Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A CLT does not automatically grant a tenantfarmer absolute ownership of the covered
landholding. Under PD No. 27, land transfer is
effected in two stages: (1) issuance of the CLT
to the tenant-farmer in recognition that said
person is a deemed owner; and (2) issuance
of an Emancipation Patent (EP) as proof of full
ownership upon the tenant-farmers full
payment of the annual amortizations or lease
rentals.
As a preliminary step, therefore, the issuance
of a CLT merely evinces that the grantee
thereof is qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of
the land tilled by him, as provided under P.D.
No. 27. The CLT is not a muniment of title that
vests in the tenant-farmer absolute ownership
of his tillage. It is only after compliance with
the conditions which entitle the tenant-farmer
to an EP that the tenant-farmer acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the
landholding. Stated otherwise, the tenantfarmer does not acquire full ownership of the
covered landholding simply by the issuance of
a CLT. The tenant-farmer must first comply
with the prescribed conditions and procedures
for acquiring full ownership but until then, the
title remains with the landowner. Heirs of
Teresita Montoya, et al. v. National Housing
Authority, et al., G.R. No. 181055, March 19,
2014.
Land registration; Classification of land;
evidence of a positive act from the government
reclassifying the lot as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public
domain. Accordingly, jurisprudence has
required that an applicant for registration of
title acquired through a public land grant must
present incontrovertible evidence that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable by establishing the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. Sps. Antonio
FAMILY LAW
Adultery of a woman.
Explain.
Answer: No. The alien spouse can claim no
right under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code as the substantive right
established is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
As held in Van Dorn v. Romillo, G.R. No. L68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139 and
Pilapil v. Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30,
1989, 74 SCRA 653:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws,
[the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still
subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot
be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.
The provision was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. The
capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry,
however, depends on whether the foreign
divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to
do so. Without the second paragraph of Article
Sheriff.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff
the supposed exemption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public
action, they now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later
claiming the said exemption. (De Mesa v.
Acero, et al., G.R. No. 185064, January 16,
2012, Reyes, J).
A child must establish filiation before
support may be granted.
Q Petitioner filed a petition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary protection order
against the respondent for alleged woman
and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked
for financial support. She alleged that
respondent is the father of her child. He
denied being the father of the child and that
the signature appearing in the child
Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that there is no prior judgment
establishing the filiation of the child hence,
there is no basis to order support. Is the
dismissal correct? Why?
DONATION
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Statute of frauds is inapplicable if oral
compromise has been performed.
Q The property of the respondent was
declared condemned for public use to expand
the Lahug International Airport. On appeal,
there was a compromise to stop the
respondent from pursuing with the appeal,
but with an oral assurance that if the
purpose would not be pursued, the property
would be resold to him. The public use was
not pursued, hence, there was a demand for
the resale of the property, especially so that it
has been converted to a commercial area, but
the petitioner contended that it is not bound
by the oral assurance that it would be resold,
using the Statute of Frauds as defense. Is the
defense proper? Why?
Answer: No. The Statute of Frauds operates
only with respect to executory contracts, and
does not apply to contracts which have been
completely or partially performed. The reason
is that, in executory contracts there is a wide
ESTOPPEL
Tenant cannot deny the title of the lessor
due to estoppel; exception.
Q There was a contract of lease over a
property but the lessor did not inform the
lessee that there was a mortgage over the
property subject of the lease contract. For
failure of the lessor to pay the loan, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and eventually the
property was transferred to the bank. For
failure to pay the rentals, demand was made
to pay and vacate, but the lessee contended
that since the lessor was no longer the
owner, he had not right to sue for ejectment.
The lessor contended that the lessee is
stopped from questioning the title of the
lessor. Is the contention of the lessee correct?
Explain.
Answer: Yes. The conclusive presumption
found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court known as estoppel against tenants
provides the tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. The rule is not absolute.
What a tenant is estopped from denying x x x
at that price.
Not even the avowed public welfare or the
constitutional priority accorded to education,
invoked by petitioner PUP in
the Firestone case, would serve as license for
the Court, and any party for that matter, to
destroy the sanctity of binding obligations.
While education may be prioritized for
legislative and budgetary purposes, it is
doubtful if such importance can be used to
confiscate private property such as the right of
first refusal granted to a lessee. (Polytechnic
Univ. of the Phils. v. Golden Horizon Realty
Corp., G.R. No. 183612; National Dev. Co. v.
Golden Horizon Realty Corp., G.R. No.
184260, March 15, 2010).
Prohibition against subleasing of land does
not include the building constructed by the
lessee.
Q In a lease contract over a parcel of land,
the agreement was that the lessee shall
establish a sports center and parking area to
ease the parking congestion at the Domestic
Airport. There was an exclusive option to
renew the contract of lease granted to the
lessee, but the lessor refused to renew on the
ground that it violated the prohibition
against subleasing of the premises. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, because the prohibition against
subleasing the premises refers only to the
subject property, the land. Being the builder of
the improvements on the subject property, said
improvements are owned by it until the turn
over to the lessor at the end of the contract.
The lessee was not leasing the improvements
from the lessor, thus; then it is not subleasing