The Warsaw Pact Today: And Tomorrow?

Author(s): Raymond L. Garthoff

Source: The Brookings Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 34-40
Published by: Brookings Institution Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20080163
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Warsaw

The

Tomorrow?

Today?And

Raymond

Five

Gor
years ago, on April 26, 1985, Mikhail
bachev and the leaders of the six Eastern Euro
a
of the Warsaw
Pact signed
pean members
a
that
second
30
It
alliance
for
years.
protocol renewing
was Gorbachev's
act in the international
first major
arena as general
secretary of the Communist
Party of
the Soviet Union. None
of the signers
then
realized
five years all except Gorbachev
that within
and Woj
ciech Jaruzelski of Poland would
be gone. Nor that of
the seven members
the
Soviet
Union would
still
only
none
And
of
have a Communist
them,
government.*
that the future
anticipate
10 years would be in seri

could
including Gorbachev,
of the Pact for even another
ous

Pact

question.

its first 30 years

the Warsaw
Pact served
During
in
several purposes,
the
interests
of the Sovi
primarily
et Union, but in some aspects also for its other mem
bers. In a paradoxical
way, the Pact also came to serve
certain purposes
for the United
if
States and NATO,

L. Garthoff

the Western
al
only as an opponent
against which
liance could be rallied. While
the several objectives
and functions
of the Pact in those years can be de
scribed
in various ways,
three major
they fall within
categories:
A device

for Soviet

control of its politi

hegemonic
and
economic
bloc of Eastern
cal, ideological, military,
or
satellites
allies.
European
A Soviet-controlled
for contin
command
military
and defensive.
Soviet and Eastern
in various
in
spheres,
and
ideology,
military

offensive
gent military
operations,
A mechanism
for coordinating

and actions
policies
European
cluding
foreign policy, internal
policy.
All of these roles were seen as mutually
reinforcing
and as serving overall objectives
se
such as enhancing
and
international
influence.
curity
politi
Ideological,
and military
taken as a
cal, economic,
solidarity was
given.

in practice,
flaws. Albania was virtually
1961
and
in 1968. Ro
by
formally withdrew
was less than a full
mania
from the mid-1960s
partici
pant, in particular with
respect to integrated military
in turn excluded
and was
from some
arrangements,
There were,

^Bulgaria in the first half of 1990 had a reform government based

on

the fomer
Communist,
were
scheduled

elections

renamed

Socialist,

party.

Multiparty

for mid-June.

A senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program

and former ambassador to Bulgaria, Raymond L. Garthoff is the
author

of several

books

on Soviet

affairs

and U.S.-Soviet

relations,

on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1989)

among them Reflections
and Deterrence
in Soviet Military Doc
and the Revolution
trine (forthcoming, September 1990).
The Brookings

Review

Summer

1990

Illustration

excluded

and intelligence
coordination.
The one time
military
that several members
of the Pact took up arms
(though
without
having to resort to their use) was in 1968 to co
erce another member,
to make
inter
Czechoslovakia,
so that the
nal political
and
changes
political
ideologi
of the alliance would
cal solidarity
not be broken.
by Robert Soul?35

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in 1956, only a year and a half after the for

Similarly,
had been coerced
mation
of the Warsaw
Pact, Hungary
to
remain
in
the
alliance.
Soviet
force
Nonetheless,
by
while
and among the mem
there were changes within
renewed
in
bers over the years, when
the Pact was
to perform
1985 it continued
all three functions.
is gone. The Soviet
function
the
primary
Today
over a monolithic
Union does not exercise hegemony
has
and the
bloc. The ideological
shattered,
solidarity
to the Com
role of the Warsaw
Pact as the successor
is dead. The Pact remains a po
intern and Cominform
alliance, but it is no longer a tool of So
litical-military
is it an obedient
viet management
and control. Nor
can be reached only by consent of the
bloc. Decisions
members.

The military
but most
main,

also declined
because
of changes
in Soviet
policy.
Moscow
has given no indication
that it would wish
these activities
of its allies to continue,
and it is reduc
own
its
activities.
similar
ing
As the Warsaw
Pact has ceased to be a mechanism
for Soviet control, it has gained some new value for its
other members
as a means
of

for the Soviet Union

(and perhaps
too)
events.
world
Concerned
influencing
about maintaining
its borders with Germany,
Poland
welcomes
the reassurance
it receives both from the So
viet troops on its territory and from the support of its
other Pact allies. The new noncommunist
governments
of Eastern Europe may carry more weight
in the West
on issues such as the Czech
a
for
proposal
pan-Euro
than does the USSR. While
arrangement
ties
have
the Pact still
ideological
frayed or broken,
reflects some unchanged
realities.
geopolitical

pean
command
arrangements
of the members
have

re

nominally
their
annulled
to
the
Soviet
of
command
po
military
predelegations
in the event of war or
litical and military
leadership
in Poland, Hungary,
crisis. The national
parliaments
control over deci
have reasserted
and Czechoslovakia
sions on use of the armed forces. The German Demo
is a
in its interim remaining
existence
cratic Republic
name only. Romania may, at least for
in
military
ally
from Moscow
than itwas,
be less distant
the moment,
re
its military.
but it too will not subordinate
Bulgaria
the most reliable ally.
on a
remains
Coordination
among Pact members
in
rela
but
wide
of
there, too, changes
issues,
range
are
new
A
consensual
basis
has
apparent.
tionships
some areas. Pact foreign ministers,
meet
in
developed
in March,
for example,
agreed on sup
ing in Prague
a pan-European
a
Com
for
Czech
porting
proposal
in Europe that would build on the
for Security
mission
in
and Cooperation
of Security
existing Conference
even
as
came
the
So
This
agreement
Europe process.
in op
isolated among Pact members
viet Union was
a
for
reunited
NATO
Germany.
membership
posing
coordi
On other matters,
intelligence,
particularly
mains

nation

has been drastically

curtailed. Czechoslovakia,
have cut back coordina
East
and
Germany
Hungary,
as combating
the drug trade and
tion to such matters
in some areas of counterintel
terrorism. Coordination
It is likely that only Bul
also probably remains.
for the moment,
Poland) continues,
garia (and possibly
on political
to coordinate
Moscow
and
with
closely
even
without
there
and
probably
intelligence,
military
the former intimacy and Soviet control.
has lapsed, in part be
coordination
Close political
cause of the changes
in the countries
of Eastern
its for
has
for
East
pulled
example,
Germany,
Europe.
active
and
advisory
intelligence
police,
military,
merly
out of countries
and programs
missions
throughout
and Hun
East. Czechoslovakia
Africa and the Middle
and arms sales pro
gary are curbing arms production
as the armed
in the Third World
grams
(although
ligence

forces of these countries

terest in selling surplus

are reduced,
arms). But

there is some in
has
coordination

security

Erosion

of aMilitary

Alliance

events
the revolutionary
in Eastern Eu
would
have
about
the
of
Although rope
brought
dismantling
the Warsaw
Pact's military
in any event, it is
alliance
to recognize
that the process began earlier,
important
in Soviet political
assessment,
propelled
by changes
and
and doctrine.
outlook,
security
policy
military
in 1985-86
These
and accelerated
in
changes
began
new
a
with
the
of
of
doctrine
defensive
1987,
adoption
and in 1988, with major unilateral
force re
sufficiency,
ductions
for negotiated
and further proposals
drastic
arms reductions. While
in the last
the pace of change
few months
has undoubtedly
been faster and less con
trolled

than Gorbachev
had foreseen,
the direction
of
set.
been
had
change
already
deliberately
member
By early 1990, all six of the non-Soviet
states had banned
Communist
other
(or any
party)
in the armed
forces, and several even
organizations
barred military
from partisan
officers
affilia
political
tion. The former Political Administrations
and deputy
for political
affairs
of the
commanders
(descendants
or
been
have
either
abolished
"political commissars")
converted
into at least nominally
nonpartisan
political
education
bodies.
and welfare
are
All Pact countries,
the Soviet Union,
including
re
their
and
reducing
substantially
military
personnel
on more
the
forces
defensive
remaining
structuring
are
lines. Hungary
and Czechoslovakia,
for example,
tactical
offensive
and
short-range missiles,
eliminating
as well. Hun
tactical bombers
is eliminating
Hungary
are
around the coun
garian troops
being distributed
in the western
try rather than deployed
part, in accor
a
dance with
"defense of all azimuths"
policy.
tours have been reduced
in all mem
Conscription
in Hungary,
ber countries
Ro
except the Soviet Union:
to 12 months
and East Germany
from 24, in the
to 18months. With
the possible exception
of Ro
are all sharply cutting military
Pact countries
mania,
items. Czecho
export
production,
including military

mania,
others

36

The Brookings

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Review

Summer

1990

Officially, Soviet military

commanders

have reacted

calmly and coolly to these

drastic changes,

saying

that

everything was proceeding

without disruption. In fact,
they

are greatly

concerned

by the uncontrolled
rush of developments

of the So
is ceasing production
for example,
own marketable
L-39
of
its
T-72
tank
and
viet-designed
trainer
and
aircraft.
light utility
force cuts, averaging
The initial Eastern European
came in the wake of the 12 per
about 10-12 percent,
Slovakia,

in Decem
cent Soviet unilateral
reduction
announced
more
have
drastic
reductions
ber 1988. Since late 1989
or
on
are
1992
the
and
under way. By
been announced
der of 30 active divisions,
rather than the 60 non-Soviet
in 1988, will remain in
credited
Pact divisions
Warsaw
10 instead of 30 Soviet di
Eastern Europe and perhaps

turned to the USSR by 1992. Soviet forces are sched

no later
and Hungary
uled to leave Czechoslovakia
and will probably be out of Poland by
than mid-1991,
1992. All Soviet forces will also be returned home from
in 1992. Even Soviet military
and Vietnam
Mongolia
in Ethiopia, Ango
advisers are likely to be withdrawn
and cut back, if not fully with
la, and Mozambique
in Cuba.
drawn,
a need for nuclear weapons
sta
No
longer seeing
the Soviet Union will prob
its borders,
tioned beyond
all its tactical nuclear weapons
ably also withdraw
in 1990 ?
and call on
from Eastern Europe sometime
to do the same. The Soviets have already tak
the West
en some steps in this direction,
in 1989, for
removing
fighter
example, all of their SU-24 (Fencer) long-range
from Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary).
bombers
in prac
The joint Warsaw
Pact military
command,
has only a residual
tice a Soviet staff and command,
it may still
function. The one area in which
planning
is in co
that
is
have some meaning,
unclear,
although
west
the
defense
of
and
air
Eastern
Europe
ordinating
ern USSR.
to exist with
If the Warsaw
Pact continues
its present membership
after
(minus East Germany
war
still
it
will
coordinate
reunification),
probably
a
for
defensive
against
operations
hypothetical
plans
NATO attack. The kind of offensive
strategic concept
for even a war of defense
that underlay
alliance plans
at
least
1987 can no
from the Pact's
until
inception
longer even be planned.
The unilateral
Soviet Western
Theater of Military
con
in 1984, may
established
command,
Operations
on
"Front"
Soviet
The
four
Soviet
field
tinue,
territory.
in East Germany,
stationed
Poland, Hun
commands,
as
known
of
and
and
Czechoslovakia
gary,
Groups
as
in
next
few
the
dissolve
Forces, will, however,
years
these forces are withdrawn.
Plans for wartime
integra
tion of the armies of those four Warsaw
Pact allies into
the four Groups of Forces have already had to be aban

visions.

doned.

the borders of the

The Soviet armed forces beyond
in 1988
in
from
USSR
575,000 men
Europe will decline
end
the
to something
between
and
400,000 by
300,000
and Poland. Of
of 1991, located in eastern Germany
remain under the
than 195,000 would
these, no more
in the
the
United
States
accord with
for incorporation
in
In
Forces
Conventional
(CFE) agreement.
Europe
no more
will
than
be
there
50,000 in
practice
probably

Soviet military
leaders have reacted calm
Officially,
to
these
drastic
that
and
ly
saying
coolly
changes,
was
a
without
In
everything
proceeding
disruption.
a
ex
with
interview
German
for
newspaper,
February
ample, General Vladimir N. Lobov, the chief of staff of
the Combined
Forces of the Warsaw
Armed
Pact, said:
states
the
allied
have
[Pact]
"Recently
again declared
their loyalty to the obligations
from the Pact
arising

eastern

and

by 1995, and perhaps none, depend

Germany
on
American
forces in western
Germany.
ing in part
on
the drawdown
of Soviet
The
factor
limiting
the shortage
of rail
in 1990-91
is logistical:
forces
inwithdrawing
transport
troops from Eastern Europe,

all remaining
125,000 troops from Czecho
including
and the absence of
slovakia and Hungary
mid-1991,
by
in
those
the
USSR
for
troops not demo
living quarters
for officers'
bilized
families).
(and in particular
of eastern Ger
With
the probable
special exception
all
Soviet
be re
will
forces
abroad
many,
virtually
The Brookings

Review

Summer

have stressed
Pact guarantees
that the Warsaw
... At the same time,
their sovereignty
and security.
to perfect
the necessity
the instruments
and activities
of the alliance and to turn it from a military-political
one is empha
into a political-military
organization
sized."

In fact, Soviet military

leaders are greatly concerned
the
uncontrolled
rush
of
At the Pact
by
developments.
chiefs of staff meeting
in January 1990, to which Gen
re
eral Lobov was undoubtedly
the Soviets
referring,
were
un
to
the
and
unable
get
portedly
unequivocal

1990 37

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he gave no hint of deep unilateral

Pact reductions,
the
or
a
demise
of
East
impending
Germany,
restructuring
of the very alliance.

It was,

of course,

Gorbachev himself who set

the objective of turning
theWarsaw

Pact

into a primarily
political alliance, well before
the revolution of
November-December

1989.

Revealed: A Crack in the Curtain

the Cold War, itwas the Soviet expecta
in the event of war,
on the
depending
of its outbreak
and the nature of the
conflict" would
"diplomatic
accompany
the armed
conflict. As one Soviet military
theorist,
Vladimir
wrote
in Military
Zemskov,
Major General
conflict will
Thought in 1969, "The point of diplomatic
be
directed
toward
the hostile
obviously
weakening
in every way possible,
means
coalition
of
separat
by

tion that
Throughout
circumstances
war, a spirited

states from it and depriving

the main
ing individual
of
his
international
ties
and
from al
enemy
support
and
neutral
states."
lies, dependent
For the Soviets,
this diplomatic
conflict represented
both opportunity
and threat. Thus, in the words of one
Soviet

to "loyalty"
to the Pact that
commitment
come
to be regard
and
that
may
meeting
they sought,
in
the
demise
of Sovi
ed as the symbolic
turning point
over the armies of Pact countries.
et military
command
in February whether
Asked by a Soviet interviewer
conditional

of Soviet

forces from Czecho

military
not "bring harm
and
Poland would
slovakia, Hungary,
re
to our defense,"
General
Lieutenant
Igor Sergeyev
was
calculated
Parity
"Undoubtedly.
sponded bluntly:
on the existing
counts
status quo. Defensive
doctrine
on the present grouping
of troops. As
and deployment
we lose space, we come closer to danger. If under pari
someone
else gains. The
loses, that means
ty someone
in
the
Pact
Warsaw
certainly are a loss
impending changes
us
And
the
view.
all the theoret
for
from
military point of
a military-political
about replacing
ical dissertations
withdrawal

one are little consola

alliance with a political-military
tion. That's a play on words"
added).
(emphasis
himself who set the ob
Itwas, of course, Gorbachev
Pact into a primarily
po
jective of turning the Warsaw
the revolution
of Novem
litical alliance, well before
was
the official
decision
1989. And
ber-December
of the
in July 1989 at a meeting
in Bucharest
made
But the Soviet
Committee.
Pact's Political Consultative
no doubt foresaw a much
leaders in particular
military
more
less
transformation.
and
far-reaching
gradual
are especially
Their expectations
clear from an article
1989 by General
Petr
written
before mid-November
In this
Pact's commander-in-chief.
Lushev, the Warsaw
in the January 1990 issue of
article, which
appeared
Staff journal, Lu
Thought, the Soviet General
Military
the defensive
doctrine
and announced
shev discussed
in Soviet and Eastern European
reductions
forces, but

Lomov, also
strategist, Colonel General Nikolai
in
the
confidential
General
Staff
writing
journal, "It is
clear that in the course of a war one of the main
tasks
of the socialist coalition will be to attract on to its side
the peoples of non-socialist
countries." At least equally
in
Soviet
prominent
thinking,
though rarely articulat
concern
over
has
been
to do the
Western
ed,
ability
same to them. As General Zemskov wrote,
the imperi
to "attempt
to break up the
alists have been expected
socialist community
Warsaw
[the
Pact] and to separate
countries
from its ranks."
individual
not much discussed
inWestern
Although
political
it is not surprising
that in a war, and
military writings,
a
in
time of mounting
tension
and threat
especially
a
seek to neutral
leading up to war, both sides would
ize members
of the opposing
alliance by diplomatic
or pressures. What
inducements
is new is the
political
of an actual case of a conditional
revelation
defection
a quarter of a century
ago.
by one alliance member
the radical changes
in East-West
Given
the
relations,
now
and
the
it
Warsaw
Pact,
concerned,
governments
seems appropriate
to disclose
secret.
this long-held
The tensions generated
the
Cuban
missile
crisis
by
had significant
in Europe, where no one
reverberations
to be brought
wanted
into a war over the issue of Sovi
et missiles

in Cuba. While members

of NATO and the
Warsaw
Pact dutifully
gave public support to the Unit
ed States and the Soviet Union,
the lead
respectively,
ers of one country decided
after that crisis to seek to
their
distance
ment
if their

from any automatic

engage
country
alliance
leader again as
superpower
sumed such risks.
The country was Romania.
Its leadership
confiden
at a very
the
United
States
advised
government
tially
in any
level
would
that
Romania
remain
neutral
high
as
such
the
conflict generated
Soviet
de
actions,
by

ployment
had been

to Cuba, which
of strategic nuclear missiles
consultation
with Roma
taken without
prior
38

The Brookings

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Review

Summer

1990

nia. The Romanian

that
sought assurances
leadership
a
in the event of hostilities
from
such
situation,
arising
on the
not attack Romania
the United
States would
it
mistaken
would
that
be
allied
with
the
assumption
in such a war.
Soviet Union
in response
United
States
indicated
that it
take note of any country that did not participate
its territory to be used in military
actions
permit
or
connec
the
United
States
its
In
this
allies.
against
were
told that itwould be impor
tion, the Romanians
tant for the United
States to know whether
there were
on Romanian
nuclear weapons
soil, and that if the
United
States were
that there were
given assurance
be taken into account
in U.S. tar
none, that fact would
The
Romanians
that w
geting.
subsequently
responded
no nuclear weapons
there were
in Romania
and of
fered the United
States any opportunity
it wished
to
The

would
in or

ac
that fact. (The absence of nuclear weapons
verify
corded with U.S.
and
the
States
United
intelligence,
did not pursue
the verification
of the
offer.) Because
ex
of
the
of
this
matter,
any knowledge
sensitivity
was
au
held.
It
been
has, however,
very closely
change
confirmed.
thoritatively
Pact's
Thus, at least one large crack in the Warsaw
existed
before
the
redefinition
of
the
al
solidarity
long
liance's functions
and authority
in
1989.
Roma
began
nia has not, of course, actively participated
in the mili
command
of
the
Pact
since
the
1960s. The
late
tary
Romanian
to
the
United
States, un
private
approach
known to the Soviet leaders or anyone else, gave added
to the declaration
in April
1964 in which
the
first
leadership
expressed
public dissatis
faction with Romania's
voice in the Warsaw
Pact. Both

meaning
Romanian

The fact that the

Romanian leadership
in 1963 had secretly
expressed

contingent

neutrality

to theUnited States
represented a serious breach

of alliance obligations.

The

Brookings

Review

Summer

1990

were

undertaken
by Gheorghiu
of greater Romanian
autonomy
his successor Nicolae Ceausescu.
The fact that the Romanian

Dej, marking
followed after

the line
1965 by

in 1963 had
leadership
to
the United
secretly expressed
contingent
neutrality
a serious breach of alliance
States represented
obli
a
war
com
should
break
Soviet
out,
gations.
Today,
mand over the forces of any other Warsaw
Pact coun
no
nor
is
is
the
of
automatic,
try
longer
participation
any

member.

New Role for the Pact?

hile the departure
of East Germany
may seem
to eviscerate
the Warsaw
it
should
be re
Pact,
called that East Germany was not even a member
until
a year after the Pact was
founded.
the
Furthermore,
Pact itself was formed not in response
to the founding
of NATO
in 1949, but in response
to West Germany's
to that alliance
admission
in 1955. A reunited Ger
in NATO may have a similar effect in
many
reviving
Eastern European
interest in maintaining
the Warsaw
Pact until a pan-European
security system develops.
There is a dialectical
between
relationship
changes
in the Warsaw
Pact and in the attitudes of its members
toward the alliance. The fear that the Soviet
leadership
would be able to use
in the Pact as an ex
membership
cuse to intervene
in a member
internal af
country's
fairs has dissipated.
As a consequence
Soviet control is
much weaker,
but to the extent that the loss of fear re
duces
incentives
for members
to leave it, the Pact is
stronger.

The Warsaw
Pact also serves some residual
military
as well as revivified
functions.
political
coordinating
the Eastern European member
states will in
Although
time undoubtedly
sources
their
of higher
diversify
education
arms and
and of military
military
equip
for some time the Soviet Union
ment,
and, to a lesser
will
to provide
continue
extent, other Pact members
such services
through
long-established
arrangements.
exercises
and planning
Joint military
will, however,
drop sharply and in due course probably cease.
Soviet
Minister
Ivan Aboimov
Deputy
Foreign
summed
for an alliance among
up the new grounds
the members,
based on mutual
interests. The Soviet
he said in an interview published
in February
Union,
1990 in the Soviet journal
Argumenty
ifakty, "will build
relations
in such a way
that the countries
of Eastern
can be convinced
of the main
Europe
thing: that al
liance relations with
the USSR will not be a brake on
the path to their independent
that the
development,
Warsaw
Pact is not a means
to preserve
Soviet hege
means
to preserve
in
mony, but a necessary
stability
new
until
structures
are
of
built
Europe
security
the common
home."
That was
guarding
European
and
well
said.
The
will
alliance
continue
frankly
only if
its members,
who now have a free choice, decide that it
remains in their interest.

39

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none of the member

states shows
the present,
signs of leaving the alliance. As the new Hungarian
Defense
Colonel
General
Ferenc Karpati,
Minister,
stated in late February:
has no intention of
"Hungary
from the Warsaw
it
withdrawing
Treaty, but considers
to carry out changes
in the organization
in
necessary
re
to present-day
the interest of better
adaptation
For

The country's
endeavor
that the military
quirements.
in the foreseeable
defense
blocs be dissolved
future
to this. We see a possibility
does not run contrary
for
it
is
these
but
alliances,
military
indispens
abolishing
able to set up a new European
security system in order
to guarantee
to
security, reduce troops and armaments
a considerably
lower level and dismantle
offensive
weapons."

to what is probably
These statements
draw attention
source
sustenance
for the War
the most
of
important
saw Pact today, and on which
a
its future will depend:
shared interest among the Eastern European members
se
in seeing a new all-European
and the Soviet Union
can
evolve
that
the
Warsaw
curity arrangement
replace
Pact and, at least in part, NATO. Although
Czechoslo
?
with
and Poland
the
vakia, Hungary,
disagreeing
Soviet Union ?
have said they prefer a reunited Ger
to remain in NATO
rather than be neutral,
many
they
favor a pan-European
also strongly
arrange
security
to NATO. Accord
of what happens
ment,
regardless
for dissolution
of
the
call
Soviet
ingly, they support
a European
se
Pact and NATO when
both the Warsaw
curity

system

the Warsaw

comes
Pact

into being.

can

serve

in the meantime,

And
and

is

?
serving

as

a European
security
lobby to boost such
noted with
The Bush administration

system.
great satisfac
tion the support of Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Hun
in
for
German
NATO, but failed to
gary
membership
ar
note their preference
for a pan-European
security
to
absolute
Indeed, giving
NATO,
rangement.
priority
in the Bush administration
about a European
security

officials
cautious
they
countries

fear

it could

become

have

been

very

regime because
of NATO
the preference

as well.

also brushed
The Bush administration
off, perhaps
too quickly,
that a reunified Ger
the Soviet proposal
both of NATO and the War
many might be a member
saw Pact. Dual membership
would
not, as Henry
some
have
be another
others
and
Kissinger
suggested,
not be cut
would
to
neutralize
way
Germany. Germany
NATO
could be undiminished.
one
its
of
members
hardly suffer from having
if Ger
to Warsaw
And
Pact discussions.
also privy
in the Pact, Germany
and the Soviet Union
many were
as
to
each
act
other, something
might
counterweights
and Hungary might welcome.
Poland, Czechoslovakia,
loose;
would

its ties to NATO

from the
reaction
But in the light of strong negative
dual alliance membership
United
States and NATO,
seems quite unlikely.
for Germany
While
the Soviet Union had implicitly drawn a line
as recently as the summer of 1989 that no members
of

leave no matter what

internal political
no
that
situation
occurred,
changes
longer prevails.
The future of the Warsaw
Pact will be determined
pri
of a struggle between
two con
marily
by the outcome
On the one hand, the Pact has
tending considerations.
the Pact should

its main
outlived
and, moreover,
purposes
original
bears the burden of its past sins. On the other hand, a
and revitalized
reformed
Pact may be able to serve
new roles on behalf of its Eastern
as well as
European,
are seen as
If such new functions
Soviet, members.
the onus of the past, the Pact will survive;
outweighing
itwill succumb.
All members
of the Pact favor a gradual
replace
ment
of both counterposed
alliances
by a common
Soviet
leaders,
security
pan-European
arrangement.
and especially military
dis
leaders, seek simultaneous
solution of both alliances.
But NATO does not intend
to dissolve. Most members
of the Pact, and probably
the Soviet political
as well, would
settle for
leadership
a
as
secu
the
Warsaw
Pact
fade
away
seeing
European
even
if
would
be
(as
rity system develops,
likely) the
NATO alliance remained.
The United
States and its NATO allies thus have a
if not,

Pact. IfNATO
major voice in the future of the Warsaw
is given such exclusive
in
the
realm
priority
security
its
members
that
the
for
enhanced
East
by
prospects
are
West security cooperation
the
values
of
prejudiced,
the Warsaw
will be enhanced
Pact to its members
and
itwill probably
If the members
continue.
in
of NATO,
the United
States and Germany,
maintain
particular
a Euro
their alliance but also cooperate
in building
of
all
the
continent,
pean security
system embracing
then perceived
need for the Pact by its smaller mem
bers will diminish.
so
as the CFE negotiation
remains
Similarly,
long
in terms of parity in a balance between
structured
two
there
alliances,
will, paradoxical
contending
military
existence
ly, remain an implied need for the continued
of the Pact to support the process of arms reduction
in
are
The
alliances
adver
necessary
Europe.
currently
But that can be changed.
sary-partners.
it should be noted
that if the Warsaw
Pact
Finally,
should be disbanded
it
for
if
both
(as might,
example,
were
to leave after East
and Czechoslovakia
Hungary
?
the other members
dissolves),
and, for
Germany
?
that matter,
those that departed
bi
reaffirm
might
lateral alliance
with
Soviet
Union
the
arrangements
in some cases with one another. Such bi
and perhaps
lateral

the Pact and could

antedate
arrangements
or
maintained
after it ceased to exist.
reinvigorated

be

The

Pact is thus uncertain.

future of the Warsaw
short life as a
have only a relatively
probably
alliance, but it does contin
voluntary
political-military
ue to exist, and it may have a brief renaissance
as a
forum before
it loses its
consulting
political-military
raison d'?tre. Only
redefined
time, the course
newly
It will

of events, and the actions

liances will tell. D

40

of the countries

The Brookings

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Review

of both

al

Summer

1990