he has never been engaged in recruitment. To
prove that he was really engaged in the delivery of heavy equipment, he
presented a document of Import Service signed by a certain Alexander Arcilla
addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr., City Mayor, Cavite City dated
March 14, 1997 and were marked as Exhibit 1 and 1-a. He also presented
another document of Import Services issued by the Department of Trade and
Industry addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as Municipal Mayor of Imus,
Cavite; a photocopy of a Bill of Lading from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc.; and Invoice of used vehicles, airconditioners and
washing machines and the packing list which were all marked as Exhibits 3
to 5.Sometime in March 24, 1998, he met the complainants at Pio del Pilar, in
Makati City at the apartment of accused Aida de Leon. He went there to
follow-up their transaction about heavy equipment with Mayor Binay
because, it was accused de Leon who entered the transaction with Mayor
Binay. While he was there, the complainants were introduced to him by
accused de Leon. He admitted meeting the complainants on April 29, 1998 at
Maxs Restaurant but the reason was for him to meet Mrs. Marero in person
and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending case for large
scale estafa and she needed a clearance. He denied having signed Exhibit
B. He further claimed that the topic of their meeting was to supply heavy
equipment in Baguio City. He denied having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6,
1999. He likewise denied signing the receipt showing the total amount of
P158,600.00.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court held that the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently
established the criminal liability of appellants for the crimes charged.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) committed by a
syndicate
HELD: Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1)
the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2)
the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement[15] defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated
in Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers[;] and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. In the simplest
terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from
the government, give the impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes.
We believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
offense sufficiently. The case records reveal that appellants did in fact
engage in recruitment and placement activities by promising complainants
employment in Japan. Undisputed is the fact that the former did not have any
valid authority or license to engage in recruitment and placement activities.
Moreover, the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the prosecution clearly show that, in consideration of their promise of foreign
employment, they indeed received various amounts of money from
complainants totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning their purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process,
collected from complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees,
the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.[18] In
fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent
themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to send workers
abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have
the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the
latter to tender payment of fees.

It is also important to determine whether illegal recruitment committed by

appellants can be qualified as a syndicated illegal recruitment or an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage when it is committed by
a syndicate or carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring
and confederating with one another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with each other in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under Article 38(b) of the Labor
Code.
In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4) accused -- Jane Am-amlaw,
Aida de Leon, Angel Mateo and Vicenta Medina Lapis participated in a
network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the various
phases of the recruitment scam formed part of a series of machinations.
Their scheme was to lure complainants to Manila and to divest them of their
hard-earned money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The
prosecution evidence shows that complainants were convinced by Jane Amamlaw to go to Manila to meet someone who could find employment for them
abroad. Upon reaching the city, they were introduced to Aida de Leon and
Angel Mateo; Mateo claimed to have the contacts, the resources and the
capacity to employ them overseas. After that initial meeting, complainants
made several payments to him, supposedly for the processing requirements
of their deployment to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina Lapis who
volunteered her assistance in the processing of their employment papers and
assured them that Mateo could easily send them abroad.
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all
the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted
in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another,
indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed.
The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and in line with People v. Yabut,
[26] that complainants are entitled to recover interest on the amount of
P118,000, which the trial court awarded from the time of the filing of the
Information until fully paid. We agree with the OSGs observation and hereby
grant the legal interest on the amount prayed for.
In a number of cases,[27] this Court has affirmed the trial courts finding that
victims of illegal recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the amount to be

recovered as indemnity, from the time of the filing of the information until fully
paid.
7. PEOPLE VS CHUA
GR No. 128280 APRIL 4, 2001
FACTS: Chua was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale for recruiting and promising work in
Taiwan to 9 people, without a license. According to Chua, she received a call
from Taiwan informing her that some people were needed so she called
several people and collected money but the placement in Taiwan never
materialized. The POEA issued a certification that Chua was not licensed to
recruit persons/ workers for overseas employment. Chua argues that she
had an approved application for a service contractors authority.
But the records show that she failed to comply with post licensing
requirements.
ISSUE: WON Chua was licensed to recruit workers for overseas work.
HELD: The SC held that Chua wasnt licensed to perform recruiting activities.
The records show that the license was not issued due to her failure to comply
with post-licensing requirements. It is the issuance of the license which
makes the holder thereof authorized to perform recruitment activates. The
law specifically provides that every license shall be valid for at least 2
years from the date of issuance unless sooner cancelled or revoked by the
Secretary. Chua admitted herself that she wasnt licensed when she replied
to the Taiwan Company.
8. PEOPLE VS MERIS
GR NO. 11745-7447MARCH 28, 2000
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of illegal recruitment
in large scale and estafa. She contends that her conviction was erroneous
because the court never acquired jurisdiction over her person, as her arrest
was illegal, and that the prosecution failed to establish estafa.
ISSUE: WON Accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment
HELD: YES. Accused-appellants contention that she was a mere applicant
and eventually a victim like complainants holds no water. Note should be
made of the fact that throughout the trial of the case, no mention was made
that accused-appellant exerted any effort to seek a refund for her money nor
did she file a case against Julie Micua, her alleged victimizer. Her only
excuse was that at the time of the filing of the complaint in Manila, she was
confused and the investigating officer would not listen to her side of the

controversy. Moreover, accused-appellant and her husbands acts of

receiving almost all the payments of the complainants and issuing receipts
signed by Julie Micua contradict her claim of being a mere applicant. There
were even times that accused-appellant herself signed the receipts for the
placement fees.
Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that accused-appellant conspired and
actively participated in the deceitful plan adopted by her co-accused Julie
Micua, Rico Cordova and her own husband, Renato Meris, to hire without
license or authority, gullible and nave applicants for non-existent overseas
jobs.
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMINA ANGELES Y
CALMA
G.R. No. 132376 (April 11, 2002)
FACTS:
Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when
she received a call from her sister, Priscilla Agoncillo, who was in Paris,
France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippines and await the
arrival of her friend, accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in
processing her travel and employment documents to Paris, France. Heeding
her sisters advice, Maria immediately returned to the Philippines. Marceliano
Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions
from his sister Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who will also assist in the
processing of his documents for Paris, France.
Maria and Marceliano eventually met accused-appellant. During their
meeting, accused-appellant asked if they had the money required for the
processing of their documents. Maria gave P107,000.00 to accusedappellant at Expert Travel Agency. Subsequently, she gave another
P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 as additional payments to accused-appellant.
Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accusedappellant and he gave an additional P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 at the
United Coconut Planters Bank in Makati.
Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn was
working in Canada but she went to Belgium to visit her in-laws. After meeting
accused-appellant, Analyn Olpindo called up her sister, Precila Olpindo, in
the Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the latters
arrival in the Philippines because accused-appellant can help process her
documents for employment in Canada. Precila Olpindo eventually met
accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency. Accused-appellant asked for
the amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give $2,500.00.
No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since
she did not testify in court.

Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that it was easier to
complete the processing of their papers if they start from Jakarta, Indonesia
rather than from Manila. Precila Olpindo, Vilma Brina and accused-appellant
flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. However, accused-appellant returned to the
Philippines after two days, leaving behind Precila and Vilma. They waited for
accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never returned. Precila and Vilma
eventually came home to the Philippines. They started looking for her but
they could not reach her.
Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
presented a certification to the effect that accused-appellant was not duly
licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.
In her defense, accused-appellant averred that she never represented to the
complainants that she can provide them with work abroad. She insisted that
she was a marketing consultant and an international trade fair organizer. She
met Priscilla Agoncillo in France and they became friends. Priscilla asked her
to assist her siblings, Maria and Marceliano, particularly in the processing of
their travel documents for France. Accused-appellant told Priscilla that she
can only help in the processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was
Priscilla who promised employment to Maria and Marceliano. She received
money from complainants not in the form of placement fees but for the cost
of tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements. She has the
same defense for Analyn Olpindo whom she met in Belgium.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment and four (4) counts of estafa. The case was elevated to the Court
of Appeals.
Accused-appellant alleged that she never promised nor offered any job to the
complainants.She pointed out that not one of the complainants testified on
what kind of jobs were promised to them, how much they would receive as
salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their
employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first
determine.
ISSUE: Whether or not Angeles is guilty with four (4) counts of estafa and
one (1) count of illegal recruitment
RULING:
1.) Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: 1) that the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and 2) that the

offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34.
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant
gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to
send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed.4 To be engaged in the practice
of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise
or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether
locally or abroad.
Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants
jobs abroad. Hence, accused-appellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully
convicted of illegal recruitment.
2.) Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly,
these elements are present in this case.
Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that
she could find employment for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them
believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and
Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would
use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel
requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, Samina
Angeles used it for other purposes and then conveniently disappeared.
Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them by
their own relatives. She abused their confidence when she led them to
believe that she can process their travel documents abroad, thus inducing
them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their travel
documents, she failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return the
amounts entrusted to her.
Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to
possess the power and capacity to process their travel documents.

P107,000.00 Maria; 190,00 Marceliano; 61,200- Precila. WHEREFORE,

in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED.
10. Manuela S. Catan/M.S. Catan Placement Agency v. The
NLRC and Francisco Reyes
G.R. No. 77279 (April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fah
dShabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm recruited private respondent
Francisco D. Reyes towork in Saudi Arabia. The term of contract is for one
(1) year, however, the contract provided for automatic renewal. Said contract
was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by
hi Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant
operator. On March 30, 1983 while he was working as a crusher plant
operator, his ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating. On
May 15, 1983 after expiration of renewed term, private respondent returned
to the Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights
Medical Center for which he incurred expenses. On September 9, 1983, he
returned to Saudi and resume to his work and on May 15,1984, he was
repatriated. And upon his return, he had ankle treated for which he incurred
further expenses. Private respondent filed a claim against Catan placement
agency on the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the
employer shall compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently
disabled in the course of employment.
POEA rendered judgment in favor of the complainant. Ordering the
respondent placement agency to pay SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY FIVE and 60/100 (P7, 985.60), TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINTY
SIX 20/100 (P29, 096.20) and 10% for attorneys fees. On appeal,
respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to privat
erespondent, since the time he was injured his original contract had already
expired?
HELD: Yes, Catan Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private
respondent. Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to
have expired on May 14, 1982as it was automatically renewed since no
notice of its termination was given by either or bothparties at a month
before its termination. As stipulated in their contract. M.S. Catan Agency was
at the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial
disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal,
foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility

over the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service

contract and the welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still
existed, the contract of employment in question not having expired yet.
This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not co-terminus with the term of such agreement so that if either
or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do
not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to
the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very
purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign
jobs abroad was enacted.
11. SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO
G.R. NO. 81510 (14 MAR 1990)
FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the
POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty.
Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the
POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing
that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure
Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to
implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and
Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the
order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the
return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated
against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure
(or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

HELD: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of

arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and
prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme
Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The
power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the
sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in
the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and
void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the
Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the
implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

respondent Secretary of Labor who issued a decision ordering cancellation of

petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no
showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone
would redound to the national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental
Motions for Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting
Secretary of Labor. Petitioners elevated the case before the Court on a
Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is
an employer's prerogative has no legal basis at all. Under Article 40 of the
Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain
an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right
to choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement
of an alien employment permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code is null and void as it is in violation of the
enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to
determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
RULING:

12. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY

CONE vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES
G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment
issued Alien Employment Permit in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a
United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner
General Milling Corporation ("GMC").
Petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby
the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.The Board of Special
Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved
petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from
temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee. Petitioner GMC requested
renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also requested
that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional
Director granted the request. Alien Employment Permit valid until 25
December 1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines
("BCAP") appealed the issuance of said alien employment permit to the

Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides as

follows:
Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may
issue an employment permit to the applicant based on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of
Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of
any person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for
which the services of the applicant are desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will
redound to the national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate
government agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of
investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic development;
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking
admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or

foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the

Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the
applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in
the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which the alien is desired.
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said
employment permit may be issued upon recommendation of the government
agency charged with the supervision of said registered enterprise. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized
to take into account the question of whether or not employment of an alien
applicant would "redound to the national interest" because Article 40 does
not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems
impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the
national interest is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place,
the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he employment permit may be
issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services
for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the
Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of
discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12

of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of
Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority
and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code,
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved
manpower training, allocation and utilization;
xxx xxx xxx
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking
work in conformity with the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the
national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a
registration and/or work permit system;
Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law
too insubstantial to require further consideration.
Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent
Secretary of Labor has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an
Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek to withdraw their
Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for
lack of merit.