PERSONS: FAMILY CODE CASES (Art.

1-44)
------------------------ARTICLES 1-34 CASES-----------------------NIAL v. BAYADOG (2000)
Pepito Nial married Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. On 1985 he shot Teodulfa dead and a year and 8 months after her
death, Pepito remarried the respondent Bayadog WITHOUT SECURING A MARRIAGE LICENSE. They executed
an AFFIDAVIT in 1986 stating that they had been COHABITATING for at least 5 years-- thus, a marriage license is
no longer necessary.
In 1995, Pepito Nial died due to a car accident. Petitioner heirs herein are filed a DECLARATION OF NULLITY for
the marriage contracted by their father with herein respondent Norma Bayadog. They allege that the marriage is
void ab initio because it was contracted lacking marriage license. They are filing for such because of the
assumption that the second marriage would affect the successional rights over the estate of their father.
In her defense, Norma Bayadog filed to dismiss the case alleging that they are not among the persons who can
file for Annulment as stated under Art. 47 of the Family Code. The RTC dismissed the case for the reason that
the Family Code is silent, obscure and insufficient to resolve the case.
This court now resolved that the two marriages involve in this case be addressed by the Civil Code having been
contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Art. 53 of the Civil Code states that Marriage License is a requisite in contracting a valid marriage and the
absence thereof renders the marriage void ab initio. Furthermore, addressing the defense cohabitation as an
exemption, the 5 year period must be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of marriage. It should
be characterized with exclusivity, continuity and must be unbroken. There must be an absence of a legal
impediment ever since.
In the case at bar, the cohabitation that happened between the deceased and the respondent cannot be
considered because only 1 year and 8 months had elapsed after the dissolution of Pepitos marriage with
Theodulfa due to her death. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is an actual severance of it by the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with another party as husband and wife Thus, the
affidavit filed has no legal bearing, void ab inito.
On the issue regarding the personality of the petitioners to file for the declaration of nullity of marriage on behalf of
their deceased father, the court ruled that while the court is silent as to who may file for such, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either spouse. Furthermore, the defense of the respondent pursuing Art. 47
does not apply since such article deals with voidable marriages or those for annulment.
The court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same as long
as it is essential to the determination of the case.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED, the RTC ruling is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, case ordered reinstated.
GARCIA v. RECIO (2002)

Before a foreign divorce decree be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official
act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. [39] Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
[40]
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed
to know by reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45]There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: 1. A party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy.[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the

legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO (2005)

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and
were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a
few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that
his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry
with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
WON respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations
that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme
Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction
absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to
case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Art. 26 Par. 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who
has been divorced by a spouse who has acquired a citizenship and remarried, also remarry under Philippine law.

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied
her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of
this certiorari proceeding.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and respondent Judge is hereby ORDERED TO DISMISS the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married.
Couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980. 1 Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983".
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
Only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

Here, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Adultery cases dismissed.

SAN LUIS v. SAGALONGOS (2007)

This case is filed for the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis who contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime.
His 1st marriage was on 1942 which 6 children were born. When his first wife died, he remarried subsequently on
1968 with one Merry Lee Corwin a foreigner, with whom he had a son named Tobias. Corwin divorced San Luis in
Hawaii. A 3rd marriage was contracted after with Felicidad Sagalongos, herein respondent, in the USA. There were
no children born out of the third marriage but they lived together for 18 years until Felicisimos death on 1992.
After his death, Sagalongos sought the dissolution of the CPA and the settlement of the assets of the deceased in
the trial court of Makati. The children of San Luis from his first and second marriage contended that Sagalongos
motion is invalid because she filed it in the wrong venue and that her marriage to their father is bigamous,
therefore void ab initio. The trial court dismissed the letters for admission filed by the respondent, it should have
been filed in Laguna, where the deceased is domiciling and that the divorce obtained by the deceaseds second
wife (Corwin) is not binding in the Philippines.
The CA reversed the trial courts decision of the trial court. As regards to the venue, actual residence/abode is not
the same as the legal residence or domicile. Furthermore, as regards to the divorce obtained by Corwin, a
foreigner, Art. 26 of the Family Code apply capacitating San Luis to marry Sagalongos. The petitioners however,
contend that Art. 26 (2) cannot be retroactive.
The SC ruled that the letters of admission were properly filed in the proper venue. The deceased resided in
Alabang for purposes of the settlement. As to the marriage contracted by the deceased and the respondent
Sagalongos, the SC applied its ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. This case is remanded to the trial court for the
reception of further evidence proving the divorce between the deceased and Cornwell decreed by court of Hawaii.
Nevertheless, the SC finds that the petitioner has capacity to claim for the estate of the deceased even if the
previous marriage is not proven rendering the deceased incapacitated to marry the respondent. She may be
considered a co-owner of the properties acquired through her and the deceaseds joint efforts pursuant to Art. 144
on rules of co-ownership or Art. 148, in case respondent fails to prove her marriage and the divorce, on limited coownership proportion to their contributions. The latter requires a proof of actual cohabitation.
Thus legal capacity of the Sagalongos for the estate of the deceased may rise as the deceaseds lawful wife or as
his co-owner under Art. 144 or Art. 148 of the Family Code.
RULING: Petition DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

REPUBLIC v. IYOY

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, [2] declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left
for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers;
he disregarded the said request.
Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother
to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the
sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent
Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child.
On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest,
plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary
to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals on the ground: I.
Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity. II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance
not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
is inapplicable to the case at bar.

The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein.
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was
indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an
American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on
behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence (Republic vs. CA & Molina), this Court
finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Ancheta vs. Ancheta: Sol. Gen. is the counsel for the State
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

LLORENTE v. CA & ALICIA LLORENTE

Lorenzo Llorente married Paula Llorente (petitioner) on 1937. Lorenzo is an enlisted service man of the US Navy.
When the war broke out, he departed to US and was able to be naturalized in the year 1943. On 1945, he visited
his wife Paula only to find out that she is pregnant and having an illicit relationship with his brother Cerefino.
Lorenzo and Paula had an agreement that they would separate peacefully which was notarized. Lorenzo returned
to US and filed for a divorce which became final on 1952.
Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente, herein respondent. She had no knowledge
about the formers previous marriage. They lived together from 1958-1985 and begot three children named Raul,
Luz and Beverly. On 1981, Lorenzo enacted a last will and testament where he bequeathed all his property in
favor of Alicia and his children. The petitioner Paula filed for letters of administration over the estate of the
deceased Lorenzo.
WON the divorce secured by Lorenzo for his marriage with Paula is binding in the Philippines. And WON the will
executed by Lorenzo is valid.
The SC ruled that the foreign law, having been naturalized, should govern over the divorce, will and marriage of
Lorenzo Llorente pursuant to Art. 15 and 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, the NY law, which
supposedly applies, follows the Domiciliary Theory as regards to the estate of the deceased. Therefore, the
Philippine Laws apply to the validity of the will of Lorenzo.
As regards to the divorce obtained, it is valid and binding in the Philippines pursuant to the rulings of the SC in the
cases Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera and Republic v. Quinta. The effects of the divorce as in this
case, to the succession of the estate of the decedent, are matters left for the trial court to determine.
As to the validity of the will, foreign law is controlling whether or not it is valid.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is SET ASIDE. RTC decision is reversed. The divorce
granted by the state of California is VALID. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for the intrinsic validity of
the will and the successional rights allowing proof of the foreign law.

----------------------------ARTICLES 35-44: VOID MARRIAGES CASES----------------------------

CHI MING TSOI v. CA and GINA LAO TSOI (1997)

Gina Tsoi filed for an annulment against Chi Ming Tsoi in the QC RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Chi, herein petitioner, appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the trial court on 1994.
Chi and Gina got married on 1988 in Manila Cathedral as evidenced by a Marriage Certificate. After the reception,
they proceed to the house of the petitioners mother, no coitus happened between them during the first four nights
they were married. In an effort for a honeymoon, they went to Baguio. However, the petitioner invited relatives and
once they were there, he allegedly avoided sexual attempts by taking long walks and sleeping on a rocking chair.
From 1988-1989, there is still no coitus that happened between the married couple. Gina even alleges that she
did not even se her husbands private parts nor did he saw her private parts. With that, they submitted themselves
to a urologist for a medical examination. The result of the medical examination of the petitioner was kept
confidential.
Gina now contends that he is impotent and a closet homosexual--she apparently saw him once using his mothers
eyebrow pencil and facial cream. She further believes that Chi only married her for the maintenance of his
residency in the Philippines. She refuses to reconcile with her husband.
Chi on the other hand does not want to severe their marriage because he alleges that he loves her so much. But if
such were to be dissolved, it is because of Ginas fault. In his defense, it was actually Gina who avoided him
whenever he commences sexual intimacy by touching her private parts, and that whenever they try to have
sexual intercourse, he is forced to stop because Gina is hurt.
There is no sign of impotency. Medical records show that his penis (2 inches) is capable of erection, however soft,
but still able to perform sexual intercourse.
The SC finds that the senseless refusal to have sexual intercourse or to consummate marriage is equated to
psychological incapacity for failure to fulfill the essential marital obligations--one of which is to procreate. To
procreate, marriage has to be consummated. Thus, such refusal is destruction to the integrity and wholeness of
the marriage.
RULING: The CA decision is AFFIRMED, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO (2004)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA reversing the decision of the RTC which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Judge Manuel Siayngco.
Juanita C. Siayngco and Manuel Siayngco were married at civil rites on 1973 and before the Catholic church in
the same year. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, they adopted a baby boy in 1977
and named him Jeremy.
After 24 years of marriage, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juanita on
the ground of psychological incapacity. She is domineering and selfish, complains about almost everything even
the most trivial things. She has an extremely volatile (unpredictability) and bellicose (aggressive) nature. She does
not respect his high position as municipal trial court judge nor she has shown moral support thereof. Her

psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her resentment for what she perceived as lack of love,
appreciation from her own parents since childhood.
In her defense, petitioner Juanita alleged that Manuel is still living with her and that he only invented malicious
stories against her so that he can marry his paramour. That she is a loving wife and mother and that Manuel is the
one who was remiss in his marital and family obligation. And that she was raised in a happy family and had a
happy childhood.
Diagnosis of the witness psychiatrist Dra. Garcia, presented by Manuel as witness, stated that both spouses
contributed to the collapse of the marriage. The partner relational problem affected their capacity to sustain their
marital bond with love, support and understanding. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which
warrants the personality disorder, will bring more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of
traits, which were in existence before the marriage, will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.
Juanita denied the allegations and that like every normal couple, they had their own share of fights and that they
were happily married until Manuel started having extra-marital affairs that he admitted to her. She wishes to
preserve their marriage. Even after he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.
Furthermore, after the pre-trial, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.
Another medical expert, Dr. Maaba, testified that Juanita, overall, is psychologically capacitated to comply with the
basic and essential obligations of marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both spouses
psychologically incapacitated and on the Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA case ruling. The petitioner contends the CA ruling.
WON the CA is correct in reversing the RTC decision declaring the marriage void pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case depends crucially on the facts of the case.
The SC ruled that it is an error for the CA to rule the case at bar basing in the Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA ruling despite a
clear divergence on the facts. Sexual intimacy is not the issue here but a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways. In the book, these inadequacies of Juanita do not
amount to psychological incapacity to disable her to perform and comply all the essential marital obligations.
As ruled in Santos v. CA psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of nullity is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should mean as a mental incapacity that causes either or both
spouse to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage. Thus such ground must be characterized by: Gravity; Juridical Antecedence;
Incurability and as expounded:
1. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Root cause must be psychological (not physical) although its MANIFESTATIONS and/or
symptoms
may be physical.

MEDICALLY or CLINICALLY identified

ALLEGED in the complaint

SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN by experts

CLEARLY EXPLAINED in the decision

3. The incapacity must be proven to exist at the time of the celebration of marriage although the
manifestations of the illness need not to be perceivable at such time.
4. It must be shown that the incapacity is medically or clinically permanent or incurable which is
absolute or relative in regard to the other spouse not necessarily against everyone. It must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. It must be grave to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of
marriage. It must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
6. Essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Art. 68-71 (between husband and wife)
and
Art. 220, 221, 225 of the Family Code as regard to parent and children. Non-complied
marital obligations must be stated in the petition and proven by evidence and included in the text
of the
decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive should be given respect by the courts.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF MANUEL: What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as
well as from other testimonies is that the essential marital obligation, which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. However, sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Such must be shown that it is a manifestation of a
disordered personality and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. It must be
noted that Manuel admitted that he is having affairs because he wanted to have a child.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF JUANITA: Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio, presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Manuel failed to prove his allegations of lack of respect, jealousy and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and controlling nature etc. as grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential marital obligations. Neither these defects were proven to be already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they incurable. Psychological reports state that they are capacitated.
Unsatisfactory marriage is not a NULL and VOID marriage. Irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
do not constitute psychological incapacity contemplated in Art. 36;
RULING: Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC decision is
reinstated and given full force and effect.

REPUBLIC v. MOLINA (1997)

Petition for certiorari for the CA decision affirming in toto the RTC decision declaring the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab inito on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Roridel Molina commenced the filing of the case in 1990. Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between

them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family.

Their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served.

Reynaldos defense: He admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in
effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

The petitioner Republic, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The SC ruled that the petition is meritorious. The intention of the law as regards to the Article 36 is to deal with the
most serious psychological disorders demonstrative to a clearly inability/disability to conform to the marital
covenant and fulfill the essential marital obligations. Such must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Characterized by gravity, juridical antecedents, and incurability.
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

Gravity is absent. It is merely shown that they do not get along well as husband and wife. Medical report only
showed mere incompatibility and not psychological incapacity.
8th of the Molina doctrine: The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vincula
contemplated under Canon 1095.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. The CA ruling affirming in toto the RTC ruling is SET ASIDE. The marriage between
Roridel Molina, respondent and Reynaldo Molina, petitioner remains to be VALID.

MARCOS v. MARCOS (2000)

Petition for review of the CA decision reversing the RTC decision declaring the marriage between Brenda Marcos
and Wilson Marcos null and void pursuant to Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or
a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The parties first met through their job at the Malacaang. They became sweetheats and were married on 1982
under civil rites in the MTC of Pasig. A church wedding happened subsequently on 1983. Five children were born
out of the marriage. Wilson joined the AFP on 1973 and was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos regime. Brenda, on the other hand, joined the Philippine Air Force on 1978. After
the EDSA revolution, they both sought discharge from military service.
Wilson engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would
hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they
were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw
him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left
the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for
their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. The court a quo found the
appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find
work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children.

The, on the other hand, CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented stating: Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decisionIn the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad
Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her unable to assume them.
The SC believes that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.
The foregoing guidelines laid down by the Molina doctrine do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What
is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
We rule in the negative regarding the sufficiency of evidence. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.1wphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated
with legal separation. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.
RULING: Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity.

BUENAVENTURA v. CA et. al. (2005)

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his
petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC decided that the marriage is null and void ab initio, ordering the plaintiff to pay for moral damages,
support for their son; the liquidation of their conjugal partnership property. RTC also awarded the custody of the
child to his mother, herein defendant. Petitioner Noel Buenaventura appealed to the CA which issued a resolution
increasing the support to be given from P15,000 to P20,000.
In a petition for review of Certiorari, the petitioner claims that the CA erred in awarding the respondent moral
damages in the amount of P2.5 Million and exemplary damages of P1 Million with 6% interest from the date of its
decision, without any legal and moral basis.
CA articulated that the awarding of damages was based on Art. 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code after findings
of fact ascertained from the testimonies of the parties and likewise those of the psychologists.
Apparently, Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him by professing true love although he was just under heavy
parental pressure to marry and because of pride he married respondent Isabel. His career has always been his
priority, petitioner Noel is unable to relate to Isabel and to their son Javy, as a father. He did not make the
marriage work and left Isabel and their son.
Petitioner assails that unlike in breach of ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may
not be awarded. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral
damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which
the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have
no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code
By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the
same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who
had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived,
it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.
RULING: CA decision is MODIFIED, the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation are deleted. One half of petitioners shares in MMP and PGC is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of co-ownership and not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. As

regards to the custody and support, court renders it MOOT and ACADEMIC as their son has reached the age of
majority. Thus, DISMISSED.
BOBIS v. BOBIS (2000)
Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted three marriages without the dissolution of one before the other. In 1985 he
married Maria Dulce Javier, in 1996 he married Imelda Bobis, herein petitioner and for the third time he married
on Julia Hernandez. Thus an information for bigamy was filed against the respondent Isagani on 1998 in the RTC
of QC. Thereafter, the respondent commenced the civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was contracted without Marriage License, he also filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question for the determination of the criminal case. The trial court granted the motion.
Imelda, petitioner, argues that the judicial declaration of nullity should have been obrained before entering into the
second marriage.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constituted a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 4 It must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Its two essential elements are:7 (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this
is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is
still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered
that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner,
on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of
majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.The issue in this case is limited
to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists . No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of
an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render.
Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may
not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not
obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to
belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter
of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests
upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it
should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain
the suspension of the criminal action.
The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this
cannot be done.1awphi1
Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party
can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. 19 The reason is that, without a judicial
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the
criminal action against him.
RULING: The petition is GRANTED. The RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is
ordered to immediately proceed with the criminal case of Bigamy filed against respondent Isagani Bobis.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE (2004)

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA decision affirming the RTC decision finding
the petitioner Lucio Morigo guilty of Bigamy. He also assails the resolution of the appellate court denying his
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Lucio and one Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Tagbilaran City for 4 years. After the school year
1977-1978, they lost contact with each other. But on 1986, Lucio was surprised to receive a card from Lucia from
Singapore. They exchanged letters and became sweetheats. In the same year, Lucia went back to the Philippines
but left again for Canada to work there, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back and
petitioned Lucio to join her in Canada. They got married on 1990 in Bohol. In the same year, Lucia reported back
to work in Canada leaving Lucio behind.

Lucia filed for divorce against Lucio on 1991. Subsequently in 1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago in Bohol.
In 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC Bohol for his marriage with
Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In the same year, the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran charged Lucio with Bigamy which the RTC found him guilty.
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of
a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
While the appeal on the CA is pending, the trial court granted the judicial declaration of nullity between the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had
been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 14 of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the
Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person
intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse.
The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of
said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners
contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his
act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
The elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the
eyes of the law, never married."
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from
the beginning."
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
RULING: The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA as well as the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the petitioner is ACQUITTED from the charge of bigamy on the ground that guilt has not been proven with
moral certainty.

GOMEZ v. LIPANA (1970)

Defendant-appellant Joaquin Lipana contracted two marriages. First with Maria Ancino in 1930 and the second
with Isidra Gomez in 1935. The latter was contracted with the first marriage still subsisting. Joaquin concealed the
matter from the his second wife.
In 1943, Joaquin and Isidra acquired by purchase a land in Cubao Quezon City for the price of P3,000.00. Torens
title for the property was issued in the name of Joaquin married to Isidra. On 1958, Isidra died intestate and
childless, the only surviving heirs are her sisters. In 1961, Ofelia Gomez, herein appellee, the judicial
administratrix of the deceased Isidras estate, commenced a suit for the forfeiture of Joaquins share in the Cubao
property pursuant to Art. 1417 of the Old Civil Code.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave
cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in
favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.

10

In the present appeal Joaquin attributes two errors to the trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the
validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that Article
1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
The appellant maintains that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for
that purpose, which could be filed only by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former
spouse. (Pursuant to Sec. 30 of Act 3613, which was the controlling statute at the time the marriages were
celebrated.)
The SC believes that it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case. There is no suggestion here
that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra
Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The
burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not
discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he
contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that since the defendant's first marriage has not
been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired during the second marriage,
of which interest she would be deprived if his share should be declared forfeited in favor of the second wife.
It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417,
there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose. In the
instant case, however, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the
second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after
dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
RULING: Decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint is DISMISSED.

VILLANUEVA v. CA and LILIA VILLANUEVA (2006)

This is a petition for review assailing the CA decision affirming with modification the decision of the RTC of
Valenzuela dismissing the petitioners petition for annulment of his marriage to respondent and ordering him to
pay exemplary damages etc.
On 1988, Orlando, herein petitioner, married Lilia, herein respondent in Palawan. Orlando filec with the trial court
a petition for annulment alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia who was
already pregnant even though he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage. He further alleged that they did
not cohabitate after the marriage and that he learned that Lilias child died during delivery on 1988.
On her defense, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The petitioner freely and voluntarily married her and
that they cohabitated for almost a month after their marriage. He even wrote letters to her when he returned to
Manila and she visited him personally. He knew about the progress of her pregnancy which unfortunately ended
with their son being born prematurely.
The trial court dismissed the case and ordered the payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. CA affirmed modifying the damages to be awarded.
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent;
and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so
We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not
less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage
annulled.
Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by
Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring
about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits
by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence
of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired
by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. The Court is not
convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will
to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank.
He never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of
those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing
their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage,
such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA affirming with
modification decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of

11

his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is
DELETED for lack of basis.
SANTOS v. CA and JULIA BEDIA-SANTOS (1995)
This is a present petition for review on certiorari filed by Leouel Santos assailing the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the trial court denying his petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Julia BediaSantos on the ground of psychological incapacity, Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Leouel, petitioner and was then a 1st Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia in Iloilo. They got married in
1986 before MTC Judge Lazaro of Iloilo City, subsequently before church rites. They lived at Julias parents in the
same city. On 1987, Julia gave birth to a boy named Leouel Santos Jr. Later, Leouel averred because of the
frequent interference by Julias parents to the spouses family affairs. They quarreled occasionally and mostly
because of the question of when and where they should start living independently from Julias parents or when
Leouel would spend a few days with his own parents.
On 1988 Julia left for the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels discouragement. After 7 months, for the first
time, Julia called Leouel, she promised to return home after the expiration of her contract in 1989 but she never
did. Leouel got a chance to go to the US as well through a training program he underwent. He tried to locate his
wife, get in touch with her but his efforts were of no avail.
Thus, Leouel filed in the RTC of Negros Oriental a complaint for voiding marriage under Art. 36 of the Family
code. In her defense, Julia denied his allegations and claimed that it was Leouel who became irresponsible and
incompetent. The court dismissed the case on 1991 which the CA affirmed. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia
to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code.
RULING: Petition is DENIED.
HERNANDEZ v. CA (1999)
This is a petition for review on certiorari for the decision of the CA affirming the RTC decision which dismissed the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and
botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became
sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher.
Lucia Hernandez, petitioner and Mario Hernandez, private respondent, were married in Cavite on 1981. There
were three children born out of such marriage named Maie, Lyra and Marian.
On 1992, Lucia filed before the RTC of Tagaytay a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. In her complaint, she alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the filing of the
suit, Mario failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household, he goes to drinking sprees and cohabitated with another woman whom he had an illegitimate child
with. He also had affairs with different women and because of that Lucia endangered her health by having her
infected with STD (Gonorrhea). She now prays for support with a total amount of P 9,000.00 a month, that she be
declared the sole owner of their property located in Don Gregorio Subdivision as well as the jeepney Mario took
with him when he left the conjugal home on 1992.
Mario failed to file his answer; the asst. provincial prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine whether
there is a collusion between the parties. No collusion was found. Thus, the case set for trial.
The trial court dismissed the case for the reason that the circumstances mentioned by Lucia to support her claim
of psychological incapacity are grounds cited by the law as valid reasons to grant legal separation and not for a
declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment.
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for
the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive
of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph
(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner
by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was
celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction
with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would
require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be
legally accepted by the Court.

12

For the CA: It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic
sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse.
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof
that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time
they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and
not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court
held.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Any doubt is resolved in favor of the marriage.
RULING: Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED.
DEDEL v. CA (2004)
David Dedel met Sharon Corpus-Dedel, herein respondent while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The got married before the Court of Pasay on 1966 then a church wedding followed on 1967. There were
four children born in the union. Petitioner David now avers that Sharon is an irresponsible, immature wife. She
had extra-marital affairs with a Dentist, a Lieutenant and a Jordanian national named Mustafa. Sharon was under
treatment by a psychiatrist however she continued her illicit relationship with Mustafa, even married him and
whom she had two illegitimate children. When Mustafa left, Sharon went back to David with her illegitimate
children. David accepted her despite everything but only to be abandoned by her to go with Mustafa in Jordan on
1995 with the children she begot with Mustafa. Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Thus David filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Sharon on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Dayan testified and declared that David is the type who exerts his best in whatever he does, while Sharon is a
person who is suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder manifested by her infidelity, several instances of
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse--thus the bringing of her children with Mustafa to David and live
with the latter. The repeated acts of infidelity, abandonment are indications of such disorder. This amounting to a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court granted the declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent Republic through the OSG appealed. The CA set aside the trial court decision and dismissed the
petition. Thus, this instant petition.
WON the evidence presented is enough to sustain psychological incapacity. Does the aberrant sexual behavior of
Sharon fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, legal separation. The evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage
of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the
Roman Catholic Church.
RULING: The petition is DENIED. The CA decision reversing the RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
LAM v. CHUA (2004)

Petition for review on certiorari for the CA decision.

Adriana Chua, respondent commenced the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose
Lam, petitioner at the RTC of Pasay on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Adriana and Jose got married on 1984 and begot one son named John Paul. Adriana alleged that the
psychological incapacity was not then apparent and manifest only after the celebration of the marriage. He
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing. He mismanaged the conjugal partnership gains to the point
where she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their CPG and separation of present and future
properties. RTC of Makati approved said agreement on their properties. Furthermore they have been separated in
bed and board for a long time and agreed that the custody of John Paul be with Adriana subject to visitation rights.
In his failure to answer, the Asst. City Prosecutor investigated if there is collusion between the parties. Negative.
Thus the trial court set the hearing. Adriana testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged in the traditional
Chinese way. She testified that her marriage with Jose was abnormal since he seldom comes home; he never
worked and kept asking money from her to buy sports cars. She offered documentary evidence.
In an urgent motion to re-open, Adriana secured new evidences. The RTC of Pasay admitted two Marriage
Contracts dated 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago and another dated on 1982 between Jose and one
Evan Lock. It shows that Jose had been married twice before his marriage with Adriana in 1984.

13

RTC rendered the marriage between Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous by nature.
Jose filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the support to be given to their child. He alleges that an
agreement was already embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC where both parties agreed to contribute
250,000 each to a common fund for the benefit of their child. RTC denied.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission of the additional evidence. The
ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of
existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the child.
Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was
ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase "And for respondent to support the child of
petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable"15 found at the ultimate paragraph of
the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of
the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon
Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
However, in the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other
woman, which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay
RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous.
On the issue of support, testimony of the Adriana does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the
amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence
must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided
for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child. Furthermore, since the requisite of notice
and opportunity to refute was deprived to Jose, this court reverses the decision of the CA regarding the award of
support and remands the case to the RTC of Pasay for further proceedings.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA and the RTC dismissing the appeal is SET ASIDE only
insofar as the support is concerned, thus null and void. Case is REMANDED to the RTC of Pasay to reopen the
trial with respect to the claim of support.

MALLION v. ALCANTARA (2006)

Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
On 1995, Oscar Mallion filed a petition seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara on the
ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC of San Pablo which subsequently denied the petition. Oscar
appealed to the CA but the same was dismissed for failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees. On 1999
another petition for the same declaration was filed in the RTC of San Pablo, this time alleging that his marriage
with the Editha is null and void due to the lack of marriage license. Editha filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata and forum shopping. RTC dismissed.
Oscar now appeals, while two cases were the same, the cause of action is distinct and separate. Thus res
judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. Neither forum shopping is attendant or of the rule which proscribes
the splitting of a cause of action.
Editha in her comment counters that while suits are anchored on a different ground it still involved the same issue
which is the validity of their marriage. Furthermore, Oscar violated the rule on multiplicity of suits.
Petition lacks merit.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit."
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by
prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res
judicatain its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a
bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially
split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the
actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997
of the RTC of San Pablo.
RULING: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
NAVARRO v. CECILIO-NAVARRO (2007)
Review of the decision of CA reversing RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Narciso Navarro
Jr. and Cynthia Cecilio-Navarro.

14

They were college sweethearts. They married both in civil and church rites and were awaiting their first child.
Narciso was still a medical student while Cynthia was a student of pharmacy. They lived at Narcisos parents and
were financially dependent on the same. Their union bore 4 children.
Narciso alleged that Cynthia complained that he did not have time for her, that she constantly quarreled with him
and when they do she refuses to have sex with him. She was not supportive of his career. Neither marriage
counseling worked. He filed a petition for the declaration of nullity when he found out that her eldest daughter is
pregnant by a man whom Cynthia hired to follow him.
To counter Cynthia stated that she had no marital problems until she found out that Narciso was having an illicit
affair with one Dr. Lucila Posadas. That she caught him inside the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa with Lucila, a
confrontation ensued. Thus, Narciso seldom went home until he finally left his family in 1986. The affair with Lucila
continued. She admitted hiring someone to follow Narciso to spy on him. That she still loves him regardless.
Trial court held in 1998 that both were psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Thus marriage was declared null and void. Cynthia appeals and assigns errors in annulling her marriage instead
of decreeing their legal separation ruling petitioner Narciso as the guilty spouse.
CA held that such did not constitute psychological incapacity reversing the trial court decision and declared that
the marriage between Cynthia and Narciso still subsists.
Petitioner appeals to the SC. Thus, WON the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be
supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them four children. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations,9 it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness10 existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests.
Petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
RULING: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The CA decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
ANTONIO v. REYES (2006)
Petition for review assailing the decision of CA reversing the RTC decision declaring the marriage between
Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes null and void.
Barely a year after they first met in 1989, Leonilo, 27 y.o. and Ivonne, 37 y.o. married before a minister in Manila
City Hall and a through a subsequent church wedding on 1990. A child was born out of their union who died five
months later.
Leonilo filed the petition in 1993 on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ivonne persistently lied about herself-occupation, income, educational attainment and other things, to the people around her. To wit:
She concealed to Leonilo that she gave birth to a illegitimate son whom she introduced as the adopted
child of the family.
She fabricated story that her brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill her.
She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist/ that she graduated with a degree in psychology.
She claims to be a singer and postulated a luncheon show at the Philippine Village Hotel and even
presented an invitation to that effect.
She invented friends named Babes and Via--who supposedly sent lengthy letters to Leonilo.
She represented herself as a person of greater means: altered payslip, acquiring sala set from the marked
but told that it was from a famous furniture dealer, spent lavishly ending up borrowing money from other
people on false pretext.
She was insecure and jealous calling up his officemates all the time to monitor him.
Dr. Lopez and Dr. Abcede testified that they observed that Ivonnes constant lying was abnorman and pathological
so as her extreme jealousy amounting to paranoia since there were no actual basis thereof. Thus for them,
psychologically incapacitate to perform the essential marital obligations.
Ivonne counters that she performed all her marital obligations by attending to Leonilos needs. And that there is no
truth to the allegations that she fabricated stories/invented personalities.
Dr. Reyes refuted the findings of the previous doctors and stated that Ivonne was not psychologically incapable in
performing the essential marital obligations.
Trial court ruled in favor or Leonilo, herein petitioner. Thus ruling the marriage as null and void. The Catholic
church also annulled the marriage of the parties due to lack of due discretion. Still the CA reversed the trial court
ruling since for them, the totality of evidence was insufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
Thus, Leonilo elevated the matter to the SC.
WON the psychological incapacity of Ivonne was sufficiently and evidently established.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses and experts.
The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. Allegations were
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.
Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage--manifested by keeping her illegitimate child from Leonilo.

15

The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It indicates a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth.
A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal
or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation,
she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
It is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It
would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to
her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the Catholic Church
annulled the marriage of the parties. In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunals consent.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. The RTC decision is REINSTATED.

REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO-HAMANO (2004)

Petition for review of CA decision affirming the RTC decision declaring null and void the marriage between Lolita
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines then
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there until the half of 1987. By November of the same year, she gave birth
to their child. In 1988 they got married before the MTC of Bacoor. A month after their marriage, Toshio went back
to Japan and promised to return during the holidays. He sent them money for two months then suddenly nothing.
Lolita wrote to him but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, Lolita learned that Toshio apparently visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. There was no response from Toshio regarding the
complaint filed by Lolita. Prosecutor found that there is no collusion.
RTC rendered decision and declared the marriage NULL and VOID. Toshio failed to fulfill the obligations as
husband and father. He is indifferent, immature and irresponsible over the needs and welfare of his family. The
Sol. Gen. appealed to the CA but the latter denied.
Lolita exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. Thus for the Trial Court: The appellate court thus
concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and
to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned
them a month after his marriage to respondent but we find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
RULING: Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA decision affirming the RTC decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

LANDICHO v. RELOVA (1968)

WON the existence of a civil suit for annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against the
petitioner with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse of the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. For Judge Relova, negative
and the SC sustains him.
In February 1963 Rolando Landicho was charged in the CFI of Batangas presided by Judge Relova, herein
respondent, with the offense of bigamy. Rolando Landicho, being lawfully married to Elvira Makatangkay without
being dissolved contracted a second marriage with Fe Pasia. On March 1963, Fe Pasia filed on the same CFI
presided by respondent judge, a petition seeking to declare her marriage with Rolando null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation employed by the latter and at the same time because
of its bigamous nature. On June 1963, petitioner filed a complaint against Elvira Makatangay, his first spouse in
order that his marriage with such be declared null and void on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her. On October 1963, Rolando moved to
suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision of the validity of the 2 marriages. Respondent
Judge Relova denied for lack of merit. Thus this petition.
At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies
had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
RULING: Petition is DENIED and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is DISSOLVED.
DONATO v. LUNA (1988)

16

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain
him.
On the January 23, 1979 the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information for Bigamy against Leonilo Donato based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before Leonilos arraignment, Paz filed a civil action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage contracted on September 1978 based on the ground that she has only consented because she had no
prior knowledge that Leonila was already married to one Rosalinda Maluping on June 1978. In his answer, he
defended that his marriage with Paz was void since such was solemnized without a ML and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence was used by Paz in obtaining his consent to the marriage.
Paz and Leonilo cohabitated at least for five years, deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit
of wedlock evidenced by a joint affidavit they both executed.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been
obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation
and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private
respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

WEIGEL v. SEMPIO-DY (1986)

Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for at the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Caloocan for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage celebrated on July 1978 with Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground of Lilias
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion which took place on June 1972 in QC.
Lilia admitted the previous marriage but alleged that such was null and void having been forced to enter said
marital union.
WON the prior marriage is void or voidable.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
RULING: Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED.
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE (2000)

Petition for review seeking the reversal of the RTC decision denying petitioner Meynardo Betrans prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to keep the proceeding of the trial of a concubinage case against him
on the ground of the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the same against his wife-constituting a prejudicial question.
Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix married on 1973 in Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao. On
1997 Meynard filed a declaration of nullity for his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC
Quezon City. To counter, Charmaine alleged that it was Meynardo who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
with one Milagros Salting, she subsequently filed concubinage against regarding the matter before the RTC
Makati.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if
the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject
petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal
case because he was never before a married man. This is untenable.
ELEMENTS OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Furthermore, the declaration of nullity is only essential in cases of remarriage. But for other purposes, other
evidence is admissible like testimonial or documentary to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage
be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who

17

contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the
Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MERCADO v. TAN (2000)

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
Petition for review assailing the 1998 decision of the CA denying reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the
RTC convicting Dr. Vincent Paul Mercado guilty of bigamy.
Vincent and Ma. Consuelo Tan, complainant, got married on 1991 before the MTCC of Bacolod a marriage
contract was duly executed and signed. While Vincent indicated that he was single, there is no dispute that at that
time, he was actually married with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a ceremony happened on 1976 on civil and church rites.
With Thelma, he bore two children, with Consuelo sired a son.
October 1992, Consuelo filed for a letter of complaint for bigamy through the City Prosecutor of Bacolod. On
November 1992, Vincent filed for an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Thelma which was
granted by the RTC in May 1993.
As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely:
(a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d]
all the essential requisites for validity.
He now posts as a defense that his previous marriage had been declared null and void and that Consuelo had
knowledge actually of the first marriage of the accused with Thelma.
For the trial court, ince no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his
second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife. The CA affirms saying that
the final judgment declaring a marriage void is necessary on purpose of remarriage only (Art. 40) and what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
The SC does not find the petition meritorious. When the information of bigamy was filed, it was undisputed that he
is legally married to Thelma and that while such was still subsisting, he contracted another marriage with
Consuelo.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages, which are considered valid until
set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. 8 Thus,
he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the
recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat,
the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
RULING: Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO (1993)

Gregorio Nolasco, respondent, file before the RTC of Antique for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Janet Parker pursuant to Art. 41 of the Family Code. The petitioner Republic opposed for the reason that Gregorio
did not posses the well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead and that such was a cunning
attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Gregorio was a seaman and he met Janet, British, in a bar in England during one of his ships port calls. Janet
lived with Gregorio on his ship for six months and got married in the Philippines on 1982. He again obtained a job
on a ship. He left Janet in the Philippines to live with his parents but on 1983, he received a letter from her mother
informing him that Janet had given birth to his son and that she left. He returned in antique by November upon
knowledge of such news.
Gregorio testified that his efforts to look for Janet in England were fruitless. He sent letters to the bar where he
first met Janet that, all were eventually returned to him. He inquired among friends but he had no news of Janet.
He further testified that he married Janet despite the lack of knowledge as to the latters family background. That
she refused to disclose to him much information even after they were married and the disappearance was not
reported to the Philippine government authorities. His mother, Alicia, testified that Janet had desired to go back to
England before even giving birth to Gerry, their son. The trial court granted the presumptive death of Janet Parker.
CA affirmed.
WON Gregorio has a well-founded belief that Janet is already dead pursuant to Art. 41 of the Family Code.
4 Requisites must be satisfied as pointed out by the Sol. Gen.:
That the absence has been for 4 consecutive years or 2 consecutive years if there is danger of death
under circumstances laid down in Art. 391 of the Civil Code

18

Wish to remarry
Well founded belief that the absent spouse is dead
Institution of a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
For the petitioner, Gregorio failed to prove that he complied with the third requisite--well-founded belief.
The Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to
London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends
of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from
his captain upon knowing Janet left, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. failed to explain why
he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his
wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult
to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one. Thus, Gregorio failed to establish a
well-founded belief required by law to sustain the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Janet Parker.
RULING: Decision of CA affiriming RTC decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is
REVERSED, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

ARMAS v. CALISTERIO (2000)

Teodorico Calisterio died intestate on 1992 and was survived by Marietta Calisterio, his wife. Marietta had been
previously married with James Bounds who disappeared without a trace on 1947. The subsequent marriage with
Teodorico happened 11 years later on 1958 without Marietta having priorly secured a declaration of presumptive
death.
Antonia Calisterio, Teodoricos sister, filed with the RTC of QC claiming to be the sole surviving heir of his brother
since his marriage with Marietta is bigamous in nature thereby null and void. She also prays that her son
Sinfroniano Armas Jr. be appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased. Marietta opposed and stated that
her previous marriage has been dissolved due to the absence of James for more than 11 years before the
marriage she contracted with the petitioners brother.
The trial court appointed Sinfroniano and Marietta as administrator/trix respectively of the estate of Teodorico.
Marietta appealed to the CA which reversed the trial courts decision and eventually denied Antonias motion for
reconsideration. Antonia appeals to this court.
WON the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico is valid that would be determinative of her right as a surviving
spouse.
Since the marriage between the deceased and the respondent was solemnized before the Family Code took
effect, the Civil Code shall be applicable in this case and Art. 83 of such states that a subsequent marriage during
the life time of the first spouse if illegal an void ab initio unless such was annulled/dissolved except for the
subsequent marriages contracted in the absence of the first spouse provided that the present spouse has acted in
good faith. A judicial declaration of absence is not necessary as long as the period of absence is met.
This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.1wphi1
RULING: CA decision is AFFIRMED and it is declared that said one-half share of the decedents estate pertains
solely to petitioner to the execution of her own children.

MANUEL v. PEOPLE (2005)

Petition for review of the CA decision affirming the RTC decision convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy.
On 1975, Eduardo Manuel first married Rubylus Gaa in Makati. He met Tina Gandalera, herein complainant in
Dagupan in 1996 and went to visit the latter in Baguio. They went to a motel despite Tinas resistance and he had
his way with her. Eduardo proposed to her on several occasions assuring her that he was single. Tina even met
his parents and assured to her that their son was still single. She finally agreed and the subsequent marriage of
Eduardo was solemnized on April 1996 in a civil rite in the RTC of Baguio.
The first three years of Tinas marriage to Eduardo were happy until such time when he rarely comes home and
whenever she asks for money, since she is jobless, Eduardo would slap her. Sometime in 2001, Eduardo took all
his clothes, left and never returned. He also stopped giving financial support. Curious, Tina inquired to the NSO
where she eventually learned that Eduardo had been in deed previously married. She secured a copy of the NSO
certified marriage contract. To counter, he alleges that Tina was a GRO and that she knew about the previous
marriage and still agreed to marry him and that his abandonment of her was because of a love-bite on her neck.
Furthermore, he also believes that his first marriage with Rubylus was invalid and he did not know he has to go to
court for the nullification before remarrying.
His marriage with Rubylus was forced because the latter threatened him that she will commit suicide, and that
after she was charged with estafa, he visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again for more than
20 years.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when
he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at

19

the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer
subsisted.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage; the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.
The private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense
against the State and not just against the private complainant.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage
was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. 36 The prosecution also proved
that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under Art. 41, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
RULING: Petition is DENIED, the CA decision is AFFIRMED.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE (2004)
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the CA decision affirming the RTC decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty
of bigamy and denying his motion for reconsideration.
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates and after the school year 1977-78, they lost contact to each
other. In 1984, Lucio was surprised to receive a letter from Lucia from Singapore; they became sweethearts after
exchanges of letters. Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. They maintained
constant communication. Both were married on August of 1990, subsequently Lucia reported back to work leaving
Lucio behind. On 1991 Lucia filed a petition for divorce in Ontario, it was granted on 1992. On October of the
same year, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. In 1993, he filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage in RTC of Bohol
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. CA affirmed.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
RULING: The petition is GRANTED. Lucio Morigo is ACQUITTED.
TENEBRO v. CA (2004)

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Veronico Tenebro contracted a marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 1990 in civil rites. They lived together until
the latter part of 1991 when Veronico informed Leticia that he had been previously married to Hilda Villareyes,
whom he married on 1986. He showed a copy of the marriage contract. After that he left their conjugal home
stating that he was going to Hildas and live there.
On 1993, Veronico contracted another marriage with Nilda Villegas. Leticia learned about the union, she verified
whether Hilda in deed is married to Veronico, in a letter, Hildla expressed that Veronico was her husband. Thus,
Leticia filed a complaint for bigamy against Veronico. Veronico pleaded guilty and assert for his defense that while
he indeed cohabitated with Hilda, their marriage was not valid since no marriage ceremony ever took place to
solemnize their union. That he only signed a marriage contract to enable her to get the allotment from his office
with his work as a seaman and that his brother verified whether there was any marriage with Hilda but there was
no record of said union. RTC found him guilty. CA affirmed.
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself.
Petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. The mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is consummated bigamy.

20

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while
his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of
the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.
RULING: Petition DENIED, the CA decision convicting Veronico Tenebro of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

CARINO v. CARINO (2001)

Petition for review seeking to set aside the CA decision affirming in toto of the RTC decision. The issue in this
case is the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Carino whose death benefits
is now the subject of controversy between Susan Nicdao-Carino, petitioner and Susan Yee-Carino, respondent.
Santiago first married Susan Nicdao on 1969 with whome he had two offspring while he married Susan Yee on
1992 with whom he had no children in their almost ten years of cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away due to diabetes complications under the care of Susan Yee. Both wives filed a claim for
monetary benefits and financial assistance. Susan Nicdao was able to collect P146,000.00 while Susan Yee,
P21,000.00.
Susan Yee filed for collection of sum of money praying that Susan Nicdao to at least return to her half of the 146K
she collected.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster
her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. Thus the presumed validity has been overcome, thus,
void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is, likewise, void ab initio pursuant to Art. 40.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED, the CA decision affirming the RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
complaint is DISMISSED.

TY v. CA (2000)
This is an appeal seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming the RTC decision declaring the marriage
contract between Edgardo M. Reyes and Ofelia P. Ty, petitioner, null and void ab initio.
Private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Anna Villanueva in civil and church rites on 1977. However such
marriage was declared null and void for lack of marriage license and lack of consent of the parities on 1980. But
even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Edgardo contracted another marriage with Ofelia Ty in
civil rites, 1979 and church rites, 1982.
Edgardo filled a declaration to nullify his marriage with Ofelia on the ground of lack of marriage license and that he
was still married to Anna.
To counter Ofelia presented a Marriage License. RTC sustained Edgardo civil suit and declared his marriage with
Ofelia null and void ab initio in 1991. Both parties appealed to the CA but such affirmed the trial court decision.
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even
without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting
marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse
to determine for himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second
marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would
be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of
the Civil Code on marriage.
WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into
validly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null and
void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The
appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to

21

establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read
into the provisions of law previously obtaining. For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void is essential.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.
A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and
weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social
institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the
two ceremonies.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED, CA decision is SET ASIDE and the marriage between Ofelia and Edgardo is
declared VALID and SUBSISTING.

22