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Moving About in a Technological World:

A Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Inquiry o f
Urban Streets and Freeways as Public Architecture
by
Joem W. Kroll
M.A. (University o f Gottingen, Germany) 1976
M.C.P. (University o f California, Berkeley) 1986
M.S. (University o f California, Berkeley) 1987
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction o f the

requirements for the degree o f
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
Architecture
in the
GRADUATE DIVISION
o f the
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
Committee in charge:
Professor Galen Cranz, Chair
Professor Hubert L. Dreyfus
Professor Peter Bosselmann
Spring 2001
UMI Number 3019707
Copyright 2001 by
Kroll, Joem W.
All rights reserved.
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Moving About in a Technological World:

A Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Inquiry o f
2001
by
Joem W. Kroll
Abstract
Moving About in A Technological World:
A Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Inquiry of
by
Joem W. Kroll
Doctor o f Philosophy in Architecture
University o f California, Berkeley
Professor Galen Cranz, Chair
In order to improve our dwelling on streets, this inquiry outlines the thought o f Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976) and applies it to central issues o f designing for more inclusive uses
o f our public roads. The inquiry is guided by the question: How can we develop a free and
positive relation to technology? In exploring issues o f technology within the context o f street
design, the study employs hermeneutic, or interpretive, phenomenology which Heidegger
conceived and developed. Each major phase o f his thought can be marked by a concept that
anchors a specific way o f access to our environment: equipment; works o f art (unifying
cultural paradigms); things. These three route markers characterize Heidegger's thought as
a searching movement into ever richer ontologies (understandings o f being). Each o f these
vantage points reveals our public roads in different ways.
Following the phenomena
elucidated by Heidegger's three main ontologies, three principal street functions are explored:
(1) everyday street environments as smoothly functioning equipment for moving about, (2)
airports and (automated) freeways as potential works o f art, and (3) streets as public spaces
uniquely suited for dwelling in postmodernism's multiple local worlds. Observation and
interpretation guided by phenomenological concepts provide the major kind o f evidence. The
inquiry suggests two main conclusions: (A) In order to fully express and facilitate the various
social practices taking place on streets, architects, urban planners, and transportation
engineers are advised to develop a thorough understanding o f the phenomena elucidated by
Heidegger's three main ontologies.
(B) Our streets and highways need to function as
smoothly interlocked equipment and as things focusing multiple local worlds, while preserving
a status as latent works o f art that may spontaneously emerge as full-fledged unifying cultural
paradigms. By freely accepting a technologically advanced and flexible postmodern world
where we are on the move and dwell via moving, we are more likely to design our streets not
only for safe and efficient travel, but also for regaining joy and delight while moving about.
Journeying is not only about "getting there." It must also be moving.
I dedicate this inquiry to

my parents Ewald and Gerda Kroll
and to my wife Cathy
in gratitude
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction........................................................................................................vi
PART I
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC NATURE OF STREETS........ 1
Chapter I
Phenomenology in Environmental Design Research..................................2
Chapter 2
1.1
Environmental Design Research and Phenomeno logy
1.2
Basic Propositions o f Environmental Phenomenology
1.3
Phenomenological Analysis and Semantic Ethnography
Encountering Streets and Contemporary Street Issues..........................27

2.1
Street Encounters
2.2
Main Contemporary Street Issues
PART II
HEIDEGGER ON BEING HUMAN AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL

ENVIRONM ENT............................................................................................54
Chapter 3
Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Being-in-the-World, and Spatiality... 55

3.1
Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Basic Terms and Overview
3.2
Environment and Equipment
3.3
Existential Spatiality and Physical Space

3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
Regions, Places, and Public Space

Distance, Dis-stance, and Nearness
From Existential Spatiality to Physical Space
iii
Chapter 4
Modern Technology and the Work o f A rt................................................104

4.1
Our Present Ambivalence Toward Technology
4.2
Heidegger's Account o f M odem Technology

4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.3
Chapter 5
The Enframing
The Danger
The Turning
Elements o f a Work o f Art
Dwelling in A Technological W orld...........................................................123

5.1
What Things Do
5.2
Dwelling in Many Ways
PART IE
MOVING ABOUT IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD..........................144
Chapter 6
The Street as Transparent Equipment.....................................................146
Chapter 7
6.1
Materials, Nature, and Publicness o f the Urban Street
6.2
Signs as Street Equipment
6.3
Streets as Equipment for Walking
Moving About as a Work of A rt................................................................ 176

7.1
Transportation as Our Potential Work o f Art

7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3
7.1.4
Transportation's Central Role

The Automobile-Highway System
A Work o f Art OfiFCourse
The Automated Highway System
7.2
Airports as a Future W ork o f Art

7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.3
Chapter 8
Special Features o f Aviation Technology

A New Denver International Airport
Denver International Airport as a Proposed Work o f Art
A Resisting Thought
On the Way to Dwelling on Streets.......................................................... 208

8.1
The Trash Can as a Thing
8.2
The Freeway Thinging
Chapter 9
Implications for Street Designers and Educators.................................. 239
Appendix
An Outline o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology..........................................259

1
2
3
4
5
The Project o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology

The Subject Matter o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology
The Method o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology
The Phenomenon o f World
Being-in-the-World
Glossary...................................................................................................................................291
References............................................................................................................................... 297
L ist o f Figures
Figure 5-1
The Shrinking Globe, 1889-1981..................................................... 124
Figure 5-2
Typical Flight Velocities.................................................................... 126
Figure 5-3
A Contemporary Understanding o f Earth and S k y .........................141
Figure 6-1
Signs Destroying vs. Reinforcing Local Worlds............................. 161
Figure 6-2
Pedestrian Realms: Broken Up (top) and Out o f Scale (bottom) 168
Figure 6-3
Sidewalks Unavailable in Two W ays............................................... 170
Figure 6-4
Narrowed to Motorized U s e .............................................................173
Figure 6-5
Paths to Nowhere............................................................................... 175
Figure 8-1
Trash Cans Just One Block Apart.................................................... 209
Figure 8-2
Trash Containers Attuning Our Proper Ways................................. 213
Figure 8-3
A Gathering o f Bridges and Free Ways............................................220
Figure 8-4
In Loving M emory.............................................................................230
Figure 8-5
A Gathering o f Things....................................................................... 231
Figure 8-6
A Reminder on Dwelling................................................................... 234
Figure 8-7
Plain Street, North Dakota................................................................236
Figure 9-1
Map o f San Francisco and Berkeley, California.............................. 247
Figure 9-2
International Terminal o f San Francisco International Airport.... 248
Figure 9-3
Two Examples o f Woonerven.......................................................... 250
Figure 9-4
Kentucky Street in Downtown Petaluma, California..................... 254
(Illustrations are by the author unless otherwise noted in the text)
List o f Tables
Table 2-1
Variety o f Street Encounters............................................................... 31
Table 3-1
Modes o f Being o f Entities Other Than D asein ............................... 72
Table 3-2
Physical Space vs. Existential Spatiality........................................... 100
Table 9-1
Principal Street Functions and Characteristics................................ 241
Introduction
This inquiry attempts to fill a gap in our thinking about dwelling in a technological
world that is increasingly marked by locomotion. We are spending more and more hours on
the road and in the air. Our vehicle miles traveled increases yearly despite substantial
advances in electronic communications.
Many professions are devoted to accommodating our increasing demand for travel.
Traffic engineering addresses issues o f road capacity, efficiency, and safety. Transportation
planning searches for ways to decrease our dependency on the private automobile by better
integrating land use and transportation, and by making alternative modes o f transport more
convenient and attractive. Airport planning and design tries to anticipate and accommodate
an ever climbing demand for travel by air. These efforts to move us and our goods safely and
efficiently are mainly confined to the important issues o f capacity, efficiency, and safety. Less
tangible aspects o f moving about, such as convenience, comfort, elegance, and especially the
cultural and social dimensions o f our transport facilities, typically fall by the wayside. In
general, our outlook on streets is bland and one-dimensional. All these ways o f moving about
may get us from place to place, but they don't truly move us.
Our instrumental view o f technology in general, and o f traveling in particular, is
mainly to blame for this myopic view. We hardly consider "moving about" as a way o f being,
i.e., as a way o f dwelling in a technological world equipped with things for moving about. We
view our streets, airways, and waterways predominantly as conduits for locomotion. This
instrumental view o f transport facilities contributes to an uneasy, ambivalent relation to
technology in general and to the technology o f transport in particular. Fast moving traffic on
unbecoming streets, disrespecting nature, pedestrians, and small stores, and an overly
optimistic belief in sophisticated technology which supposedly solves our mobility problems
are reflections o f our instrumental tunnel vision.
In order to open up and broaden our perspective on how to dwell on streets, I outline
the thought o f Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and apply it to central issues o f designing for
more inclusive uses o f our public roads. Heidegger's thought provides a wide and penetrating
perspective on how we interact with our natural and built environment, how we use space,
and how we may come to grips with technology. Especially in his later writings and lectures
Heidegger explores the question: H ow can we develop a free and positive relation to
technology? This question is perhaps the most crucial issue with which our advanced
technological societies struggle.
In examining these issues o f technology within the context o f street and highway
design, I employ hermeneutic, or interpretive, phenomenology which Martin Heidegger
conceived and developed.
Taking Heidegger as my guide, I propose some answers
concerning the technology o f moving about and dwelling on streets. I present airports and
(automated) freeways as potential unifying cultural paradigms (works o f art), and streets as
series o f multiple worlds in which w e move, dwell, and have our being. My suggestions
contribute to collectively developing an affirmative relationship with advanced technology and
provide some guidelines on how to design our urban streets and freeways in a way that
enables us to joyfully move and publicly dwell on them.
viii
The territory I want to explore demands a road map for easier access. My inquiry is
divided into three parts. Two brief chapters (Part I) provide the background for this study.
Chapter 1 gives an overview o f how phenomenology is currently used in environmental design
research, while Chapter 2 introduces contemporary issues o f street use and street design.
In Part H, I outline Heidegger's thought from the perspective o f three major angles.
While his thought must be seen as a searching and evolving whole, it can be divided into three
major phases, each o f which has somewhat different concerns and specific emphases. Based
on his lectures and publications, the temporal sequence o f these phases can be roughly traced
as follows: his early period (1915 to 1930), his middle period (1930 to 1950), and his late
period o f public thought (1950 to 1970).
While exploring the essence and general
characteristics o f being human, each stage o f his thought has its particular "take on things."
His evolving thinking, which is not a unified or systematic set o f principles or doctrines,
recognizes our hum an way o f being as inherently environmental.
environm ental
With respect to
analysis and the housing o f our being that is conditioned by its environing
things, each phase o f his thought can be marked by a concept that anchors a specific way o f
access to our environment: equipment; works o f art; things. These three route markers
characterize Heidegger's thought as a searching movement into ever more complex yet
elemental ontologies (understandings o f beings). My study's sequence o f chapters, moving
from a focus on equipment, to works o f art, and finally to things, parallels Heidegger's
evolving thought.
Chapters 3 through 8 deal with these three guiding concepts in terms o f theoretical
explication (Part H, Chapters 3 through 5) and application (Part IH, Chapters 6 through 8).
Accordingly, Chapters 3 and 6 (equipment), Chapters 4 and 7 (works o f art), and Chapters
5 and 8 (things) are thematic pairs.
Chapter 3 presents basic terms and an overview o f hermeneutic (or interpretive)
phenomenology, introduces taken-for-granted phenomena such as "being-in-the-world," and
shows how we typically experience "space in everyday, routine activities using various
equipment. This first theoretical chapter explains the method o f environmental analysis of
Heidegger's early period. Because it elaborates at some length on how we commonly use our
physical environment, Chapter 3 provides essential theoretical background material also for
Chapters 4 and 5 .1 Chapter 4 presents an overview o f Heidegger's critique o f modem
technology. It also introduces the "work o f art" as a cultural paradigm that can unify a
historical culture, e.g., our advanced technological society which is at odds with technological
devices. In Chapter 5 ,1 explain what Heidegger means by "things" and how their disclosure
in practical appropriation can lead to dwelling in multiple local worlds.2
Chapters 6 through 8 o f Part EH apply Heidegger's ontological analyses to crucial but
often overlooked issues o f our transportation environment. Following the route markers in
Heidegger's unfolding understanding o f being (equipment; works o f art; things) I present
moving about in a technological world from the perspective of three principal street functions
that correspond to the three main understandings o f being. Chapter 6 examines roadways and
associated tools for moving about (sidewalks, traffic signals, signs) from the perspective o f
1 For a more detailed treatment o f phenomenologys main concepts, goal, and method,
see the Appendix: An Outline o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology.
2 The Glossary (pp. 291-296) will facilitate the understanding o f the main
phenomenological terms used in this inquiry.
smoothly functioning equipm ent which allows us to immerse ourselves fully in going about
our business. Chapter 7 searches our transportation environment for potential works o f art
which may be able to unify a heterogeneous and fragmented culture that is replete with
contradictions revolving around technology and mobility.
Airports and their abutting
circulation network, linking airways with ways on the ground, and freeways, operating in
traditional or potentially automated modes, are explored as candidates for contemporary and
future works o f art. In Chapter 8 ,1 take up Heideggers most potent and elemental ontology
o f things and try to show how humble streetscape features (such as a trash can). Main Street,
back roads, freeways, and postmodern practices o f dwelling and moving about can be
informed by things making places.
Chapter 9 summarizes my findings, charts guidelines for shaping our streets and
highways (Table 9-1), and considers the three principal street functions jointly by examining
their compatibility and overlap. In order to promote appreciation and care for our public
roads, I also suggest some "street topics" that primary and secondary schools may include as
part o f their interdisciplinary curricular activities.
By freely accepting a technologically advanced world where we are on the move and
dwell via moving, we are more likely to design our streets not only for safe and efficient
travel, but also for regaining joy and delight while moving about. Journeying is not only
about "getting there." It should also be moving.
PARTI
PHENOMENOLOGY AND
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF STREETS
Tii roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers nature in a definite way.
Heidegger, Being and Time
Chapter 1
Phenomenology in Environmental Design Research
1.1
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN RESEARCH AND PHENOMENOLOGY

This chapter gives an overview o f phenomenology as currently used in environmental
design research, and situates the main body o f this dissertation in a larger academic and
professional context.
Environmental design research is an interdisciplinary field that emerged during the
1960's in response to a variety o f environmental concerns.1 Moore, Tuttle, and Howell define
this field as
the study o f the mutual relations between human beings and the physical environment
at all scales, and applications o f the knowledge thus gained to improving the quality
o f life through better informed environmental policy, planning, design, and education.2
Due to its interdisciplinary nature and work on all scales o f the human environment,
environmental design research draws upon a variety of theoretical frameworks comprised o f
both qualitative and quantitative studies. Phenomenology is one research tradition within
qualitative environmental design research.
When using a phenomenological approach, most environmental design researchers
draw on the works o f Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (19081961). These philosophers were concerned about outlining the general structures o f human
1 For an overview o f this field, see especially the contributions by Proshansky, Wapner,
and Moore in Stokols and Altman 1987 (articles numbered 42, 41, 39, respectively). ,
2
Moore, Tuttle, and Howell 1985, 4.
3
existence, including aspects o f human spatial behavior as part o f the more comprehensive
practices o f using equipment, o f building, and o f dwelling.3 Because general existential
structures are its focal point, the research tradition inaugurated by Heidegger (and followed
to a large degree by Merleau-Ponty) has been named "existential phenomenology."
David Seamon, a trained geographer and professor o f architecture, describes the goal
and focus o f existential phenomenology as follows:
A central aim o f existential phenomenology is a generalized description and
understanding o f human experience, behavior, meaning and awareness as they are
lived by real people in real times and places. The reality o f these concrete
experiences and situations are not an end in themselves, however, but a field o f
descriptive evidence out o f which can be drawn underlying patterns and structures
that mark the essential core o f humanness.4
Existential phenomenology and its application in the environmental disciplines
originated in continental Europe. The original works in phenomenology were not focused on
the environment, but they have important implications on questions regarding "how humans
dwell." Among the first to use a phenomenological approach in environmental studies,
besides Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, are Otto Friedrich Bollnow5 and Christian NorbergSchulz.6 The collections o f essays edited by Seamon and Mugerauer (1985) and Seamon
(1993) contain contributions from 29 (mostly North American) environmental design
3 More than any other phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty paid special attention
to the hum an body; for a thorough treatment on this subject, see Merleau-Ponty 1962 (Part
One).
4
Seamon 1993, 17; emphasis in italics is Seamon's.
Bollnow 1967, and 1971.
Norberg-Schulz 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1988.
4
researchers who follow or explore a phenomenological approach. Their work can be grouped
under the label o f "environmental phenomenology."
1.2
BASIC PROPOSITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

The substantive focus and scale o f studies in environmental phenomenology varies
widely. In order to provide an overview o f these studies, I have abstracted from them those
concerns and views which are shared by the loosely defined group o f environmental
researchers who employ a phenomenological approach. I present these commonalities in
twelve thesis statements, o r brief propositions, followed by some explanatory comments.
These propositions do necessarily simplify the variety o f concerns and views held by various
environmental phenomenologists, but my succinct phrasing o f these propositions assists in
bringing the essential issues into sharper focus.
(1)
The evervdav life-world is o f primary importance.

Phenomenologists7 in environmental design research are primarily interested in
exploring the concrete life-world o f human habitats. Issues o f building science, formal
aesthetics, and history tend to play a secondary role, and are typically taken up only to the
extent that they involve, actually or potentially, tangible human experience. O f primary focus
and concern are the phenomena, i.e., the general patterns or structures as evident (though
7 For the sake o f clarity and brevity, I will use "phenomenologists" in the remainder o f
this chapter as an abbreviation for "designers and design researchers in environmental
disciplines (such as architecture, urban design, landscape architecture, geography) employing
a phenomenological approach."
5
often hidden and not easily discernible) in everyday human activities and shared practices.
Vernacular architecture and traditional settlements are therefore germane areas o f study.8
(2)
The design profession needs an alternative to functionalism and formalism.

Since its inception during the first quarter o f the twentieth century, the original
pragmatism and innovative functionalism o f architectural modernism has often degenerated

into sterile, formalist designs. Uncritical and mechanistic imitations o f modernist exemplars
resulted in cold, arid, and habitually dwarfing "habitats." An equally uncritical and extreme
response to modernism's sterile legacy subsequently gave rise to shallow self-serving caprices
o f formalism in the guise o f postmodernism and deconstruction.9
Much contemporary design is disconnected from "life in the street" because it
addresses only safety issues and resource efficiency (functionalism), serves as historic set
pieces for corporate image promotion (postmodernism) or is reduced to idiosyncratic selfexpression addressed with tongue-in-cheek to the architectural literati (deconstruction). In
8 See, for instance, the phenomenological studies o f Dalmatian towns (Violich) and
wells in Ireland (Brenneman) in Seamon and Mugerauer 1985; o f the landscape and
indigenous building types o f Catalonia (Nogue i Font) and Northern Greece (Walkey) in
Seamon 1993; and o f the adaptive settlements and genius loci o f Rome, Prague, and
Khartoum (Sudan) in Norberg-Schulz 1980.
9 Much o f postmodern and deconstructionist architecture can be understood as a
quixotic but acceptable response to extreme and unimaginative modernism Extreme and
unimaginative products ensue whenever a formerly new paradigm (e.g., modernist
architecture) is merely imitated as a style. Postmodernism (as historic formalism) and
deconstruction (as idiosyncratic formalism) are, in general, not convincing responses to the
liberating original tenets and achievements o f modernism See, for instance, the programs and
manifestoes on twentieth-century architecture in Conrads 1980, and Klotz 1988 on the
historical setting o f postmodern architecture.
6
contrast to architecture reduced to utilitarian functions, mere image maker, or stylistic
commentary, design informed by phenomenology tends to pay attention to more basic and
"pedestrian" needs and intends to build individual structures and urban settlements which can
house, interpret, and express the common yet multifaceted experiences and social practices
o f everyday living.
(3)
A synthesis is needed to bring various environmental disciplines togeth er.

As a counterbalance to narrow specialization, environmental design research informed
by phenomenology may provide a platform for integrating specialized environmental design

research approaches and for "healing the rifts between art and science, seeing and
understanding, knowledge and action, and design and building." 10
Those supporting the use o f phenomenology in the environmental disciplines are
convinced that it can reconfigure and transform the traditional divisions o f academic branches
in general and the design fields in particular. Mainly because o f its promise for synthesizing
knowledge and discovering environmental meaning, some protagonists assign to
phenomenology a central unifying role in academia and the applied professions.11
10 Seamon 1993, 1.
11 The arguments for a unifying role o f phenomenology and contributions along these
lines demonstrate, as in any emerging field, varying levels o f methodological rigor and results.
See, for instance, the contributions by Norberg-Schulz, Seamon, Relph; and Zimmerman on
"deep ecology" (in Guignon 1993, 240-269).
(4)
Humans need distinct and significant places.

Phenomenologists point to the widely observed and lamented "loss o f place" which
is, more precisely, a loss or an erosion o f place identity. They are convinced that the built
environment is a decisive factor for the physical and psychological well-being o f individuals,
groups, and society as a whole. In order to shed The Geography o f Nowhere (Kunstler 1993)
and return Home from Nowhere (Kunstler 1998), phenomenologists call for designing and
building identifiable places which unobtrusively yet effectively reinforce historical awareness,
social identity, and local culture. Instead o f using the natural and built environment mainly
for purposes o f resource efficiency, phenomenologists encourage to cherish, celebrate, and
nurture the particular genius loci, and to re-create in this spirit.12
(5)
Designers build on the users implicit knowledge.

Rather than relying mainly on questionnaires and surveys or on their own
preconceived notions, designers need to tap into the users' tacit knowledge or implicit
understanding.13 It is difficult to tap into this implicit knowing- because it is by nature
12 For a specific treatment on discovering, celebrating, and building in the pervading

spirit o f a place, see Genius Loci by Norberg-Schulz (1980).
13 Many concerns and issues phenomenology deals with are explicitly shared by
researchers who don't consider themselves phenomenologists. For instance, Edward T. Hall
(1969) explores The Hidden Dimension in personal interactions, and Michael Polanyi (1962,
1967) traces The Tacit Dimension in everyday activities and in science.
"seemingly mundane and not striking." 14 This implicit understanding is a kind o f knowledge
everyone embodies and "carries around" and o f which one is typically not conscious. It is this
tacit embodied knowing which phenomenology wants to make explicit in its general
structures. Environmental phenomenologists want to use these explicit general structures o f
implicit knowing to make our physical environment more livable.15
Design built on the embodied knowing shared in a particular culture can preserve,
enhance, and highlight the users' life-world. It seems that the crux o f phenomenology can
therefore be phrased as follows: How can this tacit knowledge be accessed? The following
nine steps or building blocks are methodological candidates for accessing this tacit knowing.
Except for step (d), which I only use in passing, these steps comprise also my general
approach. They can be identified as follows:
(a)
direct, keen, and unbiased observation leading to cautious generalizations;
(b)
systematic reflection about these tentative generalizations aided by familiarity

with the history o f thought;
14 Seamon 1993, 11. In "Sacred Structures o f Everyday Life: A Return to Manteo,

North Carolina," Randolph. Hester (in Seamon 1993, 271-297) describes the difficulties local
residents and hired professionals had in identifying and articulating these "seemingly mundane
and not striking" but central elements o f a setting that was ordinary and commonplace.
15 In Chapter 3 and in the Appendix, which outlines hermeneutic phenomenology, I
present more specific reasons for the difficulties in accessing this tacit knowledge. In
attempting to make this tacit knowledge explicit, a phenomenologist must uncover subtle but
pervasive predispositions which direct and govern our ways o f seeing and doing. The
difficulties o f this uncovering are further compounded by the circular and essentially openended process o f understanding. For instance, in order to clarify^ and deepen the
phenomenological process o f understanding one must submit this process to its own
interpretive categories. However, in order to be applicable to environmental design,
environmental phenomenology does not have to deal extensively with these important
theoretical issues which are outlined in the Appendix.
9
(c)
critical appropriation and evaluation of research in environmental assessment

and cognition;
(d)
corroboration o f generalized findings through comparative research, including

cross-cultural studies;
(e)
disciplined and objectifiable introspection;
(f)
surveying and analyzing the arts and literature as copious sources for insights
into the general characteristics o f human nature (i.e., the phenomena);
(g)
interpreting the observed phenomena and inferred conclusions in terms o f the

culture that is analyzed;
(h)
augmenting these interpretations by appropriate sociological, psychological,

and anthropological knowledge;
(i)
and, in general, always keeping a perspective that is as precise as the

phenomena admit and as comprehensive as they require.
These methodological steps or buildings blocks can be traced in the original works o f
phenomenology. In theoretical development and practical application, these methodological
components are not so neatly isolated as they appear in the list above and do not follow a pre
ordained sequence. Being subject to the logic o f understanding, these building blocks o f
phenomenology necessarily follow a circular or spiral structure in which concepts and
empirical facts are interdependent agents o f a fluid whole that is nourished by an ever
changing, creative tension. This general methodological perspective o f phenomenology is
buttressed by the conviction that method is always subservient to the phenomena it is
employed to elucidate.
10
(6)
We learn about places and how people use them bv keen and empathetic observation
and description.
Informed by phenomenological theory, keen and empathetic observation and
description o f shared social practices and settings are the basic method o f applied
environmental phenomenology. Because o f its emphasis on descriptive qualitative data,
environmental phenomenology is at times incorrectly identified with a ll qualitative
approaches. Observation and description, leading to tentative generalizations, are the basic
vehicles o f investigation in the sciences as well as in the humanities.
Environmental researchers and designers use phenomenological theory with varying
levels o f sophistication, and apply it more or less explicitly, and more or less appropriately.
Partial or inconsistent use o f phenomenological theory is one reason why environmental
phenomenology is occasionally used as an umbrella label for all qualitative approaches in
environmental design research. Phenomenology as a coherent general description o f the
human life world is only one o f several approaches in the qualitative research tradition.
Phenomenology shares with these approaches their common concerns and issues, but it has
its specific "take on things" and, correspondingly, its own terminology.
Phenomenology is a method o f investigation that originated during the first quarter
o f the 20th century and subsequently has lead to a wide range o f theoretical developments and
applications in various fields.
Its emphasis on unbiased yet involved observation and
description is shared by many researchers, writers and artists who not necessarily understand
11
themselves as "phenomenologists".16 Their kindred work may serve as inspiration and
stimulation for those who want to employ an explicit phenomenological approach. For
instance, many proponents o f environmental phenomenology consider the poetry, artistic
analyses, and the scientific studies o f Goethe (1749-1832) as a paradigm for their field.
Goethe's way o f describing natural phenomena (e.g., plants, stone formations, colors), places,
and people employs keen observation, engaged concern, an almost naive and open mind, and
ever a sympathetic and intimate "eye" as conditions for genuine knowledge.17
Phenomenologists demonstrate resonant concern and care for the settings they
observe and describe, while trying to avoid subjectivism, sentimentalism, and sensationalism.
They show people in their practical daily involvements, immersed in their world, and
emphasize their shared social practices even when focusing on individual cases or specific
events. A phenomenological description aims at making the explored places, events, and
social practices lucid, transparent, and intelligible on their own terms.
Furthermore, a
phenomenological analysis aims at making intelligible an entire world in which people, things,
conventions, and institutions find their place and meaning.
Phenomenological "data" thus quarried may be used as mere stepping stones for
psychological and sociological analyses, or for scientific data processing (statistical analysis)
16 Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the eminent physician and thinker o f ancient Greece, for
example, can be regarded as the first and foremost "phenomenologist." He pursued almost
every major phenomenon known in his culture with systematic and often tedious passion, due
respect for the historical precedent, probing persistence, and with fervent curiosity insisting
to know "What is it?"
17 For a recent application o f an explicit Goethian approach, see Mark Riegner's essay
"Toward a Holistic Understanding o f Place: Reading a Landscape Through its Flora and
Fauna" inSeam on 1993, 181-215.
12
with the purpose o f determining causal relationships. However, a clear methodological
distinction needs to be made between phenomenological findings as part o f a
phenomenological study, on the one hand, and their use as "data" for quantitative analysis,
on the other. The latter is bound to present its results as "objective facts" that are severed
from the life-world. Contrary to the decontextualizing tendency o f science, phenomenology
intends to make an entire world, on its own terms, more intelligible, lucid, and present.18
(7)
Interpretation is more important than explanation and prediction.

Understanding is a central feature o f human living and interaction. Understanding
encompasses the entire range o f human experience, from everyday routine activities, where
understanding remains typically and necessarily "tacit," to systematic reflection about, and
interpretation o f this central and pervasive human activity. Phenomenology attempts to
extract and systematize the "natural" and tacit understanding by making it explicit as a central
structure o f being human. This higher or second-order understanding (systematic reflection
and interpretation) o f understanding (everyday coping in one's world) is the goal o f
hermeneutic phenomenology.19
Scientific data and principles arise from attempts to better understand our world and
to go about our individual and common business more successfully. Scientific explanation
18 For a more comprehensive justification o f this important methodological distinction

o f different kinds o f knowing based on different kinds o f engagement with one's world, see
the Appendix, especially The Phenomenon o f World (Section 4) and Being-in-the-World
(Section 5).
19 See also Sections 1 and 2 o f the Appendix.
13
and prediction must therefore be imbedded in a comprehensive interpretive framework if they
claim relevance for human living. In attempting to lead to a more comprehensive and relevant
understanding o f our life-world, phenomenology is not, as often misconstrued, an opponent
o f science but a necessary complement.
A phenomenological interpretation aims at making manifest what is implied or tacit
knowledge which is typically taken for granted. While approaching the concrete phenomena
o f the life-world inductively, phenomenology emphasizes its general patterns. Such general,
shared patterns or structures o f c o m m o n experience stand in contrast to the abstract,
depersonalized, and decontextualized concepts o f science. However, both scientific and
phenomenological research seek generality and utility, albeit pursuing different purposes.
Science is interested in causal explanation, prediction, and control, whereas qualitative
research, such as phenomenology, is interested in deepening our understanding o f our routine
and cultural activities and thereby establishing m eaning. It follows that phenomenology is not
a form o f individualism or subjectivism, as often mistakenly charged. Contrary to this
misconception, phenomenology seeks the structure o f social practices, thereby shedding light
on diverse areas o f human experience, including the reciprocal relations o f humans and their
natural and built environment.
Phenomenologists hold that proper understanding is an emic process, i.e., it occurs
"from the inside out," arising from absorbed involvement in one's world and becoming
increasingly explicit with the aid o f systematized and generalized concepts. Knowledge o f the
world one is intimately involved with can never be made fully explicit and objectified. In
contrast to a scientist, a phenomenological observer, analyst, or interpreter remains dependent
14
on the very structures that are to be made intelligible. In contrast to a scientist who is
expected to keep an impersonal distance toward the object o f study, a phenomenologist
remains necessarily linked to the world that is to be understood "from the inside out."
Understanding, even on its higher and self-reflective levels as systematic hermeneutics, is

necessarily circular.
Designing and building must proceed accordingly, i.e., intimate knowing o f settings,
social conventions and customs, and the users' physical and cultural needs and wants must
first be understood before an environment can be designed and built that is congruent with
the users' world. A design and building process that is informed by the primacy o f emic
understanding and interpretation is more likely to be successful than the work o f a hired
outside expert and detached specialist whose role is typically limited to merely technical
issues.
Empathy and receptivity are often regarded as basic requirements for interpretation.
Literature and the arts, which draw upon and express multifaceted receptivity and engaged
involvement, are at times used by phenomenologists as sources for interpretive insight and
design clues.20
20 See, for instance, David Seamon, "Reconciling Old and New Worlds: The DwellingJoumey Relationship as Portrayed in Vilhelm Moberg's 'Emigrant' novels" (Seamon and
Mugerauer 1985,227-245), and his "Different Worlds Coming Together: A Phenomenology
o f Relationship as Portrayed in Doris Lessing's Diaries ofJane Somers" (Seamon 1993, 219246). Heidegger, especially in his later writings, quotes poets (such as Holderlin, Hebbel,
Rilke, Stifter, and Trakl) for their penetrating perception o f places and insights regarding the
nature o f dwelling. For Heidegger's use o f a passage from Rilke that vividly illustrates the
phenomenon o f being-in-the-world, see Section 5 o f the Appendix.
15
Environmental design researchers using an interpretive approach tend to demonstrate
"elective affinities" to both artistic expression and vernacular design. They are typically not
much interested in issues o f building science, architectural history, or formal analysis o f
buildings and settlements. While such areas o f research are in principle susceptible to an
interpretive approach, including phenomenology, they hardly attract phenomenologists. In
contrast, places teaming with life and expressing the overt and covert practices o f a culture
attract phenomenologists.21 Phenomenologists are drawn to common places, such as
factories, arcades, and alleys, or to spots at society's fringe, such as favelas, the demimonde
o f red light districts, or even slaughter houses.22 In contrast to a scientific analysis requiring
generality and detachment, a phenomenological description empathetic yet matter-of-fact
-- o f ordinary places and events can show us vividly and tangibly, as Heidegger (BP 173)
puts it, "in how elemental a way the world ... leaps toward us from the things."
(8)
Form follows understanding.

Designing and building is not reducible to specialized knowledge and skills applied to
technical problems o f housing people and organizing human settlements according to
21 See, for instance, Saile's views o f a Pueblo world and Violich's reading o f Dalmatian
towns (in Seamon and Mugerauer 1985, 159-181, and 113-136), and Nogue i Font's
Catalonian landscape experience and Walkey's encounter with the vernacular architecture o f
the Builders' Guild in Northern Greece (in Seamon 1993, 159-180, and 129-157).
22 See, for instance, the novel Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929) in which Alfred Doblin
describes the "hero's" struggles o f leading an ordinary and respectable life after having been
released from prison. Ensuing disappointments, temptations o f the underworld, and finally
becoming a murder suspect m ark the "hero's" struggles which are skillfully mirrored by an
eerie description o f life's short stay in a slaughter house.
16
"rational" principles o f resource efficiency and economies o f scale. "Form follows function"
was a professed credo o f architectural modernism. From a phenomenological vantage point,
designing dwellings, work places, and urban environments calls for following the tacit
understanding o f world and culture at hand. Such a tacit understanding can be made explicit
by a conceptual understanding that reflects upon, while necessarily remaining anchored in,
the structures o f the life-world.23 Hermeneutic phenomenology aims at such generalized
understanding.24
(9)
Design must reflect and reinforce meaning.

The teaching and practice o f architecture and urban design must focus more on the
pragmatic requirements and cultural values o f the intended users. Places are meaningful to
their users if they fulfill functional requirements and express local cultural values. The
creation o f meaningful and identifiable places is very important, especially in modem multi
cultural and technologically dominated environments. Much contemporary design tends to
limit itself by mostly catering to crass commercial interests, to merely functional needs, or to
novelty effects o f idiosyncratic self-expression.
The science and art o f building, as
professional practice and a field o f education, needs to live up to its potential o f creating
23 In Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, Paulo Freire (1990) employs this method for political
and educational liberation.
24 For an outline o f hermeneutic phenomenology, see the Appendix.
17
meaningful places which reflect, reinforce, and integrate functional, aesthetic, and cultural
values.25
Building on the tacit understanding of a culture does not produce high-style
architecture but tends to create congruent form. This explains why many o f the world's
vernacular buildings and settlements are generally so pleasing, comfortable, so right and
fitting, and are able to gather and support many social practices simultaneously without
drawing undue attention to themselves. Vernacular form tends to build on the underlying
culture "from the inside out" and thus serves and reinforces it. Phenomenologists challenge
themselves to emulate this seamless fusion o f culture and built form by doing deliberately
what vernacular form with the aid o f repeated cycles o f trial and error over time -- has
apparently achieved instinctively. Environmental designers consult phenomenological theory
for conceptual tools in order to achieve such seamless fusions o f culture and built form An
environmental phenomenologist, as interpreter or designer, may be regarded as a seamster or
seamstress26 who attempts to bring things nearer to us.
25 An emphasis on environmental meaning is found in phenomenological research as well

as in studies that follow other qualitative research traditions; see, for instance, Borgmann
1984 and 1992, Norberg-Schulz 1988, Rapoport 1990a, Stokols 1991, and Seamon 1993
(especially the essays number 5 through 9).
26 I am using a word play Heidegger forged in his "Conversation on a Country Path"
(Discotrrse on Thinking, 89-90). In this fictional and probing conversation, a scholar, a
scientist, and a teacher explore ways o f thinking which may enable us to regain nearness to
natural and manufactured things. Heidegger uses the German word Naherin which means
both "seamstress" and "one who brings things nearer." Using and advancing a mode o f
thinking that affords nearness, the teacher, while wondering about the stars, intimates to his
colleagues that the night is the Naherin o f the stars. The scientist agrees halfheartedly: "...
at least for the naive observer, although not for the exact scientist."
18
(1 0 )
Form expresses meaninpfiil w h oles.

As a corollary to discovering and expressing meaning in the natural and built
environment, phenomenological approaches focus on holistic perception and expression.

They encourage designers to pay close attention to the smooth flow o f successful everyday
coping activities as well as to building physical environments that conform to and facilitate
such everyday activities. This can be achieved by designing and constructing comprehensible,
meaningful wholes whose parts relate to each other in a graceful and symbiotic manner. Even
when phenomenological inquirers focus on individual elements o f an environment, they see
to it that the whole world to which these elements belong is always present and implied in
their descriptions and analyses.27
In order not to fell victim to the objectivistic approach so dominant in behaviorism,
some environmental researchers and writers employ a decidedly experiential and personalistic
perspective.28
In supporting or defending such a perspective, some proponents o f
27 The work o f some phenomenologists overlaps in part with holistic scientific

approaches such as Gestalt theory and general systems theory (see, for instance, MerleauPonty 1962). Explanatory simplicity and theoretical elegance are often the motivation
underlying scientistic holism. The holism o f phenomenology, however, is rooted in and
bounded by the pervading holistic properties o f the life-world itself (for a detailed description
o f "being-in-the-world,11the most holistic phenomenon, refer to Section 5 o f the Appendix).
Without stretching thinking in analogies too far, I further propose to understand
phenomenology as an attempt to see environments as holograms: any fragment o f a
holographic image is able to reproduce the entire hologram even if its material vessel is
broken into pieces. A holistic perspective is already evident in Georg Simmel's brief 1909
study o f "Brucke und Tiir" ("Bridge and Door," Simmel 1957, 1-7).
28 See, for example, Catherine Howett, "Tf the Doors o f Perception Were Cleansed':
Toward an Experiential Aesthetics for the Designed Landscape," in Seamon 1993, 61-73;
Tony Hiss (1 9 9 0 ), The Experience o f Place; Yi-Fu Tuan (1 9 7 7 ), Space and Place: The
Perspective o f Experience.
19
phenomenology become embroiled in fruitless disputes about organismic-holistic vs.
mechanistic-analytical approaches.
They deem it necessary to defend their holistic,
phenomenological perspective by sporting an anti-scientific stance.29

Phenomenology, properly understood, is not anti-scientific. Being a conceptual
investigation o f the life-world's structures as seen and presented from the perspective o f
humans involved and absorbed in shared social practices, phenomenology (interpreting and
qualitative) can neither embrace nor reject scientific methodology (objectifying and
quantitative). In knowing and honoring its own specific ends, interpretive procedures,
strengths, and limitations, phenomenology can respect and honor scientific research, which
has different goals and therefore different methods, strengths, and limitations/0
Irrespective of their stance toward contemporary science, phenomenologists generally
focus on the interrelationship o f environmental units rather than on these units analyzed in
isolation from the environments in which they function. Phenomenologists prefer to explore
synergistic relations and interdependencies rather than structural hierarchies and causal
relations. Researchers and designers stressing the perspective o f holism and synergistic
interdependence are developing the emerging interdisciplinary field o f phenomenological
ecology.31
29
See, for instance, Relph 1976, 1981, 1987, and 1993.
30 See Section 3.2 Environment and Equipment (below) which, in the context o f
discussing modes o f being, also briefly describes types of research appropriate for science and
phenomenology, respectively.
31 The essays in Seamon 1993, dealing with various environmental concerns and scales,
are gathered under the summary title o f "phenomenological ecology;" the ecological
orientation is especially prominent in Mark Riegner, "Toward a Holistic Understanding o f
20
(11)
Design is the servant o f lived-space.

Phenomenologists reject any preoccupation with merely form al aesthetic issues.
Their explicit or implicit working concept is "lived-space" 32 which emphasizes the

experiential dimension o f spatial encounters. In lived-space, the geometric or physical
properties o f space are an integral part o f the entire setting, i.e., they are manifest properties
that are connected with, and inseparable from, cultural activities.
Only under special
conditions (e.g., breakdown o f equipment; detached stance o f a scientific observer) do the

geometric properties o f space become manifest and explicit. When they do become manifest
and explicit, lived-space as smooth practical coping ("flow") in a familiar setting has vanished.
Lived-space, bereft o f "living," then shows itself as the abstract, skeletal space o f science/3
Design on the drawing board is intended to eventually become lived-space. Building
documents, in written or graphic form, deal, however, almost exclusively with geometric and
physical properties. Consequently, phenomenologists understand design as a process that
translates features o f lived-space into geometric dimensions and physical properties. Because
o f its reductive character, this translation process necessarily sets aside, or tends to
Place: Reading a Landscape Through Its Flora and Fauna." (Seamon 1993, 181-215)
32 "Lived-space" is a translation o f gelebter Return. Gelebter Raum is Bollnow's (1967)
adaptation o f Heidegger's precise but awkward term daseinsmafiige Raumlichkeit (spatiality
according to Dasein). Both terms refer to concrete settings in which human living takes place
(i.e., where one dwells), in contrast to the abstract, quantifiable properties o f physical or
geometric space. Bollnow (1971) enlarged upon the notion o f lived-space in M ensch und
Return. My Section 3.3 Existential Spatiality and Physical Space (below) treats more fully the
distinction between lived-space and geometric space.
33 The brief chair example in Section 3.2 (pp. 78-79) may further clarify this shift from
"lived-space" to scientific space.
21
shortchange, the tacit and less tangible features o f lived-space in favor o f the precision and
manipulability o f physical properties. This translation process is characteristic o f all design
(except one-to-one scale design, such as furniture and product design).
Adequate design is able to account for the overt requirements o f lived-space. Good
design additionally provides also for the tacit and less tangible features o f lived-space, thereby
building on the entire scope o f lived-space. Phenomenologists accordingly insist that creating
fitting environments must have its origin and end in lived-space.34
A servant o f lived-space, design can be viewed as a simplified three-part process. In
this tripartite process, an understanding o f social practices marks the foundation (phase 1),
which is followed by attempts to translate these practices (including their latent aspects) into
building documents (phase 2), which in turn become the "blue prints" for constructing
buildings, landscapes, and urban settings (phase 3) that support or reinforce these social
practices. Much o f contemporary design skips or neglects phase 1, and delights instead in the
glossy glamour o f paper architecture (phase 2 documents as ends in themselves) or in the
temporary novelty appeal o f idiosyncratic compositions (phase 3). Phenomenologists contend
that designing for lived-space does not leave any room for empty aesthetic formalism.
34 I am indebted to Kimberly Dovey's article "Putting Geometry in its Place: Toward a

Phenomenology o f the Design Process" (in Seamon 1993, 247-269) as a major source for my
argument in Proposition (11). In his Framing Places: M ediating Power in Built Form
(Dovey 1999), he uses the following primary intellectual paradigms: spatial syntax analysis,
discourse analysis, and phenomenology.
22
(12)
Designers are midwives o f culture.

The
professional
self-understanding
o f researchers
and
designers
using
phenomenology rejects the extreme and seemingly polar notions o f the designer as
"technological interventionist" and "artistic trend setter." Environmental researchers and
designers informed by phenomenology see themselves rather as facilitators o f everyday
activities which they support and reinforce either by building unobtrusive and utilitarian places
or by making the shared social practices expressly visible in works o f art.35
In contrast to technocratic interventions (as often employed by well-meaning but
misguided urban renewal policies), phenomenology may aid as a catalyst for environmental
change based on an understanding o f the underlying culture at hand. Designers trained in
phenomenology are midwives o f culture by expressing in physical form and thus
reinforcing what is going on in that culture.36
35 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 explore these two broad areas o f design. Chapter 3
examines the phenomenological foundation o f utilitarian designs that are functional,
unobtrusive, and transparent to their users. Chapter 4 is an inquiry o f characteristics and
requirements o f those designs that are able to function simultaneously as "public works" and
"works o f art" in a technological age.
36 I have borrowed from Edward Relph the image o f "midwife" as an appropriate
metaphor for the environmentally responsible and culturally attuned designer. Relph
concludes his essay "Modernity and the Reclamation o f Place" (Seamon 1993, 25-40) with
the appeal addressed to designers and planners to become "environmental midwives." In the
effort to reclaim and enliven places as the contexts o f human life, it is wisest, Relph contends
(p. 38), "to adopt the gentle and patient manner o f an environmental midwife, while rejecting
utterly the machine-driven arrogance o f some environmental equivalent to a genetic engineer."
23
1.3
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND SEMANTIC ETHNOGRAPHY

This first chapter serves as a general backdrop for introducing Martin Heidegger's
work and those approaches in design research which suggest how his work can be used for
environmental description, analysis, and design. Because semantic ethnography, a method
used in anthropology, has striking similarities with phenomenology, I want to conclude this
chapter with a brief comparison o f theses two approaches. I will begin with a recap o f
phenomenology which is followed by a sketch o f their similarities and differences.
37
A phenomenological description aims at making the explored places, events, and

social practices lucid, transparent, and intelligible on their own terms. Furthermore, a
phenomenological analysis aims at making intelligible an entire world in which people, things,
conventions, and social institutions find their place and meaning. The general methodological
perspective o f phenomenology is guided by the conviction that method is always subservient
to the phenomena it is employed to elucidate.
Phenomenology is a systematic interpretation o f what is "given" in the life-world, i.e.,
what is "there." 38 As a conceptual qualitative approach, phenomenology can relate to
quantitative research in a threefold manner: phenomenological findings can give rise to, be
stimulated by, or be conducted parallel to quantitative studies of the same subject matter.
37 Professor Galen Cranz uses semantic ethnography in Architecture 110 Social and
Cultural Factors in Architecture and Urban Design, University o f California, Berkeley. For
three quarters I was a teaching assistant for this course (1981-82).
38 In a crude but telling way, phenomenology can be characterized as the most radical
or purest form o f positivism because it seeks to illuminate nothing but that which is
immediately given: the datum, i.e., consciousness (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty); or humans
intimately engaged with their world (Heidegger).
24
Pitting quantitative and qualitative approaches against each other, as if they were excluding
alternatives, is misdirected. Phenomenology has specific goals using unique conceptual tools.
Accordingly, its usefulness depends on the stated purpose. As any conceptual framework or
method, it has specific strengths and limitations.
Phenomenology shares many o f its features, including strengths and limitations, with
semantic ethnography.39 Both approaches are well suited for describing a culture or cultural
scenes in their own terms. Their main limitations pertain to quantification and statistical
explanation. Because o f their emphasis on understanding a culture and its language from an
inside-out (or emic) perspective, both approaches employ conceptual and interpretive
methods which are not directly quantifiable. Semantic ethnography and, to a lesser extent,
phenomenology are in principle susceptible to quantifying their specific findings. But doing
so would miss, in most cases, their focus and goal: to achieve an intimate, insiders
understanding o f a cultural scene (semantic ethnography) or o f essential characteristics o f
being human in general (phenomenology). What semantic ethnography attempts for specific
sub-cultures or cultural scenes, phenomenology attempts for an entire culture in general
terms. Consequently, the basic concepts o f phenomenology40 aim at being comprehensive,
with the result o f frequently appearing abstract.
39 For an introduction to semantic ethnography and 12 case studies, see James P.

Spradley and David W. McCurdy, The Cultural Experience: Ethnography in Complex
Society. Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1972.
40 For an overview o f hermeneutic phenomenology and its basic terms, see Section 3.1
and the Glossary. The Appendix presents a more detailed outline o f hermeneutic
phenomenology.
25
Central to both approaches is their emphasis on understanding the structures o f the
life-world and on interpreting their meaning. A good ethnographer o r phenomenologist is
able to discover aspects o f human beings o f which they themselves are not aware because
these aspects seem so natural and self-evident. Both approaches share passion and curiosity
about that what members o f a (sub-)culture typically take for granted (e.g., personal space).
Spradley and McCurdy elaborate on the work o f the semantic ethnographer:
The ethnographer doesnt take anything for granted. He searches for the meaning o f
things the foil participant (o f a cultural scene gloss J.K.) knows but doesnt know
he knows. The ethnographer seeks to make explicit all the things his informant tacitly
employs to organize his behavior. It takes a very skilled person with a high degree
o f self-awareness to study a cultural scene he has already acquired.41
This important passage highlights the common interests o f both approaches, even
though Spradley and McCurdy characterize only semantic ethnography. Phenomenology and
semantic ethnography emphasize that culture, not any individual, organizes behavior.
However, the notion o f organizing ones behavior has a connotation that is, for a
phenomenologist, too intentionalistic. Especially those aspects o f culture and comportment
that are shared and taken for granted are transparent to the foil participant. Through
enculturation they have become second nature and are so self-evident that it is very difficult
to verbalize the obvious. The transparency o f these common practices, which necessarily
stay in the background during routine activities, is a condition for their successful smooth
performance.
The transparency o f these background practices also accounts for the
difficulties in making them explicit.
41
Spradley and McCurdy 1972, 34.
26
The semantic ethnographer studies the language o f his informants to reveal the
underlying structure o f cultural categories. The phenomenologist analyzes ordinary and
poetic language as well as taken-for-granted philosophical notions o f her culture and shows
how practices o f self-understanding, including practices opposing such self-understanding,
are embodied in poetic, scholarly, and ordinary language.
A phrase Heidegger uses in his later writings highlights the centrality o f language
emphasized in both approaches: Language is the house o f being. In its home man dwells.42
My study will introduce phenomenological concepts (e.g., available equipment, world,
spatiality according to Dasein, being-in-the-world, dwelling) and indicate how they can be
used in design and evaluation o f our physical environment, public streets in particular.
42 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism (BW 193; GA 9, 313); language is the house o f

being is used several times in A Dialogue on Language (in OWL, US).
27
Chapter 2
Encountering Streets and Contemporary Street Issues
This chapter gives a brief overview o f major ways o f encountering streets (Section
2.1) and o f main contemporary street issues (Section 2.2) in order to situate the major body
o f my inquiry (Part II and Part HI).
The way we encounter streets shapes our intellectual and physical tools for building,
maintaining, and using streets. The way we experience streets shapes our concepts and means
o f addressing the host o f issues that arise in their multifunctional uses.
These often
contentious issues can be addressed in a more satisfactory manner when we have gained more
insights into how we encounter streets, how we use them, and how we dwell on them.
2.1
STREET ENCOUNTERS
The vast and expanding research on street use and street design may be grouped into
seven major types o f encountering streets (see Table 2-1). These encounter types reflect
analytically distinct ways o f using streets which, however, most often overlap and occur
simultaneously. Over time, professional specialization has increasingly taken hold o f these
types o f encountering streets and has crystallized analytically distinct uses o f streets into
protected, often exclusive professional disciplines. While such professional specialization can
generate detailed knowledge and often powerful physical innovations, it can also lead to
further segregation o f street uses, which is a major cause o f the sterility o f the modem
"efficient" street.
28
Based on my research and professional work in transportation planning and

engineering,1 I have identified seven main types o f encountering streets. By listing and briefly
discussing various ways o f experiencing streets, I want to indicate the astonishingly wide
spectrum o f street usage. Acknowledging the wide variety o f street uses acknowledges also
the legitimacy o f professional specialization while guarding against its exclusiveness and
limiting demarcations. I want to use the list o f street encounters (Table 2-1) as a matrix for
creative combinations and professional cross-fertilization which, I hope, can lead to more
multifunctional, expressive, and enjoyable streets.
I present these encounter types (1-7) in increasing order o f self-awareness and
reflexivity on the part o f the users. The userss way of encountering streets ranges from being
almost entirely unconscious o f the physical infrastructure (street as utility channel) to
deliberately shaping it via urban design, which is a secondary yet engaging mode o f
encountering the street. The street is a place where a lot can happen. Accordingly, streets
can be encountered as:
1 As a civil engineer associate/traffic engineer (City o f Petaluma, California; 1987-89)

I worked in various areas o f traffic operations (e.g., safety, circulation improvements, traffic
calming) and on transportation planning for new suburban residential developments. Since
1989, I have been working for the City and County o f San Francisco as an assistant
transportation engineer (9 years) and as a transportation planner (2 years). My main work
areas have been traffic engineering support for private and City building projects,
encroachment permit review for various installations on sidewalks (e.g., street furniture),
coordination o f land use and transportation facilities, and traffic routing plans, specifications,
and cost estimates for street reconstructions
29
(1)
Utility Channel
The street fulfills many important functions that are not visible and obvious. A variety
o f utilities are embedded in the public right-of-way. Under their pavement, urban streets host
conduits for fresh water, waste water, storm drainage, water for fire suppression; gas lines;
electricity; telephone, cable TV, and other communication lines. These "life lines" are buried
in the street. Consequently, we are typically not aware o f them and take them for granted. We
become aware o f these underground utilities during their malfunctioning. When we know that
a gas main is punctured or a water main is broken, our awareness is heightened and we are
in a state o f alert. We expect that after construction, repair, or maintenance these utilities
become "buried" again in order to discharge their duties and fulfill their vital functions for us.
Rarely do we encounter street utilities directly or for a prolonged period o f time. The
street as a utility channel is an invisible entity for the typical street user. We are "on top" o f
these utilities when we can forget them More than in any other way of using streets, we take
their underground utility for granted.
Civil engineering and construction are the main professional fields responsible for
designing, constructing, and maintaining underground utilities. The specialized expertise
developed in these fields is one contributing factor for the "remoteness" o f the underground
infrastructure which is out o f sight for the ordinary street users. Indeed, if the street as a
utility channel is working properly, its underground gear does not see the light o f day.
30
(2)
Commonplace
During most o f our everyday activities, the street is a shared public space for
conducting a variety o f pragmatic activities. Our residences abut streets and are accessed by
them. We use streets to go to work, to friends, and to entertainment. Not only do we use
streets to reach specific stores, we occasionally also shop on streets buying newspapers,
snacks, and refreshments from street vendors. We meet friends, acquaintances, or tourists
on streets. I f the climate allows, we also frequent street cafes, enjoying the drinks and food
as much as the social scene.
The street is an unobtrusive stage for diverse activities. We park, repair, and care for
our cars on streets. Children use residential streets for bicycling and various other kinds o f
play, even though the typical residential street is not designed for playing in the roadway.
During all these activities, the street remains in the background, ie., the street itself is not the
focus o f our activities. Precisely because it does not feature prominently, the street can
function as a smooth conduit for our everyday social practices.
The street is a central element o f the urban physical infrastructure. The public rightsof-way amount to a large percentage (about 25% to 35%) o f a city's entire surface area. This
fact in itself, one should assume, may establish the street firmly in our awareness. Yet -- as
in the case o f utility channel we take the street for granted, because we are directly and
frequently engaged with it during the course o f the day.
31
-------;--------- - --------------- -
Street Encountered A s
Professional Practice
Prevailing Human A ctivity
Utility Channel
civil engineering,
construction
using underground utilities

without being aware o f them
except during breakdown
Commonplace
person-environment studies,
sociology, environmental
psychology, anthropology
everyday social practices;

dwelling in the public realm
Circulation Network
transportation planning,
traffic engineering,
geography
accessing places for work,

entertainment, recreation;
distributing goods and social
services
Stage for Artistic

Expression
street performers
providing entertainment,
social commentary;
expressing cultural identity
Forum for Political

and Community
Action
civic parades and fares,

political demonstrations;
political science
expressing political opinions;

building o f community
Historic Setting
architectural and urban

history
experiencing and expressing

cultural identity through
time
Medium for Shaping

and Expressing
Community Life
urban physical planning,

architectural and urban
design
affording a variety o f street

uses by providing
synergistically balanced
settings
Table 2-1
Variety o f Street Encounters
32
The street as commonplace is studied by sociologists, anthropologists, environmental
psychologists, or by environmental designers who
are conducting sociological,
anthropological, or psychological studies. In response to the felt need o f design that is based
on research, an interdisciplinary field emerged during the 1960s. That field came to be
known as environmental design research or person-environment studies. The latter term
better indicates by its very name the dynamic relationship o f its subject matter.
As an aid to primarily architects and urban designers, the field o f person-environment
studies investigates social, psychological, and cultural dimensions o f the built environment.
These dimensions are considered from the perspectives o f being either an ingredient or a
result o f design. The built environment is seen as both dependant and independent variable
in the design process. In either case, designers assume that if these factors are properly
accounted for, the resulting places will be more livable. Being a blend o f various disciplines
and methodological perspectives, person-environment studies endeavor to explore the
complexity and dynamics o f settings and to point out those design elements that foster safe,
pleasant, and vibrant environments, including streets.
While the architectural and urban design tradition has relied in the past mainly on
internal professional criteria and on creative inspiration, person-environment research
attempts to put design on a more objective foundation.
In order to do so, this
interdisciplinary field has to collect, create, and integrate an ever growing amount o f
qualitative findings and quantitative data. As a result, research-based design has become
increasingly specialized, thereby contributing to a widening gulf between design researchers
and practitioners. The greater the amount o f available data generated by design research, the
33
harder it becomes to design straightforward, unique, and fitting places. The challenge of
dealing with proliferating research-based design information is exacerbated by the emergence
ofi or demand for, m ulticultural environments.
Is the generation o f more data the answer to this challenge? Hardly. More relevant
conceptual frameworks and qualitative studies is the perspective pursued in this inquiry.
Phenomenology, as applied to the design professions, shares with other person-environments
approaches the task o f translating the generalized understanding o f everyday common
practices into concrete physical settings that house these practices.
(3)
Circulation Network
Streets allow us, one way or the other, to get somewhere. Most o f our locomotion
is indeed accomplished on streets or below the road surface. Even subways use the public
rights-of-ways, mostly their lowest levels. Such locomotion from A to B is typically an
onerous rather than a pleasant experience. In a fine grained circulation network, the origin
and destination choices are almost limitless, and we take "any way" to minimize space, time,
and discomfort. The street is used as a means for accessing places for work, entertainment,
and recreation, and for distributing goods and services throughout an interconnected
circulation network. The joy ride and taking the "scenic route" is an exception rather than
the rule. The feet that we view streets in such an instrumental fashion may be a reason why
we have so little pleasure and satisfaction during the journey, and why we want to make the
trip as short and as fest as possible. However, acknowledging the pragmatic role o f streets
34
as circulation networks does not necessarily exclude a more comprehensive appreciation o f
streets.
Up to about the third quarter o f this century, the relatively young and burgeoning
profession of traffic engineering has produced a systematic and unified body o f principles and
standards for designing urban streets, rural highways, and freeways. This unification o f
design principles and standards was achieved, however, by promoting narrowly defined
functions o f streets (e.g., maximizing vehicular capacity and safety) and by eliminating or
neglecting many o f the other important purposes o f streets. Traffic engineering's goal o f
building and maintaining an infrastructure for the safe and efficient movement o f goods and
people has relegated all non-motorized functions o f streets to memory lane.
The
opportunities o f experiencing "inefficient," walkable streets are limited today to fleeting

vacation episodes mostly in other, less motorized societies, or to encountering them, second
hand, via Helen Levitt's black-and-white photographs, Norman Rockwell's charming, innocent
paintings, or via Disneyland.
Since about 1975, the cost o f catering to this narrow conception o f the street as a
traffic channel has become very apparent, and professionals and the public alike have
demanded the taming o f the automobile in order to make streets more livable. Those traffic
engineers who are loyal to human needs rather than to perpetuating dated professional biases
are responding to calls to civilize the street. But our speedy society, focused on economic
performance and enamored by technological gadgetry, tends to favor roadways whose
performance can easily be quantified and whose benefit-cost ratios can easily be
demonstrated, given a narrow set o f performance criteria. The new generation o f "automated
35
highways" is already on the horizon, and is pushing us fast toward their "early deployment."
Yet even the limited principles o f traffic engineering, if used properly, can provide a powerful
set o f tools for shaping new streets or modifying existing ones. The design concepts "traffic
calming" and "woonerf' (Dutch for living yard, or livable residential street) demonstrate
that established and emerging traffic engineering principles can be p art o f the overall solution
o f designing streets for more kinds o f users and uses.
(4)
Stage for Artistic Expression
The street in its urban setting can be designed according to artistic principles
(Camillo Sitte). Some streets may even be experienced as art (see, for instance, Wayne
Thiebauds paintings o f streets). Independent o f their degree o f artistic merits, streets can
function as stages for artistic expression. Buildings and the spaces between them can form
the physical shell o f artistic life on the street.
Street art if not cast in concrete as pavement pattern, in bronze as sculpture, or
in brass as poetry plaque -- is sporadic, unpredictable, and temporary. Poetry readings,
musicians, dramatic performances, pantomimes, and the painting o f murals turn out to be
fresher and more invigorating if their creation is left unplanned, i.e., not planned by civic
authorities or corporate sponsors.
Street art's mercurial nature is best untouched by planning hands. However, urban
planners and designers can create opportunities for artistic expression to take place. Small
urban places, adequately scaled plazas, or just engaging sidewalks and crowded street comers
may provide the stage for such fleeting performances. Instead o f depending on urban
36
authorities "to look the other way" when pedestrian circulation space becomes "dangerously"
congested via these pleasant obstructions (which require "critical pedestrian mass" in the first
place), designers can build-in such potential stages as part o f comprehensive urban design.
Building overhangs and recesses for weather protection and visual focal points are possible
design elements. Subway stations make for good acoustics, but are typically unpleasant
places to stay and listen. The streets above busier, noisier, and often dirtier fere much
better in terms o f providing places for temporary dwelling, observing, and listening. More
arcades could be built to foster such unscheduled and unannounced entertainment. Of course,
we cant be guaranteed that the afforded opportunities will actually be used by the pedestrian
artists (and only by them) who want to entertain, stimulate, and to provoke critique, laughter,
and donations.
We have no set standards for the creative life on the street other than those imposed
by civility and creativity. Design, however, can anticipate the street as stage and build in
opportunities for public, creative expressions. If such stages are provided, great streets can
self-confidently parade their greatness, and even mediocre streets may become great, if only
temporarily. Great streets are alluring impresarios but no guarantors for the creative life on
the street.
(5)
Forum for Political and Community Action
The street can become the focal point for shared concerns and joint action. In this
sense, the street has a political dimension. Streets provide a platform for civic and military
parades and for presidential inaugurations (Pennsylvania Avenue). Streets are often the stage
37
where political opinions are expressed, and where social changes are demanded or even
initiated. N ot only the French Revolution was ignited on the capital's streets. In Buenos
Aires, mothers and wives demonstrated silently but staunchly against the human rights abuses
o f Argentina's military regime. Masses demanded political freedom and change in the streets
o f Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Berlin, Leipzig, and Peking. We remember the picture o f
Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank in the streets o f Moscow, presenting himself as the bulwark
o f Russia's political and economic freedom.
The street as a focus o f a nation's or city's political life presents itself most often in
less dramatic ways. The political and social life o f a community may express itself through
a fere or parade along Main Street. Merchants and residents are concerned about the physical
features and maintenance o f their streets as an important factor in protecting economic vitality
and quality o f life in a neighborhood. Involved residents are concerned about the local
ambience. They gather to build a consensus for common goals and means for achieving them.
Those residents and merchants care for their shared streets as defining elements o f their
community. They dwell on those streets. They make their streets their business.
In order to achieve community consensus regarding goals, actions, and resources, the
involved citizens do not rely mainly on systematic research for evaluating alternative visions
and means. The prevailing communication and decision making process is essentially political
in character. Requests and ideas are solicited, expressed, discussed, and evaluated at home
owner association and neighborhood meetings or at the formal planning commission and city
council meetings. The discussed ideas and requests frequently involve street matters. They
range from low-income housing to streetscape features (e.g., trees, benches, bus shelters,
38
lighting), from establishing a community watch to installing various traffic calming devices.
Speed bumps, traffic diverters, and "preferred" truck routes are subjects o f extensive and
heated debates.
Standards and criteria exist for the installation o f stop signs, traffic signals,
recommended street widths, radii, and lighting. These standards and criteria, however,
address only the technical aspects o f the street's infrastructure. With respect to specific
community preferences, no standards are "correct" other than those formulated or accepted
by the concerned residents themselves, and are valid only as long the shared consensus lasts.
This activist approach to street design and maintenance is particularly successful in
combination and alliance with urban design and transportation professionals. Professional
expertise can widen the range o f options and means for evaluation and simulation o f planned
environments. The degree to which a street is made "livable" depends mainly on ability and
willingness to actively care for the neighborhood.
Making streets livable rests on the
determination o f those who live along a shared street to demand attention, resources, and
implementation. The common street provides opportunities for democracy from the ground
up.
(6)
Historic Setting
A street can serve as a window to a community's past. In allowing its past to be

present, a street affords more personal and tactile encounters than a museum or a library can
ever provide. Individually and collectively, the street names, building frontages, pavement
materials and their conditions relate the past. Yet, these stories are not forced upon the
39
passers-by. These ever changing stories typically remain in the background and become
animated only upon request. Architectural and urban history are systematic and formal
requests to let the street speak o f its past. For the general public, the street's history remains
tacit. By keeping its history in the background yet summonable upon request, the street can
perform its pedestrian, utilitarian functions. Monuments and easily recognizable landmarks
o f the city can stand out only on the basis o f their relatively bland surroundings. Yet even the
Coliseum, the Eiffel Tower, and Big Ben are taken for granted by the urban resident.
Historically important streets, such as the Champs Elysees, Kurfurstendamm, RingstraBe, or
Pennsylvania Avenue, express cultural identity diachronically through time, and extend
opportunities for synchronically experiencing this temporal identity. I f the street is to serve
its multiple purposes, however, its history must not force itself upon its users. The stories
a street may tell have to remain optional.
Architectural and urban history can provide insights into the workings o f a "past"
culture and can trace a setting through its transformations over time. As a side benefit, a host
o f design ideas may be culled from a streets successive adaptations for the benefit o f
contemporary practice.
By examining and interpreting how streets have served past
communities, contemporary design can be enriched, relativized, and challenged to provide

working answers for our communities today.
40
The "pack-donkeys ways" 2 o f the past have made place for Haussmann's stately
avenues and Le Corbusier's modem, straight, and fast motorways. Yet, the widespread
disenchantment with the modem street has lead to recalls o f the "pack-donkeys way"
rehabilitated as the artistic street, the garden street, and as Main Street. Neo-traditional
neighborhood design, even in its half-hearted and compromised recall o f the past, is a tenable
response to the public's rejection o f the barren mono-functional street and to the publics
reminiscence o f historical precedents. Neo-traditional streets, due to their adaptive ability to
accommodate the automobile, can provide a new link to our circulation network and to our
immediate past.
Even though the historical research on intra-cultural and cross-cultural studies is vast,
only cautious generalizations can be drawn regarding potential successful applications o f a
historical precedent to specific contemporary design problems. No specific design solutions
can be distilled from the bulk o f historical street studies. The historical perspective in street
studies is primarily not interested in directly affecting existing or future conditions. The main
goal of architectural and urban history is the understanding o f a past setting on its own terms
and its change over time. This academic field reconstructs and preserves a vast pool o f design
ideas as an incidental benefit for contemporary design practice.
2 In his The City o f Tomorrow and Its Planning, Le Corbusier (1982,18) extols straight
roads and denigrates winding roads: The winding road is the Pack-Donkeys Way, the
straight road is mans way. The winding road is the result o f happy-go-lucky heedlessness,
o f looseness, lack o f concentration and animality. The straight road is a reaction, an action,
a positive deed, the result o f self-mastery. It is sane and noble.
41
Streets are historic settings within a larger historic context. But only a few specialists
view streets "historically." For most o f us, the street provides a practical and unspectacular
passage through lived space and time.
(7)
Medium for Shaping and Expressing Community Life
Contrary to architectural and urban history, all other ways o f encountering streets
mentioned above have a keen interest in, or a potential for, directly affecting the physical,
social, and artistic characteristics o f streets.
Architecture and urban design, as academic field and professional practice, tends to
acknowledge all types o f street encounters. Only on the basis o f this broad acknowledgment
is it possible to use the street as a medium for both: shaping and expressing community life.
Street design is explicitly or implicitly always also urban and community design.
Therefore street design must respect all functions o f streets and all ways o f encountering
them Urban designers' main challenge consists o f taking streets seriously as integral parts
o f communities and as determining factors o f the prevailing quality o f life. While various
interest groups make sure that streets fulfill their functions as efficient and safe circulation
arteries or as stages for civic pride and festivities, it is particularly easy to overlook the quiet
but important demands of the street as "commonplace" (2).
Even when seemingly
unimportant street details (such as widths, parking pattern, curbs, lighting, signs, and trees)
are the specific focus o f contemplated actions, the entire physical, economic, and socio
cultural life o f a community is at stake.
42
The particular challenge urban designers and architects face today is the very difficult
translation o f the overall multicultural community vision(s) into physical forms that actually
produce the desired outcomes without producing unintended side or aftereffects.
The
modernist movement in city planning, for example, shows how the intertwined ideals o f
spatial separation o f land use, clarity, speed, comfort, and efficiency can, when achieved, lead
to unanticipated and undesirable results from which the modem city still suffers today.
Since Camillo Sitte's City Planning A ccording to A rtistic Principles, 1986 (Der
Stadtebau nach seinen kunstlerischen Grundsatzen, 1889) urban designers have been
postulating various ideal features o f civic design elements, including streets. But the last 100
years have seen continuing shifts in professional opinions, ranging from romantic, organic
settings to sleek and fast motorways, from functional, rational street hierarchies and back to
multi-functional, "neo-traditional" streets.
The shifting and conflicting views o f street purposes, design principles and features
reflect not only a generational succession o f urban designers. The polarizing and often
contradictory demands w e make o f streets reflect a society that continues to shift emphases
and tradeoffs between efficiency, engineering logic, artistic principles, and livability. Still
today, at the beginning o f the 21st century, a short-sighted efficiency bias tends to win the
street battle in the United States, and unfortunately also in many developing countries.
However, demands are becoming louder and more pronounced for building streets that invite
a variety o f uses. This can be achieved by understanding human needs and practices, and by
building civic structures, development clusters, and circulation networks that mutually
enhance and synergistically respond to each other.
43
Street design is a professional practice drawing upon a wide range o f professions such
as architecture, urban design, city and transportation planning. It is a medium for shaping
and expressing community life. For professional designers as well as for the community
activists, designing streets is also a distinct way o f experiencing them. The process o f
studying, designing, building, and modifying streets is a unique and perhaps the most
deliberate way o f encountering streets.
2.2
MAIN CONTEMPORARY STREET ISSUES

Over the last several years, two issues have emerged in surveys as the main concerns
o f residents in the San Francisco Bay Area: traffic congestion, followed by crime. It can be
taken as a sign o f good times that traffic congestion has consistently overshadowed all other
concerns such as armed conflict, racial tensions, hunger, education, unemployment,
epidemics, etc. A recent poll conducted by the Bay Area Council (October 13-22, 1998)
confirmed transportation as the number one concern o f Bay Area residents.3
Two o f the three top contenders on this recent list o f public concerns (transportation,
education, crime) are associated with our public streets. In the following, I briefly summarize
our contemporary concerns about streets and their use under four headings:
J Diana Walsh, Residents rate transportation worst problem: Bay Area poll reveals
record-high anger over regions overrun roadways. San Francisco Examiner, December 10,
1998, p. A-23. In this poll, Bay Area residents responded to the question What is the most
important problem facing the Bay Area today? as follows: transportation (40%); schools,
education (14%); crime (12%); overpopulation, crowding (9%); housing (8%); environment,
pollution (6%); economy (6%), homelessness (5%), drugs (3%).
44
A.
A.
The Street as a Shared Realm,
B.
Street Safety,
C.
Aesthetics, Maintenance, and Identity o f Streets,
D.
The Future Street: Smart, Neo-Traditional, or Merely Virtual.
The Street as a Shared Realm

The street remains today a source o f both great utility and considerable frustration.
We expect a lot from our public streets. We count on streets to facilitate shopping and our
various social obligations. We expect that they transport us to work, entertainment, and
relaxation in the shortest amount o f time, at the least cost, and at the highest level o f
convenience.
We want development to take place, and buildings to be retrofitted or
remodeled. Yet we expect an unobstructed roadway when we pass the construction site. We
want others to use public transportation so that we may enjoy a high level o f service on urban
streets or on freeways.
Many o f us enjoy a vital and bustling downtown shopping district, but we become
very frustrated when we can't find parking spaces. And when we finally do find a parking
space we may be annoyed that the allowed parking time is restricted. Motorists become
enraged about parking control officers who enforce the permitted parking duration in order
to create parking turnover, which is a condition for economic vitality and a matter o f equity
with respect to access. Someones route to work, which includes some residential streets as
shortcuts, may be perceived as a neighborhood invasion by those who live along these
residential yet public streets.
45
The street is a public realm o f cooperation but also o f conflicting values and interests.
Traditionally, the street has accommodated conflicting demands, partly because o f the
advantage o f physical proximity, and partly because o f necessity.
Improved and expanded transportation technologies (the subway, the street car, the
automobile) gave to the modernist planner momentous options: functional separation o f land
uses and distinct street hierarchies, followed by widespread sub-urbanization which requires
the use o f the private automobile and increases our dependence on it. In the aftermath o f this
modernist solution to perceived urban stress, streets have become straighter, wider, and
faster. The public rights-of-way became increasingly populated with cars, and less and less
with people. The modernist streets are as indistinguishable from each other as are the steel
and glass skyscrapers arising from the same belief in spatial segregation, speed, and
individualized transport.
The futurist credo expressed through the modernist street gave way to the realization
that the streamlined street is not a place where one wants to be and dwell. The modernist
street is a space engineered almost exclusively for locomotion. Recently, we have begun to
realize what we have lost by delivering the city, town, and countryside over to the
automobile. Today's challenge is one o f designing public places and streets that acknowledge,
accommodate, and tame the car while re-admitting other hidden and suppressed functions o f
the public street.
Readmitting historical uses to the ecology o f the modernist street does not happen
without tension and conflict. The accommodation o f pedestrians, bicyclists, public transport
riders, and the handicapped community has to occur often at the expense o f the auto's
46
previously unchecked reign. Increasing the number o f species in the street's ecology means
curtailing the dominance o f private motorized vehicles.
A new equilibrium o f cars, bicycles, and pedestrians is emerging on streets (as on a
woonerf or a pedestrianized street, now common again in Europe). Frequently, those streets
dont have any curbs. The elimination o f curbs signals to everyone that people and cars are
to mingle on the same level. This new equilibrium in the street's ecology signifies a trend
toward equity among various types o f street users. While the elimination o f curbs cannot be
seen as a general remedy for achieving such equity, it indicates, however, the possibility o f
a peaceful co-existence among various street users. The shared roadway is a general model
for taming and integrating the car as a useful but harnessed member o f the heterogeneous
community o f street users.
B.
Street Safety
The street is a place o f life and death. Automobile accidents cause many fatalities and
injuries: in the USA alone, about 40,000 deaths and 100,000 injuries occur each year. We
want safer cars and roadways, we want calmer and less traffic in our neighborhoods, Le., on
"our" street. We are concerned about our children's safety.
We are bombarded daily with news o f robberies, shootings, rapes, and other assaults
occurring on our streets. I f streets are not directly implicated in these crimes, they are cited
as accomplices, e.g., as places where a bank robbery took place, where a car chase started or
ended, or where a famous person was killed, by car or bullet. We are familiar with "bad
47
streets," i.e., places where bad things are almost expected to happen. We may view these
had streets as the shadow counterparts o f the ritzy and glitzy shopping districts.
Streets are places o f crime, at least o f potential crime. Various security devices on
store doors and windows, car alarms, locks on steering wheels, automatic car door locking
mechanisms, and remote head light switches testify to the level o f perception and
preoccupation with crime and security on streets.
C.
Aesthetics. Maintenance, and Identity o f Streets

In contrast to our homes and work places, we commonly experience streets as places
o f transition, as a spatial channel to get from A to B." We typically don't dwell on streets.
The street itself as an enjoyable place to be, is rarely a chosen destination for the North
American traveler.
Consistent with a widely held view o f the street as a place o f transition suitable for
tramps and suspicious transients, we have made many o f our public streets into uninviting
places, by design or default. In order to keep undesirables out o r away, many streets in
suburbia (including access roads o f shopping malls) don't feature sidewalks at all. Anyone
who walks despite such impediments is, in the eyes of many, a shady individual and persona
non grata. In literature, television shows, and newspaper reports, todays outcasts are often
cast as characters without motorization.
Given this ingrained bias, public officials find it difficult to convince their
constituencies to pay for beautification and maintenance o f public streets.
Ongoing
maintenance is less visible than freeway widening, building overpasses, and installing traffic
48
signals. This relative neglect in terms of maintenance and cleanliness seems paradoxical when
considering the many hours residents spend on improving their own front yards, be it for
personal satisfaction or economic improvement o f their homes. "Curb appeal" is an essential
factor in real estate transactions. Well maintained street frontages yield higher selling prizes
o f homes. On the small, private scale, the issue o f maintenance, care, concern, attention to
detail and continued investment is obvious and generally accepted. Concerned citizens and
public officials repeatedly experience road blocks, however, when they want to extend the
same level o f care to the public realm at large.
Suburban c o mmunities have been built that often feature residential enclaves
protected from the rest o f the community by high walls along an arterial road. Myriad dead
end streets in these freely chosen ghettoes are to ensure privacy for residents and a confusing
labyrinth for outsiders and intruders. This anti-social, private gesture is a gesture o f defense,
and a rejection o f the public at large and the public road connecting to it. Shopping malls
show their backs to traveling motorists (e.g., along U.S. 101 at the Corte Madera shopping
mall) signalizing their status as an exclusive enclave. In contrast, the high-rise public housing
towers in Marin City, a few miles south, are fully open to public view.
The shortcomings o f the modernist street have become obvious to design
professionals and the public alike. As a result, a rediscovery o f the public street is on its way.
Today, many designers, planners, and developers are driven to strengthen or enliven Main
Street after we have destroyed it by catering to the shopping malls. Not long ago, we ripped
out street car tracks to make way for the "more advanced" technology o f private motorized
transportation. Today, communities are fighting for Federal dollars to build street car lines
49
(e.g., in Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose, San Diego, Portland). We expect economic
turnabouts, even small economic miracles, from putting rail back into the public street. San
Franciscos Third Street Light Rail Project, for instance, is to connect the underdeveloped
Bayshore and Hunters Point neighborhoods with downtown and the rest o f the City's transit
network. High hopes are riding on this public investment.
Do these efforts amount only to a nostalgic romanticism evoking the "good old days"?
They certainly reflect a call for small-scale development responsive to community needs, for
more real choices in moving about, for places with identity and unique character, and a call
for neighborhoods that are well connected to each other.
Traditional Neighborhood
Development 4 is a response to modernism's functional separation o f land uses and to the

widespread over-dependence on the private automobile. It remains to be seen, however, if
Traditional Neighborhood Development is a promising beginning or merely a marginal
adjustment within the modernist segregation paradigm.
4 Traditional Neighborhood Development (TND) is a recently rediscovered model o f

physical planning that seeks to enhance community character, reduce dependency on private
automobiles, and facilitate walking, biking, and use o f public transportation. TND can be
achieved by providing a mix o f land uses, higher (6-12 dwelling units per acre) than typical
suburban residential densities (1-5 dwelling units per acre), narrower streets, and design
elements that foster neighborhood ambience (e.g., street orientation o f homes, front porches,
back yard garages, alleys, off-street walkways, and shared street space where feasible). For
suggested TND design guidelines, see Institute o f Transportation Engineers 1999b and
Burden 1999. Vuchic (1999) discusses various policies, principles, and examples o f
Transportation fo r Livable Cities.
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D.
The Future Street: Smart. Neo-TraditionaL or Merely Virtual

While various attempts are underway to reclaim the street as a multipurpose, shared
place available to the entire community, new economic and technocratic forces are emerging
that want to turn the streets and highways into "smart" traffic corridors. A consortium o f
high-tech corporations and the Federal Government are spearheading this program under the
banner o f "Intelligent Transportation Systems" (ITS). A fragmented and disjointed surface
transportation network, heavily lopsided in favor o f the private single-occupancy automobile,
might form, according to ITS promoters, one integrated system with the aid o f sophisticated
electronic hardware and software. ITS supporters expect that the integration o f the surface
transportation network can be achieved through extensive use o f smart information
technology, such as electronic fare collection, central traffic management centers, traveler
information systems, and vehicles equipped with fully automated control systems driving
conveyer-belt-like on automated freeways . ITS critics point out, however, that roadway
congestion is not caused by inadequate capacity or lack o f information about roadway
conditions but by sprawl, lack o f coordination between land use and transportation planning,
and by inefficient road usage (low vehicle occupancy). Rather than calling for advanced
technology, these critics are calling for integrated, regional transportation planning and a
more efficient use o f the existing surface transportation infrastructure through mass transit
and ride sharing.
The electronic age promised us less need for locomotion o f physical things, yet the
local roads and highways increasingly suffer from traffic congestion. Teleconferences were
supposed to substitute for, if not entirely replace, face-to-face meetings.
Automated
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freeways, the latest technological fix to make traffic congestion obsolete, would allow a
doubling o f vehicles on "smart" computer-guided freeways. The solution to the congestion
problem would be achieved by electronically controlled, close spacing o f vehicles. The
likelihood o f rear end collisions, ITS promoters claim, will be reduced significantly by
advanced vehicle control systems or entirely eliminated by fail-safe design. According to this
intelligence scheme, eyes on the street are going to be replaced by electronic eyes. But
who monitors what these electronic eyes see? Furthermore, who enjoys what they see on the
streets and freeways?
Most o f these high-tech fixes will make the street less tangible and less real, because
we will rely less on our senses, direct observations, judgments, and decisions. The streets will
be populated by technological devices rather than by people. Instead o f spending funds on
making streets more usable for a variety o f users, on basic maintenance and street
beautification, we are to spend them on complex and expensive electronic gadgetry embedded
in or alongside the roadway. This is at least the vision o f the powerful ITS-lobby. Instead
o f making streets more walkable, we risk making them more virtual.
A continuous disregard for the street as a public space is mirrored in these high-tech
proposals which imply the view that highways as well as streets are principally traffic
conduits. In line with this narrow instrumental view o f streets, the ITS enthusiasts urge
legislators, politicians, and traffic engineers to revamp our streets and spruce them up
electronically. This electronic drapery, however, is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy:
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
1)
by making streets electronically smart and "intelligent," we deny their role

as teacher (Grady Clay 1987, 155-169) and thereby further reduce their
potential for direct tangible experience;
2)
by counting on advanced information technology, we further reduce the social,

political, and aesthetic dimensions o f streets;
3)
by increasing the streets' vehicular throughput electronically, we reduce our

opportunities to build communities that minimize the need for traveling,
especially traveling in vehicles transporting only one person;
4)
by filling the roadway and sidewalks o f streets with electronic devices, we

supposedly can dispense with humans to vitalize them. Who needs a walkable
downtown or neighborhood when you can buy electronically while viewing
the merchandise on a TV program or on your computer, appreciate exciting
and inviting cities on TV or video, and drive to your health club for a stair
masters workout? Who needs to live in a historic setting, asks the urban
technocrat further, when you can summon the entire recorded history at your
fingertips on the information super highway?
The call for traditional neighborhood development goes forth at the same time the
traditional, "un-intelligent" street is to receive its electronic make-over. Preservation emerges
when the cherished things become threatened. "Tradition" emerges when a shared practice,
previously taken for granted, is in danger. The call for traditional neighborhood development,
irrespective o f its actual merits, makes sense in the context o f the encroaching electronic
super highway, be it the one paved with asphalt or the one paved with information.
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Collectively we have a choice to make the public street more virtual or more real,
more informational o r more telling, more fleeting or more experiential, more high-tech or
more tangible.
It is the task o f this inquiry to show how phenomenology can contribute to more
public, vital, and engaging streets which are able to function as [1] supporting background
for our shared social practices (Chapters 3 and 6), [2] works o f art (Chapters 4 and 7), and
[3] as things, humble or high-tech, for dwelling in multiple worlds (Chapters 5 and 8).
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PARTE
HEIDEGGER ON BEING HUMAN

AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
Thinking is threatened by three dangers.

The good and hence wholesome danger is the
neighborhood o f the singing poet.
The wicked and hence most acute danger is
thinking itself. It must think against itself,
o f which it is only seldom capable.
The bad and hence confusing danger is
philosophizing.
Martin Heidegger, A us der Erfahrung des Denkens

(GA 13:80; transl. J.K.)
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Chapter 3
Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Being-in-the-World, and Spatiality
3.1
HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY: BASIC TERMS AND OVERVIEW

This section introduces main concepts o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology in the form
o f a concise overview.1 It constitutes the conceptual foundation for my entire inquiry,

especially for Chapters 3 and 6.2 In Chapter 6 ,1 show in concrete examples how the concepts
introduced in Chapter 3 can assist in understanding and designing streets as transparent
equipment for moving about.
A clarification o f Heidegger's central concepts, such as world and being-in-the-world,
is necessary for apprehending his analysis o f "derivative" concepts such as environment
[Umwelt], equipment [Zeug], and spatiality [Rdum lichkeit]. These secondary terms - all
fundamental conceptual tools for the design professions - are explained in the following
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Heideggers concepts o f the work o f art (Chapter 4) and dwelling
(Chapter 5) do not necessarily depend on the terminology introduced in Chapter 3, but they
can be much better understood if the meanings o f phenomenologys basic terms have been
clarified. Section 3.1 offers such a preparatory clarification.
1 The detailed commentary o f Division I o f Being and Time by Hubert Dreyfus (1991)
is an essential background for my understanding o f Heidegger, especially o f his early writings
and lectures.
2 In the Appendix the reader will find a more systematic outline o f Hermeneutic
Phenomenology. The Glossary provides definitions and clarifications o f the main terms used
in this inquiry.
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For the sake o f clarity, I will first briefly introduce Heideggers subject matter (general
characteristics o f being human).
I will then sketch his method (phenomenology) and
introduce the central terms world and being-in-the-world?

In his major systematic w ork Being and Time, Heidegger analyzes the main
characteristics or structures o f being human.
existentials.
He calls these general characteristics
"Existence is Heidegger's technical term for humans' way o f being.
Phenomenology is the title o f the method, or analytical procedure, which Heidegger uses to
elucidate these general structures.
The subject o f his analysis is human nature in its essential characteristics. Heidegger
implies that these general structures reflect the nature o f people in modem Western
civilization, if not o f humans in general. Heideggers term for human being is Dasein, which
he defines as follows: "This entity which each o f us is himself and which includes inquiring
as one o f its possibilities o f its being, we shall denote by the term Dasein" (BT 27, SZ 7).
Many readers o f English translations o f Heideggers work have difficulties in properly
distinguishing between being and beings.
In order to facilitate understanding o f this
distinction, the German terms Sein und Seiendes are best translated as being and entities
(rather than beings). Entities can be divided into humans and non-human entities. Heidegger
defines being as "that on the basis o f which entities are already understood" (BT 25-26, SZ
6). The notion of being is subject to much confusion or misunderstanding. Hubert Dreyfus
3 Where a basic term is first defined, it appears in bold type face in this section. The
page references in parentheses after quotations refer to Heideggers works (English
translation, German original) as listed and identified in the Bibliography.
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explanation is very useful in demystifying this seemingly enigmatic notion: Being is not a
substance, a process, an event, or anything that we normally come across; rather, it is a
fundamental aspect o f entities, viz. their intelligibility. 4 We tacitly understand entities such
as towns, people, streets, o r automobiles based on our everyday experiences, and do not
necessarily average our past experience to know what a town, person, street, or an
automobile is. Entities such as these have become enmeshed in our background practices that
we take for granted.
Our understanding o f entities is embodied in the way we typically deal
with them This embodied understanding is an ever present part o f our background practices
o f which we have no explicit awareness during everyday practical activities.
Being, the intelligibility o f entities, typically remains tacit. Tradition and culture are
those depositories that grant us pre-reflective and unthematized understanding o f these
entities. Heidegger conceives his phenomenology as a systematic conceptual attempt to
make manifest and explicit what is typically "taken for granted as being self-evident" (BP 58,
GA 24:80).
Phenomenology draws on this pre-reflective, embodied understanding o f Dasein and
non-human entities when it makes this understanding conceptually explicit. Making this prereflective, non-conceptual understanding explicit in conceptual terms is one o f the major
challenges phenomenology faces.5
Dreyfus 1991, xi.
5 Being, the intelligibility o f entities, can be made manifest also in non-conceptual ways,
for example, in creative literature, poetry, paintings, movies, and program music. In Section
5 o f the Appendix, I briefly indicate how creative literature can make abstract concepts o f
phenomenology, such as being-in-the-world, palpable by means o f empathetic description.
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What is typically "taken for granted as being self-evident" is our embodied knowing
and our socially shared skills, i.e., our background practices. Because they are so pervasive,
they are mostly unnoticed and transparent. An example o f such background practices is the
embodied knowledge which members o f a specific culture share in keeping an appropriate
distance pertinent to the type o f social occasion.
Gestures and other non-verbal
communication, instantly understood by members of the same culture, are also part o f our
tacit background practices.
Why does Heidegger characterize his analytical approach as interpretive or
hermeneutic phenomenology? Phenomenology is the practice o f reading or laying out the
general characteristics o f existence, i.e., Daseins way o f being.
In other words,
phenomenology is an explicit discovering o f that which Dasein already understands, but either
forgets or covers up while engrossed in everyday activities.
Phenomenology can be characterized as a conceptual tracing o f how Dasein in its
everydayness encounters its physical and social environment. Its goal is a theoretically
unbiased description o f Daseins everydayness. Phenomenology expresses this goal in its
maxim To the Things Themselves! This maxim is, however, neither a call for scientific
positivism nor for subjective introspection. To the Things Themselves! demands nothing
other than the study o f Dasein on its own terms, i.e., how it understands itself.
In order to do so, phenomenology must maintain an inside-out perspective when it
describes and interprets Daseins essential features. Dasein always interprets itself in one way
or another. This (usually unthematic) self-understanding is one o f Daseins main features. The
conceptual elucidation o f Dasein and its existence, its way o f being, must therefore be
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interpretive as well.
interpretation.
Hermeneutics is the study o f the methodological principles o f
Because Heidegger uses interpretation when uncoiling Daseins self-
understanding in its various levels and aspects, he calls his method Interpretive or
hermeneutic phenomenology.
As stated before, phenomenology is primarily interested in Daseins everydayness, that
is, in the way it is ordinarily absorbed in its routine coping activities. Daseins immersion in
its familiar world is reflected in the semantic components o f the common word Da-sein
which Heidegger adopts for us human beings whose self-understanding is inextricably tied to
the surroundings that harbor and engage us: Dasein is that entity whose being (Sein), i.e., its
intelligibility, is "there" (da) with its world. Daseins world is a pre-reflectively and directly
understood nexus o f social practices, available tools, and concerned practical involvement.
For Dasein in its everyday coping activities, the world is not an object for disinterested
study or investigation. Rather, Dasein practically relates to its world and comprehends it
prior to any self-conscious cognition. Furthermore, the phenomenon named world makes it
possible for Dasein to deal smoothly and successfully with everyday things. Heidegger
characterizes Daseins world as follows: The world as already unveiled in advance (typically
not explicitly -- gloss J. K.) is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with
it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter o f course, that we are
completely oblivious o f it. World is that which is already previously unveiled and from which
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we return to the entities with which we deal and among which we dwell (BP 165, GA 24:
235). 6
By way of a stringed series o f definitions and explanations o f terms, we have arrived
at being-in-the-world which is the most fundamental characteristic o f Dasein's everyday
existence. In common, non-deliberate, successful coping activities, Dasein is always among
its things o f use. Dasein is already out there with the things it is intimately involved with.
Being absorbed in its world, Dasein transcends conceptual distinctions such as subject and
object, inside and outside, cognition and world. 7 Such dichotomies can claim validity only
outside o f Dasein's world, for instance, when one assumes a detached, theoretical stance.
Heideggers main focus is, however, Daseins everydayness.
Daseins primary interest (from Lat. inter esse, to be in or among) is its intimate being
with or among its commonplace things. Dasein exists in its world. In order to emphasize
the unity o f Dasein and world, Heidegger creates the compound noun being-in-the-world:
Dasein exists in the manner o f being-in-the-world, and this basic determination o f its
existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all. (BP 164, GA 24:
234) In other words, if we want to understand how Dasein relates to itself, to others, and to
its environment, we must acknowledge the unitary phenomenon o f being-in-the-world as
I have made improvements to the translation o f the last sentence.
7 World (in quotation marks) signifies Daseins world viewed from the objective,
detached perspective o f science. Heidegger calls Daseins primal, thing-bound absorption in
its world originary or ontic transcendence because, prior to any deliberation, Dasein has
delivered itself to the interlocked entities it deals with during concerned practical activities.
For a more developed discussion o f this (phenomeno logically understood) worldly absorption,
see Sections 4 and 5 o f the Appendix.
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Daseins basic mode o f existence and, hence, as the source o f its intelligibility. As far as our
everyday coping activities are concerned, being-in-the-world reflects the way we are.
Because I am interested in analyzing streets in the way we typically encounter them,
i.e., as involved and practically engaged users, the phenomenon of being-in-the-world guides
the conceptual perspective o f my entire thesis, especially in Chapters 3 and 6. I conjecture
that our built environment, including local streets, commercial strips, and freeways, can be
much improved if designers work with an "understanding from within," i.e., if they recreate
Daseins perspective, first in their minds, then on streets. My thesis wants to show how
planners, architects, and engineers can develop such a design perspective through a dialogue
with phenomenology.
That dialogue is inspired and spurred by a positive answer to the following question:
Can this elemental phenomenon o f being-in-the-world be enhanced deliberately and housed
by environmental design professions such as architecture, urban design, and landscape
architecture, including highway engineering? The housing o f being-in-the-world is especially
relevant for issues discussed in the remainder o f Chapter 3 and its application counterpart,
Chapter 6.
Based on my research and my professional experience in transportation
engineering and city planning, I have come to know firsthand that good environmental design
cannot guarantee but enhances opportunities for experiencing being-in-the-world. Good
environmental design accommodates and reinforces Daseins world. It tailors the physical
environment to suit being-in-the-world. Conceiving and constructing such fitting design
requires, however, a prior understanding o f Dasein for which to make hospitable places.
Therefore I put much emphasis in this study, especially in the conceptual Part II (Chapters 3
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through 5), on this requisite understanding before I turn more concretely in Part HI (Chapters
6 through 8) to the question o f how design can accomplish the task o f building places that fit
Dasein.
In this preparatory section I have presented a brief sketch o f hermeneutic
phenomenology, defined its basic concepts relevant for my study, and indicated in general
terms how phenomenology informs the subsequent chapters.
In sum, hermeneutic or
interpretive phenomenology
analyzes the a priori or the "fore-structure" o f understanding,
deals with what is typically hidden, covered-up or with that which is taken for granted
in our background practices, and
analyzes essential structures or characteristics (existentials) o f Dasein's everydayness.
Phenomenological understanding is circular. One horizon o f understanding opened

up by phenomenological hermeneutics modifies our previous understanding which in
turn leads to a modified view o f Dasein and its world.
Our background practices cannot be made totally explicit or transparent. Dasein is

not a computer program one could ever get totally clear about because every level o f
understanding is embedded in a "prior" or more fundamental level o f understanding.
Dasein and existence cannot rest at a definitive closure.
interpretations. Dasein and its understanding is open-ended.
There are no fin a l
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3.2
ENVIRONMENT AND EQUIPMENT

Having sketched the phenomenological concepts o f the world and being-in-the-world,
I can now proceed to Heidegger's account o f environment [Umwelt], equipment [Zeug], and
o f availableness [Zuhandenheit].
These three closely related concepts are essential
components o f a phenomenological account o f spatiality [Raumlichkeit] which I present in

Section 3.3.
"That world o f everyday Dasein which is closest to it, is the environment [Umwelt]."
(BT 94; SZ 66) Umwelt literally translated means "around-world." It is the world environing
Dasein, i.e., the world that immediately surrounds us in our involved, practical dealings. In
everyday transparent coping, we are so absorbed in our concerned activities that the
environment and consciousness appear to have merged into mere transparent coping. When
our activities are functioning smoothly, this merging o f "consciousness" and "environment"
may reach identification. "I am what is around me" is Wallace Stevens' paradoxical phrase
characterizing this phenomenon.8 This phrase is paradoxical because it uses "I," "me" and
"around" while implying that they disappear. The paradox arises due to language which states
an identification o f "I" and "what is around me," yet cannot help but use terms o f semantically
non-identical parts and separate units of an environmental whole. This paradox is one of the
challenges Heidegger's phenomenology and its concepts face.
Heidegger wants to give a systematic account o f the various ways or modes in which
the environment is given or experienced, depending on our stance towards the things around
8 "I am what is around me" is the first line o f Wallace Stevens' poem "Theory." Stevens
1997,70.
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us. Furthermore, this hypostatized merging o f "consciousness" and "environment" is, as we
shall see, a statement made from a stance outside o f practical concerned involvement. Seen
from within this involvement a "perspective" whose way o f seeing is typical o f our
everyday successful coping activities
"consciousness" and "environment" as separate
components o f an originary whole are secondary, derived phenomena, and are, as I shall argue
with Heidegger, not primarily given.
For this reason, I have stated above that the
environment and consciousness appear to have merged into mere transparent coping when
we are absorbed in our concerned activities. A phenomenological analysis uncovers the
alleged merging o f consciousness and environment, or o f subject and object, as a statement
made after and about practical concerned involvement which is ever an undivided and non
aggregated phenomenon: being-in-the-world. In his study o f the know-how and art of dealing
with technological devices, Robert Pirsig describes this unitary phenomenon o f being-in-theworld or "pure Quality" as follow s:9
Phaedrus felt that at the moment o f pure Quality perception, or not even perception,
at the moment o f pure Quality, there is no subject and there is no object. There is
only a sense o f Quality that produces a later awareness o f subjects and objects. At
the moment o f pure Quality, subject and object are identical, (emphasis in italics mine)
Keeping this unitary phenomenon o f being-in-the-world in mind, let us now turn to
Heidegger's analysis o f how we primarily encounter equipment and the environment.
Pirsig 1976, 284.
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The environment as the world closest to us is encountered in absorbed dealings
[Umgang] 10 with intra-worldly things. This closeness is not a matter o f physical proximity,
but a matter o f active concern and care. The intra-worldly things are not merely perceived,
but are manipulated in absorbed practical coping to get something done. The manipulation
o f the things o f use [Gebrauchsdinge], or equipment, in absorbed practical activity has its
specific kind o f knowledge: tacit knowing.11 "The kind o f dealing which is closest to us is,
as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind o f concern which
manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of'knowledge'." (BT 95;
SZ 67) The quotation marks qualify this kind o f knowledge as pre-reflective, embodied
know-how that typically remains unthematic, yet is always present in everyday transparent
dealings.
Phenomenology wants to make this tacit knowing explicit, and can thus aid architects
and urban designers in imagining their design products, e.g., public places and streets, from
the perspective o f the users. Environmental designers need to conceptually understand this
10 The translators' footnote on Umgang may be helpful. "This word means literally a
'going around' or 'going about', in a sense not too for removed from what we have in mind
when we say that someone is 'going about his business'. Dealings' is by no means an accurate
translation, but is perhaps as convenient as any. Intercourse' and Trafficking' are also possible
translations." (BT 95, footnote 2) Given Heidegger's intention, however, I find the two latter
translations misguiding renderings o f the much more palpable and earthy Umgang which
connotes spatiality [Um- (around, about)], motion [-gang (going)], practical circumspection
[Umsicht], and things comprising our immediate environment [Umwelt] ready for use in order
to [um zu] accomplish something. "Dealings" is the best available translation o f Umgang.
11 For the role o f "the tacit dimension" in everyday life and in science, see Michael
Polanyi 1967 and 1962.
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tacit knowing (which they, too, embody) before they can imagine, draw, modify, or explain
their designs.
What are the nearest things that such a knowing "knows"? "The nearest things that
surround us we call equipment." (BP 163; GA 24, 232) When we encounter equipment
[Zeug] in absorbed and smooth everyday coping, it is "available" or "ready-to-hand"
[zuhanden]. "Availableness" [Zuhandenheit] is Heidegger's term for the mode o f being o f
equipment in which Dasein typically encounters it in everyday successful coping. When we
encounter entities by way o f observation and experimentation or through theoretical
reflection, everyday practical activity has stopped and w e "stand" detached from them.
Entities thus encountered are merely "occurrent" or "present-at-hand" [vorhanden].
"Occurrentness" [ Vorhandenheit] is Heidegger's term for the mode o f being o f entities that
are encountered in this detached stance.12 "Availableness" and "occurrentness" are the two
main modes o f being o f entities other than Dasein, with "unavailableness" and "pure
occurrentness" completing the modes as elaborations or special cases ofthe two main modes.
These categories, listed in Table 3-1 below, are essential for Heidegger's entire fundamental
ontology and, consequently, for his account o f how we understand the environment,
equipment, and spatiality.
12 The adjectives zuhanden and vorhanden literally mean "at-hand" and "before-hand."
The text of Being and Time translates "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand." These
translations are able to retain the connotation o f "hand" which Heidegger employs. They are,
however, clumsy, especially in their form as nouns ("readiness-to-hand" and "presence-athand"). "Available" and "occurrent" are less concrete but smoother terms which I will use
henceforth. I have changed the quotations accordingly.
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67
The following explication will focus on "availableness" and "unavailableness" o f
equipment because these modes have especially when contrasted with "occurrentness" and
"pure occurrentness" implications for general design guidelines which may serve as
building blocks o f a normative theory o f design informed by phenomenology.
Heidegger distinguishes four modes o f being o f entities other than Dasein. I will be
using the street environment and moving about to exemplify these four modes. Equipment
that is encountered in smooth successful coping is "ready-to-hand" or available [zuhanden].
For an experienced driver, for instance, shifting gears is a smooth, effortless, and "mindless"
activity. Manipulating the clutch and the gearshift lever in a synchronous way is so familiar
that it is completely transparent to the driver. In smooth successful coping activity, there is
no thought, just shifting. The equipment o f driving is ready-to-hand, o r available. That is,
o f course, not the case during learning to drive a stick shift car. During learning, the
unfamiliar gear for manual operation is very much on one's mind to the point that an
inexperienced driver is totally wrapped up in it and therefore insufficiently aware o f what else
is going on around him. The learner is preoccupied with successfully manipulating particular
tools until, through practice, sufficient familiarity is reached that allows the driver to forget
them and move on to higher levels o f driving skills. Then, tool using becomes automatic and
transparent.
Another example of the availableness o f equipment is driving on a freeway under ideal
conditions: smooth pavement, good visibility, and few vehicles. When, furthermore, signs
and pavement markings are legible, when the on-ramps and off-ramps allow comfortable
driving due to proper horizontal and vertical roadbed alignment (superelevations), and when
68
drivers keep a safe distance and indicate lane changes through signaling, near perfect driving
conditions are reached. Under such conditions, the freeway as equipment for long-distance
automotive travel is available for the participating motorists absorbed in transparent driving.
In such smooth, transparent functioning, there are no "subjects" conscious o f "objects," nor
is there any thematic awareness o f equipment.
The example o f shifting gears focuses on an individual person absorbed in successful
coping in an everyday environment. The freeway example serves to show equipment in its
publicness, i.e., in the way it is collectively understood and shared by many drivers
simultaneously. The two examples also show how equipment becomes available through
smooth interconnections with other equipment. In transparent functioning, no individual
pieces o f equipment "stick out" as unwieldy obstacles or as objects for reflective awareness.
Athletes can experience such transparent interaction with nature, equipment, or team mates
as "flow." 13 Transportation engineers and planners categorize such transparent and
frictionless movement o f vehicles as "free flow" (Level o f Service "A" or "B").
Transparent everyday coping encounters unthematically -- an equipmental whole
or equipmental nexus14 rather than individual and isolated pieces of equipment. One "takes
in" this network o f equipment through Umsicht which should be interpreted as "engaged
13 For an account o f such transparent, smooth interaction with things or people, see
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyis 1990 study Flow: The Psychology o f Optimal Experience.
14 In the following I substitute "equipmental whole" or "equipmental nexus" for
"equipmental contexture" (Basic Problems) or "totality o f equipment" (Being and Time)
which are unnecessarily abstract and arid translations. Zusammenhang literally means
"hanging together;" hence adequate English terms are "nexus" or "whole," and
Zeugzusammenhang (equipmental nexus or equipmental whole) designates the way various
equipment "hangs together" in order to serve a practical purpose.
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awareness o f one's surroundings" rather than as "circumspection," as in the following
translation: "The view in which the equipmental nexus stands at first, completely unobtrusive
and unthought, is the view and sight o f practical circumspection [Umsicht], o f our practical
everyday orientation." (BP 163; GA 24, 232) An equipmental nexus is accessed via engaged
circumspection and concerned involvement, not through theoretical interest or curiosity. This
insight o f hermeneutic phenomenology has important consequences for environmental design,
especially for architecture, which is particularly dominated by fashions, styles, and
ideosyncratic expressions rather than by concern for accommodating the world o f the users
in its everydayness.
In everyday practical activities and smooth coping, natural or built entities are not
encountered as objects for inspection or appreciation, but as equipment transparently serving
a purpose. "Circumspection uncovers and understands entities primarily as equipment.... We
say that an equipmental whole environs us. Each individual piece o f equipment is by its own
nature equipment-for for traveling, for writing, for flying." (BP 163; GA 24, 232-233) An
item o f equipment serves a particular function. However, the usefulness o f each item o f
equipment depends on its seamless linkage to other items o f equipment. An integrated nexus
o f equipment is at least as important as the proper functioning o f each individual item o f
equipment. To illustrate his point, Heidegger traces a nexus o f equipment with which he as
author, writing in the mid 1920s, is intimately familiar: "ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting
pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room." He concludes:
These "things" never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to
add up to a sum o f realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us
(though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as
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something 'between four walls' in geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for
dwelling.15 Out o f this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any individual'
item o f equipment shows itself Before it does so, a nexus o f equipment has already
been discovered. (BT 97-98; SZ 68-69)
In contrast to the availableness o f equipment that characterizes smooth coping,
Heideggers analysis o f Dasein's environment singles out three other modes o f being o f entities
other than Dasein. While entities in the mode o f occurrentness and pure occurrentness lose
their serviceability as equipment, it is the unavailableness o f equipment which lets equipment
be encountered thematically. During absorbed successful coping, there is no equipment and
no thematic reflective awareness. Equipment is transparent. Equipment is being encountered
explicitly and thematically as soon as it becomes unavailable.
Through further
decontextualization into an object o f experimentation and reflection, equipment loses its

equipmentality [Zeughafiigkeit] altogether in the mode o f (pure) occurrentness (modes 3 and
4). Unavailableness o f equipment (mode 2) can show up in three ways: equipment can be
conspicuous, obstinate o r obtrusive. In the following, I briefly illustrate these three types o f
equipment problems (see also Table 3-1 on page 72).
(2.a)
When equipment malfunctions it becomes conspicuous [<aujfallig]. Your car
does not start the first time you turn the ignition key. Giving more gas, you try a second time,
and the car starts. You are able to get going again by making minor repairs or adjustments.
Equipment can become conspicuous also when you use someone else's car whose seat and
rear-view mirror may need adjustment. You forget about these adjustments as soon as they
15 Each item o f equipment Heidegger discusses has a concrete and down-to-earth

meaning. In line with the pragmatic connotation intended also in Wohnzeug, I have
substituted "equipment for dwelling" for "equipment for residing."
71
are done, and you are on your way.
We discover equipment on occasion literally for the first time when it becomes
unusable. Heidegger traces how we discover equipment thematically:
"We discover its unusability... not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but
rather by the circumspection o f the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability
is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.... Pure occurrentness announces
itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the availableness o f something with
which one concerns oneself that is to say, o f the sort o f thing we find when we put
it back into repair." (BT 102-103; SZ 73)
(2.b)
If the engine still does not start, practical deliberation is necessary to eliminate
the disturbance. The vehicle which is supposed to drive you to where you need to go is now
obstinate [aufsassig]. In its obstinacy [Aufsassigkeit] the car is "there" in a disturbing way.
"Did I leave the lights on last night?" "Is the car out o f gas?" Since the fuel indicator shows
sufficient gas, you may use another available car with which to jump start your obstinate one.
I f you get the car going again by the jump start or by a small repair, the breakdown is
temporary, and the equipment for driving can recede again into transparent functioning.
(2.c)
If the jump start is unsuccessful and if other attempts to start the engine don't
work, the car now becomes obtrusive [aufdringlich] in its permanent breakdown. You stand
helplessly before the car you are seriously concerned about. You have to call outside help.
In its obtrusiveness [Aufdringlichkeit], the broken equipment evokes practical concern. Such
concern does not exist when equipment is occurrent during systematic observation (as in a
series o f tests in a laboratory), when purely occurrent in pure contemplation (as an exhibit in
a science museum), or when it is available in transparent coping. Equipment becomes
thematic and a matter o f practical concern when it is unavailable.
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Mode o f being
What happens
Dasein's stance
1. Availableness
Equipment
functioning smoothly.
Transparent coping.
Absorbed in practical
activity. Manipulation.
2. Unavailableness
Equipment problem:
3. Occurrentness
(a) Malfunction
(conspicuous:
car does not start at first).
Get going again

(after making minor
adjustment).
(b) Temporary breakdown

(obstinate: battery dead,
car needs a jump start).
Practical deliberation.
Eliminating the
disturbance.
(c) Permanent breakdown

(obtrusive: unable to
fix the problem).
Helpless standing before,

but still concerned.
Everyday practical
activity stops.
Detached standing
before,
Theoretical reflection.
(Wonder.)
Skilled scientific activity.
Observation and
experimentation.
4. Pure
occurrentness
Table 3-1
Rest.
Getting finished.
Pure contemplation.
Just looking at
something.
(Curiosity.)
Modes o f being o f entities other than Dasein

(adapted from Dreyfus 1991, 124-125; Table 3)
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Let us further characterize the three types o f unavailable equipment by using examples
which illustrate the publicness o f the street as a nexus o f common and shared equipment for
moving about. (As in the example o f the private automobile above, the number 2 followed
by a small letter at the beginning o f the next three paragraphs refers to a particular equipment
problem outlined in Tabie 3-1 above: 2. Unavailableness.)
(2.a)
Motorists are accustomed to traffic signals displaying the color green, yellow,
or red continuously for the duration o f several seconds. I f motorists see a flashing red
indication at a familiar intersection whose traffic signals normally don't flash, they are alerted
to a malfunctioning traffic signal. B y drawing attention to its malfunctioning, the traffic signal
equipment makes itself conspicuous by annnoucing its limited usefulness. Motorists must
yield to opposing traffic when feeing a flashing red indication, or proceed with caution when
facing a flashing yellow indication. The intersection functions as a stop sign controlled
intersection when all approaches display a flashing red. In any case, by design or as a result
o f malfunction, a flashing signal indication prompts drivers to be alert and circumspect. For
a moment, absorbed and transparent driving is interrupted but is typically restored after the
driver has made the appropriate adjustment. For a moment, traffic signals and other vehicles
have become thematic.16
16 The traffic signal equipment which makes its own malfunctioning conspicuous to the
motorists can be seen as a special case o f availableness o f equipment (mode 1), because from
the perspective o f signal design and programming, it functions properly by indicating its
partial malfunctioning. The flashing signal is, by design, conspicuous to the drivers while
serving as equipment functioning smoothly on a higher level o f operation, which in turn is able
to make the maneuvers at the intersection as safe and smooth as possible, given the partial
malfunction.
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(2.b)
When something is in the way o f travel, a fallen tree, for example, the street
as circulation equipment becomes obstinate. Or somebody may be double-parked, thereby

blocking traffic in one lane. After getting around or removing the obstacle, which may
involve skillful action, some deliberation, or some effort, normal driving activity can continue.
The breakdown was only temporary.
(2.c)
When a driver is circling the block in need o f a parking space and is unable to
find one, then cars, other drivers, occupied parking spaces, and indeed the entire equipmental
nexus o f moving about, become obtrusive. The previous smooth driving suffers permanent
breakdown, even though the vehicle itself operates perfectly from a mechanical point o f view.
The obvious fact o f continued driving in search o f an available space the missing link in
completing the trip underscores the obtrusiveness o f the driving that gets nowhere. The
driver may be passing the entrance o f the building where he needs to make the errand, but
helplessly moves on due to lack o f (legal) parking. The spatial proximity to one's destination,
which is so close yet remains out o f reach, highlights the breakdown o f linking trip origin and
destination. The worldly character o f the street as an interconnected set o f related equipment
and driving skills was previously taken for granted and not noticed during smooth successful
driving.
Now, in obtrusive unavailability, the world o f moving about in this urban
environment is encountered explicitly. In its unavailableness, this particular world is now lit
up and announces itself; it is the same world which, during transparent functioning, was
hidden and tacit.
When an item o f equipment becomes unusable, the entire reference nexus o f
equipment is disturbed, and while this nexus was previously unnoticed or tacit, it now
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becomes explicit. The nexus has been alerted circumspectively and manifests the particular
world, moving about in an urban setting in our case, as that "wherein concern always dwells.
The nexus o f equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a whole
constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this nexus, however, the world
announces itself." (BT 105; SZ 75) Heidegger continues:
Similarly, when something available is found missing, though its everyday presence
has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice o f it, this makes a break in
those referential wholes which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes
up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was
available with, and what it was availablefo r. The environment announces itself afiesh.
(BT 105; SZ 75)
The foregoing explication o f the three types o f unavailableness o f equipment shows
how the world is lit up through equipment receding in its availableness, and how the world
becomes deprived o f its worldliness and thereby thematic and explicit. The world is thematic
and explicit only when equipment has become unavailable. During transparent coping, Dasein
has no thematic reflective awareness o f equipment, o f its availableness, nor o f the world;
equipment just withdraws and becomes transparent.
The peculiarity o f what is proximally available is that, in its availability, it must, as it
were, withdraw in order to be available quite authentically. (BT 99; SZ 69)
Absorbed in practical activity, Dasein encounters "what is proximally available" (equipment)
as transparent or withdrawn. Once equipment is not available anymore (as in mode 2 and
subsequent modes), one can see that one had been dealing with equipment that was
encountered in transparent functioning. As soon as equipment is encountered thematically,
it has already lost its equipmentality [Zeughaftigkeit], and the world has lost its worldliness
[Weltlichkeit]. One encounters equipment authentically only while being in the world. Being-
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in-the-world (originary transcendence) is a disclosing [Erschliefieri\ which allows Dasein to
discover [entdecfcen] entities. In absorbed successful coping activity, Dasein is disclosing its
world. This disclosedness o f the world is a condition for Dasein to discover intra-worldly
things at all, such as equipment.
Reading Table 3-1 from top to bottom, one can trace equipment in increasing stages
o f decontextualization, or deprivation o f its worldliness [Entweltlichung]. When equipment
has become obtrusive (mode 2.c), Dasein is perplexed but still concerned. When Dasein loses
this concerned involvement it encounters entities that are merely occurrent [vorhanden].
Occurrentness [Vorhandenheit] (mode 3) is the mode in which entities become the object o f
systematic observation, experimentation, and reflection. In the mode o f occurrentness,
entities can still appear as equipment (as in the case o f an automotive laboratory), however
only as equipment that is stripped o f its worldliness. Everyday practical activity and concern
has now ceased. Then, it becomes the specific challenge o f engineering and design to re
create in this artificial setting the worldliness o f this item o f equipment
if only in
approximation and in essentially decontextualized fashion in order to improve the

transparent functioning o f this equipment in its typical environment.17
17 It is a major design challenge to respond to the nexus, or environmental setting, o f

equipment (e.g., vehicles, furniture, private or public places) and to emulate the equipmental
whole in experimentation or simulation. A phenomenological analysis, such as attempted
here, can provide insight into this generic problem and can provide a conceptual structure for
dealing with specific design issues. In addition to examples presently discussed and those in
the following section on existential spatiality, I provide some phenomenological applications
in Part HI o f this inquiry.
77
When commodities (such as automobiles) have been produced, and when their
physical properties are being studied scientifically, they become objects o f pure contemplation
and are now encountered as bare facts and sense data, for example in economic or accident
statistics (mode 4). A piece o f equipment is now a purely occurrent object. Having reached
a final stage in the deprivation o f its worldly character, equipment is finished as far as its
immediate pragmatic usefulness is concerned. Automobiles may be viewed in rest as finished
products in showrooms or, if aged to a respectable vintage, in a science museum. Such
equipment suspended in pure occurrentness is now an object o f pure contemplation o r
curiosity. Items o f equipment which are purely occurrent are "Cartesian" bare facts and sense
data which can be classified and catalogued. Totally decontextualized entities whose physical
properties have been studied scientifically can be formalized and expressed as mathematical
functions (e.g., the behavior o f cars in breaking or crash tests).
To apply these four-fold modes o f being o f entities to an architectural example, let us
briefly consider the Greek temple. This time, we will trace the temple in increasing degrees
o f worldliness.
As a "must" on a guided tour to "experience the cradle o f Western
civilization," the Greek temple is encountered as an item o f curiosity in pure occurrentness

(mode 4).
The historical world, which gave rise to this structure, is gone, even for
contemporary Greeks. That is also true for a group o f archaeologists who are excavating an
ancient site. For these archaeologists, the temple site to be excavated is the object o f skilled
observation and reflection (mode 3), perhaps even o f wonder and excitement, but the temple
is still not part o f a world as encountered in transparent everyday activities (mode 1). We can
only infer such a worldly encounter from our historical sources. For the Greeks o f antiquity,
78
the temple was a common part of their built environment- A war or an earthquake may have
damaged the temple and made it unavailable (mode 2) as equipment for Greek citizenship
practiced in daily routine (mode 1).
To further illustrate these four basic modes o f encountering the environment, I select
an example from the near environment: the chair.18
One's stance vis-a-vis one's environment determines the way one encounters it.
Following Heidegger, we have identified four basic stances: 1. being absorbed in successful
everyday activities; 2. feeing malfunctioning or breakdown o f equipment and being stuck, but
still being concerned about one's routine coping activities; 3. being engaged in detached
observation, experimentation, or theoretical reflection; 4. just looking at something in pure
contemplation.
One's stance vis-a-vis one's environs corresponds to the following modes o f being o f
things one deals with:
1. things are functioning smoothly as available equipment;
2.
equipment becomes unavailable; 3. things are manipulated as occurrent objects (as in

scientific experiments); 4. things are encountered as purely occurrent objects for pure,
uninterested contemplation.
Depending on my stance toward my surroundings (depending on what I am "up to"),
a chair shows itself in different ways, as sketched in tire following example. 1. When I use
my chair in my study, it unobtrusively supports me in my reading and writing because it
18 For a recent study o f the chair from a social, cultural, and ergonomic point o f view,
see Galen Cranz, The Chair: Rethinking Culture, Body and Design. New York: W. W.
N orton & Company, 1998.
79
withdraws subserviently into the background. 2. When I drive the car o f somebody else, visit
the dentist, or go to a library or lecture hall, I may need to adjust the seat or select a different,
more fitting chair, otherwise I will suffer not only a temporary impediment but a breakdown
o f my intended activity. 3 . 1 design or test a chair as part o f an ergonomic study. 4 . 1 see
Pharaoh's Chair, or a chair pin as jewelry.
Depending on my stance, I encounter my environs in different modes o f being: 1. the
chair in my familiar study where everything has its habitual place and is easily available; 2.
a familiar environment that needs minor fixing (e.g., a chair's height or angle), or a new
commonplace environment (e.g., my friend's car; a library) to which I may have to adjust in
order to make it available to me; 3. an ergonomics lab equipped for chair research; 4. an
encyclopedia, a museum, or the actual historical setting in which I encounter Pharaoh's Chair
which is, however, decontextualized. I may approach this chair with indifference, curiosity,
or awe. The curiosity or even fascination this object may produce in me is possible because
it is beyond the circle o f my everyday activities and because it remains free from the
objectifying grip o f science.
Environmental phenomenologists are primarily interested in studying the workings o f
interconnected equipment in everyday, common environments in order to improve their
smooth functioning and availableness (mode 1). They are interested in environmental
malfunctioning or breakdown (mode 2) only in so far as they can learn from it for the benefit
o f reestablishing or maintaining mode 1 encounters. By distinguishing the four modes o f
being o f entities, phenomenology can identify and characterize detached reflection,
observation, and experimentation (mode 3), but the proper means o f mode 3 investigation is
80
science.19 Casual observation and disinterested curiosity are ways of encountering bare facts
or decontextualized artifacts (mode 4).
We have discussed the four modes o f being o f entities other than Dasein at some
length because they are useful in reevaluating our traditional assumptions about how we
understand and shape our immediate environment Traditional ontology has sought to ground
intelligibility in pure occurrentness (mode 4) on the basis o f which the other three modes are
said to become accessible and understandable.
Traditional ontology, epitomized in
Cartesianism, holds that we primarily and usually encounter purely occurrent entities out o f
which we build our everyday world. Much research in contemporary behavioral and cognitive
science is dominated by traditional ontology, which is reading Table 3-1 with an intelligibility
arrow from bottom to top. In contrast, phenomenologists contend that intelligibility descends
from top to bottom (from mode 1 to mode 4) and that this direction o f intelligibility has to
be followed in any attempt to make sense o f our everyday world.
Because this basic proposition has important consequences for understanding our
shared commonplace practices, Heidegger exerts so much effort in analyzing Dasein's
everyday world and being-in-the-world as the primary environment wherein Dasein typically
dwells. His examples o f using various items o f equipment (a hammer, a living room, a lecture
hall, a sidewalk, a railway platform) serve the purpose o f showing how we actually encounter
our near environment and how we deal with things in everyday practical concern.
19 Phenomenology can be viewed as a mode 3 activity which operates, however, on a

higher level o f reflection than typical mode 3 activities (e.g., science). If normal science
(Kuhn 1971) were to engage in meta-level reflection, as phenomenology does, such reflection
would disturb science paradigmatic way of doing things.
81
We have illustrated the three types o f the unavailableness o f equipment because the
complementary terms o f conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness o f equipment are
important for design that is informed by a phenomenological approach. Expressions such as
inconspicuousness [Unauffalligkeit], non-obstinacy [Unaufsassigkeit], and unobtrusiveness
[ Unaufdringlichfceit] characterize the way equipment is primarily and usually encountered in
transparent coping.
Inconspicuousness, non-obstinacy, and unobtrusiveness signify a
"positive phenomenal character" (BT 106, SZ 75) o f those environing things that are
encountered as available [zuhanden]. This "positive phenomenal character" o f equipment
expressed by these privative terms can be employed as general concepts in designing and
evaluating places and settings.
Private and public places which successfully accommodate utilitarian purposes, such
as a workshop, a playground, or a street, are networks o f interconnected items o f equipment
which typically are inconspicuous, not obstinate, and unobtrusive. Design that is intended to
serve utilitarian purposes opposes that kind o f architecture and urban design which is mainly
built as self-conscious "art." 20 Self-consciously artistic design wants to draw attention to
itself to the sponsor, and, o f course, to the artist rather than to serve merely "pedestrian"
purposes. Self-consciously artistic design distracts from rather than aids our everyday coping
activities. Such design reduces our daily things o f use (mode 1) to objects o f curiosity and
mere "looks" (mode 4). For the purpose o f facilitating smooth transparent functioning o f
20 Chapter 4 deals with the work o f art as a shared cultural paradigm in the context o f
modem technology. Chapter 7 examines our transportation environments for potential works
o f art.
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various types o f equipment that make up our environment, design should generally avoid or
minimize features that result in conspicuous, obstinate, or obtrusive environments.
Conspicuousness may be an appropriate intentional design characteristic, however, if it serves
as a safety feature (as, for example, prominent signs and locations o f fire extinguishers and
emergency exits, or the flashing traffic signals described above) which in turn facilitates the
environment's overall smooth functioning.
In the context o f environment and equipment, we have discussed the four modes o f
being o f entities other than Dasein in order to better understand the unitary and most
fundamental phenomenon o f being-in-the-world. We have now gained some insight into
being-in-the-world as a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments
constitutive for the availableness o f an equipmental whole. (BT 107; SZ 76) Heidegger
points out that such absorption requires that our practical concerns are embedded in a context
with which we are at least minimally familiar:
Any concern is already as it is on the basis o f some familiarity with the world.21 In
this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters within-the-world and be
taken by it. (BT 107; SZ 76)
I understand this cryptically formulated passage as follows:
Any concern in
circumspective absorption takes place on the background o f some familiarity with the world;
and this familiarity is nothing but non-thematic, embodied, practical understanding o f one's
world.
21
I have modified the translation o f this sentence to stay closer to the original: Das
Besorgen istje schon, wie es ist, a u f dem Grunde einer Vertrautheit mit Welt. BT translates:
"Any concern is already as it is, because o f some familiarity with the world."
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An underlying question o f this chapter, and indeed o f this entire inquiry, is whether
this basic phenomenon o f being-in-the-world can deliberately be enhanced and housed by
architecture and urban design. Based on my research and my professional experience in
transportation engineering and city planning I conclude that environmental design is that
professional field which is uniquely capable and equipped not to guarantee but to enhance
opportunities for experiencing being-in-the-world.
The general field o f environmental design is charged with improving our physical
environment. Good environmental design practice, by gleaning its principles and attributes
from the unitary phenomenon o f being-in-the-world, facilitates our everyday transparent
coping activities. This general phenomenological design perspective leads to the subsequent
question o f how design can accomplish this task in concrete physical terms. I suggest some
answers to this question in Chapter 6 (The Street as Transparent Equipment). My suggestions
incorporate insights gained from Dasein's spatiality to which we turn next.
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3.3
EXISTENTIAL SPATTALITY AND PHYSICAL SPACE

Heidegger's analysis o f spatiality [Raumlichkeit] and space [Raitm\ follows, and
parallels, his account o f environment [Umwelt\, equipment [Zeug], and of availableness

[Zuhandenheit]. In B eing a n d Time and his Marburg lectures, these latter concepts in turn
are preceded by examinatio n s o f "being," "world," and "being-in-the-world." The order in
which Heidegger analyzes these concepts reflects a progression from general to more specific
concepts. This conceptual order expresses his conviction that existential spatiality, our
everyday way o f encountering space in engaged activities, can be understood properly only
after the more encompassing concepts have been explicated. His analytical procedure thereby
parallels the embeddedness o f our everyday spatial encounters (Dasein's spatiality) in being-inthe-world. Existential spatiality is an essential but only one dimension o f being-in-the-world.
Just as equipment is transparent in successful coping activities, space typically remains
transparent and unthematic in our everyday dealings.
In this section, I will lay out the reasons for the necessary transparency o f physical
space in Dasein's everyday dealings. I will try to show, furthermore, that physical space (Le.,
geometric, objective, or scientific space) obtains a legitimate status on the basis o f a clear
demarcation between existential spatiality and physical space. These phenomenological
investigations of "space" are to serve as a theoretical foundation for improving the design and
maintenance of our public settings, streets in particular.
In the sections o f B eing and Time and his early lectures that specifically deal with
spatial issues, Heidegger (a) describes how we encounter space in our everyday coping
activities (Dasein's spatiality), (b)
shows that Dasein's spatiality takes place on the
85
background o f shared or public space, and (c) demonstrates that physical o r scientific space
can be understood as a derivation, or a "deworlded mode, o f existential spatiality. In the
remainder o f this chapter we will focus on these spatial issues.
3.3.1
Regions. Places, and Public Space

Heidegger's analysis o f existential spatiality, in contrast to physical space, parallels his
discussion o f available and unavailable equipment encountered in engaged activities, on the

one hand, and occurrent objects studied via detached observation, experimentation, and
reflection, on the other. In other words, existential space relates to physical space as
absorbed practical involvement relates to detached observation.
To recapitulate, available equipment is accessible, ready-to-hand [zuhanden] to be
used. Heidegger uses the common word zuhanden as a technical term that derives its
analytical strength from its rootedness in common practices as reflected in language.
Heidegger's use o f the term zuhanden, an adjective literally meaning "at-hand," designates
equipment that is ready-to-hand or available. Zuhanden and Zuhandenheit (availableness)
capture the concreteness, immediacy, and manipulability o f everyday equipment.22
Available equipment implies proximity. The presence o f available equipment is,
however, not a matter o f geometric distance but o f practical engaged involvement. Each item
22 Being and Time translates "zuhanden" as "ready-to-hand;" Dreyfus (1991) suggests

"available." The clumsy "ready-to-hand" and the abstract "available" unfortunately lose
zuhanden's apt connotation o f tangible and palpable things o f everyday use. Despite these
shortcomings, I will continue to use the word "available" for lack o f a better alternative
translation.
86
o f equipment has its associated place in order to be available for its user. "In each case the
place is the definite 'there* or *yonder' ["Dort" und "Du"] o f an item o f equipment which
belongs somewhere." (BT 136; SZ 102) Where each item o f equipment belongs depends on
its place within the equipmental nexus which makes up a "region" [Gegend\. Heidegger
defines a "region" as the "whither" \W ohin\ of equipment. This "whither" allots items o f
equipment their specific places within a nexus of places [Platzganzheit\ .
This 'whiter', which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which
we circumspectively keep in view ahead o f us in our concemful dealings, we call
'region' [Gegend]. (BT 136; SZ 103)
A region, such as a workshop, structures interconnected items o f equipment and their places.
The place where each item o f equipment belongs is defined by the regional whole. A region
organizes the places and orients its users. We encounter a region before any particular places
within this region. A surveyable portion o f a town's Main Street, for example, is taken in
"whole and at once" before one makes out any individual components o f the street such as
stores, street furniture, and people using the street in various ways.
Something like a region m ust fir s t be discovered if there is to be any possibility o f
allotting or coming across places for an equipmental whole that is circumspectively
at one's disposal. (BT 136, my italics; SZ 103)
The discovery o f particular places o f equipment depends on prior discovery o f the region as
the whole environment within which the interrelated items o f equipment are placed. Our
access to the things o f everyday use proceeds from the environmental whole to its constituent
parts. This whole, however, is not a mere aggregate o f isolated environmental bits. A region
is a unified and coherent environmental entity (a gestalt) and a referential whole that allots
87
places to various items o f equipment and thereby provides overall orientation for the users
o f this particular region.
In an early lecture, Heidegger exemplifies the relationship o f region and places o f
equipment by describing how we typically encounter a room. We use individual items o f
equipment within a referential whole which assigns places to these individual items and thus
makes them accessible to us. In this lecture, Heidegger calls our habitual understanding o f
a referential whole fam iliarity:
My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and
put together a manifold o f things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see
a referential whole as a coherent unit,23 from which the individual piece o f furniture
and what is in the room stand out. Such an environment o f the nature o f a coherent
referential whole is at the same time distinguished by a specific fam iliarity. The
coherence o f the referential whole is grounded precisely in familiarity, and this
familiarity implies that the referential relations are well-known. Everyday concern
constantly attends to these relations in using them and working with them; one dwells
in them.24 (HCT 187; GA 20, 253)
This is a key passage in Heidegger's account o f Dasein's spatiality, i.e., o f our everyday spatial
encounters. In the following, I will explicate some o f the major implications o f this passage.
23 Being and Time translates geschlossen as "closed" and Geschlossenheit as "closed

character." While these translations are literally correct renderings, they unnecessarily create
severe difficulties for understanding this important passage. The original text suggests that
geschlossen be translated as "whole," "complete," "round," "unbroken," "linked,"
"consistent," or, as I prefer, "coherent." I have accordingly modified the translation o f this
passage.
24 I have smoothened the translation o f this clumsy sentence (last sentence in quote):
Das alltagliche Besorgen geht als Verwenden von, Hantieren mit, diesen Bezugen standig
nach; man halt sich in ihnen auf. Being and Time provides a literal but awkward translation:
"Everyday concern as making use o f working with, constantly attends to these relations;
everyone dwells in them." (HCT 187; GA 20, 253)
88
When I encounter a room, I do not first gather a multiplicity o f sense data which I
subsequently synthesize into a spatial unit that I then recognize as a room. I simply encounter
the room at once as a unified, coherent whole. M y skill for encountering a room and for
dealing with its layout and furniture is activated automatically on the basis o f fam iliarity with
many rooms. My skill for encountering an environmental whole (a room, street, or landscape)
and for dealing with its individual items o f equipment is a result o f many years o f
acculturation. A familiar setting prompts an associated comportment that is fairly predictable
and consistent. A person's longitudinal and a groups' cross-sectional behavior patterns
illustrate this predictability and consistency. My comportment in a living room vs. in a
bathroom or garage, for example, is typically not a deliberate act but an automatic response
on the background o f "primary familiarity, which itself is not conscious and intended but is
rather present in [an] unprominent way" (HCT 189; GA 20, 255-256).
The unprominent, tacit way I encounter a specific type o f room, say a living room, is
not only consistent regarding an individual's comportment, but is also consistent among most
users o f a specific cultural group. This is the case because "my" background familiarity is not
o f my own making but shares a common or public understanding o f dealing with
environmental settings such as streets, institutional buildings, and residences. Upon closer
examination o f background familiarity it becomes evident that everyday dealings with the
world are not so much a m atter o f anyone's own particular world, but that right in our
natural dealings with the world we are moving in a common environmental whole" (HCT 188;
89
GA 20, 255).25
This common environmental whole accounts for "that familiarity in
accordance with which Dasein ... knows its way about' [sich 'auskennt'] in its public
environment" (BT 405; SZ 354).26
Our background understanding and familiarity with our everyday environment is
"present in an unprominent way" (HCT 189; GA 20,255-256). This tacit understanding and
spontaneous familiarity is not the result o f a conscious and intended act. Our typical spatial
encounters are grounded in practical involvements that are o f concern to us. We have learned
earlier that Dasein is that being that is concerned about its being, and that it goes about its
cares on the background o f shared understanding and practices. We do not first encounter
geometric space and then discover our available things o f use. In our involved dealings with
our everyday world, the geometric or objective space o f science remains necessarily hidden.
25 I have modified the translation o f this quote considerably. In particular, I have

substituted "dealings with the world" for the misleading "preoccupation with the world" as
rendering for Umgang m it der Welt. Furthermore, I have translated in einer gemeinsamen
Umgebungsganzheit as "in a common environmental whole" rather than as "in a common
totality o f surroundings." Note that the adjective gemeinsam (common) is also italicized in
the original text.
26 In my reading o f Heidegger's writings, I emphasize the public character o f our spatial
experience because many Heidegger studies unduly portray Heidegger's early work as an
undergirding o f a modem isolated "I" that creates his own private world (existentialism). In
line with this emphasis, I have presented the quoted passages and comments above as
arguments for the seemingly self-evident propositions that
(1)
our "individual" spatial experiences rest on a public, common, and mostly
unthematic understanding o f our everyday environments, and that
(2)
our regional orientation [gegendhafte Orientierung] and the places within this
orientation are laid out on the basis o f Daseins practical concerns.
90
Prior to any explicit knowledge o f objective space, we encounter a network o f usable things
surrounding us.27
The regional orientation o f the multiplicity o f places belonging to the available goes
to make up the aroundness the "round-about-Ms" o f those entities which we
encounter as closest environmentally.... The "above" is what is "on the ceiling"; the
"below" is what is "on the floor"; the "behind" is what is "at the door"; all "wheres"
are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday
dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement
o f space. (BT 136-137, my italics; SZ 103)
Before any manipulation o f equipment or any observational measurement o f space can
"take place,"
Dasein must have "taken in" a region (e.g., a workshop, a block o f a
commercial or residential street).
This taking in o f regions happens automatically and
spontaneously on the basis o f our familiarity with similar settings. Dasein's everyday concerns
discover28 regions prior to discovering the places o f individual items of equipment. It is a
region "in the first place" which gives items o f equipment their places, their coherence and
structure, and thus makes them truly available for the users. Therefore Heidegger can
conclude that the background availableness o f a region must have the character o f
inconspicuous familiarity [Charakter der unauffdlligen Vertrautheit] "in an even more
primordial sense" than the available equipment embedded within this region. (BT 137; SZ
104)
27 For a "derivation" o f scientific space from Dasein's spatiality, see the following
Subsection 3.3.3.
28 Heidegger uses the word "to discover" [entdecken] in the sense o f transparently
coping with available equipment. When Dasein successfully uses regions, places, and
equipment, it discovers them for its everyday dealings. Discovering, in this sense, does not
mean revealing something that was hidden before, but appropriating things o f use to smoothly
accomplish a routine task. In the present discussion I am following this pragmatic meaning.
91
Inconspicuous familiarity is a necessary feature o f any environmental background that
is able to support smooth, everyday coping activities. We will explore in Chapter 6 how
properly functioning signs in an urban fabric (Section 6.2) and how sidewalks as transparent
equipment for walking (Section 6.3) depend on this inconspicuous familiarity o f the
environing background.
3.3.2
Distance. Dis-stance. and Nearness

In the previous segment we have learned how regions and places are laid out
according to Dasein's everyday concerns and care. Dasein does not experience space as an
abstract complex o f geometric distances between occurrent objects. The environmental
things Dasein deals with on the basis o f everyday concern and inconspicuous familiarity are
things o f practical use. In smooth transparent coping, the things Dasein uses spatially are not
objects occurrent in space. In successful everyday coping activities, pure geometric space
always remains hidden and necessarily overlooked. It is therefore an individual's practical
involvement with items o f equipment which determines their nearness and remoteness vis-avis this individual.
Central to Heidegger's analysis o f existential spatiality is the notion o f Dasein's
tendency to bring things within its range o f involved practices. Heidegger discusses this
pervasive yet tacit tendency of Dasein by coining a new word from Entfem ung, the German
term for "distance." By writing Entfem ung as Ent-fem im g, Heidegger highlights the negative
sense o f the prefix ent-.
His wordplay E nt-fem ung then means "the establishing and
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overcoming o f distance, that is, the opening up o f a space in which things can be near and
far." 29
In attempting to approximate Heidegger's coinage, the translators o f Being and Time
render Ent-fem ung as "de-severance".30 Hubert Dreyfus proposes "dis-stance" as an
improved translation o f E nt-fem im g. "Dis-stance" captures Heidegger's wordplay as much
as possible: in "dis-" it captures the negative sense o f ent-, and its spelling is close to and its
pronunciation is identical with "distance." In the following I will use "dis-stance" (used as
technical term without quotation marks) as my preferred translation o f Ent-fernung.
A distinction needs to be made here which Heidegger implicitly makes yet often blurs
through ambiguous formulations.
In his discussion o f Dasein's spatiality, he does not
sufficiently distinguish ontic distances between an individual Dasein and specific items o f
equipment from Dasein's ontological dis-stance. Dasein's dis-stancing is opening up fields o f
activities in which specific items o f equipment can be near and far. Distances vis-a-vis a
specific Dasein change all the time, while dis-stance (an existential) does not. Heidegger's
blurring o f the ontic and ontological level o f discussion is largely responsible for the difficulty
o f his analysis o f Dasein's spatiality. By observing this distinction, we may be able to focus
on the substantive difficulties inherent in the subject matter.
29
Dreyfus 1991, 130.
30 See also the translators' discussion (BT 138, footnote 2) regarding the difficulties o f
translating Ent-fem ung.
93
Heidegger states in a concise phrase: "Dasein is essentially dis-stancing [ent-femend]"
(BT 139; SZ 105).31 Dis-stancing is the vanishing o f famess [Feme] o f things by bringing
them into the sphere o f Dasein's concerns, and thus bringing them near to Dasein. The
vanishing o f famess o f things implies, however, that Dasein also recognizes their remoteness
[Entfemtheit]. Dis-stancing brings things near, that is, makes them available to Dasein by
establishing a field o f practical involvement in which things can show up as present, i.e., as
near and far. As part o f bringing things near, "dis-stance discovers remoteness" (BT 139; SZ
105). Where the distinction between near and remote things is blurred (as in the instrumental
understanding o f technology), things cannot be truly available.
"In Dasein there lies an essential tendency to nearness." (BT 140; SZ 105) Dasein
tends to establish a coherent field of concerned activities in which things can be near and far.
Dasein's dis-stancing establishes and overcomes distances between Dasein and its environing
things, and thus makes them truly available. As an existential, a basic structure o f Dasein, disstance has no degrees but makes it possible for Dasein to encounter items o f equipment at
different degrees o f accessibility.
The degree o f each item's accessibility, in turn, is
determined by Dasein's degree o f practical concern, involvement, and absorption.

Dasein's dis-stancing is fundamentally different from the objective measurement of
geometric distances between physical objects. This is evident, for example, in the way we
31 "Dasein ist wesenhaft ent-fem end...." B eing and Time translates: "Dasein is
essentially de-severant...." Hubert Dreyfus (1991, 131) suggests: "Dasein is essentially disstancial..." I am using "dis-stancing," the present participle of "to dis-stance," as a translation
o f ent-femend, the present participle o f ent-fem en. Thereby I preserve the grammatical
structure o f the original text.
94
estimate distances. In our everyday dealings, we are not concerned about precise geometric
measurements. We unthematically use distances on the basis o f our practical concerns and
daily chores. In order to indicate a particular distance, we use expressions such as "a good
walk" [ein Spaziergang], "a stone's throw" [ein Katzensprung], or "as long as it takes to
smoke a pipe" [e/we Pfeife long] (BT 140; SZ 105). Today members o f an automotive
society say, for instance, that one's friend lives "ten minutes away." This estimate typically
implies a drive with an automobile. The objective distance could range from about two to ten
miles, depending on factors such as type o f road, road and weather conditions, and congestion
level. "Ten minutes away" bypasses any need for assessing an objective distance, because the
dis-stancing driving is all that matters. That which is dis-stanced by a "ten minute drive"
retains its availableness for us and reaffirm s its /w/rawordly character. I present this example
to illustrate how the recognition and overcoming o f ontic distance is made possible by
Dasein's inherent "drive" for ontological dis-stance.
Because our spatial encounters are gauged by our concrete concerns and involvement,
an objectively long distance can be encountered as much shorter than an objectively shorter
distance which, for some reason or other, is "hard going." Even the same way (e.g., daily
commute on the bus), under the same objective conditions, can vary in length and quality
from day to day for a commuter, depending on what he is concerned with while traveling this
particular way. He may be in a hurry to "get there," pre-occupied with things to do once
arrived at the office, engrossed in a pleasant conversation or the newspaper, or napping.
Under the same objective conditions, a traveled distance can be encountered quite differently
95
depending on one's mood, comfort, and concerns.32 The objective distances between
occurrent objects do, therefore, not coincide with nearness or remoteness o f things that we
use in everyday activities.
Stating this difference is not to favor "subjective" against
"objective" factors which may determine the quality o f any particular environmental
encounter. On the contrary, the concept o f Dasein's spatiality dissolves the false dichotomy
between subjective (person centered) and objective (physical) environmental factors by
highlighting the underlying unity o f person and world in being- in-the-wo rid. Dasein's
spatiality implies that the experienced quality, appropriateness, or fit o f a particular setting is
mainly a function o f our circumspective dealings, concerns, and practical involvement. Items
o f equipment which we encounter as intraworldly things, i.e., through engaged practical
activity, are things we are near to.
We dwell among them.
A guiding issue, mostly
unarticulated, in architectural and urban design is the question: How can we physically
accommodate and facilitate such dwelling?
What is objectively and presumably closest to us is something that we typically
overlook or overhear, as, for example, glasses immediately in front o f our eyes, a telephone
receiver while tele-conversing, or the noise o f the motor while driving a car.
Glasses
immediately in front o f our eyes are so close yet simultaneously so remote that finding them
can at times be difficult and perplexing. I f equipment is to be truly available and functioning
smoothly, it must be inconspicuous, and that to the point o f rem aining transparent in
32 In my paper "Mood Places: 'Affectedness' as a Condition for the Possibility o f

Environmental Perception" (Kroll 1994) I have elaborated on the way mood situates us in our
environment.
96
successful coping activities. Being oblivious to the equipment it uses, Dasein is truly with it.
For this reason, I characterized (in Subsection 3.2) equipment that is truly available and
functions smoothly as transparent.
Equipment that is available for use has the character o f inconspicuousness. To
illustrate this point Heidegger takes the example o f the street as "equipment for walking"
[Zeugzum Geheri].
One feels the touch o f [the street] at every step as one walks; it is seemingly the
nearest and realest o f all that is available, and it slides itselfj as it were, along certain
portions o f one's body the soles o f one's feet. And yet it is farther remote than the
acquaintance whom one encounters "on the street" at a "remoteness" o f twenty paces
when one is taking such a walk. (BT 141-142; SZ 107)
Heidegger concludes from this example:
Circumspective concern decides as to the nearness and famess o f what is proximally
available environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells with beforehand is what is
nearest, and this is what regulates our dis-stances. (BT 142; SZ 107)
The second sentence o f this passage contains one o f Heidegger's ambiguous
formulations. He should have avoided the plural "dis-stances" [Ent-femungen] and should
have used the singular "dis-stance" [.Ent-femung] o r the gerund "dis-stancing" [das Entfernen] for Dasein's basic structure that is at issue here. Furthermore, Heidegger should have
used "distances" [Entfemungen] for the geometric span between an individual Dasein and the
specific items o f equipment it manipulates. Heidegger's main point in this context can be
restated as follows: It is circumspective concern which establishes a field o f absorbed
involvement in which, through dis-stance, things can be encountered as far or near.
In addition to establishing distances for or near, our circumspective concerns organize
our spatial orientation [Ausrichtung] o f right/left, above/below, and front/back. Dis-stancing
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orients Dasein within a region by letting things be near and far, thus making the places o f
individual items o f equipment accessible. As is the case with dis-stance, orientation is made
possible by, and in turn facilitates, Daseins practical absorbed involvement in its world.
"Circumspective concern is a dis-stancing that orients." 33 (BT 143; SZ 108)
In everyday coping activities, Dasein delivers itself to its world; it is absorbed in it.
The spatiality o f Dasein's world is a matter o f practical concern and involvement, not a matter
o f dealing deliberately and consciously with physical geometrical space.
Orientation as well as dis-stance, as modes o f being-in-the-world, are guided
beforehand by the circumspection o f concern. Out o f this orientation arise the fixed
directions o f right and left. Dasein constantly takes these directions along with it, just
as it does its dis-stances. (BT 143; SZ 108)
Directions such as right and left, above and below, front and back, depend on the location o f
one's body.34 These directions are fixed relative to an individual's centered lived space in
which his distances to specific items o f equipment shift constantly.
Dis-stance as an
existential, however, does not shift. Heidegger's statement that dis-stances constantly move
along with Dasein is therefore ambiguous and potentially misleading. Heidegger could have
33 Das umsichtige Besorgen ist ausrichtendes Ent-fem en. Being and Time translates:
"Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives directionality." This translation shows
how problematic "de-severing" and "directionality" are as renditions o f Ent-fem en and
Ausrichtung. My translation above tries to preserve the active sense o f the gerund das
Entfem en that is qualified by the participial adjective ausrichtendes ("orienting").
Ausrichtung provides more than a mere direction for one's attention and manipulation; it
concretely situates and orients us. Therefore, I translate Ausrichtung as "orientation" rather
than "directionality."
34 Heidegger does not enlarge on Dasein's "bodily nature" ("L e ib lic h k e itquotation
marks are Heidegger's), but briefly acknowledges that this '"bodily nature' hides a whole
problematic o f its own" (BT 143; SZ 108). For a detailed phenomenological analysis o f the
human body, see Merleau-Ponty 1962, Part One.
98
avoided this ambiguity by clearly distinguishing between ontic distance and ontological disstance. Ontic distance is a result o f each individual's centered activities. By contrast,
ontological dis-stance is an essential structure o f being human, and thus shared and public.
The centered spatiality o f each individual human being establishes its bodily orientation and
shifting distances from specific items o f equipment. It can do so because it moves in a public
realm o f accessible equipment which has already opened up the possibility o f each private
stance. The centered spatiality each Dasein carries around with it depends therefore on public
space in which it already dwells. We will see later (Section 6.1) how public streets must be
designed to accommodate and enhance our centered spatiality we carry around.
3.3.3
From Existential Spatiality to Physical Space

Regions and the places o f equipment made accessible by dis-stance and orientation
have the character o f inconspicuous familiarity. In smooth successful coping, Dasein is

absorbed in its world. Even though Dasein deals with a multiplicity o f things all the time,
Dasein does not encounter them as abstract "spatial entities" or "physical objects" but as
concrete and interlaced items o f equipment that have their places in a field o f engaged
activities. Proximally, Dasein never discovers the spatial dimension o f equipment.
In
everyday coping activities, the spatial dimension stays necessarily "hidden" in the background.
The hiddenness o f geometric space is a condition for successful coping activities. This
spatiality o f practical involvement is the background on the basis o f which physical or
geometric space can come to the fore and be dealt with explicitly.
99
Physical or geometric space begins to emerge when equipment becomes unavailable,
i.e., when smooth transparent coping is disturbed. Despite the disturbance o f transparent
coping, however, unavailable equipment is still encountered in the mode o f concern (see also
Table 3-1 on page 72).
Different types o f professions approach space" quite differently. They deal in fact
with different types o f space," either with physical space or with existential spatiality. These
types o f space and their main characteristics are listed in Table 3-2 (page 100). Design
professions such as architecture, engineering, and construction measure, calculate and
manipulate spatial entities as physical space. In contrast to theoretical disciplines such as
geometry and physics, however, these design professions also have to account for Dasein's
existential spatiality. When these design disciplines thematize this spatiality, they do so,
Heidegger implies, still circumspectively [umsichtig]:
The spatiality o f what we proximally encounter in circumspection can become a theme
for circumspection itself as well as a task for calculation and measurement, as in
building and surveying. Such thematization o f the spatiality o f the environment is still
predominantly an act o f circumspection by which space in itself already comes into
view in a certain way. (BT 146; SZ 111-112)
In contrast to abstract spatial disciplines, the design and building professions even
on a theoretical level (as in this inquiry) deal with space still circumspectively because
(1)
they design, or at least are able to design, settings that support Dasein dealing
with its environment circumspectively;
(2)
they must they must proceed with care and concern during construction in
order to implement the design in a safe and efficient manner and to give form
to existential spatiality envisioned by the designer.
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Physical space
Geometrical space, the space o f the
Existential spatiality
Lived space, the space o f the available.
occurrent.
I Homogeneous, no center.
Personal: centered in each o f us.
Pure extension.
Orientation (up/down, right/left).
Three-dimensional multiplicity o f
Remoteness/nearness o f equipment.35
positions.
Measurements o f distance.
Table 3-2
Public: has regions and, in these, places.

Degree o f availability.
Physical Space vs. Existential Spatiality (from Dreyfus 1991, 139)
Only by means o f further abstractions from Dasein's everyday world ("de-worlding"

[Entweltlichung]) through science is it possible to discover pure space and the threedimensional multiplicity o f possible positions. The process o f discovering this pure and
homogeneous space o f science begins when equipment (e.g., a street), by circumstance or by
design, becomes unavailable (as a result o f a traffic accident, for example). Subsequently, this
process o f "de-worlding" progresses to laying bare occurrent space by subjecting existential
35 Dreyfus' Table 4 (1991,139) reads here "Remoteness/nearness o f objects" rather than

"Remoteness/nearness o f equipment." I have made the change to emphasize the association
o f physical space with objects, and o f existential spatiality with equipment as used things.
101
spatiality to further successive abstractions (plotting o f debris, measuring the lengths o f tire
marks, etc.). Heidegger elaborates:
When space is discovered non-circumspectiveiy by just looking at it, the
environmental regions get neutralized to pure dimensions. Places and indeed the
whole circumspectively oriented nexus o f places belonging to available equipment
get reduced to a multiplicity o f positions for random things. The spatiality o f what
is available within-the-world loses its involvement-character [Bewandtnischarakter],
and so does the available. The world loses its specific aroundness; the environment
becomes the world o f nature. The world,36 as a whole o f available equipment,
becomes spatialized [verraumlicht] to a nexus o f extended things which are just
occurrent and no more. The homogeneous space o f nature shows itself only when the
entities we encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character o f the
available gets specifically deprived o f its worldliness. (BT 147; SZ 112)
This process o f progressive deprivations o f Dasein's worldliness is what Heidegger calls "deworlding" [Entweltlichung]. The geometric-mathematical space o f science is literally, and
necessarily so, "a world apart" from Dasein's spatiality.
The successive abstractions from Dasein's spatiality reveals occurrent space.37 This
geometric or physical space can come into view when our everyday practical concerns cease
and when we overlook the equipmental character o f the things that make up our spatial
36 I have omitted the quotation marks around 'world' to make the use o f quotation marks
in this sentence consistent with the meaning Heidegger gives it earlier. This is one o f many
passages in which Heidegger is inconsistent concerning the usage o f world vs. "world." See
Subsection 3.2.1 above for an explanation o f the difference.
37 For the purpose o f the present discussion, I use the terms "geometric space," "physical
space," "scientific space," and "occurrent space" synonymously. See also Table 3-2 (Physical
Space vs. Existential Spatiality) earlier in this section. In line with Descartes' strict dichotomy
between consciousness (res cogitans) and physical objects (res externa), occurrent space has
also been called "Cartesian space." According to Descartes' ontology, the world is made up
o f objects extended in space which are intelligible through the analytical processes o f
consciousness. The detached consciousness tries to apprehend these objects "extended in
space." For Descartes, consciousness and the physical world, including everyday things o f
use, are entirely distinct spheres. See "The Phenomenon o f World" (Section 4 o f the
Appendix) for a brief summary o f Heidegger's critique o f Descartes' dualism.
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environment. In keeping with his workshop example as a model for any nexus o f equipment,
Heidegger uses the hammer to illustrate the switch from existential spatiality to physical
space.
In the "physical" assertion that "the hammer is heavy" we overlook not only the toolcharacter o f the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any available
equipment: its place. Its place becomes a matter o f indifference. This does not mean
that what is occurrent loses its "location" altogether. But its place becomes a spatiotemporal position, a "world-point", which is in no way distinguished from any other.
This implies not only that the multiplicity o f places o f available equipment within the
confines o f the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity o f positions, but
that the entities o f the environment are altogether suspended38. (BT 413; SZ 361362)
During everyday coping activities the environing work world circumscribes and
"defines" the linked places o f available equipment. When involved activities cease, this
pragmatic "definition" o f equipment and their places is suspended, and items o f equipment are
now discovered as occurrent objects that occupy geometric positions. The withdrawal o f
everyday concern and involvement thus results in the "de-worlding" o f Dasein's world, and
brings pure geometric space to the fore.
This suspension o f available equipment through abstract, homogeneous space is a
legitimate enterprise o f theory, and Heidegger acknowledges its legitimate place in science.
By acknowledging the legitimate place o f physical or geometric space, he brings into sharper
38 " ... sondem das Seiende der Umwelt wird iiberhaupt entschrdnkt." The English text
translates abstractly " ... but that the entities o f the environment are altogether releasedfrom
such confinement." I translate entschrdnkt as "suspended" because it better fits the meaning
o f this sentence. Once the places o f available equipment are reduced to a pure multiplicity
o f indifferent spatio-temporal positions, the environment ( Um-welt, the surrounding world)
has lost its involvement-character. Then Dasein's world as a whole o f available equipment
is suspended.
103
focus Dasein's spatiality, i.e., the spatiality o f everyday coping skills (lived space).
In
Chapters 6 and 9, I will demonstrate how a focus on Dasein's spatiality and the contrast
between existential spatiality and physical space can be used as guides for outlining the
specific challenges and opportunities o f environmental design.
104
Chapter 4
Modern Technology and the Work of Art
In the previous chapter, I have shown how we typically encounter our spatial
environment during our routine coping activities: we are absorbed in a pre-reflectively and
directly understood nexus o f social practices, available tools, and concerned practical
involvement. Following Heidegger, I have called this nexus world. When we are in it, we
take the world for granted, including the items with which we are intimately involved. The
world and our equipment are transparent to us during routine coping activities. Our everyday
world must indeed be transparent to us if we are to perform our ordinary tasks smoothly and
successfully.
Components o f our built environment, including our public streets and freeways, fulfill
not only important pragmatic functions we expect o f them In addition, they have significant
social and cultural dimensions to which our society, proud o f its technological achievements,
tends to pay little attention. I will argue in Chapter 4 that this neglect is a result o f an
instrumental or technological understanding o f technology and that a unifying cultural
paradigm, a work o f art," can assist us in overcoming the currently dominant mis
understanding o f technology.
In this chapter, I attempt to specify main characteristics o f a non-technological
understanding o f technology.
Some o f Heidegger's later writings serve as a basis for
discussing the predominant instrumental understanding o f technology and for outlining ways
to go beyond it. O f particular interest in this context are his essays "The Question Concerning
105
Technology," "The Turning," "Memorial Address," and "The Origin o f the Work o f Art." 1
I present transportation as a unique manifestation o f the instrumental understanding o f
technology and indicate (in Chapter 7) avenues to overcome this instrumental view within our
existing practices o f moving about.
The automobile-highway system and aviation, the system o f our air-ways, embody and
focus the dominant practices o f our time, thus potentially serving as a unifying cultural
paradigm, a "work o f art.2 Our highways and airways as a crystallization o f a commonly
shared understanding o f being can be brought into focus by design principles that are gleaned
from our practices. These design principles are able to provide a visible and tangible
expression o f a non-technological understanding o f technology. Such an understanding can
be physically embodied in a "work o f art." Such an artwork, if generally and positively
accepted, could lead to overcoming technological understanding even amid technology.
1 "The Question Concerning Technology," and "The Turning" are contained in

Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (QCT), orig. "Die Frage
nach der Technik" in Vortrage und Aufsatze (VA) and "Die Kehre" in Die Technik und die
Kehre (TK); "Memorial Address" is contained in Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (DT),
and "The Origin o f the Work o f Art" in Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (PLT), orig.
"Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege (HW).
2 In Chapter 7 ,1 will present the planning and design o f the new Denver International
Airport in the form o f a brief case study and test o f the "transportation as our work o f art"
hypothesis.
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4.1
OUR PRESENT AMBIVALENCE TOWARD TECHNOLOGY

We produce and use increasingly sophisticated technological devices in our everyday
life. These devices are supposed to make living more comfortable, safer, and more enjoyable.
Technology promises decreasing toil, more leisure and increasingly disposable income.
Increases in productivity made possible by technological innovations are directed toward
cultural enrichment for the greatest number o f people possible and for raising the standard o f
living for everybody, so at least the socio-technological credo goes. Because homo technologicus has to earn his livelihood less and less with the sweat o f his brow, technology has
become a kind o f secular release from the Fall. M odem man brings about this annihilation o f
the Fall by his own ingenuity and effort. Modem technology as it is generally understood
and self-consciously celebrated -- is that ever increasing self-empowering force which allows
us to return to paradise, now self-made, and to enjoy all its fruits, too.
Despite these promises and the all-pervasive effects o f technology on our daily living,
advanced industrial societies retain an uneasy relationship with technology. On the one hand,
we hail and embrace technology wholeheartedly and allow our lives to become increasingly
dominated by it. O n the other hand, we rebel, more or less, visibly, against this ever
increasing dominance.
The prevalence o f drugs, especially among yuppies and among those who make their
livelihood from their sale, the young urban unemployed, can be understood as another set o f
techno-chemical fixes that are used in the hope o f overcoming the leveling, desensitizing
effects o f technological implements with which we fill our lives. Consequently, our high-tech
culture expresses a pervasive demand for thrills, for highs with "ecstacy" and "crack." All o f
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these and less dramatic self-induced peak-experiences are the mirror image o f a life's flatness
vis-a-vis indifference brought about by the ubiquitous rule o f technological devices.
Following Heidegger's analysis o f technology, I want to show that it is not technology
itself but rather a technological (or instrumental) understanding o f technology which is cause
o f the widespread, if only subliminal, discontent with technological civilization. Elements o f
a non-technological understanding are then presented using transportation technologies,
streets, highways, and airways, as a focus for non-technological practices and as a vehicle for
overcoming an instrumental, confining understanding o f technology.
4.2
HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY
4.2.1
The Enframing
Our pronounced enthusiasm for technological devices and equally pronounced
resentment toward them reveal our uneasy relation to technology. What is needed, according
to Heidegger, is a fre e relation to technology. A free relation can be prepared by an
understanding which sees and works through the technological understanding o f technology.
At the base o f our technological culture lies a deep contradiction: we want to force
every-thing, our-selves included, under calculable and manipulable control, yet none of us or
no-thing is in control o f this controlling. We live in the cybernetic age, yet there is no
helmsman. The way we act collectively is through democratic voting, the outcome o f which
is a vector o f wills rather than an "optimal" solution as social engineering would like to have
it. This formal decision process often leads to a mediated but binding outcome which,
however, no one really voted for or can identify with. The formal political process and the
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allegiance to an equally formal balance o f power is our common denominator for collective
action. The process itself and its results are fragmented and incremental, adjusting the status
quo at the margins without pursuit o f a particular long-range common goal.
We in Western advanced industrialized societies see ourselves, individually and
collectively, as the shapers o f our living conditions, as the executors o f whatever happens to
be the content o f our will. We are the movers and shakers, and are ostentatiously proud o f
it. We have disposed o f any transcendent entity dominating or influencing our fate. Our
ambitions and courses o f action, understood as arbitrarily available, are subject to our will
alone. We, as modems, enjoy this contingency, are proud o f it, and seek to enhance our
ability to playfully redefine our self-made image which is, by design, as disposable and
replaceable as a styrofoam cup. The stock market o f metaphors by which we live trades only
with those images which reassure us that we are in control. We define ourselves as both the
subject and object o f a continuous experiment, a perpetual motion o f make-believe. Neither
a primordial nature nor a teleological view delimits our self-perception: we are open-ended.
The present age with its dangers and opportunities is not understood anymore as
Schicksal, as a sending. Previous Western epochs allowed human beings a more receptive
role. Humans understood themselves as dependent on forces larger than themselves. In our
Western culture a series o f understandings o f "homo sapiens" or "animal rationale" have
emerged: Homeric hero, Athenian democrat, cosmopolitan Roman, medieval Christian,
Renaissance discoverer and conqueror o f other continents as well as his own subjectivity,
Enlightenment controller o f all nature through technology informed by science.
These
particular understandings o f what it means to be human are, narrow and exclusive as they may
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be, a clearing which opens up, and closes, ways o f encountering our world and understanding
ourselves. Previous epochs in Western history believed these defining understandings to be
out o f man's control, i.e., sendings. N ow we assert they are and always were up to us. This
is the mark o f the age o f "humanism" and modem technology.
From its beginning in the 5th century B.C., Western metaphysics tried to spell out
what the "being o f beings" really is. The history o f metaphysics produced an array o f reified
concepts which were posited as being the foundation behind (meta) all that there is (physis).
The most influential o f these metaphysical concepts that have come down to us are: physis,
the Idea o f the Good, Energeia, Essence, Spirit, Substance, transcendental Subjectivity,
empirical Objectivity, and Will to Power. Our technological and scientific era has finally done
away with metaphysical questions and answers. Despite some marginally surviving enclaves
o f metaphysical thinking (even in science), metaphysical concerns are no longer at the center
o f our self-perception and ambitions. Even the metaphysical comfort which previous cultural
epochs craved and enjoyed seems to be history.
Metaphysics reduces things to mere
epiphenomena: the tangible things we encounter are proclaimed to be unreal. Metaphysics

tends to put us into an estranged relation to things by making them objects o f our positing.
Heidegger tries to show that technology, the ultimate danger, can save us from the influence
o f metaphysics which misled Western civilization for 25 hundred years.
Technology dissolves all objects into a set o f interlocking functions which themselves
become variables in even larger frameworks. We learn o f systems, and we learn that we are
systemic parts o f their multiple subsystems. Objects understood as physical entities
posited by the ordering subjectivity have vanished into variable placeholders o f systems
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o f functions. As the orderer o f this order, man makes himself part o f this ordering in which
everything and everyone becomes standing reserve (Bestcmd), i.e., a resource to be used
efficiently. These systems o f functions exist only in relation to their environment which itself
is a system composed o f other functional subsystems. The cybernetic age has turned tangible
things into functional relationships by an increasingly sophisticated "architecture o f
complexity" 3 and executes its all-encompassing feed-back ordering in the name o f "will to
will" (Nietzsche).
Modem physics has found "physical matter" to be a function o f (1) the questions
being asked and (2) the experimental set-up which forces nature to respond with a set o f
answers whose general character has been defined in advance. "Normal science," the major
bulk o f all research in any particular field o f knowledge, defines the relevant questions and the
strategies to solve them.4 Normal science itself is conducted in a system o f institutional
set-ups which order and control the knowledge business.
Researchers, teachers, and
administrators as well are defined as variable and disposable placeholders in the busy-ness o f
knowledge procurement and enhancement. In this all pervasive Enframing (Gestell), objects
3 The title and thrust o f Herbert Simon's essay "The Architecture o f Complexity"
(Simon 1982) is programmatic for the dominant understanding o f science and technology.
M odem technology shows an enthusiasm for complexity and its enhancement. Systems
theory, a brainchild o f World War II logistics and developed in the 1950s, has been an
influential movement in high technology and the social sciences. It derived its popularity from
its mission to control and manage complexity, in space and here on earth, the very complexity
technology is feeding.
4 I am using "normal science" in the sense it has been introduced by Thomas Kuhn
1971.
Ill
and objectifying subjects (Enlightenment model) have been dissolved into the same standing
reserve: everything and everyone is a resource to be used efficiently.
Thus, technology has overcome the metaphysical stance towards beings. Metaphysics
is aiming at spelling out the "real" substance o f things. Even the quest for metaphysical
comfort has largely been overcome. For Heidegger, this is a positive result. At the same
time, this technological understanding o f beings denies (as every metaphysics does) that it is
only one understanding among many possible alternatives. Today science and technology
present themselves in the form o f a teleology: all previous interpretations o f beings are
categorized as /^re-scientific understandings which, through the gradual grip o f reason, were
able to divest themselves o f their mytho-poetic residuals and which have finally, through many
stages o f distillation, culminated in our present technological understanding.
The self-understanding o f our age is technological and ahistorical: it denies that it is
historically contingent and presents itself as a global process o f rationalization. Its universal
mission as "progress" is fortified by schools and universities. It is exported, for hard currency,
to less developed countries, formerly called "under-developed." Language aptly bears witness
to this "having made progress," an improved grade patronizingly attested by those who deem
themselves advanced.
Indeed, Western technology and its ahistorical, instrumental
understanding have become global, universal phenomena.
4.2.2
The Danger
At the root o f our civilization and its discontent lies, according to Heidegger, our
instrumental and technological understanding o f technology, not the prevalence o f
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technology itself. Technology is the way we predominantly see the world and relate to things,
to ourselves as well. This predominant technological understanding denies for us the
possibility or mocks the adequacy o f alternative ways o f being. Perhaps every age in the
history o f Western culture, by necessity, denied and repressed alternative understandings o f
what it means to be human. Every historical "paradigm o f being" is both a revealing and a
concealing, a disclosure and a closure. Every understanding puts its stamp and seal on the
practices o f a particular historical culture, thereby excluding or blending out alternative
self-interpretations. Wallace Stevens says o f this compartmentalization aphoristically: "Each
age is a pigeon-hole."5
Utilitarianism has understood technology as the application of the "laws o f nature" for
the efficient satisfaction o f human needs and wants. In today's systematic, bureaucratically
organized discoveries, "natural laws" are already understood against the backdrop o f their
future utility. Scientific institutions, even basic research, have the enhancement o f resource
efficiency and power in mind, which amounts to increasing efficiency and power fo r its own
sake. Therefore Heidegger claims that in the present age technology is ontologically prior to
science.6
Heidegger wants to make visible how we, in the age o f subject-object Enlightenment
technology, had posited everything in front o f us ( Vor-Stellung) in such a way as to increase
our manipulative power. In the age o f modem technology, we have transformed this subject-
Stevens (from Adagia) 1997, 900.
6 Since about 1970, however, non-instrumental views o f technology have increasingly

become vocal; see, for instance, Pirsig 1976, and Borgmann 1984 and 1992.
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object dichotomy into a system o f efficient resources. The ever increasing self-catalyzing
efficiency by means o f which we treat everything and everyone as an efficient resource has,
however, no particular goal other than to enlarge the muscle power for enhancing the efficient
hordering o f things and people. We speak o f progress but we are blind to its circular
self-justification. As integral parts o f this total enframing (Ge-Stell), we understand ourselves
eas those who are ordered and fixed by means o f our own ordering and fixing.7
Yet, contrary to other contemporary critics o f technology, Heidegger does not
rcondemn technology, despite its ubiquitous de-humanizing effects. Heidegger just wants to
identify technology as the ultimate danger. What, then, is this danger?
Every historical culture favors one particular understanding o f being at the expense
o f alternative ones. Technology in its technological, instrumental interpretation
conceals, more effectively than previous self-understandings did, its power to repress
alternatives. Technology generates myriad ways o f concealing its cunning power to conceal.
It is the efficient totalizer and normalizer. Technology, in its instrumental understanding and
practices, is the omnipresent invisible dictator.
It has the first and last say.
Its
self-perpetuating instrumental understanding threatens to flatten even non-technological,

non-efficient practices (hiking, listening to music, playing with children, meditation, and other
"non-productive" activities and passivities).
The pervasive instrumental view o f
"technological society" undermines these practices by subjecting them, subliminally or overtly,
7 Gene technology opens up another round in our open-ended journey to become an

ever more efficient orderer and fixer.
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to the calculus o f "How to become younger, more productive, 'creative,' and thereby more
efficient and 'successful'?"
Why does Heidegger say we are hoodwinked by our instrumental view o f modem
science and technology? Technology as the totalizing and self-catalyzing enhancement o f
efficiency perpetuates itself just for the sake o f ever more efficiency: it has no specific goal.
All "goals" are already ordered and fixed only as intermediate goals. "Ends" are fixed and
instrumentalized in a complex knot as productive inputs o f optimization algorithms. The
cycle o f self- empowering power has nothing as its end. Technology, in its impoverished
guise, is movement without end, employing us as cerebral hamsters on a gigantic treadmill.
Heidegger can therefore show modem technology in its instrumental self-interpretation to be
nihilistic. If we work and live for nothing (nihil) other than this eternal return o f the same,
collective and individual activities become indifferent and therefore meaningless.
The
sugar-coating o f this barely concealed nihilism has become more and more obvious.
However, technology as such is not to be blamed for the distress in our high-tech civilization.
Heidegger, in an interpretive move analogous to his analysis o f being-in-the-world in Being
and Time, clearly identifies a distorted understanding as the source o f technological society's
predicament. The instrumental view is precarious because it portrays technology as a neutral
instrument at the disposal o f our will. Such a neutral view denies us an understanding o f the
Enframing as a particular historical revealing or clearing.
We begin to advance a new
understanding, Heidegger suggests,
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above all through our catching sight o f what comes to presence in technology, instead
o f merely staring at the technological. So long as we present technology as an
instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it. We press on past the essence
o f technology. (QCT 32; VA 40)
This neutral, instrumental view o f technology comprises the danger in our
technological society. The ultimate danger arises when we are unable to see the totalizing
and levelling effects o f using technology as a neutral instrument, and when we ultimately insist
that each understanding o f being, including the neutral, instrumental view o f technology, is
at the disposal o f our presumably autonomous "will to will."
4.2.3 The Turning

The cause o f our distress is not technology itself but its twisted interpretation and use
as an allegedly neutral agent. I f this is case, then unwinding this twist may overcome the
self-inflicted impasse o f our technological culture without having to get rid o f technology
(which does not seem to be possible nor desirable anyway).
Such an untwisted understanding has to freely accept, first o f all, technology as the
way things show up for us and the way we encounter them We have to appropriate this way
as our way. That means that we have to accept the instrumental understanding o f technology
as the ultimate danger.
Secondly, an untwisted, relaxed understanding of technology understands itself
historically, Le., as one understanding o f being among many possible ones. Such an historical
understanding denies, however, that we can freely pick and choose any packaged identity
from a supermarket called "history."
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Thirdly, we have to realize that technology as one way o f being is not up to us. This
realization is perhaps the one most alien to the dominant understanding o f our humanistic
culture. Heidegger tries to remind us that technology, as a world-historical event, is not at
the disposal o f our will. We have to accept technology therefore as a given, a gift, a sending
(Schicksal).
Such a receptive, non-voluntaristic understanding o f the historically given is a
necessary condition for overcoming the sterilizing and flattening dominance o f technology.
Technology thus understood is not anymore a neutral instrument for the pursuit o f arbitrary
purposes at the disposal o f our will, but a given o f the history o f being (Seinsgeschick).
Once the instrumental understanding o f technology is overcome by working through,
not against it, a free relation to technology can emerge: technology is then understood neither
as mankind's triumphant pinnacle nor as an unalterable fete which has to be simply endured.
A free relation to technology allows the co-existence o f technological practices and the
attention to things and activities which fell outside the grip o f the Gestell, the Enframing. A
re-discovery o f these marginal practices can undermine, or at least soften, the grip the Gestell
has over us. Non-efficient practices can remind us that the (still dominant) Gestell, through
our very practices, tends to cover up that it is a given, a sending. After all, while not in
charge o f the play, it is us who are enacting the G estell, in each and every act.
Heidegger suggests that the cultivation o f insignificant and humble practices (das
Geringe) can put the G estell into proper perspective only if these practices are both
sufficiently different from yet related to the Enframing, the Gestell. A reformed type o f
practices, Heidegger suggests, has to embody therefore a non-technological understanding,
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yet needs to take place freely within our world o f technological devices. These reformed
practices (hiking, listening to music, playing with children, meditation, for example) are
actually neither "new" nor overtly different from our "old" ways o f doing things. These new
ways are the old ways, just revised and revisited.
Such an understanding o f technology is posf-technological in the following sense: it
reflects an understanding o f technology that (1) has worked through its instrumental bias, and
(2) thus duly accepts technology as our way o f encountering our world. In such a reflective
and non-voluntaristic way we can turn technological objects into technological gifts. This we
can do for ourselves. But what about our culture as a whole? Heidegger holds out the hope
that marginal practices within the given and reinterpreted context o f the Gestell may become
that which can save us from our present nihilistic culture.
In Part HI, I suggest how streets can aid in inducing and expressing a free relation to
technology. I f experienced as a work o f art, streets or a network o f highways may create a
new cultural paradigm (Chapter 7). I f experienced as things, roads may prompt humble
practices and become their hosts (Chapter 8). In either case, streets can facilitate a posttechnological grasp o f technology. What are, then, the main components o f an artwork that
can inform our public ways to become conduits and stages for revisioning technology?
4.3
ELEMENTS OF A WORK OF ART

The turning in the face o f the ultimate danger consists o f its realization as ultimate
danger, followed by an acceptance o f technology as a given. The tremendous power o f

technology as the ultimate enframing equipped with its sty devices to conceal its own nature
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is broken by receiving even this twice concealed cover-up as a gift. This realization,
according to Heidegger, occurs suddenly: it seems to be akin to a transformation, a kind o f
secular conversion (QCT 44). This turnabout o f the danger, brought about by clearly facing
it, turns the ultimate danger into a saving power.
Heidegger seems to imply that this turning happens as an individual act (QCT 44).
Even if this turning should occur in many individuals, our overall cultural practices would
likely remain unchanged. Therefore, overcoming the G estell on the cultural level requires a
physical and public manifestation. Such a manifestation must tangibly embody technology in
its posf-technological sense.
Streets are an excellent candidate for a technological
environment that can be used and enjoyed in such a non-instrumental sense.

A non-instrumental understanding may occur in subliminal and in manifest practices.
Technology's post-technological self-understanding can provide the subliminal and sustaining
background for expressive manifestations that reflect a common, underlying change in our
outlook on technology. A public manifestation o f an acknowledged common background
would amount to an emergence o f a new cultural paradigm. A post-technological cultural
paradigm, collectively gathered and focused through the medium of creative expression,
would be, in Heidegger's agnostic terminology, a new "god." An embodiment o f a commonly
shared new cultural paradigm would, if commonly recognized as such, be a "work o f art."
A work o f art in the sense used throughout this chapter works through the
fruitful tension between two opposing forces which Heidegger names world and earth* World
See especially his "The Origin o f the Work o f Art" in PLT (first published in HW).
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is the name for our tendency to totalize, normalize and rationalize everything. World wants
to bring everything and everyone into one lucid, coherent and explicit whole. The totalizing
and normalizing nature o f world does not tolerate any anomalies and irritating deviations.
Earth is the balancing force which refuses totalization, normalization, and flattening through
world's abstractions and ordered clarity. Earth brings forth resisting anomalies which force
world to give up or soften its totalizing ground plan. Thus earth forces world to open up new
horizons and interpretations. While world gives structure and predictability, earth makes sure
that this structure is alive and continuously rejuvenated.9
A w ork o f art as a new cultural paradigm is, according to Heidegger, not to be
understood as a stimulus for aesthetic "experiences" nor as a sensational creation by a
free-floating genius who manages to impress us, for a while, by his "progressive" metaphor.
Heidegger sees the artist as a receptive and articulate organ who listens to what is going on
in her culture and who is able to focus its tacit self-understanding in physical form. A work
o f art is tacit culture made visible by unifying ongoing practices and giving them focused
physical expression by design.
The artist, as understood by Heidegger, is therefore not the self-styled creator o f the
latest metaphor to live by -- as proponents o f a playful nihilism (e.g., Nietzsche, Derrida,
Rorty) would have it. His creation consists o f synthesizing existing practices or social
9 Heideggers account o f the struggle between world and earth in a work o f art,
developed in the 1930s, resembles remarkably Thomas S. Kuhn's account o f the creative
tension between "normal" and "revolutionary" science. For this surprising similarity, see his
The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. Second, enlarged edition. Chicago: The University
o f Chicago Press, 1971.
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institutions into a new constellation. This rearrangement o f cultural material, often merely
an ensemble o f humble things, resembling driftwood that nobody recognized or cared for, can
provide a mirror with the help o f which (potentially) anyone can recognize his world, see it
afresh, and thus reaffirm it. A work o f art, then, is not a matter o f an individual exerting his
will in fancy exercises o f "happy nihilism" (Nietzsche). Because the work o f art is a material
focus o f serious concern that reflects the subliminal self-understanding o f a historical culture,
it reinforces identity and offers meaningful differences.
Reinforcing identity o f for example, the diverse culture(s) o f North America, can take
place, if I understand Heidegger correctly, only on the basis o f an already existing, and at least
minimally shared, common ground. Art, therefore, cannot create identity out o f nowhere, it
can only highlight and thus reinforce it.
Talking about a work o f art in other than general terms is difficult because an artwork
in Heidegger's sense does not exist (yet) for our age. In order to indicate what such a cultural
paradigm could be, Heidegger has to resort to an exemplary building type that served as a
cultural center for a historical people o f Western civilization.
In his "The Origin o f the Work of Art" ("Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes"), originally
delivered as a series o f three lectures between 1935-36, the Greek temple figures as a
paradigmatic work o f art. The temple o f classical Greece fulfilled several functions at once:
utilitarian, social, political, spiritual, and, in a celebrated yet unobtrusive way, also aesthetic
functions. These various functions did not relate to each other in mere additive fashion. This
exemplar o f art worked because it gathered all these functions into one integral tangible
artifact. Seeing the Greek temple as an "interesting" piece o f archaeological discovery, as a
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"must" on a Bildungsreise (educational journey) or a Mediterranean cruise, results in
encountering it only in an impoverished mode, as a decontextualized object. Even reverently
classifying the temple as a "great" masterpiece o f Western architecture, from which to borrow
(or steal) freely, as if it were a free-for-all quarry, amounts to debasing and decapitating it as
art that has worked for a historical culture. The Greek temple, in ruins or reconstructed,
cannot be a work o f art for us. It emerged over time in a specific cultural context. Emulating
the temple's structural facility, proportions, or various stylistic features, and transplanting
them into a contemporary setting testifies to its remaining radiance, and to our artistic
poverty.
In order to exemplify Heidegger's view o f how architecture as a work o f art can
gather a historical culture, let me quote at length from "The Origin o f the Work o f Art" in
which Heidegger describes a Greek temple, perhaps the temple at Paestum:
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting o f the work
draws up out o f the rock the mystery o f that rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support.
Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so
first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam o f the stone,
though itself apparently glowing only by the grace o f the sun, yet first brings to light
the light o f the day, the breadth o f the sky, the darkness o f the night. The temple's
firm towering makes visible the invisible space o f air. The steadfastness o f the work
contrasts with the surge o f the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging o f the
sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive
shapes and thus come to appear as what they are.... The temple-work, standing there,
opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which
itself only thus emerges as native ground.... The temple, in its standing there, first
gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves. (PLT 42-43; HW
27-28)
Architecture as a work of art is not added to an already existing setting. Phenomenologically
speaking, the reverse takes place: the setting comes into its own through the work. A
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medieval cathedral in a European town had this gathering power, too. The light radiating
from the gathering power o f such architecture as artw ork can only glimmer today because
"the world o f the w ork that stands there has perished" (PLT 41; HW 26).
Each historical people needs to bring forth its own work o f art in order to provide
cultural identity and unify its diverse social practices.
In Chapter 7, I will examine
transportation, especially the automobile-highway system, as our potential work o f art. An

expansive automotive world, consisting o f seemingly unending, interlaced highways, offers
an unprecedented degree o f mobility even to the average citizen who prefers to motivate and
move himself. I will ague in Chapter 7 that the automobile-highway system, as our potential
work o f art, may generate a similar unifying capacity today as the medieval cathedral or the
Greek temple generated in their times.
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Chapter 5
Dwelling in A Technological World
In the last chapter I have explored main characteristics o f a work o f art and its role
in our technological age. A w ork o f art understood as a shared cultural paradigm is able to
unify a historical culture. Before our current technological age can find a commonly shared
work o f art (most likely in transportation), we must develop a free or non-instrumental
understanding o f technology. Such a free understanding is best nourished by being in the
presence o f humble things that can teach us how to dwell Designing and building which rest
on our ability to dwell will result more likely in environments that reflect our culture.
In Chapter 5 I attempt to reformulate Heidegger's notion o f dwelling in the context
o f postmodern technology, o f which our contemporary streets are a part. As a preparatory
step, I will indicate the relevance o f rediscovering and reaffirming material things as focal
points in a highly technological world. In this chapter I will mainly draw on Heidegger's
essays "The Thing" (1950) and "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951).1 In Chapter 8 (Part ID)
I will develop more concrete examples o f how things can provide focal points for meaningful
social practices and how sophisticated technological devices may be used in the emerging
postmodern understanding o f technology. Highways and urban streets will serve as an
appropriate forum where this new technological dwelling can take place.
1 Both essays are contained in Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought.

Translations and Introduction by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Colophon Books,
1971. All references (PLT) in the text are to this edition. These essays were first delivered
as lectures in the years indicated above in parentheses.
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5.1
WHAT THINGS DO
Over the last 100 years, we have increased our traveling speed by a factor o f 1000
(Figures 5-1 and 5-2 below). We are exploring further and further reaches o f "space." With
increasing speed, we are moving not only goods and information but also ourselves. "All
distances in time and space are shrinking," (PLT 165) observed Heidegger almost 50 years
ago. Events from far away reach us within minutes, or occur before our eyes in "real time"
if we are properly connected to the "web," the expanding world-wide electronic network.
1889
Pan Amarican
Airways
Sailing ship
B/y
U S . Army aircraft
72 days
Figure 5-1
The Shrinking Globe, 1889-1981

(Source: Institute o f Transportation Engineers, 1992b, 15)
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We are generally celebrating this shrinking o f distances and time as achievements o f
our advanced technology. The advanced industrial societies are good at this miniaturizing
process, proud o f it, and want to become even better at it. Supersonic flight for commercial
airliners is about to be superseded by hypersonic flight at 6,700 miles per hour.2
It seems that we are or can be virtually everywhere and anywhere. But if one is
virtually everywhere, one is really nowhere in particular, at least not long enough to take the
place in or allow the place to take us in.3
If everything becomes equally accessible, no thing is really near and dear. With
increasing speed and shrinking distances, we tend to loose the experience o f nearness and,
consequently, the experience o f famess. We then equate nearness with proximity. We
measure distances and time, and increasingly also ourselves, predominantly in quantitative
terms. Nearness and famess become positions on a sliding scale o f distance quanta. Things
are reduced to objects that can take up arbitrary geometric positions.
What is left in this process o f objectification is uniform distancelessness "in which
everything is neither far nor near -- is, as it were, without distance" (PLT 166).
2 According to KCBS Radio (San Francisco, September 11, 1998), hypersonic flight
at 6,700 miles per hour has recently been conceptually developed and proposed for long
distance air travel.
3 We have allowed our natural and built environment to become an agglomeration o f
interchangeable sites with no identities. The reduction o f uniqueness and local character has
been lamented by many observers, for instance by James Howard Kunstler in his Geography
o f Nowhere. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
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4100 m i / h a
3200 -
Experimental
rocket-powered
airplanes
2SOO
2400
2000
1600
'l
**
1200
Schneider Cup
races (seaplanes)
800
1900
Conventional
airplanes
1920
1930
1940
1930
1960
1970
Year
Figure 5-2
Typical flight velocities (Source: John D. Anderson, Jr, 1985, 44)
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Extending Heidegger's anamnesis we may suggest that the many discontents in our
speedy civilization in which we chronically "have no time" result from lack o f
nearness. We are almost daily increasing our mobility and access to people and sites tangible
or virtual. The sites and locations we access can be marked today with any degree o f
precision through the global positioning system. We surround us with an abundance o f
objects. What we lack in our post- or hyper-modem world, however, is nearness. We
experience nearness, Heidegger argues, by being with things. By means o f objects we
increase and express our control o f the material universe. Things, on the other hand, bring
us nearness. How do things accomplish this?
In his writings and lectures, particularly in his later essays, Heidegger typically does
not begin an analysis with definitions. Following the pragmatic maxim o f phenomenology "To
the Things Themselves" (discussed in Chapter 3), Heidegger reminds us what a thing is and
what it does by presenting simple examples from everyday practices. He examines, for
instance, a wine jug to show how a modest thing gathers people and activities around itself
into the local world o f peasant life. An old stone bridge serves as another example. In the
context o f peasant life, Heidegger wants to demonstrate that and how our lives are gathered
and focused by things around us.
Things, rather than objects, give our lives tangible
delimitations, that is, meaningful boundaries, locations, and orientation: "In the strict sense
o f the German word bedingt, we are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones. We have left
behind us the presumption o f all unconditionedness." (PLT 181)
In contrast to a mere object, a thing gathers people, equipment, and practices into a
local world. By "worlds" late Heidegger means "coherent, distinct contexts ... in which we
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perceive, act, and think. Each such world makes possible a distinct and pervasive way in
which things, people, and selves can appear and in which certain ways o f acting make sense."4
As outlined in Chapter 3, early Heidegger called each such world an understanding o f being.
Throughout his three distinct stages o f thinking Heidegger maintains that disclosing or
revealing worlds is the essential characteristics o f humans.
Things assemble a local world and make it visible. A thing is a focal point around
which a local world can establish itself. When a thing gathers humans, their equipment and
interactions into one local world, it performs an activity which Heidegger calls "thinging." In
performing its unique functions, a thing makes a world accessible, that is, brings it near.
"Thinging is the nearing o f world." (PLT 181) What is lit up or made accessible through a
thing is a distinct local context. When a thing things, people, equipment, and practices are
brought into their own, i.e., they function according to their own (eigene) nature and faculties.
Heidegger calls such a process or event Ereignis (which means occurrence, happening, or,
taken literally, the process o f coming into one's own). What Heidegger has in mind when
using Ereignis is therefore suitably translated as "appropriation." In order for a thing to "do
its thing," humans need not necessarily be conscious o f its thinging. We will observe the
pervasive gathering power o f things in the examples to follow.
4 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, "Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and
Borgmann on H ow to Affirm Technology." M an and World 30: 159-177 (1997), 160. In
addition to Heidegger's later writings, especially those on technology and our material culture,
this essay has been a major guide for my Chapters 5 and 8.
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Heidegger contends that a thing things in four ways. He calls these four dimensions
or aspects o f practices: earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. These four aspects are distinct yet
interconnected. Their unifying interplay is what Heidegger calls the fourfold (das Geviert).
Heidegger derived these archaic sounding terms from the poetry o f Friedrich
Holderlin (1770-1843). In the previously quoted essay "Highway Bridges and Feasts,"
Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa have reinterpreted Heideggers poetic notions in the
context o f modem and postmodern technology. Drawing on their interpretation, I will
describe the main characteristics o f the fourfold and indicate how a thing things. In Chapter
8, one o f the three application chapters o f Part HI, I will present urban trash containers and
freeways as things, and will show how they establish a world around themselves and how
architects, urban designers, and highway engineers can more frilly bring these things into their
own.
Earth refers to "the taken-for-granted practices that ground situations and make them
matter to us." 5 In order to facilitate our everyday routines, these grounding practices are
hidden and typically remain in the background. Thus earth harbors, conceals, and protects
these tacit practices. Being withdrawn, sheltered (geborgen), and taken for granted is a
requirement for these practices to do their ground work. An example o f earth is the concept
o f "personal space" used in environmental psychology. "Personal space" refers to the area
surrounding a person which that person seeks to keep free from the intrusion o f others. The
boundaries o f this area depend, o f course, on the occasion. Furthermore, "personal space"
Dreyfus and Spinosa, "Highway Bridges and Feasts" 166.
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is in feet interpersonal as we know from being around people from different cultures.
Grounding practices such as "personal space" are a tacit dimension o f interpersonal behavior
that is framed by culture rather than by individuals. Casual and systematic observation,
research and reflection can make these tacit customs explicit. But in order to "unearth" these
implicit conventions one has to temporarily step outside o f successful everyday practices and
not take them for granted. I f these earthy background practices could not be taken for
granted in everyday activities, everything else would have no firm ground and would matter
little.
Sky refers to "the disclosed or manifest stable possibilities for action that arise in focal
situations." 6 Functioning as a diametric complement to earth, the sky opens up to us
numerous possibilities for individual and collective action. The English language expresses
this understanding by phrases such as "the sky is the limit," or "reach for the sky." However,
these open possibilities are not random or arbitrary. While maintaining one's overall sense o f
person, one is free to assume various social roles (e.g., professional, husband, parent,
environmentalist, musician), easily move among them, or create new ones. These traditionally
established o r newly created possibilities are not mutually exclusive. One may choose among
them. "What is manifest like the sky are multiple possibilities." 7 These manifest possibilities
are stable social institutions accepted within a specific culture or subculture and arise out o f
meaningful activities toward which our attention and focus is directed.
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Divinities engender "the special attunement required for an occasion to work." 8 We
may think o f baseball, football, or soccer games.
Each game fosters its own kind o f
attunement. Different street types (e.g., commercial arterial, stately boulevard, residential
street) have their own attunements or public moods, and so have different travel modes
(single occupancy automotive driving, van pool, taxi, public transportation, ferry, air travel).
We are familiar with the hushed silence in a place o f worship. Relaxed attentiveness is a
public mood we expect while driving on freeways; on residential streets, we expect the driving
to take place in an air imbued with neighborly consideration and circumspection. Carried
away by the shared, synchronous rhythm encountered, for instance, at a party, rally, or
carnival, one effortlessly slips into the specific attunement presented by each occasion or
setting. To get into the groove, a conscious decision is not required; it would in fact be
counterproductive.
The attunement one gets "into" is not o f any individual's or o f the group's making. It
is given to us by our culture. When we are in tune with the shared present moment, the
common activity may be received as a gift. When a party is "in synch," we say that everyone
is "in the swing o f things" and "in the groove." In a groovy situation like this, the Romans
felt Bacchus present; the Greeks implicated Dionysus or Eros.
Music is one o f the best ways humans get in time with a common undertaking or
occasion. Recall a military march or a football band, funeral music, wedding music, or music
in the elevator or supermarket. Upon hearing the music only for seconds, the invoked
occasion is almost tangible. We may even be attuned to the attuning power o f music. The
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orchestra o f an opera, when tuning its instruments, gets itself and the audience attuned to the
overture which in turn attunes everyone to the acts to appear on stage. Muse has descended.9
M ortals are human beings who are aware o f their finitude and fragility without letting
such awareness inhibit their outlook via undue self-consciousness, morbid attitude, or
assumed fixed identities. Dreyfus and Spinosa state: "By using this term, Heidegger is
describing us as disclosers and he thinks that death primarily reveals our disclosive way o f
being." 10 Only human beings can be mortals. Being aware o f their finitude all the time is
neither necessary nor desirable, since mortals preserve this awareness as a latent
understanding that can be recalled as the situations require or proffer.
The fourfold {das Geviert) gathers earth, sky, divinities, and mortals into one. The
fouribld can be understood as the union o f "the aspects o f practices that gather people,
equipment, and activities into local worlds, with roles, habitual practices, and a style that
provide disclosers with a sense o f integrity or centeredness." 11
Heidegger reminds us how these four aspects o f our practices, folding into one, reflect
each other. When a thing things, these distinct yet interdependent aspects playfully mirror
each other. When the fourfold in its mirror-play gathers these four aspects o f activities
around a thing, then people, equipment, and local worlds come into their own {er-eignen
9 On how street furniture can attune us to an urban setting, and on how freeways can
attune us to long-distance travel, see Chapter 8.
10 Dreyfus and Spinosa, "Highway Bridges and Feasts" 168.
11 Dreyfus and Spinosa, "Highway Bridges and Feasts" 171 -172.
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sich), i.e., are truly appropriated. Heidegger calls this process appropriation (Er-eignis).
Appropriation happens in a focal practice gathered around a thing.
5.2
DWELLING IN M ANY WAYS

A contemporary reader may argue that Heidegger described the workings o f simple
things o f a pre-modem world thereby skirting the vexing issues o f living in a technological
world. How can we relate today to the increasingly sophisticated technological things, small
and large, that surround and engage us 24 hours a day? How can we dwell in a technological
world without violating our nature as world disclosers? This section explores some answers
to these central questions o f our high technology culture and offers some general suggestions
for redesigning the physical features and cultural roles o f ground transportation. Some more
specific examples, focusing on urban streets and streetscapes, are worked out in Chapter 8.
In order to make his conceptual analysis o f dwelling as the fourfold staying with
things more concrete, Heidegger uses examples from the peasant world of the Black Forest.
In his later writings his illustrations tend to focus on things such as an old stone bridge, a wine
jug, a farmhouse, a bench along a country path, and his modest mountain cottage in the Black
Forest. Heidegger reports on simple conversations with peasants and lumbeijacks who give
him straightforward advice in a few words or with a mere gesture regarding the question, for
instance, whether he should accept a teaching position in the capital. These provincial things
and settings may be shrugged off as nostalgia for the simple country life. Because o f
Heidegger's penchant for this country life, many critics have discarded his arguments. He
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certainly was enamored with this peasant life that he new from childhood, but the biographic
origins o f many o f his examples are not the reason why he presents these things in his lectures
and writings. H e recalls them because they illustrate the kind o f dwelling he and his 1950s
audience were stillfam iliar with. These peasant things were vivid examples o f a dwelling that
was set in and congruent with a historic culture. Heidegger does not recommend to emulate
these peasant things and practices in order to create a cozy refuge in a fast-track culture.
Contrary to the opinions o f some critics, his later writings (from about 1950 on) do not
advocate escapism.
Heidegger describes a Black Forest farmhouse with much admiration and reverence
as a thing that houses the local peasant world in an exemplary manner. But immediately after
his glowing description o f the 200 year old dwelling he warns:
"Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go
back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that has been how it
was able to build." (PLT 160)
The point Heidegger is making with his peasant illustrations is the following: fitting
architecture and settlements can be built only on the basis o f a dwelling that is rooted in a
historic-cultural context. Heidegger affirm s the primacy o f common practices over merely
sound construction or vogue design. The very title o f his main essay on this topic "Building
Dwelling Thinking" suggests Heidegger's thesis: Our culture-infused dwelling is the source,
center, and end o f our thinking and building practices. Heidegger expresses this conviction
succinctly in the conditional statement: "Only if we are capable o f dwelling, only then can we
build." (PLT 160)
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This is a statement full o f implications. To be capable o f supporting our shared
practices today, architecture and urban design must be based on an understanding o f the
culture at hand, and must neither be limited to sound, utilitarian structures nor be degraded
by capricious creations o f new styles. Even modem designing and building must be embedded
in dwelling. I f designers and artisans are not sensitive to the cultural embeddedness o f their
craft, environmental alienation ensues.
How can we listen to our common dwelling and glean hints in order to properly build?
How can we dwell among technological things without succumbing to technology's power
to turn us and our things into mere resources? As soon as we have sketched the contours o f
dwelling in a technological world, we are on the road tow ard a public architecture that is in
tune with our practices. As in previous chapters o f this inquiry, Heidegger and recent
reformulations o f his thought may serve as our tour guide.
Heidegger's later writings attempt to work out -- from various perspectives such as
the history o f being, technology, dwelling-building, the arts and especially poetry a
positive, free relation to technology. In order to see how technological things thing, we must
understand, Heidegger implies, the important difference between an instrumental and a non
instrumental understanding o f technology. I suggest in the following explication that the
instrumental understanding o f technological devices has been or still is the prevailing view o f
modem technology, whereas a non-instrumental understanding is emerging in various
practices that have been labeled, for lack o f a better term, />as/modem.
The instrumental understanding of technology is built on a subject-object dichotomy.
Within this modem instrumental understanding, human beings perceive themselves as
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autonomous subjects with stable, fixed identities and "professions." They invent, produce,
and organize objects for satisfying various kinds o f desires. Even if the mass-produced and
organized objects are able to satisfy the desire o f humans (in most cases the satisfaction is at
best temporary, calling for a never ending assembly line o f desire creating goods), they are
still standing over and against the consuming subjects.
Recent advances in electronics and information technology have made even humans
part o f the system o f flexible resources, or, as Heidegger says, o f the standing reserve.13 If
everything and everyone is a flexible resource used in endless disaggregation and
reaggregation, there are no more subjects and objects. When subjects seeking to maximize
satisfaction vanish, so do objects that are used exclusively as instruments. Analogous to a
gestalt switch, objects have made room for things to emerge.
Within this non-instrumental, postmodern understanding o f technology human beings
do not see themselves anymore as having a fixed, neatly circumscribed identity. Such human
beings, in concert with high technology, are able to assume multiple identities and skills which
are solicited by each situation at hand. While their poly-identity is not stable, it may be
regarded as meta-stable. These human beings do not use technological devices primarily for
their satisfaction but as flexible resources enabling them to exercise adaptable and ever
expanding skills. In a spirit o f congenial affinity with these flexible resources and high-tech
12 For a more detailed account o f Heidegger's analysis o f modem technology, see

Chapter 4.
13 For Heidegger's analysis o f flexible resources, or standing reserve (Bestand), see The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt. New York:
Harper & Row, 1971, especially the essays "The Question Concerning Technology" and "The
Turning."
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gadgets, these performers, inventive and adaptive as chameleons, are at their best and come
into their own when they reveal and honor the postmodern world as a series o f open
possibilities.
Having overcome the modem subject-object dichotomy, the postmodern
understanding o f being provides us with unprecedented possibilities, but it can also lead to
danger. Being freed from a fixed identity humans may loose themselves in an endless process
o f adaptation, transformation, and flexibility enhancement.
The temptation o f this
postmodern fluid identity lies in simply moving between high technology skills and practices
without serious engagement and commitment. Exercising this fluid high-tech identity without
focus and commitment, however, negates or works against our essence as world disclosers.
For Heidegger, loosing, obstructing, or undermining this essence is the greatest danger.
How can we preserve our nature as revealers o f coherent, distinct contexts or worlds
amidst postmodernism's liquidation o f formerly fixed cultural institutions, roles, and identities?
The dissolution o f a fixed identity enables us to develop multiple skills which in turn open up
a variety o f different worlds and associated focal practices. This postmodern horizon o f
unending flexibility allows not only the exercise o f diverse skills, but, far more importantly,
the use o f our typically "dormant" background skill o f disclosing worlds. This background
skill is indeed our safeguard for not being totally consumed by functioning as a pliant
resource. We need to preserve our essence as world revealers. This essence may become
manifest only at rare occasions, but it must remain available as an anchor in the creatively
turbulent waves o f postmodernism. We can preserve our fundamental disclosive skill if we
augment our elastic technological identities by nurturing pre-technological identities and allow
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for a shifting back and forth between these identity styles. As long as we are receptive to
non-technological things thinging (e.g., trees, flowers, animals, family gatherings, art, music,
crafts) we understand technology as one among many possible worlds in which to dwell. On
the basis o f this inclusive understanding o f various worlds, focused by various things each
thinging differently, we will not elevate technology (e.g., computers and the internet) to a
unifying "work o f art," i.e., a cultural paradigm that through its force and pervasiveness
dwarfs or invalidates other local worlds and focal practices (e.g., folk dancing, gardening,
hiking, sailing, organizing around community concerns).
Humans who understands themselves as mortals are aware o f the fragility,
imperfection, and impermanence o f everything on earth, including the m ost sophisticated
technological devices. M ortals recognize limits, safeguard against presumed absolutes, and
thus keep themselves open to the widest spectrum o f identities, skills, and experiences.
Mortals can develop an appreciation for high-tech devices as well as for the most humble
things and practices. This inclusiveness o f world understanding and the pliant but engaged
commitment to local worlds is the main characteristic o f humans understanding themselves
as mortals dwelling in a technological world.
How can this postmodern, non-instrumental understanding o f technology be made
manifest in our environment? More specifically, how can transportation facilities, highways
and streets in particular, aid in the emergence o f this free and decidedly positive relation to
technology?
In order to suggest some answers to these important contemporary issues we will take
up an example Heidegger uses. According to Heidegger, the West has developed a series o f
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overarching understandings o f being. In rough chronological order these total understandings
may be briefly sketched as follows: wild nature; things needing human nurturing; things as
crafted products; beings as creatures (Medieval Christianity); objects organized to satisfy the
desires o f subjects; technological devices and humans as flexible resource. The last two
models refer to the epochs o f modem and postmodern technology, respectively.
In "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger associates the major epochs with a bridge
type. He does not mention a bridge type for the era o f modem technology. But we may
assume that he had in mind the solid, imposing iron structures o f the Eiffel Tower and railroad
bridges. For the last stage in his series, high technology, Heidegger uses the freeway bridge
(Autobahnbrucke). Flying unimpededly over other segments o f the freeway system, the
freeway "bridge," also called "fly-over" by highway engineers, creates a system o f sprawling,
non-stop interchanges that changes the countryside into an accessible commodity: "The
freeway bridge is harnessed and coupled to the network o f long-distance traffic which is
calculated for maximum speed." (PLT 152)14 The freeway and its grade-separated inter
changes smoothly bridges the multiple directions o f bustling traffic twenty-four hours a day.
By enhancing mobility, options, and opportunities drivers responding with a debonair shift
o f merely 90 degrees to freely merge into another highway ~
the freeway bridge is indeed
an exemplary postmodern thing. Reviewing his list o f bridges, Heidegger summarizes how
each one o f them things:
14 "Die Autobahnbrucke ist eingespannt in das Liniennetz des rechnenden and moglichst
schnellen Femverkehrs." Heidegger 1954,153. I have altered the translation to stay closer
to the original meanings o f the words, especially "einspannen" (to harness, to yoke).
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Always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and the hastening ways
o f men to and fro... The bridge gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the
divinities whether we explicitly think o f and visibly give thanksfo r, their presence,
as in the figure o f the saint o f the bridge, or whether that divine presence is obstructed
or even pushed wholly aside. (PLT 152-153)
Each thing things according to its ow n mode o f revealing. Like every other thing,
"the bridge gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals." (PLT 153)
Put another way: "Bridges escort in many ways." (PLT 152) We will see in Chapter 8 how
the postmodern freeway "bridge" things.
I close this chapter with an image o f a contemporary understanding o f earth and sky
(see Figure 5-3 below). Rigo, the artist, created this mural in 1998.15 Since his artistic
identity evolves from year to year, as Rigo told me, the artists name changes accordingly.
Having been painted on two elevations o f this building at the south-east com er o f 31x1Street
and Mission Street (San Francisco) in 1998, this mural was created by Rigo 98. Responding
to my questions, Rigo generously provided the following information which I am
paraphrasing. I will conclude our discussion about dwelling in a technological world with a
brief interpretation o f this mural.
The work is site specific. The parking lot adjacent to the building will make room for
a multistory building 16 which will obliterate SKY and GROUND. The meaning o f this mural
changes over time. People who remember these signs will see them gradually disappear as
15 Telephone conversation with Rigo on October 12, 1999. I am thankful to Debra

Lehane (San Francisco Art Commission) for providing me with Rigo's telephone number.
16 Excavation began in December 2000.
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the new construction will be erected from the ground toward the sky. SKY is close to the top
o f the building and signifies an upward movement toward increasingly less architecture.
GROUND is close to the bottom o f the building and signifies a downward movement toward
the origin o f the building, its foundation.
Figure 5-3
A contemporary understanding o f earth and sky

(mural by Rig 98; at the comer of 3rd St. and Mission St., San Francisco)
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This art work deals with memory and time by twisting the typical relation between
signs and what they designate. Typically a sign is installed to point to something new or
important, or to a future event. In Rigo's mural, however, SKY and GROUND foreshadow
their own eclipse. The erection o f the new building, which is designed to be very close to the
older building adorned with the mural, will make SKY and GROUND gradually invisible.
Only the memory o f this mural will remain over time.
In the context o f my study, the pair o f signs can be understood as follows. This mural
is an artistic commentary about the processes o f urban development, change, and renewal. We
can take these common urban practices for granted which ground a citys transformation, or
we can try to resist them In either case, for many citizens they are a matter o f concern,
discussion, and political action. The skyline o f the city testifies to the possibilities and
opportunities that have been taken up, but also points to the sky and light that have been
appropriated by the stalwart skyscrapers. Only the sky is the lim it! is an idiomatic phrase
that expresses the bustling building sentiment with youthful vigor and hubris. The diametrical
trajectories o f SKY and GROUND create a tension that attunes us to the two faces o f urban
change: destruction and renewal. The mural highlights the tension o f the interplay between
ruin and rebirth, between hidden foundations and open possibilities. It makes for a fitting
local attunement to this thriving part o f San Francisco (South-of-Market, or Soma). The
mural itself will vanish in proportion to the progressing birth o f the new emerging walls. This
mural will become even more telling in the face o f its approaching demise. Its attuning power
will come into its own at the very point o f its obliteration.
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This art work confirms us as buoyant city dwellers reaching for the sky and as mortals
by holding up to us the feet that change, dissolution, and renewal are events in which we take
part collectively.
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PART III
MOVING ABOUT
IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD
"Only if we are capable o f dwelling, only then can we build."

Heidegger, Building Dwelling Thinking
145
In Part II o f this inquiry, I have given a phenomenological account o f being-in-theworld and "lived space," the work o f art, and o f dwelling in a technological world. In Part
HI, I will provide concrete applications o f the analytical insights gained in the previous
chapters to various aspects o f our transportation environment. Accordingly, I will present
moving about in a technological world from the perspective o f three principal street functions:
1. Everyday street environments as smoothly functioning equipment for facilitating access,
mobility, and public life (Chapter 6),
2. Freeways as our (potential) work o f art, understood as a commonly shared cultural
paradigm (Chapter 7), and
3. Streets as things, i.e., as focal points uniquely suited for dwelling in postmodernism's
multiple local worlds (Chapter 8).
In each chapter o f Part HI, I recap the prior conceptual discussions (i.e., o f equipment,
the work o f art; and dwelling among things, respectively) before I present applications
pertaining to various transportation modes and urban scales. Using the three principal street
functions as perceptual guides lets us see urban dwelling and moving about from original and
prolific vantage points. However, streets messy, unruly and surprising as they are, do
not follow neatly this threefold classification. In my concluding Chapter 9 ,1 will consider
these principal street functions jointly by examining their compatibility and overlap.
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Chapter 6
The Street as Transparent Equipment
6.1
MATERIALS, NATURE, AND PUBLICNESS OF THE URBAN STREET

In analyzing how we deal with equipment in everyday coping activities, we have learnt
in Chapter 3 that "Dasein... is nothing b u t... concerned absorption in the world" (HCT 197;
GA 20, 267-268). Dasein is us, each and every one o f us. We understand ourselves,
collectively and "individually," on the basis o f commonly shared background practices (being)
which typically remain tacit and unthematic.
We have discussed equipment as those
interrelated things o f use which comprise our near environment. That which is closest to us
in our everyday dealings is, however, not available equipment itself, but that towards which
such equipment is being used: the work [das Werk], The work is the "towards-which" [das
Wozu\ o f equipment, such as a house as equipment for dwelling, or a street as equipment for
trading, shopping, gathering, and for moving about.
The work (the intended product
emerging) establishes the nexus o f interconnected equipment in the first place.

That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves
[die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves
primarily is the work that which is to be produced at the time; and this is
accordingly available too. The work bears with it that referential whole within which
the equipment is encountered. (BT 99; SZ 69-70)
The work lets us encounter not only equipment and its referential nexus, but also what it is
made o f (materials), the macroscopic natural environment (nature), as well as the intrinsic
public character (publicness) o f what we design, build, produce, and utilize.
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In his analysis o f equipment, Heidegger takes most o f his illustrating examples from
the world o f a craftsman's workshop. The shoemaker's workshop, for example, is a private
or semi-private setting. The workshop o f the shoemaker making or repairing gear for walking
[Schuhzeug] was, in the mid 1920s, a vivid example for showing how equipment is available
for a skilled craftsman, how the work lets us encounter the material (e.g., leather) it is made
o f how it "references" nature, and how even a custom-tailored pair o f shoes draws upon and
takes account o f the public world. Today, workshops no longer are our primary environment
o f production. Let us therefore use common public works projects, streets in particular, to
illustrate how publicly undertaken works and implemented designs can reveal materials,
nature, and the shared public world.
When walking on a sidewalk in an urban setting, for instance, we may notice the
materials out o f which the street as equipment for circulation is made. We encounter, mostly
unthematically for sure, materials such as concrete, asphalt, basalt or granite which are used
for pavement or curb stones.
In going about our business, we are using sidewalks,
crosswalks, traffic signals, and garbage containers. We do so while taking their availability
as equipment for granted. We also take for granted the materials they are made o f even
when we get in touch with them while pushing the button to activate a pedestrian signal, for
example. As long as we are successfully going about our business, we thematically encounter
neither equipment nor materials. They are typically noticed only during malfunctioning.1 A
1 The trained architect or urban designer may notice various street equipment and
materials in a deliberate o r "conscious" way. But this happens typically only when "on duty."
During everyday activities, the designed environment is for planners, architects, and engineers
as transparent as for everyone else.
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cracked sidewalk, for instance (see also Figure 6-2 top, p. 168), lets us encounter concrete
in its strength and brittleness, and when this cracked concrete reveals tree roots, it also reveals
the slow but unyielding force o f nature.
Materials can deliberately be employed in a way which allows the material o f
equipment to shine forth while the equipment itself remains in a subservient role. A red stone
or brick pattern, for example, may clearly yet unobtrusively mark and highlight a crosswalk
or a store entrance. In serving a pedestrian function, the material can thus become manifest
and come into its own. It is available for appreciation, but does not force itself onto those it
carries. In its unobtrusive familiarity, the material is always ready to withdraw again into
smooth functioning.
The equipmental and referential nexus o f the street lets us discover not only materials
but also nature and publicness, often simultaneously. We see the slight cross-sectional
curvature o f the street's roadbed, its seamless transition into the gutter, and know what it is
for, even when it does not rain. The gentle longitudinal slope o f the road and gutter allows
the rain to run through the iron drain cover which lets water but no wheels or people through.
The disappearing water points to the underground utilized to make movement easier above.
The storm drain cover is one o f many openings through which we are visibly connected to the
underground, which in so many ways is tacitly at our service. The raised curb stone restrains
and guides the rain, and keeps us above water and apart from moving vehicles.
Curbs painted red, yellow, blue, white, or green indicate the intended parking use. At
times, a sign reinforces the message. The colored curbs may bear officially stenciled letters
confirming legal authority. Movement is restricted, by the people, for the people. The
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colored curbs as well as miles o f lane striping not only point to common movement and public
intercourse tamed and regulated by markings, signs, and lights. They also summon the
painters, sign installers and electricians who, on call 24 hours a day, fix, replace, or modify
the features o f the street. They do their job for the sake o f the public, allowing people to
move about safely and smoothly in the street. The crews' skilled handling o f tools and
materials ensures that drivers, cyclists, and shoppers can forget about the street to the degree
that they can get totally absorbed in it and be taken in by it in order to go about their business.
The transparent functioning o f the street is the typical mode in which it is available to
its various users. The world o f the street as a vehicle for multiple purposes is transparent for
its users, and has to remain so if smooth functioning is to continue. This world with its
various kinds o f interconnected equipment, materials, and its inherent public character, has
to stay in the background and remain withdrawn in its inconspicuous familiarity "in order to
be available quite authentically" (BT 99; SZ 69). In contrast to street fairs and parades
which are the exception o f street usage rather than the rule (even in San Francisco) the
publicness of the street, in its typical mode o f operation, does not announce itself. I f the
world o f the street is to be made genuinely available to its users, it must remain withdrawn
in the background. In Heideggers words: "In order for the available not to emerge from its
inconspicuousness, the world m ust not announce itself." (BT 106; SZ 75) 2 Indeed, the
2 "Das Sich-nicht-melden der Welt ist die Bedingung der Moglichkeit des
Nichtheraustretens des Zuhandenen aus seiner Unauflalligkeit." The translators have
significantly modified the structure o f this compact and important sentence. I have further
simplified the translation by substituting "In order for..." for "If it is to be possible for...". By
means o f the accurate but clumsy phrase "If it is to be possible for..." the translators try to
preserve Heidegger's transcendental formulation ("...condition o f the possibility of..."). This
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street's inconspicuous familiarity is a condition for smooth functioning o f the street in its dayto-day operation.
Street fairs, parades, and block parties are exceptional uses o f streets, and they can
retain their significance as deliberate and organized celebrations only if these uses remain the
exception rather than the rule o f street usage. The intentional and planned celebration o f
public facilities, events, and institutions is possible if they remain available as background that
normally can be taken for granted. The authentic uw-thematic "celebration" o f the street takes
place all the time in its everydayness. During street fairs and parades, this tacit and commonly
shared taking part becomes a deliberate party. During such celebrations, the public street is
turned into an expressed focal point, now obvious and visibly highlighted for all. What we
commemorate and cheer during street fairs and parades is indeed this everyday mundane and
transparent functioning o f public facilities and institutions which we own and routinely take
over as ours through our daily practices. This taking over or appropriation o f public facilities,
events, and institutions reaches such a degree that we can take them for granted. Where this
everyday commonplace functioning o f the street is not secure and cannot be taken for
granted, as dining external conflict o r internal strife, there is no ground for celebration.
formulation is, however, unnecessarily convoluted and awkward, because it relies syntactically
and semantically too much on nouns rather than on verbs. Heidegger's general preference for
nouns often results in a semblance o f conceptual abstractness and rigidity which runs counter
to phenomenology's tenet o f letting the phenomena show themselves as clearly as possible.
The precise but often ungraceful style o f Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) results, however,
to a large degree from the labors o f a thinking which tries to free itself from the strictures o f
traditional ontology while employing terms that are still bound to this ontology. His lectures
o f the same period, e.g., History o f the Concept o f Time (HCT), The Basic Problems o f
Phenomenology (BP), and The M etaphysical Foundations o f Logic (MFL), are more
accessible but less comprehensive and less precise.
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The tacit celebration o f the street as public forum is observed in its daily use, in its
undramatic repairs, routine maintenance, or minor modifications. And over the years we have
witnessed modifications o f streets, plazas and private places intended to accommodate an ever
increasing range o f users. The street shows this accommodation for instance in the growing
number o f curb ramps, particularly at intersections. For most pedestrians crossing the
roadway, the curb requires only an inconvenient step or an extra maneuver o f the stroller. For
others, a curb six inches high can be a major impediment for moving about, especially for the
very young, the elderly, and wheelchair bound citizens.
In order to provide a steady and comfortable passage from curb to curb across the
travel lanes for the unmotorized traffic participants, a portion o f the sidewalk near the
obstinate curb is removed and replaced with new concrete which is poured in such a way as
to provide a maneuverable ramp with a gentle slope, flush with the roadway surface. The
sidewalk equipped with such a ramp is now coming down to roadway level and is thus
reaching out to a more inclusive range o f users.
This removal o f an obstinate barrier by a small modification o f a public facility is a
step in broadening the utility o f public facilities as part o f an ongoing effort to increase the
accessibility o f the city as a cultural and commercial organism available for everyone.3 At the
3 One curb ramp costs about $1,000; that amounts to about $8,000 to install curb ramps
for a four-legged intersection.. The Federal Americans With Disabilities A ct (ADA) requires
two curb ramps at each comer in order to promote and facilitate perpendicular pedestrian
roadway crossings, especially for visually impaired pedestrians. Adding acoustic signals
(chirping sounds) to a four-legged signalized intersection costs about $5,000. I thank Bridget
Smith, Tom Folks, and Jerry Robbins (San Francisco Department o f Parking and Traffic) for
providing me with these estimates (October 25, 2000).
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close o f the concrete pour, the still moist concrete allows the imprint o f parallel grooves on
the three sidewalk sides o f the ramp so that visually impaired pedestrians can feel their way
around. The three sets o f grooves in the concrete orient these pedestrians in the right
direction for crossing the roadway. At times the fresh concrete even allows a fresh urbanite
to leave a personal footprint o r a more cryptic message for pedestrian posterity.
The street's materials are cut and molded to the features o f the human body and its
culturally codetermined requirements for mobility, commerce, communication, and marginal
personalization. This custom tailoring and shaping o f construction materials contributes to
the smooth operation o f the street in order to be ready-to-hand. Improved pedestrian access
can be achieved by building new or retrofitting existing structures. Manipulating the materials
o f the street for accommodating special user groups makes mobility equipment, such as a
sidewalk equipped with curb ramps, a shared and communal facility. By providing and
facilitating access for everyone, the public character o f the street is made even more manifest
and evident.
The street as a facility cut to the needs o f a more inclusive range of users affords a
more fluent movement with which more users can be at ease. Instead o f formerly serving as
circulation space predominantly for the able bodied, the retrofitted sidewalk now promotes
access not only for people in wheelchairs, but also for the elderly, the visually impaired, for
parents with strollers, people pulling luggage on wheels and grocery carts, and in most
instances as an unintentional side benefit also for the homeless equipped with shopping
carts serving as their humble mobile homes.
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In summary: The street as an incremental product o f public works can reveal to its
users afresh the various materials it is made o f and the public ways in which they are used.
The mundane and simple layout o f the street alone can show how we collectively
accommodate and manifest nature, that is, nature as we understand it and use its forces. The
way we protect ourselves from nature and make use o f its resources and energies in turn
recalls with every laid brick, raised curb stone, and concrete sidewalk pour the public
community through which and for which the public works are made. The street as a nexus
o f equipment for moving about discloses in a public way not only its materials but also the
larger environment in which we dwell. Heidegger indicates how publicness and nature are
intertwined:
Along with the public world, the environing nature [die Umweltnatur\ is discovered
and is accessible to everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern
discovers nature in a definite way.4 A covered railway platform takes account of bad
weather; an installation o f public lighting takes account o f the darkness, or rather o f
specific changes in the presence or absence o f daylight -- the 'position o f the sun'. In
a clock, account is taken o f some definite constellation in the world-system.... When
we make use o f the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously
available, the environing nature is available along with it. (BT 100-101; SZ 71)
In referencing the larger environment in which we dwell, the specific material an item
o f street equipment is made o f becomes somewhat immaterial A clock or a sun dial showing
the time in the hustle and bustle o f downtown, takes account o f the specific constellation o f
4 "In den Wegen, Strafien, Briicken, Gebauden ist durch das Besorgen die Natur in
bestimmter Richtung entdeckt." The phrase "as having some definite direction" is a literally
correct translation o f in bestimmter Richtung. It is, however, totally misleading in the context
o f this passage. I have modified the translation of this sentence in Being and Time
accordingly as "...in a definite way".
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the earth relative to the sun and silently serves as one o f our available tools that can
simultaneously veil and unveil our being-in-the-world.
6.2
SIGNS AS STREET EQUIPMENT

Among all types o f equipment, signs stand out due to their special status. As we shall
see, signs may be regarded as second-order equipment- A sign as a tool for indicating
[Zeigzeug] reveals in each case the context in which interrelated items o f equipment are being
used. By e xam ining the functioning o f signs we may gain further insights into the workings
o f equipment in general. We will discuss street signs within the context of moving about. I
will apply insights from the general analysis of signs to basic principles o f sign design and sign
placement. We will begin our discussion o f signs inductively by considering turn signal
indicators of motor vehicles, an example Heidegger uses.5
The turn signal indicators, manipulated by the driver, are located at each comer o f a
car. By their prominent location on the car's body, the signal indicators establish and display
a noticeable reference to other traffic equipment and participants, motorized and unmotorized.
Irrespective o f whether the turn signal indicators are used or not, their prominent location
alone evokes the entire public network of equipment for moving about. By means o f
5 "Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position
indicates the direction the vehicle will take -- at an intersection, for example." (BT 108-109;
SZ 78) Flashing turn signal indicators were not invented yet in the mid 1920s when
Heidegger wrote Being and Time. Instead o f the "adjustable red arrow," I will use the
flashing turn signal indicator, its present-day equivalent, since it serves the same referential
function. I will modify the quotes accordingly.
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activating the turn signals, the driver indicates to others what his intentions are for the next
few seconds down the road. The other traffic participants can thereby anticipate his
movements and adjust their behavior accordingly. By slowing down, stopping, o r by giving
way, they can smooth traffic flow and avoid collisions. An inattentive or inconsiderate driver
who neglects to give a sign o f his intended moves can undermine the entire smooth
functioning o f the local traffic situation from which he also profits and on which he implicitly
relies. Such a driver obviously does not respect the public world o f moving about. It is said
o f such a driver that he is living "in his ow n world."
A turn signal indicator is an integral and constitutive part o f the entire environment
o f moving about. When flashing, a turn signal o f a private automobile is an inherently public
sign.
This sign is an item o f equipment which is available for the driver in his concern with
driving, and not for him alone: those who are not traveling with him and they in
particular also make use o f it, either by giving way on the proper side or by
stopping. This sign is available within-the-wo rid in the whole equipment-nexus o f
vehicles and traffic regulations. (BT 109; SZ 78)
An available sign, such as a flashing turn signal, prompts us to automatically react to
the traffic situation that it highlights. Without thinking we are reacting to this sign by
adjusting our speed, giving way, or by stopping. These spontaneous reactions to a specific
situation while being on our way, Heidegger suggests, indicate general characteristics o f our
being. "Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's being-in-the-world.
Dasein is always somehow directed [ausgerichtet] and on its way; standing and waiting are
only limiting cases o f this directional 'on-its-wayl." (BT 110; SZ 79)
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Signs provide a unique orientation on our way. They are distinguished from other
tools in that they grant us a contextual orientation for our public ways and thereby assist us
in moving about in this context with simultaneously attentive yet absorbed actions and
responses.
Almost always, signs provide a spatial reference, as in the case o f a sign indicating
"One Lane Road Ahead" or a warning sign without any words displaying only a curved
arrow. It is not the spatial assignment itself however, which is the distinctive service o f a
sign. As in the case o f a sign indicating "Rail Road Crossing Ahead - 500 Feet," the sign
orients the participants within the equipmental whole o f roads, vehicles, and traffic
regulations. "Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells,
what sort o f involvement there is with something." (BT 111; SZ 80)
Signs marking the entrance o f a country, state, county, city, or corporate headquarters
bear witness to where one's concern dwells. Even street name signs, mostly in small towns,
may cue strangers and reassure local residents wherein they live. Each street name sign in
Sebastopol (Sonoma County, California), for instance, repetitively displays an apple,
reinforcing this town's self-understanding as an apple growing community. In Rohnert Park,
another city in the same county, all street name signs in the same city section start with the
same letter, supposedly for a semblance o f neighborhood identity and easier orientation in this
city o f about 50, 000 people. Rohnert Park is planned community built within a few years.
This fast growth shows. The same-letter sign device is a well-intended visual aid which adds,
however, to the monotony and sameness against which these identity tokens have been
installed as a remedy.
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A sign is not just a semiotic device signifying directions, spatial distances, places and
activities. A sign such as "Road Construction Ahead," brandishing black letters on an orange
square standing on one comer, summons the entire nexus o f construction activities and
equipment one finds oneself in and thereby directs us to make appropriate public use o f the
construction site. Such use can consist o f slowing down, watching out for road workers and
machinery, or taking a detour. Put succinctly: a sign highlights a world and thereby enhances
its availableness. As evidenced by carefully designed lettering, shapes, and colors, signs
radiate the projected image o f scenic routes, national parks, international corporations,
Western saloons, and the flowing, streamlined frontiers o f NASA. Advertisers know that
signs are not merely utilitarian devices signifying occurrent objects. They exert much creative
effort on designing signs that promise a world. As we know, the buyer most often acquires
only the promise.
The power to make a world visible and more accessible to its users is at the center o f
Heidegger's definition: "A sign is not a thing which stands to another thing in the relationship
o f indicating; it is rather an item o f equipment which explicitly raises an equipmental whole
into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character o f the available
announces itself." (BT 110; SZ 79-80; emphasis in italics mine)
We can now ask: "How do we interact with signs?' The way signs work and users
encounter them points to some general requirements for sign design and sign placement.
We have learned so far that a sign is tool with a special status: it highlights an
equipmental nexus and thereby makes each item o f this nexus more accessible. Despite its
temporary and relative prominence at each instance o f use, a sign remains subservient to the
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entire equipmental whole. A sign sheds light on our everyday dealings in such a way that it
opens up the "aroundness" [das Umhafte] o f a familiar environment and brings it into an
explicit survey [Ubersicht]. Heidegger elaborates:
The sign addresses itself to a being-in-the-wo rid which is specifically "spatial". The
sign is not authentically "grasped" Y'erfafit"\ if we just stare at it and identify it as an
indicator-thing which occurs. Even if we turn our glance in the direction which the
turning signal indicates, and look at something occurrent in the region indicated, even
then the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the
circumspection o f our concemfiil dealings, and it does so in such a way that the
circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an
explicit "survey" whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This
circumspective survey does not grasp the available; what it achieves is rather an
orientation within our environment. (BT 110; SZ 79)
In a typical everyday situation a sign is properly used, or authentically encountered,
neither by close scrutiny nor by reflection. If traffic participants were to engage in detailed
examination or deliberation o f traffic signals or turn signals, for instance, the familiar
availableness o f the equipmental environment would get lost, and the involved activity o f
smooth and safe moving about would stop. A sign, such as a traffic or turn signal, is
authentically encountered through spontaneous action in response to the situation at hand.
By using the words Ubersicht and, in particular, Ubersehen, Heidegger provides an
additional hint about how we authentically "grasp" a sign. The English rendition o f Ubersicht
and Ubersehen, both translated as "survey," does not preserve the significant connotation
conveyed by the preposition iiber. Especially Heidegger's unequivocal use o f the gerund
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Ubersehen 6 (overlooking, glancing over, disregarding, glossing over) suggests that a sign is
authentically encountered when one notices and then overlooks it, Le., virtually ignoring it
in favor o f taking in the relevant context which the sign highlights. For a "glance o f an eye"
[Augenblick], the sign lights up the interconnected functioning o f the things around us.
Thematic awareness o f the sign is neither required nor useful. In many situations, thematic
awareness may impede the smooth functioning o f moving about.
Through the unique
capability of the tool for signifying, however, we can notice a sign and still be successfully
absorbed in going about our business.
The spatial references o f a sign are subordinated to a referential whole o f
commonplace equipment and public practices. Therefore a sign does not need to convey
exact dimensions even if it pretends to do so, as is often the case o f signs indicating a
distance.7 Taking the indicated dimension o f the sign "Railroad Crossing Ahead 500 Feet"
literally would in fact be counterproductive. The worldly orientation and circumspective
g lancing over would be lost in favor o f g aining insignificant spatial precision. The pursuit o f
6 Note that in the important passage quoted above, Heidegger uses Ubersicht (survey)
in quotation marks, but not Ubersehen. It seems that he feels more comfortable with the
gerund Ubersehen (glancing over) in which the preposition uber (over) resonates more
strongly and therefore hints much better than "survey" at the proper use of a sign in its
context.
7 Contrary to many signs which announce a distance along the path o f travel, indicated
dimensions of roadway widths (e.g., o f a bridge or o f a lane through a toll plaza), heights
(e.g., vertical clearances o f tunnels or underpasses), and vehicle weights are critical and
therefore precise. By prominent location, size, color contrast, and precision o f indicated
dimensions (e.g., "Clearance 14 ft. 6 in."), signs let the motorists know how literally they
want to be taken. This is a subtle yet crucial feature o f the sign in its capability to highlight
the situation at hand and prompt appropriate actions. Well designed and placed signs signal
to the motorists in an instant in which environment they move about, i.e., "wherein they
dwell."
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such precision when approaching a railroad crossing, for instance, can yield only tragicomic
effects because they play on our instinctive understanding o f how to property use such a sign.
Circumspective glancing over, which is engaged yet relaxed, does not focus on a
specific item o f the equipment-nexus, for instance on the sign giving advanced warning o f the
approaching railroad crossing or the flashing turn signals.
On the contrary, the
circumspective glancing over which achieves that environmental orientation which safeguards
our moving about. Focusing on one item o f equipment can yield more information (shape,
color, exact location, etc.). But this sharpening o f the focus leads to an isolation o f the
(previously available) item from its circumspectivety encountered environment. When such
a sharpening o f focus or gazing sets in, the worldly character o f the available equipment-nexus
is lost. Gaining more and precise data results then in a breakdown o f the absorbed and
transparent engagement which signs are supposed to facilitate.8
What are, then, the requirements for a sign to do its job? We will illustrate these
requirements by contrasting a message sign in a neighborhood commercial district (Lombard
Street, San Francisco, Figure 6-1 top) with street name signs and store signs (Minna and
[New] Montgomery Streets, San Francisco, Figure 6-1 bottom). I want to show how signs
can open up and reinforce a local world, on the one hand, and how they can destroy the
genius loci o f a street for several blocks, on the other.
g
The present analysis o f the circumspective encounter o f signs in everyday dealings in

contrast to scrutinizing, studying, or designing signs is an extension and application o f our
discussion o f the four modes o f being in Subsection 3.2.3 (Environment and Equipment). The
distinctions between equipment that is available (mode 1) or unavailable (mode 2) for its users
and equipment that is studied as objects (mode 3) or merely contemplated (mode 4) are
fundamental analytical categories o f hermeneutic phenomenology.
Figure 6-1
Signs Destroying (top) vs. Reinforcing (bottom) Local Worlds
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A sign can highlight the context o f an equipment-nexus (pedestrian accessible
commercial district with offices above retail stores) with which its regular users are already
fam iliar (see Figure 6-1 bottom). The street names at the building's com er are legible
without being obtrusive. Showing themselves as part o f the building, they squarely indicate
the location o f the building and orient the passers-by. Even though the com er and the
location o f the street name signs are emphasized by a decorative wave pattern, the signs do
not draw undue attention to themselves and remain in line with the horizontal accents o f the
building facade. For those citizens who already inhabit and dwell in this nexus o f various
interlocking equipment (for walking, automobile traffic, commerce), the street name signs
reinforce a familiar context. Moreover, these name signs are noticeable only to the degree
that they draw attention to the entire context at hand, not to themselves. In this way, they
provide a double function: they orient the newcomers and reinforce the local world for those
who are familiar with it.
The success o f a sign in supporting transparent everyday activities depends on the
balance it strikes between announcing itself vs. announcing its context. Heidegger reminds
us of the need for an inconspicuous background for a sign to do its works. As is the case
with the proverbial knot one ties in a handkerchief as a sign to oneself to do a specific chore,
"the sign itself gets its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness o f the equipmental whole,
which is available and 'obvious' [.selbstverstandlich] in its everydayness." (BT 112; SZ 81)
Sufficient difference and appropriate contrast between a sign and its inconspicuous
background is required. The degree to which a sign must "stand out" from its environment
in order to be noticed depends on the significance assigned to this sign relative to others
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nearby. The degree o f prominence is well balanced in the case o f the "Minna Nail" store sign
(Figure 6-1 bottom). Its dark background makes the sign stand out against the light building
facade while the light color o f the letters harmonize with it. For emphasis repetition is chosen
rather than mere size (a second store sign is partially visible in the lower right hand comer).
Such balancing and blending makes for the success o f "Minna Nails." An absence o f
proportion and response to its immediate environment is the major fault of the large message
sign on Lombard Street (Figure 6-1 top). This oversized sign was installed in early Fall 1998
by the State o f California, Department o f Transportation (Caltrans) to provide information
for motorists traveling northbound on Lombard Street (designated "U.S. 101" for several
blocks in lieu o f a proposed freeway that was to replace Lombard Street). This message sign,
supported by a massive steel pole anchored in the narrow median strip, is almost three stories
high and visible from many blocks away. This sign is out o f scale and out o f touch with the
neighborhood in terms o f material, texture, and message. It draws successfully attention to
itself, but it is doing so at the expense o f the local world. It brings the fast world o f the
freeway into a neighborhood commercial habitat. Instead o f highlighting the environing local
context in its inconspicuous familiarity, the intruding sign insists on making the conspicuous
familiar by invoking a world out o f place.
Instead o f shining guiding light on the
neighborhood and making it more accessible, this message sign was installed to shine "Golden
Gate Bridge Congested" into the living rooms and bedrooms o f adjacent motels and
residences. Disproportional in bulk and bearing, this weighty sign forces itself upon the
neighborhood and reduces it to subservient background.
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A suitable street sign announces itself only in so far as it enhances the smooth
functioning o f transparent background practices. A well functioning street sign conforms to
a principle which may be labeled "the law o f appropriate contrast." This "freeway" sign on
Lombard Street is inappropriate and violates the local background activities. In a different
context, this pompous sign would conform to this principle. It needs a fitting location. Its
present posture is an imposture.
Applying this "law o f appropriate contrast" to the commercial strip, I want to submit
the following observations. Many commercial strips in the United States, typically along
arterials rather than along downtown retail frontages, suffer from visual "pollution" or
overload. Too many signs have been placed on such a street. M ore precisely, the visual
chaos is caused by no order or hierarchy o f signs. Almost every sign is o f equal referential
weight to the point that none is realty signifying anything effectively. References abound, but
no structured referential whole exists. On such a commercial strip, we find ourselves in a
"forest" o f signs which mutually cancel or neutralize each other. One might as well have no
signs at all.
An inconspicuous background is valued both by public and private interests in sign
design and sign placement. Various parties compete for the same urban space. Public signs
are often outnumbered and dwarfed by private signs. Even billboards, the extremely large
signs installed mostly for advertising purposes, lose their referential impact on motorists
driving by as soon as visual competition arrives which spoils the prized inconspicuous
background. Newly added boards which attempt to tie the passers-by to the alluring product
or exotic vacation spot result in diminishing appeal o f each individual piece o f visual magic,
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and diminishing returns to the sponsor. Short o f monopolizing the urban vertical space, a
sponsor has to frequently change the content o f the message if he wants to avoid that. W ith
continued display and diminishing novelty and appeal for the potential consumer, the sign
begins to blend into the urban background.
In central business districts, along freeways, and especially along commercial strips,
private and public signs com pete for the attention o f m otorists and pedestrians. A "forest"
or "jungle" o f signs may be regarded as sensory overload o r merely as an aesthetic nuisance.
For regulating and controlling traffic movements, however, visual clutter is a liability. For
signs such as "One Way," "Do N ot Enter," or "Stop" to do their job, one must be able to
count on their continued conspicuousness relative to their local operational environment.
W ithout obliterating other items o f the urban landscape, an important traffic sign must stand
out against the background o f other equipment for moving about and the rest o f the urban
landscape. The interconnected nexus o f buildings, roads, and street furniture must add up to
an overall inconspicuous background if vital signs are to be able to do their job.
An
analogous requirement applies to the appropriate acoustic environment for police vehicles,
ambulances, and fire trucks. Our discussion suggests a basic but important guideline: In each
case the efficacy o f the visual or acoustic sign to be noticed depends more on controlling the
environmental background, which needs to remain inconspicuous, than on specific features
o f the sign itself.
In summary: Irrespective o f how conspicuously a sign may stand out against its
background, it is this very background and its continued smooth functioning to which the sign
renders its service. Contrary to art which draws attention to itself a sign draws attention to
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itself only for a glance and for the sake o f the whole equipment-nexus o f which it remains a
part. In order to signify successfully, a sign must not be noticed thematically.
Because it ensures and enhances the accessibility o f a network o f equipment, the sign
can be considered a second-order tool. As a stationary pilot or beacon a sign momentarily
highlights the context o f familiar equipment and shared practices, i.e., the world one is
actively immersed in. For a sign to be truly available to its users, the world to be lit up
momentarily must already be familiar.
In anything available the world is always already "there". Whenever we encounter
anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically.
But it can also be lit up in certain ways o f dealing with our environment. It is the
world out o f which the available is available. (BT 114; SZ 83)
And it is the world in its lit up and reinforced /wconspicuousness (as in Figure 6-1 bottom)
to which the sign remains subservient in a signifying symbiosis.
6.3
STREETS AS EQUIPMENT FOR WALKING

World and available equipment mutually reinforce each other. W hen the world is
present yet announced, it is folly there. Then we are immersed in our everyday activities, and
the various items o f equipment we are dealing with are transparent to us.
We may assume that it is easy to design for transparent coping activities in which one
is "lost, i.e., folly immersed. Such an assum ption is based on the incorrect conjecture that
"transparent" means approximately the same as "bland," "drab," or "neutral." W hen smoothly
functioning everyday activities take place, they are not noticed. The following challenge for
167
design arises: how to get a handle on an environmental nexus that is, and should remain,
transparent? Designing to ensure transparency can be approached from a negative vantage
point. Answering the question how environing transparency is lost or becomes unavailable
may provide some clues in an indirect manner. I will pursue this roundabout approach in this
section in search for transparent equipment for walking.
During this examination o f streets I will present a few simple, pedestrian examples.
Streets encompass two different types o f circulation space: the roadway for movement and
parking o f vehicles, and sidewalks for walking and access to local property. While the
roadways o f streets receive much attention and resources in our motorized society, sidewalks
are often treated as a fringe issue.
Sidewalks become unavailable to pedestrians because they are frequently not designed
o r maintained as functioning equipment for walking. Sidewalks are improperly vertically
aligned, under-scaled and over-paved, obstructed, not contiguous, or they end precipitously,
leading pedestrians nowhere. We will sample each type o f equipmental breakdown.
In North American cities more walking seems to take place on treadmills and "Nordic
Tracks" than on sidewalks. Even if this observation is incorrect, urban planners and civil
engineers need to bear in mind: Sidewalks must not be neglected, if we want to avoid that
even more "walking" and neighbors disappear behind private walls. A broken or abruptly
jutting sidewalk "sticks out" and ends transparent walking immediately (Figure 6-2 top). On
such a sidewalk one may loose one's footing, trip and fell. During good daylight one may be
able to see this uneven surface in advance and avoid falling by going around it (the film role
container placed next to the raised concrete shows a sidewalk projection o f about five inches).
168
Figure 6-2
Pedestrian Realms: Broken Up (top) and Out o f Scale (bottom)
169
But one's leisurely and absorbed walk is disturbed, not only at this specific spot but for the
rest o f the walk, perhaps even for the remainder o f one's stay in this neighborhood. From
now on, one is on alert for future breakdowns during one's walking. When a sidewalk thus
announces itself in its unavailableness, walking as an activity in which one is immersed has
ceased.
At some locations a flush surface is rare, at other locations it is too abundant. In
attem pts to provide for spacious mobility and safety, we often overdesign, leaving a locale
o f asphalt in the wake (Figure 6-2 bottom ). This residential dead-end street has a curb-tocurb width o f 40 feet. At the location o f the playground (the sandbox is partially visible at
lower left comer) the roadw ay bulges out to 104 feet (2.5 times its regular width),
presumably to accommodate stated o r assumed requirements for turning around emergency
vehicles, fire trucks in particular. One may want to justify such large pavement circles on
safety grounds. But turning around fire trucks can easily be accomplished by using their
reverse gear or via the townhouses' driveways, especially by fire department staff who are
trained and skilled in maneuvering in tight spaces. Such abundance o f unneeded asphalt
invites racing behavior (not only from outsiders), and it divides a neighborhood. Insisting on
overly wide roadways in order to accommodate dubious turnaround requirements for
emergency vehicles highlights the need to make turning around unnecessary. This can be
accomplished by implementing a guideline for designing streets that make a neighborhood
truly accessible: if at all possible, do not build dead-end streets.
170
Figure 6-3
Sidewalks Unavailable in Two Ways
171
If a cul-de-sac cannot be avoided, build a roadway loop large enough (1) for
conveniently turning around emergency vehicles and (2) for inhabiting the dead-end street's
"dead space" by building at least one o r two dwelling units in its center. In our case, the
playground might mark the neighborhood as a safe and children-friendly environment if it
were placed in the "dead space" o f a looped street. One may object to such design by
pointing to the playground's increased traffic exposure. But placing the playground in the
center o f the looped street can result in several synergistic benefits: (1) emergency vehicles
can swiftly turn around; (2) by providing horizontal deflection o f traffic, the central
playground can function as an amiable, multi-functional traffic calming device; (3) when going
to and from the playground island (which should have curb cuts and marked crosswalks), one
has to watch only one direction o f traffic at a time; (4) the playground, placed in such a
prominent location rather than being tucked away, makes itself more accessible and discloses
itself to the entire neighborhood as a public place for play and recreation.
Sidewalks dwarfed by overly wide roadways and walkway surfaces punctuating
absorbed walking are not the only obstacles for pedestrians. When walking, we occasionally
have to stop on a sidewalk that ends abruptly, forcing us into the roadway or into the illegal
and unsafe realm o f jaywalking (Figure 6-3 top). Having arrived at the other side, caught
neither by police nor car, we find our narrow path obstructed by power line poles prominently
placed in the center o f the sidewalk next to an elementary school (Figure 6-3 bottom). A
token attem pt has been made to widen the pedestrian realm o f two feet on either side o f the
pole by setting one front yard "fence" pole 5 inches back. A t this location the pedestrian
realm can be improved in several ways. (1) The power lines can be undergrounded. (2) The
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elementary school administration may approve that the power line poles be moved to the
street side o f the ample, unused lawn in order for the school and neighborhood to have
adequate walking, wheelchair, and stroller access. (3) The sidewalk can be widened to
provide a clear pedestrian path o f travel (I recommend that the unobstructed path has a
minimum width o f 6 feet).
At times pedestrians find themselves banned from their own community (Figure 6-4).
One side o f the street provides no sidewalk, the other side suddenly truncates one's path and
renders the road narrowed to motorized use only. An elementary school is tw o blocks away
from this pedestrian trap. Driving one's children to and from school becomes necessary under
these street conditions. Passing through this gauntlet sours one's short walk to Cherry Valley
School (Petaluma, California). This is also the way to downtown. Once you decide to drive
to avoid the dead-end sidewalks, you contribute to congesting "Historic Downtown" even
further. You become annoyed because you can't find available parking spaces, and "Historic
Downtown" becomes less accessible, less attractive, and less historic.
These few examples o f sidewalks unavailable for absorbed carefree walking can be
found in Petaluma, California within about one square mile. They are spotted easily, even by
someone who usually drives rather than walks the streets.9 These few examples tell the town
dwellers: these streets are not made for walking. Streets unequipped for walking inform us
citizens that the pedestrian paths lead to nowhere, as shown in Figure 6-5. Shopping malls
9 Thinking phenomenological^ has made me aware o f transparent equipment facilitating

being-in-the-world. It has made me also more sensitive to environmental failures or
breakdowns, and provides me with clues about making equipment "invisible" for the sake o f
being-in-the-world.
Figure 6-4
Narrowed to M otorized Use

(the same location seen from both directions)
174
have no use for pedestrians since they cannot carry much merchandise home. Pedestrians are
allowed to walk parallel to the mall, remaining at the periphery of shopping, but cannot walk
into its "center." Instead o f a sidewalk leading to the arrayed stores, we find lush landscaping
(Figure 6-5 top). I f citizens become sick or frail in part because o f lack o f exercise which
walking provides, they have to "go" to a health center and consult with experts on proper
body movements (Figure 6-5 bottom). The path for pedestrians is narrow here (6 inches
wider than the 2-foot gutter) while the signs announcing the paths and ways to health are
filling the extravagant landscape buffer. From what or whom is this buffer shielding? Cars
crossing railroad tracks in close proximity to this foundation and center o f health care could
invoke vitalizing circulation. But the paths for pedestrians on both sides o f Southpoint
Boulevard lead instead to nowhere. They abruptly end even though development has taken
place beyond the railroad tracks. Motorists, however, are not impeded by the pedestrian road
blocks and find at the southern end o f Southpoint Boulevard the State's Department o f Motor
Vehicles.
Pedestrians must be able to take a smoothly linked street network fo r granted in order
for streets as walking equipment to be truly available to them. When streets reveal gaps in
providing transparent walking equipment, a whole neighborhood, even a whole town,
becomes unavailable for walking.
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J PETALUMA HEALTH CAIU f>is

J PETALUMACOMMUNITY HEM111 1,;:
|
PETALUMA HEAI TH ( t 1*
4 PATHWAYS TI'C'KA\smh
Figure 6-5
Paths to Now here
176
C hapter 7
Moving About as A Work of Art
Chapter 4 has summarized Heidegger's thinking about technology and the work o f art.
A work o f art understood as a cultural paradigm gives to things their look and to men their
outlook on them selves. 1 An artw ork, as construed in this inquiry, is tacit culture made
visible by unifying ongoing practices and giving them focused physical expression by design.
In this chapter I w ant to show that transportation, especially our advanced automobile
highway system, has the potential for becoming a work o f art o f technologically advanced
societies.
7.1
TRANSPORTATION AS OUR POTENTIAL WORK OF ART
7.1.1
Transportation's Central Role

Several branches o f contemporary technology are candidates for becoming a w ork o f
art: gene technology, fusion o f atomic nuclei as a new source o f virtually unlimited energy,
the internet, space stations. Something unique about transportation technology makes it an
ideal candidate for a future work o f art.
Transportation embodies in a unique w ay the general character o f our technological
civilization: unprecedented mobility and its celebration. Where transportation is considered
Heidegger PLT 43; HW 28.
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successful, it incorporates efficiency, rationalization, change, the linking o f formerly distinct
regions and activities, the shrinking o f distances and consequently the blending o f cultural
differences. Especially in the advanced industrial societies, transportation is a m atter o f
serious concern. Residents in the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, for years have been
considering transportation as their number one problem.2 Transportation infrastructure,
policies, and financing are on people's minds and on the ballot.3 The "level o f service" (LOS)
o f traffic flow, expressed as a ratio o f actual traffic volume to theoretical capacity,4 has been
voted the yardstick o f future development and residential grow th.5 Traffic management is
2 Since at least the mid 1980's, transportation has been perceived as problem number
one for Bay Area residents, according to a poll for the Bay Area Council. The Oakland
Tribune, October 21, 1986; A-2. For a more detailed and recent update o f this poll, see
Chapter 2, footnote 3 (p. 43).
3 In November 1986, Alameda and Contra Costa Counties voted on an additional 0.5%
sales tax for transportation improvements. Berkeley Tri-City Post, October 22, 1986; 1.
4 For the methodology employed to arrive at volume to capacity ratios and associated
levels o f service (LOS), see Transportation Research Board 1980.
5 With Measure H having passed in Walnut Creek (November 1986), no future
development will be approved unless it can be dem onstrated that the level o f service at all
signalized intersections during the peak hours will not exceed a volume/capacity ratio o f 0.85
as a result o f development. Research I conducted at the Institute o f Transportation Studies,
University o f California at Berkeley (June 1986 - May 1987), under guidance from B etty
Deakin and Alex Scabardonis showed that most signalized intersections in Walnut Creek at
the time o f the vote already exceeded a volume to capacity ratio o f 0.85 dining the peak
hours. Relevant for our discussion here is the observation that one technological device
(growth control via quality o f traffic flow) is introduced to curb another one (almost universal
access via the automobile) whose ubiquitous availability is equally starkly defended. This is
another example o f our ambiguous, if not outright schizophrenic relationship to technology.
Apart from the "tragedy o f commons" at play here, the quality o f urban and suburban life that
is at issue here. The question o f the possibility o f "dwelling" is misguidedly phrased and
debated as a technological question.
178
becoming a serious matter also in technologically less developed parts o f the world.6 The
attention given to transportation issues is an indication o f its centrality for technological
society. This attention, and subsequent public plans to improve traffic flow, safety, and
efficiency, in turn will make the transportation system an even more totalizing and flexible
agent o f resource mobilization.
In the following, I will examine the automobile-highway system as a presently
dormant and sputtering work o f art. Airports and airways streets in the sky connected to
earth are then presented as a potential w ork o f art for the next generation to come.
7.1.2
The Automobile-Highwav System

Language reflects social practices. The very word "automobile" (self-mover) reveals
our understanding o f its mechanical workings and can explain the ingrained popularity o f its
use. For Americans, and increasingly so in other countries as well, the auto and the highway
have become second nature.
In contrast to the automobile, public transportation in the United States works, if at
all, only for commuting to and from the decreasing number o f central business districts.
Except for commuting to and from these activity centers, which become increasingly
dispersed, you generally need your auto for purposes o f business, recreation, and for visiting
friends and relatives. Without access to a car, you have only poor access to the economy, to
6 See, for example, Lisa G. Nungesser, "Urban Congestion in Cracow, Poland: The
Problem Remains Despite High M ass Transit Mode Split", Journal o f the Institute o f
Transportation Engineers, Vol. 56, No. 8., August 1986.
179
cultural events and other recreational activities. W ithout a driver's license, you have, for
practical purposes, no identity. W ithout participation in weekend "low riding" o r cruising,
a suburban youngster is not "in."
In short, without the ability to motivate and move 7 yourself you are a captive in a
free society. You are, in transportation jargon, a "captive rider" because you depend on the
mercy o f merely public transportation. Instead o f being a self-mover, you depend on the
omnibus which is a vehicle for everybody for "them" as many perceive this mode choice,
thereby declaring it second-rate by definition in a society o f individuals. Indeed, public
transportation is also called "mass transportation" or "mass transit" in technical term s.8 When
you depend on vehicles for "everybody" for your transport, your choice o f time, locations,
7 The nouns motion, motive, m otif motivation, and automobile are all derived from the
same Latin w ord movere (to move). The common source o f these and related term s is not
always clear or obvious. But language harbors a common origin and reveals it upon inquiry.
Language reflects social practices and background understanding. This insight is given
earthly expression in the formulation o f late Heidegger that language is "the house o f being;"
see, for example, the essays in his On the Way to Language (OWL).
8 From the perspective o f an individualistic society, "mass transportation" appears to
be prim a fa cie an "inauthentic" mode o f transport, irrespective o f how w ell a public
transportation system works. One's self-understanding as an independent, self-reliant, and
well dem arcated "I" appears to be violated through any form o f ride sharing (e.g., bus, van
pool, car pool, jitney). This self-understanding o f many US Americans, especially dominant
in the W estern and younger parts o f the country, is one decisive factor often overlooked in
the numerous and periodically repeated attem pts for obvious ecological reasons to
increase the number o f persons per vehicle, at least for commute trips. For a suggestive
analysis o f our embodied transport practices from a Jungian perspective, see James Hillman's
Psychological Fantasies in Transportation Problems. Irving, Texas: Center for Civic
Leadership, University o f Dallas, 1979; reprinted in a slightly abbreviated version as
"Transportation" in Hillman 1991, Chapter 8: Psychoanalysis in the Street. For a strong
defense o f the automobile as "our" mode o f transport, "authentically" based on evolved social
practices and forms o f land use in the W estern United States, see Melvin M. W ebber "The
Joys o f Automobility," in W achs and Crawford 1992. The connection betw een auto
transportation and culture is explored via diverse contributions in Lewis and Goldstein 1986.
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and com fort levels are curtailed. Y ou don't decide anymore alone on your moves. You are
no longer a unique individual, standing out o f the masses. And public sentiment, trying to
nurture an association between mass transportation and collectivism, often suggests that it is
not a long way from being a "captive rider" to becoming a "free loader."
Riding on the freeway in your auto-mobile, compared to mass transport, frees your
ways o f doing things from social constraints. You can do your "own thing" in your selfmoving space bubble; that is at least one o f the illusions which freeway riding is driving on.
In several o f his novels, Jack Kerouac described how riding the automobile can move
the m otorists:
It was drizzling and m ysterious at the beginning o f our journey. I could see that it
was all going to be one big saga o f the mist. "Whooee!" yelled Dean. "Here we go!"
And he hunched over the wheel and gunned her; he was back in his element,
everybody could see that. W e were all delighted, we all realized we were leaving
confusion and nonsense behind and performing our one and noble function o f the
time, move. And we moved!
This passage from Kerouac's 1955 novel On the Road 9 exemplifies the exhilaration o f
transport the 1950's offered the growing number o f automobilists. M embers o f a high-tech
society, whose identities are bound up with change, have no particular home. Change itself
and "being on the move" becomes the home without a home.10 High-tech nomads dwell via
moving. Daily advertisement urges you to jump on the bandwagon and begin moving your
body through Jazzercise, Nordic Trak Skies, or via homebound bicycles. These more endured
Kerouac 1976, 127.
10 For an early acknowledgment o f the impact o f ever changing spatial patterns, see
M elvin W ebber's essay on "The U rban Place and the Non Place U rban Realm" (Webber
1964).
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than enjoyed movements, the repeated promise goes, will get and then keep you in shape so
that you can count yourself among the "movers and shakers," even if you don't get anywhere.
Let us continue a while with autom otive nomad Kerouac On the Road. While
accompanying D ean M oriarty, the novel's hero, on another cross-country auto trip, Sal
Paradise is singing this little so n g :11
Home in Missoula,
Home in Truckee,
Home in Opelousas,
Ain't no home for me.
Home in old M edora,
Home in Wounded Knee,
Home in Ogallala,
Home 111 never be.
Being everywhere is being nowhere, the song suggests.
Homelessness and no place
attachment are the other side o f high mobility, at least for a generation that is beat. Yet, Sal
Paradise, Dean M oriarty, and all those James Deans in the country wouldn't have it any other
way. They see themselves as rebels with a cause that moves them. As the beatnik literature
and movies o f the James D ean generation such as "Rebels Without a Cause" indicate, "the
cause" does not have to be well understood or articulated in order to serve as a moving
agent.12
11 Kerouac 1976, 240.

12 Off-beat poems, music and car chases, as portrayed in James Dean's few movies,
became a work o f art (in Heidegger's sense) for the beatnik generation. James D ean (19311955), its hero, died at age 24 when his sports car crashed at high speed. I f this "death o f a
car's man" had happened only in the movies, it w ould have made a tragic, albeit somehow
appropriate, finish and finale.
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The freeway allows you to pursue your very own trip13 without being obstructed by
people that have a different goal than you. Through grade separated highways, tunneled,
depressed or elevated, cross traffic is moved out o f your way: "they" are on their own trip.
The freeway is designed to allow merging traffic to enter the main flow with a minimum o f
friction. The other "movers and shakers" who, being moved on the same traffic channel and
perchance on the same radio channel, share a portion o f their trip with you as they move in
the same direction, generally maintaining a skillful and collected vigilance in keeping a safe
distance. Keeping a safe distance from one another is a prerequisite for "getting there:"
13 The fantasy that you can do your "own thing" in your self-moving space bubble is a
decisive factor on which the continued popularity o f the automobile is driving. As a daily
commuter on an express bus, I become, more or less inadvertently, an eyewitness o f what
auto drivers are doing in their cars while driving. Especially when the express bus is stuck
in traffic, looking down from the omnibus into the crawling solo-mobiles reveals the auto as
the vehicle o f choice. Automobilists, while in motion, are doing the following, in rough
decreasing order o f frequency: drinking (coffee), using the car phone, eating, smoking,
putting make-up on, shaving, reading newspapers or books, writing, talking to oneself
(inferred), singing (inferred), drumming on the steering wheel o r dash board, picking their
nose. The variety o f activities decreases with increasing number o r persons per vehicle.
Talking to one another is rare. Sleeping, while common on the bus, is a behavior discouraged
by the setting; a car passenger rarely sleeps. Keeping to oneself, in contrast, is the most
common form o f communion during the typical ride sharing commute. Romance, suggested
by frequent or prolonged eye contact, intense talking, or outright fondling, occurs only during
the Friday p.m. auto commute, especially Wien such out-of-town driving ushers in a three-day
weekend. The omnibus, providing even less privacy than car or van pooling, correspondingly
affords a diminished variety o f behavior. Bus passengers sleep or doze, read, or type on their
lap-top computer. Given the physical proximity and some choice in seating, talking is
surprisingly rare. The cellular telephone, an increasingly used communication tool
supplementing locomotion by car, is hardly used on the bus. W hen it is used, however, the
telephone (typically an incoming call) marks a distinct intrusion in the omnibus world. The
increased used o f car phones, lap-top computers, modems, and fax machines turns private
automobiles into office-mobiles. This trend worries some transportation planners because the
increasing commute hours are used to effectively extend the office hours, which may reduce
public pressure to battle recurring traffic congestion and urban spraw l
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going to work, visiting friends or the movies, and getting home. As on the freeway, so in life:
keeping a safe distance is ground rule number one for "getting along." 14 Sophisticated
technology can bring the ordinary but typically buried background practices to the fore and
into drastic focus, including the "natural" consequences o f violating the safe distance law.
While driving on the freeway, however, you are led to forget constraints o f any sort
and tend to fancy yourself as being free to choose your speed, your lane, and the rhythm you
are moved by. And if you offer a ride to someone else, you share your "space," but you are
still in control. Freeway crimes (e.g., robberies, shootings) alone demonstrate that the actual
control at one's disposal is much smaller than is typically assumed. But this fear o f losing
control mobilizes another round o f calls for "getting on top" o f the problem and for "getting
the upper hand over crime by increased police presence, carrying "mace," and equipping your
car with telephone, "the club" or tinted windows. The drive to be and stay in control is a
condition for the widespread acceptance o f the freeway technology. For m ost people, the
freeway fulfills this drive better than any other transport technology. Yet, by giving leeway
to this drive, the freeway in turn increases demand for control.
Through this brief glance at highway safety, its perception by the public, and its
exploitation by the "safety" industry, the automobile-highway system reveals its spiraling and
self-nurturing appetite for the intertwined netw ork o f mobilization, control, and technological
14 This form ulation unduly ontologizes the freeway experience by suggesting that this
experience is primordially given and that the stationary portions o f living are ju st derivatives
o f the existentially m ore basic practice o f moving about. This is o f course an exaggeration,
even for a highly mobile society. The form ulation "as on the freeway, so in life" is used here
as a caricature that actually casts some light on our general understanding o f "being-with"
others by highlighting a specific safety practice in using the automobile-highway system.
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innovation.
In Subsection 7.1.4 on the Automated Highway System, currently being
developed, we will briefly discuss the most recent efforts, actively supported by the United
States Federal government, to drive the electronic highway to its limits, ia ., present limits.
Until we gain control over highway capacity and congestion by way o f electronically
hooking up the vehicle to a steering and guideway network (the new generation o f freeways),
we will have to make do with the existing, less efficient fram ework. When the freeway is
congested, your freedom o f movement is severely restricted. But even during "forced flow,"
you hold the steering wheel, you choose your acoustic environment, and you still enjoy a safe
distance from the other drivers thanks to your expensive steel cage which, after all, has been
chosen by you. The automobile-highway system nourishes our fantasies o f freedom, mobility,
and individualism.15
I f you are willing and able to pay the price, the automobile indeed grants you almost
ubiquitous mobility. Drive-in restaurants, drive-in movie theaters, and drive-in banks allow
you the luxury o f not having to leave "your space."
15 For an unabashed celebration and defense o f the values o f freedom and individualism
as afforded by the automobile and the required road system, see Melvin M. Webber, "The
Joys o f Automobility," in Wachs and Crawford 1992,274-284, quoted earlier in this Chapter
in the context o f individual vs. mass transportation (footnote 8); see also Webber's earlier
essays o f 1964,1973, and 1983. The pervasive influence o f the automobile is undeniable, yet
few make the case for the autom obile as a defining agent o f our culture. Webbers is one o f
the few voices today arguing for affirmatively acknowledging the automobile and its central
place in our culture, and for incrementally improving on both. Using different concepts,
Webber is in feet acknowledging the automobile-highway system as our w ork o f art as
defined in this chapter and in C hapter 4. Those who pay hom age to this system in word and
everyday action embrace rather than merely utilize it; hence the grounds for "The Joys o f
Automobility."
185
Even today, in the face o f tough global competition, the automobile industry remains
central to the U.S. economy. The autom obile and its groundbreaking counterpart, the vast
system o f engineered pavement, is the G estell incarnate. The U .S.-Interstate system alone
has indeed global dimensions: added together, this largest engineering project in history
stretches 1.5 times around the earth.
The above phenomenological fragments may suffice to present the automobile's
central role in our understanding o f being. It is so central that we don't notice it most o f the
time. Is it, then, a work o f art, or are w e being taken for a ride?
For a generation which understood itself as beat, the symbiosis o f auto-ways and free
ways was used as a kick. You were getting high on the highways which became instrumental
for the speedy transport o f your emotions. But even amidst the instrumental practices, there
shines forth the kernel o f a new relation to the technology o f transport. Let us listen again
to our beat fellows On the Road: 16
We all jumped to the music and agreed. The purity o f the road. The white line in the
middle o f the highway unrolled and hugged our left front tire as if glued to our
groove. Dean hunched his m uscular neck, T-shirted in the w inter night, and blasted
the car along.... It was crazy; the radio was on full blast. D ean beat drums on the
dashboard till a great sag developed in it; I did too.... "Oh man, what kicks!" yelled
Dean.
For those having grown up with autos and freeways, driving today, with a limit of 55
o r 65 mph put on our motions, is less ecstatic but no less central. The Los Angeles
metropolitan area is the climax o f the automobile-highway system. In greater Los Angeles,
the centrality o f the auto as a common denominator o f social intercourse becomes more
16 Kerouac 1976, 128.
186
visible than anywhere else. To understand the protest in Los Angeles against the installation
o f high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, also known as "diamond lanes" for their symbolic
pavement logo, one needs, as Joan Didion suggests in her White Album ,17
to have participated in the freeway experience, which is the only secular communion
Los Angeles has. M ere driving on the freeway is in no way the same as participation
in it. Anyone can "drive" on the freeway, and many people with no vocation for it do,
hesitating here and resisting there, losing the rhythm o f the lane change, thinking
about where they came from and where they are going. Actual participants think only
about where they are. A ctual participation requires a total surrender, a rapture-ofthe-freeway. The mind goes clean. The rhythm takes over.
The participation in the "only secular communion Los Angeles has" requires the
cultivation o f skills ju st as in any other vocation. In his portrait o f Los Angeles, Reyner
Banham observes: 18
As you acquire the special skills involved, the Los Angeles freeways become a special
way o f being alive.... I f motorway driving anywhere calls for a high level o f
attentiveness, the extrem e concentration required in Los Angeles seems to bring on
a state o f heightened awareness that some locals find mystical.
7.1.3
A Work o f A rt O ff Course
Despite its somewhat subdued yet continued popularity, the private automobile is,
however, generally not recognized as our collective w ork o f art. We continue using it as a
great mobility tool, and occasionally celebrate its proud achievements and "its inpact on our
lives," typically in the form o f parading old-timers. Yet we seem to be too conscious o f its
negative consequences to acknowledge the private automobile as our work o f art. Let us
recall some o f the shadows the automobile is casting on our mobility.
17 Didion 1980, 83.

18 Banham 1984, 214 ff.
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We are painfully aware o f the thousands o f injuries and fatalities per year,19 entangling
us in a deepening quagmire o f financial, legal, medical, and insurance dilemmas.
The freeways that prom ised sw ift access to jobs and recreation are loaded with
congestion and frustration.
Making room for urban freeways has caused displacement o f many people and
deterioration o f the quality o f life for those who "live next door."
We are aware o f the enormous appetite o f the auto for gasoline which, even if we are
willing to pay increasingly higher prizes for it, is not renewable.
Over the years, cars have becom e m ore energy efficient and less polluting but with
more and m ore cars on the road,20 we can't help but see and smell their output. So
we create regional Air M anagement Districts to coordinate local air quality measures
and to overrule, if necessary, local Home Rule for the greater good o f the entire
region.
19 "Collisions on highways, roads, and streets kill more than 500,000 people worldwide
each year, and an additional 15 million are injured. The cost o f American and Canadian
accidents (more than 52,000 deaths and 4 million injuries) is estim ated to exceed $60 billion
annually." Wilson and Burtch 1992, 94.
20 In the U.S. there are currently 190 million registered vehicles (as o f 1993). "There
is a registered m otor vehicle for every 1.3 people in the United States, and the average
American household has twice as m any automobiles as it has children under the age o f
twenty." M artin Wachs, "Men, W omen, and Urban Travel: The Persistence o f Separate
Spheres," in Wachs and Crawford 1992, 86. The United States has by for the highest level
o f motorization. In 1985, there were 711 vehicles (cars and commercial vehicles, excluding
motorcycles) per 1,000 people. Following suit are Canada (561), N ew Zealand (545),
Australia (540), and W est Germany (440). These 1985 data are reported in Wilson and
Burtch 1992, 95; see also Table 2-2 in Institute o f Transportation Engineers 1992a, 30.
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To protect us against the cumulative noise o f the combustion engine, we build walls
between our highways and communities, thereby confining the driver to tunnel vision.
While driving along portions o f1-680 in Contra-Costa County, for instance, your view
o f M ount Diablo is diabolically obstructed.
Attempts to beautify the separating sound walls through expensive materials and
pleasing patterns 21 reveal even more obtrusively the surgical severance between our
"functionally specialized" spheres o f dwelling, working, recreating, and the ways o f
"getting there."
Tunneled freeways and gigantic desolate parking lots near shopping malls attest to the
aesthetic deterioration the car has brought in its wake. Reacting to this haunting
nightmare w ith increasing guilt and decreasing funds, we call for retrofitting
Aesthetics in Transportation.22
Increased access for the automobile is often gained at the expense o f other, mostly
"softer" transportation modes, such as bicycling o r walking. Paving the way for the
private autom obile frequently reduces the quality o f or reduces public access to
natural and urban amenities. For decades, San Franciscans and tourists had been
weary o f the Embarcadero Freeway, a double-decked monstrous structure barring
convenient access to one o f the most beautiful waterfronts in N orth America. The
21 A lineal foot o f sound wall (8 foot high, 8 inches thick, with a 3 foot 6 inches concrete
base) costs $170 (G eorge Nickelson, Omni-Means, personal communication w ith the author;
October 22,1993). Assuming sound protection on each side o f the highway, the construction
cost for a mile o f sound wall amount to about $1.8 million.
22 U.S. D epartm ent o f Transportation 1980.
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enduring cries for its demolotion were countered by long-standing arguments o f its
local benefits in terms o f improved traffic flow and economic gains. As on other
automotive issues, the collective resolve was ambiguous. It needed the jolts and the
cracks o f the Loma Prieta earthquake o f 1989 to arrive at the decision against repair
and in favor o f demolition.
Private automobile use and ownership patterns not only reflect an economically
stratified society, but also further amplify it. Persons w ith no or insuffient access to
a private vehicle do not have equal access to the economic pie.
Despite the
automobile having become m ore and more affordable since the invention and mass
production o f Ford's Model-T, the distributional consequences o f unequitable car
ownership have neither been adequately addressed nor solved."
Our overdependence on the private automobile is directly responsible for urban

sprawl, loss o f farmland, inefficiencies such as long commuting on congested
highways, oil dependency, pollution, and difficulties for child care and working
women.
Alas, if after all the auto-highway system is not a w ork o f art, it comes closer to such
status than any other contemporary candidate. Despite the centrality and the spell it may have
over us, we clearly continue to have an ambivalent relation to the auto-highway system.
Therefore it cannot be a work o f art in the encompassing sense as discussed in Section 4.3
23 I cannot forget a rum or I once heard, according to which executives in charge o f

hiring workers asked the job applicants, as standard procedure, whether they owned an
automobile. If they didn't, this "applicant profile" was then taken as "evidence" that the job
seeker would not be able to maintain a job.
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(Elements o f a W ork o f Art) and as succinctly defined by Dreyfus and Hall: "Things function
as works o f art when they unify a people and show them their understanding o f being." 24 The
freedom o f movement and the emotional transport the automobile may offer are offset by
ecological and aesthetic concerns, and by vexing problems stemming from people's
displacement and inequitable access to this system. These persisting negative features prevent
the auto-highway system from being openly and unambiguously celebrated as a work o f art.
Furthermore, we feel the need for controlling and taming the auto, at least in close proximity
o f where we dwell. Communities increasingly ask for more traffic calming and control,
especially on residential streets. Can we accept, or embrace, a work o f art that we want to
control?
In short, the private automobile and its vast strata o f asphalt and concrete are not on
a par with the G reek temple in terms o f providing a unifying cultural paradigm.25 A work o f
art "gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves." 26 The outlook the
automobile offers us is one we seem to reject o r perhaps missing a chance for a new
cultural identity wearily overlook.
24 Dreyfus and Hall, "Introduction," in Dreyfus and Hall 1992, 21.

25 la Asphalt Nation, Jane Holtz Kay (1997) recounts how the private automobile turned
from supplementary servant o f our mobility to autocratic m aster o f our public dwelling.
26 Heidegger PLT 43; HW 28.
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7.1.4
The Automated Highway System

I have argued in the last two subsections that the automobile-highway system came
close to becoming a work o f art, roughly during the period 1945-1965. This mobility system
has been serving us with reasonable success as transparent equipment. It is a veritable
candidate for becoming a w ork o f art. But despite its ubiquity and about 200 million N orth
American daily users, it has not reached the comprehensive status o f a unifying cultural
paradigm.
A work o f art is not a tension free artifact; on the contrary, it lives and thrives on
internal conflict. In a widely recognized work o f art, however, tension, conflict, and ongoing
struggle are not neutralized, but harmonized and thus fruitfully preserved. The preponderance
o f consequences left unharmonized is the most likely reason why the automobile-highway
system of the post World W ar II era, a promising candidate, did not become a full-fledged and
publicly recognized work o f art. This candidate, spruced up with sophisticated electronics,
has a second chance as the "automated freeway" and is making a new run for becoming a
work o f art after all.
The advanced industrial societies, especially the U nited States o f America, Germany,
and Japan, are currently working on a high-tech update o f the freeway and interstate system.
In the United States, these efforts are coordinated and made public under the name Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) o f which automated freeways are a central and perhaps the
most exciting and controversial part. ITS America, a consortium o f private companies and
the U.S. Federal Government, is spearheading this nascent technology and is pushing "early
deployment" in its publicity campaigns. With the help o f advanced electronics, the new
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marriage o f sophisticated guideways and sm art automobiles under autom atic control is
supposed to give our ground transportation system a smarter look and a new, "intelligent"
outlook for humankind currently stuck in traffic.
The Automated Highway System (AHS), an integral part o f the overall Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) efforts, is proposed as a solution mainly to traffic congestion
and accidents. An automated highway consists o f a conventionally constructed roadway
equipped with an advanced vehicle guidance system embedded in the roadway. A smart
vehicle able to detect and follow the smart guidance system will make driving automatic.
Individuals can leave the driving to the intelligent freeway system which takes care not only
o f vehicle steering but also o f adjusting the traffic flow to varying weather conditions and
road conditions (vehicle volumes and spacing, merging traffic, incidents, breaking, and so
forth). Once the driver has programed the auto-com puter for the desired destination (i.e.,
selected the exit from the automated freeway), the driver may pursue more rewarding
activities, may access the virtual electronic super-highway via on-board or lap-top computer,
or may go to sleep. Ergonomic panels on the smart-mobile's dashboard indicate the vehicle's
location in the smart network, estimate travel times, suggest alternate routes, and offer other
flexibility options at the driver's disposal. The smart vehicle alerts a sleeping o r drowsy driver
when it is time to leave the smooth electronic super-highway and to m uster up the courage
and gum ption for driving on the traditional "unimproved" roads.
Because the individual smart vehicles are guided through artificial rather than direct
human intelligence, the safety margins betw een moving vehicles can be drastically reduced.
Doing away with the slow and capricious reaction times o f humans, autom ation can thus
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reduce the minimum (safe) headway between vehicles from currently 1.5 - 2.0 seconds to 0.8
seconds. This enormous reduction in minimum vehicle headway amounts to a doubling o f
freeway lane capacity. Proponents o f the AHS expect not only a considerable reduction in
accident rates but also a virtually congestion free commute. Egan R. Smith concludes his
study o f the automated highway system (AHS) as follows: 27
AHS deployments on congested urban and suburban freeways can significantly
improve speed and travel time on these facilities, and significantly increase facility
capacity to respond to future year demand.... The attraction o f the AHS facility
results from increased capacity and the facility's ability to sustain a constant
comfortably high speed at increased traffic flow.
The AHS has passed beyond its incubation phase and awaits deployment on our
freeways. In August 1997, the world's first AHS public demonstration was performed on a
7.6-mile stretch o f Interstate 15 northeast o f San Diego, California. Several Members o f the
U.S. Congress attended the demonstration and participated as passengers in autom ated
vehicles. During test runs for this public demonstration, The Press Democrat reports, "...the
program's 10 Buick LeSabre guinea pigs have logged more than 5,000 miles o f autom ated
travel. Most o f that distance has been in convoy, and mostly 12 feet apart at 65 mph but
w ith the easy potential, say test engineers, o f 100 mph w ith only 6 feet o f separation." 28
This emerging technology leaves many questions unanswered at the present time.
Many o f these questions (such as the interaction o f autom ated and traditional vehicles,
breakdown o f vehicles on the automated guideways) are technical in nature and can probably
27 Egan R. Smith, "Modeling Perspectives for the Autom ated Highway." Institute o f
Transportation Engineers Journal, March 1996, 38.
28 Paul Dean (Los Angeles Times), '"Look, officer, no hands': Automated highway may
be around the comer." The Press Democrat, Saturday, July 5,1997, A3.
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be solved in the near future by further research. Legal and institutional issues (e.g., vehicle
crashes due to failure o f the autom ated guideway or the smart cars) are far from being
resolved. Transportation planning methods and experience provide the greatest challenge to
the AHS technology as a proposed solution to recurrent traffic congestion. In a recent paper,
I have cautioned against the high expectations high-technology companies and the U.S.
government place on AHS, and have argued against this mobility technology because o f low
person/vehicle occupancy ratios accepted as a given, continued use o f the internal combustion
engine, and static supply-demand assum ptions.29 M y paper concludes:
Maximizing vehicle capacity on high-volume links o f a regional travel network
amounts to optimizing a subsystem (AHS) while increasing stress on the rest o f the
system. Such stress occurs in the form o f increased vehicular overload or congestion
on the "non-advanced" network links (assumed to remain at traditional capacity).
Additional side and after effects o f this p artial network optim ization are: increased
energy consumption via induced vehicle miles traveled, increased air pollution, and
further settlem ent dispersion.... The AHS, if built, will be a planning disaster o f the
greatest proportion. This "system" is built on technocratic thinking that avoids
addressing the causes o f transportation problems and prefers instead to treat, or
merely mask, their symptoms through very expensive technology. It is therefore a
folly to build automated highways that would only pave the way for electronically
cementing gridlock.
Given these serious reservations concerning net benefits, does the AHS have a chance
o f becoming a work o f art? I believe yes, provided the technology o f the AHS becomes even
more sophisticated, and provided regional transportation planning is made m ore intelligent
as well. In the following I will make a few suggestions on how a system o f automated
freeways can become our next work o f art.
29 Joem Kroll, "Electronically Cementing Gridlock: The Folly o f Building Automated

Freeways." Institute o f Transportation Engineers, 51st Annual M eeting o f D istrict 6, San
Jose, California, July 5-8, 1998. Compendium o f Technical Papers, 312-311.
195
The AHS as currently conceived and developed can incorporate many o f our social
practices that characterize living in a fast, high-technology environment that provides a
multiplicity o f options. The AHS addresses our high expectations for mobility, user-friendly
advanced technology, flexibility, and for personal safety. But the AHS lets us down in term s
o f addressing the land use and transportation dynamics, environm ental impacts, and the
continued dependency on fossil fuels. AHS technology cannot deal directly with regional land
use and transportation dynamics. One major change, however, may turn this likely planning
disaster into a possible w ork o f art, i.e., a manifestation o f the implicit self-understanding o f
our technologically advanced, postm odern society. This m ajor modification o f the AHS
hinges on switching from gasoline powered to electric vehicles. This switch can address the
issues o f air pollution, noise, and oil dependency.
The weak link o f electric vehicles remains the relative low range or, conversely, the
prohibitive weight o f needed batteries for long distance travel. I f designed primarily for
electric vehicles, the AHS could supply electric energy to the smart cars along their way. The
electronic guideway could provide this energy source via a "third rail" mechanism (similar to
a subway system) or via electronic signals or beams. While driving on such autom ated
highways, the vehicles may store enough energy for completing their journey on traditional
roads after they exit the electrically charged freeways.
Such a mobility system would
elegantly unify two opposing tendencies: our drive for community or even secular communion
(the common energy source and guideway), and our drive for independence and individuality
(driving individual, custom -tailored units with unique looks). This high-tech guideway and
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energy distribution system will further charge us up if its energy in turn is supplied from
renewable resources such as hydroelectric, geothermal, biomass, wind, o r solar power.
I f the scenario o f thousands o f vehicles receiving their "clean" life sustenance from the
same energy source simultaneously in front o f everyone's eyes does not inspire a work o f art
in the making, consider the trump convenience. The intelligent guidance system, while
providing safe and swift mobility while drivers relax, supplies the smart cars w ith clean
energy, charges their batteries for the remainder o f their trips on un-electrified roads,
identifies the energy receiving vehicles, and presents their owners with a monthly bill (which
the owners may pay electronically while riding on the e-way which is charging them). No
need to fill up at gas stations, to mail checks, or to fight for oil or gas. Such book and house
keeping can be done in the e-mobile which becomes office and dwelling. Myriad moving
dwellings linked together turn the intelligent highway into a public space o f advanced
proportions. I f this proposed technology encourages more ride sharing (the home o r on
board computer can find matches), and if this sophisticated technology advances our
understanding o f our common high-tech practices while we are actively engaged with them,
we will be moved by a new work o f art.30
30 I owe the idea o f electric instead o f gasoline powered vehicles driving on the AHS to
my colleague Jack Lucero Flack who, responding to my AHS critique quoted above,
suggested electric vehicles as a way to make the AHS more intelligent (conversation in
September 1998). I developed the electrification idea further by making the electronic
guideway or roadway the source o f propelling and charging the smart vehicles. I am a
member o f the Intelligent Transportation Systems Council (Institute o f Transportation
Engineers). The idea o f using the smart roadways also as energy source for vehicles has, as
far as I know, not been proposed before. The idea o f developing the electronic highway (eway) into a new cultural paradigm is certainly breaking new ground.
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Leaving the earth, if only for a short while, has been mankind's dream for aeons. In
the following section, we will explore airports and airways, including their required ground
transport linkages, as a possible future work o f art which would make a consummate match
with the newly conceived e-way. This widened horizon may give us further hints as to needed
elements for m ak in g our ground transportation more uplifting.
7.2
AIRPORTS AS A FUTURE WORK OF ART
7.2.1
Special Features o f Aviation Technology

The high-tech character o f aviation technology is obvious. Our aviation ambitions can
be traced back to the beginning o f W estern civilization when Icarus tried to escape from
imprisonment by means o f wings made o f wax. The wings we rely on also melt; but they do
so only at a higher temperature. The Promethean dream to overcome gravity and be free as
birds in the sky has been realized in this century. It took less than seven decades (1903-1969)
from the first flight to the landing on the moon.31
Aviation has reduced the vast distances between continents to a m atter o f a few hours1
flight time in relative comfort. Global totalization has become the norm. Apollo, our hightech god o f sunlight and prophecy, helps us see the entire earth as one unit. Finally, we can
make even the earth a part o f the G estell or a part (or even the focal point) o f a non
31 Whether the Wright brothers were actually the first aviators by means o f a heavier
than air dirigible, and whether they were beaten by a few years, is immaterial as to the
enormous speed o f aviation development. For an excellent technical treatm ent and historical
overview o f aviation technology, see John Anderson's Introduction to Flight (Anderson
1985).
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instrumental understanding o f being.
Future generations may use the earth merely
instrumentally as a filling station or as a transfer point in inter-stellar travel. Ultimate

objectification would then become universal. Or w e may, alternatively, view the earth as our
original ground giving rise to aviation and airports, our future works o f art.
Like no other technology, aviation can hold up to us what we as a civilization are up
to: being challenger o f space, the ultimate frontier. Seen in the proper perspective, aviation
can make us both proud and humble. The more sophisticated our airships, the less significant
our "earthly" concerns: we may become "awe-full," in the original sense o f the word as being
filled with awe. This transport may contribute to the melting o f subjective vs. objective
stances into one standing reserve (Bestand) in which we overcome our technological
understanding o f things as mere "objects" on call to be ordered by "subjects." Heidegger
implies a newly found solidarity between formerly opposed "subjects" and "objects:"
Whatever stands by in the sense o f standing-reserve no longer stands over against us
as object. (QCT 17; VA 24)
N ow we can realize that by treating our everyday things as objects, we have been on the
wrong track all along.
Because o f the temporary suspension o f the earth's pull on us, resulting in both the
elevation and the volatility o f flying, aviation technology requires a tight-knit man-machine
symbiosis that leaves the subject-object dichotomy o f modernism behind. Such a symbiosis
requires, more than in any other area o f technology, ultimate precision, vigilance, and care for
the things our being so visibly depends on. Furthermore, aviation by necessity transcends any
individualistic trip by forcing ultimate cooperation betw een all agents involved: aircraft
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engineers and mechanics, m eteorologists, air traffic controlers, pilots, aircraft personnel, to
name the m ost important ones. The above features suggest that if a work o f art emerges, it
will do so in the context o f aviation.
7.2.2
A New Denver International A irport

Denver will probably be the first metropolitan area in N orth America which will see
the construction o f a new major airport for general aviation. Many interested parties have a
stake in "doing it right:" the residents o f the region, the local politicians, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the airlines, and future travelers. This section outlines the initial planning
stage and criticizes the underlying planning and design m ethodology from the perspective
discussed in this chapter. Subsection 7.2.3 will outline some features the new airport should
have in order to serve as a possible w ork o f art for the region.
Like all major airports in this country, the present Stapleton International Airport will
soon reach its operating capacity. The Metro Airport Study, sponsored by the Denver
Regional Council, identified the expansion o f Stapleton International into the federally owned
Rocky M ountain Arsenal northeast o f the city as the best site for the proposed facility. A
decade o f public debate culminated in the preparation o f seven briefing papers for the "New
A irport M aster Plan." 32
The Denver urbanized area has about 1.5 million residents, w ith Denver itself having
a population o f about half a million, but it is not the population size o f the Denver
32
City and County o f Denver 1985.
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metropolitan area itself w hich will generate the projected long-term needs. Denver is a
W estern hub for major airlines (the fifth largest airport in the USA). This regional function
has made the present carrier airport obsolete. The m ajor steps in the preparation o f the
M asterplan (aviation demand forecasting, financial feasibility, community and legal issues,
program for long-term development, etc.) have been taken. In 1985, the recommendations
concerning the new carrier airport were subject to the political process. The decisions which
had to be made were difficult because o f the enormous public investment required and the
uncertainty of aviation demand for the new airport brought about since airline deregulation.
55 million enplanements are projected for the year 2020.
The briefing papers for the new airport masterplanning consist o f the follow ing:33
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
No. 5
No. 6
No. 7
W ork Program and Management Plan

Forecasts and Airport Requirements
A irport Site Selection
Preliminary Design Concepts
Long-Range Airport Concept
Phase I Development Plan Alternatives
Final Recommendations.
Illustrious consulting firms -- specializing in fields ranging from geo-technical engineering,

aircraft noise control, airport access, parking and circulation have been contracted for
cooperation. Issues brought up and comments being furnished during the meetings o f the
Planning Group, the Advisory Committee and during public hearings have been meticulously
recorded. The work program for the technical issues o f the study consists o f 103 separately
33
City and County o f Denver 1985, Briefing Paper 1, 1.
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identified tasks. The work program for the environmental study alone consists o f nine
additional separate tasks.34
In short, attempts have been made to meet the requirem ents for sound engineering,
responsible p lanning, and dem ocratic participation. Judging on the basis o f the available
material, I conclude that the highest standards o f comprehensiveness and technical expertise
have being applied. W hether requirem ents for a new generation o f wide body aircraft with
unusually long wing spans and for super-sonic and sub-orbital aircraft will be taken into
account or not, the present planning process embodies the state o f the "art."
Yet there is no evidence that thought has been given to incorporating features that
reflect aviation as a candidate for a possible new cultural paradigm. Table 3.2.1, Technical
Evaluations Matrix (Year 2020), cross tabulates 19 factors (27 measures o f performance) and
9 alternative sites for the airport. This table is followed by a Ratings M atrix (Table 3.3.1.)
in which even ethereal factors such as "Vegetation Factors" and "Wildlife Resources" are
being considered. Yet "Residences to be Acquired" and "Change in Adjacent Communities"
are the only measures o f perform ance (expressed in dollar values) for the factor "Social
Effects." A look at the Ratings M atrix (Year 2020) is an invitation for indecision: 169 boxes
with different shades o f grey refuse to reveal the "optimal" solution.
The problem o f
aggregating all these micro-evaluations into a convincing overall design scheme is passed over
with silence. Even if a weighting m atrix for the 27 measures o f performance is to be decided
upon, the arithmetic outcome may be binding but hardly convincing as a coherent design idea.
34
City and County o f Denver, Briefing Paper 1 ,6 ff.
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Briefing Paper N o. 3 on Site Selection concludes w ith the bottom line. Table 3.3.2
presents a Comparison o f Capital Costs (Million 1986 Dollars, Year 2020). The total costs
projected for the nine site alternatives range from 15 Million (Existing Stapleton, Base Case
1) to 2,348 Million (Stapleton Expansion, Second Creek, Canted Runways)!
Despite the laudable efforts at comprehensiveness and technical know-how,
something is fundamentally wrong with a planning procedure which breaks up the
masterplanning into 100 mini tasks. The procedure is fundamentally flawed because it expects
the explicit decision making about the 100 subcomponents to merge into one objectified
overall design scheme which is supposed to be optim al given the evaluation criteria. Even
explicit and quantified objectification o f the 100 decision fragments will not add up to a
convincing overall design scheme. Following Heidegger, prior to this analytical procedure
a pro-ject, an agreed upon general concept which is "put before" all the minute
categorizations and quantifications, should come first. Such a commonly shared project ~
the specific features o f which may be and should be initially blurry is able to synthesize the
myriad o f considerations into a unified edifice. Unifying the political debates, public hearings,
and the myriad o f detail decisions during its long construction period and subsequent use,
such an inspirired edifice as synthesizer may function as a regional work o f art. Planning and
designing for facilities o f the magnitude o f the Denver airport without a unifying scheme is
a sterile vivisection even before the edifice can com e to life.
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7.2.3
Denver International Airport as a Proposed W ork o f Art

The toughest challenge for designing the new airport as a work o f art is letting go o f
the instrumental attitude o f challenging and willful making. A willed or imposed work o f art
is a contradiction in terms. Designers and engineers generate numerous ideas to solve design
problems. However, nobody knows in advance what the work o f art will be like until it is
suddenly "there." If the above characterization o f transportation, and aviation in particular,
as the presently purest manifestation o f what we as a collective are up to is correct, then a few
meta-technological design principles may be distilled from what is "currently going on."
Those design principles, then, would not be imposed; they rather would be gathered from
reflections on our already existing but overlooked micro practices. Such gathering (Greek
legeiri) is the unique logic o f a w ork o f art.
Following Heidegger's poetic anatomy o f a work o f art (outlined in Section 4.3),
airport design and aviation as a potential work o f art have to embody the fruitful struggle o f
totalizing and resisting forces, i.e., the struggle between "world" and "earth." The interplay
o f these forces may inform the following post-technological design principles for the future
Denver airport.
A Desien Proposal
While the use o f an airport, as well as flying in general, is as smooth, comfortable, safe
and transparent as possible, w e are surrounded by friendly reminders o f our finitude,
mortality, and o f our fu n d a m e n ta lly endangered situation. Flying is a limited release from
"earth." Even while flying we realize that we are still dependents o f the earth (food, water,
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oxygen, fuel, communication, etc.). The flight crew, airline operations, and the airport design
features help make these dependencies unobtrusively visible to the traveler.
M ore tangible ways o f letting "earth" show itself can be devised. Points o f interest
on the ground are usually pointed out by the flight crew, not so the more im portant events,
i.e., when something goes wrong. These dangerous instances are the "earth's protest against
the smooth -- often arrogant dominance o f the totalizing Gestell, the ultim ate danger.
These refusals o f "earth" should be communicated not only to the technical support apparatus,
but to the passengers as well. But revealing "earth" in such a dow n-to-earth fashion goes
against the grain o f the perceived interest o f sm ooth airline management W orld Airways,
Trans World Airways and the other worldly airlines which assure you, united and with a
smile, that the sky is friendly.
The airport itself conveys a sense o f historic contingency by documenting what has
been there before. Thus traveler and employee are reminded o f our values and trade-ofls. The
history and contingency o f aviation itself is the subject matter o f exhibits placed in the
terminal buildings. The airport is an ideal place to accentuate a feel for individual and
collective transition. Global connectedness is stressed by various design features working on
different communication channels (visual, acoustic, touch related) while equally emphasizing
local ambience. International style architecture is avoided because this global architecture
reinforces the universalizing thrust o f aviation while neglecting to pay tribute to local
conditions and custom s. Flying remains an adventure when origin, transfer point and
destination reveal their unique regional differences.
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Denver lies at the eastern foothills o f the Rocky M ountains, which are part o f the
m ountain chain which stretches from Alaska to the southern tip o f Chile. The Rockies are
part o f the Pan American spine. Denver as a former American frontier still connects the East
and the West o f the continent. This extraordinary geographical location and place in history
is highlighted through corresponding exterior and interior design. While staying clear o f the
mountains, the runways, taxiways and view corridors o f the terminal buildings are chosen in
such a way that the mountains become present. A rtifacts in the lobby and at the gates
recollect the American and Indian traditions and place the Denver region in its history. The
overall design o f the terminal complex recalls these traditions by alluding to pueblo, adobe
or railroad station. The airport and its natural surrounding mutually reinforce each other in
their unique features by letting nature and artifact be distinct yet related phenomena. Each
is autonomous and yet related to its opposite. Their connected autonomy lets each come into
its own.
By way o f the general design features outlined above, the new Denver International
A irport will be m ore than a way station to be passed through as quickly as possible.
Stapleton International, or whatever name the new airport will carry, will then serve as a
m irror o f our practices and ambitions as well as a means for transport. It will remind us that
when flying the skies we tend to leave "earth" behind or even forget it altogether. The airport
will be smooth and transparent in its utilitarian functions catering to our demands for
efficiency, change and pace. A t the same time, "earthly" design features will quietly remind
us what we are up to, and that it does not have to be that way. Thus the airport will m irror
our practices and implicate w hat they leave out, thereby offering us a meaningful place in
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space and time. Gathering these functions into one technological arte factum , the airport will
be a m anifestation o f techne: the coming together o f art, craft, and technology. Denver
International may thus become a regional w ork o f art.
H orst Berger and Edward M. D e Paola are working on the enclosure structures o f the
Landside Terminal. The tensile structure will consist o f 1.45 million square feet o f fabric
roof. In an article reporting on their efforts, Berger and De Paola express their aspiration for
this portion o f the new Denver A irp o rt:35
One o f its most visible features will be the Great Hall o f the Landside Terminal.
Tensile structure technology will stand out as a means o f enclosing space efficiently,
economically and elegantly. This fabric ro o f expresses the integrated nature o f tensile
structures where form and function are identical, where art and technology merge.
On the inside, the structure resem bles a classic basilica; on the outside, it imparts
images o f mountains and tepees. The new Denver A irport will be an enjoyable
architectural experience, created by the truly integrated effort o f architects and
engineers.
7.3
A RESISTING THOUGHT
A w ork o f art is a m anifestation o f the implicit self-understanding o f a unified.,
historical culture. It may therefore be inappropriate to expect a pluralistic society such as the
USA to find itself in one work o f art. A way out o f this dilemma may be the coming into
being o f many diverse works o f art, each reflecting in their ow n way a distinct unified
subculture. The ultimately successful w orks o f art may then be those whose boundaries
intersect w ith others. Still, the question remains whether one work o f art can integrate and
35
Berger and De Paola 1992, 43.
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unify a pluralistic and fragmented culture.
The very hope for the emergence o f one
overarching artwork unifying a pluralistic society may evidence the pervasiveness o f the
totalizing enframing. Seen from the perspective o f middle Heidegger, there either is a work
o f art or we continue to live in a destitute time. Since a work o f art has to emerge out o f our
practices virtually overnight and cannot be willed, we first have to go through our
multifaceted technological fragmentation all the way before a work o f art can come forth and
thereby show us that we have gone through it.36
36 Because the artwork is rooted in commonly shared social practices, it cannot

materialize by legal fiat nor by mere artistic inspiration. I resume the artw ork theme
throughout Chapter 9, examining the compatibility and overlap o f the three principal street
functions, and discuss conditions for the emergence o f an artwork in my concluding remarks
at the end o f that chapter.
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Chapter 8
On the Way to Dwelling on Streets
In this chapter I apply the theoretical insights gained in Chapter 5 on "Dwelling in a

Technological World" to two very different street environments. I will focus first on a
m odest but important streetscape element: the trash can in the urban fabric (Section 8.1).
Then I will turn our attention to the continental network o f freeways (Section 8.2). M y
guiding questions are: How do trash cans and freeways thing? How can an understanding
o f their specific ways o f thingmg aid us in improving our public streets and freeways in such
a way that we may more humanly dwell on them?
8.1
THE TRASH CAN AS A THING

In order to exemplify the archaic sounding fourfold and its four aspects {earth, sky,
divinities, mortals), I will not review Heidegger's main examples, the water or wine jug and
the Black Forest farmhouse. Instead, I will apply these four dimensions o f practices to an
ordinary and often slighted streetscape feature: the trash can. I will interprete the trash can
as a thing in the sense developed in Chapter 5 and will show its specific way o f "thinging."
The original meaning o f "thing" is assembly or gathering. Drawing on this origin, I
will furthermore indicate how this unassuming streetscape item can come into its own as a res
publica, i.e., as a material focus o f public concern and import. The trash cans shown on the
photographs gather local worlds in San Francisco.
Figure 8-1
T rash cans just one block apart, establishing very distinct local worlds.
Mission St. at 4th St.(top); Howard St. at M oscone Convention Center (bottom )
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Grounding M atters
The trash can is a small but integral part o f the urban circulation system. The trash
can aids the circulation o f materials and foot traffic by maintaining basic cleanliness. In
fulfilling these important functions, the trash can harbors taken-for-granted-practices in many
ways. The trash can is generally taken for granted and therefore often disrespected, snubbed,
and even abused.
As beings dependent on food, fluids, merchandise, and information, we need to
depose o f left-overs, bags, containers, wrappings, and paper new and old. If we don't want
to carry trash around o r drop things on the ground, we have to find a trash can to depose o f
the refuse. By being available in a convenient yet unobtrusive way, the trash can accepts and
affirms us as producers o f waste. Nowadays, the trash can also gives us the option o f being
recyclers o f various elements o f the earth (Figure 8-1, top). Receiving our waste for
recycling, the trash can prom pts and affirms us as the earth's preservers.
Being itself made from elements o f the earth, the trash is a receptacle which conceals
and covers our waste and thereby protects our public ways. Its main value lies in its void that
temporarily stores our refuse and hides it from our view. Its ability to conceal our garbage
is transparent to us, yet we do not want the trash can to be literally transparent.
Standing firmly on the ground, the trash can tacitly holds up to us what we as a public
espouse and assume to be self-evident. We enjoy public places that are alive with people and
various activities. We want these places to be intensively used but also visibly cared for and
well maintained. It m atters to us to pass through or dwell in such orderly spaces. It matters
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to us to maintain distinctions betw een cared for and neglected spaces, between visual order
and clutter, and between clean and dirty places.
Directly and indirectly, the property placed trash can supports various urban activities,
such as walking, shopping, conversing, and the smooth transition from one to the other.
W ithout forcing a break in our urban flow, the trash can allows for the graceful and civilized
end o f one activity (e.g., deposing o f an ice cream's stick or wrapper) and thereby easing us
into a new activity (e.g., buying and reading a newspaper). The well-placed trash can, in its
own way, provides a proper ground for our urban and urbane ways by offering alternatives
to littering, by collecting trash and hiding it from our view, and by keeping this entire
gathering process in the background.
Opening Possibilities
As long as the trash can is periodically emptied, it provides an opening that is ready
to receive our materials for recycling which benefits our urban and our natural environment.
It functions as a receptacle in manifest ways. The trash can is a visible and persuasive
invitation to keep our urban parks, roadways, and sidewalks clean.
It also provides
opportunities for teaching us and our children how to care o f our common ground and for
instilling the unspoken message that keeping this ground civilized m atters to us. The trash
can teaches without words.
Even a fu ll trash can announces the possibility o f trash disposal, either by pointing out
the need to seek another empty one or by requiring compression o f its contents to make room
for more waste material. Even if temporarily full, a trash can does not negate its potential for
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its valuable service. On the contrary, a full or overflowing trash container reveals its valuable
service the more plainly and bluntly.
The trash can's service is evident to everyone. Its service, furthermore, is also stable
and generally predictable by the way it is placed. Obvious locations are where people are
likely in need o f waste disposal and where, conversely, they are most likely to litter if a trash
bin is not ready to hand. In general, its most fitting locations are therefore at convenience
stores, transit stops, benches, and at crosswalks. In order to provide an unobstructed
pedestrian path o f travel, the trash can is placed close to the building line or the curb. The
well-placed trash can facilitates several activities (unimpeded walking, keeping clean, and
waiting at neat spots) a t the same time.
The trash can presents waste disposal and recycling as inviting possibilities. Urban
dwellers have the choice to respond to or reject the trash can's open invitation. This humble
streetscape device summons and respects peoples choice. The trash container is not a
straightjacket nor does it call for a jail cell if its summons are not heeded. Urban dwellers
have several options. One can carry one's trash around o r take it home. One can deliberately
search for a trash can o r wait ft>r one that may come one's way. One can apply oneself and
compress trash to m ake room for more "contributions" to urban order and cleanliness. One
is also free to litter. The trash can opens up, and simultaneously shows us, these multiple
possibilities, thereby mirroring in a public way our social and political horizons. The streets
o f Singapore, for instance, are much cleaner than ours in the United States. For littering, we
don't get punished by the stick. For littering, we are punishing ourselves by having to look
into our urban m irrors.
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Figure 8-2
Trash containers attuning our proper ways.

Yerba Buena Gardens (top); at U nion Square (bottom)
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Attuning the Setting

The look o f the trash can attunes us to its genius loci, the pervading local spirit.
Design, placement, and maintenance o f the trash can establish a behavior setting. The setting
which this thing sets up attunes our perception, mood, and interaction. The way it strikes and
moves us affects us individually and collectively. We sense and respond to its "vibes." An
attractive, clean, and "empty" trash container prom pts us to use it, a shapeless, dirty, and
overflowing one repels us even if we intend to depose o f trash.
A trash can that properly attunes its surrounding is unobtrusively available without
drawing undue attention to itself It does not dw arf its surrounding and the local practices
it is designed to support in an unassuming way. In tune with the specific local mood which
the trash can establishes, passers-by tend to use or disregard it. A well designed, placed, and
maintained trash can, unpretentiously yet persistently, solicits silent authority, simple respect,
and an informal loyalty to the public realm.
The attunem ent the trash can creates by way o f its affective qualities is publicly
granted. Even if the trash can is made by an artisan, the collective attunement it may create
is not o f any one individual's doing or effort. We are attuned to a trash can's feel and
ambience even if we are not aware o f it. Its attunem ent is "in the air," that means it works
in subtle yet pervasive ways. In order for its civilizing sway to take hold a trash can must
never look trashy.
Figure 8-2 above suggests some o f the efforts with which trash cans may be selected,
placed, maintained, or even modified to increase their attuning power. B oth trash cans are
not only conveniently located for trash disposal and pedestrian circulation, they also reinforce
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the formal local spirit o f place. The trash cans vertical lattice design (Figure 8-2, top)
highlights the falling w ater and, by matching color, emphasizes its close connection to the
public green. The square trash can (Figure 8-2, bottom ) is actually a standard City model
adapted sufficiently enough to underscore both difference from and connection to the rest o f
the city. Through its overall shape it reinforces its connection to the city. However, its light
green paint (rather than the standard earthy ocher, see Figure 8-1 top) exactly matches the
color o f the adjacent ornate street light pole and complements the red bricks which pave the
way for shopping. N ote that the green paint of this shopping district trash container (Figure
8-2, bottom) also covers the area where the City typically displays its insignia.
The trash can at the bus stop (Figure 8-1, top), in contrast, flashes its official seal. It
shows citizens via perforated letters and arrows where to "recycle" (bin on top) and where
to "litter" (main container). The trash can at the convention center (Figure 8-1, bottom)
exhibits its sculpturesque elegance without any exhortation o r pointers. By means o f its slick
bronze surface, and in partnership with the adjacent bronze street light pole mimicking a palm
tree, this container o f civilization and commerce draws together a restricted world o f staged
conventions, exhibits, fashion and other vogue devices. The trash container Fabrique en
France establishes here an island o f exclusive calm in the urban thicket.
In Care o f M ortals
Opening up possibilities for us, grounding and sheltering our taken-for-granted ways
that we inhabit, and attuning us to the mood o f local w orlds, the trash can provides a final
service by recalling that the m aterial and social orders o f things can foil or fall short o f our
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expectations, ambitions, and dreams. It can gently remind us that the ways o f civility to which
it attunes and accustom s us are fragile and tem porary. When things fail o r show signs o f
intentional damage, the mood o f a place can dramatically change. An otherwise attractive and
well placed trash container that is overflowing, for example, is a sorry site and can spoil the
mood around it. Precisely because a trash can offers us choice, it can also show us how one
can be out o f tune w ith the decorum that it locates. W hen we don't respond to its summons,
the trash can disowns us by spotlighting our trashing o f the propriety it requests.
A disrespected, overflowing, or unstable trash can reveals to us that even simple and
robust things are subject to change and decay. A trash bin in obvious need o f maintenance
or repair teaches us that at times the taken-for-granted things and the practices they solicit
cannot be taken for granted and that they need our deliberate care, effort, and dedication to
keep them going. As we need things, so things need "the vigilance o f m ortals." (PLT 181)
Cared for and understood with vigilance the humble trash can affirms us as mortals.
As a temporary container o f our refuse and recycler o f our waste, the trash bin may hold vigil
over us and intimate that our possessions and achievements, including any particular instances
o f world disclosing, are temporary, fragile, even disposable. By facilitating our everyday
activities, the trash can tacitly teaches us that things are in flux, move in cycles, and need "the
vigilance o f m ortals."
Gathering Into One

The fourfold does not show its four aspects o f practices {earth, sky, divinities,
mortals) in sequence or as separate images. Establishing a local world, the fourfold gathers
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all four aspects simultaneously. When we analyze the trash can in its four distinct aspects,
we necessarily narrow our view o f the way it things. In presenting the unitary phenomenon
o f thinging, we indicate the undivided th in g in g in four distinct ways only for reasons o f
practicality and clarity. The trash can is one, and as one thing it gathers people, equipment,
and activities into one local world around itself. The trash can creates a ring o f sway. Its
sphere o f influence can maintain stable in the everyday urban flow when it receives our
m atter-of-fact and abiding attention.
This brief indication o f how the four aspects o f thinging fold into one local world
completes my interpretation o f the trash can as an urban thing, i.e., as a focal point o f urban
practices. It is one o f many possible ways to describe a th in g thin g in g. In order to present
a thing that takes hold o f its natural surroundings, I quote below Wallace Stevens's
"Anecdote o f the Jar" (1919).1 His account o f a jar -- confected "... not to console/N or
sanctify, but plainly to propound" 2 illustrates in poetic form the phenomenon which
Heidegger calls "a thing thinging." It may be read as a complement to my preceding tale o f
the urban trash can.
1 Contained in Harmonium, a volume o f poems published in 1923. Wallace Stevens

1997, 60-61.
2
Wallace Stevens, "Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction," in Stevens 1997, 336.
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Anecdote o f the Jar
I placed a ja r in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it,

And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The ja r was round upon the ground
And tall and o f a port o f air.
It took dominion everywhere.

The ja r was gray and bare.
It did not give o f bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
Responding to a cue from this jar, I propose to place a trash can in the center o f a
small urban space where it can take its gray and bare dominion. We spend a lot o f private and
public funds on "public art" that often amounts to no more than provocative gesture or
decorative addition to urban streets and plazas.
We ponder little on the many urban
sculptures which are to spur our urbane ways. A trash can encountered, at first sight, as a
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sculpture but disclosed as a thing may be a most revealing res publica. Such a trash container
prominently placed in an urban public place may tam e the wilderness around it, prom pt us to
rise to our public being, and gather our ways and means. As a public focal point this
container may do all this by ju st being there.
8.2
THE FREEW AY THINGING

After having traced how the urban trash can, a very humble thing often neglected and
shunned, gathers a local world around itself I want to focus now on freeways as public works
which receive a lot o f attention, in positive and negative ways. Based on "Dwelling in a
Technological World" (Chapter 5) I will review the freeway as a thing. My guiding questions
in this section are: How do freeways thing? How can an understanding o f their specific ways
o f thinging aid us in improving them so that we may better live with them in a manner
appropriate for a postm odern age o f mobility and flexibility.
Taking o ff from Heidegger's suggestion o f the freeway "bridge" and the netw ork o f
gracefully interconnecting freeways as civic structures that embody our technological
understanding o f being, I will examine the freeway from the perspective o f the four aspects
o f practices as explained in Chapter 5. I will argue that the typical freeway is open to the sky,
somewhat less hostly to the attuning divinities, deserves just a passing grade on earth, and
fails us as mortals.
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gKSiigii
Figure 8-3
msegvmigH
A gathering o f bridges and free ways (Source: University o f Pennsylvania)
The freeways and their "bridge" segments, gently branching o ff without interrupting
our travel, connect to other freeways which in turn lead to arterial, collector, and residential
streets. This laced hierarchy o f streets, culminating in the freeway in terms o f reach, capacity,
and public expense, takes hold o f the land and makes it accessible to virtually everyone. The
freeway has maximized our individual mobility tremendously. The possibilities the freeway
has opened up with respect to long-distance travel are historically without precedent. Drivers
and passengers who are still receptive to these relatively recent possibilities feel, at least
occasionally, an air o f excitement fueled by so much abundant freedom to move about. Those
who feel escorted by the freeway and its gentle directional options may rekindle the almost
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magical enthusiasm which the futurists celebrated in their early modem visions o f technology
and speed. Some o f them may feel grateful for modem urban designers such as Le Corbusier
who chartered cities to segregate into dwelling tow ers and open spaces interlaced with
highways.
This m odem vision, however, has gradually eroded since the early 1960s 3 when
individualized freedom and the celebration o f local worlds began to emerge as ends superior
to material satisfaction and the bland sameness o f a universalized "International Style" o f
dwellings, cities, and motorways. Already a generation ago, many people sensed that
contrary to imposing claims and promises o f unbridled mobility, the freeways, especially
where they insisted on penetrating dwelling areas, were cutting off options for individual
movement and access to local worlds. Since then, the ongoing freeway controversy has
demonstrated how much mobility, access, options, and choices matter to us.
We have seen in Chapter 5 that our everyday things must encompass all four aspects
o f practices for an anchored world and complete dwelling to take place. Testing the standard
freeway against the fourfold's quiet demands suggests that even the smooth and elegant multi
3 In response to increasing concerns about the negative impacts o f urban freeways, the
Federal-Aid Highway Act o f 1962 mandated that federally funded highway projects be based
on a continuous and comprehensive transportation planning process in which all levels o f
government are to participate cooperatively. In order to achieve a more balanced surface
transportation system, the U.S. Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation A ct o f 1964
(for an historical overview o f urban transportation planning in the United States, see U.S.
Department o f Transportation, 1988). These m ajor Federal Acts and following supportive
legislation attem pted to address the growing concerns about the adverse consequences o f
automobile domination in urban areas. Jane Jacobs observations on The Death and Life o f
Great American Cities (1961) mark the first major milestone in the critique o f the modernist
city vision in which the car functions as its hub.
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level interstate bridge is found wanting. The lofty freeway interchanges and cloverleafs (see
Figure 8-3) generally do not occasion a feeling o f being lucky and grateful for the fortune and
affluence the freeways spread before us. Even the bridging and interweaving fly-overs do not
elevate us sufficiently to bridge gaps between diverse activities or social and ecological
communities. I f w e believe the media, we are stuck on and w ith our freeways.
Despite their faults and shortcomings, we go on using and building freeways and thensmooth interconnections because they allows 24-hour, on-demand, uninterrupted travel
through grade separations. These vertical separations o f travel paths are made possible by
calculating and aggregating various resources: material, financial, and human.4 The autobahn
"bridge" exemplifies a postmodern understanding in terms o f our drives for maximum
flexibility, efficiency, and mobility. This bridge swings to the rhythms o f our times. Base
isolators and expansions joints literally expand even further the flexibility and adaptability o f
civic structures to withstand a major earthquake. Yet the way our freeways and their bridging
interconnections support our common drives and focal practices must be deemed unbalanced,
especially in the case o f urban freeways. It may turn out that our contemporary limited
enthusiasm for freeways, and the occasional pointed revolt against them, result from their
inadequate manifestation o f the fourfold. The typical freeway does not come into its own,
I am arguing below, because it does not invite all four aspects o f our practices in even
measure. The standard freeway admits the fourfold but only in distorted ways.
4 In line w ith the postmodern understanding o f technology which emphasizes efficient

and flexible aggregation and disaggregation o f resources, m ore and more Personnel
Departments have been renamed "Department o f Human Resources."
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With its multiple possibilities and ubiquitous options covering the entire N orth
American continent, the freeway does indeed manifest the sky. The praised possibilities,
however, may be considered oversold considering that the joy o f "happily zipping around an
autobahn cloverleaf in tune with technology" 5 is these days more likely to be found in a TV
commercial rather than during the daily commute. B ut in principle, the autobahn and its
bridging interconnections do manifest our contemporary horizon o f expectations. The
freeway connects us swiftly to choice locations such as the dealing and wheeling metropolis,
the soothing ocean, o r elevating places like Heavenly.
The divinities, the attuning ones, descend upon the freeway, albeit w ith less and less
enthusiasm. When experiencing free flow 6 on the freeway, drivers may feel thankful for the
abundant freedom o f moving about and for the ease o f accessing multiple worlds. When a
freeway allows this free flow, displays engaging scenery along its way, and grants us safe and
reliable vehicles and fair weather as friendly travel companions, it attunes us most
appropriately to our prized mobility technology and flexible life brimming w ith options.
The popular culture has recognized and expressed this attunement by celebrating the
freeway and its graceful interconnections that let us take o ff into new directions. The
Beatniks were perhaps the first who responded enthusiastically to the freeways' enchantment.
Dreyfus and Spinosa 1997, 174.
6 I am using free flow as a short form for the technical term "free-flow speed" used
in traffic engineering. In Operational Aspects o f Highway Capacity (Institute o f
Transportation Engineers, 1992a, 117-153), William R. Reilly states: The free-flow speed
is defined as the average travel speed o f passenger cars operating under conditions o f low to
moderate traffic volume. (150) A t a free-flow speed o f 60 mph and at level o f service A
(lowest level o f congestion), a driver experiences a maximum density o f 12 passenger cars per
minute per lane (Table 5-41, 151).
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They understood and extolled the freeways as focal things that attuned their free ways. Even
though the enthusiasm experienced On the Road has paled considerably since Jack Kerouac7
reportedly typed his novel on a continuous roll o f paper during an intense creative spell
propelled by speed and movements from coast to coast, the tune o f Willie Nelson's "On the
Road Again" is still being played and generally well received. It still strikes a cord in us,
makes us beat to its rhythm, and attunes us along our ways.
When using a freeway o r interchange today at the close o f the 20th century, we
generally do not have the sense o f having received something special. Previous generations
which had less options to choose from were generally more grateful for the ones they had. If
there is a residual sense o f gratitude when being escorted along our interstates, it is commonly
pointing back to us when we pass freeway construction sites and read "Your Tax Dollars At
Work." By now, the typical freeway experience has become too commonplace to engender
genuine excitement. But a multi-level freeway interchange (see Figure 8-3 above) teeming
with hundreds of vehicles that are gracefully changing lanes and purposefully heading in
various directions, can still generate a sense of common achievement and pride. Being
grateful for these flexibility opportunities when they do shine forth, if only intermittently, is
an attunement which the extensive freeway network still affords today.
While the freeway opens up a vast horizon o f options and attunes us to our flexible
technology for accessing a variety o f worlds, dwelling on earth as mortals are aspects o f our
practices which are woefully neglected or blended out by design. The standard highway plans
7 Jack Kerouac, On the Road. New York: Penguin Books, 1976. Published first in
1955, On the Road has been Kerouac's most successful novel.
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cement this neglect right into road alignment, roadside features, and signage by focusing
almost entirely on capacity, information, and safety issues. We typically encounter social and
cultural dimensions o f the road only in arid passages on traffic regulations and via counsel on
legal matters.
Freeway adoption signs along highways, proudly naming sponsors and
caretakers, are promising indications that mortals do care for the ground that sustains and
moves them. As a s u s ta in in g aspect o f our practices, earth is, however, typically not an
integral part o f roadway design. As the freeway adoption signs imply, concerned citizens and
volunteers feel called upon to make up for a typical highways earth deficit through special
maintenance efforts o f their own.
Conservative and minimalist design degrades the expressway to an expedient channel
for surface mobility. We eagerly accommodate access to supermarkets and shopping malls.
Access to earth, our sustaining cultural institutions and background practices, are not part o f
the design principles found in textbooks on highway engineering. Furthermore, access to
scenic beauty, historic sites, cultural institutions, and dwelling areas is in general interpreted
only literally as a direct physical locomotion from point "A" to "B." Our notion o f access has
to become broader and grounded more deeply. It is important that we maintain visual
connection, if only in passing, to what we are given and what we have built. Scenic beauty,
historic sites, cultural institutions, and dwelling areas must nevertheless be present even if we
don't access them tangibly. We must be assured o f their background presence so that we can
indeed take them for granted; only then do they ground our everyday practices. Earth is a
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design element that shelters such worldly access and makes it matter to us by preserving it as
withdrawn yet available backdrop.8
As members o f the automotive society we take for granted that we have the flexibility
options provided to us by the private automobile and the pervasive hierarchy o f interlinked
streets. We are accustomed to these options, we pay for them (mostly through gas taxes),
and we feel entitled to them. We become aware o f the fact that they do matter to us mainly
when these options are not available to us, even if only temporarily. As a transportation
engineer and commuter, I daily witness the pervasive relevance o f mobility that the public
takes for granted. I witness mobility matters coming to the fore in public meetings where
freeway demolition, retrofit, or widening, and even more localized issues such as parking
patterns, curb side use, and traffic calming measures are passionately debated. Surveys in the
San Francisco Bay Area indicate almost yearly that ground transportation and the
preservation of mobility are at the top o f the region's priority list, outranking important issues
such as education, public health, and crime.9
We may conclude that a high level o f mobility and access are an integral but "hidden"
and taken-for-granted part o f our everyday life. As defining requirements that ground our
highly mobile and fast pace life, mobility and access must stay in the background. They come
8 For a standard textbook example neglecting earth design, see Clarkson H. Oglesby
and R. Gary Hicks, Highway Engineering. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982. The U.S.
Department o f Transportation, Federal Highway Administration has recently begun to
explicitly address scenic, historic, aesthetic, and cultural factors through Flexibility in
Highway Design. Washington, D.C., 1997.
9
For pertinent survey results, see footnote 3 on p. 43.
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to the fore with a vengeance when property access is denied or when the taken-fbr-granted
mobility is missing (or merely perceived to be curtailed): then "road rage" is unearthed.
In the context o f this study, road rage can be interpreted as a result o f an
instrumental understanding o f transportation. When drivers are confining themselves to this
instrumental understanding, they use the network o f roads and vehicles merely as a means to
get from A to B. They don't value the ground transportation network, which they entrust
with their speedy delivery, in its full posf-technological sense. When drivers, by contrast,
develop a post-technological understanding o f transportation technology, then they encounter
the ground transportation network as a web o f things and practices that assists them in
revealing themselves as beings who are on earth with technology.
When we are driven by time and impatience, captivated by the instrumental view o f
technology, we diminish our faculty o f disclosing our world, i.e., our everyday here and
now. In most instances o f our contemporary life, our world is a technological one.
However, a pervasive emphasis on getting somewhere as quickly as possible prevents us
from experiencing and enjoying the process o f moving in a technological world. By way o f
moving through and beyond the instrumental understanding o f transportation technology, we
may elevate driving to a moving meditation 10 and leave "Instrumental City" behind for good
as an obsolete, stress-inducing place o f efficiency worship. When drivers are engaged in the
world o f the road and enjoy moving about in itself, they find no reason for rage but ample
grounds for mutual respect and civility.
10 I have borrowed the term moving meditation from K. T. Bergers illuminating

manual Zen D riving (1988).
228
In order to infuse more civility on and along the road, these tacit grounding matters
should become somewhat more explicit, at least occasionally, in order to remind drivers,
passengers, and pedestrians that things have not always been this way and that moving about
on earth can be pleasant in different ways and at different paces. Highways and freeways can
be vehicles to get us closer to nature (even if we don't leave our cars) rather than merely
means to commute, cross the country, or flee the cities. Uniform building lines and setbacks
guide our urban moves with more inviting gestures than buildings with drastically varying
heights, gaping spaces between them, or with zigzagging distances from the edge o f the
roadway. When highways and streets are designed for dwelling on earth, they move us in
many ways. Designing and maintaining engaging roadside structures and features along our
highways, rather than only at trip origin and destination, is one avenue o f making moving
about pleasant in itself rather than merely a means to an end.
Our freeways that traverse our countryside or pass over the urban fabric do not
acknowledge us as mortals. Reminders that might acknowledge and affirm us as mortals are
intentionally and systematically eliminated from our transportation facilities. The smooth road
surface on the Interstate Highways, the emergency call stations available at expected
distances, and frequent "traffic updates" on the radio tend to make us forget that on US roads
alone 40,000 people are killed and over 100,000 people are injured yearly. Automobile
accidents are the leading cause o f death in the highly industrialized countries. Yet our high
volume and high speed facilities do not show any signs that let us pass as mortals. In
societies that are less driven by speed and efficiency (e.g., in Southern Europe and developing
countries) crosses along roads mark spots where people have been killed, thereby reminding
229
us o f our mortality, building a community with those who have passed on, and affirm in g us
as mortals
Concerned individuals and small groups are presently the only ones who demonstrate
initiative and unassuming leadership in appreciating the wholeness o f our common ventures.
In the remainder o f this chapter I will review a few transportation examples that demonstrate
practices which acknowledge us as mortals.
Lately one may observe that relatives or friends have erected memorial sites for those
who have been killed on our speedy routes. By doing so, they restore a balance in our
understanding and appreciation o f the complete scope o f that which happens on our high- and
byways. These modest roadside shrines (Figures 8-4 and 8-5, next two pages) are easily
overlooked by drivers rushing by. Not knowing the personal significance o f the randomly
gathered trinkets and knickknacks that humanize crash pieces and personalize the fatal site,
outsiders may view these makeshift shrines as kitschy. These humble sites and the private
practices for which they provide a focus for observance are too marginal to make the news.
But if one is driven to return to these humble shrines erected "in loving memory," one notices
that someone cares for them: ribbons and notes have been added, a flag blown to the ground
has been raised again, and fresh flowers grace the freeway site. At least for a small audience,
their gathering power is undeniable.
230
7 T lovi*g nsnoftv
GEORGIA NOSES
1185IW
Figure 8-4
In Loving Memory (US 101, southbound on-ramp, Petaluma, Calif.)
Figure 8-5
A gathering o f things (US 101, northbound, Marin County)
232
"Human Factors," a field o f applied research mostly narrowly understood as
efficiency, safety, and comfort enhancing ergonomics, is all what remains o f mortals. A sense
that being human, even in our high-tech world, is fragile and temporary is smoothed by
design, for instance through comfortable horizontal and vertical road alignments. Along
freeways, destination and guide signs are green, offering the same promise as "Evergreen,"
the mortuary on the next block. We seem to accept as a limit only the sky with its multiple
possibilities. The yoked system o f freeways and private automobiles exerts such a presence
with its dominating supermarket options and their bright and radiant signs that all other ways
o f dwelling and moving about are overshadowed.
We understand our roads and highways principally as skyways. Chicago names its
elevated highways indeed skyways. I f roads and highways are reduced, however, to sterile
traffic channels and sophisticated conveyor belts, they transmit the silent but constant message
that the plethora o f high-tech options is all there is. I f you do not want to be consumed by
being an agent of flexibility and adaptability, you have to head nowadays deliberately for the
back roads. Away from the freeways and its gentle curves and evergreen signs, you can
encounter there the rugged, the off-beat, the unique. The neglected bridges, potholes, and
rough edges encountered on those back roads tell you where our collective attention and
resources go, but also where m ortals are still welcome.
Public agencies and elected officials, charged with design, operation, and maintenance
o f our public roads, seem to be bent on keeping these facilities free o f properties or
connotations that would affirm us as mortals. But shouldn't we erect a memorial, for
instance, along the former doubled-deck Cypress Freeway (1-880 in Oakland) which was
233
leveled by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake? Ought we not remind drivers which bridge
segment on the lower deck o f the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (1-80) was dislodged
by the same earthquake causing one car to fell into the bay?
Ought we not visibly
commemorate in gratitude that only one vehicle was lost on that bridge even though at 5:05
PM the rush hour traffic could have easily extracted a much higher human toll? Shouldn't we
publicly and conspicuously celebrate the feet that most o f the time we pass these and similar
feteful locations without any harm?
Official agencies in charge o f these facilities do not want do deal tangibly with these
grave matters for reasons o f aesthetics, "safety," politics, and, o f course, legal liability.
Elected officials and public admistrators are glad that destructive events such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, and floods are passing and transient "incidents," but, oddly enough, they do not
want to publicly recognize fragility, transiency, and impermanence!
Shouldn't our public roads and buildings be able to teach us more than how to
shrewdly scurry around in a hyperactive maze? Public works that recognize and welcome us
as mortals, in manners grand or subtle, could not only provide for our expedient circulation
but could really quicken and animate us.
Observing us as mortals along our freeways are still marginal local practices. The
interlinked freeways presently function adequately as focal points but only for the dominant
understanding o f ourselves as flexible resource. We want to use our freeways only as
highways and are moved by them only as skyw ays. We need, however, to widen our
perspective by a more comprehensive understanding and a more earthy appreciation o f
234
streets, and we need to become more familiar with alternative ways o f dwelling which they
may offer us.
Figure 8-6
A reminder on dwelling
(mural by Rigo 94; 6th Street north o f Folsom Street, San Francisco)
Getting o ff the speedy freeways and getting on roads that provide less mobility but
more accessibility allows one to enter and reveal novel worlds. Taking roads less traveled
attunes us to diverse practices that are refreshingly different from, and at times diametrically
opposed to, the enticing web o f the interstate, internet, and other international alliances.
When attending to less hasty ways we may realize that we are not dwelling at home when we
are riding the interstate merry-go-round, when we are held virtually in suspense via fleeting
235
"in-between" states, or when we make connections around the earth only electronically. We
seem to need conspicuous reminders (Figure 8-6) that we dwell not only in our individual
intercity express mobiles Hash in g along the widespread interstates but also in the local inner
city. To complement our high-tech postmodern dwelling we have to grow down-to-earth and
rediscover how to be streetwise.
N ot far from North Dakota's Interstate-94 spanning the North American plains, one
may stumble upon a store on a plain street that is apparently frozen in time (Figure 8-7, next
page). Unexpected discoveries are possible on such plain streets which are named Main
Street in many towns. Those off-speed roads calm the hard beat o f the metropolitan hustle
and provide soothing syncopations. The hand-written Store Hours announce off-the-cuff that
they are not Business Hours conducted and observed as usual. The store keeper does not
manage anything or anyone, but makes a living, is open to commonplace and friendly chatter
and, at times, closes unexpectedly or is not there at all. It is unlikely that this merchant needs
a pager or a pace maker. These Stores Hours, unwittingly scribbled as a vernacular poem,
amount to a folk song in free form and a vade mecum counteracting our haste and waste.
This meandering rhapsody on Plain Street is beating to a drum different from the
speedy ways and flexible means o f our dominant culture. It has been written with endearing
care and much consideration for customers. This store sign is, nevertheless, also a notice o f
gentle defiance. The store is open at odd hours and its keeper tends to being there on his own
time.
R ep ro d u ced with p e r m issio n o f the
237
This store's animating accents result from Plain Street's syncopations. In the sound
world, a syncopation is a temporary displacement o f the regular metrical accent caused
typically by stressing the weak beat. By responding to our soft spots, failings and foibles.
Plain Street invites us to humor its Store Hours as a Book o f Hours.
This wandering sign stores the possibility and pens the necessity o f inhabiting and
keeping alive those practices which empower us to resist the flexibility treadmill and to pursue
endeavors that are at odds with perpetual adaptation and transformation. This sign is a public
recollection. It reinforces the urgent message that if we want our postmodern technological
being to amount to more than hollow busyness and hyperactive muscle flexing, we must
assure that focal endeavors, as withdrawn or odd as they may look to outsiders, are tolerated,
accepted, and even nurtured. Inclusiveness in recognizing and appreciating multiple worlds
may become a custom. Habitual practice o f such customs can make them part o f a common
dwelling that overcomes the strictures o f modernism. Preserving Main Street its rhythms,
smells, and sounds or reinventing it according to "neo-traditional" principles is one step
in the direction toward a multifarious postmodern dwelling.
Building and m a in ta in in g roadside shrines at the fringe o f highways, rediscovering
Main Street or Downtown dwelling, and enjoying polyphonic attunements and a pulse out o f
step with the 8 to 5 beat, are examples o f marginal practices which counterbalance our
technological understanding o f being which is necessarily biased in favor o f achieving and
enhancing flexibility. Such peripheral projects and fringe activities, taken on and cultivated
by individuals or the public, affirm not only local worlds but, via detour, also our
technological understanding o f being as long as this understanding leaves room for mortals.
238
We can develop a free and positive relation to technology inasmuch as we not only enjoy
being virtuoso chameleons at home in multiple worlds but also retain and nurture our essence
o f being their disclosers.
"Only if we are capable o f dwelling, only then can we build." It behooves us to heed
the clues from humble roadside shrines, from oddities on roads less traveled, and from
whatever else Main or Plain Street has in store for us. I f we allow a multiplicity o f focal
practices to inspire and guide our public ways, we have not yet built communities o f mortals
but are well on the way to dwelling in a technological world.
239
Chapter 9
Implications for Street Designers and Educators
During the journey through the preceding chapters we have reviewed urban
streets and highways from the perspective o f three principal functions: equipment, works
o f art, and things (as defined in Part II). Each o f these vantage points reveals our public
roads in different ways.
The question arises: Which o f the three principal functions
should guide us in our design o f streets? A subsequent issue may simplify the first one
by asking: Since we have hardly mastered the art and science o f building roads that serve
us comprehensively as smoothly functioning and interconnecting equipment for moving
about, isn't it extravagant to expect our streets to become works o f art or even things that
hold sway over multiple local worlds in which we may dwell? Shouldn't we be satisfied
with transparent, efficient, and safe transport and with streets that adequately fulfill these
basic mobility functions? I will explain in this concluding chapter why our streets should
function as smoothly interlocking equipment and as focal points o f multiple local worlds.
The principal street functions reflect three different understandings o f being
which is the focus o f each o f Heidegger's three main phases o f thought. These three
major street functions present our environment in different lights and make it accessible
via equipment, works o f art, or things. Despite the unique access they provide to our
environment, these three understandings o f being are not mutually exclusive.
contrary, they overlap considerably.
O n the
240
In this concluding chapter I will argue
(1)
that architects, urban planners, and transportation engineers need to have a basic
understanding o f the phenom ena which the three understandings o f being
elucidate, and
(2)
that our streets and highways need to function as transparent equipment and as
things gathering local worlds, while preserving a status as latent works o f art that
m ay spontaneously emerge as full-fledged unifying cultural paradigms.
I f one agrees that, ideally, all three understandings o f being should be tangibly
expressed in our transportation environment, one has to face the next challenge: Which
is the logical priority and which is the temporal order o f implementation? I will address
these questions by referring to Table 9-1 (next page). This table relates principal street
functions to various street characteristics. It summarizes the basic requirements for each
street function and lists a few transport candidates that lend themselves as most likely
exemplars for each function. It also suggests possibilities for how a utilitarian transport
environment (e.g., a typical commercial arterial street) might be improved by designing
opportunities for a more comprehensive street usage.
Designing for transparent mobility equipment seems to be the easiest task because
such a design needs to take into account only the most basic, utilitarian requirements for
moving about. Once this elementary foundation has been laid, one might proceed to the
more complex levels o f works o f art and things. While a potential w ork o f art, such as
aviation o r automated freeways, necessarily consists o f smoothly functioning equipment,
it must also actively engage and captivate an entire generation o f users who consider
these ways common ground and identify with them.
Our current National Highway
241
P r i n c i 1p a l
EQUIPMENT
Street
Fu net ions
W ORK OF ART
THING
Human Activities
Facilitated
transparent everyday
coping activities
practices unifying
an entire culture
dwelling in multiple
local worlds
Basic Street
Characteristics
Required
inconspicuous
familiarity
manifestation o f
cultural aspirations
gathering the
fourfold
Transportation
Candidates
local, regional, and

national road
network;
commercial arterial
boulevard;
system o f interstate
freeways;
automated
highway;
multi-modal
transport facility
(e.g., airport)
residential street,
woonerf (semiprivate dwelling);
Main Street
(public dwelling);
Basic Means to
Achieve Desired
Streets Functions
smooth
interconnectedness
within and between
transportation
modes
city, regional, or
national public
works project that
engages society at
large
utmost variety o f
individual units
(stores, dwellings)
on the basis o f
common standards
that grant adaptive
flexibility
Table 9-1
Principal Street Functions and Characteristics
242
System is a long way from being celebrated as such a work o f art. Given its limited
conception as a pragmatic interlinked mobility network, it may never rise to the status o f
an artwork. I ascertain an unbridgeable gap between a transportation system understood
as transparent equipment vs. as a work o f art. No matter how smooth and "invisible" any
equipment for moving about may become, it cannot become an artwork. Transparency o f
equipment is necessary for absorbed successful going about one's business and for a work
o f art to fulfill its many pragmatic requirements. Mere transparency, however, bars any
equipment from becoming a work o f art that must be folly present to all.
Despite its dominant utilitarian bent, our present North American transportation
environment has a few examples that indicate the possibility o f a pragmatic transport
system elevating itself to a commonly accepted work o f art. A case in point is Route 66,
which connected Chicago with Los Angeles. Having been eclipsed by the faster and
high-capacity Interstate System, many portions o f Route 66 either decayed or froze in
time. Today, the well-preserved portions are very successful tourist magnets. In addition
to still fulfilling its pragmatic function o f providing for local, state and interstate travel on
its maintained portions, Route 66 has several other characteristics o f a potential work o f
art. Travelers are drawn to this longitudinal landmark connecting tw o thirds o f the USA.
It provides and unabashedly celebrates collective identity centered on the private
automobile. Route 66 is cheered and commemorated in songs, paintings, photographs,
and advertising art. Despite its historic and preservationist leanings, Route 66 give us a
preview o f national status and roadside characteristics that travelers would encounter if,
for instance, the entire US National Highway System were a work o f art. Route 66, being
just a fraction o f the National Highway System and failing to spark similar popular
243
enthusiasm on other US highways, is not a work o f art in the sense used in this inquiry.
Americas Main Street, as Route 66 has been labeled, is an exception.
66 is the
mother road, tells us John Steinbeck,1 and it is there where you get your kicks, assures
us songwriter Bobby Troup. Via its uniqueness Route 66 testifies the more graphically to
the overall artless state o f our National Highway System. By giving us glimpses o f a
contemporary work o f art replete with playfulness, idiosyncrasies, and a relaxed
collective identity, Route 66 indicts the rest o f our ground transportation system, and by
implication our mobile society, as an Asphalt Nation. 2
In the previous paragraphs I have described the difficulties o f elevating smoothly
functioning equipment into a work o f art. What about turning transparent equipment into
world-situating things by adding to them, refining, or otherwise modifying them? The
answer is the same as before: No amount o f mere modification can turn well functioning
equipment into things that gather local worlds.
Can works o f art, transcending mere functionalism, be transformed into things
around which local worlds may crystallize? In order for unifying art to work it must
engage an entire culture. Cultures o f the distant or recent past were able to produce such
unifying paradigms. I recall a few examples: the two Temples o f the Ancient Israelites,
the Greek Temples and open-air amphitheaters, the Roman coliseums and stadia, the
Medieval Cathedrals; we find less unifying power in the Parisian Boulevards built in the
1 John Steinbeck referred often to Route 66 in his novel The Grapes o f Wrath
(1939). For an excerpt from this novel focusing on the mother road o f the West, see
my reference Steinbeck 1991.
2 I have borrowed this epitaph from Jane Holtz Kays 1997 study entitled Asphalt
Nation.
244
19th century, the Eiffel Tower, the New York sky scrapers, and the Brooklyn Bridge or
the Golden Gate Bridge. These artifacts could be built on the basis o f a generally shared
understanding o f main cultural aspirations.
Today's heterogeneous societies o f the
advanced industrial nations seem to lack unifying cultural practices that could be made
manifest in public works. Attempts at deliberately building a work o f art may even be
considered anachronistic or inauthentic because no unifying cultural foundations seem to
exist. A contemporary observer, surely, has difficulties detecting them.
We may regret not having a work o f art in North America, but I want to briefly
mention a characteristic o f a work o f art that would make its manifestation under present
cultural conditions somewhat suspicious, if not outright impossible. Any work o f art
u n ifie s
a culture by highlighting its common ambitions and shared practices. By doing
so, it suppresses understandings o f being that do not fit or surpass the generally accepted
cultural frame, for example: the cosmology centered around the sun rather around the
earth; political and religious practices deemed heretical and threatening by the authorities
that be; revolutionary science. Its totalizing tendency makes an artwork an unsuspected
partner with the enframing technology that turns everything and everyone into objects
(modem technology) or resources (postmodern technology). While a unified culture has
enormous benefits for individuals and society at large, the costs o f unifying
conglomerates tend to be discounted. Heidegger's late thought can be read as a search for
anti-trust arguments.
His late meandering and self-critical thinking, having worked
through totalizing regimes in technology and politics, breaks up overarching frames o f

thought and action, and points to the gathering power o f things that establish local
worlds.
245
As we have seen in the preceding discussion, attempting to transmute smoothly
functioning, utilitarian street environments into works o f art or local worlds focused by
things has led us into culs-de-sac. Let us therefore proceed in reverse order. Designing
for the gathering o f the fourfold, as outlined in Chapter 5 and exemplified in Chapter 8,
can yield the m ost profound and significant built environment. The challenge then lies in
the task o f designing a series o f multiple local worlds that are focused by things and also
function as smoothly interlaced equipment. I f engineers, architects, and planners design,
build, and maintain streets as strings o f multiple local worlds, while providing for
sufficient transparency and unifying potential o f our public streets, they can equip our
culture with a well integrated ground transport network that can fulfill all three main
street functions simultaneously.
Let us move from conjecture to concrete possibilities. The Parisian Boulevards,
for instance, have fulfilled all three principal street functions over the last 140 years. The
boulevard is a utilitarian device for moving a large number o f vehicles.
Residences,
businesses, stores, and cultural institutions are never for away from this major traffic
artery. Not only is the street environment artistic and well proportioned by multistory
buildings providing a uniform enclosing boundary for the wide street, but the boulevard
is a work o f art. The boulevards majestic posture and civil confidence invites cultural
identification not only during parades. The point where several boulevards merge and
where traffic joins and disperses in different directions, as at the Arc de Triomphe, is
truly a civic arch o f triumph. More important, though less celebrated than the civic
grandeur, are the narrow frontage roads (contre-allees) that provide access to local stores
and residences. The series o f local worlds strung along the boulevard lets the traffic rush
246
go by. These local worlds are not in the way o f those urban travelers who head for
distant ones. In turn, the busy traffic passing on the main roadway lets the local worlds
be what they are.
Furthermore, the boulevard allows easy switching from utilitarian
commute by car or bus to accessing these manifold local worlds, or to celebrating the
boulevard as a commonly shared work o f art by enjoying a relaxed walk on the wide
sidewalks, a cafe or glass o f wine in public, or a parade o f national significance. Such a
street is a public living room. Not by chance did a million people celebrate France's
World Cup Soccer Championship in July 1998 not on soccer fields but on the stateliest o f
boulevards, the Champs-Elysees. The center o f the celebration was the Place de TEtoile,
the ground o f the common stars.
The boulevard does not function perfectly with respect to all main street
functions. But this street type is a good example o f cross-appropriation between worlds
centered on the same civic structure. Building a similar street environment for the 21st
century is our challenge today.
Facing this challenge, we have three basic options. (1) We can be modest and
repeat the boulevard exemplar because its potential is not yet exhausted. Wide and long
streets, such as Van Ness Avenue and Geary Boulevard in San Francisco and University
Avenue in Berkeley are possible candidates in the San Francisco Bay Area (see map on
next page). (2) We can also be more daring by constructing technologically advanced
infrastructure such as airports that connect not only to international but also to local
worlds (see Figure 9-2 on p. 248), or automated freeways which may spearhead a
synergistic relation between electric vehicles and nature preserved and enhanced (3) We
may give up the search for such large-scale transportation facilities that could transform
247
ip
E&Tr'fA
SSSgl
i l f t liiil
SSSfips*
m
.Oakland
San
llbrai
^w-'flswosrth'
j.
:
v*J
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Figure 9-1
Map o f San Francisco and Berkeley, California

(showing Van Ness Avenue and Geary Boulevard in San Francisco, and
University Avenue in Berkeley)
1999 California State Automobile Association. Used by permission
248
Figure 9-2
International Terminal o f San Francisco International Airport

(model view), completed in December 2000
(Source: San Francisco International A irport Annual Report 2000, 18-19)
249
themselves into overarching works o f art. Instead o f waiting for their arrival, we can be
content with multiple local worlds as long as they also fulfill basic utilitarian functions
with sufficient ease.
In search for dwelling in multiple local worlds strung along Main Street, for
instance, we can gather a few clues from the Dutch w oonerf (living or residential yard).
A woonerf functions as transparent transportation environment by providing direct public
access to and from residences. On such a residential street, automobiles are admitted to
the public shared realm as one among many kinds o f yard dwellers.
By design, the
private automobile is treated as an intruder into a space that is shared by pedestrians,

bicyclists, planned or casual social gatherings, children at play, and motorists. A woonerf
is a pragmatic multifunctional public living room. Does it qualify as a work art?
In addition to being a very useful arrangement o f neighborhood units, a woonerf
has the possibility o f becoming a work o f art. In the Netherlands, the woonerf is o f
almost universal appeal because o f its capability o f harmonizing the ambitions o f a
mobile society with the need for traffic safety, residential comfort, and multifunctional
use o f public space. Furthermore, woonerven can be constructed in new developments,
and an existing neighborhood block can be reconstructed as a woonerf with relatively
little expense. While a whole nation, e.g., the Netherlands, may support the concept o f
the woonerf it is nevertheless difficult to see how the woonerf can rise to the level o f a
work o f art. This multifaceted model o f a residential street limits its ascendance to an
artwork by its underlying defensive gesture against the intrusion o f the private automobile
into residential areas.
Figure 9-3
Two Examples o f Woonerven

(the picture at the bottom shows an intersection o f two residential
yards, or living streets)
(Source: Bundesminister fur Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Stadtebau,

Stadtverkehr im Wandel, Bonn, 1986, pp. 30 and 45)
251
The woonerf is about minimizing adverse impacts o f the car and about civilizing
it. This street type does not celebrate the car nor itself Le., the traffic-calmed island in
the sea o f rampant automobility. The woonerf does not manifest overarching defining
cultural aspirations.
It is not a work o f art. Nor is the w oonerf merely transparent
equipment serving mobility, access, and dwelling needs simultaneously. The woonerf is
a thing
It provides a local solution to a general social problem: the taming o f the
automobile within a residential setting.

The woonerf is a local thing than can emerge at many locations.
The living
yards general design concept can be adapted to various local conditions. The woonerf
shields many residential streets and its multiple users from being mere resources for the
enhancement o f efficiency.
The woonerf is a communal center and focus o f serious
concern for its abutting dwellers.

multidimensional dwelling.
A woonerf makes a place for a postmodern,
By gathering together various previously dispersed and
fragmented social activities (driving, parking, social meetings, spatial separation o f age
groups, etc.) into a h a rm o n iz in g tangible edifice, the woonerf creates a local world that
makes room for Life Between Buildings. 3
As we have seen, the w oonerf is a model for finding common ground for various
social activities that the modernist planning paradigm deems to be in conflict. This still
dominant p la n n in g paradigm attempts to resolve real or perceived conflicts between
incompatible land uses by physically separating them. The w oonerf emerged out o f a
social need, was refined by design professionals, and was publicly legalized by City Hall.
3 In Life Between Buildings (1987), Danish Architect Jan Gehl points out basic
patterns o f pedestrian life and design elements that make for successful ordinary places.
252
This late 20th century thing is a good example o f how to overcome modernist strictures:
by allowing diverse social practices to come together in a shared, physical focal point that
gathers and harmonizes them in one world.
US Main Streets can learn from the pedestrian example that the woonerf offers.4
Many decaying M ain Streets in the USA can be revived as vitality conduits to energize
distinct local worlds by blending moving about, shopping, residing, and being in a public
forum. The likelihood o f reclaiming Main Street can be enhanced by ensuring not only
the required mix o f land uses, but also a mix o f access to and along Main Street. Too
many towns and cities are only partially successful in maintaining a lively neighborhood
commercial street because the automobile remains the sole or dominant mode o f access.
A truly accessible M ain Street, such as 24th, Irving, or Chestnut Streets in San Francisco,
can also be reached and traversed on foot, by bicycle, and by public transport. Compared
with alternative modes o f transport, the private automobile needs much space whiie in
motion or parked. M uch o f the space claimed by the automobile can be put to better use
by enhancing the choices o f access along M ain Street. Wide and pleasant sidewalks can
4 The Dutch w oonerf (living or residential yard) and the German Wohnstrafie
(living street) are actually reinventions based on mixed land uses that were the commonly
accepted rule in European cities before the advent o f modernism. The modernist credo, a
European fantasy fueled by a desire for speed and rationalization o f the life world,
found fertile ground for almost unlimited propagation in the USA due to availability o f
land and substantial public subsidies o f the automobile-highway system. As the legacy o f
modernism has shown, a clinical separation o f land uses leads to sterile work
environments, downtowns dead after rush hour, boring suburbs, and chronic traffic
congestion. Historically based reinventions such as the woonerf, the Wohnstrafie, or
pedestrian zones in downtown areas suggest ways that lead us out o f modernisms
compartmentalization o f our collective life.
253
feature table and chairs and other street furniture, thus converting sidewalks from a mere
utilitarian device and legal requirement into a place for public dwelling.
Different transport modes reveal different worlds or different aspects o f them. I f
we want Main Street to present us multiple worlds in which to move, dwell, and have our
being, we must provide multiple ways o f access to it.
In concert with advanced
technology, we may find our way to and around Main Street and cherish the variety o f
goods, services, and communication avenues that postmodern technology makes
available to us within walking distance. By hosting dwelling units above businesses,
Main Street not only enlivens its ambiance, especially during evenings, but also makes
the offered variety more directly available to Main Street dwellers.
Furthermore, it
teaches shoppers and visitors that the offered variety is not to be sampled via assemblyline consumption but is available with integrity as an assembled quilt of shopping, doing
business, strolling, relaxing, people watching, and dwelling (see Figure 9-4, next page).
Main Street can offer the variety and flexibility a contemporary city or town dweller may
wish for: a bakery, a shoe repair, computer store, dry cleaner, travel agency, a flower
store, a book store, and a shop selling coffee and tea.
Such a street responds to our
prismatic, multifaceted being. Moving in and out o f these stores, or just passing by their
individual characters that conform to an overall relaxed unity, can be a local event, a
public appropriation.
Streetscape features (trees, benches, store porches, trash cans,
newsstands, signs, etc.), windows displaying engaging merchandise, and street vendors
and artists contribute to the coexistence o f multiple local worlds which a postmodern,
non-instrumental environment can offer.
Figure 9-4
Kentucky Street in D ow ntow n Petaluma, California
255
Design, construction, and maintenance o f streets can facilitate such dwelling in
m ultiple worlds. Postm odernism s high technology devices, if understood and used in a
non-instrumental way, can benefit all principal street functions. The use and appreciation
o f complex o r simple street environments (e.g., boulevards, freeway interchanges; or
modest, straightforward, pleasant residential streets) is a collective acquisition requiring
some training, effort, exposure to good examples, and im agination.
The primary and secondary school system should assist students o f all ages in
appreciating and caring for streets, sophisticated or pedestrian, which we usually take for
granted. In the following I suggest some examples o f curricular activities based on
m aterial discussed in this inquiry:
children in elem entary school personalizing their route to school by painting

sidewalks and murals;
learning about local history through a study o f streets names, their changes, and
the successive social groups living on those streets;
comparing historic paintings o r photos o f streets w ith current conditions in search

o f agents o f change;
visiting local public works or engineering departm ents to lean about issues o f
design, maintenance, and uses o f streets and highways, as well as students
conveying in words o r pictures their perceptions o f streets they are living on or
frequently use to engineers and planners;
seeing photos or films o f streets and public places in other countries and find
reasons for the variety o f street environments;
256
children, teachers, and parents brainstorm about improved street usage and curb
side m anagem ent in drop o ff and pick up areas, and establish safe alternative
ways for children to get to and from school (safe route to school program );
seniors in high school making class trips to exciting street environm ents, for
example, to a stretch o f Route 66, and learn via prior preparation and participant
observation about US geography, history, Native American inhabitants,
population migration, road design, roadside architecture, pop art, and advertising
schemes;
getting involved in an adopt-a-highway or a neighborhood watch program;
becoming active in the local planning process (traffic comm ittees, creation or
updates o f General Plans, lobbying for or against highway interchanges,
overpasses, parking garages, etc.);
in academ ia, fostering a deepened appreciation o f streets and public places, and
using a broad interdisciplinary approach (e.g., history, sociology, architecture,
philosophy, engineering) in studying streets and ways to improve them ;
prom oting continuing education for design professionals and concerned citizens at
university
extensions
programs,
conferences,
lectures,
public
seminars,
professional journals and newspaper articles, as well as by cruising on the

electronic highway in search for getting and spreading streets news."
This partial list o f possible curricular projects revolving around streets suggests
ways to increase our appreciation, care, and enjoym ent o f this important stratum o f our
organized public life. W hen streets are seen and used as attractive and exciting places for
257
dwelling, as gatherings around a whole gamut o f simple o r urbane things, a renaissance
o f the street as public realm has begun.
U ntil the arrival o f such a renaissance, the advanced industrial societies have to
come to terms w ith technology in general and establish, individually and especially
collectively, a free relation to technology in all areas o f society, including design,
maintenance and use o f our public streets and highways. We cannot be tom anymore
between the choice o f artistic and pleasant streets on the one hand and efficient yet
forbidding streets on the other. This dilemma marks the realm where a work o f art finds
its place as a social and cultural keystone. A contemporary w ork o f art may reveal itself
some day as automatic freeway, as space station or as some yet unknown invention that
uses the Internet as a stepping stone. We may reject a collective artwork, welcome it, or
ju st wait for Godot Boulevard. Given our propensity for mobility and flexibility, a
work o f art, if it m aterializes at all, will most likely emerge in the context o f
transportation.
The electric car, equally in tune w ith advances in artificial and
environmental intelligence, is a fitting candidate for a future work o f art. Since a w ork o f
art must spontaneously spring forth from our social practices, it cannot be willed or
planned. A work o f art, understood as a m anifestation o f the implicit self-understanding
o f a historic culture, cannot be known in advance.
collectively once it is there.
It can only be acknowledged
We have to be receptive to its unpredictable nature,
unannounced arrival, or eventual absence. One thing is sure, however: we may not rush
it.
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W hile r e m a in in g receptive to a prospective work o f art, w e citizens o f the

advanced industrial societies have to endure our current technological fragm entation and
ambivalence. This incongruity can be softened w ith respect to its everyday impacts by
nurturing local worlds. True to our penchant for change and locomotion, many o f these
differentiated and unique local worlds w ill likely revolve around streets and associated
m obility technology.
c o m m u n in g
Perhaps an ever-denser network o f such locally rooted and
worlds, centered around th in g s mobile or immobile, may presage and pave
the way not only for a national but a global w ork o f art.
By freely accepting a technologically advanced world where we are on the move
and dwell via moving, we are more likely to design our streets not only for safe and
efficient travel, but also for re g a in in g jo y and delight while moving about. Journeying is
not only about "getting there." It must also be moving.
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Appendix
An Outline o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology
The main concepts o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology have been introduced in Section

3.1. In order to make the text o f Chapter 3, the first o f the three theoretical chapters (Part
II), read as smoothly as possible, the basic terms introduced in Section 3.1 have been
explained in skeletal form only. In this Appendix, I present a more fully argued outline o f
Hermeneutic Phenomenology which serves as a theoretical foundation for my entire inquiry.
1.
The Project o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Heidegger understands his early writings and lectures not as a system o f definitive
statements pronounced from a particular substantive point o f view, but as an unprejudiced

search for concepts o f what it means for various entities to be. His early work does not aim
at espousing any particular m aterial theory, but aims at conceptually opening up the very
approach to any possible substantive statements about entities. In this respect, his w ork is a
formal and transcendental analysis. Furthermore, this opening up the search for the
conditions o f the possibility o f understanding is guided by "the analysis o f the m atters
themselves," that is, by the way we typically encounter them in their everydayness. Being
guided by "the m atters themselves" as given in their everydayness, Heidegger feels justified
in saying "I have no philosophy at all" (HCT 301-302; GA 2 0 ,4 17 ).1
1 See also his brief rem ark about "the Heideggerian philosophy which does not exist"
(G A 9, 69).
260
Heidegger undertakes his conceptual search from multiple focal points (e.g.,
encountering equipment, "space, "time," talking), yet with one single question in mind: what
does it mean for any entity to be? An entity is anything that is.2 Heidegger wants to analyze
the being o f entities. To state it alternatively: he wants to clarify entities' ways o f being and
to make these ways explicit in their essential structures and in the manner we typically
encounter them. Entities whose ways o f being are thus illuminated can be o f any kind:
"things, people, abstractions, language, etc." 3
To properly understand the being o f entities, that is to say, the specific ways they
present themselves to us, Heidegger takes a step back and first illuminates the being o f that
entity that is asking the question o f being. This entity is us, the human being. "Existence"
[Existenz] is Heidegger's technical term for humans' way o f being. Making explicit the
essential structures o f existence is the topic o f hermeneutic phenomenology.
Heidegger's early work aims at a systematic disclosure and fully developed
interpretation o f the basic structures o f being human. Their exposition is presented under the
2 I am using the terms "entities" and "beings" synonymously for anything that is. Both
terms can serve as a translation for the plural o f the German word das Seiende. In general
I prefer "entities" despite its abstractness, because it can be less likely confused with "being"
(noun), das Sein in German. Sein and Seiendes are more clearly distinguishable than "being"
and "beings," hence my preference for the paler but clearer term "entities" instead o f "beings"
for anything that is. The meaning o f being (das Sein) as Heidegger employs it in his early
writings will be outlined in this Appendix. The term being is the most important concept in
Heidegger's work, and it is perhaps the hardest to clarify. But some clarification, even if
necessarily abstract, is needed if the more detailed and concrete exposition o f the phenomena
in the following sections o f this Appendix is to make sense. It is the aim o f this Appendix to
provide such a clarification and a conceptual foundation for my entire inquiry.
3 Dreyfus 1991,1. In general, the detailed commentary o f Division I o f Being and Time
by Hubert Dreyfus (1991) is an essential background for my understanding o f Heidegger,
especially his early writings and the recently published lectures given at M arburg University.
261
program o f a fundamental analysis o f existence, and hermeneutic phenomenology is to serve
as the congenial method to lay them bare. Because his method not only uses but also reflects
on the interpretive concepts and processes through a second-order or m eta-interpretation,
Heidegger characterizes his phenomenology as hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the study o f
the methodological principles o f interpretation.
Heidegger wants to resume the old but abandoned question what is being? His
inquiry encompasses various entities, such as natural things, artifacts, social institutions,
humans and their dwellings and cities. Heidegger's overall task is to provide an undistorted
perspective for answering what is being? which is the most fundamental but unanswered
question o f W estern thinking, according to Heidegger.
N ot science, psychology, or
sociology, but everydayness is to be the judge o f and guarantor for maintaining an

unprejudiced perspective.4 His overarching goal is to achieve a prim ordial5 foundation for
an elaboration o f the question what is being? His intermediate goal, however, is the
clarification o f essential structures o f human existence, because it is we who, in some way or
4 Heidegger does not claim that the perspective o f everydayness in Division I o f Being
and Time (and in the M arburg lectures, 1923-1928) is unbiased in the sense o f scientific
objectivity. He maintains, however, that the perspective o f everydayness is unprejudiced in
the sense o f being able to reveal the way we typically encounter entities and that it is therefore
as free as possible from any theoretical distortion o f the phenomena (as brought about by
traditional philosophy, behaviorism, or cognitive science). It is generally assumed, for good
reasons, that the sciences and humanities can shed light on everyday practices. Heidegger's
phenomenology is reversing this epistemological relation by interpreting the sciences and
humanities, in fact all comportments o f explicit knowing or knowledge, as a derivation o f
everyday practices. The consequences o f this reversal are outlined in the following sections
o f this Appendix and explicated more concretely in Chapters 3 through 9.
5 When Ursprung is translated as "source" and ttrsprunglich as "primordial,"
Heidegger's intended connotations based on the root "spring-" are lost, as in entspringen (to
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another, are already making sense o f entities, human and non-human. This intermediate goal
is the focus o f Heidegger's early writings. The interpretive layout o f essential structures o f
existence is the subject matter o f these writings, and hermeneutic phenomenology is the
programmatic title o f their method.
The method o f an inquiry cannot properly be demonstrated divorced from its subject
matter. Statem ents on method prior to any substantive investigation can therefore be
presented only in an abstract and preliminary way. The usefulness and appropriateness o f a
method has to be shown in the very process o f opening up the concrete subject matter at hand
(in this inquiry beginning with Section 3.2: Environment and Equipment). In this sense, the
following rem arks on hermeneutic phenomenology as a method (Appendix Section 3) can
only serve as a formal overview and outline. A methodological outline requires, in turn, at
least a preliminary notion o f the subject m atter, which is sketched in the following section.
leap forth). On the unavoidable loss in these translations (as is the case with most o f
Heidegger's technical terms), see BT 399, footnote 3.
263
2.
The Subject M atter o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology

In going about our daily chores and routines, we encounter entities o f various kinds:
inanimate things., living creatures, other human beings, language, social institutions and
conventions, etc.
In our everyday dealings with these entities we always have some
understanding o f these entities, i.e., o f how they show up for us. When we enter a house we
have never seen before, for instance, we have a pre-reflective and unthematized understanding
o f what we encounter and o f where we are. Our daily routine encounter o f entities o f all sorts
is carried, as it were, by an underlying or tacit understanding o f their meaning, i.e., o f what
they are to us. The understanding o f entities we encounter is typically non-reflective and non
explicit.
We say o f entities that "they are" or "they exist." The meaning o f "they are" or "they
exist" remains unexamined and unarticulated in our everyday going about our business. We
always understand in some way how these entities present themselves to us. In our everyday
dealings with entities, we typically gloss over their being. Understanding them always in one
way or another, we gloss over that which makes them intelligible to us. In our routine
involvement with beings (entities), we take the being o f beings for granted. Tradition and
culture are those depositories that grant us such pre-reflective and unthematized
understanding. Heidegger conceives his phenomenology as a stepwise conceptual elucidation
for making manifest and explicit what is typically "taken for granted as being self-evident".6
6 Even though the following quotation pertains to a specific topic, it aptly characterizes
the general thrust o f Heidegger's conceptual analysis o f "alleged trivialities." The passage is
part o f his account o f "intentionality" as the inherent directedness o f our comportments.
"Comportments relate to something: they are directed tow ard this whereto; or, in formal
terms, they are related o r referred to." Discoveries such as this one are, "one might think, ...
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The empirical or positive sciences 7 are exploring entities in term s o f their specific
properties in order to arrive at discemable regularities, ideally in the form o f quantifiable laws.
In contrast to the sciences that explore entities (beings) in such a way, the task o f W estern
philosophy for 25 hundred years has been to reflect on "being," Le., on that which renders
beings or entities intelligible.
"Ontology" is the traditional name for the conceptual
investigation o f being. Such an investigation must presuppose a fundamental distinction

between beings (or entities) and their being. Heidegger calls this fundamental distinction the
"ontological difference."
The ontological difference is a necessary cornerstone o f any
ontology.
Since an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f the being o f entities is always already preceding our
dealings with them, an understanding o f being, irrespective o f how detailed or explicit, occurs
structurally "earlier" than any tangible encounter. An understanding o f the being o f entities
is embodied in the ways we deal with them. This embodied understanding can be called our
unsurpassable trivialities which one ought to shrink from pronouncing.... The only thing we
care about here is that this trivial identification and what is intended in it should not escape
us that we should perhaps bring it closer to us. Perhaps then the alleged triviality will turn
into a total enigma. Perhaps this insignificance will become one o f the most exciting problems
for him who can philosophize, who has come to understand that what is taken for granted as
being self-evident is the true and sole theme o f philosophy." (BP 57-58; GA 24, 80)
7 Here and in the following brief discussion o f the fundamental difference between
ontology and the empirical sciences, I use "science" ( W issenschaft) in the sense o f any
systematic investigation that employs an explicit notion o f its subject m atter and its method.
It is this general, older sense o f science (scientia) which is implied, for instance, in the
German terms Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) and Sozialwissenschaften (social or
behavioral sciences). In retying on this commonly implied broader notion o f Wissenschaft,
Heidegger can present his fundamental ontology as a "science o f being" ( Wissenschaft vom
Sein).
265
background practices. Phenomenology draws on this pre-reflective comprehension o f being
to make this embodiment conceptually explicit A prior and mostly tacit understanding o f the
being o f entities, i.e., their intelligibility, precedes our everyday practices as well as the
reflective practice to make them explicit and manifest (hermeneutics). Letting the background
practices come to the fore and methodologically reflecting on this conceptual bringing forth
or unveiling is the task o f hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger's fundamental ontology,
employing hermeneutic phenomenology as its m ethod, is a systematic dis-covery aimed at
making self-evident and explicit the ways entities (e.g., streets) are always already given to
us. Such an ontology does not advocate a specific worldview, but analytically reconstructs
and clarifies our a priori knowledge, o r more precisely, our a priori knowing.
... a priori means that which makes beings as beings possible in what and how they are.
But why is this possibility or, m ore precisely, the determination o f possibility labeled
by the term "earlier"? Obviously not because we recognize it earlier than beings. For
what we experience first and forem ost is beings, that which is; w e recognize being
only later or maybe even not at alL This time-determination "earlier" cannot refer to
the tem poral order given by the common concept o f time in the sense o f
intratemporality. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a time-determination is
present in the concept o f the a priori, the earlier. (BP 324; GA 24, 461-462)
In reconstructing our "before-knowing" or the a priori structures o f our practices,
ontology transcends the specificity o f entities w ith respect to that w hich makes them
intelligible to us. In ontology as a transcendental science, "we are surm ounting beings in
order to reach being" (BP 17; GA 2 4,23). This surmounting o f beings is not an abstraction
o f unique characteristics for arriving at an average notion o f a particular class o f beings (e.g.,
dwellings, animals, humans). Surmounting beings (entities) ontologically is a stepwise
process o f making their a priori structure, their being, manifest and express. Consequently
being can be defined as "that on the basis o f which entities are already understood" (BT 25-
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26, SZ 6). We tacitly understand entities such as towns, streets, o r automobiles based on our
everyday experiences, but do not necessarily average our past experience to know w hat a
town, street, or an autom obile is. Entities such as these have become enmeshed in our
background practices that we take for granted.
The history o f W estern thought is a linked series o f attem pts at spelling out the
intelligibility o f various kinds or classes o f entities which have traditionally been clustered into
three overarching groups: (1) natural things ("nature"), (2) morality, action, community, and
(3) works o f art. W estern thinking has been struggling in determining what makes entities
intelligible, what constitutes their being, or how they are given to us. Finding a common
denominator for the core o f these struggles, Heidegger can declare that "being is the proper
and sole theme o f philosophy" (BP 11; GA 24, 15).
Philosophy, that is, Occidental ontology, has repeatedly fallen victim to two basic and
grave mistakes or misconceptions. The Western philosophical tradition has understood being
as either (1) some causal agent situated behind or beyond entities, or as (2) one extant entity
among other extant entities. Stated differently, traditional w estern ontology has understood
the being o f beings as either (1) some factually existing foundation, a kind o f metaphysical
"super Being," 8 or as (2) an entity as present as any other entities, thereby collapsing the
fundamental distinction betw een being and beings (entities) altogether.
8 In order to guard against this traditional misconception, all major recent translations
o f Heidegger's works avoid the previous practice o f capitalizing "being" (noun), since "Being"
tends to suggest an entity distinguished by an elevated o r supernatural status. In citations
from the English translations I will therefore always use "being" even where the translators
prefer capitalization, as is the case in Being and Time.
267
Heidegger conceives his philosophical w ork as a continuation o f the age-old effort o f
clarifying our understanding o f the being o f beings. By putting the question o f being on the
footing o f an analytics o f existence, however, Heidegger frames his fundamental ontology as
a radical break with the history o f Western thought. Yet even this radical break, Heidegger
acknowledges, is historical and must interpret itself historically. Understanding the being o f
beings is intimately bound up w ith an understanding o f time, which understanding in turn is
historically defined.9
The misconceptions o f our philosophical tradition are no mere accidents. They are
rooted in the very course and conceptual makeup o f western thinking as we have inherited
it from the Greek thinkers, Plato and Aristotle in particular. Heidegger repeatedly points out
and demonstrates that the intelligibility o f entities has not been achieved, and that,
furthermore, not even the horizon for asking the question o f being has been properly
prepared. Responsible for this neglect are the two misconceptions mentioned above. Most
importantly, traditional ontology has neglected to reflect adequately on the being o f that entity
who is asking ontological questions: the human being, or Dasein. "This entity which each
o f us is himself and which includes inquiring as one o f its possibilities o f its being, we shall
denote by the term Dasein." (BT 27, SZ 7) Heidegger's radical break w ith the tradition o f
western th in k in g is m arked by his insistence that the paramount task o f any ontology is
9 For Heidegger time is the horizon for the understanding o f being.

A
phenomenological analysis o f time is therefore central to the analytic o f existence. Since this
dissertation focuses on applying hermeneutic phenomenology to design and uses o f public
streets, the topic o f time can be disregarded without unduly restricting the main topic.
Interesting and quite challenging would be a phenomenological study o f "time in the city,"
building on Kevin Lynch's 1972 inquiry What Time is This Place?
268
making transparent the existential structures o f the inquirer. The inquirer Heidegger is
analyzing is, however, not homo sapiens gazing disinterestedly at objects, but Dasein, a being
intimately involved w ith its world. Dasein is that being that is "there" (da) with its w orld.
Dasein is an ordinary German word basically meaning "to be there," "to be present,"
or "to exist" when used as a verb, and "presence" o r "(human) existence" when used as a
noun. Employing all o f its semantic connotations, Heidegger uses Dasein as a technical term
for that entity that is "there" w ith its world: the human being as involved with and absorbed
in its everyday coping activities. The very concept o f Dasein as a technical term already
intimates, at least for a reader familiar with its non-technical usage, what is to be highlighted,
analyzed, and cleared. F or making manifest the background structures o f our everyday
dealings with our familiar surroundings, Dasein is a deft and handy term, whereas "human
being," "individual," "subjectivity," or "consciousness" are, as we shall see, too abstract or
simply misleading. W hen Heidegger uses such terms, he is doing so in the context o f working
out the specific thrust and characteristics o f his ontological analytics o f Dasein in contrast to
related but fundamentally different efforts in anthropology, neuro-physiology, psychology,
or philosophy o f mind w hich investigate mental representations.
Dasein as the central term and subject m atter o f Heidegger's critical ontology does
not denote a "conscious" subject over and against detached objects, the human body traced
in its daily routines, or an information processing unit dealing with mental contents through
cognitive processes. W hat Dasein stands for in positive term s becomes clearer and more
palpable when I explain the phenomena o f world and being-in~the-world (Sections 4 and 5).
In this section, I roughly sketch the main issues in analyzing Dasein. In order to maintain the
269
distinct character o f an analysis o f existence as an "understanding from within," Le, o f Dasein
as seen from the perspective o f D asein itselfj and for lack o f an adequate English rendition
o f this central term, translators prefer to retain Dasein as a technical term without the use o f
italics. Henceforth I will follow this convention in this Appendix, as I have done in the main
body o f this inquiry.10
In his analysis o f Dasein, Heidegger differentiates two kinds o f investigations and two
kinds o f understanding. An investigation is "ontic" (or "ontical") if it concerns beings or
entities (human or any other kind), and it is "ontological" if it concerns ways o f being that are
fundamental, explicit and shared. A n individual's understanding o f his or her own way o f
being is "existentiell;" and a manifest and express understanding o f ontological structures o f
Dasein is "existential." 11 Heidegger is doing existential analysis and not, as some authors
claim, existentialism 12 which focuses on the alleged plight o f individual existence.
In contrast to the philosophical tradition which has demonstrated an inherent tendency
tow ard speculation and abstraction from that which is actually given, Heidegger bases his
ontology on an ontic entity: Dasein. Furthermore, Dasein is distinguished from all other
entities because ontological understanding is a fundamental feature o f its makeup.
10 For further clarification o f the central term Dasein, see BT 27, footnote 1; and BP
333-337 ("A Note on the Da and the Dasein").
11 For a more detailed discussion o f these fundamental term s, see BT 31 (especially
footnote 3) and BT 33 (especially footnote 2); see also Dreyfus 1991, 20.
12 Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre (up to about 1960), and Karl Jaspers are among
the best known representatives o f existentialism.
270
"Understanding o f being is itself a definite characteristic o f Dasein's being. Dasein is ontically
distinctive in that it is ontological." (BT 32, SZ 12)
Typically and for the most part, however, Dasein's understanding o f itself is preontological or pre-theoreticaL Therefore, the task o f Heidegger's existential analytics is to
provide a detailed and explicit account o f Dasein's pre-theoretical or tacit understanding o f
itself His fundamental ontology is carried out as an analysis of"existence." Existence is the
name for Dasein's being. Heidegger explains the complementary relationship between Dasein
and existence as follows: "That being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way
o r another as its own, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence'." (BT 32,
SZ 1 2 )13
As existing Dasein is a self-interpreting being that encounters entities those o f its
own kind and those different from itself with a pre-ontological understanding. Because
Dasein is a self-interpreting being it cannot be studied as if it were a thing naturally occurring
among other things o f nature. Behaviorism studies humans, whereas existential analysis
interprets Dasein. "Humans" and "Dasein" are not coextensive terms. Even traditional
ontology tends to speak o f Dasein in the sense o f an extant entity occurring in nature. Kant
and Husserl, for instance, employ the term Dasein in the sense o f a natural entity being
present. Heidegger elaborates:
For us, in contrast, the word "Dasein" does not designate, as it does for Kant, the way
o f being o f natural beings. It does not designate a way o f being at all, but rather a
13 I have modified the translation in light o f the two marginal notes for this passage
found in Heidegger's ow n copies o f Sein und Zeit as documented in Volume 2 (Sein und Zeif)
o f the complete w orks (GA 2). The standard translation reads: "That kind o f being towards
which Dasein can com port itself in one way o r another, and always does com port itself
somehow, we call 'existence'." (BT 32, SZ 12)
271
specific being which we ourselves are, the human D asein. We are at every moment
a Dasein. This being, the Dasein, like every other being, has a specific way o f being.
To this way o f the Dasein's being we assign the term "Existenz" "existence"; and it
should be noted here th at existence or the expression "the Dasein exists" is not the
sole determination o f the mode o f being belonging to us. (BP 28; GA 24, 36-37)
Stating negatively that Dasein is foremost not a natural entity does not mean, o f course, that
aspects o f human beings (e.g., functions o f the human body, customs and conventions) cannot
properly be studied by an empirical science, physiology o r anthropology, for instance.
Treating Dasein as a thing o f nature in an ontological investigation, however, misses the very
point o f an existential analytics: Dasein is self-interpretation. Furthermore, in interpreting
itselfj Dasein makes itself transparent and thereby modifies its existence.
By basing his ontology on Dasein as a self-interpreting being, Heidegger is
acknowledging and highlighting Dasein's unique position in any investigation, be it ontological
or ontic. While in the empirical sciences Daseins grounding function necessarily remains
tacitly and subliminally in the background, Dasein and its way o f being, existence, become the
keystone and guiding focal point o f Heidegger's fundamental ontology as a "science o f being."
Dasein is self-revealing from the ground up, irrespective o f the kind o f activity.
Dasein reveals itself in its concerned everyday activities (pre-ontological understanding) as
well as in the practice o f doing hermeneutic phenomenology (ontological understanding).
Always disclosing itself somehow and thereby its world, Dasein can be said to be "in
truth." Even when fleeing from o r covering up the structures o f its being, Dasein is "in truth,"
because any fleeing or cover-up (inauthentic modes o f being) is possible only on the basis o f
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the more prim ordial propensity tow ard disclosure o r truth.14 Heidegger explicates Daseins
tendency tow ard disclosure as follows:
Being is given only if there is disclosure, that is to say, if there is truth. But there is
truth only if a being exists which opens up, which discloses, and indeed in such a way
that disclosing belongs itself to the mode o f being o f this being. We ourselves are
such a being. The Dasein itself exists in the truth. To the Dasein there belongs
essentially a disclosed world and w ith that the disclosedness o f the Dasein itself. The
Dasein, by the nature o f its existence, is "in truth, and only because it is "in" truth
does it have the possibility o f being "in" untruth. Being is given only if truth, hence
if the Dasein, exists. (BP 18-19; GA 24, 25)
3.
The M ethod o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Because w e and our way o f being existence are the focus o f Heidegger's
fundamental ontology, the subject m atter o f an analytics o f Dasein seems close at hand. What
can be closer to us and therefore m ore intelligible than Dasein? Heidegger addresses this
apparent closeness explicitly: "Ontically, o f course, Dasein is not only close to us -- even
that which is closest: we are it, each o f us, we ourselves. In spite o f this, o r rather for just
this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest." (BT 36, SZ 15)
Because it is
ontologically farthest, Dasein requires a comprehensive disclosure.

Phenomenology attem pts to make manifest and explicit what is typically "taken for
granted as being self-evident" (BP 58; GA 24, 80): our embodied knowing and skills, or
background practices. Because they are so pervasive, they are m ostly unnoticed and
transparent. A n example o f transparent background practices is the embodied knowledge
14 Fleeing from and covering up the structures o f its being, resulting in "foiling," are
themselves existentials, i.e., essential structures or characteristics o f human being.
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which members o f a specific culture exhibit in keeping an appropriate distance pertinent to
the type o f social occasion.15
Hermeneutic phenomenology focuses on this a priori know-how and makes it the
express object o f investigation. Plato, "the discoverer o f the a priori" (BP 326; GA 24, 463464), had called this recourse to unthematized knowing "anamnesis."
For Heidegger,
phenomenology is a systematic retrieval o f the "forgotten" tacit understanding that is prior

(Lat. prius) to and the basis o f any specific manifest understanding.
We have heard that the Dasein dwells daily and first and for the most part solely with
beings, even though it must already have understood being in that very process and
in order to accomplish it. However, because the Dasein spends itself on and loses
itself in that which is, in beings, both in itself, the Dasein, and in the sort o f beings that
it itself is not, the Dasein knows nothing about its having already understood being.
Factically, the existent Dasein has forgotten this prius. Accordingly, if being, which
has already always been understood "earlier," is to become an express object, then the
objectification o f this prius, which was forgotten, must have the character o f a coming
back to w hat was already once and already earlier understood. (BP 325-326; GA 24,
463-464)
The term "phenomenon" is derived from the Greek verb <pafvecr9ai ("to show itself')
which in turn stem s from (ftaivoa ("to bring to th e light o f day, to put in the light"). A
phenomenon is something that shows itself in itself.
"Accordingly the jta ivop teva or
15 In The Hidden Dimension Edward T. Hall (1969) has explored this tacit embodiment
o f social and personal space. As a cross-cultural study o f spatial background practices,
"proxemics" is his term "for the interrelated observations and theories o f man's use o f space
as a specialized elaboration o f culture" (Hall 1969, 1). Similar to Heidegger's ontological
studies 40 years earlier, the purpose o f Hall's anthropological "research on people's use o f
space" is "to bring to awareness what has been taken for granted. By this means, I hope to
increase self-knowledge and decrease alienation. In sum, to help introduce people to
themselves.... A ll o f my books deal w ith the structure o f experience as it is m olded by
culture, those deep, common, unstated experiences which members o f a given culture share,
which they communicate without knowing, and w hich form the backdrop against which all
other events are judged" (Hall 1969, ix-x).
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'phenomena' are the totality o f what lies in the light o f day or can be brought to the light...."
(BT 51; SZ 28) As koyoq is a letting-something-be-seen, phenomenology, then, is the
practice o f reading or laying out the phenomena in the way they show themselves.
Heidegger's formal definition o f phenomenologys task is "to let that which shows itself be
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself' (BT 58; SZ 34).
I f the phenomena were to reveal themselves indeed by themselves, no specialized
procedure or method would be required other than simple perception. But because the
phenomena are deeply hidden in our taken-for-granted transparent background practices, they
require a special method to bring them to the fore. The phenomena phenomenology wants
to bring to light are therefore just the opposite o f what is typically taken as self-evident.
Heidegger elucidates: "Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'." (BT 60;
SZ 36) Phenomenology, then, is an explicit dis-covering o f that which is already understood,
but is either forgotten in everyday involved activities or covered up.
The etymological derivation o f "phenomenology" sketched above signals its radical
empiricism. Heidegger believes that hermeneutic phenomenology is even more rigorous than
the empirical sciences because it is revealing the "roots" (the a priori structures) o f science
as anchored in Dasein's everyday dealings in its world, or "being-in-the-world" (see Section
5 o f this Appendix). By analytically cutting through the thicket o f distorting theories and the
underbrush o f traditional misconceptions, hermeneutic phenomenology aims at laying bare
and making visible through interpretation what is actually given to Dasein, and only that:
275
"The term 'phenomenology1expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things
themselves!" (BT 50; SZ 27) 16
Any access to "the things themselves" has to take into account Dasein's interpretive
stance tow ard itself other Daseins, and tow ard entities other than itself. This means that
Dasein cannot be studied as a thing o f nature analyzed by the categories o f science (e.g., time,
space, causality). Dasein and existence, its w ay o f being, are analyzed by finding the
structures that Dasein itse lf reveals. Instead o f subjecting Dasein to a preconceived system
o f categories, hermeneutic or interpretive phenomenology studies Dasein on its own terms.
Furthermore, Dasein is to be brought to light how it exists for the most part, i.e., in its
everydayness. In order for phenomenology to bring forth Dasein's existentials, its essential
structures, on its own terms,
we m u st... choose such a way o f access and such a kind o f interpretation that this
entity can show itself in itself and from itself [cm ihm selbst von ihm selbst her]. And
this means that it is to be shown as it is proximaily and for the most part in its
average everydayness. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we
shall exhibit not just any accidental structures but essential ones which, in every
kind o f being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the
character o f its being. (BT 37-38; SZ 16-17)
The qualifying phrase "proximaily and for the most part" in this quotation is a
translation o f the paired expression zunachst und zum eist frequently occurring in B eing and
16 In Phenomenology o f Perception Maurice Merleau-Ponty defines phenomenology as

a "philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins -- as an
inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and
primitive contact w ith the world.... To return to things themselves is to return to that world
which precedes knowledge, o f which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every
scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in
relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a
river is." (M erleau-Ponty 1962, vii and be)
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Time and in Heidegger's Marburg lectures (1923-1928). Especially in its inproved translation
as "primarily and usually",17this qualifying phrase reminds the reader that it is Dasein's typical
way o f being or its everydayness which is the focus o f interpretive phenomenology. That
which is taken for granted in our everyday transparent coping is perhaps hardest to reveal.
Our background practices appear so natural that they defy easy and ready articulation. Their
pervasive yet elusive character is an enigma that phenomenology is called upon to bring into
focus and to comprehend analytically.
Time and again it becomes necessary to impress on ourselves the methodological
maxim o f phenomenology not to flee prematurely from the enigmatic character o f
phenomena nor to explain it away by the bold stroke o f a wild theory but rather to
accentuate the puzzlement. Only in this way does it become palpable and
comprehensible, that is, intelligible and so concrete that the leads for disentangling the
phenomenon leap out tow ard us from the enigmatic m atter itself.
(BP 69; GA 24, 97) 18
Systematic investigation has the tendency to canonize its method as "the way to
proceed. A once congenial approach to solving a puzzle is often later taken out o f context
17 H ubert Dreyfus has suggested this improved translation (Dreyfus 1991, xii) as part
o f an ongoing effort among several Heidegger scholars to standardize their English
term inology o f Heidegger's central concepts. For the list o f suggested translations o f
Heidegger's central concepts, see Dreyfus 1991, x-xiii. On zunachst, see also the translators
footnote (BT 25). Toward the end o f Being and Time Heidegger explains in section 71 (The
Temporal Meaning o f Dasein's Everydayness) the use o f "primarily and usually" (zunachst
and zum eist). Using the improved translation, this passage reads: "In our analyses we have
often used the expression 'primarily and usually. Primarily' signifies the way in which Dasein
is 'manifest' in the "with-one-another" o f publicness, even if 'at bottom ' everydayness is
precisely something which, in an existentiell manner, it has 'surmounted'. Usually' signifies
the way in which Dasein shows itself for Everyman, not always, but 'as a rule'." (BT 422; SZ
370)
18 I have made a slight correction in the first sentence ("maxim" instead o f "m ax im s")
and have improved the understanding o f the second im portant sentence ("the leads for
d ise n ta n g lin g the phenomenon" instead o f "the indications for resolving the phenomenon").
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by epistemology o r philosophy o f science, and then ossified as the standard methodological
technique. Phenomenology is not immune to becoming a perfunctory method for elucidating
Dasein and existence. Being true "to the things themselves" requires any method to be
subservient to the phenomena that are to be clarified. Ultimately, m ethod v a n ish e s to the
degree it has disclosed its phenomena.
There is no such thing as the one phenomenology, and if there could be such a thing
it would never become anything like a philosophical technique. F or implicit in the
essential nature o f all genuine method as a path toward the disclosure o f objects is the
tendency to order itself always tow ard that which it itself discloses. W hen a method
is genuine and provides access to the objects, it is precisely then th at the progress
made by following it and the growing originality o f the disclosure will cause the very
method th at was used to become necessarily obsolete. The only thing that is truly
new in science and in philosophy is the genuine questioning and struggle with things
which is at the service o f this questioning. (BP 328; GA 24, 467)
Even though Heidegger's work (from about 1930 onward) ceased bearing the express
title o f phenomenology, the tenets o f phenomenology guided his approach throughout his
entire work. If phenomenology is heeding its maxim "To the things themselves!" it can indeed
recede as a special m ethod in proportion to the light it is shedding on the phenomena.
Assigning secondary importance to its title and method is consistent w ith the maxim o f
phenomenology.
Heidegger reformulates the task o f phenomenology in "My Way to
Phenomenology," published about 40 years after Being and Time and The Basic Problems
o f Phenomenology:
In what is m ost its own phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility o f
thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, o f corresponding to the claim o f
what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can
disappear as a designation in favor o f the m atter o f thinking whose disclosure re m ains
a mystery." (TB 82; SD 90. In the last sentence I have changed the translation o f
Offenbarkeit o f thinking from the potentially misleading "manifestness" to
"disclosure.")
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Heidegger singles out three basic components o f phenomenology:
(1)
phenomenological reduction which leads the analysis from ontic entities to their being; (2)
phenomenological construction which views entities in the perspective o f their being; and (3)
phenomenological destruction which aims at a critical appropriation o f the history o f being
and its concepts (Heidegger calls this third component also his "critical ontology"). In effect
these three components are always present in any phenomenological analysis, even though
they are not expressly singled out as such or do not necessarily occur in this particular
sequence.
Sections 1 through 3 have outlined hermeneutic phenomenology in preparation for the
most central phenomena to be described in the following sections o f this Appendix. Due to
the circularity o f the subject m atter itself, most o f Heidegger's concepts define each other,
thereby making a linear outline almost impossible, often stylistically awkward, and logically
repetitive. Describing circular phenomena in linear sequence, holistic features piece by piece,
and Dasein from "within" while rejecting the assumption o f "inside" and "outside" as distinct
and separate spheres
these are some o f the particular challenges hermeneutic
phenomenology is called upon to master. These particular challenges prompt the often
peculiar terms Heidegger coins to get his points across. A t this stage o f the presentation, we
are sufficiently familiar w ith Heidegger's basic terms, and can proceed to the most central
phenomena: world and being-in-the-world.
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4.
The Phenom enon o f World

"World" is as central a term in Heidegger's phenomenology as is Dasein. Dasein and
the world it dwells in are co-determining and mutually defining notions.

Self and w orld belong together in the single entity, Dasein. S elf and world are not
two entities, like subject and o b jec t... but self and world are the basic determination
o f Dasein itself in the unity o f the structure o f being-in-the-world. (BP 297; GA 24,
422)
Heidegger uses "world" as an ontological term in contradistinction to both (1) the
ordinary pre-philosophical concept o f w orld which signifies a set o f equipment, roles, and
practices such as the business world, and (2) the conventional philosophical concept o f world
which signifies the totality o f entities o r "all that is the case," as Ludwig Wittgenstein
proposes in his Tractatus.19 When Heidegger uses "world" (with quotation marks), he refers
to the ordinary meaning or to the conventional philosophical notion; when he uses this
concept without quotation marks, he intends the phenomenological meaning as described in
this section. I will follow this convention henceforth.20
19 "The w orld is all that is the case [1].... The world divides into facts [1.2].... The
totality o f existing states o f affairs is the w orld [2.4].... The subject does not belong to the
world: rather, it is a limit o f the world [5.632]." These selected concise statements from
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1974), first published in German in 1921, portrait an empiricist and
atomistic notion o f "world." This empiricist concept o f world, which became a matter-of-fact
doctrine o f logical positivism, is just the opposite o f the phenomenon Heidegger wants to
make evident. Heidegger's concept o f w orld is close to Leben (life) introduced by Wilhelm
Dilthey in his hermeneutic psychology around 1890. Leben subsequently evolved into the
concept o f the Lebenswelt (life-world) in Husserl's later work and his phenomenological
school. As will become apparent in the following, "life-worki" is a term that would, in
Heidegger's phenomenology, be a redundant compound or a tautology.
20 Heidegger establishes this convention in Section 14. The Idea o f the Worldliness o f
the World in General (BT 93; SZ 65). Frequently, Heidegger violates his ow n convention.
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Heidegger maintains th at the concept o f world, o r the phenomenon thus designated,
has been passed over by W estern thinking, resulting in conceptual distortions and pseudo
problems.
A clarification o f Heidegger's w orld-concept is a basic requirement for
understanding his "derivative" concepts such as environment [Umwelt], equipment [Zeug],

and spatiality [.Raumlichkeit] all fundamental conceptual tools for the design professions.
Even though the concept o f w orld is more fundamental than its conceptual derivatives, full
elucidation o f the phenomenon o f world can be achieved perhaps only after understanding the
derivative and "more concrete" phenomena.
Before presenting th e concept o f world in positive term s, let us first determine what
Heidegger does not mean by this concept. As indicated in the previous quotation, Dasein and
world do not correspond to the traditional distinction o f subject and object: "Subject and
object do not coincide w ith D asein and the world." (BT 87; SZ 60)
The intimate and interdependent relation between Dasein and the world can perhaps
be best approached by introducing here the existential [Existenziaf] called "being-amidst"
(Sein bei). As we have learned in the previous section, existentials are defined as the most
general structures or characteristics o f Dasein:
As an existential, 'being-am idst' the world never means anything like the beingpresent-at-hand-together [Beisammen-vorhanden-sein] o f things that occur. There
is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' o f an entity called Dasein' with another
entity called 'world'. (B T 81; SZ 55)
"Being-amidst" characterizes Dasein as being intimately involved with the environing things
in everyday skillful coping. Seen from a phenomenological perspective, Le., seen from within
this concerned and transparent coping, the world is not the sum total o f entities forming a
composite object for cognition performed by a detached subject. The synthetic subject-object
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relation welded by such a cognition is the product o f an epistemological stance which has
itself already rem oved from transparent everyday coping.
"Subject" and "object" are
analytical concepts resulting from a theoretical stance whose task it then is to re-combine
"subject" and "object" into a coherent whole via a cognitive theory.21 Heidegger maintains
that such a cognitive-analytical approach cannot adequately reflect our absorbed action which
is typically devoid o f any self-consciousness and "mental" content.
The philosophical
tradition which attem pts to account for intelligibility by synthesizing discrete elements (e.g.,
subject, object, cognition or perception) is called "Cartesianism," named after Rene Descartes
(1596-1650). Descartes is generally considered the founder o f modem philosophy, which was
based, among other things, on the axiom "I think, therefore I am." Contrary to Cartesianism
and its 20th-century variations, Heidegger wants to demonstrate that and how discrete
elements are understandable only on the basis o f a previously understood world, i.e., a prereflectively and directly understood nexus o f social practices, available tools, and concerned
practical involvement.
The dominant philosophical tradition, ever since Plato's and A ristotle's fascination
with theory, has been elevating the purified theoretical stance to a position allegedly superior
to un-reflective practical involvement. The "Cartesian" tradition, which is in fact as old as
W estern civilization itself, thus creates its ow n problem o f needing to find a cognitive link
between subject and object. Heidegger shows that this so-called purified and presumed
21 In the words o f Mephisto, Goethe mocks in his Faust the inadequacy o f the traditional
cognitive-analytical approach in studying the world o f living entities: "Who would study and
describe the living, starts/ By driving the spirit out o f the parts:/ In the palm o f his hand he
holds all the sections,/ Lacks nothing, except the spirit's connections." (Goethe 1963, 199)
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superior theoretical subject-object relation is an impoverished derivative o f our everyday
involved dealings w ith things o f use [Gebrauchsdinge] that surround us.
By undercutting the Cartesian tradition
still dominant today, especially in
epistemology, cognitive sciences, and artificial intelligence on the basis o f a pragmatic and
non-cognitive approach, Heidegger wants to make evident that Dasein is always already
amidst the things o f use (tools, equipment), and that the world is always already understood
somehow before any discrete thing o f use can be singled out for detached observation or
theoretical reflection.
Heidegger sees him self in the business o f clearing away long-standing and obstinate
misconceptions which are responsible, in part, for many conceptual distortions in the
theoretical disciplines and, consequently, in education and in professional practice. One o f
these historical misconceptions is the artificial subject-object dichotomy. This dichotomy,
together with its corollary inner-outer hiatus, can be unmasked as a pseudo-problem if it can
be shown that Dasein always already directs itself primarily and usually towards things it deals
with in everyday coping activities. Absorbed in smoothly flowing activities, Dasein does not
admit any fragmentation such as a subject-object split.
The inherent directedness o f Dasein toward things it is intimately involved with, also
called intentionality, is a phenomenon which is not easy to describe. So ingrained are
traditional epistemological notions such as subject and object, or inside and outside, that
doing without them seems impossible when describing Dasein's intentionality, as in the
following passage:
When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first
get out o f an inner sphere in which it has been proximaily encapsulated, but its
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prim ary kind o f being is such that it is always 'outside* amidst entities which it
encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. N or is any inner sphere
abandoned when Dasein dwells am idst the entity to be known, and determines its
character; but even in this "being-outside' amidst the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if
we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself'inside' as a being-inthe-w orld which knows. (BT 89; SZ 62)
Always "already out there" amidst the things o f use is the basic ontological constitution o f
Dasein (M FL 167). Dasein typically dwells amidst the things o f practical concern. In
involved, practical dealings with things, Dasein has always already transcended the alleged
gap betw een "subject" and "object," between "inside" and "outside." Hence Dasein dwells
in what Heidegger calls "ontic transcendence" in The Metaphysical Foundations o f Logic
(MFL), his last lecture in Marburg (1928). "For Dasein there is no outside, for which reason
it is also absurd to talk about an inside," he states in a lecture two semesters earlier (BP 66;
GA 24, 93).
Having outlined Dasein's being amidst the things o f use and its intentionality or ontic
transcendence, I can now present one o f Heidegger's positive definitions o f the phenomenon
o f world.
The w orld as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically
occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a
m atter o f course, that we are completely oblivious o f it. W orld is that which is
already previously unveiled and from which we return to the entities with which we
deal and among which we dwell. (BP 165; GA 24,235; I have m ade improvements
to the translation o f the last sentence.)
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5.
Bein g-in-the-W o rid

Even in the process o f arguing against the appropriateness o f traditional dichotomies
such as inside/outside o r subject/object, one is still ensnared in the traditional ontology from
where the thinking in such dichotomies originates. In order to avoid the traditional misleading
term s altogether, Heidegger introduces a compound expression that is to express as a
unitary notion and in somewhat more concrete term s Dasein's dwelling amidst its things
o f use: being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein].
Dasein is not also extant among other things w ith the difference merely that it
apprehends them. Instead, Dasein exists in the manner o f being-in-the-worldand this
basic determ ination o f its existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend
anything at all. By hyphenating the term we m ean to indicate that this structure is a
unitary one. (BP 164; GA 24, 234; I have reduced the ample use o f italics in this
quote; last italics mine.)
Being-in-the-world is the m ost fundamental characteristic o f Dasein's everyday existence.
The hyphenation is a linguistic means Heidegger employs to stress the primordial or originary
[ursprunglich] belonging together o f Dasein, world, and "being-in" [In-Sein]. Being-in-theworld as the basic and unitary phenomenon is ontologically prior to any derivative concept
such as "subject" and "object," "inside" and "outside," and "theory" and "practice." In
everyday, non-deliberate, ongoing coping, these analytical distinctions are already transcended
beforehand; being-in-the-world is another name for this "originary transcendence" (MFL 135).
Thus, being-in-the-world is the source o f intelligibility in general; more precisely, it
is the condition for both (1) involved successftd coping in everyday activities and (2)
theoretical, detached reflection attempting to account for such practice (epistemology).
Theoretical concepts such as "subject" and "object," "theory" and "practice" -- in fact, all
detached, theoretical activities become intelligible (make sense) on the background o f the
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underlying and unitary phenomenon o f being-in-the-world.
(W e shall see later in this
Appendix why this is the case.)

This does not mean that Heidegger argues against scientific, analytical procedures in
an attem pt to privilege practice vis-a-vis theory. His goal is m ore fundamental. Through
fundamental ontology, with phenomenology serving as method, he wants to make visible the
"hidden" and taken-for-granted background practices that allow us to make sense o f our
activities, including making analytical distinctions and detached observations in a theoretical
stance. Let us therefore restate again at this point that Heidegger does not deny the
legitimacy and achievements o f science in revealing and explaining natural laws. He rejects,
however, the claim that science can give an adequate account o f Dasein's existence, i.e., o f
how we primarily and usually go about our everyday concerns. Since Dasein is a self
interpreting being, being-in-the-world is a matter o f understanding all the way through, and
cannot property be an object o f analytical and causal explanations built up out o f aggregated
"objective" data devoid o f m e a n in g .22 The evidence and argum entation that warrant this
general statement are presented throughout this Appendix.
On the basis o f the above outline o f the fundamental phenomenon o f being-in-theworld, or originary transcendence, the concept o f world appears now in a clearer light. We
now understand why the world, seen from the perspective o f our practical, concerned
22 An interpretation o f science as a derivative mode o f being-in-the-world has far

reaching implications for science and our technological civilization. I cannot deal with this
subject extensively. See Heidegger's explicit remarks on science in Being and Time, and
Dreyfus 1991, especially Chapter 6. Heidegger's account o f the existential basis o f science
leads to his later critique o f modem technology. Chapter 4 o f my inquiry deals with his multi
faceted critique o f modem technology, and Chapter 5 builds on his suggestions for a
postm odern dwelling in a technological world.
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involvement, is not an object for Dasein to investigate. In its phenomenological conception,
the world has no independent, "objective" reality apart from Dasein, the generalized, yet ever
concrete, human agent. Dasein and the work! it dwells in are inseparable. The w orld exists
as Dasein exists. The world is an aspect o f the unitary and underlying being-in-the-world and
has the character o r "coloring" o f Dasein, as described as follows:
The world is not the sum total o f extant entities. It is, quite generally, n o t extant at
alL It is a determination o f being-in-the-world, a moment in the structure o f Dasein's
mode o f being. The world is something Dasein-ish. It is not extant like things but it
is there, like Dasein [being-there] which we ourselves are: that is to say, it exists. We
call the m ode o f being o f the being that w e ourselves are, o f Dasein, by the name o f
existence. This implies as a pure m atter o f term inology that the world is not extant
but rather it exists, it has Dasein's mode o f being. (BP 166; GA 24, 237; I have
simplified the translation o f the fifth sentence by staying closer to the original.)
"W orldliness" [ Weltlichkeit] is the world's way o f being. As an ontological term , it
marks a structural characteristic o f being-in-the-world; hence it is itself an existential.
Worldliness defined as the way the world exists has nothing to do with the ordinary meaning
"worldly" as being devoted to material as opposed to spiritual pursuits. W orldliness as the
world's way o f being corresponds to existence23 as Dasein's way o f being.
Dasein finds itself not through introspection, but through being actively immersed in
the the world. Through th in g s which Dasein encounters within-the-world, or intraworldly
\innerweltlich] things, Dasein encounters itself. This is a simple but basic experience which
serves as a leitm otiv in many literary works o f art, as, for instance, in G oethe's Italian
Journey. In this autobiographical report o f his tw o-year travel, he repeatedly describes how
he gets to know him self by way o f things. For Goethe, the experience o f overcoming a long
23 Here and throughout the Appendix, I use "existence" and "to exist" as technical terms
as defined in Section 3.1 o f the main text.
287
standing self-absorption through opening himself to the things around him becomes so
revealing that he seeks it out deliberately, even to the point o f declaring it the main purpose
o f his journey (1786-1788). "M y purpose in making this wonderful journey is not to delude
m yself but to get to know m yself through things [um mich an den Gegenstanden kennen zu
lem en]." 24 Especially the public life and architecture o f Rome becomes the world which
dissolves his self-absorption:
Let me put it like this. In this place, whoever looks seriously about him and has eyes
to see is bound to become a stronger character \mufi so lid werderi\: he acquires a
sense o f strength hitherto unknown to him. His soul receives the seal o f a soundness,
a seriousness without pedantry, and a joyous composure. A t least, I can say that I
have never been so sensitive to the things o f this world as I am here. The blessed
consequences will, I believe, affect my whole future life.... I am not here simply to
have a good time, but to devote myself to the noble objects [grofie Gegenstande]
about me, to educate m yself before I reach forty." (Goethe 1982, 124; the two glosses
in brackets are mine)
The role the encountered things around him play in his discovery and development o f
a more authentic "objectified" self appears, however, somewhat skewed in this passage, partly
because o f the novelty o f the discovery and, to a large degree, due to the objectivistic bent
o f the otherwise lively translation which favors penetrating boldness over textual accuracy.
The point o f this passage is Goethes discovery o f how important the encounters with things
24 I have altered the translation o f the second half o f this sentence. The translation o f
Auden and Mayer reads: "My purpose in making this wonderful journey is not to delude
m yself but to get to discover m yself in the objects I see." (G oethe 1982, 40; c the original
text in Goethe 1967a, 45.) In my judgement their translation o f ton mich an den
Gegenstanden kennen zu lem en as "to get to discover m yself in the objects I see" is too
objectivistic, as is the case in the following passage that I quote. Goethe is referring to the
concrete things around him encountered as a unitary, vivacious and holistic world that draws
him in; he does not refer to objects he merely sees. I have changed the translation accordingly
to "to get to know m yself through things."
288
great and small are for his development which he, before the journey, experienced as being
stuck in circles around his "inner self."
Heidegger's account o f how Dasein can find itself through intimate, active
involvement with the things o f its world can systematically explicate the described "self'revelations which allow anyone to "become solid." "We understand ourselves by way o f
things," Heidegger lectures in 1927, "in the sense o f the self-understanding o f everyday
Dasein.... Dasein thus comes toward itself from out o f the things." (BP 289; GA 24, 410) It
is, however, not the things taken in isolation, but as intraworldly things
... in and from which we encounter ourselves. That is why this self-understanding o f
the everyday D asein depends not so much on the extent and penetration o f our
knowledge o f things as such as on the immediacy and primordiality
[Ursprunglichkeit] o f being-in-the-world.... W hat is important is only w hether the
existent Dasein, in conformity with its possibility for existing, is prim ordial enough
still to see expressly the world that is always already unveiled with its existence, to
verbalize it, and thereby to make it expressly visible for others. (BP 171; GA 24, 244)
In addition to hermeneutic phenomenology, which aims at conceptual explication,
creative literature and poetry are the means most capable o f verbalizing the immediacy and
primordiality [Ursprunglichkeit] o f being-in-the-world and thereby o f making it "expressly
visible for others." As testimony on this point, Heidegger quotes a passage from Rainer
M aria Rilke's novel The Notebooks o f Malte Laurids Brigge (originally published in German
in 1910). I reproduce here this passage from a recent translation25 that is fresher than the
translation used in The Basic Problems (BP). Notice in the following passage, as Heidegger
25
Rilke 1990, 45-48.
289
points out, "in how elemental a way the world, being-in-the-world Rilke calls it life -leaps tow ard us from the things." (BP 173; GA 24, 246)
Will people believe that there are houses like this? No, they'll say I am not telling the
truth. But this time it is the truth; nothing has been left out, and o f course nothing has
been added. Where would I get it from? People know that Im poor. People know
that. Houses? But, to be exact, they were houses which no longer existed. Houses
which had been demolished from top to bottom. It was the other houses that were
there, the ones that had stood alongside them, tall neighboring houses. Apparently
they were in Hanger o f collapsing, since all support had been removed; a whole
scaffolding o f long, tarred poles had been rammed diagonally betw een the rubblestrew n ground and the bared wall. I don't know if I have already said that this is the
wall I am talking about. It was, so to speak, not the first wall o f the existing houses
(as you would have supposed), but the last o f the ones that were no longer there.
You could see its inside. Y ou could see, at its various stories, bedroom walls with
wallpaper still sticking to them ; and here and there a piece o f floor o r ceiling. Near
these bedroom walls there remained, along the entire length o f the outer wall, a dirtywhite space through which, in unspeakably nauseating, worm -soft, digestive
movements, the open, rust-spotted channel o f the toilet pipe crawled. The gaslight
jets had left dusty gray traces at the edges o f the ceiling; they bent here and there,
abruptly, ran along the walls, and plunged into the black, gaping holes that had been
to m there. But the most unforgettable things were the walls themselves. The
stubborn life o f these room s had not let itself be trampled out. It was still there; it
clung to the nails that were left, stood on the narrow remnant o f flooring, crouched
under the comer beams where a bit o f interior still remained. You could see it in the
paint which it had changed, slowly, from year to year: blue into moldy green, green
into gray, yellow into a faded, rotting white. But it was also in the places that had
been kept fresher behind m irrors, paintings, and wardrobes; for it had traced their
outlines over and over, and had been with cobwebs and dust even in these hidden
places, which were now laid bare. It was in every flayed strip o f surface; it was in the
damp blisters on the lower edges o f the wallpaper; it fluttered in the tom -off shreds,
and oozed from the foul stains which had appeared long before. And from these
walls, once blue, green, and yellow, and now framed by the broken tracks o f the
demolished partitions, the air o f these lives issued, the stubborn, sluggish, musty air
which no wind had yet scattered. There the noons lingered, and the illnesses, and the
exhalations, and the smoke o f many years, and the sweat that trickles down from
armpits and makes clothing heavy, and the stale breath o f mouths, and the oily smell
o f sweltering feet. There the pungent odor of urine lingered, and the odor o f soot, the
gray odor o f potatoes, and the heavy, sickening stench o f rancid grease. The sweet
smell o f neglected infants lingered there, the smell o f frightened schoolchildren, and
the stuffiness from the beds o f pubescent boys. And all the vapors that had risen from
the street below, or fallen dow n from above with the filthy urban rain. And many
things brought there by the weak ho use-winds, which always stay in the same street;
290
and much more whose origin would never be known. I said, didn't I, that all the outer
walls had been demolished except the last one ? It is this wall that I have been
talking about all along. You would think I had stood looking at it for a long time; but
I swear I began to run as soon as I recognized this wall. For that's what is horrible
that I did recognize i t I recognize everything here, and thats why it passes right
into me: it is at home inside me.
291
GLOSSARY
This Glossary contains the m ost im portant phenomenological term s that I use in my
inquiry. I have tried to keep their definitions or explanations brief in order to provide the
reader with a convenient and readable orientation. However, many terms listed in this
glossary remain abstract and ambiguous w ithout their fuller clarification in the main text.
Terms which are used in my definitions o r explanations and which are defined elsewhere in
this glossary appear in small caps. The abbreviations indicating the source o f the Heidegger
quotes are identified in References (following this glossary).
available,
availableness
When w e encounter equipment [Zeug] in absorbed and smooth

everyday coping, it is "available" or "ready-to-hand" [zuhanden].
"Availableness" [Zuhandenheit] is Heidegger's term for the mode o f
being o f equipment in which D a se in typically encounters it in
everyday successful coping activities. (See also Table 3-1 where
availableness is contrasted with three additional modes o f being
other than D a se in : unavailableness, occurrentness, and pure
occurrentness.)
background
practices
An understanding o f the being o f entities is embodied in the ways

we typically deal w ith them. This embodied understanding can be
called our background practices. P h eno m en o lo g y attempts to
make these practices explicit.
being
Heidegger understands being as "that on the basis o f which beings

are already understood" (BT 25-26, SZ 6). Being is a fundamental
aspect o f beings (or entities), i.e., their intelligibility.
being-in-the-world
Being-in-the-world is the most central characteristic o f D a se in 's

everyday existence. In everyday ongoing coping activities, D a se in ,
immersed in its w o r ld , is already and always among its things o f
use. D asein exists in the manner o f being-in-the-world, and this
basic determ ination o f its existence is the presupposition for being
able to apprehend anything at all." (BP 164; GA 24,234) In other
words, being-in-the-world is the manner in which we encounter our
everyday routine environment and is therefore the source o f
intelligibility in general.
292
Dasein
"This entity which each o f us is himself and which includes

inquiring as one o f the possibilities of its being, we shall denote by
the term D a sein (BT 27, SZ 7) Dasein is that being that is "there"
(da) with its world.
earth vs. world
In his discussion o f the w ork o f art Heidegger identifies two

opposing forces, "earth" and "world," whose fruitful tension and
interplay establish the artwork. "World" refers to the organizing
and totalizing tendencies o f the artwork, and "earth" refers to those
forces that resist "world." While "world" gives structure and
predictability, "earth" makes sure that this structure is alive and
continuously rejuvenated. In the analysis o f D a se in and in the
context o f dwelling w ith things, world and earth, respectively,
have different meanings. (For "earth" as one aspect o f our
practices, see the fo u r fo ld .)
enframing
The enframing [Gestell] is the mark o f modem technology. Objects

and living beings are been reduced to disposable placeholders o f the
same standing reserve [Bestand] which is turning them into
resources to be used efficiently.
en tity
An entity is anything that is. I use the terms entities and beings"
synonymously for anything that is.
existence
Existence [Existenz] is Heideggers term for hum ans' or D esig n 's

way o f being.
existential
spatiality
Existential spatiality (or D asein 's spatiality) refers to the spatial

environment as human beings encounter it in their everyday routine
activities. When humans are absorbed in what they are doing,
space is not encountered thematically and explicitly as it is in
science, engineering, and architecture. (See also Table 3-2.)
293
existentiell vs.
existential
A n individual's understanding o f his or her own way o f being is

"existentiell," and a m an ife s t and express understanding o f
o nto lo g ical structures o f D a s e in is "existential." Heidegger is
doing existential analysis and not, as some authors claim,
existentialism which focuses o n the alleged plight o f the lives o f
individuals and their "existentiell" understanding. (See also o n tic
v s. ontological investigation.)
fourfold
The gathering power o f a t h i n g opens up for humans four

dimensions o r aspects o f practices: earth, sky, divinities, and
m ortals. Heidegger calls their unifying interplay the fourfold [das
G eviert]. Earth refers to "the taken-for-granted practices that
ground situations and make them m atter to us." Sky refers to "the
disclosed o r manifest stable possibilities for action that arise in focal
situations." D ivinities engender "the special attunement required
for an occasion to work." (quotes are from Dreyfus and Spinosa
1997, 166-171) Mortals are hum an beings who are aware o f their
finitude and fragility without letting such awareness inhibit their
outlook via undue self-consciousness, morbid attitude, or assum ed
fixed identities. The fourfold gathers these four aspects o f practices
into one union that centers a local world.
free relation to
technology
A post-technological, or non-instrumental, understanding o f

technology does not deny any pragm atic utility o f technology, but
accepts technology as our appropriate way o f dealing w ith the
w o r l d , i.e., as our current way o f being. This ontological and
historicized understanding o f technology does not disavow
technological utility, but includes it as one o f many aspects o f
technology (beauty and playfulness, for example). A free relation
to technological devices is based on such a non-instrumental
understanding, which comfortably coexists with a variety o f nontechnological, even m arginal, practices (crafts, visual arts, religious
practices, hiking, bird watching, etc.). Seen from a non
instrum ental perspective, technology is one o f the major ways we
organize and understand our collective and individual lives in the
current historical epoch. (See also technological
u n d e r s t a n d in g )
294
hermeneutic
phenomenology
The task o f hermeneutic phenomenology is to make the essential

structures o f ex isten c e explicit. Because Heidegger uses
interpretation when uncoiling various levels and aspects o f
D asein s self-understanding, he calls his m ethod interpretive or
hermeneutic phenomenology. Through systematic interpretation
hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to elucidate our tacit
back g ro und PRACTICES. On a second level o f interpretation,
phenomenology reflects also on its language and interpretive
procedures as well as on its embedment in culture and the history o f
thought.
hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is the study o f the methodological principles of

interpretation.
instrumental
understanding
For instrumental understanding o f technology, see technological

un derstand in g o f technology.
ontic vs.
ontological
An investigation is "ontic" (or "ontical") if it concerns beings or

entities (humans or any other kind), and it is "ontological" if it
concerns ways o f being that are fundamental, explicit, and shared.
Heidegger's ph en o m eno lo g y is an ontological investigation. (See
also existentiell v s . existential understanding.)
ontology
"Ontology" is the traditional name for the conceptual investigation

o f BEING.
phenomenology
Phenomenology is a conceptual clarification that attem pts to make

manifest and explicit what is typically "taken for granted as being
self-evident" (BP 58; GA 24, 80), i.e., our b a c k g r o u n d
practices . Stated alternatively, phenomenology is an explicit
discovering o f that which D a se in already understands, but either
forgets or covers up while involved in everyday activities. Its goal is
a theoretically unbiased description o f D a se in 's everydayness.
Phenomenology expresses this goal in its maxim To the Things
Themselves!" (BT 50; SZ 28) This maxim is, however, neither a
call for scientific positivism nor for subjective introspection. It
calls for a study o f D a s e in on its own term s, i.e., how it
understands itself. (See also h erm eneutic phenom eno lo gy .)
295
phenomenon
A phenomenon is something manifest, i.e., something that shows

itself in itself. The phenomena "are the totality o f what lies in the
light o f day or can be brought to the light...." (BT 51; SZ 28) As
logos can be understood as a letting-something-be-seen,
phenom enology is the practice o f reading or laying out the
phenomena o f our everyday environment in the way they show
themselves.
technological
understanding
A technological understanding o f technology comprehends

technological devices mainly as neutral means for achieving
something (e.g., goods, mobility, efficiency, capital) and
maximizing its utility. Therefore this understanding can also be
called an instrumental understanding o f technology. (See also free
RELATION TO TECHNOLOGY.)
thing
A thing is a focal point around which a coherent and distinct

context, a local w orld , can establish itself. Things gather a local
w o r ld and make it visible to those who dwell in it. When the
gathering power o f things reaches beyond local worlds, things have
the potential o f becoming w o rk s o f ar t , i.e, shared cultural
paradigms. "Things function as works o f art when they unify a
people and show them their understanding o f being." (Dreyfus and
H all 1992, 21.)
work of art
A work o f art (in the sense used in this inquiry) is a physical

manifestation o f shared cultural practices which, if commonly
recognized, establish a cultural paradigm. A work o f art is tacit
culture made visible by unifying ongoing practices and giving them
focused physical expression. In the context o f US history, the
railroad was a 19th century w ork o f art. A work o f art "gives to
things their look and to m en their outlook on themselves." (PLT 43;
HW 28) In other words, a w ork o f art is a manifestation o f the
implicit self-understanding o f a unified, historical culture.
296
world
W orld [Welt] is a pre-reflectively and directly understood nexus o f

social practices, available equipment, and concerned practical
involvement. Heidegger points out that we are involved with our
world before we are engaged with specific equipment: The world
as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact
specifically occupy ourselves with it, o r apprehend it, but instead it
is so self-evident, so much a m atter o f course, that we are
completely oblivious o f it. World is th at which is already previously
unveiled and from which we return to the entities with which we
deal and among which we dwell. (BP 165; GA 24, 235). World
(in quotation marks) signifies our social and physical environment
viewed from the objective, detached perspective o f science. In
late Heidegger, a local world is a coherent and distinct context
established and focused by a thing that makes this local world
visible to those who dwell in it. (See also ea r th vs. w orld in
Heidegger's analysis o f the w ork of a r t .)
worldliness
W orldliness [Weltlichkeit] is the world's way o f being.
297
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ProQ uest Information and Learning

Moving About in a Technological World:

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction o f the

UMI Number 3019707

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

Moving About in a Technological World:

Following the phenomena

(B) Our streets and highways need to function as

I dedicate this inquiry to

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC NATURE OF STREETS........ 1

Phenomenology in Environmental Design Research..................................2

Environmental Design Research and Phenomeno logy

Basic Propositions o f Environmental Phenomenology

Phenomenological Analysis and Semantic Ethnography

Encountering Streets and Contemporary Street Issues..........................27

Main Contemporary Street Issues

HEIDEGGER ON BEING HUMAN AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL

Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Being-in-the-World, and Spatiality... 55

Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Basic Terms and Overview

Environment and Equipment

Existential Spatiality and Physical Space

Regions, Places, and Public Space

Modern Technology and the Work o f A rt................................................104

Our Present Ambivalence Toward Technology

Heidegger's Account o f M odem Technology

Elements o f a Work o f Art

Dwelling in A Technological W orld...........................................................123

Dwelling in Many Ways

MOVING ABOUT IN A TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD..........................144

The Street as Transparent Equipment.....................................................146

Materials, Nature, and Publicness o f the Urban Street

Signs as Street Equipment

Streets as Equipment for Walking

Moving About as a Work of A rt................................................................ 176

Transportation as Our Potential Work o f Art

Transportation's Central Role

Airports as a Future W ork o f Art

Special Features o f Aviation Technology

On the Way to Dwelling on Streets.......................................................... 208

The Trash Can as a Thing

The Freeway Thinging

Implications for Street Designers and Educators.................................. 239

An Outline o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology..........................................259

The Project o f Hermeneutic Phenomenology

The Shrinking Globe, 1889-1981..................................................... 124

Typical Flight Velocities.................................................................... 126

A Contemporary Understanding o f Earth and S k y .........................141

Signs Destroying vs. Reinforcing Local Worlds............................. 161

Pedestrian Realms: Broken Up (top) and Out o f Scale (bottom) 168

Sidewalks Unavailable in Two W ays............................................... 170

Narrowed to Motorized U s e .............................................................173

Paths to Nowhere............................................................................... 175

Trash Cans Just One Block Apart.................................................... 209

Trash Containers Attuning Our Proper Ways................................. 213

A Gathering o f Bridges and Free Ways............................................220

A Gathering o f Things....................................................................... 231

A Reminder on Dwelling................................................................... 234

Plain Street, North Dakota................................................................236

Map o f San Francisco and Berkeley, California.............................. 247