Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bankoff
Selective memory and collective forgetting. Historiography and the Philippine centennial of 1898
In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, The PhilippinesHistorical and social studies 157
(2001), no: 3, Leiden, 539-560
GREG BANKOFF
Material for this article is drawn from Post-colonial national identity in the Philippines;
Celebrating the centennial of Independence (Bankoff and Weekley forthcoming).
540
Greg Bankoff
The People's Republic of China has continued to venerate traditional heroic characters such
as Ch'u Yuan, Han Kao-tso, Wu Tse-t'ien and even Confucius (Crozier 1977:4).
3
See, for example, Elizabeth Nissan's essay on the changing symbolic value of the sacred
city of Anuradhapura in Sri Lankan historiography (Nissan 1997:23-41).
4
Eduardo Gonzalez, a fellow at the Institute for Popular Democracy, holds 'an accident of
geography' that isolated the archipelago from the mainstream of Asian civilizations responsible
for this state of affairs and maintains that the entire socio-cultural configuration of the
Philippines was determined 'by a void of compelling dimension' (Gonzalez n.d.:3).
5
Christianity played a somewhat analogous role in East Timor under Portuguese colonialism, but then Catholicism provided an important nationalist referent during the Indonesian
occupation of the country 1975-1999. Pat Smythe argues that after 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule less than 30 per cent of the population were formally registered as Catholic, while 90
per cent of the people presently declare that affiliation (Smythe 1998:153-4).
Bonifacio was court-martialed and sentenced to death on the charge of sedition in May
1897. Though the sentence was subsequently commuted to indefinite exile and imprisonment,
he and his brother were nonetheless executed on 10 May. The truce of Biak-na-bato was signed
in November 1897 in which the Spanish paid the sum of 400,000 pesos in return for the surrender of rebel arms and the exile of Aguinaldo and other members of the Revolutionary Committee to Hong Kong.
541
542
Greg Bankojf
debate in recent years over the validity of the historical evidence and the
nature of their respective characters discounts either from serving as a unifying national role model (Ileto 1998:203-37; Churchill 1997; May 1997).
Then there is the question of participation among the different ethnic
groups of the archipelago: not every Filipino can derive his descent from
forefathers who fought in the Revolution. Significant national minorities,
Muslims in the south, the tribal peoples of the Cordillera and ethnic Chinese,
did not really participate in the events of 1896-1898. A modern state apparatus that seeks to normalize its people into an undifferentiated body of citizens by imbuing specific historical events with nationalist symbolism may
unwittingly call attention to notions of difference based on ethnic, regional or
religious origins that have often served as the foundations upon which colonial rule was established. Such symbols, in fact, may only reinforce contemporary struggles for separate identities (Chatterjee 1993:33) and may even
lead to the construction of counter-ethnicities and to demands for counterstates based on counter-nationalisms (Appadurai 1993:415). In the final
analysis the Philippine Revolution was a failure, marking not the birth of a
nation (in anything more than a symbolic sense) but an ensuing period of
colonial rule that endured for another 48 years. More than any other aspect
of the Revolution, it was this lack of success that problematized the celebration of the centennial of national independence in 1998.
The imperative to produce 'a people' that are 'nationals' is mainly the product of the late 19th- and early 20th-century nation-state. According to Etienne
Balibar, this is a process that involves converting the external frontiers of a
state into the 'internal frontiers' of self-ascription. But tensions inevitably arise
between the concept of an 'ideal nation' and the notion of fictive ethnicity that
seeks to make of the population a natural community as much in the past as
in the present and future (Balibar 1991:92-6). Philippine history in general and
the Revolution of 1896-1898 in particular pose certain problems in the production of a fictive national ethnicity. The ability of the colonial state, more
especially the American regime, to enumerate the peoples of the archipelago
not only established clear limits or boundaries to the national estate but also
divided them into discrete communities. Both Spaniard and American viewed
Philippine society as a 'melange of communities'; they were unable to countenance the idea that subject peoples could constitute a single political community or nation as did 'advanced western peoples' (Chatterjee 1993:223-4).
The national successor to the colonial state has proved unable to convince Filipinos that they constitute a single cultural community or to merge them into
a larger more modern political identity. Seeking recourse in the Revolution of
1896-1898 as the foundational event in the history of the nation only reinforces
the ethnic divisions within society and ensures that modern politics 'continues
to run along channels excavated by colonial discourse' (Chatterjee 1993:224).
543
As Partha Chatterjee writes, the mode of recalling the past, the power of representing oneself 'is nothing other than political power itself' (1993:76). The
ability of a mainly Tagalog and Christian Manila-based ruling class to extend
their patronage back through time, to fashion the past by creating an 'official
history', allows them to determine the values to be attached to the revolutionary experience and so to define the terms upon which modern nationalism is constructed. While there is a measure of dissension as to the particulars of this definition and how various historical incidents should be
represented or importance accorded to specific individuals, there is little real
dispute over what constitutes the basis of this national identity - democracy
and competitive economic development. However, neither the sense of
democracy nor the manner of development is precisely what they are made
out to be: the first is tainted by oligarchy, the second is often far from deregulated market-driven decision making, despite the rhetoric. What is important
for this official view of the past is that these values are established as the prevailing credentials and that the historical record is made to conform to their
dictates. So the Revolution of 1896-1898 has to be interpreted in such a way
that it promotes democracy and establishes the preconditions for economic
development. At the same time, separate or local histories need to be incorporated within the larger nationalist account so as to present them as part of
the 'natural past' of the archipelago, one whose boundaries match those of
the modern nation-state.
While the democracy that is expounded by this Manila-based elite is modelled on the Western democratic tradition, it is not participatory but oligarchic in form. It narrowly defines the concept of freedom as a political
process that effectively makes an electorate decide between two contending
factions of the elite for leadership.7 Establishing the past democratic credentials of the nation thereby takes on added importance as a means of legitimizing the present governing institutions and, indirectly, those who control
them. Accordingly, the Revolution is presented not simply as a struggle to
cast off colonial bondage but as the principal event in the evolution of a
democratic tradition from which all subsequent developments can be traced.
The Revolution heralded the birth of 'the Filipino nation as a land of freedom-loving people' (Centennial celebration 1997:12), a state of mind, which,
according to President Ramos, could only be realized through 'the logic of
democracy' (Maragay 1998:1). Moreover, as the first democratic republic in
Asia, the Philippines is credited with becoming the 'father of independence'
7
This notion of democracy is not that necessarily favoured by the great majority of poor or
less educated Filipinos (Canieso-Doronila 1997:70).
544
Greg Bankoff
to the rest of Asia and, in turn, inspiring freedom in Africa (RP 1998:5).8
Not only does the Revolution establish the Philippines' credentials among
developing nations, but it also permits the struggle to be seen in a somewhat
different light: not as defeat on the battlefield and ensuing colonial bondage
but as the commencement of a process of constitutional tutelage under US
administration. In fact, the history of the hundred years following 1898 are
recast along these lines. Thus, despite the proclamation of the first republic
under the authoritarian leadership of General Emilio Aguinaldo, Filipinos
'did not linger too long in a dictatorship' but immediately sought 'constitutional legitimacy'. The four decades of US colonialism only channelled the
struggle for freedom into the parliamentary arena where it achieved political
fruition in 1946. It was this democratic tradition that was mainly responsible
for the economic success of the Philippines during the 1960s. If development
subsequently lagged behind the other emerging nations of Asia in the 1970s
and 1980s, this, too, is blamed on 'the detour toward authoritarianism from
1972-86' {Celebration 1998). But the spirit of a freedom-loving people is impossible to suppress for long and the 'aberration' of the Marcos years was
soon swept away by the EDSA9 Revolution, whose 'people power' restored
Filipino history to its true course and 'indirectly set the stage for freedom in
Russia and Eastern Europe' (RP 1998:5). Martial law not only legitimized the
1986 Constitution and its presidents as the restorers of democracy, but it also
served to discredit 'the Asian values model' to which was attributed the 'cultural camouflage' for disguising dictatorship {Celebration 1998). The proof of
all this is held to be manifest in the smooth transition of power from Fidel
Ramos to Joseph Estrada in 1998, that proved to the world how deeply Filipinos 'value the ideals and practice of constitutional democracy' (Maragay
1998:2; Raymundo 1998:6).
Hand in hand with democracy goes 'faith' in economic growth. Indeed,
the two 'must come together and work together'; Filipinos express a natural
desire 'to be free and to prosper' (Maragay 1998:1; Raymundo 1998:1).
Development, however, remains more of a future promise than a present
reality, the greener valley that lies just over the other side of the hill or the
other side of the millennium {Run-up 1997:8). Nevertheless, it is just as integral to the construction of a sense of national identity as democracy, ultimately
providing the raison d'etre to justify the entire oligarchic structure of political
power in the country. According to President Ramos, only democracy can
lead 'to sustained economic growth and social progress' (Maragay 1998:1).
8
10
An event achieved on 27 March 1998 with the passage through Congress of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package and the Oil Deregulation Law.
11
The economy's subsequent poor performance in contrast to the recovery evident in many
of its neighbours is largely blamed on the highly personalistic and idiosyncratic decisions of the
since deposed President Estrada.
545
546
Greg Bankoff
sion executive at Channel 4, explains: 'We didn't have access to the public
except through the newspapers, the radio and TV programmes. That's why
our main target, really our primary target, was not the people but the media.'
(Matubis 1998)
However, to successfully disseminate information on the Centennial, the
CIC had first to package its product in such a way as to 'entice' the media to
carry its releases. Matubis described the role of his agency as one of 'transforming' Philippine history into what he termed 'chewable chunks', simplified episodes that might more readily be appreciated by the public (Matubis
1998). In the process of contextualizing history for the short temporal constraints of the modern media (colour slide, 30-second radio break or 60-second television spot), the Revolution was often reduced to a visual image with
little or no explanatory commentary: the emotional or stirring moment like
the raising of the flag in victory at Alapan, the proclamation of independence
at Kawit, the signing of the Malolos Constitution, which could so easily be
made to engender the desired feeling or 'message'. Matubis was adamant
that 'politics' was not a factor determining the emphasis placed on the presentation of the historical material, but his denial only reveals the probable
bias of those among the elite who made such decisions:
Question: 'Do you think the political administration influenced what was celebrated?'
Matubis: 'No, no. I didn't think that happened. What I think the NCC was really
focused on was that the Centennial was celebrated properly and I am happy to
note, so far as the Commission members were concerned, and they represented
the spectrum of the community, because you had members of the administration,
members of the opposition, you had members of the academe, all sectors were
represented in the NCC, I do not think that politics entered into why we should
emphasize this, why we should not emphasize that. There was no such thing,
okay? I think the Commission was neutral in that sense.' (Matubis 1998)12
The resultant media coverage of the Centennial stressed the values of a
democratic heritage and the promise of a competitive economic future. These
qualities of national identity were celebrated as the principal distinguishing
characteristics of the Filipino and were assumed to underlie the nation's distinctiveness from its Asian neighbours. Whether these views were generally
accepted by the majority of people as the basis of their sense of citizenship is
difficult to gauge. The Centennial had to compete for space in the media with
national and local elections in 1998, which deprived the event of mass cover12
The other sectors included corporate managers, army generals and 'women leaders'. Later
representatives of the Tribal and Muslim communities were added, but whether they 'contributed a lot to the Commission is a different thing [...] but at least in terms of the structure,
there was a voice' (Tan 1998).
547
age except in the last few weeks preceding the anniversary of the actual
proclamation of independence.13 But it also had to contend with a generally
low level of historical consciousness among the population. As a consequence, public speakers often had to resort to high levels of hyperbole in
order to excite a sense of nationalism. However, as the eminent Filipino historian Onofre Corpuz notes, such rhetoric 'does not penetrate to the guts of
our people and the message from an independence day oration dies out
before the echoes have faded away in Manila's polluted air' (Corpuz 1998:4).
A notable exception was the Philippine Daily Inquirer, which commenced a 100-day countdown to the 12 June celebrations with a daily column of historical vignettes written by Ambeth
Ocampo.
14
President Macapagal's decision (Proclamation 28 of 12 May 1962) was made in the context
of public indignation at the US Congress's rejection of a bill authorizing an additional appro-
548
Greg Bankoff
priation of US$73 million in war payments to the Philippines, a cut that was later restored. There
were also more practical difficulties in sharing a national day with the United States, as foreign
diplomats would inevitably choose to attend the functions held at American rather than
Philippine embassies (Manalo 1998:2).
15
The PHA's campaign included a series of public seminars and a resolution petitioning the
President and Congress for the adoption of this change made on 24 March 1960. Professor
Gabriel Fabella is credited with initiating this movement by publishing an article entitled
'Philippine Independence, June 12th or July 4th in the Sunday Times Magazine on 1 July 1956
(Historian's Role 1998:1, 6).
549
550
Greg Bankoff
Any Filipino resistance fighter who refused to surrender was classified as a bandit after the
passage of the Bandolerismo Act by the US Philippine Commission in 1902 and consequently
subject to execution or 20 years imprisonment. For the histories of some of the most notable of
these leaders, see Orlino Ochosa (1995).
20
The history of the Philippine-American War is reputedly not taught in US schools (De La
Cruz 1998).
21
Among the eminent people who have petitioned for the bells' return are the historian, Fr.
Horacio de la Costa (1958) and former President Fidel Ramos (1993-1994 and again in 1997) (De
La Cruz 1998; Silva 1997).
551
552
Greg Bankoff
they also effectively contest whether it can create the conditions necessary for
sustained economic development.25
Apart from the nationalist and radical critiques, there are a multiplicity of
other dissenting voices in the contemporary Philippines that dispute the official history of the Centennial. The Roman Catholic clergy, feminists and ethnic minorities, each in their own way, also challenge the construction of
national identity based on an oligarchic concept of democracy and a deregulated market economy (Bankoff and Weekley forthcoming:Chapter 4). However, their failure to sustain a meaningful public debate on these issues is not
simply due to their disunity of purpose or vision. Nor can it be blamed solely
on their inability to create an alternative rendition of the past that has real
meaning to the majority of Filipinos and that dispels all hint of patronage.
While these are certainly factors, the root cause of their lack of success may
lie in something much deeper. As Conrado de Quiros writes in his recent
obituary of Renato Constantino, the Philippines is a country with an almost
desperate need to forget, one that 'lives almost exclusively in the present, the
past gliding by like water against an aimless boat, leaving no markers behind'
(Quiros 1999). The degree to which the Centennial actually challenged this
notion of a forgotten past and a continuous present was perhaps indicated by
the indifferent opinion polls and the limited public impact of the extensive
25
The lack of real economic development in the Philippines is blamed on a heady mixture of
colonial exploitation and the financial mismanagement of the Marcos years. Colonialism is held
responsible for initially retarding agricultural growth in the 17th century, then restricting its
expansion to a few export commodities (notably sugar, tobacco, abaca and coconut) during the
late 19th century, before creating dependence on a single market with the passing of the PayneAldrich Tariff Act of 1909 that abolished tariffs between the Philippine and American markets
through a system of quotas that regulated the amount of Philippine agricultural produce entering the US. (On the economic distortions created by colonialism in the Philippines, see Fast and
Richardson 1983.) The financial mismanagement under the martial law regime of President
Marcos, especially the extensive international borrowing to fund non-revenue generating investments and the granting of guarantees to favoured corporations that subsequently failed (socalled crony capitalism), saddled the economy with a large foreign debt. The country's total
overseas loans rose from US$2.6 billion in 1975 to US$26 billion by 1984 (Oviedo 1998:23). The
legacy of both colonialism and debt is seen as having seriously distorted the Philippine's economy and of hampering the ability of post-1986 administrations to take any significant measures
to relieve the extreme poverty that still afflicts many millions of Filipinos. Nor are these conditions seen as unrelated: both past colonialism and present debt tie the country to foreign masters, many of whom are the very same colonialists of old. Criticism is levelled at multilateral
funding agencies, large foreign multinationals and government policies in favour of economic
deregulation that perpetuate this historic chain of oppression'. A notable example of opposition
to foreign economic dominance was the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998 (RA 8479), which permitted the three foreign oil companies (Shell, Caltex and Petron) to set their own prices, a condition
of the IMF to end its economic restrictions on the Philippines. The companies were subsequently
accused of failing to pass on substantial falls in the monthly landed cost of crude to customers
553
The notion that the purposeful forgetting of the past may be part of an active
process of creating new, shared identities has been previously noted among
ethnic groups within Southeast Asia. Placing more importance on creating
kinship ties in the future and of ignoring divergent ancestral descent has
been referred to as 'genealogical amnesia' among the Balinese (Geertz and
Geertz 1964) and as 'structural amnesia' among the Iban (Freeman 1961:208).
hi the Philippines, similar practices have been recorded in the Visayas
(Dumont 1992:146-7) and among the Buid of Mindoro (Gibson 1986:88). The
emphasis instead is on expanding horizontal relationships in the present and
future that may serve to enhance an individual's life chances, with little
regard for a past that confers no comparable benefits. Unsurprisingly, the
practice is found to be more prevalent among commoners (Geertz and Geertz
1964), though O.W. Wolters argues that the relative unimportance of lineage
in determining claims to status is characteristic of Southeast Asian cultures as
a whole (Wolters 1982:5, 9). In her study of migrant communities on the
island of Langkawi, Janet Carsten describes the importance of kinship ties
and how these are 'wide' rather then 'deep', 'stretching outwards, following
degrees of "siblingship" rather than backwards into the past'. She suggests
that there is a historical relationship between the constant population flux in
maritime Southeast Asia, the personalistic form in which authority has been
exercised, and the energy and ease with which new kinship ties are forged in
migrant communities (Carsten 1995:326-9). While these concepts have so far
been applied mainly to small-scale societies, their significance for the nationstate can also be considered.
The concept of citizenship in the Philippines has been found to be problematic, with few people, apart from politicians and government functionaries, identifying in any real sense with the idea of the nation. Instead, citizenship is more frequently described in terms of belonging to communities,
both local and large, that express national affiliation as expanding concentric
circles of horizontal social ties in which identification 'with the family or clan
lay closest to the heart and identification with the Filipino, farthest away'
(Diokno 1997:19-20). This dichotomy between the abstraction of nation and
sense of community largely replicates class divisions between elite and the
rest of the population within the wider society and is reflected in their differing perceptions of the past.
Elites are concerned with lineage and descent. They look to the past to
554
Greg Bankoff
validate their position in the present. In particular, they prefer occasions that
commemorate a history in which their forebears played a significant role, as
this serves to remind people why they currently occupy privileged positions
in society. They especially operate on a national scale, as the scope of their
interests is commensurate with the widest possible socio-economic and political unit available, the Republic of the Philippines. (Some, of course, have
supra-national interests.) The future they favour is one that is a continuation
of the past, an enduring history. For them, the Centennial offered a perfect
scenario for celebrating history in such a manner that it propelled them into
public notice and linked them to the heroes of a revolutionary past, which
was itself presented as the origin of the nation-state. The majority of the
population, on the other hand, are largely indifferent to family background
and ancestry. Many, in fact, are recent rural-urban migrants and think more
in terms of extended kinship relations. Their concerns are less national and
more oriented towards the local, the sphere they better understand and in
which they mainly operate. They find few occasions in the past worth commemorating and little or nothing of the past worth celebrating. History is
best forgotten; their prospects in society depend on a future made more
secure by expanding their horizontal social connections, often through ritual
or fictive ties of siblingship. The Centennial, therefore, meant little in terms
of national symbolism and was only significant in so far as it promised a
better future, a future, moreover, that was distinct from a history redolent
with past injustices and exploitation. The apparent eagerness with which
many public commemorations such as the 12 June parade were greeted
should not be confused with pride in the past as presently constructed, but
more as enthusiasm for a grand occasion on which to have a fiesta at someone else's expense.
It is this dichotomy between elites' and majority views of the past and
their perception of history that may account for the relatively mixed survey
findings on Centennial awareness among different sectors of the population.
While popular consciousness of the commemorations rose significantly from
47 per cent in September 1996, to 55 per cent in June 1997, to 78 per cent by
April 1998, these figures varied substantially between regions and among
socio-economic groups. Thus Centennial awareness was greatest in MetroManila (97 per cent) and Luzon (84 per cent) but much lower in the Visayas
(68 per cent) and Mindanao (63 per cent). The differences were even more
striking among certain sectors of the population. According to the April 1998
survey, 93 per cent of persons classified as belonging to ABC-class demographic profiles were conscious of the Centennial as compared to only 63 per
cent for those with an E class profile. And awareness declined rapidly at the
local level: only 35 per cent of those in the Visayas and 23 per cent in Metro
Manila were conscious of actual events being staged in their own neigh-
The corresponding statistics for Luzon and Mindanao were 40 per cent and 44 per cent
respectively. I can offer no explanation for this relatively higher latter figure based on current
information. These percentages were based on the number of people actually aware of the
Centennial and not the total population.
27
The euphemism used in the Philippines for the murder of political opponents by members
of officially sponsored assassination gangs.
28
Jurado argued that whatever his other actions Marcos was still a former president and war
hero of Bataan, that the Libingan grounds were not as sacred as some make out ('not all heroes
are buried there, and not all those buried there are heroes'), and concluded that: 'only the vocal
minority is making noises against your plan to bury the Marcos issue. The majority of people
are behind you'.
555
556
Greg Bankoff
would be too crude an analysis. There is space, indeed there is even place
made for such manifestations of resistance. Both, in fact, contribute to shaping a Philippine historiography as a series of synchronic narratives by which
the past is given shape and from which a mutually acceptable definition of
national identity may eventually evolve. However, the 'space' and the 'place'
have so far always been determined by the elites on their own terms.
Accordingly, selective memory and collective forgetting do not stand so
much in opposition to one another but are rather more in the nature of mutually reinforcing discourses.
REFERENCES
Appadurai, Arjun
1993
'Patriotism and its future', Public Culture 5-3:411-29.
Atencio, Joel
1999a
'Ople', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb.com.ph/main/9902/ 05fm01c.asp.
1999b
'Fil-Am war centennial today', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb. com.
ph/main/9902/ 04fm01d.asp.
Balibar, Etienne
1991
'The nation form; History and ideology', in: Etienne Balibar and
Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, nation, class; Ambiguous identities, pp.86106. London/New York: Verso.
Bankoff, Greg and Kathleen Weekley
forthcoming Post-colonial national identity in the Philippines; Celebrating the centennial
ofindepence. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate/Gower.
Beacon to the world
1998
'The Centennial; A beacon to the world', Manila Bulletin, http://www.
mb.com.ph/1998/JUN98/12jml0.htm.
Bengco, Regina and Janet Garcia N
1998
'Libingan burial is final; Erap', Malaya 17-144:1, 8.
Benigno, Teddy
1998
'Today; The Centennial a cause reborn; Erap urged to reconsider',
Philippine Star, 12 June.
Bhabha, Homi
1990
'Introduction; Narrating the nation', in: Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and
narration, pp.1-7. London/New York: Routledge.
Cadelina, Minnie, Janet Garcia and Victor Reyes
1998
'Who says Centennial awareness is low?', Malaya 17-143:1, 6.
Canieso-Doronila, Maria Luisa
1997
'An overview of Filipino perspectives on democracy and citizenship',
in: Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy and citizenship in Filipino
political culture. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center.
Carsten, Janet
1995
"The politics of forgetting; Migration, kinship and memory on the
557
periphery of the Southeast Asian state', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 1-2:317-35.
Casayuran, Mario
1999
'RP told of US moves to correct war records', Manila Bulletin, http://mb.
com.ph/main/9902/Ufm01h.asp.
Celebration
1998
'A celebration of constitutional democracy', Philippine Daily Inquirer,
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/doro.htm.
Centennial celebration
1997
"The Centennial celebration of the first republic in Asia; The Biak-naBato Republic', Manila Bulletin 299-2:12.
Chatterjee, Partha
1993
The nation and its fragments; Colonial and postcolonial histories. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Churchill, Bernardita Reyes (ed.)
1997
Determining the truth; The story of Andres Bonifacio. Manila: The Manila
Studies Association, The National Commission for Culture and the
Arts Committee on Historical Research, The Philippine National
Historical Society.
Constantino, Renato
1975
The Philippines; A past revisited. Quezon City: Tala.
1998
'Centennial dissent', Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb. com.ph/1998/
}UN98/03jmlla.htm.
Corpus, Onofre
1998
'Keeping the spirit of 1986 alive', in: J.A. De La Cruz,"The Morning
After', Malaya, 13 June.
Crozier, Ralph
1977
Koxinga and Chinese nationalism; History, myth, and the hero. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.
Cruz, Pennie Azarcon de la
1998
'Bringing back the bells of Balangiga', Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://
www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/lifestyle/lif_2.htm.
Diokno, Maria
1997
'Becoming a Filipino citizen; Perspectives on citizenship and democracy', in: Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy and citizenship in Filipino
political culture, pp. 17-39. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center.
Dumont, Jean-Paul
1992
Visayan vignettes; Ethnographic traces of a Philippine island. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Fast, Jonathan and Jim Richardson
1983
Roots of dependency; Political and economic revolution in 19th-century
Philippines. Quezon City: Foundation For Nationalist Studies.
First hundred
1998
"The first hundred years', Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/junl2/opinion/aec.htm.
558
Greg Bankoff
Freeman, J.D.
1961
559
Forging of caste and community in India and Sri Lanka. Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
No need
1998
Not free
1998
'We're still not free from foreign oppressors', Philippine Daily Inquirer,
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jun98/iunI5/opinion/nealc.htm.
Ochosa, Orlino
1995
'Bandoleros'; Outlawed guerrillas of the Philippine-American War 19031907. Quezon City: New Day.
Ople, Bias
1999
'US Library of Congress restores Filipino dignity', Manila Bulletin,
http://www.mb.com.ph/oped/blas/990216.asp.
Ordonez, Elmer (ed.)
1998
The Philippine Revolution and beyond. Manila: National Centennial
Commission/National Commission for Culture and the Arts.
Oviedo, Sheila
1998
'A hobbled economy's hundred-year dependence', Today 1608:23.
Quezon, Manuel
1997
'Centennial; Who cares?', Philippine Free Press 89-35 (30 August).
1998
'Truly a flag of history', Today 1608:17, 22.
Quiros, Conrado de
1999
'Dumaan Ako Kay Constantino (conclusion)', Philippine Daily Inquirer,
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/sep99/sep01/opinion/qui.htm.
Raymundo, Dulce
1998
'Reduce rich-poor gap, Ramos urges', Philippine Journal 11-117:1,6.
Renan, Ernest
1990
'What is a nation?', in: Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and narration, pp. 822. London/New York: Routledge.
RP
1998
'RP "1st Democracy in Asia" - JdV, Philippine journal 11-117.
Run-up
1997
'Run-up to the Centennial', Philippine Daily Inquirer 12-185:8.
Santillan, Cecilia
1995
'The Philippine Centennial; 1896 or 1898?', Business World 9-93:1,11.
Silva, John
1997
'Filipinos must make noise to have Balangiga bells returned', Philippine
Daily Inquirer 13-14:D10.
Smythe, Pat
1998
"The Catholic Church in East Timor', in: Torben Retboll (ed.), East
Timor; Occupation and resistance, pp. 153-73. Copenhagen: International
Work Group For Indigenous Affairs. [IWGIA-Document 89.]
Tan, Samuel
1998
Interview with Dr Samuel Tan, Director of the National Historical
Institute and Commissioner of the National Centennial Committee',
National Historical Institute, Ermita, Manila, 7 July.
560
Greg Bankoff
Torres, Estrella
1998
'Awareness on history doubles', Today 1608:2.
Venecia, Jose' de
1997
'Building Blocks for the Future', Malaya 16-149:5.
1998
'Centennial messages, economic freedom', Manila Bulletin, http://zvww.
tnb.com.phll998lJUN98H2jm01c.htm.
Wolters, O.W.
1982
History, culture, and region in Southeast Asian perspective. Singapore: