Assignment: Legal Ethics

1.

Importance of Judicial Ethics

In Re: Sotto 82 Phil 595

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
VICENTE SOTTO

January 21, 1949

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was
required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel
Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily
newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment,
for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many
mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his
effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization
of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need
be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a
far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary.
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to file
his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said
answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his
answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in
order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous
statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed
to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted
for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and intimidation
as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under

section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and
imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with
no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his
opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty
or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no
consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was
not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The
provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on
the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In
re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is
a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States,
which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as
expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as
an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted
to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several
states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they are State or
Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express
grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is
expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the
courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may
be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower
them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, this
Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same,
has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen
has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or
interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the
decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending
to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land.
(In reKelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision
of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had
the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our
construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of

the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could
not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial
notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the
clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the
intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in
applying said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent
does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court
and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in
order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in
the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according
to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith
and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if
true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and
statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11,
alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying
thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its
fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with
liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of
the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very
appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and

the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated
by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold
the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter
its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial
business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power
to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an
orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of selfdefense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by
virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days
from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court
why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic,
for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against
Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948, the
respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other
statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the
imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the
Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent
said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when
it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the
court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave
for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January
5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in
citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came
here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the
charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court
in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with
intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false
accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Respondent published in the Manila newspapers of Sunday, December 5, 1948, a written statement in
relation with the decision rendered by this Court sentencing Angel Parazo to 30 days imprisonment for
contempt.
On December 7, 1948, considering the statement as "intended not only to intimidate the members of this
Court or influence the final disposition of said (Parazo) case, but also to degrade and vilify the
administration of justice," this Court adopted a resolution ordering respondent to show cause within five
days why he should not be punished for contempt, "without prejudice to taking further action against him
as attorney."
Alleging to be suffering from myologenous leukemia, with moderately severe anemia, and that his
physician had advised him to have "absolute rest and to avoid any form of mental and physical strain for a
few weeks," respondent prayed for a 15-day extension to file his answer. He was granted a 10-day
extension.
In the resolution of December 13, 1948, granting said extension, this Court branded as false respondent's
allegations the effect that he had formal charges pending in this Court against Mr. Justice Perfecto and
that the latter is the "moving spirit" of these contempt proceedings.
Two days after the expiration of the 10-day extension granted to him, respondent filed his answer. The
belated filing of said answer was overlooked by this Court in order not to deprive respondent of the
benefits of his answer. Filed out of time, due to his unexplained fault, it could legally have been rejected.
In said answer, dated December 24, 1948, respondent repeated one of his allegations which, in the
resolution of December 13, 1948, this Court had already declared to be false.
Respondent has not denied that he is the author of the statement for which he has been summoned to
our bar for contempt and he has not denied the correctness of the text published in the Manila
Chronicle and other daily newspapers and which is reproduced in the resolution of this Court of
December 7, 1948.
In his statement, respondent does not limit himself to saying that this Tribunal has erroneously interpreted
Republic Act No. 53, but alleges that said erroneous interpretation "is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members," coupled with this sweeping and
calumnious accusation:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court.
To fittingly crown this dastard imputation of deliberately committing blunders and injustice, respondent
would bully the members of this Court, by making the following intimidating announcement:
To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court.
There are other rhetorical passages in respondent's statement, aimed to emphasize the nuclear ideas of
the statement, to the effect that the majority of the members of the Supreme Court are incompetent and
narrow-minded and guilty of "so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed" and that the author
will introduce in the coming congressional sessions a measure "to change the members of the Supreme
Court" and to effect a "complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.

Among such maximizing expressions intended to stress the main ideas and purposes of the statement
are the following:
1. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy.
2. It need be said loudly, very loudly so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court if today
is far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victoriano Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the
Philippine judiciary.
3. The reporter, who is erroneously convicted of contempt and unjustly sentenced to 30 days
imprisonment by the Supreme Court, should be immediately and spontaneously pardoned by the
Executive Power, to serve as lesson in law to the majority of the members of that High Tribunal.
4. That sentence is intolerable, and should be protested by all newspapers throughout the
country, under the cry of "The press demands better qualified justices for the Supreme Court."
There can be no question that respondent knowingly published false imputations against the members of
this Court. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices
deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a
constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the
Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing
replacement by better qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no
single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on
fact.
Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood
of falsehoods. The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual in
respondent, and this is proved when he reiterated in his answer one of his allegations in a previous
petition which were pronounced by this Court to be false in its resolution in its resolution of December 3,
1948.
More than thirty years ago, using the words of respondent himself, in "those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, and Manual Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of
the Philippines judiciary" and when it was the "impregnable bulwark of Justice," the Supreme Court
pronounced respondent guilty of falsehoods three times: first, in case in which he was sentenced to 4
years and 2 months of prision correccionalfor criminally abducting Aquilina Vasquez, a girl less then 18
years of age, and to pay her a dowry of P500 and to support the offspring of his relations with her (U.
S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231); second, in a sentence of disbarment as a blackmailer (In re Sotto, 38 Phil.,
532); and third, in prison sentence for false libel (U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666). The first and the last
sentences bear the signature of Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano himself.
In the first case the Supreme Court found that only on July 29, 1906, Vicente Sotto wrote a letter to
Aquilina Vasquez, protesting his love for her and urging her to leave her house and go with him; on the
afternoon of August 1, 1906, Sotto made an arrangement with Luis Crisologo for the renting of his house
since that night when Sotto went with Aquilina into the room of the house, where she passed the night;
Sotto had told Crisologo that he wanted the house for a forestry ranger who was just arriving from Bohol;
Sotto did not leave the room until the middle of the night; Aquilina transferred to a house in Sambag
where Sotto brought various housekeeping utensils; during the following days and nights Aquilina was
visited by respondent.

On August 10, 1906, a complaint was filed against Vicente Sotto and Pio Datan, charging them with the
crime ofrapto. As a defense, respondent offered evidence to show that on August 5, 1906, a legal
marriage was celebrated between Aquilina and the accused Pio Datan, Sotto's washerman and
accomplice in crime. Upon the evidence, the Supreme Court pronounced the celebration of the alleged
marriage to be false. The certificate of marriage offered as evidence in support of the claim that the
marriage took place had been declared a forgery.
It is not necessary to give the details of the whole disgusting affair, wherein the revolting and sinister
nature of an individual is pictured in bold relief with some of its ugliest features. The more that 4 years of
imprisonment imposed upon the accused did not reform him. It only served to emphasize the beginning of
along career of falsehoods and slanders already spanning more than 40 years, soon nearing half of a
century.
Respondent also chose not to deny his intimidating announcement to introduce in the coming sessions of
Congress, among the first measures, one for the change of the members of the Supreme Court and for
the latter's complete reorganization.
He has not explained or justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme Court with change
and reorganization, and why, to make the intimidation more dreadful, he had to announce the horrible
course of subverting and trampling down the Constitution, as all who can read and understand the
fundamental law know that it is beyond the powers of Congress to reorganize and change the
membership of the Supreme Court.
Because the announcement is highly subversive, being aimed at shaking the very foundations of this
Republic, it could have been no less terrible than for the respondent to have announced an intention to
attain his purposes by resorting to open rebellion. The fact that respondent is a lawyer and a senator
aggravates his flaunted purpose to assault the very Constitution he has sworn to obey and defend.
We have devoted considerable time to respondent's answer.
As first defense, respondent alleges that he made the written press statement, not as a lawyer or as a
private citizen, but as a senator. He avers a senator should have ample liberty to discuss public affairs
and should not be annoyed with contempt proceedings.
Now law or valid authority has been invoked in support of the theory, unless we could countenance a
fictitious maxim that respondent is the sovereign. The theory lacks even the merit of novelty. Long before
the claim of respondent that, because he is a senator, he is above the law, Mussolini, Hitler and all the
tyrants and dictators who preceded them since the dawn of history had always claimed that they were
above they law and acted as if they were really so. Unfortunately for respondent, senators are creatures
of the Constitution and the Constitution makes them amenable to law.
As a second defense, respondent alleges that, not having appeared either as attorney or a witness in the
Parazo case, he cannot be held either for direct or for indirect contempt.
The defense is based on stark ignorance of the law on the subject.
Respondent alleges, as third defense, that he made his statement with "utmost good faith," with "no
intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the High Tribunal," and that he has
not attacked nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.
This allegation lacks sincerity in view of his imputation, among several others equally false and
calumnious, that the majority members of the Supreme Court have committed many blunders and
injustices deliberately." The slanderous imputation can only be attributed to bad faith.

As another defense, respondent questions the validity of the penal provisions of Rule 64, implying that
said penalties are not procedural in nature, and invoking the provisions of section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, limiting the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to matters of pleading, practice, and
procedure in courts, and to the admission to the practice of law.
Respondent's contention can be easily disposed of by quoting the following provisions of Act No. 190:
SEC. 231. What Contempts of Court may be Punished Summarily. A court of First Instance or
a judge of such court at chambers, may punish summarily, by fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or both, a person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct administration of justice, including the
refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness when
lawfully required.
SEC. 232. What Other Acts are Contempts of Court. A person guilty of any of the following act
any be punished as for contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment of command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties, or in his official
transactions;
3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of the court held by him.
5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real estate
who, after being evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with judgment
rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession by the person who the
sheriff placed in possession of said reality.
SEC. 235. Trial of the Charge. Upon the day fixed for the trial, the court shall proceed to
investigate the charge and shall hear any answer or testimony which the accused may make or
offer.
SEC. 236. Punishment if Found Guilty. The court shall then determine whether the accused is
guilty off the contempt charged; and, if it be adjudged that he is guilty, he may be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. If the contempt
consist in the violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such contempt may also be ordered to
make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation.
Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for contempt are not procedural in nature, courts of
justice may impose said penalties, if not under Rule 64, under the provisions of Act No. 190.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature of their
functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform effectively their functions.
They function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience to command is
essential to make the commands effective.

Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule 64, He is
correct in calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial legislation in matters of
judicial practice and procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the press, which includes the right to
criticize judges in court proceedings.
Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said freedom, with which we fully
agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question involved in these proceedings.
No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so, has ever denied respondent
the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize our proceedings, this Court and its members.
Respondent's statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision and the majority members
of this Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, to miscarry and
defeat justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying
them with the menace of change, reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have
been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the menacing action constitutes a flagrant
violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by the freedom of the press or by the freedom to
criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his senses has ever conceived that such freedom
include any form of expressed gangterism, whether oral or written.
The freedom of the press is not involved in these proceedings. To assert otherwise is to mislead. What is
at stake in these proceedings is the integrity of our system of administration of justice and the
independence of the Supreme Court and its freedom from any outside interference intended to obstruct it
or to unduly sway it one way or another.
The freedom of the press is one of the causes which we have always endeared. The repeated
prosecution and persecutions we have endured in the past for its sake we have been hailed to court
eight times, are conclusive evidence of the firm stand we have taken as defender of such freedom. It
can be seen from official records that every acquittal handed down to us by the Supreme Court had been
a new step forward and new triumph for the freedom of the press. (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 42 Phil., 113 Sept.
9, 1921; U.S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 58, March 4, 1922; U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887, March 4, 1922.)
That stand has remained the same, as can be shown in our written opinion in another contempt
proceedings in the Ben Brillantes case, which failed to attract public attention at the time.
Among the facts which we cannot ignore in deciding this case, are the following:
1. That this is not the first time respondent has been brought to a court of justice, for a grave misbehavior
and for perpetrating stark falsehoods. In a decision by the Supreme Court of September 6, 1918,
respondent was removed from the office of attorney-at-law and incapacitated from exercising the legal
profession. He was found guilty of:
(a) Lack of fidelity to clients;
(b) Blackmailing, by abusing his position as director of a newspaper whose columns he used to blacken
the reputation of those who refused to yield to demands made by him in his business as lawyer;
(c) Publication of malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the integrity of a judge who had fined
him for the crime of libel;
(d) Giving false testimony or perjury. (38 Phil., 532.)

2. On September 24, 1918, the Supreme Court sentenced respondent to imprisonment for libel, for
besmirching the honesty of three private individuals, Lope K. Santos, Jose Turiano Santiago and
Hermenegildo Cruz with false charges. (38 Phil., 666.)
3. After having been cited for contempt in these proceedings, respondent, in order to pose as a martyr for
the freedom of the press, waged a campaign of viturperation against the Supreme Court. He made
repeated press statements and delivered speeches in his home province to show that he cannot expect
justice from the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court will imprison him, that he will be imprisoned for
the sake of the freedom of the press, thereby posing as a false martyr for it.
4. In his persecutory obsession, respondent would make all believe that, contrary to fact, the writer of this
opinion is the moving spirit behind these contempt proceedings and that the Supreme Court is acting
merely as a tool. Apparently, respondent was irked by his failure to sit even for a single moment in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, because of our objection. The publicity given to our objection has exposed the
illegality of respondent's designation made by the Senate President as, under section 11 of Article VI of
the Constitution, the power to choose Senators for the Electoral Tribunal belongs to the Senate, and not
to its presiding officer. At the bar of public opinion, the Senate President and respondent appeared either
to be ignorant of the Constitution or to be bent on flagrantly violating it.
5. Respondent is the number of the bill which was enacted into Republic Act No. 53, but the purposes of
his bill were thwarted by an amendment introduced by the Senate, denying the privilege granted therein
when in conflict with the interest of the Senate. Respondent's bill was for an absolute privilege. Because
the majority decision of the Supreme Court had made his failure patent, respondent took occasion to give
vent to his grudge against the Supreme Court, wherein, of the 15 cases he had since liberation, he lost all
except three, as can be seen in the records of the following cases:

L-23, Filomena Domiit Cabiling vs. The Prison Officer of

the Military Prison of Quezon City

LOST

L-212, Narcisa de la Fuente vs Fernando Jugo, etc. et al.

WON

L-247, Monsig. Canilo Diel vs. Felix Martinez, etc. et al.

WON

L-301, In the matter of the petition of Carlos Palanca to be

admitted a Citizen of the Philippines

LOST
(As amicus
curiae

L-307, Eufemia Evangelista et al. vs. Rafael Maninang

LOST

L-599, Amalia Rodriguez vs. Pio E. Valencia et al.

LOST

L-1201, Vicente Sotto vs. Tribunal del Pueblo et al.

LOST

L-1287, Ong Sit vs. Edmundo Piccio et al.

LOST

L-1365, Vitaliano Jurado vs. Marcelo Flores

LOST

L- 1509, Tagakotta Sotto vs. Francisco Enage

LOST

L-1510, Bernarda Ybaez de Sabido et al. vs. Juan V.

Borromeo et al.

LOST

L-1938, Vicente Sotto vs. Crisanto Aragon et al.

WON

L-1961, The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio de los

Reyes

LOST

L-2041, Quirico Abeto vs. Sotero Rodas

LOST

L-2370, Voltaire Sotto vs. Rafael Dinglasan et al.

LOST

Upon the records of his previous cases in 1918 and of these proceedings, it is inevitable to conclude that
we have before us the case of an individual who has lowered himself to unfathomable depths of moral
depravity, a despicable habitual liar, unscrupulous vilifier and slanderer, unrepented blackguard and
blackmailer, shameful and shameless libeler, unmindful of the principles of decency as all hardened
criminals. He is a disgrace to the human species. He is a shame to the Senate.
Aghast at the baseness of his character, we felt, at first blush, the impulse of acquitting him, as his
contemptible conduct, culminating in the press statement in question, seemed compatible only with the
complete irresponsibility of schizophrenics, idiots, or those suffering from doddery.
His repeated press releases in which he tried to focus public attention to the most harmless part of his
statement, wherein he accuses the majority of the Supreme Court of incompetency or narrowmindedness, have shown, however, that respondent is not completely devoid of personal responsibility,
as he is aware that he has no possible defense for alleging that the members of the Supreme Court have
committed "blunders and injustices deliberately," for which reason he has widely publicized his

expectation that he will be sentenced in this case to imprisonment, a penalty that, by his repeated public
utterances, he himself gives the impression that he is convinced he deserves.
Verily he deserves to be sentenced to six months imprisonment, the maximum allowed by Rule 64, and
such penalty would not be heavy enough because of the attendance of several aggravating
circumstances, namely, the falsehoods he resorted to in this case, his insolence after he was cited for
contempt, the fact that he is a lawyer and a Senator, the fact that he has already been sentenced to
imprisonment for falsely libeling three private individuals, the fact that more than 30 years ago he had
been disbarred as a blackmailer, the fact that more than 40 years ago he was sentenced to be jailed for
more than 4 years as an abductor. The majority of this Court has sentenced a young and humble
newspaperman to 30 days imprisonment only for refusing to answer a question. The offense committed
by respondent is much graver than a mere refusal to answer a question.
We concur, however, in the decision imposing upon respondent a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment and ordering him to show cause why he should not be completely deprived of the privilege
of practicing the profession of a lawyer. High reasons of humanity restrained us from sending respondent
to prison, unless he should voluntarily choose to enter therein, instead of paying the fine. He is old and,
according to his physician, suffering from myologenous leukemia with moderately severe anemia,
requiring absolute and avoidance of any from of mental and physical strain, and we do not wish to
endanger respondent's life by sending him to prison, and thus causing him the mental and physical
strains which his physician advised him to avoid. Although the continued existence of respondents is
more harmful than beneficial to our Republic and to human society, we have to be consistent with our
abidance by the injunction of the Sermon on the Mount: "Thou shalt not kill." (Matth., Chapter 5,
paragraph 21.) Although their segregation from the society of decent men is advisable because of the
dangers of corruptive contamination, even the lives of moral lepers have to be spared. After all, the
heaviest punishment for an evildoer is the inherent stigma of shame of his evildoings.
Let it be clear that we are not punishing respondent because we want to curtail his freedom of the press,
but because of his wanton interference in the independence of the Supreme Court his overt attempt to
deprive us of our freedom of judgment in a pending case, his swashbuckling bravado to intimidate the
members of this Court to sway their decision in favor of a litigant.
The freedom of the press is not in the least involved in these proceedings. The offensive statements has
not been published by respondent as a newspaperman, editor or journalist. He does not appear to be a
member of the staff of any one of the newspapers which published his statement. We did not even molest
said newspapers. Their editors have not been cited for contempt. We did not interfere with their freedom
to publish the scurrilous statement.
If respondent has not attempted by his browbeating to undermine and overthrow the very foundations of
our judicial system and actually sought to defeat and miscarry the administration of justification in a
pending litigation, we would certainly have abstained from summoning him merely for criticizing, insulting
and slandering the members of the Court. After all his reputation for lack of veracity, malice and
unscrupulosity is well-known in official records branding him with the indelible stigma of infamy.
His blatant posing, therefore, in this case as a martyr for the freedom of the press, as part of his
systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders directed against the Supreme Court, is an imposture
that only ignorants, blockheads and other mental pachyderms can swallow.
It takes too much effrontery for such a character as respondent to pose as a martyr and no less than for
the sake of a sacred cause, the freedom of the press, which no one has no much dishonored with his
blackmailing practices and by his long list of cases in the courts of justice, starting as far back as 1901.
(Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231; In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532; U. S. vs. Sotto, 38
Phil., 666; R.G. No. 201; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 11067; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 14284; U. S. vs.
Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 16004; People vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 23643.)

Respondent belongs to that gang of unprincipled politicians headed by a Senate President who trampled
down the popular will by the arbitrary and unconstitutional suspension of Senators Vera, Diokno and
Romero (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192), who issued the false certification as to the voting of the
congressional resolution regarding the infamous Parity Amendment, thus perpetrating falsification of
public document (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1), who muzzled the people by ordering, in
usurpation of executive powers mayors all over the country not to allow the holding of public meetings
which the opposition had organized to denounce the frauds in the elections of November 11, 1947
(Cipriano C. Primicias, as General Campaign Manager of the Coalesced Minority Partiesvs. Valeriano E.
Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, 80 Phil., 71) who wantonly violated the Constitution by interfering
with the management of the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Suanes vs. The Chief Accountant of
the Senate, 81 Phil., 819), who, again in violation of the fundamental law, usurped the exclusive powers of
the Senate when he designated respondent to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and who crowned his
misdeeds by enunciating on Saturday, January 15, 1949, the most immoral political philosophy that of
open toleration of rackets, graft and corruption in public office.
According to Rizal, the victims immolated in the altar of great ideals, to be acceptable, have to be noble,
spotless and pure. They should, therefore, be as noble and pure as Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Lincoln,
Bonifacio, Mabini, Gandhi and Rizal himself. Then and only then will martyrdom be hallowed and glorified
because it is will worthy of the effulgent grandeur of sacred ideals. "Hate never produces anything but
monsters and crime criminals!" Love alone realizes wonderful works, virtue alone can save! Redemption
presupposes virtue, virtue sacrifice, and sacrifice love! Pure and spotless must the victim be that the
sacrifice may be acceptable!" (El Filibusterismo.)
Respondent complains in his answer that he is not accorded fair dealing because the writer of this opinion
has not abstained from taking part in this case. The complaint is absolutely groundless. It is based on two
false premises, concocted by respondent to make it appear that he is a victim of persecution, and on a
conclusion, also false, because based on the two false premises.
Respondent alleges that there are pending in the Supreme Court certain charges he filed against the
writer and that the undersigned is the "moving spirit" behind these proceedings. Both trump-up allegations
are false, and the Supreme Court has declared it to be so in its resolution of December 13, 1948.
The records of the Supreme Court show that no such charges have been filed. Respondent ought to
know, if he can read and understand the Constitution, that if he has any charge to file against a justice of
the Supreme Court to seek his ouster, he has to file it with the House of Representatives, the only agency
authorized by the fundamental law to institute impeachment proceedings.
If the House of Representatives should institute it, the respondent will have the opportunity to sit in
judgment as a senator as, under the Constitution, the Senate is the sole tribunal on cases of
impeachment.
No justice with full sense of responsibility should commit a dereliction of official duty by inhibiting himself
in a case upon imaginary or fabricated grounds. The members of the Supreme Court are not such moral
weaklings as to easily yield to dishonest appeals to a false sense of delicacy. A cowardly surrender to
groundless challenges of unscrupulous parties is unbecoming to a judge, and much more to a Justice of
the Highest Tribunal of the Republic.
It is true that, after respondent had failed to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because we objected to
the designation issued to him by Senate President Avelino on constitutional grounds, he requested the
Chief Justice to relieve us one of the members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and respondent would
make it appear that for his move we are prejudiced against him.
He is absolutely wrong. His request to the Chief Justice did not disturb us the least. The Constitution does
not grant anyone the power to oust, replace, or dismiss any member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,

judicial or senatorial, during his term of office in the Tribunal. Although an illegal substitution has been
made once in the case of Senators Sebastian and Cuenco, such precedent did not make constitutional
what is unconstitutional, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has made clear his stand to uphold
the Constitution by stating it in black and white in the decision he penned in the Suanes case L-2460.
Respondent's failure was so obvious for us to mind his move.
After all, should we waste time and energy by entertaining any kind of prejudice against respondent, when
there are so many great minds, beautiful characters, and wonderful personalities that are demanding our
attention and whose spiritual companionship makes life enjoyable?
If we had entertained any prejudice against respondent, we would have meted out to him the penalty of
imprisonment which he well deserves ,without minding the ill consequences it may entail to his health and
life and without heeding the promptings of our pity and sense of humanity. Fortunately, very many years
have already elapsed since we acquired the state of mind with which we can judge things and persons
with an open and free conscience, truly emancipated from the shackles of any prejudice. The hateful
events during the Japanese occupation were the best mycelium for spawning and the choicest fertilizers
for growing prejudices against Generals Yamashita and Homma, to the extent of justifying any measure
or action that would spell their doom. Immediate members of our family and ourselves endured agonizing
sufferings and some of our near relatives were liquidated under their regime. But when Yamashita and
Homma came to this Supreme Court, seeking remedy against the absurdly iniquitous procedure followed
by the military commissions which tried them, so iniquitous that it closed to the Japanese generals all
chances of fair trial, no scintilla of prejudice precluded us from casting the lone vote intended to give them
the remedy and justice they sought for, notwithstanding the fact that Yamashita and Homma, appeared, in
the general consent of our people, to be veritable monsters of cruelty and murder. Certainly, respondent
would not pretend having given us, if ever, stronger grounds for prejudice than Yamashita and Homma, or
that he is worse than both of them.
We are not to end this opinion without expressing our steadfast addiction to the following propositions:
1. The independence of the judiciary from outside interference or obstruction is essential to the effectively
of its functions so that it can afford protection to fundamental rights including the freedom of the press,
against encroachments and illegal assaults.
2. The freedom of the press includes the right to comment on pending judicial cases and the right to
criticize the public and private life of all public officers, without any exception.
3. The freedom of the press does not, however, safeguard any publication intended to bully courts and
judges in order to sway their judgment on pending cases, and such interference and obstruction should
be promptly and drastically checked for the sake of an effective administration of justice.
4. Tribunal should be prompt in stopping the threatening and browbeating tactics of swaggering political
ruffians and cutthroats bend on thwarting the scale of justice, as the opposing alternative to such a stern
judicial attitude is surrendered to judicial anarchy.
5. Courts of justice annealed to face and ever ready to deal vigorously with attempts to turn them into
puppets of domineering would-be dictators are essential in maintaining the reign of law and guaranteeing
the existence of an orderly society.
This opinion has been written to modify and clarify our stand in concurring in the decision.

2.

Judges should not be persuade by the pressure of public opinion

Go vs CA 206 SCRA 165

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.

ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not
for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and
procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge
in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837
without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor
moves for the cancellation of the bail. The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where
bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove
that there is a strong evidence of guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge

was confronted with the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is
so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the
nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a
derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. The rule on the
disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE. "It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as
found by a judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although
required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the
judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have
erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice" is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business,
including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of
justice.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, AND
PETITION CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. Hence, if the trial judge
decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the
trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a
motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive
the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or
petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE
NOT PRESUMED. While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2,
the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment
will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich.
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING
HEARING OF CASE AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND
DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE
OUTSIDE METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. In the case at hand, respondent judge
acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial
after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that
respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of
his claim that the judge is partial.
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF OVERRULING
PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF

A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS;
REASON. The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by
respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an
affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge
should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the
witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution.
Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Pearanda, it
was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the
case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he
may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of
conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection
raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only
baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular
piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that
"the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to
simulate evidential strength" is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS;
REASON. The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred
during one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's
bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution
and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe
for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons
given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is
summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the
same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for
petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case . . .
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail
proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of
witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." If the trial
judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving
both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail
proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the
respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for
cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented was not
motivated by bias or prejudice.
10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER'S
ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT
NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY. Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates
his argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated
July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a
preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February
11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a
preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not

necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we held that erroneous rulings do not always
constitute evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact
that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not
create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular
litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous
order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates
against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. In
the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his
lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial
court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, but to
suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent
judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the
disposition of a particular issue . . . Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions
assailing various orders of respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending
against him. Apart from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has
previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial
court held in abeyance. The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become
unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned
from the fact that between the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or
December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of
stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523)
pages. Hearings are still being conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts
to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for
the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another
dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule
11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer
shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal
system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their
clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice.
Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of
respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court
has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful
or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers
may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS
LANGUAGE TOWARD A JUDGE. Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for

petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly erroneous
assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings,
contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his
defense. . ." The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner
in . . ." In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to
have: (a) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before
he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of
the facts." . . . In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and
authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the
opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and
contemptuous.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J p:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying
petitioner's Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and
June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305. 1 The CA Decision
and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated
September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's
Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge
participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the petitioner.
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila. After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified petitioner
Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On July 8, 1991, petitioner,
accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station. He was
arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, 1991.
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion
praying for petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond
of P100,000.00.
The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12,
1991, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the
July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c)

cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
July 17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed before the Supreme
Court. 3 This motion was denied by respondent judge. 4
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner,
the respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued detention at the
CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the place where accused
should be detained."
On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting
that custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal
possession of firearms involving petitioner.
On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI temporary
custody of petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his
constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted only during
office hours and petitioner is to be returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day;
and (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the status of the investigation.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order dated July
29, 1991 be nullified and recalled.
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full custody of
petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of firearms.
An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue
concerning the proper venue of petitioner's detention.
After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991
ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so
that a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued. The
Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody
of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991.
On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent judge inhibit
himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
September 4, 1991. 15
On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16
Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not
Guilty" was entered for him by the trial court. 17
In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals
the petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.

On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two
petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a
decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial
court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation.
After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101837, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause
to charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the Provincial
Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set
the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the merits.
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the
Department of Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and
finally to this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.
On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying
petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
As to the denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part:
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the denial of
petitioner's motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
absent any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in
support of his motion for recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore
speculations than anything else.
In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must be
allegation and proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the
"barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is
such allegation in the petition, the Court has however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to
accept the petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been unduly influenced by the alleged
publicity.
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio
vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we
are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It
ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for
a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet
crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the
fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to
assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We
have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party 'will not be

given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if
weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to
person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as
far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement:
"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings
and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in
denying petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4
of the Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's
motion for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided
by the Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of
venue was first adopted, hence not applicable to the instant case." 19
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a petition under
Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On September 9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of
the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised and
the arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a
Resolution denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its assailed decision.
On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner
reiterates his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary
mandatory injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated
December 9, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation of bail
proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears that after the presentation of eleven (11)
witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial court considered the question
concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion
to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But the trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9,
1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on
December 16, 1992, petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his defense evidence
by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 24
On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining order
(TRO) restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner
to present his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed in another
Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26
On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration no longer
raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on
what petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on

one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only
consider the allegations and issues raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment
thereon filed by the OSG.
Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of
the Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and
elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification
of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute
that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a
judge who does not play favorites." 30
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of the
litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain
and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our
Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by
the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a
high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.
While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established rule is
that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. 36
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation
under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor
and the rich. 37
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on
the part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency
of this petition stating that:
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend
the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, in the context of
his questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a pre-determined
verdict of guilt." 38
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by
the judge before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the
official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and rules
favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed
with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being
called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this case was decided prior to the introduction of

par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and
applied in People v. Moreno should not likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule
137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure
prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule
137, sec. 1, par. 2, thus:
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it
is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed
with the trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her disqualification
by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 43
Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he
shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this
Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for
inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient
of filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the
trial.
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing
jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation.
Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case
during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. This Court has not,
in connection with the petition, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent
judge from further hearing the case. The TRO which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after
the petition was denied and pending this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from
resolving the question on the cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The
TRO did not restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to
hear petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to
continue trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge
committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing the case during the
pendency of the petition before this Court.
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court Resolution
dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating
partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand." 45
Petitioner alleges:
"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary investigation,
petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily
ordered which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February
1992) the unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra,
clearly and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment of petitioner's culpability."
46
The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge
on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo
Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have
admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to
affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected
that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.

This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Pearanda, 47
it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing
the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the judge's
ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a
judgment of conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the
objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not
only baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular
piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that
"the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to
simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one of
the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. On
September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2)
for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution
and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by
respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and
different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of
witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously
limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 50
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing." 51
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to
cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an
application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings
since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order
which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the
bail. 52 The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as
in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of
guilt. 53 In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same
issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the
court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the
hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail
proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of
witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to

whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 If the
trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after
giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail
proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings.
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the
prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already
presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the
respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect
allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court
nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In
People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In
Luciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has
erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a
decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an
unusual occurrence in our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge
can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of
the judge on the ground of bias or partiality. 59
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not only in
safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the judiciary the
people's confidence, an element so essential in the effective administration of justice. The rule
should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the ends of
justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for
disqualification's, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason,
seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or
prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion
for disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more
friendly judge." 60
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his
lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial
court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61 but to
suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent
judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the
disposition of a particular issue:
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991

4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings

and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila August 22, 1991
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
7. Motion to Suspend Action on
Formal Offer of Evidence and on
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of
respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the
present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other
petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a
temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance.
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated
and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between
the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the
records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have
reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being
conducted.
When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the
Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for
Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of
stenographic notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the respondent judge's Order which
denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end to petitioner's
obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by dwelling on incidental matters. The
motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied with finality.
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that Attys.
Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by this
Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge which betrays
disrespect to the trial court.

Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer
malevolence" 62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further
stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay
despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were
also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." 64
In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have:
(1) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before
he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of
the facts." 65
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule
11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer
shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing
their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a
license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar
is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more
importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's
stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of
the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the
lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in
calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
67
In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this
Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the
language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a
FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and language will
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to their records.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.
3.

Judges should refrain from influencing the outcome of the litigation

Marces, Sr vs Arcangel 258 SCRA 503

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-91-712 July 9, 1996

BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court Davao
City, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:p
Respondents was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Brach 12, at Davao City. 1 He is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment,
and immorality.
The complaint alleges the following:
(1) Complaint is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children,
namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are
residents of the BRC Village, Catalunan Penqueo, Davao City.
In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into complaint's neighborhood. They
became the nearest neighbors of the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that
year, a domestic helper of the Caases sought complainant's help for alleged maltreatment she had
received from her employers. Complainant, who was the incumbent Purok leader, referred the
matter to the barangay authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and the
Caas families became strained.
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth Marces
and the latter's daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was
triggered by a relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the two families
but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a major issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a
passenger jeepney despite the fact that there were no more seats available because complainant
was riding on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had intended to cause the complainant's
arrest, because as the jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Caas asked the driver to stop the

vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off and called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces
arrested.
The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs.
Caas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases
against the herein complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was detained
for one night without the knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Caas allegedly boasted in the
neighborhood.
The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against
him, in connection with which the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge
Sarabia told the complainant that he really did not know anything about the cases and that he had
only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.
(2) As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint with
the Barangay Captain against complainant's wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation conferences
between the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3, 1990. Although
he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged that
respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences
were being held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to
influence the Barangay Officials; and
accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latter's daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the complainant,
accusing him of sending the judge a death threat by means of a letter which purported to have been
sent by the New People's Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Caas showed
"arrogance and callousness at all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and
impregnable when she is with the judge."
(3) The feud between the Marces and Caas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there was
a violent confrontation between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as a
result of hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during which, according to
complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.
(4) On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and
arrested members of the complainant's family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom
Headquarters. The arrests were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary
inquest was conducted which complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were pre-arranged
and the complaint sheet was fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance and service of

the "warrant" (i.e., so-called Arrest Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom "can only
be done by a person with a strong connection, power and influence," such as respondent judge,
considering his high position in the government and close relations with the Caas family.
(5) In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found probable
cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his
son, Farley. Complaint's countercharges were dropped. Three days after, warrants of arrest were
issued by the RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley respectively. Complainant
alleges that respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of
the preliminary investigation.
(6) Subsequently, complainant's son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the Maa City Jail. It is alleged that respondent's Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car of
the arresting policemen "as if to make sure that the evil plan" allegedly "authored by Judge Arcangel
is well followed and executed." "To add insult to injury," it is alleged that while the applications for bail
bond of complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City,
respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted, telling the
representative of the bonding company, "Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue?" He
then removed the receipts and arrogantly left with the receipts.
(7) Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special interest
in his family's feud with the Caas family. All he knew before was that the judge's car was often
parked in front of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when Mr. Caas was away working overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge alleges
(1) that the charges against him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the
same were filed merely to gratify complainant's personal spite and animosity against him; and (3)
that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to file against
the complainant for slander and threats.
Respondent judge further avers:
Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the
handling of the same to Mrs. Caas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs.
Flordeliza Caas who obtained the warrants. He only requested judge Sarabia of the MTCC of
Davao City to issue them. 2 Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having been issued in
connection with pending cases and that there were other warrants against complainant which could not
be served because of complainant's close connection with the officers of the warrant section. 3
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case between the
Mares and Caas families and allegedly acted as "an escort" of Mrs. Caas and "baby-sitter" of her
daughter, respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and claims that he could not
have disturbed the proceedings because none were held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he
went to the barangay hall because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her daughter
Lydia. Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which

Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia allegedly called Mrs. Caas "KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO"
("PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR OF A LAWYER"). 4 The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to file
charges in court as a result of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas and that he went to the house
of the Caas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo Caas was away. Respondent claims that he has known
the Caas family since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he used to
go to the Caas residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in the latter's family problem. After
this was settled, he continued going there because he and Mr. Caas had business interests in the
manufacture of appliance protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of criminal
cases 5 and is notorious in the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29,
1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the felons and the guilty parties.
On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging
harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the Administrator of the
Social Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an acquired asset consisting of a
house and lot, which happens to be the residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the
Philippine Airlines was asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the
complainant; (c) the respondent judge, together with a certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting
witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking incident; (d) the respondent judge filed an
administrative case with the Professional Regulations Commission against Nikki Marces; daughter of
the complainant who had just passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e) respondent still
visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being cases
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks.
He calls attention to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the
December 29, 1990 hacking incident and contends that this is improper and unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana
suddenly died on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate Justice Fidel P.
Purisima, but the reception of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan
of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of
the case, together with the evidence adduced before him, to this Court. The records were later
transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima recommends
dismissal of the charges against respondents judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge
that respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to
intervene. As to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence establishes the same.

Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned that
repetition of the acts of impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent
portions of Justice Purisima's report states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondents Judge at the residence of
Mrs. Flordeliza Caas in Barangay Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and allusion that
the former has illicit relation with the latter are utterly devoid of sufficient
substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the complainant and members of
his family that the respondent Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has
been completely effaced and reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the
unequivocal and straightforward testimonies of Flordeliza's husband and parents that
the respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did not have any immoral
implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses, the latter was their
frequent visitor in 1990, when respondent Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, were
engaged in the manufacture of appliance protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, day
and night, should be in the best position to observe her. Whether or not his wife is
unfaithful to him is a matter within the sphere of the husband to detect. Here, Engr.
Wilfredo B. Caas having given his wife clean slate, We an do no less. A different
conclusion and ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects
(Article 215, New Civil Code; Article 149, Family Code).
xxx xxx xxx
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the handcapping
[sic] of a son of complainant, who was allegedly handcapped [sic] and brought to the
Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao Light and Power company. Absent any
admissible evidence that the respondent Judge was the one who caused such
malfeasance to happen, he is not answerable therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation
conference between the Marces family and Caas family on October 27 and
November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao
City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and out of the
conference room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to wield influence as
Regional Trial Court Judge, is firmly anchored on Complainant's evidence, which has
not been effectively traversed and negated by respondent's evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the respondent
Judge arrived at the Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, in the
company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the latter's small child. During the said
mediation conference between the Marces family and Caas family, respondent
Judge entered the conference room and made it known to all and sundry that he is

the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such
actuation was indiscreet and improper because the disputes and controversies
between the two warring families could develop into a litigation before any of the
courts of Davao.
All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced, pro and con, before Honorable Executive Judge Romeo D.
Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; the ineluctable conclusion is that
on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the respondent Judge intruded into the
conference room, and interfered with a mediation conference then being held
between the family of the herein complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon
Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and while inside said room, tried to
influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the Presiding Judge of
Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior and an improper
actuation under the premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent Judge
influenced the prosecutors and police authorities of Davao City to harass the family
of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper
conduct to be fully supported by the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the claim
of respondent judge that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990 because he
had himself filed a complaint against Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia, is belied by the
fact that respondent judge's complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint, of
which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another
judge, before whom the case against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants; and
(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have been
made without the intervention of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have actually
been admitted by respondent judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge
Sarabia that the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent judge. This
allegation is supported by a handwritten not (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:

If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please
issue another aliaswarrants as the accused is now in town.
Thanks.

(Sgd.) Paul Arca

In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court 6 of the MTCC-Davao
City, Branch 3, stating the following:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three (3) Estafa
Cases against MR. BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM and 11CM has been in archive since December 28, 1983 due to non-arrest of the accused
and an alias warrant of arrest was issued against the accused.
That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification of
its status and information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that accused is back in town and
that ultimately resulted to the dismissal of the three (3) cases on March 11, 1991,
without which verification the said cases would have remained pending to date.
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs. Caas. The
entry in the Daily Record of Events of the Ulas Police Substation 7 stated that "[e]lements of this unit
led by P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. .
.who was charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM duly
signed by Judge Edipolo Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given by
one FLORDELIZA CAAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . ."
To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991, that
Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas requested him "to have the warrants renewed,
thus, he requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants" 8 against the complainant.
Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had been
able to evade service of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City.
Even if this had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his own influence.
Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judge's interceding with the Metrodiscom
authorities for the issuance of a so-called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D.
Marces, his wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on January 2,
1991. Respondent's own witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that he was accompanied by respondent
to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col. Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of
his family. Thus, in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo Caas, stated:
13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by Ben Marces
and his family within the premises of our house on December 29, 1990, I called

Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben Marces was trying to manipulate the
case by making it appear that they were the victims. . .
14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at the Tugbok
Police Station, I was given a run around by the police authorities and I sensed that a
ranking police officer was interceding in behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report of the incident
after more than three days, I sought the assistance of Judge Arcangel, who
accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col. Nelson Estares, to whom I explained the
entire incident and treatment I received from the police who was investigating the
case;
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in the investigation and affirmed that it was because of the help
of respondent judge that he was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus: 9
[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
Q: In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law,
what action did you take?
A: I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the
hacking incident. I even went to the Tugbok police station.
Q: What action was taken at the police station?
A: The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried to
pass me around.
Q: When no action was taken in your complaint by the police station,
what did you do?
A: Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge
Arcangel to accompany me to Col. Estares.
Q: When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col.
Estares, what did you do?
A: He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my
wife and my mother-in-law were attacked by the Marces family and
they were hacked and I requested Col. Estares to help me because
the police did not take any action and I even sensed that somebody
was supporting the Marces family.
With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of Justice
Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant's

family and the Caas family and (2) such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation
proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the conflict. These acts of respondent
judge must be viewed not as single, isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the
enmity between the two feuding families. Thus viewed we find the actuations of respondent judge
improper and censurable.
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law, 10 the intermediary
between conflicting interests, 11 and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice. 12 Unless it was a
case filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. The Code of
Judicial Conduct provides:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge. 13
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly
influence him or enjoy his favor. 14

Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter
between feuding families. In attending, at the request of Mrs. Caas, the barangay
conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs. Caas, respondent lent
the prestige of his office to a party in a case.
Respondent's request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the
complainant is no less censurable. As the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor: 15
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons
mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2,
Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity
and impartiality.
Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Caas to Col. Nelson Estares
who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of the latter's family. It would have been
impossible for the Caas family to procure the arrest of complainant and of members of his family by
the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.
Wilfredo Caas' claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three
days the police still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify
respondent's intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become the subject of
litigation in his court should have deterred him from getting involved in the feud.

Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be ever
scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges "in pending
or prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute
an element in determining his judicial course." It cannot be overemphasized that "a judge's official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." 16
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct. We do not agree
with complainant, however, that respondent's misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service.
While in some cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring judges were
dismissal, there were in those cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such drastic
disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra v. Mapalad, 17respondent, aside from pressuring
complainants to drop criminal charges against the accused, likewise refused to inhibit herself when she
knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty of delay in deciding the case. On the other hand,
in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor 18 the respondent was found guilty of attempting to influence another judge to
acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in addition, of making untruthful statements in the certificate of
service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first administrative
case. On the other hand his record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional
Trial Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary. In the circumstances of this
case, the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring
member of the judiciary who has not shown himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of
Proverbs says, "A single reprimand does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a
fool." (17:10)
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar
acts of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are
hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo and Puno, JJ., took no part.
4.

Conduct of Judges must be above reproach

Jacinto vs Vallarta 453 SCRA 83

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541. March 10, 2005
Spouses JESUS V. JACINTO and NENITA C. JACINTO, Complainant,
vs.
Judge PLACIDO V. VALLARTA, Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Quiet dignity, self-restraint, civility and temperate language are expected of every judge. All
members of the judiciary must strictly follow the ethical standards laid down by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The Case and the Facts
This case originated from a Complaint1 filed by Spouses Jesus V. Jacinto and Nenita C. Jacinto on
March 22, 2002. Judge Placido B. Vallarta was charged therein with gross negligence, gross
ignorance of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and unbecoming conduct.
The Complaint alleges as follows:
"1. That on September 4, 2001, Judge Placido B. Vallarta issued an Order against us for a Writ of
Replevin for our vehicle Isuzu Cargo Truck. The Order was in favor of a certain rich and influential
spouses from Nueva Ecija, Mr. & Mrs. Gaudencio and Carina Magundayao, who sold the truck to us
on September 13, 1999;
"2. That according to our knowledge and belief [a] Writ of Replevin should not have been ordered
against us considering our agreements with spouses Magundayao stated in the Deed of Conditional
Sale legalizing the sale of the Isuzu Cargo Truck;
"3. That we [did] not violate any of the agreement[s] in the Deed of Conditional Sale. Nevertheless, it
was us who [were] cheated and the right to own the truck was taken from us by spouses
Magundayao, hence, we sent them a demand letter;
"4. That after the Sheriff recovered the truck from our possession on September 7, 2001, we
immediately went to the Office of Judge Vallarta to settle the problem amicably. We stooped down
and pleaded for help. However, we were dismayed by the attitude shown by Judge Vallarta and the
words from him [were] so surprising that we [did] not expect to hear from a public servant and from a
Judge for that matter. Instead of giving sound advice to our case, Judge Vallarta acted otherwise and
was totally rude towards us. For whatever reason he dealt with us in an ill-mannered way that even
resulted for my fainting in the Office of the MTC-Gapan, because he at that time was asking him, if
possible I will deposit the money to the Court, representing our payments to spouses Magundayao
however, Judge Vallarta sarcastically uttered the following words: Wala akong pakialam diyan sa
pera ninyo kung gusto ninyo hanapin ninyo ang inyong kalaban, I answered him Wala po

kasi ang aming kalaban (Magundayao) nagpunta daw po sa abroad and he replied Eh, wala
pala edi hanapin ninyo, sino ang gusto ninyong maghanap ako at saka hindi pumapasok sa
isip ko yang mga sinasabi mo (pointing his forehead) humanap ka ng abogado mo na
makatutulong sa iyo, dagdag ka pa sa problema ko.
"5. That because of the injustice shown to us by Judge Vallarta we cannot help but to think that due
to the money and influence by spouses Magundayao the Order of Writ of Replevin was issued
wrongly. He issued the Writ of Replevin without clearance from the Supreme Court. We say this so
because upon our thorough examination of the complaint and the attachment thereof we found out
that the certification from the Supreme Court issued in favor of the Utility Assurance Corporation,
prove a defective replevin bond;
"6. That because of [the] inconsiderate attitude of Judge Vallarta, given our limited resources, we
were left with no other choice but to hire the service of a legal counsel. And on September 12,
2001[,] our Counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin and a hearing was set on
September 18, 2001. Unfortunately, both the Plaintiff Magundayao and their Counsel failed to appear
on the said hearing.
"7. That on September 19, we went to Supreme Court and found out that Utility Assurance
Corporation, bonding company that issued Replevin Bond was not authorized to do business at the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan. A certification dated September 19, 2001 from the Supreme
Court was issued to us;
"8. That on September 23, 2001 hearing for Motion to Quash was set for the second time. But then
again Counsel for the Plaintiff (Magundayao) did not appear in Court and so they ask for
postponement;
"9. That on October 9, 2001 third setting for the Motion To Quash, we (Defendant) submitted
additional defense exhibits. For the third time counsel for the Plaintiff did not appear in court Judge
Vallarta asked the Plaintiff why their counsel [was] not present for the third time. Without too much
effort from their side Plaintiff bl[u]ntly responded, Ewan ko po;
"10. That on October 23, 2001[, the] fourth setting of hearing for Motion to Quash, Judge Vallarta
gave another chance to the Plaintiff (Magundayao) to answer all our defense exhibits. And the
Plaintiff asked for repeated postponement and [the] hearing was reset to November 6, 2001;
"11. That on November 6, 2001, surprisingly we were called inside the Chamber of Judge Vallarta by
a certain retired Judge Jose E. Belen (MTC-GAPAN) and was asked by him to settle the case
between the Plaintiff and Defendant outside the court and tried to convince us not to question the
clearance of Utility Assurance Corp. But the settlement did not materialize because of the demands
of the Plaintiff which we believe too much for them to ask;
"12. That on November 6, 2001, after failed attempt for settlement Judge Vallarta advi[sed] the
Plaintiff to withdraw the Writ of Replevin because the defect of the Replevin Bond was not cured.
And our counsel withdraw the Motion to Quash as was advi[sed] by Judge Vallarta;

"13. That on November 7, 2001, our counsel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Motor Vehicle. On
the same date, much as he would not want it to do, Judge Vallarta ordered the release of [the] motor
vehicle. But before he signed the Order for the release[,] he confronted us and uttered the following
in verbatim, O ngayong alam ninyo na mali ang aking ginawa hindi ninyo ako idemanda.
Idemanda ninyo ako ng makita ninyo ang inyong hinahanap. We cannot believe that those
words came from a Judge;
"14. That on November 8, 2001, the Plaintiff filed for another Replevin Bond dated November 5,
2001 for the second time, through the Pacific Insurance Company. But still this bonding insurance
company was not authorized by the Supreme Court to do business with the Municipal Trial Court of
Gapan;
"15. That on November 9, 2001, the Plaintiff filed Motion for Reconsideration dated November 8,
2001 without proof of service considering that it was only a mere scrap of paper;
"16. That on November 20, 2001, at the hearing for [the] Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the
Defendant raised [a] question regarding the proof of service for that motion. On the instant[,] Carina
Magundayao presented a fake proof of service. But Judge Vallarta accepted or tolerated the proof of
service as presented by Carina Magundayao and disregard counsel for the defendants questioning.
He even instructed our counsel to just receive the motion on the date of the hearing and required
[him] to answer it within 5 days. Then a hearing was set on November 27, 2001. Counsel for the
Plaintiff [did] not appear in court;
"17. That on November 26, 2001, we went to Supreme Court and found out for the second time the
defect of the second Replevin Bond. Another certification was issued upon our request. On the same
date we were able to file our Opposition/Comment for the Motion for Reconsideration;
"18. That on November 27, 2001 hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and we (defendant) through
our counsel presented another certification from the Supreme Court, Judge Vallarta made an Order,
that both the Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment be submitted for Resolution.
Counsel for the Plaintiff again [was] not in Court;
"19. Surprisingly on December 21, 2001, Sheriff Ernesto Mendoza went to our house purposely to
replevin the subject motor vehicle. Because we are law abiding citizen, after our consultation with
our lawyer on the following day, we voluntarily surrender[ed] the vehicle to Sheriff Mendoza and to
the Clerk of Court Atty. Herminigildo M. Linsangan;
"20. As much as we would like to go to the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan (MTC-Gapan) immediately
after the truck was recovered from us to verify how the Writ of Replevin was again issued despite the
pending incident, we [could] not do so because on [the] days following December 21, 2001 until
January 1, 2002 the Court [was on] vacation. To our great dismay and mortification, Judge Vallarta
did not resolve said Motion for Reconsideration and our Opposition/Comment to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, an unsigned Order dated November 27, 2001 can attest to that. We were able to
secure a certified true copy of the said unsigned Order from the Clerk of Court, MTC-Gapan on
January 2, 2002. Despite all these he still issued an Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the
new clearance.

"21. That in view of said anomalies we discovered, our counsel file[d an] Urgent Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin dated January 3, 2001;
"22. That on January 15, 2002[,] the date of hearing for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration With
Motion To Quash Writ of Replevin, Judge Vallarta failed to appear in his sala;
"23. That on February 12, 2002, Judge Vallarta advi[sed] us to enter into [an] amicable settlement,
hence we ask[ed] for the postponement of the case to file the appropriate compromise agreement.
Judge Vallarta instructed our counsel to withdraw our Urgent Motion For Reconsideration With
Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin;
"24. However, we failed to settle the case amicably because the Plaintiff reneged the previous
commitment they made while we were inside the chamber of Judge Vallarta;
"25. That because of said development and in fact our Isuzu Cargo Truck has been deteriorating and
its some accessories [were] missing one by one[,] we were constrained to file our Counter Replevin
Bond to release the said truck on February 27, 2002;
"26. That on March 1, 2002, we filed our Motion To Release Motor Vehicle in lieu of the said Counter
Replevin Bond and it was brought out to the attention of Judge Vallarta;
"27. That on March 5, 2002, we went to Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and show[ed] him our Counter
Replevin Bond as well as the Motion of our counsel. However, he responded to us indifferently and
uttered the following statement,O ano ang kailangan ninyo?. We amiably
responded, Pakikiusap po sana namin na mai-release na ang aming sasakyan para
makapaghanap-buhay na po kami, ito lamang po ang aming ikinabubuhay. To our
astonishment he showed impatience and said Ayaw pirmahan ni Judge Bernardo ang
pinapipirmahan ko, sabihin ninyo (while pointing his finger to us) na pirmahan ito at ubos na
ang panggastos na ibinigay ko sa tauhan ko na P500.00 ayaw pa niyang pirmahan ito. We
were totally perplexed at that statement. Why would be brought out something for which we have no
business at all? We are trying to plead for our case and has nothing to do with whatever dealings he
has with Judge Bernardo. Still holding on our temper we told him, Wala po kaming kinalaman sa
sinasabi ninyo at wala po kaming karapatan na sabihan si Judge Bernardo na pirmahan kung
ano man ang pinapipirmahan ninyo. Upon hearing those words from us he again respond with
anger and finality, kung ayaw ninyong sabihin magtalikuran tayo. Hindi ko alam kung kailan ko
maaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. Tingnan ko sa Martes (March 12, 2002) kung naroon ako
(MTC-Gapan) kung hindi ako makarating pasensiya kayo at hintayin ninyo kung kailan ko
aaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. That manner he conversed to us as well as the statement he
uttered were least expected to come from a moral and Honorable Judge. Even then, we were able to
identify ourselves as only x x x ordinary citizens, as against Judge Vallarta who is the Acting
Presiding Judge in our case, we contained our emotions and left the court;
"28. That on March 12, 2002, our case was called almost 11:30 in the morning because he arrived at
around 10:30 in the morning and our counsel asked and presented that our Motion be granted.
However, Judge Vallarta requested our counsel to give him time to study the matters regarding the

posting of Counter Replevin Bond and just asked to follow him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija on the following day, Wednesday, March 13, 2002;
"29. That on March 13, 2002, as agreed upon by Judge Vallarta and our counsel, we followed him in
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Giving us enough hope that he will release the Isuzu Cargo Truck, we
even requested one of his Clerk in MTC-Gapan to accompany us brought with her pertinent
documents/records pertaining to our case. However, upon seeing us again Judge Vallarta gave
various reasons for him not to release the truck. And base from our little knowledge of the law most
of his excuses just trying to play trick on us. One flimsy reason he mentioned was that Plaintiff
should be given [the] opportunity to examine our Counter Replevin Bond, an opportunity not once
bestowed on us. Making us realized (sic) more how powerful money and influence work against us
who have nothing. Our meeting with him ended up with another instruction that our counsel file an
Amended Motion to Approve the Release of Motor Vehicle for which Plaintiff must be furnished.
Hearing for the said Motion was set on March 19, 2002;
"30. That on March 19, 2002, we waited Judge Vallarta until 12:00 oclock in the morning in the
Municipal Trial Court of Gapan but he did not show up for unknown reason." 2 (Emphasis in the
original)
On April 15, 2002, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. referred the Complaint to respondent
judge and asked him to file, within ten days from receiving it, a comment thereon. 3 However, the
latter failed to do so despite his receipt of the Complaint on April 30, 2002. 4
During the 2002 barangay elections, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy and was
considered automatically resigned effective June 10, 2002. 5
Subsequently, the court administrator sent respondent the "1st Tracer" dated September 20, 2002,
reiterating the directive for the latter to comment on the Complaint within five days from receipt of the
Tracer; otherwise, the matter would be submitted to the Court for resolution without the comment.
The 1st Tracer was received by respondent on October 16, 2002, but he again failed to file his
comment. Hence, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made its report and recommendation
on the matter even without his comment.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
The OCA considered respondent judge to have waived his right to present evidence to controvert the
Complaint against him.
It opined that although he had erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin, complainants failed to prove that
the error was deliberate and malicious or done with evident bad faith. It pointed out that an
administrative complaint was not the appropriate remedy for every erroneous order issued by a
judge.

However, it found that respondent had failed to comply with his duty "to conduct himself with
courtesy and, to avoid using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." Hence,
the OCA recommended that he be penalized with a fine of P5,000.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the OCA.
Administrative Liability
Complainants fault respondent mainly (1) for issuing a Writ of Replevin, even if the bonding
company that issued the replevin bond was allegedly not authorized to do business with the MTC of
Gapan; and (2) for failing to act, favorably and with dispatch, on their various Motions and counterreplevin bond for the release of the truck to them.
The facts laid down by complainants are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the
law. To be held liable therefor, "the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross
or patent, deliberate and malicious."6 Respondent may have erred in issuing the Writ of Replevin,
but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. Because complainants did not furnish this
Court a copy of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 4896, there is no basis for showing how they
presented the case and the need for a writ of replevin to respondent. While manifesting palpable
impatience bordering on rudeness, as well as personal disinterest in their cause and problems, his
utterances and behavior fail to support a finding that he acted deliberately and maliciously.
Neither is there any clear and sufficient basis for finding respondent liable for gross negligence and
issuance of an unjust interlocutory order. He cannot, however, be completely absolved of
administrative liability.
Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the
will and inclination to obey the law.7 Thus, the official conduct of judges should be free from
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond
reproach.8 Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 9
In this case, respondent displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate
of the law.10His unguarded utterances, impatience, and undisguised lack of concern bordering on
contempt for the plight of complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help,
constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the judiciary.
From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members of the bench, a resort to
intemperate language only detracts from the respect due them and becomes self-destructive. 11 The
judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a number of
restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted
positions in the administration of justice.12Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.13 Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in

order to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.14 "Maintaining the dignity of courts and
enforcing the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of
justice."15
Respondent must be reminded that government service is people-oriented. "Patience is an essential
part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding." 16 Impatience and
rudeness have no place in government service, in which personnel are enjoined to act with selfrestraint and civility at all times.17
Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies vulgar and unbecoming conduct as a light
charge, for which a fine18 of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming
conduct and hereby FINED five thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., on leave.
5.

Judges impartiality

Ty vs Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank 422 SCRA 649

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 149797-98

February 13, 2004

NANCY L. TY, petitioner

vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, COURT OF APPEALS and HON.
PATERNO V. TAC-AN, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Batangas City, Branch
84, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside and
reverse the June 7, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576
which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed the assailed
Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.
On August 16, 1995, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino, for
brevity) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, presided by respondent
Judge Paterno V. Tac-an, an action for reconveyance of real property against petitioner Nancy Ty,
together with Tala Realty Services Corporation, Pedro B. Aguirre, Remedios A. Dupasquier, Pilar D.
Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim, Cynthia E. Mesina, Rubencito M. Del Mundo, and Add
International Services, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Tala, et al.).
On November 15, 1995, Tala, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. However, on a
motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino, the complaint was reinstated. 2
Tala, et al., with the exception of Nancy Ty3 and Cynthia Mesina,4 filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was however denied in an Order dated June 3, 1996. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
On the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants, except Nancy Ty and Cynthia Mesina, the
record shows that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff dated February 23, 1996 was
sent by mail on February 2, 1996 to this Court and received by the Court on March 5, 1996. The
copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration was furnished to Alampay Gatchalian Mawis Carranza
and Alampay, Counsels for the defendants at their address in Makati City on February 26, 1996. The
copy sent to the Court was received on March 5, 1996. It could safely (sic) assumed that copy sent
to the defendants counsel at the nearer address at Makati City even before March 5, 1996 or on
March 1, 1996, at least 4 days in transit. In the normal course of events or as a matter of practice,
counsels file comments or opposition to Motions without need of Court orders. So, from March 1,
1996, they could have filed comment and opposition within 10 days therefrom, or on March 11, 1996
without awaiting for a Court order. The Court does not believe that the said motion for
reconsideration was received by said defendants counsel on March 28, 1996 or one month and 2
days after mailing by plaintiffs counsel. The extension of 5 days given to defendants contained in the
Order of March 7, 1996 was only a matter of grace extended by the court, a reminder that their
opposition must be forthcoming. Lawyers must be vigilant in the defense of their clients. x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
On July 8, 1996, petitioner and Tala, et al. filed their respective answers to the complaint. Two days
later, Tala, et al. also filed a motion to suspended proceedings, on the ground that an appeal by
Banco Filipino to the April 1, 1996 Order of the respondent court is still pending resolution. The
motion to suspend proceedings was, however, denied by respondent court.
On October 21, 1996, Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to produce or make
available books, documents and other papers relevant to the case. 5 Notwithstanding Tala, et al.s
opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to produce certain documents within a specified
period of time, despite failure by Banco Filipino to tender the costs for such production and

inspection. In its Order dated November 20, 1996, the trial court justified Banco Filipinos failure to
advance the expenses of production and inspection in this wise:6
Further to the Order dated November 1996, requiring the defendant Tala to produce certain
documents within the specified period of time, for those documents in which the defendant is bound
to keep by law or regulation, their production cannot be the subject of assessment for cost against
plaintiff-movant. Otherwise, cost maybe assessed and billed but the same shall be submitted to the
Court for approval. x x x.
Thereafter, Taal, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration to the afore-quoted Order, on January 14
1997.
In the meantime, on December 20 1996, Banco Filipino filed a manifestation/omnibus
motion7 praying, among others, for the declaration of certain allegations and propositions as being
factually established and for the allegations/defenses in Tala, et al.s answer to be stricken out.
The trial court granted Banco Filipinos motion to declare certain facts as established in an Order on
February 26, 1998, the dispositive portion of which provides:8
Premises considered, and pursuant to Rules 27 and Section 3, Rule 29 of the Revised Rules of
Court, this Court hereby:
A) Declares
1) as having been established the fact that defendant TALA did not have the financial
capacity to acquire by purchase the disputed Batangas property at the time of their
acquisition;
2) as having been established the fact that TALA had not the means of acquiring the
Batangas property other than through the advanced rental payments made by
plaintiff;
3) as having been established the fact that the Batangas property had merely been
transferred by way of trust to TALA, as trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, which
was there as purchaser of the property;
4) prohibits defendant TALA from introducing any evidence contrary to sections (1),
(2) and (3) of paragraph A, above.
B) Strikes out allegations/defenses in defendant TALAs Answer and/or other pertinent
pleadings averring that:
1) TALA is an independent corporation, not a trustee of the plaintiff;
2) TALA acquired the Batangas property independently and using its own funds
through armslength transaction;

3) TALA is the full and absolute owner of the disputed property.

Meanwhile, Tala, et al. failed to produce the requested documents. In a Supplemental Order dated
April 15, 1998, Tala, et al. were directed to produce additional documents. The Supplemental Order
reads:9
Further to the Order dated February 26, 1998 and considering that the documents presented so far
by the defendant Tala are not complete in relation to those itemized in the said Order, defendant Tala
is further ordered to produce the following documents from 1979 to 1985:
1. records of stocks subscribed, paid-in and issued;
2. for loans payable leasees deposit, subsidiary ledger, evidence of indebtedness;
3. for lands purchased, the deeds of sale.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On May 4, 1998, Banco Filipinos urgent motion to reset hearing and for extension of time to appoint
a commissioner, through its special counsel, was granted. On May 11, 1999, Banco Filipino was
directed to present its next witness.10
Thereafter, Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by the trial
court.11 Tala, et al.s motion for reconsideration of the order admitting the said exhibits was denied.
Banco Filipinos motion to withdraw certain exhibits was granted.
Thereafter, Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of respondent
judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest prejudgment and partiality.
On April 14, 2000, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the Orders of
the court were based on facts and applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondent judge likewise
reprimanded Tala, et al. for filing several motions designed to delay the proceedings. 12
Separate motions for reconsideration were filed by Nancy Ty and Tala, et al., but the same were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated May 8, 2000.
Dissatisfied, Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59576 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59173, assailing the two
Orders of respondent judge dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.
In a consolidated Decision dated June 7, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the two petitions and
affirmed the assailed Orders by respondent judge. 13
Hence, the instant petition, based on the following grounds:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS CALLING FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE
COURTS POWER OF SUPERVISION AND REVIEW, WHEN IT CHOSE TO EXAMINE ONLY
SOME, NOT ALL, OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF JUDGE TAC-AN, WHICH, TAKEN
COLLECTIVELY AND NOT INDIVIDUALLY, DEMONSTRATE A STRONG BIAS AND ANIMOSITY
AGAINST PETITIONER AND TALA ET AL AND REVEAL AN OBVIOUS PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF
BANCO FILIPINO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY, OR EVEN CONSIDER THE
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN FECUNDO
V. BERJAMEN, LUQUE V. KAYANAN AND OTHER SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE INTEMPERATE AND ACCUSATORY LANGUAGE OF JUDGE TAC-AN IN HIS ORDER DATED
14 APRIL 2000 IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE LATTERS "EXASPERATION BORDERING ON
INDIGNATION" AT THE PETITIONER WHICH "MAY UNNECESSARILY CLOUD HIS
IMPARTIALITY" AND WHICH WARRANTS HIS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT AND
FOUND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 20 MARCH 2000 DID NOT BETRAY THAT JUDGE
TAC-AN HAD ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE PENDING BEFORE RTC BATANGAS BRANCH
84.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED,
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, OR AT LEAST SANCTIONED
SUCH DEPARTURE BY JUDGE TAC-AN, WHEN IT DELIBERATELY SELECTED ONLY A FEW OF
THE BADGES OF BIAS, HOSTILITY AND PREJUDGMENT CITED BY THE PETITIONER AND,
WORSE, WHEN IT WILLFULLY FAILED TO RESOLVE ISSUES RAISED IN PETITIONERS AND
TALA ET ALS RESPECTIVE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONERS
OMNIBUS MOTION WAS INTENDED TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT AND NOT TO AVAIL OF THE LEGAL REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE RULES OF COURT
TO ENSURE THAT HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS PROTECTED AND
GUARANTEED.14

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.
Petitioner argues that, by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of respondent
judge cited as "badges of hostility, bias and prejudgment", the appellate court departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and disregarded principles laid down by
jurisprudence.
Petitioner asserts that the Orders which were issued by respondent judge demonstrated his
predilection to act with bias in favor of Banco Filipino and manifested his escalating hostility and
animosity towards petitioner and her co-defendants, Tala, et al.
In regard to the Order dated June 3, 1996, petitioner contends that it was not Tala, et al. but Banco
Filipino, which was duty bound to establish the date of actual receipt of its motion for
reconsideration. She complains that respondent judge contravened the express provisions of the
Rules of Court when he "unilaterally relieved Banco Filipino of its statutory obligation to prove
service of its motion for reconsideration and, instead, applied, x x x a so-called safe assumption in
determining when petitioner and her co-defendants should have received the same." 15 Moreover, she
takes offense to the respondent judges statement that he did not believe Tala, et al.s claim of
receipt of the pleading on 28 March 1996, thus, in effect branding them as "liars".
Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is complete upon
actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5)
days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of
such time.
In the case at bar, there is no postmasters certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the
addressee and thus returned to the sender, after first notice was sent to and received by addressee
on a specified date. Absent such notice, the disputable presumption of completeness of service does
not arise and by implication, respondent judge could not presume actual receipt by addressee.
Petitioner also alleges that the Order dated November 20, 1996 is another indicium of respondent
judges manifest partiality when he granted the motion for production of documents despite failure by
Banco Filipino to advance the cost for such production and inspection. The respondent judge
justified his Order with a sweeping declaration that "the amount is insignificant by any standard and
could readily been resolved between the parties involved. Records reveal that Tala did not charge
Banco Filipino for the documents it eventually produced pursuant to the motion for production." 16
Respondent judges peremptory act of absolving Banco Filipino from paying the expenses for the
production of documents is disturbing for its lack of basis. There was no basis for respondent judge
to conclude that the amount involved was "insignificant" considering that, as the records would show,
no reference of any amount was made by the parties. Moreover, his categorical declaration that Tala,
et al. did not bother to charge Banco Filipino the amount of expenses runs counter to the evidence at
hand. In opposing the motion for the production of documents, 17 Tala, et al. cited, as one of their
grounds, the excessive expense it would incur in case the motion would be granted. Sound judicial
action dictates that he should have inquired first into the validity of Tala, et al.s claim, whose rights

were bound to be affected, instead of making a sweeping and dismissive Order exempting Banco
Filipino from complying with its legal obligation.
Petitioner also assails the Orders dated: (1) April 15, 1998 Order directing Tala, et al. to produce
certain documents not requested by Banco Filipino; and (2) May 11, 1999 Order directing Banco
Filipino to present its witness.
The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be confined to promote
the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up
some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where the judges participation in the conduct
of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.06 which provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that
undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the presentation of specific
documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and
who to present as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on. To our mind, respondent
judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what
evidence to present to prove its case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting
evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial, the final determination of what evidence
to adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of their
primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as
inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any
semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the
minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation
of the peoples faith in our courts.18
Petitioner also questions the manner with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipinos formal
offer of exhibits. The records show that on November 29, 1999, petitioner filed her comment on
Banco Filipinos formal offer of exhibits. On December 8, 1999, respondent judge granted Banco
Filipino and Tala, et al. five (5) days each within which to file their respective reply and rejoinders. On
December 9, 1999, Tala, et al. filed their comment. Yet the next day, December 10, respondent
judge, without awaiting the reply and rejoinders of the parties, issued an order admitting all the
exhibits offered.
The seeming haste with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipinos formal offer of exhibits
cannot simply be ignored. It is true, as the appellate court observed, that the filing of a reply lies in
the sound discretion of the court. What is objectionable, however, is that respondent judge expressly
granted the parties a period of time within which to file their respective pleadings, only to disregard in
the end, the period he himself had set and, thus deprived the parties an opportunity to ventilate their
respective sides and render the issues clearer.

Finally, petitioner argues that respondent judge prejudged the case when he issued the March 20,
2000 Order. She claims that the Order, which categorically and unqualifiedly stated the existence of
an implied trust, rendered a definite resolution of one of the principal issues in the main case without
awaiting her and Tala, et al.s evidence.
In his April 14, 2000 Order, respondent judge brushed aside petitioners argument by declaring that
the "finding is only interlocutory because this can be rebutted by the defendants x x x. Necessarily,
the Court must make an initial assessment of the evidence as presented by the plaintiff if they
constitute prima facie evidence x x x."
There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to conclude, out of necessity, the existence of a
prima facie case on the basis alone of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. As correctly pointed
out by petitioner, it is only when the plaintiff demurs to evidence that the trial court may rule on the
case before the defense presents its evidence. Moreover, the assailed Order, being interlocutory in
nature, is not the final decision. As such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an
interlocutory order, on the principal issue that effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the
interest of substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between the
parties must be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory Order.
It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
parties as an impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself
in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are
eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity. In the
case of Bautista v. Rebueno,19 we stated:
. . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold
himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his
actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the
case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances
appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite
such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion
in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the
Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood,
his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. (Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge issued the assailed
directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a
clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Courts previous
pronouncements that to warrant the judges inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be
shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source,20 this rule does not apply where
the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate predisposition to deviate from established
procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the
Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision
that pertain to the judges judicial functions may not be proper considerations to charge a judge of
bias though these acts may be erroneous.21 However, where said complained orders, taken not

singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial
magistrate, due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The June 7, 2001 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed the Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is directed to inhibit himself from presiding in Civil
Case No. 4521. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City is directed to reraffle the said case to another judge.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., no part. Former counsel of a party.