Federal Register / Vol. 72, No.

191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 56287

TABLE 4.—CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES FOR CHEMICAL ELEMENT WEIGHT PERCENTAGES—Continued

Materials P Mn

Welds ........................................................................................................................................................... 0.019 1.63

TABLE 5.—MAXIMUM HEAT-AVERAGE RESIDUAL [°F] FOR RELEVANT MATERIAL GROUPS BY NUMBER OF AVAILABLE DATA
POINTS
Number of available data points
Material group s [°F]
3 4 5 6 7 8

Welds, for Cu > 0.072 ...................................................................................... 26.4 45.7 39.6 35.4 32.3 29.9 28.0
Plates, for Cu > 0.072 ...................................................................................... 21.2 36.7 31.8 28.4 26.0 24.0 22.5
Forgings, for Cu > 0.072 .................................................................................. 19.6 33.9 29.4 26.3 24.0 22.2 20.8
Weld, Plate or Forging, for Cu ≤ 0.072 ........................................................... 18.6 32.2 27.9 25.0 22.8 21.1 19.7

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day reduced reliance on operator actions. Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN:
of September 2007. The impact of a large, commercial Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event, E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If
Annette L. Vietti-Cook, and the NRC’s requirements applicable you do not receive a reply e-mail
Secretary of the Commission. to the design, construction, testing, confirming that we have received your
[FR Doc. 07–4887 Filed 10–2–07; 8:45 am] operation, and maintenance of design comments, contact us directly at 301–
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P features, functional capabilities, and 415–1966.
strategies for design basis events would Hand deliver comments to: 11555
not be applicable to design features, Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
NUCLEAR REGULATORY functional capabilities, or strategies 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.
COMMISSION selected by the applicant solely to meet Federal workdays. (Telephone 301–415–
the requirements of this rule. The 1966).
10 CFR Part 52 objective of this rule is to require Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S.
nuclear power plant designers to Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301–
RIN 3150–AI19
perform a rigorous assessment of design 415–1101.
Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for features that could provide additional You may submit comments on the
New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, information collections by the methods
to the extent practicable, the effects of indicated in the Paperwork Reduction
AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Act Statement.
an aircraft impact, with reduced
Commission. Publicly available documents related
reliance on operator actions.
ACTION: Proposed rule. to this rulemaking may be viewed
DATES: Submit comments on this electronically on the public computers
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory proposed rule by December 17, 2007. located at the NRC’s Public Document
Commission (NRC or the Commission) Submit comments on the information Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint
is proposing to amend its regulations to collection aspects on this proposed rule North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
require applicants for new standard by November 2, 2007. Comments Maryland. The PDR reproduction
design certifications that do not received after the above dates will be contractor will copy documents for a
reference a standard design approval; considered if it is practical to do so, but fee.
new standard design approvals; assurance of consideration cannot be Publicly available documents created
combined licenses that do not reference given to comments received after these or received at the NRC after November
a standard design certification, standard dates. 1, 1999, are available electronically at
design approval, or manufactured the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at
reactor; and new manufacturing licenses ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
that do not reference a standard design by any one of the following methods.
adams.html. From this site, the public
certification or standard design approval Please include the following number
can gain entry into ADAMS, which
to assess the effects of the impact of a RIN 3150–AI19 in the subject line of
provides text and image files of NRC’s
large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear your comments. Comments on
public documents. If you do not have
power plant. Based on the insights rulemakings submitted in writing or in
access to ADAMS or if there are
gained from this assessment, the electronic form will be made available
problems in accessing the documents
applicant shall include in its to the public in their entirety on the
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR
application a description and evaluation NRC rulemaking Web site. Personal
Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
of design features, functional information, such as your name,
415–4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or address, telephone number, e-mail
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the address, etc., will not be removed from
Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS

effects of the aircraft impact with your submission.

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear
Submit comments via the Federal Regulatory Commission, Washington,
6 Wall thickness is the beltline wall thickness
eRulemaking Portal http:// DC 20555–0001; telephone 301–415–
including the clad thickness. www.regulations.gov.
7 RT
PTS limits contributes 1 × 10
¥8 per reactor 1462; e-mail: sxs4@nrc.gov or Ms.
year to the reactor vessel TWCF. Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nanette Gilles, Office of New Reactors,
8 Excluding underclad cracks in forgings. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

VerDate Aug<31>2005 16:53 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM 03OCP1
 56288 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone
301–415–1180; e-mail: nvg@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
III. Currently Approved Standard Design
Certifications
IV. Renewal of a Standard Design
Certification, Combined License, or
Manufacturing License
V. Newly Designed Power Reactors
A. Introduction
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impact
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
D. Evaluation of Design Features,
Functional Capabilities, and Strategies
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Guidance
VIII. Specific Request for Comments
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Plain Language
XI. Agreement State Compatibility
XII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XIII. Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact: Availability
XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XV. Regulatory Analysis
XVI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XVII. Backfit Analysis
I. Introduction
The Commission believes that it is
prudent for nuclear power plant
designers to take into account the
potential effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. The Commission
has determined that the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-
design-basis event and has chosen an
approach consistent with NRC’s
previous approach to such events. The
overriding objective of this rule is to
require nuclear power plant designers to
perform a rigorous assessment of design
and other features that could provide
additional inherent protection to avoid
or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of an aircraft impact, with
reduced reliance on operator actions. In
this manner, this rule would result in
newly designed power reactor facilities
being more inherently robust with
regard to a potential aircraft impact than
if they were designed in the absence of
this rule. This rule thus provides an
enhanced level of protection beyond
that which is provided by the existing
adequate protection requirements,
which all operating power reactors are
required to meet, and which would be
provided by the proposed adequate
protection requirements that the
facilities will be required to meet when
finalized (see the proposed 10 CFR part
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
73, ‘‘Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials,’’ power reactor security
requirements (71 FR 62663; October 26,
2006)).
The proposed rule would require
applicants for new standard design
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
certifications that do not reference a
standard design approval; new standard
design approvals; combined licenses
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, and those
applicants with applications pending on
the effective date of this rule (relevant
applicants), to perform an aircraft
impact assessment of the effects on the
designed facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Based on the
insights derived from that assessment,
the application would have to include a
description and evaluation of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects
of an aircraft impact, addressing core
cooling capability, containment
integrity and spent fuel pool integrity.
The applicant would be required to
describe how such design and other
features avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the aircraft impact effects
with reduced reliance on operator
actions.
The Commission has determined that
the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event.
For this reason, the Commission-
approved final design basis threat (DBT)
does not include an aircraft attack. The
NRC published its final DBT rule, Title
10, Section 73.1, ‘‘Purpose and Scope,’’
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR 73.1), in the Federal Register on
March 19, 2007 (72 FR 12705). Two
well-established bases support the
exclusion of aircraft attacks from the
DBT. First, it is not reasonable to expect
a licensee with a private security force
using weapons legally available to it to
be able to defend against such an attack.
Second, such an act is in the nature of
an attack by an enemy of the United
States. Power reactor licensees are not
required to design their facilities or
otherwise provide measures to defend
against such an attack, as provided by
10 CFR 50.13, ‘‘Attacks and Destructive
Acts by Enemies of the United States;
and Defense Activities.’’
The Commission has addressed
aircraft attacks by regulatory means
other than the DBT rule in 10 CFR 73.1.
By Order dated February 25, 2002
(Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM)
Order), the Commission required all
operating power reactor licensees to
develop and adopt mitigative strategies
to cope with large fires and explosions
from any cause, including beyond-
design-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR
9792; March 4, 2002). The Commission
has proposed incorporating the
continuing requirement to provide for
PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
such mitigative measures in the NRC’s
regulations in the proposed 10 CFR part
73 power reactor security requirements,
specifically the proposed revisions to 10
CFR 73.55, ‘‘Requirements for Physical
Protection of Licensed Activities in
Nuclear Power Reactors Against
Radiological Sabotage,’’ and Appendix
C, ‘‘Licensee Safeguards Contingency
Plans,’’ to 10 CFR part 73. If these
requirements, which are promulgated
on the basis of adequate protection of
public health and safety and common
defense and security, are finalized, all
current and future power reactors must
satisfy them.
The current requirements, in
conjunction with the currently proposed
revisions to the security regulations in
10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10
CFR part 73, will continue to provide
adequate protection of the public health
and safety and the common defense and
security. Nevertheless, the Commission
has decided to require relevant
applicants to evaluate possible
additional features to avoid or mitigate
the effects of an aircraft impact beyond
satisfying the current regulations and
the proposed 10 CFR part 73 regulations
(assuming they become final).
The Commission’s DBT requirements
(both orders and existing rules) are
based on adequate protection of the
public health and safety and common
defense and security. As such, they are
excepted from the cost-benefit analysis
that otherwise would be required under
10 CFR 50.109, ‘‘Backfitting.’’ This new
proposed rule to address the capability
of newly designed power reactors
relative to a potential aircraft impact is
based both on enhanced public health
and enhanced safety and common
defense and security but is not
necessary for adequate protection.
Rather, it would be to enhance the
facility’s inherent robustness.
Requiring applicants for new reactor
designs to perform a rigorous aircraft
impact assessment and describe design
features to address the effects of a
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact is
consistent with the NRC’s historic
approach to beyond-design-basis events
and is consistent with the NRC’s
position in its ‘‘Policy Statement on
Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding
Future Designs and Existing Plants’’ (50
FR 32138; August 8, 1985) (Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) Accession No.
ML003711521). The policy statement
notes, ‘‘The Commission expects that
vendors engaged in designing new
standard [or custom] plants will achieve
a higher standard of severe accident
safety performance than their prior
designs.’’ The NRC reiterated that
03OCP1
 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
regulatory approach in its ‘‘Policy
Statement on the Regulation of
Advanced Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated
July 8, 1986 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML051660651), ‘‘The Commission
expects that advanced reactors would
provide more margin prior to exceeding
safety limits and/or utilize simplified,
inherent, passive, or other innovative
means to reliably accomplish their
safety functions.’’ This regulatory
approach has demonstrated its success,
as all designs subsequently submitted to
and certified by the Commission
represent substantial improvement in
safety for operational events and
accidents. Therefore, the NRC is
proposing to require applicants for
newly designed facilities to assess the
effects of an aircraft impact on the
designed facility.
The Commission considered the
appropriate location for requirements on
an aircraft impact assessment during its
deliberations on the security assessment
rulemaking (10 CFR 73.62) proposed by
the NRC staff in SECY–06–0204,
‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security
Assessment Requirements for New
Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN
3150–AH92),’’ dated September 26,
2006 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML062300068). In its Staff
Requirements Memorandum on SECY–
06–0204, dated April 24, 2007 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML071140119), the
Commission disapproved the staff’s
recommended rulemaking as described
in SECY–06–0204. The Commission
directed the NRC staff to include the
aircraft impact assessment requirements
in 10 CFR part 52, ‘‘Licenses,
Approvals, and Certifications for
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ (72 FR 49352,
August 28, 2007) to encourage reactor
designers to incorporate practicable
measures at an early stage in the design
process. This proposed rule is the result
of that effort.
This proposed rule would revise 10
CFR part 52 to require applicants for
new standard design certifications that
do not reference a standard design
approval; new standard design
approvals; combined licenses that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval to assess
aircraft impact assessments and describe
the design features and other means to
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of an aircraft
impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. This proposed rule
renders as duplicative and therefore
unnecessary the staff’s proposed 10 CFR
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
73.62 rule to require security
assessments. That rule would have
required a security assessment which
would include mitigation of large fires
and explosions, a target set analysis, and
design features to protect target sets
against DBTs. The large fires and
explosions provisions of that rule would
be subsumed by this proposed 10 CFR
part 52 aircraft impact rule. Sufficient
target set provisions are included in the
NRC’s proposed changes to 10 CFR
73.55, which applicants for new
facilities would have to satisfy if that
rule is made final. Designers of new
facilities are encouraged to account for
the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55 in the
facility design so as to minimize more
costly, post-design features to meet
those requirements. Accordingly, the
proposed 10 CFR 73.62 is not necessary
because the Commission is proposing a
new 10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact
assessment rule.
In contrast to its relation to a possible
security assessment rule, however, the
new 10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact
assessment rule would complement the
proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 and
Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, to
mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions. The proposed 10 CFR 73.55
and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73
provisions on mitigating large fires and
explosions codify the adequate
protection requirement imposed on
existing operating reactors by ICM
Order, Item B.5.b. These provisions of
the proposed 10 CFR part 73 rule,
therefore, are necessary for adequate
protection and must remain in
regulations 1 that are applicable to all
currently operating reactors and must be
satisfied by all newly licensed reactors.
Regarding large fires and explosions,
which are two likely effects of an
aircraft impact, the proposed Appendix
C to 10 CFR part 73 is limited to
mitigative strategies ‘‘using existing or
readily-available resources,’’ which
effectively can be adapted to existing
facilities. For example, certain facility
features might be virtually cost-free if
designed into the facility (e.g., spatially
diverse containment penetrations) but
effectively impossible to retrofit. Thus,
strategies that were not required by ICM
Order, Item B.5.b, and are not required
by proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and
Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 because
they do not use existing or readily
available resources, might be
implemented in new reactor designs
1 By Order dated February 25, 2002 (ICM Order),
the Commission required all operating power
reactors to develop and adopt mitigative strategies
to cope with large fires and explosions from any
cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft
impacts (67 FR 9792; March 4, 2002).
PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56289
because of the aircraft impact
assessment rule. The proposed aircraft
impact assessment rule does not deal
with a design basis event but would
result in facilities with additional
features to avoid or mitigate the effects
of an aircraft impact because they would
be designed into the facility. Such
features would reduce reliance on
operator actions to cope with an aircraft
impact event. Thus, this proposed rule
is not necessary for adequate protection,
but rather is an enhancement that will
result in newly designed facilities being
more inherently robust against aircraft
impacts than the facilities not subject to
this proposed rule.
In contrast to the adequate protection
requirements of proposed 10 CFR 73.55
and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, a
proposed rule that would enhance
safety and security by requiring an
evaluation of newly designed facilities
to avoid or mitigate the effects of aircraft
impacts is appropriate for inclusion in
10 CFR part 52. The NRC is therefore
proposing to require applicants for
newly designed reactors, which will
have to satisfy the revised 10 CFR part
73 provisions if the rule is made final,
to also perform an aircraft impact
assessment under this proposed rule.
However, the NRC expects that,
compared to a licensee for a facility that
was not designed to meet the
requirements of the proposed rule,
licensees for facilities that are designed
to comply with the proposed rule would
have much less of a need to develop
specific procedures, guidance, or other
strategies to cope with the loss of large
areas of the plant due to explosions or
fires in order to comply with the
requirements in the proposed 10 CFR
73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part
73. The Commission sees this as a
significant benefit of this proposed rule;
namely, that features to avoid or
mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact
are designed into the facility and will
result in much less reliance on operator
actions for such protection.
Consideration of a rule to require
applicants for newly designed reactors
to perform an aircraft impact assessment
and describe design and other features
addressing such impacts, which are
beyond-design-basis scenarios, is
similar to the Commission’s
consideration in the mid-1980’s of new
rules addressing accidents more severe
than design basis accidents. The 1985
‘‘Policy Statement on Severe Reactor
Accidents’’ explained the Commission’s
conclusion that, although it was
proposing criteria to show new reactor
designs to be acceptable for severe
accident concerns, then-existing plants
posed no undue risk to public health
03OCP1
 56290 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
and safety, and thus, there was no need
for action on operating reactors based on
severe accident risks. The Commission’s
reasoning in the severe accident context
supports its conclusion that although
new reactor designs should be assessed
for aircraft impacts and designed to
avoid or mitigate the effects of an
aircraft impact, existing reactors and
designs provide adequate protection of
the public health and safety and
common defense and security.
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
The Commission has determined that
the existing designs of currently
operating nuclear power plants, together
with the security program actions
mandated by the NRC’s orders (some of
which are codified in the NRC’s final
DBT rulemaking and others of which are
being incorporated into other NRC
regulations), as well as the protection
provided by other Federal, State, and
local entities, provide an adequate level
of protection to public health and safety
and common defense and security
against aircraft impacts. As a result of
the events of September 11, 2001, the
NRC has undertaken a series of actions
to provide continued reasonable
assurance of adequate protection to
public health and safety and common
defense and security at the United
States commercial nuclear power
facilities. The NRC has assessed the
potential vulnerabilities of operating
nuclear power reactors to aircraft
impact, and it has issued orders and
provided associated guidance to
licensees for implementing a range of
mitigative strategies. The results of these
aircraft impact assessments were
derived from detailed calculations of
plant damage mechanisms (e.g.,
structural failures, shock and vibration
effects, and fire effects). The NRC
ensured that implementation of the
February 25, 2002, ICM Order included
measures to mitigate such scenarios.
The Commission’s ICM Order, Item
B.5.b, first established the requirement
for licensees to implement certain
mitigation measures at existing power
reactors for these beyond-design-basis
events. This requirement was
specifically intended to address ‘‘losses
of large areas of a (reactor) plant due to
fires and explosions.’’ The Commission
has since incorporated this requirement
into the proposed rulemaking for 10
CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR
part 73. Under the proposed 10 CFR part
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
73 rulemaking, future license applicants
must identify and implement mitigative
measures similar to those required for
currently operating plants.
Most recently, the Commission
published a final rule on March 19,
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
2007 (72 FR 12705), amending the DBT
in 10 CFR 73.1. The DBT rule describes
general attributes that nuclear power
plant licensees must defend against
with high assurance. This rulemaking
enhanced the DBT by codifying
generically applicable security
requirements similar to those previously
imposed by the Commission’s April 29,
2003, DBT Orders.
On the basis of the previous
information, the NRC concludes that
existing power reactors pose no undue
risk to public health and safety or
common defense and security from the
effects of an aircraft impact based on the
Commission’s specified aircraft
characteristics. Therefore, the NRC is
not applying the aircraft impact
assessment requirement in this
rulemaking to existing operating nuclear
power plants.
III. Currently Approved Standard
Design Certifications
The Commission has concluded that
the proposed rule need not be applied
to the four currently approved standard
design certifications in Appendices A
through D to 10 CFR part 52.2 Therefore,
applicants would not need to recertify
these standard designs to meet this
proposed rule. This follows from the
Commission’s determination that the
aircraft impact rule is an enhancement
above and beyond what is necessary for
adequate protection and that the aircraft
impact scenario, as previously
explained, is a beyond-design-basis
event. Just as the currently operating
power reactor facilities continue to meet
adequate protection requirements and
do not need to meet this new aircraft
impact rule, so too are the already
certified standard designs sufficient to
meet adequate protection design
requirements. Any reactor facility built
to one of these already-certified designs
will, of course, have to satisfy all
adequate protection requirements
applicable to operating power reactors.
The original applicant (or successor in
interest of any of the four current
standard design certifications) may
voluntarily seek to amend the standard
design certification to add design
features, functional capabilities, or
strategies in accordance with the
requirements of proposed 10 CFR
52.500, ‘‘Aircraft Impact Assessment.’’
The NRC encourages voluntary
enhancement by the applicants for the
four current standard design
2 The four standard design certifications currently
in effect are the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water
Reactor (ABWR) design (Appendix A), the System
80+ design (Appendix B), the AP600 design
(Appendix C), and the AP1000 design (Appendix
D).
PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
certifications because it will increase
the already high levels of safety and
security provided by these reactor
designs. Applicants may implement
these design modifications in different
ways, including:
• Applications to amend the existing
design certifications.
• Application for a new design
certification based on the existing
certification, but containing the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies identified as a result of this
rule.
• Requests submitted by combined
license applicants for plant-specific
departures from the standard design,
where the departure implements the
modifications developed by the original
design certification applicant’s
voluntary implementation of the
provisions of the proposed 10 CFR
52.500 (these requests may be submitted
by each individual combined license
applicant, or they may be submitted by
a group of combined license applicants
under the provisions of Appendix N,
‘‘Standardization of Nuclear Power
Plant Designs: Combined Licenses to
Construct and Operate Nuclear Power
Reactors of Identical Design at Multiple
Sites,’’ to 10 CFR part 52 and subpart D,
‘‘Additional Procedures Applicable to
Proceedings for the Issuance of Licenses
to Construct and/or Operate Nuclear
Power Plants of Identical Design at
Multiple Sites,’’ to 10 CFR part 2,
‘‘Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of
Orders.’’
IV. Renewal of a Standard Design
Certification, Combined License, or
Manufacturing License
The NRC’s proposed rulemaking does
not require updating of the assessment
of aircraft impacts required by proposed
10 CFR 52.500 as part of an application
for either a renewed design certification
under 10 CFR 52.57, ‘‘Application for
Renewal,’’ a renewed combined license
under 10 CFR 52.107, ‘‘Application for
Renewal,’’ and 10 CFR part 54,
‘‘Requirements for Renewal of Operating
Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ or
a renewed manufacturing license under
10 CFR 52.177, ‘‘Application for
Renewal.’’ The NRC’s requirement for
assessment of large, commercial aircraft
impacts is not an aging-related matter,
nor is it based on time-limited
considerations. Hence, aircraft impacts
under the proposed rule are outside the
scope of any combined license renewal
proceeding under 10 CFR part 54 and
combined license holders do not need to
update the assessment required by 10
CFR 52.500(b) at the license renewal
stage. Similarly, aircraft impacts under
03OCP1
 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
the proposed rule are outside the scope
of any manufacturing license renewal
proceeding under 10 CFR 52.177.
V. Newly Designed Power Reactors
A. Introduction
Under this proposed rule, relevant
applicants for newly designed power
reactors would be required to undertake
the following:
• Perform an assessment of the effects
on the designed facility of a beyond-
design-basis aircraft impact
• Evaluate potential design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies for
avoiding or mitigating the effects of a
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact on
the key safety functions of the facility
• Describe how such design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions
The proposed rule is based on the
premise that it is desirable for future
power reactors to avoid or mitigate the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
through design features that reduce or
eliminate the need for operator actions.
Because this type of consideration needs
to occur during the development of the
design itself, the NRC directs the
requirements at plant designers.
The NRC does not expect plant
designers to demonstrate that design
features alone, without any operator
action or mitigative response activity,
will practicably avoid or mitigate the
effects of the beyond-design-basis
aircraft impact. The NRC recognizes that
the decision to rely on design features
(as opposed to operator action or
mitigative strategies) is complex, and
often involves a set of trade-offs
between competing considerations. The
NRC’s goal is that the designer
implement a rigorous assessment
process to ensure that the design
process constitutes a reasoned approach
for assessing the plant design to identify
practicable design or other features that
either minimize the effects of, or
mitigate, a beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact.
B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impact
Since September 11, 2001, the
Commission has used state-of-the art
technology to assess the effects of
aircraft impacts on nuclear power
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
plants. As part of a comprehensive
review of security for NRC-licensed
facilities, the NRC conducted detailed,
site-specific engineering studies of a
limited number of nuclear power plants
to assess potential vulnerabilities of
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
deliberate attacks involving large,
commercial aircraft. In conducting these
studies, the NRC consulted national
experts from several Department of
Energy laboratories using state-of-the-art
structural and fire analyses. The agency
also used realistic predictions of
accident progression and radiological
consequences.
The proposed rule sets forth a general
description of the aircraft characteristics
that are required to be used to perform
the beyond-design-basis aircraft impact
assessment. The assessment must be
based on the Commission’s specified
aircraft characteristics used to define the
beyond-design-basis impact of a large,
commercial aircraft used for long
distance flights in the United States,
with aviation fuel loading typically used
in such flights, and an impact speed and
angle of impact considering the ability
of both experienced and inexperienced
pilots to control large, commercial
aircraft at the low altitude
representative of a nuclear power
plant’s low profile.
Beyond these general characteristics,
the Commission will specify for plant
designers in a Safeguards Information
(SGI) guidance document more detailed
characteristics of the large, commercial
aircraft that should be used in the
required assessment. Although the
detailed aircraft characteristics will be
described in an SGI guidance document
and will not be publicly available
because of their potential value to
terrorists, the description of some of the
factors used in selecting the parameters
is offered to foster a better
understanding of this rulemaking:
1. The aircraft used by the terrorists
on September 11, 2001. The staff has
reviewed the results of the September
11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. The NRC has
used these reviews in previous studies
for operating reactors. The NRC also
used these reviews to make its decisions
with respect to this rulemaking.
2. Communications with other U.S.
Government agencies. Since September
11, 2001, the NRC has worked closely
with the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense,
and other agencies both to understand
their information on terrorist threats and
to communicate the NRC’s study results.
3. Communications with foreign
governments. A number of foreign
governments are considering the
construction of new nuclear power
plants. The NRC is communicating with
the regulatory authorities in these
countries to understand their
requirements and to convey its own
results and plans.
PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56291
4. Evaluations of commercial aircraft.
The NRC has studied the types,
numbers, and characteristics of
commercial aircraft flown in U.S.
airspace.
Because this proposed rule is
intended to provide added features to
avoid or mitigate the effects of a beyond-
design-basis event, the choice of aircraft
characteristics and the scenario used for
this analysis will not be linked to threat
assessments or to any evolution of
aircraft design. The proposed rule
would require that the design-specific
impact assessment use the Commission-
specified aircraft characteristics as
described in proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b).
As stated previously, more specific
details about the aircraft characteristics
specified by the Commission will be
contained in a separate guidance
document under SGI controls. Because
the guidance containing the more
detailed aircraft characteristics will be
SGI, the document will only be made
available to those individuals with a
need-to-know and who are otherwise
qualified to have access to SGI. Plant
designers (including their employees
and agents) who meet the Commission’s
requirements for access to SGI would
have access to the guidance document
containing these more detailed
characteristics in order to perform the
assessments required by the proposed
rule.
The Commission has carefully
balanced the public interest in knowing
the characteristics of the specific aircraft
to be used in the aircraft impact
assessment and the need for meaningful
comment on specific details of the
aircraft impact assessment. The result is
an aircraft impact assessment proposed
rule that describes the general aircraft
characteristics which applicants are
required to use in their aircraft impact
assessments. The text of this proposed
rule and the associated supplementary
information, provide ample information
to enable meaningful comment on what
the aircraft impact assessment should
entail. No additional information is
necessary to understand or to comment
on the proposed aircraft impact
assessment rule. Members of the public
can provide the Commission their views
on this rulemaking regarding the design
areas to be addressed in the assessment,
functions to be evaluated for possible
enhancement, and criteria for assessing
practicability without having access to
the more detailed SGI aircraft
characteristics. Therefore, access to the
proposed SGI aircraft characteristics
contained in the regulatory guidance is
not necessary to enable meaningful
public comment on the proposed
aircraft impact assessment rule.
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 56292 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
This regulatory approach is similar to
that used by the NRC in describing the
DBT against which security programs
under 10 CFR part 73 must defend. The
general characteristics of the DBT
appear in 10 CFR 73.1. More detailed
information of a sensitive nature is
contained in adversary characteristics
documents. As is the case with the
Commission’s aircraft characteristics,
the technical bases for these documents
derive largely from intelligence
information and contain SGI that must
be withheld from public disclosure.
They are available only on a need-to-
know basis to those who are approved
for access. In the final DBT rule, the
NRC was careful to set forth rule text
that does not compromise licensee
security, but it also acknowledges the
need to keep the public informed of the
types of attacks against which nuclear
power plants and Category I fuel cycle
facilities are required to defend. The
NRC is taking a similar approach in this
proposed aircraft impact rule. This
approach strikes the appropriate balance
between public disclosure of the
regulatory requirements governing
nuclear power plants, and protection of
public health and safety and common
defense and security.
C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
Technical Issues
Because the aircraft impact is a
beyond-design-basis event, the methods
and acceptance criteria used should be
based on realistic assumptions. The
aircraft impact assessment would
include the items detailed in the
following paragraphs:
1. Consideration of aircraft
characteristics. The assessment must
consider a large, commercial aircraft of
the type currently in use for long
distance flights in the United States as
described previously in this document
and in 10 CFR 52.500(b). More detailed
characteristics of the large, commercial
aircraft to be used in this assessment
will be contained in a separate guidance
document under SGI controls.
2. Plant functions, structures, systems,
components, and locations to be
assessed. The critical functions required
to be evaluated in the aircraft impact
assessment include core cooling,
containment integrity, and spent fuel
pool integrity. Evaluation of the
survivability of these functions, should
consider not only the key components,
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
but also power supplies, cable runs, and
other components that support these
functions. The evaluation may take
credit for the availability of both safety
and non-safety equipment. The
assessment should evaluate whether the
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
structures containing equipment that
provides needed functions are likely to
be affected by the specified large,
commercial aircraft impact. Factors to
be considered in the evaluation include
the size and location of the structures
and the presence of external
impediments to impact.
3. Damage mechanisms. The
assessment should model the structural
response, shock and vibration effects,
and fire effects of the postulated aircraft
impact.
a. Structural assessment. The
structural assessment should be based
on a detailed structural model of the
plant taking into account the nonlinear
materials and geometric behavior. The
assessment should consider both local
and global (plant-wide) behavior, as
well as thermal effects resulting from
fire.
b. Shock assessment. The assessment
should evaluate the local and global
(plant-wide) shock and vibration effects
resulting from the postulated impact.
c. Fire assessment. The fire
assessment should consider the extent
of structural damage and aviation fuel
deposition, if any, and spread within
the impacted buildings. The assessment
should consider both short- and long-
term fire effects.
Regulatory Treatment of the Assessment
The impact assessment is subject to
audit and review by the NRC and,
therefore, must be maintained by the
applicant along with the rest of the
information that forms the basis for the
relevant application, consistent with
paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 52.0, ‘‘Scope;
Applicability of 10 CFR Chapter I
Provisions,’’ 10 CFR 50.70,
‘‘Inspections,’’ and 10 CFR 50.71,
‘‘Maintenance of Records, Making of
Reports.’’ The applicant does not need
to submit the impact assessment—as
opposed to the ‘‘description and
evaluation of the design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies’’
required by proposed 10 CFR
52.500(c)—to the NRC in its application.
Under the proposed rule, the NRC
will confirm that the impact assessment
was performed consistent with the
regulatory requirements and related
guidance documents. The NRC may take
appropriate enforcement action for any
violations of applicable NRC
requirements, including, but not limited
to, proposed 10 CFR 52.500, 10 CFR
52.4, ‘‘Deliberate Misconduct,’’ and 10
CFR 52.6, ‘‘Completeness and Accuracy
of Information.’’ A failure to perform the
assessment would be a violation of the
rule. The NRC expects the assessment to
be rigorous. Any assessment that is
inadequate to reasonably assess the
PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
aircraft impact; to identify practicable
design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies; or to justify non-adoption
of potentially advantageous design
features, functional capabilities, or
strategies, could be considered a
violation of the rule.
The NRC’s decision on an application
subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500
would be separate from any NRC
determination that may be made with
respect to the adequacy of the impact
assessment which the rule does not
require be submitted to the NRC.
Applicants would only be required to
submit a description and evaluation of
the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate the effects of the applicable,
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact in
their final safety analysis report (FSAR)
with the understanding that the
complete aircraft impact assessment
would be available for NRC audit and
review at the applicant’s offices, if
needed. The NRC expects that,
generally, the information that it needs
to perform its review of the application
to assess the applicant’s compliance
with 10 CFR 52.500 would be that
information contained in the applicant’s
FSAR. Therefore, the adequacy of the
impact assessment would not be a
matter which may be the subject of a
contention submitted as part of a
petition to intervene under 10 CFR
2.309, ‘‘Hearing Requests, Petitions to
Intervene, Requirements for Standing,
and Contentions.’’ A person who seeks
NRC rulemaking action with respect to
a proposed standard design certification
on the basis that the impact assessment
is inadequate could submit comments in
the notice and comment phase of that
rulemaking. A person who seeks
rulemaking action after the NRC has
adopted a final design certification rule
on the basis that the impact assessment
performed for that design certification is
inadequate could submit a petition for
rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802,
‘‘Petition for Rulemaking,’’ and 10 CFR
2.803, ‘‘Determination of Petition,’’
seeking to amend the standard design
certification. A person who seeks
agency enforcement-related action on a
combined license or manufacturing
license on the basis of an inadequate
impact assessment could file a petition
under 10 CFR 2.206, ‘‘Requests for
Action Under This Subpart.’’
Once the applicant completes the
impact assessment, accomplishes the
evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR
52.500(c) based on insights gained from
the proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b)
assessment, and includes the
description and evaluation required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) in the FSAR,
03OCP1
 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
the purpose of the impact assessment
would be achieved. Accordingly, the
proposed rule would not require the
impact assessment to be updated, by
either: (1) The design certification
applicant whose application references
a design approval, (2) the design
certification applicant following the
NRC’s adoption of a final standard
design certification rule, (3) a design
approval holder, (4) a manufacturing
license applicant or holder whose
application references a design
certification or design approval, (5) a
combined license applicant or holder
whose application references a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor, or (6) a combined
license holder whose application does
not reference a design certification,
design approval, or manufactured
reactor and is required to prepare its
own assessment.
The provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(c)
require that records that are required by
the regulations in 10 CFR part 50,
‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities,’’ or 10 CFR part 52
must be retained for the period specified
by the appropriate regulation. If a
retention period is not otherwise
specified, the licensee must retain these
records until the Commission
terminates the facility license. Because
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) would
require the performance of the aircraft
impact assessment, it falls under the
category of ‘‘records that are required by
the regulations’’ and therefore, the
licensee would be required to retain the
assessment until the Commission
terminates the facility license. The NRC
also expects to add specific provisions
to each standard design certification
rule for a design covered by proposed 10
CFR 52.500 governing retention of the
aircraft impact assessment by both the
applicant for the design certification
(including an applicant after the
Commission has adopted a final
standard design certification rule) and a
licensee who references that design
certification. The NRC expects to
require applicants and licensees to
retain the assessment required by 10
CFR 52.500(b) throughout the pendency
of the application and for the term of the
certification or license (including any
period of renewal). An example of such
requirements can be found in any of the
current design certification rules,
Section X, ‘‘Records and Reporting,’’ of
Appendices A through D of 10 CFR part
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
52.
As discussed in Section VIII,
‘‘Specific Request for Comments,’’ of
this document, the NRC is requesting
comments on whether, in lieu of the
specific design certification rule
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
provisions or reliance on 10 CFR
50.71(c), it should adopt as part of the
final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking a
specific provision that would explicitly
mandate the retention of the assessment.
Such a provision, to be included in an
additional paragraph of proposed 10
CFR 52.500, would also set forth the
proposed period of retention for the
assessment as the term of the design
certification, combined license, or
manufacturing license.
D. Evaluation of Design Features,
Functional Capabilities, and Strategies
Technical Issues
The proposed rule would require
designers of new facilities to describe
how the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies adopted
based on the insights of the aircraft
impact assessment avoid or mitigate the
effects of the aircraft impact. Plant
structures critical to maintaining facility
safety functions should be designed, if
practicable, such that an impact does
not result in structural failure, and
aircraft parts and jet fuel do not enter
the structures. In circumstances in
which an impact results in aircraft parts
and jet fuel entering structures or
affecting equipment, plant structures
and layouts should be evaluated with
respect to maintaining key safety
functions by addressing equipment
survivability following the entry of
aircraft parts and jet fuel and key safety
functions are accomplished
notwithstanding the resulting internal
damage resulting from structural loads,
shock and vibration, and fire.
As discussed previously, the
Commission has issued orders to
operating plants requiring mitigation of
the effects of losing large areas of the
plant from fires and explosions. These
requirements include some reliance on
operator actions, such as realigning
systems to ensure continued core
cooling following the loss of a large
area. Because this proposed rule would
apply to newly designed facilities before
construction of the facility, the
Commission expects that improvements
can be made in the plant’s design that
have the same result as operator actions
credited in operating plants. Thus, these
designs should have reduced reliance,
relative to current operating plants, on
operator actions.
The proposed rule would require
applicants to describe how the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, ‘‘to the
extent practicable,’’ the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions. The NRC
intends this standard to include those
PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56293
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies that are realistically and
reasonably feasible from a technical
engineering perspective. For example,
the NRC believes it may be practicable
to employ new technologies currently in
use in the commercial nuclear power
industry or in another industry.
Alternatively, it would not be
practicable to introduce a design feature
that could have adverse safety or
security consequences under a different
operational or accident scenario. This
consideration of practicability allows
the designers to evaluate potential
competing technical factors, such as the
response to earthquakes, while at the
same time addressing aircraft impacts.
Nuclear power plants are inherently
very robust, secure structures designed
to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes,
earthquakes, floods, and other severe
events. They have redundant and
diverse safety equipment so that if an
active component becomes unavailable,
another component or system will
satisfy its function. The results of the
Commission’s evaluation of postulated
aircraft impacts on operating reactors
reinforced the value of design features
such as the following:
• Reinforced concrete walls
• Redundancy and spatial separation
of key systems, structures and
components
• Diversity of power supplies
• Compartmentalization of interior
structures with pressure resisting
concrete walls and doors
The NRC expects the required
evaluation to consider the value of such
design features and of possible
improvements in these and other
features. The applicant must base the
evaluation on insights gained from the
impact assessment performed under
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b).
Regulatory Treatment of the Evaluation
The NRC will confirm that the
evaluation required by 10 CFR 52.500(c)
was performed and that the FSAR
includes the necessary description and
evaluation of the design and other
features adopted to avoid or mitigate, to
the extent practicable, the potential
effects of the applicable, beyond-design-
basis aircraft impact. The NRC will
review the evaluation contained in the
application and reach a conclusion as to
whether the applicant has conducted an
evaluation reasonably formulated to
identify practicable design and other
features to avoid or mitigate the
potential effects of the applicable,
beyond-design-basis aircraft impact.
However, NRC’s review of the adequacy
of the evaluation, and the effectiveness
and practicability of the applicant-
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 56294 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
selected features, capabilities, and
strategies, are separate and distinct from
the NRC’s determination whether to
issue a final standard design
certification rule, a final design
approval, a combined license, or a
manufacturing license. Therefore, as is
the case with the impact assessment, the
NRC will use its established audit and
review process to ensure the evaluation
and determination of practicability was
performed consistent with the
regulatory requirements and related
guidance documents. The NRC may take
appropriate enforcement action for any
violation of applicable NRC
requirements. Inasmuch as the adequacy
of the evaluation and the practicability
of the applicant-selected features,
capabilities, and strategies, are separate
and distinct from the approval of the
final design in the design certification,
design approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license, there would be
no issue resolution associated with the
assessment regarding the lack of
effectiveness or practicability of
potential design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies not selected
by the applicant for inclusion in the
certified design.
The NRC is proposing that the design
features, functional capabilities, or
strategies credited for avoiding or
mitigating the effects of an aircraft
impact be described in Chapter 19 of the
FSAR, which addresses severe
accidents. The design features may
include structures or features
unchanged from the plant design as it
existed before the aircraft impact
assessment (e.g., an existing wall is
found to be effective), structures or
features included in the plant design but
enhanced to improve the response to an
aircraft impact (e.g., an existing wall is
made stronger), or new structures or
features added solely to address aircraft
impacts (e.g., a new wall). The
regulatory treatment of the design
features (e.g., how changes to the
features are controlled) depends on
which of the above categories apply. For
example, a design feature added
specifically to avoid or mitigate the
effects of an aircraft impact would be
controlled only by requirements
specifically for control of those design
features added in this proposed rule or
requirements that the NRC expects to
add to future design certifications that
would be subject to proposed 10 CFR
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
52.500. A safety-related structure
credited in the aircraft impact
assessment as a design feature would
continue to be controlled by Appendix
B to 10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Quality Assurance
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
Fuel Reprocessing Plants;’’ 10 CFR part
21, ‘‘Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance;’’ and other regulations
establishing technical and
administrative requirements on the non-
aircraft impact functions, in addition to
the proposed requirements for control of
features to address aircraft impacts.
For combined licenses not referencing
a certified design, the NRC is proposing
to have change control governed by the
requirements in a new 10 CFR 52.502,
‘‘Control of Changes to FSAR
Information,’’ to address changes to any
design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies credited for avoiding or
mitigating the effects of an aircraft
impact for a combined license that does
not reference a certified design.
Specifically, the proposed 10 CFR
52.502(c) would require that, if the
licensee changes the information
required by 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be
included in the FSAR, the licensee re-
perform that portion of the evaluation
required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c)
that addresses the changed feature,
capability, or strategy. The licensee
would also be required to describe, in
the re-evaluation, how the modified
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions. Because
this rule is being proposed to address a
beyond-design-basis event, the NRC has
determined that it is appropriate to
apply the same standard to any licensee-
proposed changes to features,
capabilities, and strategies that would
be applied during the original
evaluation of those design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies.
A combined license holder subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (i.e., a licensee
whose application does not reference a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor) may change the design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies
incorporated into the design, in
accordance with proposed 10 CFR
52.502, without prior NRC review and
approval, as long as the licensee re-
performs that portion of the evaluation
required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c)
addressing the changed feature,
capability, or strategy. The licensee
must also describe, in the re-evaluation
documented in a change to the FSAR,
how the modified design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. Licensees’ submittal of
this updated information to the NRC
PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
will be governed by the existing FSAR
update requirements in 10 CFR 50.71(e).
A design feature, functional
capability, or strategy described in a
standard design certification may not be
changed generically except by notice
and comment rulemaking, see 10 CFR
52.63, ‘‘Finality of Standard Design
Certifications,’’ paragraphs (a)(1) and
(2), and such a change must meet one
of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). All
referencing combined licenses must
implement any generic change to a
design certification rule, as required by
10 CFR 52.63(a)(3).
The NRC expects to add a new change
control provision to future design
certification rules subject to proposed
10 CFR 52.500 to govern combined
license holders referencing the design
certification that request a departure
from the design features, functional
capabilities, or strategies in the
referenced design certification. The new
change control provision would require
that, if the licensee changes the
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the standard design certification,
then the licensee must re-perform that
portion of the evaluation required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing
the changed feature, capability, or
strategy. The licensee must also
describe, in the re-evaluation
documented in a change to the FSAR
(i.e., a plant-specific departure from the
generic design control document), how
the modified design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions. Licensees’ submittal of this
updated information to the NRC will be
governed by the reporting requirements
in the applicable design certification
rule. The NRC expects to continue, in
future standard design certification
rulemakings, its practice of adopting
reporting requirements analogous to
Section X.B of the four existing standard
design certification rules. Licensees
making changes to design features,
capabilities, or strategies included in the
certified design or in the plant-specific
FSAR may also need to develop
alternate means to cope with the loss of
large areas of the plant from explosions
or fires to comply with the requirements
in the proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and
Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
A design feature, functional
capability, or strategy described in a
standard design approval may not be
changed generically except under an
application for a new design approval.
There are no provisions in 10 CFR part
52 for making generic changes to a
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 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
standard design approval. Paragraph (a)
of Section 52.145, ‘‘Finality of Standard
Design Approvals; Information
Requests,’’ states that an approved
design must be used by and relied upon
by the NRC staff and the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards in
their review of any individual facility
license application that incorporates by
reference a standard design approval
unless there exists significant new
information that substantially affects the
earlier determination or other good
cause. Therefore, any changes to a
design feature, functional capability, or
strategy described in a standard design
approval would be subject to review by
the NRC in any application that
references the design approval. Note
that 10 CFR 52.131, ‘‘Scope of Subpart,’’
states that the an applicant may submit
standard designs for a nuclear power
reactor or major portions thereof. To the
extent that a standard design approval is
issued for only portion of a nuclear
power reactor, any applicant referencing
that design approval will have to
separately comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR 52.500 for any
portion of the design not addressed in
the design approval issued by the NRC.
Under the provisions of 10 CFR
52.171, ‘‘Finality of Manufacturing
Licenses; Information Requests,’’ the
holder of a manufacturing license may
not make changes to the design features,
functional capabilities, or strategies
described in the FSAR without prior
Commission approval. The request for a
change to the design must be in the form
of an application for a license
amendment, and must meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.90,
‘‘Application for Amendment of
License, Construction Permit, or Early
Site Permit,’’ and 10 CFR 50.92,
‘‘Issuance of Amendment.’’
Under the provisions of 10 CFR
52.171(b)(2), a combined license
applicant or licensee who references or
uses a nuclear power reactor
manufactured under a manufacturing
license under this subpart may request
a departure from the design features,
functional capabilities, or strategies
described in the FSAR for the
manufactured reactor. The Commission
will grant such a request only if it
determines that the departure will
comply with the requirements of 10 CFR
52.7, ‘‘Specific Exemptions,’’ and that
the special circumstances outweigh any
decrease in safety that may result from
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
the reduction in standardization caused
by the departure.
Once the evaluation required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) is completed
and the application includes
descriptions of the design features,
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
functional capabilities, and strategies,
the purpose of the evaluation would be
largely achieved. Thus, as with the
assessment required by proposed 10
CFR 52.500(b), the applicant or licensee
would not be required to update the
paragraph (c) evaluation after the design
certification, design approval, combined
license, or manufacturing license is
issued, or in an application for renewal
under either 10 CFR 52.57, 10 CFR
52.107 and 10 CFR part 54, or 52.177.
However, licensees would be required
to maintain the paragraph (c)
evaluation, inasmuch as proposed 10
CFR 52.79(a)(47) and 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) require the proposed 10
CFR 52.500(c) evaluation and
description to be included in the FSAR
portion of the application.
Following issuance of a final design
certification rule, the design
certification applicant would not be
required to update the evaluation so
long as it does not request a significant
change to any of the design features,
functional capabilities, or strategies in
the design certification. Similarly, the
holder of a combined license or
manufacturing license would not be
required to update the evaluation so
long as the licensee makes no significant
change to the design features, functional
capabilities, or strategies described in
the FSAR.
As with the aircraft impact
assessment required by proposed 10
CFR 52.500(b), in accordance with 10
CFR 50.71(c), each combined license
holder and manufacturing license
holder whose application was subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be
required to retain the documentation
supporting the proposed 10 CFR
52.500(c) evaluation for NRC review.
With respect to a standard design
certification, proposed 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) would require the proposed
10 CFR 52.500(c) evaluation to be
included in the FSAR submitted as part
of the design certification application.
The NRC acknowledges that the
applicant for a standard design
certification is not, per se, responsible
for maintaining the FSAR information
once a final design certification rule is
adopted by the NRC. Nonetheless, the
NRC continues to believe, for the
reasons set forth in the statement of
considerations for the first design
certification rulemaking, see 62 FR
25800, May 19,1997, at 25813–25814,
25826, that the original standard design
certification applicant should be
required to maintain the accuracy of the
design certification information.
Therefore, in future standard design
certification rulemakings, the NRC
expects to continue its practice of
PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56295
adopting a records management
requirement analogous to Section X.A of
the four existing standard design
certification rules. In addition to the
information included in the FSAR for
the design certification or combined
license, the supporting documentation
retained onsite should describe the
methodology used in identifying and
evaluating the practicability of potential
features, capabilities, and strategies for
inclusion in the design; and list the
features, capabilities, and strategies that
were considered but rejected, along with
the basis for their rejection.
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 52.11 Information Collection
Requirements: OMB Approval
Section 52.11 identifies the
information collection requirements
contained in 10 CFR part 52 approved
by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.). The NRC is proposing to
modify paragraph (b) to include
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 in the list of
requirements with approved
information collections.
Section 52.47 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information
Section 52.47 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a standard design
certification. The proposed rule would
revise this section by adding a new
paragraph (a)(28) requiring that the
FSAR contain the information required
by proposed 10 CFR 52.500, ‘‘Aircraft
Impact Assessment.’’ This information,
as currently set forth in paragraph (c) of
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, is limited to
the following:
1. A description of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies credited by the applicant to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact; and
2. An evaluation of how such design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
The 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) requirement
applies only to those standard design
certification applications which are
subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that
is, those design certifications issued
after the effective date of the final rule
(see 10 CFR 52.500(a)) that do not
reference a design approval. Thus, any
standard design certification application
not referencing a standard design
approval that is docketed and under
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 56296 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
review by the NRC but has not yet been
issued in final form as of the effective
date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 must
amend its application to include the
information required by final 10 CFR
52.500.
Section 52.79 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information in
Final Safety Analysis Report
Section 52.79 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an FSAR submitted in a combined
license application under 10 CFR part
52, subpart C, ‘‘Combined Licenses.’’
The proposed rule would revise this
section by adding a new paragraph
(a)(47) requiring that the FSAR contain
the information required by proposed 10
CFR 52.500. This is the same type of
information that an applicant for a
standard design certification would
need to submit, namely, the following:
1. A description of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies credited by the applicant to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact; and
2. An evaluation of how such design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
Only those combined licenses issued
after the effective date of the final rule
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor would be
subject to 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47). Thus, a
combined license application filed after
the effective date of the final 10 CFR
52.500 and referencing a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, or manufactured reactor
would not have to include the
information required by 10 CFR 52.500.
The NRC notes that this would be true
even for a combined license application
which references one of the four current
standard design certifications (ABWR,
10 CFR part 52, Appendix A; System
80+, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix B;
AP600, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix C;
and AP1000, 10 CFR part 52, Appendix
D). This is consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR 52.79(c), (d),
and (e) which state that, if the combined
license application references a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor, then the FSAR need not contain
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
information or analyses submitted to the
Commission in connection with the
design certification, design approval, or
manufacturing license, as applicable. By
contrast, a combined license applicant
not referencing a standard design
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor whose
application is docketed and under
review by the NRC but for which a
license has not yet been issued as of the
effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500,
must amend its application to include
the information required by 10 CFR
52.500.
Section 52.137 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information
Section 52.137 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a standard design
approval. The proposed rule would
revise this section by adding a new
paragraph (a)(26) requiring that the
FSAR contain the information required
by proposed 10 CFR 52.500. This
information, as currently set forth in
paragraph (c) of proposed 10 CFR
52.500, is limited to the following:
1. A description of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies credited by the applicant to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact; and
2. An evaluation of how such design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
The 10 CFR 52.137(a)(26) requirement
applies only to those standard design
approval applications which are subject
to proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that is,
those design approvals issued after the
effective date of the final rule (see 10
CFR 52.500(a)). Thus, any standard
design approval application that is
docketed and under review by the NRC
but has not yet been issued in final form
as of the effective date of the final 10
CFR 52.500 must amend its application
to include the information required by
final 10 CFR 52.500.
Section 52.157 Contents of
Applications; Technical Information in
Final Safety Analysis Report
Section 52.157 identifies the required
technical information to be included in
an application for a manufacturing
license. The proposed rule would revise
this section by adding a new paragraph
(f)(32) requiring that the FSAR contain
the information required by proposed 10
CFR 52.500. This information, as
currently set forth in paragraph (c) of
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, is limited to
the following:
1. A description of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies credited by the applicant to
avoid or mitigate the effects of the
PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact; and
2. An evaluation of how such design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
The 10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) requirement
applies only to those manufacturing
license applications which are subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, that is, those
manufacturing licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a design certification or
design approval (see 10 CFR 52.500(a)).
Thus, any manufacturing license
application that is docketed and under
review by the NRC but has not yet been
issued in final form as of the effective
date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 must
amend its application to include the
information required by final 10 CFR
52.500.
Section 52.303 Criminal Penalties
Section 52.303 identifies the
regulations in 10 CFR part 52 that are
not issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
161o for the purposes of Section 223 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, which provides for criminal
sanctions for willful violation of,
attempted violation of, or conspiracy to
violate, any regulation issued under
Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the Act.
The NRC is proposing to modify
paragraph (b) to include proposed 10
CFR 52.500 and proposed 10 CFR
52.502 in the list of regulations not
issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
161o for the purposes of Section 223 of
the Act.
Subpart K—Additional Requirements
The NRC proposes to add a new
subpart K, ‘‘Additional Requirements,’’
to 10 CFR part 52. This subpart would
be reserved for requirements applicable
only to the licenses, certifications, and
approvals under 10 CFR part 52 that
have unique characteristics which
mitigate against placing them in other
parts of 10 CFR Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’’ of Title 10.
Section 52.500 Aircraft Impact
Assessment
Proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be a
new requirement for assessing a large,
commercial aircraft impact at nuclear
power plants and incorporating design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of such
aircraft impacts.
Paragraph (a) would state that the
requirements of this section would be
applicable to all standard design
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 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
certifications issued after the effective
date of the final rule that do not
reference a standard design approval;
standard design approvals issued after
the effective date of the final rule;
combined licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and
manufacturing licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval. A design certification rule
issued after the effective date of the final
10 CFR 52.500 rule that does not
reference a design approval is subject to
the requirements of the rule even if its
application was filed before the effective
date of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rule.
Similarly, a design approval issued after
the effective date of the final rule is
subject to the requirements of the rule
even if its application was filed before
the effective date of the final rule. A
combined license issued after the
effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500
rule that does not reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor would be subject
to the requirements of the rule, even if
its application was filed before the
effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500
rule. As noted earlier in the section-by-
section discussion of proposed 10 CFR
52.79(a)(47) of this document, a
combined license issued after the
effective date of the final 10 CFR 52.500
rule referencing one of the four current
standard design certifications, would
not be subject to the requirements of
proposed 10 CFR 52.500.
Paragraph (b) would require those
applicants subject to proposed 10 CFR
52.500 to perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects on the
designed facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft (impact
assessment). By ‘‘design-specific,’’ the
NRC means that the impact assessment
must address the specific design which
is either the subject of the standard
design certification, standard design
approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license application. The
proposed rule would require that the
design-specific impact assessment be
based on Commission-specified general
aircraft characteristics used to define the
beyond-design-basis impact of a large,
commercial aircraft used for long
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
distance flights in the United States,
with aviation fuel loading typically used
in such flights, and an impact speed and
angle of impact considering the ability
of both experienced and inexperienced
pilots to control large, commercial
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
aircraft at the low altitude
representative of a nuclear power
plant’s low profile. Beyond these
general characteristics, the Commission
will specify for plant designers in an
SGI guidance document more detailed
characteristics of the large, commercial
aircraft to be used in the required
assessment. This approach is discussed
in more detail in Section V.B of the
Supplementary Information of this
document. Because the assessment of an
aircraft impact is a beyond-design-basis
event, the methods and acceptance
criteria used in the assessment should
be based on realistic assumptions.
Paragraph (c) would require the
relevant applications to include a
description and evaluation of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies (features, capabilities, and
strategies) to avoid or mitigate the
effects of the aircraft impact that
applicants must assess under paragraph
(b). Design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies could
include such things as reinforced
concrete walls (in the original design,
modified, or added); redundancy and
spatial separation of key systems,
structures and components; diversity of
power supplies; and
compartmentalization of interior
structures. The NRC expects the
required assessment to include an
evaluation of such features, capabilities,
and strategies and of possible
improvements in them. The evaluation
of such design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies must include
core cooling capability, containment
integrity, and spent fuel pool integrity.
The description of the features,
capabilities, and strategies should be
equivalent in detail to descriptions of
other design features and functional
capabilities addressing beyond-design-
basis events or severe accidents which
are required to be described in the
design certification, design approval,
combined license, or manufacturing
license FSAR. However, the NRC
reiterates that the aircraft impact at
which these features, capabilities, and
strategies are directed is not a design
basis event. Therefore, these features,
capabilities, and strategies need not
meet the ‘‘special treatment’’
requirements 3 applicable to safety-
related or important to safety structures,
systems, and components.
The paragraph (c) evaluation should
be a structured process which would
3 See 10 CFR 50.69(b)(1)(I) through (xi) for a list
of NRC’s ‘‘special treatment’’ requirements for light
water power reactors, which would not be
applicable to the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies selected by the applicant
in accordance with proposed 10 CFR 52.500.
PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56297
require consideration of the insights
gained by the impact assessment
performed under proposed 10 CFR
52.500(b) and identify features,
capabilities, and strategies which are
practicable to include in the facility
design. The evaluation should
summarize the bases for the applicant’s
determination that the selected features,
capabilities, and strategies incorporated
into the facility design avoid or mitigate,
to the extent practicable, the effects of
the applicable, beyond-design-basis
aircraft impact, with reduced reliance
on operator actions. As with the impact
assessment, the evaluation would
address a beyond-design-basis event,
and therefore, need not be performed in
accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘special
treatment’’ requirements, such as the
quality assurance/quality control
requirements in Appendix B of 10 CFR
part 50. The proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c)
evaluation must be included in the
FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28), 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47), 10
CFR 52.137(a)(26), or 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) and should address only
those features, capabilities, and
strategies selected by the applicant for
inclusion in the plant design. In
addition to describing and evaluating
the incorporated design and other
features, the application must describe
how such design and other features,
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions. The NRC intends this standard
to include those design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies
which are realistically and reasonably
feasible from a technical engineering
perspective. For example, the NRC
believes that it may be practicable to
employ existing technologies currently
in use in the commercial nuclear power
industry or in another industry.
However, it would not be practicable to
introduce a design feature that could
have adverse safety or security
consequences under a different
operational or accident scenario.
Inclusion of any SGI in the evaluation
submitted in the FSAR as part of a
relevant application must be in
accordance with applicable
requirements in 10 CFR part 73. The
NRC will process and address requests
for access to this information from the
general public in accordance with the
NRC’s existing procedures.
Section 52.502 Control of Changes to
FSAR Information
Paragraph (a) would state that, for
standard design certifications which are
subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500,
generic changes to the information
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 56298 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the FSAR are governed by
the applicable requirements of 10 CFR
52.63. A design feature, functional
capability, or strategy described in a
standard design certification may not be
changed in the design certification
except by notice and comment
rulemaking, see 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1) and
(2), and such a change must meet one
of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). Any
generic change to a design certification
rule must be implemented by all
referencing combined licenses, as
required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3).
Paragraph (b) would state that, for
combined license applicants or holders
which are not subject to proposed 10
CFR 52.500 but reference a standard
design certification which is subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, proposed
departures from the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the FSAR for the standard
design certification are governed by the
change control requirements in the
applicable design certification rule. A
combined license holder referencing a
standard design certification subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (i.e., a design
certification issued after the effective
date of the final 10 CFR 52.500), who
seeks to depart from the design features,
functional capabilities, or strategies in
the referenced design certification,
would be governed by a new change
control provision that the NRC expects
to add to future design certification
rules to which proposed 10 CFR 52.500
would apply. The new change control
provision would require that, if the
licensee changes the information
required by proposed 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR
for the standard design certification,
then the licensee shall re-perform that
portion of the evaluation required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing
the changed feature, capability, or
strategy, and describe, in the re-
evaluation, how the remaining design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
Paragraph (c) would state that, for
combined licenses which are subject to
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, if the licensee
changes the information required by 10
CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the
FSAR, then the licensee shall re-perform
that portion of the evaluation required
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
by 10 CFR 52.500(c) addressing the
changed feature, capability, or strategy,
and describe, in the re-evaluation, how
the modified design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions. The NRC believes that, because
this rule is being proposed to address a
beyond-design-basis event, it is
appropriate to apply the same standard
that was applied during the original
evaluation of design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to any
licensee-proposed changes to such
features, capabilities, and strategies.
Paragraph (d) would state that, for
manufacturing licenses which are
subject to 10 CFR 52.500, generic
changes to the information required by
10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in
the final safety analysis report are
governed by the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR 52.171.
Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 52.171 does
not allow the holder of a manufacturing
license to make changes to the design of
the nuclear power reactor authorized to
be manufactured without prior
Commission approval. Any request for a
change to the design must be in the form
of an application for a license
amendment, and must meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10
CFR 50.92.
Paragraph (e) would state that, for
combined license applicants or holders
which are not subject to 10 CFR 52.500
but reference a manufactured reactor
which is subject to 10 CFR 52.500,
proposed departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) to be included in the FSAR
for the manufacturing license are
governed by the applicable
requirements in 10 CFR 52.171(b)(2).
Paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 52.171
allows an applicant or licensee who
references or uses a nuclear power
reactor manufactured under a
manufacturing license under this
subpart to request a departure from the
design characteristics, site parameters,
terms and conditions, or approved
design of the manufactured reactor. The
Commission may grant a request only if
it determines that the departure will
comply with the requirements of 10 CFR
52.7, and that the special circumstances
outweigh any decrease in safety that
may result from the reduction in
standardization caused by the
departure.
VII. Guidance
The NRC staff is preparing new
regulatory guidance on the requirements
in proposed 10 CFR 52.500. This
guidance is intended to provide an
acceptable method by which relevant
applicants can perform the assessment
of aircraft impacts to meet the
requirements of proposed 10 CFR
52.500. The proposed rule would
PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
require that the design-specific impact
assessment use the Commission-
specified general aircraft characteristics.
A more detailed description of the
aircraft characteristics that should be
used in the assessment will be set forth
in the regulatory guidance, which will
be issued in draft form following
publication of this proposed rule.
Because the portion of this regulatory
guidance describing the detailed aircraft
characteristics is likely to contain SGI,
that portion of the document will only
be made available to those individuals
with a need-to-know, and who are
otherwise qualified to have access to
SGI. A version of the document without
the SGI would be made publicly
available. Final publication of the
regulatory guidance is planned to
coincide with publication of the final
rule. The Commission reiterates,
however, that the commenters on this
proposed rule need not await the
publication of the draft guidance in
order to be able to comment on the
proposed rule, in as much as the rule
and the supplementary information in
this document are sufficient to comment
on the substance of the proposed rule.
VIII. Specific Request for Comments
In addition to the general invitation to
submit comments on the proposed rule,
the NRC also requests comments on the
following questions:
1. Inclusion of impact assessment in
application. The proposed rule does not
require that the assessment of aircraft
impacts that would be mandated by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) be included
in the FSAR or otherwise submitted as
part of the application for a standard
design certification, standard design
approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license. However, the
NRC is proposing that a description of
the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies credited by
the applicant to avoid or mitigate the
effects of the applicable, beyond-design-
basis aircraft impact be included in the
FSAR submitted with the relevant
application. In addition, the FSAR must
contain an evaluation of how such
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions. The NRC is
seeking specific comments on the
desirability, or lack thereof, of requiring,
in the final rule, that applicants include
the aircraft impact assessment required
by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) in the
FSAR or another part of the application.
2. Acceptance criteria. The
acceptance criterion contained in
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 by which the
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 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
NRC may judge the required assessment
and evaluation is the practicability
criterion addressed in paragraph (c),
that is, that the applicant must describe
how the ‘‘design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions.’’ The NRC is considering
adding an additional acceptance
criterion to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for
judging the acceptability of the
applicant’s aircraft impact assessment
and evaluation. The NRC is seeking
specific comments on the desirability,
or lack thereof, of adding an additional
acceptance criterion in the final rule
beyond the proposed rule’s
practicability criterion. Such an
additional acceptance criterion could
read, for example:
The application must also describe how
such design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies will provide reasonable
assurance that any release of radioactive
materials to the environment will not
produce public exposures exceeding 10 CFR
part 100 guidelines.
3. Records retention. The proposed
rule relies on the general record
retention requirements in 10 CFR
50.71(c) for retention of the assessment
required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for
combined license and manufacturing
license applicants subject to proposed
10 CFR 52.500. The NRC intends to
similarly rely on a general design
certification rule provisions for
retention of the assessment required by
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 for design
certification applicants and combined
license and manufacturing license
holders that reference a design
certification. The NRC is requesting
specific comments on whether, in lieu
of the specific design certification rule
provisions or reliance on 10 CFR
50.71(c), the NRC should adopt as part
of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking
a specific provision that would
explicitly mandate the retention of the
assessment. Such a provision, would be
included in an additional paragraph of
final 10 CFR 52.500, and would set forth
the proposed period of retention.
Inclusion of a generic records retention
requirement in final 10 CFR 52.500
would preclude the need for the NRC to
include a specific records retention
provision in each standard design
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
certification subject to final 10 CFR
52.500. The NRC requests comments on
whether such a provision should be
included in final 10 CFR 52.500,
together with specific reasons in
support of the commenter’s position.
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
The NRC also requests comments on
the appropriate period for retention of
the assessment, evaluation, and
supporting documentation. The NRC is
considering the following alternatives:
• For a standard design certification,
combined license, and manufacturing
license the period of NRC review prior
to NRC final action on the application.
• For a standard design certification
and manufacturing license, the duration
of the design certification or
manufacturing license (i.e., the period
during which the design certification or
manufactured reactor may be
referenced, including any renewal).
• For a standard design certification
or manufacturing license, until the
licensee of the final referencing license
has submitted a certification under 10
CFR 50.82(a), or the final referencing
license has been terminated.
• For a combined license, when the
licensee has submitted a certification
under 10 CFR 50.82(a), or the combined
license has been terminated.
4. Requests to amend existing
standard design certifications to address
aircraft impacts. The NRC has
concluded that it does not need to apply
the proposed rule to the four currently
approved standard design certifications,
as discussed in detail in Section III of
the Supplementary Information of this
document. Nonetheless, the original
applicant (or successor in interest of any
of the four current standard design
certifications) may request an
amendment to the standard design
certification to add design features,
functional capabilities, or strategies in
accordance with the requirements of 10
CFR 52.500. The NRC encourages such
requests for amendment by the
applicants for the four current standard
design certifications because it will
further enhance the already high levels
of safety and security provided by these
reactor designs. These design
modifications may be implemented in
different ways as described in Section
III of the Supplementary Information of
this document. However, under the
proposed rule, there are no standards,
other than those contained in 10 CFR
52.63(a), for judging changes to the
design to address the effects of an
aircraft impact. The NRC requests
specific comments on whether it should
use the same criterion to judge
amendments to an existing design
certification as it would use on a new
design certification applicant under the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500.
5. Applicability to future 10 CFR part
50 license applicants. The NRC is
proposing to apply the requirements in
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 to 10 CFR part
52 applicants only, specifically, to
PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56299
applicants for standard design
certifications issued after the effective
date of the final rule that do not
reference a standard design approval;
standard design approvals issued after
the effective date of the final rule;
combined licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and
manufacturing licenses issued after the
effective date of the final rule that do
not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval. However, the NRC is
considering extending the applicability
of the proposed 10 CFR 52.500
requirements to future applicants for
construction permits under 10 CFR part
50. The NRC requests specific
comments on the desirability, or lack
thereof, of extending, to future 10 CFR
part 50 construction permit applicants,
the applicability of the proposed
requirements to perform an aircraft
impact assessment and to evaluate the
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft
impact.
6. Addition of technical requirements
to 10 CFR part 52. In the recent revision
to 10 CFR part 52, the NRC took a
comprehensive approach to
reorganizing 10 CFR part 52 and making
conforming changes throughout 10 CFR
Chapter I, ‘‘Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,’’ to reflect the licensing
and approval processes in 10 CFR part
52. In that rulemaking, the NRC
reviewed the existing regulations in 10
CFR Chapter I to determine if the
existing regulations needed to be
modified to reflect the licensing and
approval processes in 10 CFR part 52. In
making conforming changes involving
10 CFR part 50 provisions, the NRC
adopted the general principle of keeping
the technical requirements in 10 CFR
part 50 and maintaining all applicable
procedural requirements in 10 CFR part
52. This proposed aircraft impact rule
represents a departure from that general
principle in that it proposes to include
specific technical requirements in 10
CFR part 52 and would create a separate
subpart for inclusion of future, similar,
technical requirements. The NRC is
considering relocating the proposed
aircraft impact requirements from 10
CFR 52.500 to a new section in 10 CFR
part 50 in order to maintain the general
principle it established in the
comprehensive 10 CFR part 52
rulemaking. The NRC requests specific
comments on the desirability, or lack
03OCP1
 56300 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
thereof, of relocating the proposed
aircraft impact requirements from 10
CFR 52.500 to a new section in 10 CFR
part 50.
7. Applicability to design approvals
and manufacturing licenses. The
proposed rule would apply to future
design approvals or manufacturing
licenses. In the recent comprehensive
rulemaking on 10 CFR part 52, the NRC
strived for a high level of consistency in
the requirements for design
certifications, design approvals, and
manufacturing licenses, given the
similarity in the regulatory functions of
these three processes. However, it is not
clear that there will be future design
approval applications, in light of the
NRC’s recent determination to remove
the design approval as a prerequisite for
obtaining a design certification.
Similarly, there does not appear to be
any near-term interest in obtaining a
manufacturing license for the
manufacture of a nuclear power plant.
Therefore, the NRC is considering
eliminating the applicability of the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements
to future applicants for design approvals
and manufacturing licenses. The NRC
requests specific comments on the
desirability, or lack thereof, of
eliminating the applicability of the
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 requirements
to future applicants for design approvals
and manufacturing licenses.
8. Scope of design evaluated. The
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be
applicable to all standard design
certifications, standard design
approvals, and manufacturing licenses
issued after the effective date of the final
rule and to all combined licenses issued
after the effective date of the final rule
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufacturing license. However, the
proposed rule does not address the
difference in the scope of the facility
Environmental Assessment ......................................................................................................................
SRM–SECY–06–0204 (April 24, 2007) ....................................................................................................
SECY–06–0204, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking—Security Assessment Requirements for New Nuclear
Power Reactor Designs’’ (September 26, 2006).
NUREG/BR–0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook’’ (January 1997) ..................
NUREG/BR–0058, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,’’
Revision 4 (September 2004).
X. Plain Language
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
The Presidential memorandum ‘‘Plain
Language in Government Writing’’
published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883)
directed that the Government’s
documents be in clear and accessible
language. The NRC requests comments
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
design that would be considered by an
applicant for a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufacturing license and the scope
of the design that would be considered
by a combined license applicant. For a
standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufacturing
license, the applicant is required to
address only a subset of the facility
design that a combined license
applicant is required to address. In
general, a design certification, design
approval, or manufacturing license
applicant is required to address such
items as the reactor core, reactor coolant
system, instrumentation and control
systems, electrical systems, containment
system, other engineered safety features,
auxiliary and emergency systems, power
conversion systems, radioactive waste
handling systems, and fuel handling
systems. In contrast, a combined license
applicant also must address site-specific
design features, such as the ultimate
heat sink. Combined license applicants
that do not reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor could address
such site-specific design features in
their evaluation of design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies to
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of the applicable
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on
operator actions. However, the proposed
rule does not impose any requirements
on a combined license applicant that
references a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor with
regard to addressing the potential effects
of an aircraft impact on such site-
specific portions of the design. The
proposed rule could, therefore,
introduce an inconsistency in the
treatment of combined license
applicants that reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor and combined
Document
on the proposed rule specifically with
respect to the clarity and effectiveness
of the language used. Comments should
be sent to the NRC as explained in the
ADDRESSES caption of this notice.
PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702
license applicants that submit a custom
design. Therefore, to ensure consistent
treatment of all combined license
applicants, the NRC is considering an
alternative approach in the final rule.
One approach that the NRC is
considering is to adopt additional
requirements for combined license
applicants that reference a design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor that would require
such applicants to evaluate that portion
of the design excluded from the design
certification, design approval, or
manufactured reactor for additional
design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions.
Alternatively, the NRC is considering
limiting the scope of the evaluation for
combined license applicants not
referencing a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor to
that portion of the design that would
otherwise be covered in a design
certification, design approval, or
manufacturing license application,
which would include the majority of the
facility considered most vulnerable to
an aircraft impact. The NRC requests
specific comments on the desirability,
or lack thereof, of adopting one of these
alternative approaches in the final rule.
IX. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the documents
identified below available to interested
persons through one or more of the
following methods as indicated.
Public Document Room (PDR). The
NRC Public Document Room is located
at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852.
NRC’s Electronic Reading Room
(ERR). The NRC’s public electronic
reading room is located at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
PDR Web ERR (ADAMS)
X X ML072200262
X X ML071140119
X X ML062300068
X ................ ML050190193
X X ML042820192
XI. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on
Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,’’ approved
by the Commission on June 20, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register
(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this
E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM 03OCP1
 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
rule is classified as compatibility
‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for
Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC
program elements in this category are
those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the
Atomic Energy Act or the provisions of
10 CFR. Although an Agreement State
may not adopt program elements
reserved to the NRC, it may wish to
inform its licensees of certain
requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with the particular State’s
administrative procedure laws. Category
‘‘NRC’’ regulations do not confer
regulatory authority on the State.
XII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104–113, requires that Federal agencies
use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies unless
using such a standard is inconsistent
with applicable law or is otherwise
impractical. The NRC is not aware of
any voluntary consensus standard that
could be used instead of the proposed
Government-unique standards. The NRC
will consider using a voluntary
consensus standard if an appropriate
standard is identified.
XIII. Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact: Availability
The NRC has determined under the
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, as amended, and the
Commission’s regulations in subpart A
to 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if
adopted, would not be a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment and,
therefore, an environmental impact
statement is not required.
The determination of this
environmental assessment is that there
will be no significant offsite impact to
the public from this action. However,
the general public should note that the
NRC is seeking public participation;
availability of the environmental
assessment is provided in Section IX of
this document. Comments on any aspect
of the environmental assessment may be
submitted to the NRC as indicated
under the ADDRESSES heading.
The NRC has sent a copy of the
environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to every State Liaison
Officer and requested their comments
on the environmental assessment.
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act
Statement
This proposed rule contains new or
amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:16 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget for review and approval of
the information collection requirements.
Type of submission, new or revision:
Revision.
The title of the information collection:
10 CFR part 52; ‘‘Consideration of
Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power
Reactor Designs,’’ proposed rule.
The form number if applicable: N/A.
How often the collection is required:
One time; to be submitted with each
application for a design certification not
referencing a design approval, a design
approval, a combined license not
referencing a design certification, design
approval, or manufactured reactor; or a
manufacturing license not referencing a
design certification or design approval.
Who will be required or asked to
report: Designers and any person
eligible under the Atomic Energy Act to
apply for a design certification, design
approval, combined license, or
manufacturing license for a nuclear
power plant.
An estimate of the number of annual
responses: 1.
The estimated number of annual
respondents: 1.
An estimate of the total number of
hours needed annually to complete the
requirement or request: 3,960 hours.
Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is proposing to
amend its regulations to require
applicants for new standard design
certifications that do not reference a
standard design approval; new standard
design approvals; combined licenses
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval to assess
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft on the nuclear
power plant. Based on the insights
gained from this assessment, the
applicant shall include in its
application a description and evaluation
of design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate the effects of the aircraft
impact. The evaluation of such design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies must include core cooling
capability, containment integrity, and
spent fuel pool integrity. The impact of
a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-
design-basis event, and the NRC’s
requirements applicable to the design,
construction, testing, operation, and
maintenance of design features,
functional capabilities, and strategies for
design basis events would not be
PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56301
applicable to design features, functional
capabilities, or strategies selected by the
applicant solely to meet the
requirements of this rule. The objective
of this rule is to require nuclear power
plant designers to perform a rigorous
assessment of design features that could
provide additional inherent protection
to avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the effects of an aircraft
impact, with reduced reliance on
operator actions.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is seeking public comment
on the potential impact of the
information collections contained in the
proposed rule and on the following
issues:
1. Is the proposed information
collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
NRC, including whether the information
will have practical utility?
2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the
information collection be minimized,
including the use of automated
collection techniques?
A copy of the OMB clearance package
may be viewed free of charge at the NRC
Public Document Room, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room
O–1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The
OMB clearance package and rule are
available at the NRC worldwide Web
site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/
doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60
days after the signature date of this
document.
Send comments on any aspect of
these proposed information collections,
including suggestions for reducing the
burden and on the above issues, by
November 2, 2007 to the Records and
FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T–5
F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, or by Internet electronic mail to
INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the
Desk Officer, Nathan Frey, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
NEOB–10202 (3150–0151), Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,
DC 20503. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical
to do so, but assurance of consideration
cannot be given to comments received
after this date. You may also e-mail
comments to
Nathan_J._Frey@omb.eop.gov or
comment by telephone at 202–395–
4650.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,
and a person is not required to respond
03OCP1
 56302 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
to, a request for information or an
information collection requirement
unless the requesting document
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
XV. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a regulatory
analysis on this proposed rule and has
included it in this Federal Register
document. The analysis examines the
costs and benefits of the alternatives
considered by the NRC.
1. Statement of the Problem and
Objective
This proposed rule would amend 10
CFR part 52 to require applicants for
new standard design certifications that
do not reference a standard design
approval; new standard design
approvals; combined licenses that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval to assess
the effects of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft on the nuclear
power plant. Based on the insights
gained from this assessment, the
applicant would need to include in its
application a description and evaluation
of design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate the effects of the aircraft
impact. The objective of this rule is to
require nuclear power plant designers to
perform a rigorous assessment of design
features that could provide additional
inherent protection to avoid or mitigate,
to the extent practicable, the effects of
an aircraft impact, with reduced
reliance on operator actions.
2. Identification of Regulatory
Alternatives
The only alternative considered was
to conduct a rulemaking to require
applicants to perform an aircraft impact
assessment on newly designed facilities
because the Commission directed the
NRC staff in a staff requirements
memorandum dated April 24, 2007, to
so revise the regulations. However, the
NRC staff considers the no-action
alternative as the baseline from which to
measure the costs and benefits of the
proposed rule.
The regulations in 10 CFR part 52
would be amended to require applicants
for new standard design certifications
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
that do not reference a standard design
approval; new standard design
approvals; combined licenses that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
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manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, and those
applicants with applications pending on
the effective date of this rule, (relevant
applicants) to perform an aircraft impact
assessment of the effects on the
designed facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Based on the
insights derived from this assessment,
the application would need to include
a description and evaluation of the
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies to avoid or mitigate the
effects of an aircraft impact, addressing
core cooling capability, containment
integrity, and spent fuel pool integrity.
The applicant would need to describe
how such design and other features
avoid or mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the aircraft impact effects
with reduced reliance on operator
actions. The proposed rule would result
in newly designed power reactor
facilities being more inherently robust
with regard to a potential aircraft impact
than if they were designed in the
absence of this rule.
3. Analysis of Values and Impacts of
Proposed Rulemaking
3.1 Identification of Affected
Attributes
The NRC identified the attributes that
the proposed regulatory action could
affect by using the list of potential
attributes provided in Chapter 5 of
NUREG/BR–0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis
Technical Evaluation Handbook,’’
issued January 1997. Affected attributes
include the following:
Public Health (Accident). The
proposed regulatory action would
reduce the risk that public health will
be affected by the release of radioactive
materials to the environment from the
impact of a large, commercial aircraft on
a nuclear power plant.
Occupational Health (Accident). The
proposed regulatory action would
reduce the risk that occupational health
will be affected by the release of
radioactive materials to the environment
from the impact of a large, commercial
aircraft on a nuclear power plant.
Offsite Property. The proposed
regulatory action would reduce the risk
that offsite property will be affected by
the release of radioactive materials to
the environment from the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft on a nuclear
power plant.
Onsite Property. The proposed
regulatory action would reduce the risk
that onsite property will be affected by
the release of radioactive materials to
the environment from the impact of a
PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
large, commercial aircraft on a nuclear
power plant.
Industry Implementation. The
proposed regulatory action would
require applicants for new standard
design certifications that do not
reference a standard design approval;
new standard design approvals;
combined licenses that do not reference
a standard design certification, standard
design approval, or manufactured
reactor; and new manufacturing licenses
that do not reference a standard design
certification or standard design approval
to assess the effects of the impact of a
large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear
power plant. Based on the insights
gained from this assessment, the
applicant would need to include in its
application a description and evaluation
of design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of an aircraft impact, with
reduced reliance on operator actions.
NRC Implementation. Under the
proposed regulatory action, the NRC
would incur costs to develop guidance
on performing an aircraft impact
assessment, to review the actions taken
by the applicant based on the insights
gained from the assessment, and to
review the assessment if the NRC needs
additional information to verify
compliance with this rule. The NRC
would also incur the costs of completing
this rulemaking.
Improvements in Knowledge. The
proposed regulatory action would
improve knowledge by ensuring that
applicants for newly designed nuclear
power facilities perform a rigorous
assessment of the effects of the impact
of a large, commercial aircraft on the
designed facility. Based on the insights
gained from this assessment, the
applicant would need to include in its
application a description and evaluation
of the design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
mitigate the effects of the aircraft
impact, addressing core cooling
capability, containment integrity, and
spent fuel pool integrity. The applicant
would need to describe how such
design and other features avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
aircraft impact effects with reduced
reliance on operator actions.
Safeguards and Security
Considerations. The proposed
regulatory action to address the
capability of newly designed power
reactors relative to a potential aircraft
impact is based both on enhanced
public health and enhanced safety and
common defense and security but is not
necessary for adequate protection.
03OCP1
 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
Rather, it would be to enhance the
facility’s inherent robustness.
3.2 Methodology
This section describes the process
used to evaluate benefits and costs
associated with the proposed regulatory
action. The benefits (values) come from
any desirable changes in the affected
attributes which are solely qualitative
for the proposed regulatory action; the
costs (impacts or burdens) come from
any undesirable changes in the affected
attributes (e.g., monetary costs,
increased exposures). As described in
Section 3.1 of this regulatory analysis,
the attributes expected to be affected
include public health (accident),
occupational health (accident), offsite
property, onsite property, industry
implementation, NRC implementation,
improvements in knowledge, and
safeguards and security considerations.
Ideally, a cost-benefit analysis
quantifies the overall costs and benefits
of the regulatory options relative to each
of these attributes. This analysis relies
on a qualitative evaluation of several of
the affected attributes (public health,
occupational health, offsite property,
onsite property, improvements in
knowledge, and safeguards and security
considerations) because of the difficulty
in quantifying the impact of the current
rulemaking. The proposed regulatory
action would affect these attributes
through the associated reduction in the
risks of aircraft impact damage to core
cooling, containment integrity, spent
fuel pool integrity, and other structures,
systems, and components.
The remaining attributes (industry
implementation and NRC
implementation) are evaluated
quantitatively. Quantitative analysis
requires a characterization of the
universe, including factors such as the
number of applicants and the scope of
the aircraft impact assessment being
performed. The NRC analyzed
incremental costs and benefits of the
proposed regulatory action relative to
the baseline (i.e., the no-action
alternative described in Section 2 of this
regulatory analysis).
Under OMB guidance and NUREG/
BR–0058, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis
Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,’’ Revision 4,
issued September 2004, the results of
the cost analysis are presented as
discounted flows of funds using 3- and
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7-percent real discount rates.
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3.3 Data
The NRC derived information on the
estimated number of applications
submitted for a new standard design
certification that does not reference a
standard design approval from industry
announcements. Given the uncertainty
in the number of (1) new standard
design approvals; (2) combined licenses
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and (3) new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, the NRC
staff applied its professional judgment
in this analysis.
3.4 Assumptions
The proposed regulatory action would
apply only to applications for new
standard design certifications that do
not reference a standard design
approval; new standard design
approvals; combined licenses that do
not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and new
manufacturing licenses that do not
reference a standard design certification
or standard design approval, and those
applicants with applications pending on
the effective date of this rule. It would
not apply to (1) a standard design
certification or combined license issued
before the effective date of the final rule,
(2) the design certification rule, (3)
Appendices A through D to 10 CFR part
52, or (4) a nuclear power reactor with
a current operating license.
3.5 Analysis
For Sections 3.5.1 through 3.5.4, the
cost-benefit analysis of the proposed
regulatory action is based on the
assumed number of applicants in each
category. In each case, industry would
incur both implementation and
operation costs. Furthermore, because
all of the benefits are measured
qualitatively in this analysis, only costs
are included in these subsections.
This analysis uses $105 per hour for
both NRC and industry staff rates. The
annual results are derived as present
values using the 3- and 7-percent
discount rates as described in Appendix
B to NUREG/BR–0184.
3.5.1 Standard Design Certification
Applications Not Referencing a
Standard Design Approval
In implementing the proposed
regulatory action, standard design
PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
56303
certification applicants would incur
one-time costs to develop an SGI
program, purchase an appropriate SGI
storage container, perform the aircraft
impact assessment, and incorporate the
design features, functional capabilities,
or strategies into the design based on the
insights gained from the assessment.
The NRC estimates that each applicant
would spend 120 hours to develop the
SGI program. Using the assumed staff
rate of $105 per hour, the one-time cost
of developing the SGI program would be
$13,000 per applicant (120 hours ×
$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it
would cost $2,500 to purchase an
appropriate SGI storage container.
Finally, the NRC estimates it would take
an applicant 24 staff-months for a one-
time cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months ×
4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour)
per application to complete the
assessment and incorporate the results
into the design. Thus, the one-time cost
for an applicant to implement the
proposed regulatory action is estimated
to be $420,000.
For the standard design certification
process, this analysis assumes that three
applications would be affected by the
proposed rule in the first year following
promulgation of this rule, and
thereafter, one application would be
submitted every 4 years at years 4, 8, 12,
16, and 20. Table 1 shows the
discounted flow of funds (using 3- and
7-percent discount rates) of the total
industry implementation costs for
standard design certification
applications over a 20-year period.
With respect to industry operational
costs, there would be recordkeeping
costs for retention of the assessment,
evaluation, and supporting
documentation. In addition, it is
assumed that an applicant spends 3
hours per year to maintain the records.
The estimated annual cost for
recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
hours × $105/hour). However, for this
analysis, it is assumed that it takes 4
years for the Commission to adopt the
application as a final standard design
certification rule, after which the
records are retained by the applicant for
15 years as required by the standard
design certification rule. Table 2 shows
the discounted flow of funds of the
recordkeeping costs (using 3- and 7-
percent discount rates) for applications
submitted over a 20-year period, using
the schedule discussed previously.
03OCP1
 56304 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATION APPLICANTS
Operating costs
Number of stand-
ard design certifi-
Year Using 7-percent Using 3-percent
cation discount rate discount rate
applications ($1,000) ($1,000)

1 ................................................................................................................................. 3 1,200 1,200

4 ................................................................................................................................. 1 320 370
8 ................................................................................................................................. 1 240 330
12 ............................................................................................................................... 1 190 290
16 ............................................................................................................................... 1 140 260
20 ............................................................................................................................... 1 110 230

Total .................................................................................................................... 8 2,200 2,680

TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY OPERATING COSTS FOR STANDARD DESIGN

Implementation costs
Number of stand-
ard design certifi-
Year* Using 7-percent Using 3-percent
cation discount rate discount rate
applications ($1,000) ($1,000)

1 ............................................................................................................................. 3 6.6 10
4 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.7 3
8 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.3 2.6
12 ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 2.3
16 ........................................................................................................................... 1 0.74 2.1
20 ........................................................................................................................... 1 0.53 1.8

Total ................................................................................................................ 8 11.87 21.8

* Analysis assumes that it takes 4 years for the Commission to adopt the application as a final standard design certification rule, after which
the records are retained by the applicant for 15 years.

3.5.2 Standard Design Approval functional capabilities, and strategies hours per year to maintain the records.
Applications into the design based on the insights The estimated annual cost for
Under the proposed regulatory action, gained from the assessment. The NRC recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
an applicant for a standard design estimates that each applicant would hours × $105/hour). For this analysis, it
approval would need to comply with spend 120 hours to develop the SGI is assumed that it takes 4 years for the
the requirements for an aircraft impact program. Assuming a staff rate of $105 Commission to approve the application,
assessment in 10 CFR 52.500. However, per hour, the one-time cost of after which the records are retained by
the NRC staff concludes that it is developing the SGI program would be the licensee for 60 years, at which time
unlikely that a request for a standard $13,000 per applicant (120 hours × the Commission terminates the facility
design would be submitted to the NRC $105/hour). The NRC also estimates it license. The discounted flow of funds of
for approval during the next 20 years. would cost $2,500 to purchase an the recordkeeping costs for one
Therefore, no cost-benefit analysis was appropriate SGI storage container. application are $5,400 and $1,700 using
done for a standard design approval. Finally, the NRC estimates it would take 3- and 7-percent discount rates,
an applicant 24 staff-months for a one-
respectively.
3.5.3 Combined License Applications time cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months ×
Not Referencing a Standard Design 4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour) The total industry cost is the sum of
Certification, Standard Design per application to complete the the implementation and operation costs.
Approval, or Manufactured Reactor assessment and incorporate the results The implementation cost is the present
Although the NRC concludes that into the design. Thus, the one-time cost value of the assumed one application
there is a low probability of a combined for an applicant to implement the ($420,000) which when discounted is
license applicant not referencing a proposed regulatory action is estimated $310,000 (using a 3-percent discount
standard design certification, standard to be $420,000. For one application rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent
design approval, or manufactured submitted in year 10, following discount rate). The operating costs are
reactor, this analysis assumes that one promulgation of the rule, the discounted $5,400 and $1,700 using the 3- and 7-
application would be submitted to the flow of funds of the implementation percent discount rates as shown above.
NRC in year 10 following promulgation costs are $310,000 and $210,000 using Therefore, the total discounted industry
of the rule. 3- and 7-percent discount rates, costs are $315,400 and $211,700 using
In implementing the proposed respectively. 3- and 7-percent discount rates,
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS

regulatory action, combined license With respect to industry operational respectively.

applicants would incur one-time costs costs, there would be recordkeeping
to develop an SGI program, purchase an costs for retention of the assessment,
appropriate SGI storage container, evaluation, and supporting
perform the aircraft impact assessment, documentation. In addition, it is
and incorporate the design features, assumed that an applicant spends 3

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 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 56305

3.5.4 Manufacturing License With respect to industry operational
Applications Not Referencing a costs, there would be recordkeeping
Standard Design Certification or costs for retention of the assessment,
Standard Design Approval evaluation, and supporting
documentation. In addition, it is
Although the NRC concludes that assumed that an applicant spends 3
there is a low probability of a hours per year to maintain the records.
manufacturing license application not The estimated annual cost for
referencing a standard design recordkeeping is $315 per applicant (3
certification or standard design hours × $105/hour). For this analysis, it
approval, this analysis assumes that one is assumed that it takes 4 years for the
application would be submitted to the Commission to approve the application,
NRC in year 10 following promulgation after which the records are retained by
of the rule. the licensee for 15 years, at which time
In implementing the proposed the Commission terminates the license.
regulatory action, manufacturing license The discounted flow of funds of the
applicants would incur one-time costs recordkeeping costs for one application
to develop an SGI program, purchase an are $3,300 and $2,200 using 3- and 7-
appropriate SGI storage container, percent discount rates, respectively.
The total industry cost is the sum of
perform the aircraft impact assessment,
the implementation and operation costs.
and incorporate the design features,
The implementation cost is the present
functional capabilities, and strategies
value of the assumed one application
into the design based on the insights
($420,000) which when discounted is
gained from the assessment. The NRC
$310,000 (using a 3-percent discount
estimates that each applicant would
rate) and $210,000 (using a 7-percent
spend 120 hours to develop the SGI
discount rate). The operating costs are
program. Assuming a staff rate of $105
$3,300 and $2,200 using the 3- and 7-
per hour, the one-time cost of
percent discount rates as shown above.
developing the SGI program would be
Therefore, the total discounted industry
$13,000 per applicant (120 hours × costs are $313,300 and $212,200 using
$105/hour). The NRC also estimates it 3- and 7-percent discount rates,
would cost $2,500 to purchase an respectively.
appropriate SGI storage container.
Finally, the NRC estimates it would take 3.5.5 NRC Implementation
an applicant 24 staff-months for a one- Cost to Review the Applicant’s
time cost of $400,000 (24 staff-months × Results. The NRC would incur costs to
4 weeks/month × 40 hours × $105/hour) review the applicant’s actions in
per application to complete the response to the requirements of the
assessment and incorporate the results proposed rule. The one-time cost to (1)
into the design. Thus, the one-time cost review the actions taken by each
for an applicant to implement the applicant for a new standard design
proposed regulatory action is estimated certification that does not reference a
to be $420,000. For one application standard design approval; a combined
submitted in year 10, following license that does not reference a
promulgation of the rule, the discounted standard design certification, standard
flow of funds of the implementation design approval, or manufactured
costs are $310,000 and $210,000 using reactor; and a new manufacturing
3- and 7-percent discount rates, license that does not reference a
respectively. standard design certification or standard
design approval, and (2) review the
assessment if the NRC requires
additional information to verify
compliance with this rule is estimated
to be $17,000 (1 staff-month × 4 weeks/
month × 40 hours × $105/hour).
As an example, the total NRC cost for
the first year of implementing the
proposed rule is the present value of the
costs of reviewing three applications for
standard design certifications and
reviewing the assessments at $51,000 for
all three applications. This corresponds
to a net present value of $50,000 (using
a 3-percent discount rate) and $48,000
(using a 7-percent discount rate).
Cost to Develop Guidance. The NRC
would incur 0.5 full-time equivalent
(FTE) of staff time to develop guidance
to support implementation of the
proposed regulatory action. The cost for
this action is estimated to be $76,000
(0.5 FTE at $152,000/FTE).
Cost to Provide Training. The NRC
would incur costs to develop a training
course to instruct NRC staff on the
proposed changes to 10 CFR part 52.
Assuming that it would take 20 staff-
hours to develop the training course, the
cost is estimated to be $2,100 (20 staff-
hours x $105/hour). The cost to train 20
people for 2 hours, plus the instructor’s
time of 2 hours is estimated to be $4,400
(21 people × 2 hours × $105/hour). The
total cost to the NRC to provide training
for the proposed regulatory action is
estimated to be $7,000.
Cost of the Regulatory Action. The
NRC would incur 2.2 FTE of staff time
and $150,000 in contractor support to
complete this rulemaking after
publishing the proposed rule. The cost
of this action is estimated to be
$484,000 (2.2 FTE at $152,000/FTE +
$150,000).
Table 3 shows the discounted flow of
funds of the total NRC implementation
costs for the proposed regulatory action
over 20 years.

TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

Application Implementation costs

Year Using 7-percent Using 3-percent

Number reviewed Category* discount rate discount rate
($1,000) ($1,000)

1 ............................................................................................................. 3 DC .......... 48 50
4 ............................................................................................................. 1 DC .......... 13 15
8 ............................................................................................................. 1 DC .......... 10 13
10 ........................................................................................................... 1 COL ....... 9 13
10 ........................................................................................................... 1 ML .......... 9 13
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS

12 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 8 12
16 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 6 11
20 ........................................................................................................... 1 DC .......... 4 9

Cost to Review All Applications ................................................................................................................... 107 136

Cost to Develop Guidance .......................................................................................................................... 76 76
Cost to Provide Training .............................................................................................................................. 7 7

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 56306 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules

TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF NRC IMPLEMENTATION COSTS—Continued

Application Implementation costs

Year Using 7-percent Using 3-percent

Number reviewed Category* discount rate discount rate
($1,000) ($1,000)

Cost of the Regulatory ................................................................................................................................. 484 484

Total (rounded) ..................................................................................................................................... 670 700

* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application.

3.5.6 Impacts to Other Stakeholders in knowledge, and safeguards and operator actions. In this manner, this
security considerations. proposed rule would result in newly
The NRC staff has not identified any Specifically, the benefits would designed nuclear power reactor facilities
impacts to other stakeholders or the include improvements in knowledge being more inherently robust with
Agreement States. However, the because applicants for new power regard to a potential aircraft impact than
proposed action would lead to an reactor designs would need to evaluate if they were designed in the absence of
increase in public confidence because the design features, functional this rule.
nuclear power plant designers would capabilities, and strategies to avoid or
perform a rigorous assessment of design In addition, because the impact of a
mitigate the effects of the aircraft
and other features that could provide large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-
impact, addressing core cooling
additional inherent protection to avoid capability, containment integrity, and design-basis event, this rule would
or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the spent fuel pool integrity. If the effects provide an enhanced level of protection
effects of an aircraft impact, with are not assessed by facility designers, it beyond that which is provided by the
reduced reliance on operator actions. would be more difficult to enhance the existing adequate protection
inherent robustness of the facility to requirements, which all operating
3.5.7 Qualitative Benefits of the facilities are required to meet, and the
Proposed Action avoid or mitigate the effects of the
aircraft impact. Furthermore, designers proposed adequate protection
The benefits of the proposed rule can of new facilities would need to describe requirements that facilities will be
be evaluated only on a qualitative basis. how the design features, functional required to meet if they are made final
The analysis estimates that the proposed capabilities, and strategies adopted (see Section I of this document).
action would result in qualitative based on the insights of the assessment 4. Presentation of Results
benefits in public health (accidental), avoid or mitigate, to the extent
occupational health (accidental), offsite practicable, the effects of an aircraft Table 4 summarizes the results of the
property, onsite property, improvements impact, with reduced reliance on NRC’s cost-benefit analysis for industry.

TABLE 4.—SUMMARY OF TOTAL INDUSTRY COSTS FOR PROPOSED ACTION

Using 7-percent Using 3-percent
Category of application* discount rate discount rate
($1,000) ($1,000)

Implementation Costs

DC ............................................................................................................................................................ 2,200 2,680

COL .......................................................................................................................................................... 210 310
ML ............................................................................................................................................................ 210 310

Operating Costs

DC ............................................................................................................................................................ 11.87 21.8

COL .......................................................................................................................................................... 1.7 5.4
ML ............................................................................................................................................................ 2.2 3.3

Total (rounded) ................................................................................................................................. 2,600 3,300

* DC = design certification. COL = combined license application. ML = manufacturing license application.

Table 5 shows the total costs of the

proposed regulatory action.

TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY AND NRC COSTS

ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS

Using 7-percent Using 3-percent

discount rate discount rate
($1,000) ($1,000)

Industry ........................................................................................................................................................ 2,600 3,300

NRC ............................................................................................................................................................. 670 700

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 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules 56307

TABLE 5.—SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY AND NRC COSTS—Continued

Using 7-percent Using 3-percent
discount rate discount rate
($1,000) ($1,000)

Total (rounded) ..................................................................................................................................... 3,300 4,000

5. Decision Rationale standards established by the NRC (10 Standard design, Standard design
CFR 2.810). certification.
The total present-valued costs of this For the reasons set out in the
proposed action are $4.0 million and XVII. Backfit Analysis preamble and under the authority of the
$3.3 million for 3- and 7-percent The NRC has determined that neither Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
discount rates, respectively. The the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, nor any the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
benefits are expressed only qualitatively of the finality provisions in 10 CFR part as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC
and are discussed in Section 3.5.7 of 52, apply to this proposed rule and, is proposing to adopt the following
this regulatory analysis. As noted therefore, a backfit analysis is not amendments to 10 CFR part 52.
previously, the key benefit is required, because the proposed rule
improvements in knowledge because does not contain any provisions that PART 52—LICENSES,
applicants for new standard design would impose backfitting as defined in CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS
certifications that do not reference a the backfit rule, nor does it contain FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
standard design approval; new standard provisions that would require a finding
design approvals; combined licenses 1. The authority citation for part 52
of compliance or adequate protection continues to read as follows:
that do not reference a standard design under the finality provisions in 10 CFR
certification, standard design approval, Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183,
part 52.
or manufactured reactor; and new 185, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 948, 953, 954,
The proposed rule applies only to 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444,
manufacturing licenses that do not applicants for a standard design as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232,
reference a standard design certification certification not referencing a standard 2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202,
or standard design approval would need design approval; a standard design 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended
to assess the effects of the impact of a approval; a combined license not (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112
large, commercial aircraft on the nuclear referencing a standard design Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
power plant. Based on the insights certification, standard design approval, 2. In § 52.11, paragraph (b) is revised
gained from this assessment, nuclear manufacture reactor; or a manufacturing to read as follows:
power plant designers could provide license not referencing a standard
additional inherent protection to avoid design certification or standard design § 52.11 Information collection
or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the requirements: OMB approval.
approval that are pending at the time of
effects of an aircraft impact, with or submitted after the effective date of * * * * *
reduced reliance on operator actions. the final rule. There are no existing (b) The approved information
combined licenses or manufacturing collection requirements contained in
6. Implementation Schedule this part appear in §§ 52.7, 52.15, 52.16,
licenses protected by the backfitting
After publication of the proposed rule restrictions in 10 CFR 50.109 or the 52.17, 52.29, 52.35, 52.39, 52.45, 52.46,
in the Federal Register and finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52. To 52.47, 52.57, 52.63, 52.75, 52.77, 52.79,
consideration and resolution of the the extent that the proposed rule would 52.80, 52.93, 52.99, 52.110, 52.135,
public comments, the NRC would revise the requirements for future design 52.136, 52.137, 52.155, 52.156, 52.157,
publish a final rule which would certifications, combined licenses, or 52.158, 52.171, 52.177, 52.500, and
become effective 30 days after manufacturing licenses the appendices A, B, C, D, and N of part 52.
publication. 3. In § 52.47, paragraph (a)(28) is
requirements would not constitute
The Commission requests public added to read as follows:
backfitting or otherwise be inconsistent
comments on the draft regulatory with the finality provisions in 10 CFR § 52.47 Contents of applications; technical
analysis. Interested persons may submit part 52, because the requirements are information.
comments on the draft analysis to the prospective in nature and effect. Neither * * * * *
NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES the backfit rule nor the finality (a) * * *
heading. provisions in 10 CFR part 52 were (28) For applications for standard
XVI. Regulatory Flexibility Act intended to apply to every NRC action design certifications which are subject
Certification which substantially changes the to 10 CFR 52.500, the information
expectations of future applicants under required by 10 CFR 52.500.
In accordance with the Regulatory 10 CFR part 52. * * * * *
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 4. In § 52.79, paragraph (a)(47) is
Commission certifies that this rule will List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52
added to read as follows:
not, if promulgated, have a significant Administrative practice and
economic impact on a substantial procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, § 52.79 Contents of applications; technical
number of small entities. This proposed Combined license, Early site permit, information in final safety analysis report.
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS

rule affects only the licensing and Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection, (a) * * *
operation of nuclear power plants. The Limited work authorization, Nuclear (47) For applications for combined
companies that own these plants do not power plants and reactors, Probabilistic licenses which are subject to 10 CFR
fall within the scope of the definition of risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor 52.500, the information required by 10
‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting CFR 52.500.
Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size and recordkeeping requirements, * * * * *

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 56308 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 3, 2007 / Proposed Rules
5. In § 52.137, paragraph (a)(26) is
added to read as follows:
§ 52.137 Contents of applications;
technical information.
* * * * * [EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE]
(a) * * *
(26) For applications for standard
design approvals which are subject to 10
CFR 52.500, the information required by
10 CFR 52.500.
* * * * * standard design approval; a standard
6. In § 52.157, paragraph (f)(32) is
added to read as follows:
§ 52.157 Contents of applications;
technical information in final safety analysis
report.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(32) For applications for
manufacturing licenses which are
subject to 10 CFR 52.500, the
information required by 10 CFR 52.500.
7. In § 52.303, paragraph (b) is revised
to read as follows:
§ 52.303 Criminal penalties.
* * * * * States, with aviation fuel loading
(b) The regulations in part 52 that are
not issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
161o for the purposes of Section 223 are
as follows: §§ 52.0, 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, 52.7,
52.8, 52.9, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 52.13,
52.15, 52.16, 52.17, 52.18, 52.21, 52.23,
52.24, 52.27, 52.28, 52.29, 52.31, 52.33,
52.39, 52.41, 52.43, 52.45, 52.46, 52.47,
52.48, 52.51, 52.53, 52.54, 52.55, 52.57,
52.59, 52.61, 52.63, 52.71, 52.73, 52.75,
52.77, 52.79, 52.80, 52.81, 52.83, 52.85,
52.87, 52.93, 52.97, 52.98, 52.103,
52.104, 52.105, 52.107, 52.109, 52.131,
52.133, 52.135, 52.136, 52.137, 52.139,
52.141, 52.143, 52.145, 52.147, 52.151,
52.153, 52.155, 52.156, 52.157, 52.158,
52.159, 52.161, 52.163, 52.165, 52.167,
52.171, 52.173, 52.175, 52.177, 52.179,
52.181, 52.301, 52.303, 52.500, and
52.502.
8. A new subpart K—Additional
Requirements and § 52.500 are added to
read as follows:
Subpart K—Additional Requirements
Sec.
52.500 Aircraft impact assessment.
52.502 Control of changes to FSAR
information.
Subpart K—Additional Requirements
§ 52.500 Aircraft impact assessment.
(a) The requirements of this section
apply to all standard design
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS
certifications issued after [EFFECTIVE
DATE OF FINAL RULE] that do not
reference a standard design approval;
standard design approvals issued after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE];
combined licenses issued after
VerDate Aug<31>2005 16:53 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 214001
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE]
that do not reference a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
or manufactured reactor; and
manufacturing licenses issued after
that do not reference a standard design
certification or standard design
approval.
(b) Each applicant for a standard
design certification not referencing a
design approval; a combined license not
referencing a standard design
certification, standard design approval,
manufacture reactor; or a manufacturing
license not referencing a standard
design certification or standard design
approval shall perform a design-specific
assessment of the effects on the
designed facility of the impact of a large,
commercial aircraft. Such assessment
must be based on the Commission’s
specified aircraft characteristics used to
define the beyond-design-basis impact
of a large, commercial aircraft used for
long distance flights in the United
typically used in such flights, and an
impact speed and angle of impact
considering the ability of both
experienced and inexperienced pilots to
control large, commercial aircraft at the
low altitude representative of a nuclear
power plant’s low profile.
(c) Based upon the insights gained
from the aircraft impact assessment as
stated in paragraph (b) of this section,
the application must include a
description and evaluation of the design
features, functional capabilities, and
strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects
of the applicable, beyond-design-basis
aircraft impact. The evaluation of such
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies must include core cooling
capability, containment integrity, and
spent fuel pool integrity. The
application must describe how such
design features, functional capabilities,
and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the
extent practicable, the effects of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced
reliance on operator actions.
§ 52.502 Control of changes to FSAR
information.
(a) For standard design certifications
which are subject to 10 CFR 52.500,
generic changes to the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be
included in the final safety analysis
report are governed by the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR 52.63.
(b) For combined license applicants or
holders which are not subject to 10 CFR
52.500 but reference a standard design
certification which is subject to 10 CFR
52.500, proposed departures from the
PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\03OCP1.SGM
information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to be included in the final
safety analysis report for the standard
design certification are governed by the
change control requirements in the
applicable design certification rule.
(c) For combined licenses which are
subject to 10 CFR 52.500, if the licensee
changes the information required by 10
CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the
final safety analysis report, then the
licensee shall re-perform that portion of
the evaluation required by 10 CFR
52.500(c) addressing the changed
feature, capability, or strategy, and
describe, in the re-evaluation, how the
modified design features, functional
capabilities, and strategies avoid or
mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
effects of the applicable aircraft impact
with reduced reliance on operator
actions.
(d) For manufacturing licenses which
are subject to 10 CFR 52.500, generic
changes to the information required by
10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) to be included in
the final safety analysis report are
governed by the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR 52.171.
(e) For combined license applicants or
holders which are not subject to 10 CFR
52.500 but reference a manufactured
reactor which is subject to 10 CFR
52.500, proposed departures from the
information required by 10 CFR
52.157(f)(32) to be included in the final
safety analysis report for the
manufacturing license are governed by
the applicable requirements in 10 CFR
52.171(b)(2).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day
of September 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 07–4886 Filed 10–2–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[Docket No. USCG–2007–29354]
RIN 1625–AA87
Security Zone; Nawiliwili Harbor,
Kauai, HI
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to
create a security zone in the waters of
Nawiliwili Harbor, Kaui, and on the
land of the jetty south of Nawiliwili
03OCP1