G.R. No.

L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of
Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo,
in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by
train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to
rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger,
named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point
where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the
plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with
the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that
after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact
that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the
shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one
upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it
is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment
he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he
had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where
an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the
form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover
damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the
security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor,
the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that,
although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed
as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due
caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered
in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on
the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train;

and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily
follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and
immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in
their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only
to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this
distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa,
substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly
connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing
. . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903
of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those
not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at
365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed
upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they
are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle ofrespondeat superior
if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the principle announced in
article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another,
the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant
whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence
which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises
at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The
liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed.
As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act
or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A
master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications
they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates
a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is
rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that
these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico
Reports, 215.)

This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30
Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to
respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to
the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the
negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that
the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the
authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by
reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the
person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a
mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which
arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the
concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal
duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society.
The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give
rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character
and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful
or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations
the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for
the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a
legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature
which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions
to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility
may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made
liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of
action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if
he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit
of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to
warrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the
negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is
obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the
breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be
invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person
acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position
than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee,
by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from
his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted,
juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts
if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it
would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such
servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself
of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care
had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to
the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June
27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that
plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the
Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as
those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to
carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by the
negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for the
damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had
been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had
any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the
negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing
Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the
plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for the
personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which
defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of
the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained
of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the owner by his
acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that
the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that
the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation.

The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the
latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the
particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort
rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the
briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the
defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the
defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It
also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in
the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of
the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp.
29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or
its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is
always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant.
Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care,
either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is
identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case
that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by
contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants,
that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care
in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual and
extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual
obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had
no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his
own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the
doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's
own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to
his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty
of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury
suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the
contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to
subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at
variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no
injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent
failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight
from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to
desist was contributory negligence.
1awph!l.net

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the
condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it
should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused
by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a
public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in
the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have
already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the
performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these
sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and
even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been
in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is
to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger
are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been
observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature
of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or
the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has
not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard
mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage
suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant
the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected
with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for
the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff
waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord,
namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, should be
absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed.
Johnson, J., concur.

[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
[1]

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.
Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor
an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Sclaw
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena
and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with
severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three
months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for
the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held
Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict,
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente
Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and
that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the
ground that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver
and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a
party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in
Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be

prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof. Slxmis
[2]

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding
Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding
on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioners contention. Slx

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct
the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall
allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its
registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than
that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner
unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway. Kycalr
[3]

[4]

Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and
without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in
that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of
continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to
pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has
a defect already."

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under

confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of
her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing
of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x has a defect
already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows
of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is
entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
[5]

[6]

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of
the contract of carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in open court that
the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he
was the one at fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Buena, JJ., concur.
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the
trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending
further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the
disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of
the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the
questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself,
its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or
heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side
of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its
concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the
lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of
defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at
the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during
rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto
from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water

during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water
above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors,
contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and
will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed
to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any
person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a
lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured
party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is
privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals
of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting
fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order
of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

1

of the respondent Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2
for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation
duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's

attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts
which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as
atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in
the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and
they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were
in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay
captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV
No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of
16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court,
a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts
or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that
plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.).
Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so
low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising,

then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him
to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of
whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and
he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an
Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for
the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16
this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);

(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth
in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter
of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither
can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly

broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement
and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
(43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such

cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill
his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article
21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined
that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was
criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around,
there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was
seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual
act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but
the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury
which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been
an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in
pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice
that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's

partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner.
Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed
by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased

on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance
of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the
complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal
interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the
mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the
Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was
careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages
suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article
1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the
Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar
simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903
of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this
action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,),
but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection
or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the
Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue,
we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi
delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly
envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the
solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions
which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions
of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable
by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence
shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the
minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and
living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their
employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall
have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what
he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen
years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under
their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship,
or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable,
saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. In
default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods;
if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study

shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution
is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the
genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7,
says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five
sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil
Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary
and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p.
414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes
personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada
responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus,
there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal
responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every
felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two
trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the
latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily
responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico

could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece
sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el
resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista
en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o
menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene
otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de
daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son
ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los
fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles
nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina
aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es
necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles,
entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas
y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o
sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el
Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo
por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa
en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro
regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y
otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo
ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo
el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de
inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del
proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica
sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y
se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa
juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should
be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the
collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with
the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa

surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of
effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and
belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or
omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that
such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political
purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance
with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa;
but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among
those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities
applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with
subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who
are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says:
"The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during
their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly
and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the
civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms
in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its
actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it
by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence,
but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that
of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the
criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the nonexistence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the
Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it
becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil
Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the
Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the
author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of
a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be
instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent,
Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)

Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas
personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es
necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una
responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno
responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion
de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del
maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el
maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la
ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por
lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons
for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to
know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the
fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to
the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the
persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is,
therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility
exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely
inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in
Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo
1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun
nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria?
En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas,
declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden
civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la
responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults,
this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with
whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or
subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated
persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former
is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law,
in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of
that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should
be responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set
forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from
the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente
died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de
Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a
civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court
awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared.
The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a
quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon
La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la
causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso
de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o
empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la
de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente
a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados
textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo
recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court,
in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon
Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the
criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken
cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the
limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence
of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it
is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in
ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction,
and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either
alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain
said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been

held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But
the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence
which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might
be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which
might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him
because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited
was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a
railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and
fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that
this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a
las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion
del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a
sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron
entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y
3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron
daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos
y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian
hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso,
porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento
del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de
ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el
articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se
limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902
del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation
to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff
contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their
delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent
intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused
him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors
and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of
the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original
complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of
transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the
decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal
of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next
article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court
awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a
tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff
whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from
these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in
which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable
fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil
Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the
provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that
nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under
civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant,
under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of
the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would
be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal
Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes
of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was
pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by
him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime
that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished.
These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same
subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to
show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended
thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act
or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable
whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in
respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so
far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident
in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it
unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now
in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs
before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the
Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law,
within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within
the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may
be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the
passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona
brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been
run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring

the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in
part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto
before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were
coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to
run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should
have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and
had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street
and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the
latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a
way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been
stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed
without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the
deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs.
House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion
Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault
and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality
to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V.
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the
rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter
where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial
courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on
appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House
who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in
part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order
the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point
that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a
perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the
much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother,
if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and
not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over
the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during
the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On
appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the
care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good
condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the
Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had
no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides
when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the
latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which
was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's
motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in
part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business
or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's
employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison
Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his
seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces
of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya
and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded

guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This
theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
(Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil.,
768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought
an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging
to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed
captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his
services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of
the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the
doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from
all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above
set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article
1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car
of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27.
Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila
for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from
Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming
that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the
Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of
subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising
from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of
the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman
was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation
connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal
Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx

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xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as
pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply
alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its
servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or
might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor.
(By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the
argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be
disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based
its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code
and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary
liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the
employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show
that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil
liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal
Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had
for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at
bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision
illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter
type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth.
Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from
criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case.
But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa

aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by
a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious
and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
(Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de
la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force
and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and
to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to
its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and

results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors
and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the
trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending
further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the
disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of
the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the
questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself,
its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or
heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side
of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its
concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru the
lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of
defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at
the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during
rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto
from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water
during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water
above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors,
contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and
will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed
to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any
person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a
lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured
party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is
privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will

continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals
of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting
fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order
of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.