Association of Small Landowners in the

Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of

Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS

Cases have been consolidated

because they involve common legal
questions. They will be subject to one
common discussion and resolution.

G.R. No. 79777:

The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay

and his wife who own a 9-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and
Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5hectare riceland worked by four
tenants. They question the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O.
Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657
since their tenants were declared full
owners of the mentioned lands.

G.R. No. 79310

Landowners and sugar planters in the

Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental and Planters Committee
Inc., with 1400 planter-members,
submitted a petition seeking to
prohibit the implementation of Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
Aug. 27, 1987 A motion for
intervention was filed by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters,
which claim 20 000 members). It was
granted by the court.
Sept. 10, 1987 A motion for
intervention was filed by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut
and riceland owners. It was granted by
the court.

228 & 229 were issued which rendered

his motion moot.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the
power to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the
legislative power for issuing the
measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms
to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the
Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits
required by Article 13, Section 4 of the
Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates
constitutional requirement that a bill
should only have one subject, to be
expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus
can issue to compel the performance
of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the
government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of
police power or the power of eminent
domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid
exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection
clause was violated
10.Whether or not the content and
manner of the just compensation
provided for in the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution
11.Whether or not there is contravention
of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain by divesting the
landowner of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just
compensation

G.R. No. 79744

Sept. 3 1986 The petitioner

protested the erroneous inclusion of
his small landholding under Operation
Land Transfer accusing the then
Secretary of DAR of violation of due
process and the requirement for just
compensation. Certificates of Land
Transfer were issued to the private
respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking
for the recall and cancellation of these
certificates.
Dec. 24, 1986 Petitioner claims his
petition was denied without hearing.
Feb. 17, 1987 A motion for
reconsideration was filed which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos.

RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos
during Martial Law has been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella. President
Aquino is authorized under Section 6
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No.
131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued
before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress was formally convened and
took over legislative power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure for that is not
its principal purpose and therefore is
not required to conform to the
requirements.

4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for

such limits now in Section 6 of the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill
does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from
the title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie
to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to
control the discretion to be exercised.
In other words, mandamus can issue
to require action only but not specific
action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain because there is
payment of just compensation unlike
in the exercise of police power wherein
confiscation of property is not
compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under
the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and
the lawful method. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been
laid down by the Constitution itself, we
may say that the first requirement has
been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method
employed to achieve the constitutional
goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown
that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not
see.
10.NO. It is declared that although money
is the traditional mode of payment,
other modes of payment shall be
permitted as compensation. The court
accepts the theory that payment of
the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money,
they find further that the proportion of
cash payment to the other things of
value constituting the total payment,
as determined on the basis of the
areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. The other modes, which
are likewise available to the landowner
at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits,
and other things of value equivalent to
the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that
a certain degree of pragmatism has

influenced our decision on this issue.

The Court is as acutely anxious as the
rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of
our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware
that invalidation of the said section
will result in the nullification of the
entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach
realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in
the restless countryside. That is not in
our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we
shall decree today.)
11.NO. The CARP Law conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit
by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131,
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections
raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be
transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective
owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the
tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise
their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27
shall enjoy the retention rights granted by
R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all
the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA

Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic
corporation and is the registered owner of
three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On May

6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR

a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with the
CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was denied.
Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion
of the three haciendas from agricultural to
other use but the petition was likewise
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not process of land acquisition
under CARL should observe due process
Held:
For a valid implementation of the CAR
Program, two notices are required: (1) the
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to
a preliminary conference sent to the
landowner, the representatives of the BARC,
LBP,
farmer
beneficiaries
and
other
interested parties; and (2) the Notice of
Acquisition sent to the landowner under
Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps
designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The taking
contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What
is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. The CARL was not
intended to take away property without due
process of law. The exercise of the power of
eminent domain requires that due process be
observed in the taking of private property.

Alita v CA
Facts:
Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
acquired the subject parcel of lands through
homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth
Act
No.
141.
Private
respondents
herein
are
desirous
of
personally cultivating these lands, but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the
provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June
18, 1981, private respondents instituted a
complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and
all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and
General Orders issued
in
connection
therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained
through homestead law. The RTC dismissed
the
complaint
but
on
motion
for
reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is not
applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to
the CA, the decision of the RTC was
sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not lands acquired through
homestead law are covered by CARP
Held:
Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to
them ownership of the land they till is a
sweeping social legislation, a remedial
measure promulgated pursuant to the social
justice
precepts
of
the
Constitution.
However, such contention cannot be invoked
to defeat the very purpose of the enactment
of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act
No. 141. The Philippine Constitution likewise
respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
Provided, that the original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who
still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.

approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there

was no need for Natalia and EDIC to do so
because the Natalia properties were within
the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation. Since PP 1637 created the
townsite reservation for the purpose of
providing
additional
housing
to
the
burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in
effect converted for residential use what
were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all
requisites were met.

Natalia Realty v. DAR

GR No. 103302
12 August 1993
Facts:
PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in
Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban as
townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were
designated
as
the
Lungsod
Silangan
Townsite, where Natalia Realtys properties
were situated. Estate Developers and
Investors Corporation (EDIC), the developer
of the Natalia properties, was granted
approval to develop the said properties into
low-cost housing subdivisions. The Natalia
properties then became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision.
When the CARL came into effect, the DAR
issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. Natalia immediately registered
its objection to the said Notice and requested
the DAR Secretary to cancel the same.
However, members of the Samahan ng
Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA) filed
a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before
the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain
them from developing areas under their
cultivation. The RA issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Natalia and EDIC
appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely
remanded the case to the RA. Natalia then
requested the DAR Secretary to set aside the
Notice of Coverage. Neither the DAR
Secretary nor the DAR Director concerned
took action on the protest letters.
Issues:
W/N the Natalia properties were
validly converted from agricultural to
residential land.
W/N the Natalia properties are covered
by the CARL.
Held:
YES. Natalia and EDIC complied with all the
requirements of law, even securing prior

NO. The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo

Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural lands. These lots were
intended for residential use. They ceased to
be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion
in
the
Lungsod
Silangan
Reservation.
Doctrine:
To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits
for landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative.
Title to all expropriated properties shall be
transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective
owners.
Obiter: One of the basic principles of the
democratic system is that where the rights
of the individual are concerned, the end does
not justify the means. There is no question
that not even the strongest moral conviction
or the most urgent public need, subject only
to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a
right guaranteed under Art III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right.

Issue:
W/N the CARL should include the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
W/N the requirement in Sections 13 and 32
of RA 6657 directing corporate farms to
execute and implement production-sharing
plans is unreasonable for being confiscatory
and violative of due process, with respect to
livestock and poultry raisers.
Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.
W/N the assailed provisions violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Held:
NO. It was never the intention of the framers
of the Constitution to include the livestock
and poultry industry in the coverage of the
agrarian reform program of the government.
The intention of the Committee was to limit
the application of the word agriculture.
Thus, Section II of RA 6657 which includes
private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry, and swine
raising in the definition of commercial
farms is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made
to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State.
YES. As there is no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage
of agrarian reform, there is no need to call
upon them to distribute from 3% of their
gross sales and 10% of their net profits to
their workers as additional compensation.

Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary

GR No. 86889
4 December 1990
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the
President of the Philippines. It includes the
raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its
coverage.
In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39
of the said law.
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the
livestock and poultry business, allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of certain sections of RA 6657,
of
the
Guidelines
and
Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
under RA 6657, and of the IRR of Section 11.
It prays that the aforesaid statutes be
declared unconstitutional.

NO. Substantial distinctions exist between

land directed purely to cultivation and
harvesting of fruits or crops and land
exclusively used for livestock, poultry and
swine raising that make real differences:
1. There are no tenants nor landlords in
livestock and poultry businesses;
2. Livestock and poultry do not sprout
from land;
3. Land is not a primary resource;
4. Livestock and poultry production are
industrial activities;
Livestock and poultry farmworkers are
covered by minimum wage law rather than
by tenancy law.
Doctrine: Raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine are excluded from the coverage of the
CARL.
Milestone Farms vs Office of the
President
FACTS:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of
Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the

raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2)

to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to
import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and
animal food necessary for the raising of said
cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
In May 1993, petitioner applied for the
exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare
property pursuant to the aforementioned
ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR
issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth
rules and regulations to govern the exclusion
of agricultural lands used for livestock,
poultry, and swine raising from CARP
coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application
pursuant to said AO.
DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption
Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioners property and
recommended the exemption of petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from the
coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted
LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by
Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of
the said Order, but the same was denied by
Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an
appeal with DAR Secretary
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the MCTC.
MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order
exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously
exempted by Director Dalugdug, and
declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property
to be covered by CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated
the decision of Director Dalugdug but when
the farmers filed a motion for
reconsideration, Office of the President
reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in

exempting the entire property from the
coverage of CARP. However, six months
earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as
the parties did not inform the appellate court
then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR
conversion order granting petitioners
application to convert portions of the
316.0422-hectare property from agricultural
to residential and golf courses use. The
portions converted was with a total area of
153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion
Order, the area of the property subject of the
controversy was effectively reduced to
162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these
developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge
that the property subject of the controversy
would now be limited to the remaining
162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended
decision, states that the subject landholding
from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted,
and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural
portion thereof is hereby declared covered
by the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property
should be exempted from the coverage of
CARP
HELD:
No.
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9
was not yet declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said
that the CA erred or gravely abused its
discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR
A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in
full force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA
correctly held that the subject property is not
exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as
substantial pieces of evidence show that the
said property is not exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

that lands devoted to livestock and

poultry-raising are not included in the
definition of agricultural land and
declared as unconstitutional certain
provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform. In view of
this, respondents filed with petitioner
DAR a formal request to withdraw their
VOS as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.

Department of Agrarian Reform,

represented by Secretary Jose Mari B.
Ponce (OIC)
vs
Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman
and Harry T. Sutton
G.R. No.162070

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal

Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate, inspected respondents' land
and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising
and
breeding.
He
recommended to the DAR Secretary
that it be exempted from the coverage
of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents

reiterated to petitioner DAR the
withdrawal of their VOS and requested
the return of the supporting papers
they
submitted
in
connection
therewith. Petitioner ignored such
request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued

A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be
excluded, the A.O. fixed the following
retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land
ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21
heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the
CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents

wrote the DAR Secretary and advised
him to consider as final and
irrevocable the withdrawal of their
VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine,
their entire landholding is exempted
from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR

Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order partially granting the application
of respondents for exemption from the

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 19,
2003
and
February
4,
2004,
respectively, which declared DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1993, null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.

The case involves a land in Aroroy,

Masbate, inherited by respondents
which has been devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. On October 26,
1987, pursuant to the then existing
agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail
of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law,

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coverage farms
used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en
banc decision in the case of Luz Farms
v. Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled

coverage of CARL. Applying the

retention limits outlined in the DAR
A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209
hectares of respondents' land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of
102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.
Petitioner
ordered
the
rest
of
respondents'
landholding
to
be
segregated
and
placed
under
Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents
moved
for
reconsideration, contending that their
entire
landholding
should
be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively
to cattle-raising. Said motion was
denied. Respondents filed a notice of
appeal with the Office of the President
assailing: (1) the reasonableness and
validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,
which provided for a ratio between
land and livestock in determining the
land area qualified for exclusion from
the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality
of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of
the Luz Farms case which declared
cattle-raising lands excluded from the
coverage of agrarian reform. The OP
affirmed the impugned order. On
appeal to CA, the CA ruled in favor of
respondents and declared A.O. No. 9,
Series of 1993 as void.

The raising of livestock, swine and

poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of
the investment in this enterprise is in
the form of industrial fixed assets,
such as: animal housing structures
and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers,
feedmill
with
grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies,
anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas
and digester plants augmented by
lagoons
and
concrete
ponds,
deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenance.

Petitioner DAR has no power to

regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform.
It has exceeded its power in issuing
the assailed A.O.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of

statutory
construction
that
the
reenactment of a statute by Congress
without substantial change is an
implied
legislative
approval
and
adoption of the previous law. On the
other hand, by making a new law,
Congress seeks to supersede an
earlier one. In the case at bar, after
the passage of the 1988 CARL,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which
amended certain provisions of the
CARL. Specifically, the new law
changed the definition of the terms
"agricultural activity" and "commercial
farming"
by
dropping
from
its
coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and
swine-raising. With this significant
modification, Congress clearly sought
to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987
Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of
agrarian reform.

It
is
doctrinal
that
rules
of
administrative bodies must be in
harmony with the provisions of the
Constitution. They cannot amend or
extend the Constitution. To be valid,
they must conform to and be

Issue:

Whether or not DAR Administrative

Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which
prescribes a maximum retention for
owners of lands devoted to livestock
raising is constitutional?

Held:

The impugned A.O. is invalid as it

contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry-raising.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms
case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are industrial activities and do
not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity."

consistent with the Constitution. In

case
of
conflict
between
an
administrative
order
and
the
provisions of the Constitution, the
latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of
petitioner DAR was properly stricken
down as unconstitutional as it enlarges
the coverage of agrarian reform
beyond the scope intended by the
1987 Constitution.

Central Mindanao University vs.

Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board 215 SCRA 86 (1992)

actually, directly and exclusively used and

necessary for the purpose for which they are
reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in
the best position to resolve and answer the
question of when and what lands are found
necessary for its use. The Court also chided
the DARAB for resolving this issue of
exemption on
the basis of "CMU's present needs." The
Court stated that the DARAB decision stating
that for the land to be exempt it must be
"presently, actively exploited and utilized by
the university in carrying out its present
educational program with its present student
population and academic faculty" overlooked
the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come.

Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the
CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future
campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a
project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap"
wherein parcels of land were leased to its
faculty members and employees. Under the
terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty
members and employee groups through the
extension of technical know-how, training
and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they
paid the CMU a service fee for use of the
land. The agreement explicitly provided that
there will be no tenancy relationship
between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case
was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as
tenants under the CARP. In its resolution,
DARAB,
ordered,
among
others,
the
segregation of 400 hectares of the land for
distribution under CARP. The land was
subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's
determination that the lands do not meet the
condition for exemption, that is, it is not
"actually, directly, and exclusively used" for
educational purposes.
Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who
determines whether lands reserved for public
use by presidential proclamation is no longer

DAR v. DECS
Petition for review on certiorari to set aside
decision of CA which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration
-Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of
an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares
located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay,
Negros Occidental, respectively. On October
21, 1921, these lands were donated by
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles
were transferred in the name of respondent
DECS.
-DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years,
commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to
crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease
was subsequently renewed for another 10
agricultural crop years, commencing from
crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 20042005.
-June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to
be permanent and regular farm workers of
the subject lands, filed a petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Escalante.
-After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa,
sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent
DECS, stating that the lands are covered by
CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference
with
the
farmer

beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piosa submitted

his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas,
who recommended to the DAR Regional
Director the approval of the coverage of the
landholdings.
-August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director
Andres approved the recommendation and
directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to
facilitate acquisition and distribution of
landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.
-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of
the Regional Director.
-Aggrieved
DECS
filed
a
petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
set aside the decision of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition
for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are
exempt from the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998 (CARL)NO
2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified
beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to
cover as much lands suitable for agriculture
as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657
sets out the coverage of CARP. The program
shall: cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
Following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a)
All
alienable
and
disposable lands of the public
domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of
forest
or
mineral
lands
to
agricultural
lands
shall
be
undertaken after the approval of
this Act until Congress, taking into
account,
ecological,
developmental
and
equity
considerations,
shall
have

determined by law, the specific

limits of the public domain;
(b)
All lands of the public
domain in excess of the specific
limits as determined by Congress
in the preceding paragraph;
(c)
All other lands owned by
the Government devoted to or
suitable for agriculture; and
(d)
All private lands devoted
to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be
raised thereon.

Section 3(c): agricultural land- land

devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
agriculture or agricultural activitymeans the cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities, and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural
or juridical.
The records of the case show that the
subject properties were formerly private
agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent
DECS. From that time until they were leased
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted
to sugarcane, albeit part of the public
domain being owned by an agency of the
government. There is no legislative or
presidential act, before and after the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the
said lands as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Indubitably,
the subject lands fall under the classification
of lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP
coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo
Agricultural
Corporation
were
actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.

-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from

the CARP coverage because the same are
not actually, directly and exclusively used as
school sites or campuses, as they are in fact
leased
to
Anglo
Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the
coverage, it is the land per se, not the
income derived that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner
DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657
enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as
well as the purposes of their exemption:

c)
Lands actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, , shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act.
xxx
x

xx
xxx

In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1)

the land must be actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be
necessary; and 2) the purpose is for school
sites and campuses, including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to
be necessary cannot be understated. The
words
of
the
law
are
clear
and
unambiguous. The plain meaning rule
or verba legis is applicable. Where the words
of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the

case of Central Mindanao University v.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, wherein we declared the land subject
exempt from CARP coverage. However,
DECS reliance is misplaced because the

factual circumstances are different in the

case at bar.
1st, in the CMU case, the land involved
was not alienable and disposable land of the
public domain because it was reserved by
the late President Carlos P. Garcia under
Proc.
No.
476
for
the
use
of Mindanao Agricultural College (now
CMU). In this case, however, the lands fall
under the category of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
2nd, in the CMU case, the land was
actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for school sites and
campuses. Although a portion of it was
being used by the Philippine Packing
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.)
under a Management and Development
Agreement, the undertaking was that the
land shall be used by the Philippine Packing
Corporation as part of the CMU research
program, with direct participation of faculty
and students. The retention of the land was
found to be necessary for the present and
future educational needs. On the other
hand, the lands in this case were
not actually and exclusively utilized as school
sites and campuses. They were leased to
Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational but business purposes. Also, it
was the income and not the lands that was
directly used for the repairs and renovations
of the schools.

II. We disagree with the Court of

Appeals finding that they were not
qualified beneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential
beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to
Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:

SECTION 15.
Registration of
Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination
with the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act,
shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants
and farmworkers who are qualified to be
beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential
beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC
and the DAR shall provide the following data:

(a)
names and members of
their immediate farm household;
(b)
owners or administrators
of the lands they work on and the
length of tenurial relationship;
(c)
location and area of the
land they work;
(d)

The
petition
is
GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision
dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands
under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
Province of Camarines Sur vs CA
May 17, 1993

crops planted; and

(e)
their share in the harvest
or amount of rental paid or wages
received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential
CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be
posted in the barangay hall, school or other
public buildings in the barangay where it
shall be open to inspection by the public at
all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that

the
farmers
were
potential
CARP
beneficiaries
of
the
subject
properties. Further, on November 23, 1994,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage placing the
subject properties under CARP. Since the
identification
and
selection
of
CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the
CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise
great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the
administrative agency. In this case, there
was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) is the bastion of social
justice of poor landless farmers, the
mechanism designed to redistribute to the
underprivileged the natural right to toil the
earth, and to liberate them from oppressive
tenancy. The objective of the State is that:
landless farmers and farmworkers will
receive the highest consideration to promote
social justice and to move the nation toward
sound
rural
development
and
industrialization.

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of

Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the
Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property
to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-agricultural crops and housing project
for the government employees. By virtue of
the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for
expropriation against private respondents
(San Joaquins).
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground
of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring
the resolution null and void, b) complaint for
expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol
Gen to give comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval
by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the
right to eminent domin. However, approval
of DAR must first be secured (since this
involves appropriation of agricultural lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however
disposing of the issues raised. The SC said
that the CA assumed that the resolution is
valid and the expropriation is for a public
use).
Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void.
Corollary to this issue is WON the
expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent
domain in this case is restricted by the CAR
Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may
be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of
the compensation offered?
Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public
purpose, hence the resolution is
authorized and valid.
SC explained that there had
been a shift from the old to the new
concept of public purpose:. Old
concept is that the property must
actually be used by the general public.

The new concept, on the other hand,

means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute
to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot
development center would inure to the
direct benefit and advantage of the
CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable info
and tech on agriculture, fishery, and
cottage industry, enhance livelihood of
farmers and fishermen, etc.
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here
said that the implication of the Ardana
case
is
that)
the
power
of
expropriation is superior to the power
to distribute lands under the land
reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in
the least that LGUs must first secure
approval of the Dept of Land Reform
for conversion of agri to non-agri use.
Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law
subjecting expropriation by LGUs to
the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is
not in point because it is applicable
only to lands previously placed under
the agrarian reform program. This is
limited only to applications for
reclassification submitted by land
owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of
eminent
domain
to
political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they
will be paid on the basis of the
valuation
decalred
in
the
tax
declarations of their property, are
unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just
compensation in expropriation cases
based on the value given either by the
owners or the assessor. Rules for
determining just compensation are
those laid down in Rule 67 ROC,
evidence must be submitted to justify
what they consider is the just
compensation.

12.G.R. No. 149548

December 14, 2010

ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167505
DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID
SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW),
Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC. AND/OR ATTY.
MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167540
KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
HACIENDA ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI), ET AL.,
Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167543
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR),
Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167845

ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Roxas & Co. raises the fringe issue that DAR

Memorandum Circular No. 7 (Series of 2004) has
no force and effect since the said DAR
Memorandum Circular was not published and
filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register.

G.R. No. 169163

DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V.
MARTIN, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179650
DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed
on January 13, 2010 by Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas &
Co.) and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed on January 29, 2010 by Damayan ng
Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National
Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW) and
Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda
Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI), et al., which both assail
the Courts December 4, 2009 Decision in these
consolidated cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject lands are exempt from
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage?
HELD:
Roxas & Co. cannot have it both ways. It must
either zealously argue its legal position if it
believes it to be meritorious or altogether
abandon it if it has reservations. Its Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of its earlier
Motion for Reconsideration effectively coaxes the
Court to wait for the outcome of its TIEZA
application and ultimately delay the final
resolution of these consolidated cases.
On Roxas & Co.s Motion for Reconsideration, no
substantial arguments were raised to warrant a
reconsideration of the Decision. The Motion
contains merely an amplification of the main
arguments and factual matters already submitted
to and pronounced without merit by the Court in
its Decision. In the Courts considered view,
nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or
done in these cases since all the main issues
raised have been passed upon and definitely
resolved.

The contention fails. It should be stressed that

there is no need for the publication and filing of
the said DAR Memorandum Circular with the
ONAR as it is merely an administrative
interpretation.
Roxas & Co. is merely nitpicking on the issue.
Since the DAR had initially issued CLOAs to the
farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in
Hacienda Palico, the assailed Decision merely
reiterated the original designation of the affected
individuals as farmer-beneficiaries who should be
entitled to disturbance compensation before the
cancellation of their respective CLOAs is effected.
This is in pursuance of the directive of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (Series of 1994) which
mandates
the
payment
of
disturbance
compensation before Roxas & Co.s application
for exemption may be completely granted.
Since subject landholding has been validly
determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the
previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositorsmovants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the
situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court
Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the
property in trust for the rightful owners of the
land and are not the owners of subject
landholding who should be notified of the
exemption application of applicant Roxas &
Company, Incorporated.1avvphi1
Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to
reverse the assailed Orders since there is
substantial compliance by the applicant with the
requirements for the issuance of exemption
clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Roxas & Co., Inc. and the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by DAMBA-NFSW and
KAMAHARI are DENIED for lack of merit.

12.
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
V
HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD et al.
G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005
Caguiat, et al. (Los) filed a petition
before the SAC for the determination
of just compensation for their
AGRICULTURAL LANDS in Arayat,
Pampanga
The SAC ordered the DAR and LBP to
pay the Los P30.00 per square meter
as just compensation
LBPS ARGUMENT:
*For
purposes
of
agrarian
reform the property was acquired on 21
October 1972, the effectivity date of PD 27,
therefore just compensation should be based
on the value of the property as of that time
NOT at the time of possession in 1993
SUPREME COURT RULING:
.The seizure of the landholding DID NOT take
place upon the date of effectivity of PD 27
but would take effect on the payment of just
compensation (OP v. CA)
The agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation
to be paid the Los has yet to be
settled
Considering the passage of RA 6657
before the completion of this process,
the just compensation determined and
the process concluded under RA 6657
RA 6657 is the applicable law with PD
27 and EO 228 having only suppletory
effect (Paris v. Alfeche)
It would be inequitable to
determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided
by PD 27 and EO 228
considering the DARs failure to
determine
the
just
compensation
for
a
consideration length of time
Just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator

13.

Estribillo v DAR

Facts:
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc.
requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage
of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation
therefor,
HMI
allowed
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate
the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In
1982, a final survey over the entire area was
conducted and approved. From 1984 to
1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs
covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were
issued to petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD
petitions
seeking
the
declaration
of
erroneous coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its
former landholdings. HMI claimed that said
area was not devoted to either rice or corn,
that the area was untenanted, and that no
compensation was paid therefor. RARAD
rendered a decision declaring as void the
TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because
the land covered was not devoted to rice and
corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy
relations
between
HMI
and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the
DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision.
On appeal to the CA, the same was
dismissed. Petitioners contended that the
EPs became indefeasible after the expiration
of one year from their registration.
Issue:
Whether or not EPs have become
indefeasible one year after their issuance
Held:
After complying with the procedure in
Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree where the DAR is required to issue
the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have
complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the
TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their
EPs acquire the same protection accorded to
other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent. Lands covered by such title may no
longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person.

Facts:
Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon
to construct a house on a portion of her
landholding, paying a monthly rental of
P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to
plant a portion of the land, agreeing that the
produce thereof would be shared by both on
a 50-50 basis.
When Millenes sold her land to the spouses
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the spouses
told Abajon that they intended to build a
poultry close to his house and persuaded him
to transfer his dwelling to another portion of
the landholding. Abajon refused to leave,
even after confrontation before the Barangay
Captain of the locality.
Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case
against Abajon for malicious mischief for
harvesting bananas and jackfruit from their
property without her knowledge. All the
planting on the property however, had been
done by Abajon. The trial court ordered the
referral of the case to the Ministry of
Agrarian
Reform
for
a
preliminary
determination of the relationship between
the parties. The Ministry ruled that a tenancy
relationship existed between the parties,
and, as such, the case is not proper for
hearing.
On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed
the findings and declared that the case was
proper for trial as the land involved was
residential. The new minister of the DAR,
however, set aside the said order and
declared that the criminal case was not
proper for trial, as there was an existing
tenancy relationship between the parties.
Issue: W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant.

NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a

tenant is preposterous. He only occupied a
miniscule portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot,
which cannot by any stretch of imagination
be considered as an economic family-sized
farm. Planting camote, bananas, and corn on
such a size of land cannot produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the farm familys
basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be
reviewed is patently contrary to the declared
policy of RA 3844. Moreover, there exists no
tenancy relationship between the parties
because Abajons status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out
of benevolence or compassion to live in the
premises and to have a garden of some sort.
Agricultural production as the primary
purpose being absent in the arrangement, it
is clear that Abajon was never a tenant of
Millenes.
Doctrine:
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant;
(2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) There is consent;
(4) The purpose is agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation; and
(6) There is sharing of harvests.
Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under
existing laws.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a
parcel of land has been given its possession
for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
Obiter:
If justice can be meted out now, why wait for
it to drop gently from heaven?

Gelos vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86186.

Held:
May 8, 1992

Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy

Facts:
The Private Respondent owned the subject
land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The
Landowner then entered in to a contract with
the petitioner and employed him to be
laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00
peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of
Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry
of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix
the agricultural lease rental of the land and
his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a
complaint of illegal detainer against the
petitioner that was that was dismissed by the
Ministry of Agrarian reform for the existence
of Tenancy relations between the parties. The
Private respondents appealed to the office of
the President alleging that there was no
tenancy relation between the parties.

It should also be considered that a tenant is

defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a
person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites
for the tenancy relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and

The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint

and assailed that there was a tenancy
relation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue:
Is there a Tenancy relation between the
parties?
Held:
No, it was clear that the petitioner were not
intended to be tenant but a mere employee
of the private respondent as showed in the
contract. The petitioner was paid for specific
kind of work. The court stressed many cases
that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when
the farmer is installed, and as in
this case, their written
agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more
important."

6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of

rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify
someone to be a tenant. It is clear that it is
not a tenancy relationship that exists
between the parties, what they have is
employee-employer relationship.

the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the

Court of Agrarian Relations.

Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan
claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm
fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An
oral contract of lease with a yearly rental
was entered between them. Defendant was
notified that the contract would be
terminated, but upon request was extended
for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the
complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the
Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant filed his answer that the land was
originally verbally leased to him by the
plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as
the defendant wanted, subject to the
condition that he would convert the major
portion into a fishpond and that which was
already a fishpond be improved at his
expense, which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also
assured him that he could continue leasing
as long as he wanted since she was not in a
position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for
the purpose of determining which Court shall
take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work
on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and
such, personally with the aid of helpers since
he became ill and incapacitated. His
daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who
said that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying
his instructions to the workers. Excepting
Pilar who is residing near the fishpond,
defendants other children are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a
priest all residing in Manila. None of these
has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties
is an agricultural leasehold tenancy
governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic
Act No. 3844, and the present case is within

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the

fishpond personally or with the aid of the
members of his immediate farm household
(Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the
tenancy relationship between the parties has
been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and
become of civil lease and therefore the trial
court properly assumed jurisdiction over the
case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease
governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and
the defendant as defined by Republic Act No.
1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try
and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was
denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the
relationship of appellee and appellant as that
of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy
under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that
the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian
relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No.
1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a
leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may
be either rural or urban property. As to
attention and cultivation, the law requires
the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas
the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to
purpose, the landholding in leasehold
tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in
civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that
governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to
exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an
agricultural land;

2. land is susceptible of cultivation by

a single person together with
members of his immediate farm
household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant
either personally or with the aid of
labor available from members of his
immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a
consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural
land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural
land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use
thereof. The mere fact that a person works
an agricultural land does not necessarily
make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199.
He may still be a civil law lessee unless the
other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the
second requisite since it wasnt raised. For
the third requisite, the tenancy agreement
was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work
the fishpond personally because he became
ill and incapacitated. Not even did the
members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land. Only the members
of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or
not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the

farm enterprise are included in the term

"immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring
the tenant and his immediate family to work
the land. A person, in order to be considered
a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do
not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants; and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the
land, ceases to hold, and is considered as
having abandoned the land as tenant within
the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic
Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the
status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with
the court a quo that the relationship between
the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold
tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence,
this case was not within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.