Battle of the KorsunCherkassy Pocket

For the computer game with a similar name, see Decisive Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps DetachBattles of WWII: Korsun Pocket.
ment B[21] from the 8th Army were holding a salient in
the new Soviet line. The salient to the west of Cherkasy
The KorsunShevchenkovsky Oensive led to the Bat- extended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in
tle of the KorsunCherkasy Pocket which took place
from 24 January to 16 February 1944. The oensive the center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front to
its left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right. Marshal
was part of the DnieperCarpathian Oensive. In it,
the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respec- of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potentively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, trapped Ger- tial for destroying Whlers 8th Army with the Stalingrad
man forces of Army Group South in a pocket near the model as precedent and using similar tactics as were apDnieper River. During weeks of ghting, the two Red plied to defeat Pauluss encircled 6th Army. Zhukov recArmy Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encir- ommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) to
cled German units broke out in coordination with a re- deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored
lief attempt by other German forces, with roughly two rings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket folout of three encircled men succeeding in escaping the lowed by destruction of the forces it contained, and an expocket,[17] and almost one third of their men ... dead or ternal ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the
trapped units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein
prisoners.[18]
and others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units to
The Soviet victory in the KorsunShevchenkovsky Of- be pulled back to safety.
fensive marked the successful implementation of Soviet
deep operations. Soviet Deep Battle doctrine envisaged
the breaking of the enemys forward defences to allow
fresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough by
driving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. The
arrival of large numbers of U.S. and British built trucks
and halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had in the earlier portion of the war.[19] This,
coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations
in reserve gave the Soviets the ability to drive deep behind
German defenses again and again.[20] Though the Soviet
operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in the
German front that the Soviet command had hoped for,
it marked a signicant change in operations. Through A Soviet light tank carries men into battle
the rest of the war the Soviets would place large German
forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin General Konev held a conference at his headquarters
and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one at Boltushki on 15 January with his commanders and
commissars to pass on the orders received
crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet oensives were the hall- their political[22]
The initial attack was to be conducted
from
Stavka.
mark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.
by Konevs own 2nd Ukrainian Front from the southeast
by 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with 5th Guards
Tank Army to exploit penetrations supported by 5th Air
1 January 1944
Army, to be joined in progress by 52nd Army, 5th Guards
Cavalry Corps and 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, from
In the autumn of 1943, the German forces of Field Mar- Vatutins 1st Ukrainian Front, 27th and 40th Armies were
shal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South including to be deployed from the northwest, with 6th Tank Army
General Otto Whler's 8th Army had fallen back to the to exploit penetrations supported by 2nd Air Army.[23]
PantherWotan line, a defensive position that in Ukraine Many of these formations had received an inow of new
followed the Dnieper river. By 1 December 1943 the line personnel. Red Army planning further included extensive
had been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed the deception operations that the Soviets claimed were sucDnieper in force. Only two corps, the XI under Gen. cessful, however, the German 8th Army war diary shows
Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under clearly that the German stas were concerned with the
1

3 GERMAN RELIEF ATTACKS

threat at hand.[24]

Encirclement

The great expanse of Russia made controlling a front line difcult

he expected it. Konev wired: There is no need to

worry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not
escape.[29] Inside the pocket were nearly 60,000 men
from six German divisions, operating at about 55% of
their authorized strength, along with a number of smaller
combat units. Among the trapped German forces were
the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, with the attached
5th SS Infantry Brigade Wallonien, the Estonian SS infantry battalion Narwa, and several thousand Russian auxiliaries.[30] General Wilhelm Stemmermann, the
commander of XI Corps, was placed in command of
the forces in the pocket. These forces were designated Gruppe Stemmermann. The 5th SS Panzer Division, with some 11,400 personnel,[31] had 30 operational
Panzer III/IV tanks and assault guns left, and six more in
repair.[32] The division further had 47 artillery pieces, of
which 12 were self-propelled guns.[33]

3 German relief attacks

The Soviet attack started on 24 January when Konevs

2nd Ukrainian Front attacked the salient from the southeast. Breakthrough was quickly achieved, and the penetration was exploited by the 5th Guards Tank Army
and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps the following day.[25]
Despite the awareness of German 8th Armys sta that
an attack was imminent, they were surprised by the appearance of the 1st Ukrainian Fronts newly formed 6th
Tank Army.[26] The 6th Tank Army, with 160 tanks and
50 self-propelled guns,[27] was inexperienced and took
longer than expected to penetrate the western ank of the
salient. A mobile group from 5th Mechanized Corps
233rd Tank Brigade, under the command of General
Savelev, with 50 tanks and 200 sub-machine gun armed
infantrymen, occupied Lysyanka and moved into the outskirts of Zvenyhorodka by 28 January. Here, these troops
of the 6th Tank Army met the 2nd Ukrainian Fronts
20th Tank Corps. Over the next three days, the two
tank armies formed a thinly manned outer ring around
what was now the Korsun Pocket while another, inner,
ring was formed by the Soviet 27th, 52nd, and 4th Guard
Armies.[28]

The relief attempt begins. Tanks and halftracks of 1st Panzer

Division begin movements towards the pocket, early February
1944[34]

Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the III

and XLVII Panzer Corps were assembled for a relief effort. Hitler intervened, however, and ordered the attack
Sweeping Soviet advances that created the pocket.
be transformed into an eort to counter-encircle the two
The Soviets were optimistic over the progress of the op- Soviet army groups.
eration. Stalin was promised a second Stalingrad, and General Hermann Breith, commander of III Panzer

3
Corps requested the relief formations be united to attempt to force a corridor to the trapped Gruppe Stemmermann. This request was refused, and the counterencirclement of the Soviet forces was attempted. The attack by the XLVII Panzer Corps 11th Panzer Division on
the southeastern ank of the pocket quickly stalled. The
veteran division had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns operational, therefore its contribution was limited.[35] The
III Panzer Corps attempt continued until 8 February,
when it became undeniable that the eort had failed.[36]
Manstein ordered the corps to instead drive directly to
the relief of Gruppe Stemmermann. Pulling the III Panzer
Corps back and reorganizing for the new attack 15 kiloPanzer IVs carry infantry, January 1944
meters south of Boyarka took three days.[37]
On 11 February Breith began a push with the 16th and
17th Panzer Divisions driving toward the Gniloy Tikich
River. They initially made good progress. The 1st Panzer
Division and 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH covered the
northern ank of the drive. As they drove deeper into
the Soviet positions Zhukov ordered Vatutin to assemble
four tank corps with the goal of cutting o the attacking German spearhead.[38] The weather warmed, turning the roads to a soft mud and bogging down German
progress. Here the liabilities of Germanys wheeled vehicles became evident. The Soviet forces had been provided lend-lease U.S. built four-wheel and six-wheel drive
trucks. These were largely able to get through, whereas
German two-wheel-drive vehicles were not.[38]

Both antagonists realized that the Wehrmacht relief efforts had come to a critical stage. Despite heavy Soviet
propaganda inducements, very few German soldiers and
no Waen-SS men in the cauldron had surrendered.[43]
Zhukov thus decided to send parlementaires under a white
ag with surrender demands.[35] A Red Army lieutenant
colonel, translator and bugler arrived in an American
jeep and presented letters for both Stemmermann and
Lieb signed by Marshal Zhukov and Generals Konev and
Vatutin. The German ocer on headquarters duty, a
major at Corps Detachment B and a translator, received
the emissaries.[44] After cordial talks, refreshments and
a handshake, the Soviets departed without an answer
the answer would be in the form of continued, bitter
Konev issued orders for the 4th Guards Army and 5th
resistance.[45]
Guards Cavalry Corps to attempt to split the pocket on the
night of 56 February. The strike was to fall where the
two German corps bordered.[39] As ghting progressed
the Soviet goal became clear to Stemmermann and Lieb.
Stemmermann ordered the 5th SS Divisions armor to the
scene. Together with the 72nd Infantry Division the Soviet attack was brought to a halt, buying the defenders
time.[39] Red Army eorts were renewed between 710
February. This eort was hobbled by shortages in supply.
III Panzer Corps penetrations toward the Gniloy Tikich
River made the supply lines for Soviet formations such as
Vatutins 6th Tank Army much longer.[40] The Red Air
Force attempted to resupply some units, using the Po2 aircraft.[41] Despite supply diculties, units from the
2nd Ukrainian Front were able to close in on Korsun by
10 February, collapsing the pocket to an area of six by Ju 52s at Korsun aireld, Ju 87s in formation above (January
1944).
seven miles.[27]

Surrender demand and German

maneuver within the pocket

On 11 February, III Panzer Corps continued its drive east.

The exhausted force reached the Gniloy Tikich stream
and established a small bridgehead on the eastern bank.
III Panzer Corps could advance no further, Group Stemmermann would have to ght its way out.[42]

The German air force mounted an aerial resupply operation to both the encircled forces and the German
relief columns. On 28 January, the VIII Aviation
Corps (Fliegerkorps) began operations that eventually saw
the use of 832 transport aircraft, 478 bombers (from
which supplies were dropped at low altitude), 58 ghter
bombers, and 168 ghters. Over the course of the operation, only 32 transport aircraft, 13 bombers, and ve
ghters were lost.[10] After the Korsun aireld was abandoned on 12 February, deliveries had to be dropped in
by parachute. Fuel drums and ammunition crates were

5 BREAKOUT THROUGH HELLS GATE

dropped into snowbanks by transports ying just above

the deck.
The Luftwae eort succeeded in delivering 82,948 gallons of fuel and 868 tons of ammunition plus four tons of
medical supplies to the encircled forces and 325 tons of
ammunition, 74,289 gallons of fuel and 24 tons of food
to spearheads of the relief formations, as well as evacuating 4,161 wounded while the Korsun aireld remained
operational.[46] But even this eort had only met about
half (78 tons) of the daily requirements (150 tons) of the
encircled troops as estimated by the German 8th Army
headquarters.[10]
Stemmermann began withdrawing troops from the north Congestion on the road
side of the pocket, reorienting the thrust of the escape
direction, and attacking south to expand toward the recostly defensive ghting. 8th Army radioed Stemmerlief forces on the north bank of the Gniloy Tikich. The
mann:
frenetic maneuvering within the pocket confused the Soviets, convincing them that they had trapped the majorCapacity for action by III Panzer Corps limited
ity of the German 8th Army. The trapped forces were
by weather and supply situation. Gruppe Stemnow to capture the villages of Novo-Buda, Komarovka,
mermann must perform breakthrough as far as
Khilki and Shanderovka at the southwestern perimeter
the line ZhurzintsyHill 239 by its own eort.
of the pocket to reach a favorable jump-o line for the
There link up with III Panzer Corps.[53]
[47]
breakout.
On 11 February Major Robert Kstners 105th Grenadier
Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division captured NovoBuda in a night assault.[48] The following night Komarovka fell in similar fashion.[49] On the evening of 15
February the 105th Regiment again, using its last reserves
and with two assault guns, secured Khilki, defeating a Soviet counterattack supported by armor.[50] However, of
all the German divisions in the pocket, the 5th SS Panzer
Division did more than any other to ensure the continued
survival of Gruppe Stemmermann ...[51] Since the 5th SS
Division was the only truly mobile force inside the pocket,
the divisions tracked units were repeatedly shifted from
one end of the pocket to the other to shore up crumbling
lines.
The pocket had wandered south and half-way toward
its rescuers and rested on the village of Shanderovka. The
settlement was heavily defended by the Soviets; had been
captured by 72nd Infantry troops, was retaken by units
of the Soviet 27th Army and recaptured by the Germania regiment of 5th SS Panzer Division. By nightfall on
16 February, III Panzer Corps fought its way closer to
the encircled formations, the spearheads were now seven
kilometers from Group Stemmermann.[52]

Breakout through Hells Gate

The northward thrust toward the pocket by the III Panzer

Corps had been halted by Red Army determination, terrain, and fuel shortages. After several failed attempts
by German armored formations to seize and hold Hill
239 and advance on Shanderovka, Soviet counterattacks
by 5th Guards Tank Army forced III Panzer Corps into

The message did not specify that Zhurzintsy and the hill
were still rmly in Soviet handsa failure that caused
Group Stemmermann severe casualties during the German breakout of the pocket. Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb was
appointed by 8th Army to lead the breakout. Only seven
kilometers lay between Group Stemmermann and III
Panzer Corps, but in between Konev was in the process
of repositioning forces for a nal crushing attack which
would take place [on] 17 February.[54] His formidable
force of three armies the 4th Guards, 27th, 52nd ...
and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps surrounded the encircled German forces and elements of 5th Guards Tank
Army had recently been added ... with the most powerful
units, in particular armor, placed between Group Stemmermann and III Panzer Corps.[55][56] General Stemmermann elected to stay behind with a rearguard of 6,500
men, the remaining, combined strength of 57th and 88th
Infantry Divisions.[57] The pocket was now a mere 5 kilometers in diameter, depriving Stemmermann of room to
maneuver. Shanderovka, once seen as a gate to freedom,
now became known as Hells Gate.[58] The Red Army
poured intense artillery and rocket re on the area around
the encircled troops, with nearly every round nding a target. Sturmoviks of the Red Air Force bombed and strafed,
only infrequently challenged by Luftwae ghters. Various unit diaries described a scene of gloom, with res
burning caused by Soviet night bombing with incendiaries, destroyed or abandoned vehicles everywhere and
wounded men and disorganized units on muddy roads.
Ukrainian civilians were caught between the combatants.
On 16 February 1944, Field Marshal von Manstein, without waiting for a decision by Hitler, sent a radio message
to Stemmermann to authorize the breakout. It said simply:

5
Password Freedom, objective Lysyanka, 2300
hours.[59]

Corps brought its brigade of the new Joseph Stalin-2's to

the Korsun battleeld.[67] Konev ordered all available armor and artillery to attack the escaping units, cut them
into isolated groups and then destroy them piecemeal.[68]
The two blocking Soviet rie divisions, 206th Rie and
5th Guards Airborne, had been smashed by the German assault forces; without infantry support Soviet tanks
then red into the escaping formations from a distance.
With no anti-tank weapons in the eld, T-34s commenced to wade into unprotected support troops, headquarters units, stragglers and red-cross identied medical
columns.[69][70]
What followed was a scene illustrative of warfare at its
most savage:

The German breakout

With extreme reluctance, Stemmermann and Lieb decided to leave 1,450 non-ambulatory wounded at Shanderovka attended by doctors and orderlies.[60][61][62] The
troops then began to assemble at dusk into three leading
assault columns with Division Group 112 to the north,
5th SS Panzer Division to the south and 72nd Division
in the center with the reinforced 105th Regiment in the
rst echelon to provide the assault power.[63] By 2300
the 105th Regiment two battalions abreast started
moving ahead, silently and with bayonets xed. Onehalf hour later the force broke through the rst and soon
thereafter the second [Soviet] defense line.[64] All went
well for several battalions and regiments who reached
the German lines at Oktyabr by 0410. Major Kstner
and his 105th grenadiers reached friendly lines by cautiously approaching the forward position of Panthers of
1st Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, bringing their
wounded along and their heavy weapons, but losing the
trailing, horse drawn supply column to Soviet artillery.
The 105th entered Lysyanka at 0630.[65] On the opposite
front of the cauldron, General Stemmermann and his rear
guard held fast and thus assured the success of the initial
breakout.[66]
At the left ank column, a reconnaissance patrol returned
bearing grim news. The geographic feature Hill 239 was
occupied by Soviet T-34s of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
Despite eorts to capture Hill 239, the high ground remained in Soviet hands and had to be bypassed. The direction of the German retreat had to veer o to the south
toward the Gniloy Tikich River. When daylight arrived,
the German escape plan began to unravel. Very few armored vehicles and other heavy equipment could climb
the slippery, thawing hillsides and the weapons had to be
destroyed and abandoned after the last round of ammunition had been red.[66]
General Konev, now aware of the German breakout, resolved to keep his promise to Stalin not to let any Hitlerites or Fascists escape annihilation. Soviet intelligence, however, at this stage vastly overestimated the
armored strength of III Panzer Corps, and Konev therefore proceeded in force. At this time the 20th Tank

Under the yellow sky of early morning

and over ground covered with wet snow Soviet tanks made straight for the thick of the
column, ploughing up and down, killing and
crushing with their tracks. Almost simultaneously massed Cossack cavalry wheeled away
from the tanks to hunt down and massacre men
eeing for the refuge of the hills: hands held
high in surrender the Cossacks sliced o with
their sabres. The killing in this human hunt
went on for several hours and a new round
opened on the banks of the river Gniloy Tikich, where the survivors of the rst collision of
the German column with Soviet troops dragged
and fought their way.
John Erickson, in The Road to Berlin, p.
178.
Gruppe Stemmermann had paid a staggering price in casualties for the vagueness of the radio message that had
ordered the breakout from the pocket.
By mid-day, the majority of the now intermingled divisions had reached the Gniloy Tikich stream, turbulent
and swollen to a breadth of 15 meters and a depth of two
meters[31] by the melting snow. Despite the fact that the
1st Panzer Division had captured a bridge, and engineers
had erected another, the panicking men saw the river as
their only escape from the rampaging T-34s. Since the
main body was away and south of the bridgeheads, the
last tanks, trucks and wagons were driven into the icy
water, trees were felled to form makeshift bridges and
the troops oundered across as best as they could, with
hundreds of exhausted men drowning, being swept downstream with horses and military debris. Many others succumbed to shock or hypothermia. Groups of men were
brought across on lifelines fashioned from belts and harnesses. Others formed rafts of planks and other debris to
tow the wounded to the German side, at all times under
Soviet artillery and T-34 re. Gen. Lieb, after establishing a semblance of order at the banks throughout the afternoon, crossed the Gniloy Tikich swimming alongside
his horse.[71] When the 5th SS Panzer Division commander Herbert Gille attempted to form a human chain across

7 ASSESSMENT

the river, alternating between those who could swim and

plies of any kind, and his forward elements
those who could not, scores of men died when the chain
were unable to provide rations for the troops
broke. Several hundred Soviet prisoners of war, a troupe
emerging from the pocket. Thus I had to orof Russian women auxiliaries and Ukrainian civilians who
der the pocket force in its miserable condition
feared reprisals by the Red Army, also crossed the icy
to move on westward, while I requested supply,
waters.[72] Toward the end phase of the breakout, enevacuation of casualties by air, and the bringing
gineers had built several more bridges and rear guard
up of vehicles and weapons from the rear.
units of 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions crossed the river
General Theo-Helmut Lieb[71]
dry, including 20 [horse drawn] panje wagons with ...
about 600 wounded aboard.[73]
With German armoured reserves drawn to the Korsun
That so many reached the German lines at Lysyanka was Pocket, the Soviets struck Army Group South in two
due in great measure to the exertions of III Panzer Corps other sectors. The 13th and 60th Armies (General
as it drove in relief of Group Stemmermann. The cutting Vatutins 1st Ukrainian Front) advanced south of the
of the German
edge was provided by Heavy Armored Regiment Bke Pripiat' Marshes, capturing the remnants
[75]
XIII
Corps
at
the
Battle
of
Rovno
and
advancing to
(Schweres Panzer Regiment Bke), named for its commanLutsk.
To
the
south,
the
3rd
and
4th
Ukrainian
Fronts
der Lt.Col. Dr. Franz Bke. The unit was equipped with
(Generals
Malinovsky
and
Tolbukhin)
attacked
along
the
Tigers and Panthers and an engineer battalion with spe[12]
bend
of
Dnepr
River,
capturing
Kryvyi
Rih.
[74]
cialist bridging skills.
General Stemmermann was killed during the breakout
when his command car was red upon and hit by a Soviet
antitank gun.[76] General Lieb survived the war. General
6 Outcome
Vatutin was shot by Ukrainian Nationalist UPA insurgents on 29 February 1944 and died on 15 April 1944.[12]
The Red Army encirclement of CherkasyKorsun inThe commander of 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Konev,
icted serious damage on six German divisions, includwas made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his victory
ing the 5th SS Panzer Division. Though most of the men
at Korsun. Konev also survived the war.
escaped, they had to leave nearly all of their heavy equipment behind. These units had to be withdrawn, requiring rest and near complete re-equipping. The escaped
wounded were transported from collection points near 7 Assessment
Uman to rehabilitation areas and hospitals in Poland, and
were then sent on leave to their home towns.
In a U.S. Army brief written following the war, General
Lieb commented:
I assumed command of what was left of
Force Stemmermann. By now the situation
was the following: The 72nd and Wiking Divisions were completely intermingled. No longer
did they have any tanks, artillery, vehicles or
rations. Many soldiers were entirely without
weapons, quite a few even without footgear.
Neither division could be considered in any
way able to ght. One regiment of Task Force
B was intact and still had some artillery support. However, this regiment also had no vehicles and no rations left. All wounded, estimated at about 2,000, were being gradually
sheltered in the houses of Lisyanka, and later
were evacuated by air.
For lack of vehicles and fuel, III Panzer
Corps was unable to reinforce its units in the
area of Lisyanka and Oktyabr. The corps commander, with whom I conferred by telephone,
informed me that he had been forced to assume the defensive against heavy Russian attacks from the northwest in the area immediately west of Lisyanka. He had no extra sup-

Soviet forces in Ukraine, 1944

The battle around Korsun was a Soviet victory.[1][2][77]

The German forces became trapped, and as the pocket
collapsed the forces inside were forced to retreat through
gaps in the Soviet forces surrounding them, resulting in
signicant losses in men and tremendous losses in equipment. However the details of the battle make it clear that
both sides committed signicant mistakes.
Hitlers insistence on holding the exposed salient strongly
limited the options of German eld commanders.[78]
Once the Soviets had encircled the German forces, the
German relief eorts produced mixed results. The effectiveness of the German counterattack was limited by
Hitlers plan for splitting his strength to attempt a counter

7
envelopment. The XLVII Panzer Corps attacks were ineective due to the weakness of its divisions. Though
the III Panzer Corps was far more eective, the corps
wasted a week on a failed attempt to encircle the Soviet
forces.[37] When III Panzer Corps was nally given the
mission of driving to relieve Gruppe Stemmermann, the
Germans were unable to provide Bkes heavy tank regiment with adequate fuel supplies, leading Bke to stop
the advance on Hill 239 because one group of his tanks
had run out of fuel.[79] This logistical failure was compounded by the vagueness of the radio message to General Stemmermann ordering the breakout attempt. Hill
239 remained under Soviet control, resulting in signicant casualties among Stemmermann retreating force.
The Soviet performance was also beset by errors. Soviet
intelligence on German forces in the pocket was faulty
in overestimating their strength.[3] At the same time, the
Soviets underestimated German capability for a counterattack and had to hurriedly move more forces forward to
bolster the strength of their encircling rings.[80] The Soviet air force was unable to signicantly hinder the German aerial resupply eort.[10] Ultimately, the encircling
forces were unable to prevent a German breakout, allowing a signicant portion of the trapped Germans to escape. Given the initial circumstances of the battle, the
degree of Soviet losses makes clear that while the Soviets won at Korsun, it was a victory that came at a high
price.[1]

1944, ocial honors were given in Moscow to the 2nd

Ukrainian Frontbut not the 1st Ukrainian Front. ". .
. an unforgivable error of the part of the supreme commander" was Zhukovs unhappy verdict.[83]
On the part of the Germans, the counter-attack was depicted as a glorious success in which one group of brave
German soldiers freed their equally heroic comrades who
had been trapped in the pocket. General von Vormann,
who commanded the relief attempt of the XXXXVII
Panzer Corps, bitterly noted that The troops who took
part were astonished and unbelieving when they were
told they had won a great victory at Cherkassy in the
Ukraine in 1944. The German high command, however,
was relieved that so many troops were able to escape.
Even Adolf Hitler, who was known to launch into furious tirades over any reversal on the Eastern front, only
complained briey about the amount of equipment that
had to be left behind.[84]

One of the initial historiographical works on the ghting

at Korsun was a 1952 U.S. Army publication, DA Pamphlet 20234, Operations of Encircled Forces: German
Experiences in Russia. This work was written in the context of NATOs Cold War confrontation with the Soviet
Union, and authors were highlighting historical experience of the Wehrmacht that may have proven useful to
NATO forces had a war between the Soviet Union and
NATO broken out.[85] Like most of the English-language
works on the Eastern Front of this era, it was written from
German losses indicate that of the 60,000 men originally the German point of view.
inside the pocket, their number had shrunk to less than John Ericksons 1983 The Road to Berlin and David
50,000 by 16 February. 45,000 of these took part in the Glantzs 1995 When Titans Clashed covered events on the
breakout, resulting in 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063 entire Eastern Front from a German and Soviet perspecRussian auxiliaries breaking out unscathed. In addition tive, and also devoted several pages to the ghting in the
7,496 wounded reached the III Panzer Corps, with an Korsun Pocket. Erickson did not question Soviet claims
additional 4,161 wounded evacuated from the pocket by regarding German casualties, and Glantz questioned the
air. Left behind were a total of 19,000 dead, wounded, veracity of German claims regarding the total of escapees
captured or missing. Total casualties killed, wounded or from the pocket.[86] Glantz has also translated the Soviet
missing, were 31,000.[81] German documents list total es- General Sta Study on the Korsun Operation into English
capees as 40,423, including the wounded own out of the as The Battle for the Ukraine: the Red Armys Korsun'pocket and evacuated from Lysyanka.[82]
Shevchenkovkii Operation, 1944.
Soviet sources give total losses of 80,188 casualties for
the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, with 24,286 killed and
missing, and 55,902 wounded or sick. These losses were
incurred over the period of 24 January 17 February
1944.[6]

Propaganda and historiography

More recently, the 2002 work by U.S. Army historian

Douglas Nash, Hells Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy
Pocket, JanuaryFebruary 1944, took issue with Soviet claims that Korsun was another Stalingrad.[87] Similarly, the Swedish historians Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson disputed the assertions of the Soviet General Sta Study of the Korsun Operation in their 2008
work, The Korsun Pocket. The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944, using statements
to describe the sta study such as anything but accurate
and completely unreliable. Yet, both Nash and Zetterling/Frankson conclude that Korsun was a Soviet victory
even as all three authors took issue with Soviet characterizations of the battle.[1][2][88]

Both sides hailed the events at Korsun as a victory.

Marshal Konev claimed to have inicted 130,000 German casualties, an assertion the German ocial history
has dismissed as being in the realm of fantasy.[9] Soviet
historian Sergey Smirnov described the victory at Korsun
In 2007, Volume 8 of the German semiocial history of
as a Stalingrad on the Dnieper. Marshal Zhukov was
the war (The German Reich and the Second World War)
less pleased in his memoirs, noting that on 18 February

10

was published, and part of the work authored by KarlHeinz Frieser addressed the events at Korsun. This work
also doubts Soviet claims regarding the German casualties while discussing the situation of the German forces
in detail, using available data from the German archives.
However, while German casualties in this work are taken
from German archives, it bases its assessment of Soviet
AFV and gun losses (uncritically) on German wartime
claims.[89]

REFERENCES

[18] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 280

[19] Liddell-Hart 1970, pp. 664-665.
[20] Willmott 1984, p. 180.
[21] Corps Detachment B was organized as an infantry division with six infantry battalions and normal supporting divisional units. The unit had been formed from elements
contributed by the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions. Tessin, pp. 2627.

In 2011, May, author and historian Jean Lopez published, on Economica Edition (ISBN 2717860290, ISBN [22] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37
978-2717860290 )a book named Le chaudron de [23] Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 3739
Tcherkassy-Korsun ", which cover extensively this battle.
[24] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39

See also
Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket order of battle

[25] Glantz & House, p. 187

[26] The 6th Tank Army had been formed on 20 January 1944.
Dunn, Hitlers Nemesis
[27] Erickson, p. 177

10

References

[1] Nevertheless, the Soviet position, relative to the Germans, was stronger after the battle than before, so Korsun may be viewed as a Soviet victory, even though it was
bought at a considerably higher price than it ought to have
been. (Zetterling & Frankson, p. 298)
[2] Nash, p. 382
[3] Frieser, p. 397
[4] Frieser, p. 400
[5] Frieser, p. 399

[28] Erickson, p. 177; Glantz & House, p. 187; and Frieser,

p. 396
[29] Konev, Battles Hitler Lost, quoted in Nash, p. 200
[30] Nash, p. 27
[31] Frieser, p. 424
[32] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 335
[33] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 336; a total of 242 artillery
pieces were inside the pocket.
[34] Image description abbreviated from nearly same image in
Nash, p. 161
[35] Perrett, p. 167

[6] Krivosheev, p. 109

[36] Frieser, p. 354
[7] Numbers of Soviet AFVs, aircraft, and guns taken from
Frieser, p. 395

[37] Frieser, p. 402

[8] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 277

[38] Nash, p. 162

[9] Frieser, p. 416

[39] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180

[10] Frieser, p. 405

[40] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 184

[11] . . . .: ,
1970. (Anatoly Nikolayevic Grylev. Dniepr-CarpathKrym. Moskva. Nauka

[41] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 185

[12] Glantz & House, p. 188

[13] Erickson, p. 179
[14] Glantz & House, p. 298
[15] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 283 (citing The KorsunShevchenkovskii Operation, p. 41 and 52; Krivosheev, p.
109)

[42] Group Stemmermann essentially consisted of six divisions: 57th, 72nd, 88th, 389th divisions, Corps Detachment B (Division Group 112), all infantry formations with
no armored components; and the 5th SS Panzer Division
with the attached 5th SS Infantry Brigade and the Narwa
Battalion. The only units considered still capable of aggressive, oensive operations were 72nd Infantry and 5th
SS Divisions. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 20
234, pp. 1920)
[43] Nash, p. 194

[16] Frieser, p. 417

[44] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 22

[17] Nash, p. 366

[45] Nash, p. 198

[46] Nash, Appendix 8, p. 399

[79] Frieser, p. 404

[47] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 19

[80] Nash 1995, pp. 149150

[48] The regiments of this division were raised in the city of

Trier and the Mosel valley in western Germany

[81] Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 277278

[82] Nash, p. 398

[49] Nash, pp. 212214

[83] Frieser, p. 418
[50] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 245
[51] Nash, p. 369
[52] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 255
[53] Nash, p. 258
[54] Nash, p. 287
[55] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 244
[56] Nash, p. 296, map of disposition of forces during the
breakout

[84] Frieser, p. 419

[85] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 1
[86] Glantz & House, p. 188. In this work, Glantz is skeptical
of German accounts, writing Although German accounts
claim that 30,000 troops escaped, the Soviet version is far
more credible...
[87] There was no Stalingrad on the Dnieper, as the Soviets
claimed... (Nash, p. 382)

[64] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 27

[88] For example, U.S. Army historian Douglas E. Nash points

to Soviet claims as being exaggerated; e.g., the Soviet 5th
Cavalry Corps and 4th Guards Army claimed that they
had practically wiped out most of Wiking [on 6 February
1944], though this was not remotely close ... In fact, Wikings biggest battles in the pocket were yet to come (Nash,
p. 110). The Soviets claimed to have downed more than
329 aircraft during the aerial supply operation; that number would have been more planes than the Luftwae had
operational in its Korps area during this entire period and
should be regarded as an example of the degree of exaggeration to which the Soviets were prone. This would not
be the last wildly inated claim they would make (Nash,
p. 120).

[65] Nash, p. 300

[89] Frieser, pp. 394419

[57] Carell, p. 418

[58] Nash, p. 280
[59] Carell, p. 417
[60] Perrett, p. 168
[61] Nash, p. 283
[62] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 242
[63] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 257

[66] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 40

[67] Nash, p. 267. Editors note Soviet tank corps did not
have organic heavy (JS-2) tank brigades. Nash may be
referring to one of the independent heavy tank regiments
that were assigned to the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
[68] One such isolated group of stragglers from the Wallonien
brigade was set upon by a swarm of Cossacks [Carell,
p. 430]. The vengeful cavalry hacked at the escapees with
their sabers in an orgy of slaughter [Perrett, p. 169]
[69] Nash, p. 308
[70] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 267
[71] DA Pamphlet 20234, p. 31
[72] Carell, p. 430
[73] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 272
[74] Perrett, p. 169
[75] Haupt, pp. 211212
[76] Nash 1995, p. 132
[77] Nash 1995, pp. 3, 141142
[78] Frieser, p. 394

11 Bibliography
Armstrong, Richard N. Red Army Tank Commanders: The Armored Guards. Atglen, Pennsylvania:
Schier Publishing Ltd., 1994. ISBN 0-88740581-9.
Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth. New York: Ballantine
Books, 1971. ISBN 0-345-02213-0.
Department of the Army Pamphlet 20234. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in
Russia. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 1952.
Dunn, Walter S. Hitlers Nemesis The Red Army
19301945. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books,
2009.
Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1999.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz. Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg, Volume 8. Mnchen: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 2007. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.

10

13

Glantz, David & House, Jonathan M. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. ISBN
0-7006-0717-X

Gunners from Art.Rgt. 188, 88th Inf. Div. (description abbreviated from same image in Nash, p.
145)

Coordinates:
Haupt, Werner (1998). Army Group South: The
31.2772E
Wehrmacht in Russia 19411945. Atglen, PA:
Schier Military History. ISBN 0-7643-0385-6.
Krivosheev, G. F. Soviet Casualties and Combat
Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill
Books, 1997. ISBN 1-85367-280-7.
Liddell Hart, B. H. History of the Second World War
New York, NY: Putnam, 1970.
Nash, Douglas E. No Stalingrad on the Dnieper (Paper written for the Command and General Sta College of the U.S. Army), Fort Leavenworth: 1995
Nash, Douglas E. Hells Gate: The Battle of the
Cherkassy Pocket, JanuaryFebruary 1944 . Southbury, Connecticut: RZM Publishing, 2002. ISBN
0-9657584-3-5
Perrett, Bryan. Knights of the Black Cross, Hitlers
Panzerwae and Its Leaders. New York: St. Martins Press, 1986. ISBN 0-7090-2806-7
Shukman, Harold, ed. Stalins Generals. New York:
Grove Press, 1993. ISBN 1-84212-513-3
Tessin, Georg. Verbnde und Truppen der deutschen
Wehrmacht und Waen-SS 1939 1945, Vol. 14,
Osnabrck: Biblio Verlag, 1980. ISBN 3-76481111-0.
Willmott, H. P. June, 1944. New York, N.Y.:
Blandford Press, 1984. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8
Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders. The Korsun
Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German
Army in the East, 1944. Drexel Hill (Philadelphia),
Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers. 2008. ISBN
978-1-932033-88-5.

12

External links

forum.axishistory.com photos of the battleeld

Terrain view of the Korsun Pocket area
Satellite view of the German escape route

13

Gallery

Dispatch rider from a heavy tank battalion ... as a

Tiger I passes by, February 1944 (description abbreviated from same image in Nash, p. 238)

GALLERY

492510N 311638E / 49.4194N

11

14
14.1

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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Battle of the KorsunCherkassy Pocket Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Korsun%E2%80%93Cherkassy_Pocket?

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