LT. GONZALES vs GEN.

ABAYA
FACTS:
> President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the
AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment.
Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
> more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
> Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with
the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition
to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more
military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from
their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They
also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
> President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by
General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress
the rebellion then taking place in Makati City.
> In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their
arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments.
Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
> The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that
the military personnel involved be charged with coup detat. the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them.
> DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup detat
against those soldiers.
> Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the
findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved
in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War
and was approved by the AFP top brass.
> Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February
11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup
detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Military Court can acquire jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:
YES. There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to
military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the
general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general
rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be serviceconnected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an
exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.
This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing
that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly
caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession.
The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the
court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has
conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action
which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the
law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.
Considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, also known as the Articles of War
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or
Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.

OLBES vs BUEMIO

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses.

ISSUE:

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts
of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "serviceconnected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the
court-martial.

FACTS:
> On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner)
was indicted for Grave Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
by Information.
> Denying petitioners motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in light of his
pending petition for review before the Department of Justice, Judge Hipolito dela
Vega proceeded with petitioners arraignment in which he pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Pre-trial was thereupon set. However, declared a non-working day due to the
occurrence of typhoon Chedeng. The pre-trial was thus reset.
> At the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery
that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was
again reset.
> Before the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information
on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under Republic Act No. 8493 or
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. He
argued that considering that [he] was not without any fault on his part brought to trial
within 80 days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules.
> Denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss holding that petitioner played a big part in the
delay of the case, and that technical rules of procedure were meant to secure, not
override, substantial justice.

Whether or not there was a violation of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998?

RULING:
NO. The petition does not impress. Thus, in spite of the prescribed time
limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)

length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
That speedy trial is a relative and flexible term, summons the courts to maintain a
delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy
trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of
criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into
account several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from
the delay, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively
prejudiced by the delay in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays.

PEOPLE vs MARIANO
FACTS:
> Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing private
respondent herein Hermogenes Mariano of estafa.
> In the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Hermogenes
Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal
Mayor, Constantino Nolasco authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess
property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said municipality, received from the
said USAID/NEC involving the duty of making delivery of said items to the said
Municipal Mayor, but the said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of
the said items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in spite of
repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave
abuse of confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit.
> Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information that
the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person
of the defendant.
> In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the subject
matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor
Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, was indicted
before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and
for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty and that inasmuch as the case
against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him.
> Respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to quash on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting the motion to quash on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
RULING:
YES. "Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. The word
"jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the
law" which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law to a court
or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. Bouvier's own

definition of the term "jurisdiction" has found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction
is the right of a Judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before
him, acquired through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide cases."

MIRANDA vs TULIAO

"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular

offense and impose the punishment for it.

> Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were
later identified as son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.
> Two informations for murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City.
> The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was
appealed to this Court on automatic review and acquitted the accused therein on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
> SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners as the persons responsible for the deaths.
> Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners and
warrants of arrest issued.
> Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
> In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution to
DOJ.
> The new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered
the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
> Respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this
Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the case.
> Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly
after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the two
Informations for murder against petitioners.
> Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt
of court when he dismissed the information for murder.
> Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering
the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the
estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge
against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are
two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one
is different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that We do
not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction
over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first
takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. The
Military Commission as stated earlier is without power or authority to hear and
determine the particular offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is
no concurrent jurisdiction between it and respondent court to speak of. Estafa as
described in the Information filed falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil
courts.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing
and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order issued by then Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial
relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court?

own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.

RULING:

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

NO. [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may
be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It
is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an
accused may invoke the processes of the court. Thus, an accused must first be
placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for
judicial reliefs.

PEOPLE VS LAGON

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing
a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, 9 while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his

FACTS:
> A criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City charging private
respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa.
> The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its
evidence. City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose.
The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of
the crime, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However,
by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a
person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's
authority to impose.
> Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of
Roxas City had jurisdiction over the case and that it had erred in issuing its Order
dismissing the case.
> The Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had
committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Court erred in dismissing the estafa case?

RULING:
NO. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in
criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the
commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the
commission of the offense charged. Thus, in accordance with the above rule,
jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of
Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum
penalty which a city court could impose.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the
authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute
given the allegations of a criminal information.
The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab
origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by
the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent
of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation
charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment
provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is
presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under
the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In
such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had
subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced
penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.

FIGUEROA vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, the trial court convicted
the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.
> The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner
to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction
of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts
lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the
CA affirmed the petitioners conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the
wrong court, constitute laches?
Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his
case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to
estoppel?
RULING:
NO. Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.
Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative
act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal,
and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or
on appeal, and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the
court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can
not be waived by the parties.

The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional
cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a
person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him
from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is
especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the
court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer
any harm.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action.

HEIRS OF HONRALES vs HONRALES

FACTS:
> Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales.
> Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for
parricide against respondent.
> Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended on the ground that they have
filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
> Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution recommending the
withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead.
> Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the
information for parricide.
> While the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information for
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
> Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a
petition for review with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense. They
likewise filed an Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC arguing
that there was no final resolution yet downgrading the charge against respondent that
would justify withdrawal of the Information for parricide.
> DOJ finding probable cause against respondent for reckless imprudence resulting
in parricide, instead of intentional parricide as charged.
> Respondent was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide. He was accordingly sentenced.
> Respondent filed with the RTC a motion seeking to dismiss the parricide charges
against him. He cited his arraignment and conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the
dismissal of the case against him.
> Petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion to nullify the proceedings. They
claimed that they were denied procedural due process and that the Information
before the MeTC was invalid.
> Judge Barrios issued an Order granting the withdrawal of the Information for
parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Judge Barrios
ruled that the Information for parricide found itself without a supporting resolution and
thus its withdrawal was appropriate.
> Petitioner heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders issued
by the RTC through Judge Barrios.
> CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to
make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his
judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that
the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result

in the reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondents constitutional
right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case may be remanded to the RTC without violating
respondents right against double jeopardy?
RULING:
YES. Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the
RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr.,[50] we held that once jurisdiction is acquired by the
court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional
parricide[51] pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the
criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to
the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law and can
never become executory.

PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES vs PEOPLE

FACTS:
> Accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property.
> The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
> Accused had jumped bail and remained at-large.
> [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
> The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the
civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case
against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused?
RULING:
NO. Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps
bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or

confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of

the appeal.
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the
appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accusedemployee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact
remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the
subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they
are deemed to have waived the appeal.

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article

103 of RPC which reads:

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely

harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed, deviations from the
rules cannot be tolerated.

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall

also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by
the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk
involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed,
appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case
against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to
appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment.

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If
the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the
proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived
of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in
court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.

ALONZO vs CEBU COUNTRY CLUB

FACTS
> Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the
late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the
pendency of this case, and was substituted by his legal heirs.
> Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N. Alonso had
acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government; that the
original vendee of Lot No. 727 had assigned his sales certificate to Tomas N. Alonso,
who had been consequently issued Patent, but the final deed of sale had not been
registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like the
approval of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as required by law.
> Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title had been administratively
reconstituted from the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT1310 in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of
respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc (Cebu Country Club);
> Francisco formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to restore the ownership
and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu Country Club denied
Franciscos demand and claim of ownership, and refused to deliver the possession to
him.
> Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the RTC in Cebu City an
action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of
certificates of title, and the recovery of property.
> RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club.
> Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed the
RTC. Francisco appealed to this Court; SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court and declared that the subject land legally
belongs to the Government of the Philippines.
> The Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution.
> RTC denied the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution through the
first appealed order.
> The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the denial of the
OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
> Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no longer
seeking the execution of the decision, subject to its reservation to contest any other
titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should clear evidence show such titles as
having been obtained through fraud.
> After the filing of the OSGs comment, the RTC issued the second appealed order,
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration since the party who had a direct

interest in the execution of the decision and the reconsideration of the denial of the
motion for execution was the Government, represented only by the OSG; hence, the
petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for reconsideration, especially that
they were not authorized by the OSG for that purpose.
> petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the
denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution?
RULING:
NO. The first refers to the petitioners breach of the hierarchy of courts by
coming directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition
for review on certiorari. They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the
Court of Appeals (CA), because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient
functioning of the courts and to the orderly administration of justice. Their nonobservance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court
by one more case, which, though it may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one
case too much to the Court, which has to devote time and effort in poring over the
papers submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have first
been made by the CA. The time and effort could have been dedicated to other cases
of importance and impact on the lives and rights of others.
The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the reality that
determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to bring this
appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the CA was in the better
position to review and to determine.
Franciscos father did not have any registerable title to the land in question. Having
none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or
the latters heirs. Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son
Francisco M. Alonso or the latters heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in
dispute.
The Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of the subject
lot.