ALEJANDRO QUEMUEL and RUPERTA SOLIS v. ANGEL S.

OLAES and JULIANA

PRUDENTE
Nature
Appeal from the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs to compel
respondents to reduce the monthly rental and to sell to the former the portion of the lot where the
plaintiffs house was erected.
Facts
The Olaes spouses sued in the CFI of Cavite the Quemel spouses for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land. The Quemel spouses admitted plaintiffs ownership but contended that their
occupation was gratuitous. In 1954, the trial court ordered the Quemel spouses to return the
possession of the land to the Olaes spouses and to pay the latter Php20.00 a month from January
1954, until they shall have vacated the premises. The Quemel, to forestall execution of the
judgment, filed a complaint against the Olaes spouses seeking to reduce the monthly rental and to
compel the Olaes spouses to sell to them the portion of the lot. But the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss filed by Olaes spouses, to which the Quemel spouses appealed
from, and as certified by the appellate court the appeal went to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Can the Quemel spouses invoke as their basis of cause of action Article 448 in connection with
Article 546 of the Civil Code?
Held
No. The decision appealed from is affirmed.
Ratio
A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that they are not applicable to plaintiffs'
case. Under Article 448, the 1) right to appropriate the works or improvements or 2) to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs to the owner of the land.
The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the
improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former.
This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith. But the plaintiffs are not builders in
good faith. From the pleadings and the documentary evidence submitted, it is indisputable that
the land in question originally belonged to the government as part of the Friar Lands Estate and
the title thereto was in the name of the government, until it was purchased by Agapita Solis who
applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to purchase the land by installments. The corresponding Sale
Certificate No. 531, effective July 1, 1909 was executed.
In defendants' complaint before the CFI, they alleged that they are the owners of lot and that
plaintiffs, have been occupying southeastern half portion thereof, without any right thereto,
except the tolerance of defendants, which were admitted expressly and under oath, in the answer
of plaintiffs herein. It would, therefore, appear that plaintiffs herein were not unaware of the flaw
in their title, if any, and that their true relation with the herein defendants was that of tenant and
landlord, and that their rights are governed by Article 1573 in relation to article 487 of the old
Civil Code.*
It can clearly be inferred that plaintiffs cannot compel the defendants to pay for the
improvements the former made on the property or to sell the latter's land. Plaintiffs' only right, is
to remove improvements, if it is possible to do so, without damage to the land.
*Art. 1573. A lessee shall have with respect to useful a voluntary improvements, the same right
which are granted the usufructuaries.
Art. 487. The usufructuary may make on the property in usufruct any improvements, useful or
recreative, which may deem proper, provided he does not change its form or substance, but he

shall have no right to be indemnified thereof. He may, however, remove such improvements,
should it possible to do so without injury to the property
BENITEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Both pairs of spouses, Sps. Benitez and Macapagal bought parcels of land wherein the latter found
that the Sps. Benitez encroached on a portion of their land. The Sps. Macapagal filed an action to
recover possession of said portion and after which a compromise was reached wherein the Sps.
Macapagal would sell the encroached portion to the Benitez. The Sps. Macapagal bought another
lot adjacent to that of the Sps. Benitez and found that the Sps. Benitezs house encroached a
portion of their lot [again]. After refusing to vacate despite verbal and written demands, the Sps.
Macapagal filed an action for ejectment against the Sps. Benitez [within 1 year from the last
demand]. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in favor of Sps. Macapagal. On appeal the
RTC and the CA affirmed in toto said decision. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an action for ejectment is the proper remedy to recover possession of the
encroached portion
(2) Whether or not Sps. Benitez can be made to pay rent
(3) Whether or not the option to sell exclusively belongs to the owner
HELD:
(1) YES, Sec. 1 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court allows any person unlawfully deprived of
possession by FISTS or after expiration of right to hold possession within 1 year from unlawful
deprivation to bring an action to recover possession. Forcible entry requires prior physical
possession but unlawful detainer does not require prior physical possession. Actual or physical
possession is not always necessary. And possession is not only acquired through material
occupation but also when a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right, through execution of deed of sale. [since it is
a proper remedy, the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear the matter]
(2) YES, The rent to be paid arises from the loss of the use and occupation of the property and is
technically damages. Therefore since petitioners benefited from the occupation of the property it
is only just that they be made to pay damages in the form of rent.
(3) YES, Art. 448 of the CC mandates that the option to sell the land on which another in good
faith builds, plants or sown on, belongs to the owner. The reason for this is because the owners
right is older and by principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
PECSON V. CA
244 SCRA 407
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land wherein he built an apartment complex. Due to his
failure to pay for realty taxes, his land was sold in a public auction and was sold to spouses
Nuguid. He moved for the setting aside of the auction but was denied.
HELD:
Article 448 doesn't apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder who then
later loses ownership of the land by sale or auction.
Nevertheless, the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering
that the primary intent of this provision is to avoid a state of forced ownership.
The current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of
reimbursement to the builder in good faith
The right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid
implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown
and retention of ownership of the improvements, and necessarily, the income therefrom

G.R. NO. 151815. FEBRUARY 23, 2005

SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON
FACTS:
Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment
building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer to
Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda
Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City, the RTC
upheld the spouses title but declared that the four-door twostorey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed by the CA and
by the SC. The Nuguids became the uncontested owners of commercial lot. The Nuguid spouses
moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.
ISSUE:
WON the Nuguids should reimburse Pecson for the benefits derived from the apartment building.
HELD: YES.
Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993,
when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include
the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed
the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as
his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in
good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made.
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection
of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits
the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person
who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and
useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. Given the circumstances of the instant
case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a
decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The
petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the respondent
during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.

G.R. NO. 120303. JULY 24, 1996

GEMINIANO, ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
It appears that subject lot was originally owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de
Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow,
which the petitioners sold to the private respondents, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter
that portion of the lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a
contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the
house stood, in favor of the private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of 7 years.
The private respondents then introduced additional improvements and registered the house in
their names. After the expiration of the lease contract, however, the petitioners' mother refused to
accept the monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which
resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn
sold it to the spouses Dionisio. Spouses Dionisio executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said
property in favor of the petitioners. The petitioners sent a letter addressed to private respondent
Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in arrears within
twenty days from notice. Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the
petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
ISSUE: WON Art. 448 is applicable to this case.
HELD: NO.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of the Civil Code
should apply. They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of the execution
of the contract of lease, as well as the alleged assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on
which the house stood would be sold to them. But being mere lessees, the private respondents
knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly,
they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of
his property. And even if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private
respondents possessors or builders in good faith so as to be covered by the provisions of Article
448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the
aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even
proven
R. NO.157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005
ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRC
Psd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered
that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by
respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort). It turned out that respondents Castelltort
and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent
Lina Lopez- Villegas (Lina) through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that
after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot

17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began,
with Villegas offering a larger lot near petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement
thereof. In the alternative, Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners lot with legal
interest. Both proposals were, however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel, by letter of August
24, 1995, directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and any other
structure he may have built thereon, and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners subsequently
filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for
the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction against spouses- respondents
Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.
2229-95-C.
ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD:
Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good
faith shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner
of the building to remove it from the land. The raison detre for this provision has been
enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a
state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land
the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing
Racaza v. Susana Realty, 18 SCRA 1172
FACTS:
Petitioner leased respondent's land since 1952 on a month to month basis, he erected a house
on it and live in it. On Dec., 1955, respondent demanded him to vacate the property and on Feb.,
1956, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against petitioner before the MTC. But such
complaint was dismissed on Nov., 1956 for respondent's failure to prosecute.
On Dec., 1957, respondent demanded again for him to vacate the premises and on Feb., 1958,
a new unlawful detainer case was filed against petitioner. But it did not allege the time when
Petitioner failed to pay the rent. However, from respondent's evidence, it appeared that petitioner
failed to pay since July, 1955.
MTC ordered petitioner to vacate the premises.
Petitioner appealed the order to CFI praying for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that
MTC has no jurisdiction because the complaint (2nd) was filed more than a year from Dec., 1955.
CFI ruled that unlawful detainer started on Dec., 1957. Motion for reconsideration was
denied so Petitioner appealed.
CA ruled that the 1 year period should be counted from Dec., 1957.
Hence, this petition.
RULING:
This case was brought not on the theory that the lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory
that the lease had expired. The lease was on a month-to-month basis and the lease expired at the
end of every month. It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since

what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. In this case, demand to
vacate is not necessary. Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its
term, no such demand is necessary.
SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got
married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in
1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of
things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years
are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to
every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
TECHNOGAS PHIL. V. CA
268 SCRA 5
FACTS:
Technogas owned property with buildings and walls. Uy bought an adjacent property.
There was an agreement for Technogas to demolish the wall. Uy filed a complained but
the case was dismissed. This prompted him to dig a hole along the wall, which led to
the partial collapse of the wall. A case for malicious mischief was filed against Uy.
HELD:
1. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the precise extent
or location of the property by merely examining his proper title.
2. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner doesn't militate against
its right to claim the status of builder in good faith.
3. Bad faith isnt imputable to a registered owner of a land when a part of his building
encroaches upon a builders land

Formal Requirements of a Valid Partition

The intrinsic validity of partition not executed in a public instrument is not undermined when no
creditors are involved. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of
Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or

enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of
Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not
legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. (VERONA PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 134329,
January 19, 2000)
Vda. De Nazareno v. CA [G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996.]
Property, 2003 ( 204 )
Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been
formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of
the Cagayan river. Sometime in 1979, Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on
which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In the
latter part of 1982, Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4.
A decision was rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC
Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case was remanded to the Municipal trial court for execution of
judgment after the same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for
annulment of judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 and subsequently, a case for
certiorari for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 25; both of which were dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally
enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they
occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being
claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it
was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land
Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer, recommended the
Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno be
cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application. Based on
the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an
amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the
private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.
The petitioners Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the
RTC, branch 22, for the annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and
order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the administrative decision
of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC
dismissing the complaint. Hence, the petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
1. Accretion belongs to the riparian owners; requisites

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. In
the case of Meneses v. CA, it was held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.
SARILI VS. LAGROSA G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014
Facts: Respondent is the owner of a certain parcel of land which he has been religiously paying
the real estate taxes for since its acquisition. Respondent is a resident of California, USA, and
during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject
property was issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparoby virtue of a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale)
purportedly executed by him and his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa.
In their answer, Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having
purchased the subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a Special
Power of Attorney to sell/dispose of the same, and, in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 20, 1992 conveying the said property in their favor. In this relation, they
denied any participation in the preparation of the February 16, 1978 deed of sale, which may have
been merely devised by the "fixer" they hired to facilitate the issuance of the title in their names.
Issue: Whether there is a valid conveyance of the property?
Ruling: The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers capacity or legal authority to sell
depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of
attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there
appears to be flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do;
the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances
of its execution.
Settled is the rule that a defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderance of evidence.
Since Sps. Sarilis claim over the subject property is based on forged documents, no valid title had
been transferred to them.

FERNANDEZ VS. TARUN

G.R. No. 143868
November 14, 2002
FACTS: a fishpond was originally covered by a OCT, co-owned by the Fernandez siblings. 2 of the
5 siblings, Antonio and Demetria, sold their respective shares to the spouses Tarun, both
registered and annotated on the OTC.
Later, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition of 2 parcels of registered land with exchange of shares. Among the parties to the
deed are the Fernandez siblings. It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and
respect the sale in favor of Spouses Tarun stated above.
By virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Angel Fernandez exchanged his share on the 2nd
fishpond to the shares of his co-owners in the remaining portion of the first fishpond, making
Angel and the Spouses Tarun co-owners of the first fishpond. By virtue of said deed, a TCT was
issued in the name of Angel and spouses Tarun. However, it was Angel and later on his heirs who
remained in possession of the entire fishpond.

When Angel was still alive, Spouses Tarun sought the partition of the property and their share of
its income. Angel refused to heed their demand. After the death of Angel, Spouses Tarun wrote his
heirs (petitioners herein) of their desire for partition but this was rejected by the latter. Hence the
suit for partition and damages
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision. Hence this petition.
HELD: Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code. According to them, they were not notified of the sale, but learned
about it only when they received the summons for the partition case. They claim their right to
redeem the property under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners co-owners. The sale of the contested
property to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated before petitioners succeeded their
predecessor, Angel Fernandez. By the time petitioners entered into the co-ownership,
respondents were no longer third persons, but had already become co-owners of the whole
property. A third person, within the meaning of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.