1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEPE BAUTISTA y

SABADO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the January 26, 1999 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of
the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30, finding
appellant Pepe Bautista y Sabado guilty of murder in Criminal Case
No. 613 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The Information[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] filed on April 13, 1993 charged
appellant as follows:
That on or about February 3, 1993, at Barangay Balance,
Municipality of Dupax del Norte, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and wound, with the use of a bolo,
one Rodolfo Bacoling, causing injuries to said Rodolfo Bacoling
which resulted to his death, and all to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said victim.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
sought by the accused to afford impunity in the commission of the
offense.
From the testimonial evidence of the prosecution, the following
have been established:
On the night of February 3, 1993 at the Dupax del Norte, Nueva
Vizcaya house of one Fausto Polon, appellant, Rodolfo Bacoling
(the deceased), James Buyagan, Felix Pallay, Lino Menzie and
Renato Hilario had a drinking spree.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Of the six, Pallay, Menzie and Hilario went home ahead, followed
by Buyagan, leaving behind the deceased, who was armed with a
bolo,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] conversing with appellant.
Around 9 p.m., Polons neighbor, Lorenzo Dumase, who was in his
house, heard neighbors dogs barking. Apprehensive that
somebody might be stealing his carabao, he opened the window of
his house upon which he saw, about 10 meters away, appellant
running after the deceased.
Around midnight, Hilario, who lived near Polons house, was
awakened as appellant and his brother Danilo knocked at his door.
On letting the brothers in, he was told by appellant, who showed his
blood-stained shirt, that he killed the deceased. Danilo even
brought out the blood-stained bolo. He (Hilario) thus advised the
two to go home, but they requested to be allowed to sleep at his
house to which he acceded.
At 5 a.m. of the following day, February 4, 1993, appellant and
Danilo left Hilarios house, leaving the bolo behind.[if !supportFootnotes][5]
[endif] Hilario thus wrapped the bolo and turned it over to the police
authorities.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
At about 6 a.m. also on February 4, 1993, while Buyagan was
cooking breakfast in his house, appellant arrived and confessed to
him that he killed the deceased, drawing Buyagan to report the
matter to the police.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On February 5, 1993, an autopsy was performed on the deceased
by Dr. Mary Ruth C. Reyes, Municipal Health Officer of Dupax del
Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. The autopsy report[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
dated February 9, 1993 indicated the cause of death of the
deceased to be hemorrhagic shock due to head and neck injuries
secondary to multiple hacking wounds - incised wounds in the
head, face, neck and fingers, and abrasion at the back.
As the sole witness on his behalf, appellant interposed selfdefense. He gave the following tale:
During their drinking spree, the deceased narrated many things
about [appellants] cousin Lito Vicente, including the hacking by the
latter of the deceaseds uncle.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Appellant reacted
by saying that he did not think that he had the same attitude as that
of his cousin.
After their four companions had left ahead, appellant started to
head for home too, but the deceased followed him and
badmouthed him, telling him not to run. As he looked back, he saw
the deceased unsheathe his bolo from its scabbard and raise it. He
thus embraced him, grabbed the bolo, and asked why he wanted to

hack him. The deceased, however, picked up a stone and hurled it

at him, albeit he was not hit. He then ran, and as he again looked
back, the deceased told him not to run as he was going to kill him.
The deceased eventually caught up with him, so he confronted him
and struck him with his (the deceaseds) own bolo.[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif]

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the decision[if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif] subject of the present appeal convicting
appellant of murder and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused, Pepe
Bautista y Sabado, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
Thirty Two Thousand, Three Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos (P
32,397.00) as actual expenses and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P
50,000.00) as mandatory death indemnity.
In his Brief,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] appellant assigns to the trial court
the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE
CRIME COMMITTED AS MURDER AND NOT SIMPLE
HOMICIDE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED
W I T H T H E M I T I G AT I N G C I R C U M S TA N C E S O F : A )
DRUNKENNESS; B) PROVOCATION; C) THERE WAS
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED;
D) AND IN NOT APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ONE OF SIMPLY HOMICIDE
AND NOT MURDER. (Underscoring supplied)
In finding that appellant was guilty as charged, the trial court found
that treachery qualified the killing.
The circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the
offense by the accused thereby qualifying the killing of Rodolfo
Bacoling to Murder for how else could the Court understand the
chase instituted by the accused on the victim fleeing or running
away from him and the wounds struck by him from behind the
victim.
The helpless position of the victim when he was killed because he
was then being chased from behind by the accused was not
accidental but intentionally taken advantaged of by the accused as
is evident from his resolution to really kill the victim when he
determinedly bridged the distance between him and the victim and
in that position of the victim with his back fronting the accused, the
latter hacked the victim.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Circumstances qualifying a killing to murder, such as treachery,
must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.[if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]

For treachery to be appreciated, two essential elements must

concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and
(2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack makes it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.[if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]

The records indicate that the deceased was aware of the

impending danger. By the account of Dumase, he saw appellant
running after and chasing the deceased. Appellant caught up with
him, however.
People v. Flores,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] the facts of which are similar
to those of the case at bar, teaches that:
x x x The mere fact that the victim was shot at the back while
attempting to run away from his assailant would not per se
qualify the crime to murder. In the case at bench, the evidence
established that accused-appellant, apparently drunk, emerged

2
from the factory and fired upon the victim and his companion who
were just innocently passing by. Sensing an imminent danger to
their lives, the two started to run. However, the next gunshot hit the
victim at the back and caused his death. Clearly then, with the
first gunshot, the victim has been placed on guard and has, in
fact attempted to flee. There could thus be no treachery since,
prior to the attack, the victim has been forewarned of the
danger to his life and has even attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to escape. Moreover, there was absolutely no
evidence to show that accused-appellant consciously and
deliberately employed a specific form of attack which would
specially and directly and ensure its commission without
impunity. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied).
This Court does not thus find treachery to have attended the
stabbing of the deceased.
As for appellants appeal for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstances of drunkenness, sufficient provocation, and unlawful
aggression arising from the deceaseds alleged utterance of
provocative and insulting words about appellants cousins hacking
of the deceaseds uncle and the deceaseds following him and
wanting to hack him, this Court denies the same.
For drunkenness to be mitigating, the state of intoxication should
be proved or established by sufficient evidence. It should be such
that it would diminish or impair the exercise of willpower or the
capacity to know the injustice of the act.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] In the
case at bar, what was merely established was that appellant and
his companions had a drinking spree. There was no showing that if
appellant was intoxicated, his willpower was diminished or
impaired.
Neither was there a showing of sufficient provocation. Appellants
claim that the deceased uttered insulting and provocative words
against appellant in the course of the drinking spree[if !supportFootnotes]
[18][endif] was not, however, corroborated by any of their companions.
[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] In any event, it would appear that the alleged
utterance was made at the time or immediately before the
commission of the crime.
Nor was there unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased,
given the following testimony of appellant himself, quoted verbatim:
For, even if appellant believed that the deceased did try to kill him
when he saw him raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when
appellant succeeded in grabbing the bolo, and appellant was not hit
by the stone hurled at him. For at that juncture, appellant no longer
faced any danger to his life and limb.
When an unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists,
one making a defense has no right to kill or even injure the former
aggressor.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
The commission of the crime not having been attended by any
qualifying circumstance, appellant is liable only for homicide, and
absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
therefor is reclusion temporal in its medium period, subject to the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As to the civil aspect of the case, this Court affirms the award by
the trial court of P50,000.00 civil indemnity in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] as it does the award
of P32,397.00 representing funeral expenses,[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
the incurrence of which was admitted by the defense.[if !supportFootnotes]
[24][endif]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION.
Appellant, Pepe Bautista y Sabado, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law; and to pay the heirs of Rodolfo Bacoling
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P32,397.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO

MAGALLANES, accused-appellant.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 29, 1991, at around three oclock in the afternoon,
the appellant, GREGORIO MAGALLANES, who was a mananari or
gaffer of fighting cocks, trekked the road to the cockpit of Poblacion
Sagbayan, Bohol. The appellant was in the company of several
other cockfighting afficionados, among whom were Romualdo
Cempron and Danilo Salpucial. While on their way, they passed by
Virgilio Tapales who was drinking in the store of Umping Amores
which was located on the elevated side of the road. Tapales hailed
Cempron and invited him for a drink but the latter courteously
refused as he was going to the cockpit. Tapales approached
Cempron and conversed with him briefly. For some unknown
reason, Tapales then directed his attention to the appellant who
was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales held the
appellant by his shirt, slapped him and strangled his neck. But
seeing a knife tucked in Tapales waist, the appellant pulled out the
knife and slashed at Tapales to loosen his grip. The appellant
succeeded in wounding the face and neck of Tapales who let go of
the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the appellant pursued
Tapales and when the latter fell, the appellant stabbed him several
more times before uttering the following words: you are already
dead in that case.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] With that, the appellant
stood up and rode on the motorcycle being driven by Danilo
Salpucial. Later, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities
of the town of Inabanga, Bohol.
For the death of Tapales, the appellant and Salpucial were charged
as principal and accessory, respectively, of the crime of murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1991, in the
municipality of Sagbayan, province of Bohol, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first above-named
accused as Principal, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause,
with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
use of a sharp-pointed, sharp-edges (sic) weapon (knife) one
Virgilio Tapales y Melendres hitting and injuring the vital parts of the
body of the victim which resulted in the victims instantaneous
death; that the second above-named accused, as Accessory,
having knowledge of the commission of the crime of Murder, but
without having participated therein either as Principal or as an
Accomplice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowing (sic) take part in said crime after the commission thereof,
to wit: by allowing accused Gregorio Magallanes to, and taking him
on a, (sic) backride on the motorcycle which accused Danilo
Salpucial was driving and operating, in order to flee from the scene
of the crime; x x x[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
During arraignment, the appellant expressed his willingness to
enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide with the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender;
Salpucial, on the other hand, pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him. The prosecution refused to lower the charge from
murder to homicide, hence, trial ensued after which, a decision was
rendered finding the appellant guilty of the crime of murder and
acquitting Salpucial on the ground that the prosecution had failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of
said decision is quoted hereunder:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused Gregorio
Magallanes GUILTY of the crime of Murder punished under Article
243 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessories
of the law and to pay the cost.
The accused Gregorio Magallanes is further ordered to indemnify
the surviving spouse Nathaline Tapales in the amount of
P50,000.00 representing indemnity, P50,000.00 representing moral
and exemplary damages, P31,300.00-- burial and incidental
expenses relative to the death of Virgilio Tapales and P3,000.00
representing attorneys fees, in all instances, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
x x x x x x x x x.

3
Relative to the accused Danilo Salpucial judgment is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING the aforementioned Danilo Salpucial of the
crime as charged, with cost de officio.
x x x x x x x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Before us now is the appeal interposed by Gregorio Magallanes
where he invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his
favor, and contends, in the alternative, that he should be convicted
of the crime of homicide only and not murder.
Anent the claim of self-defense, we reiterate herein the time
honored doctrine that although it is a cardinal principle in criminal
law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits committing
the crime but only in defense of oneself. In the latter case, the
burden is shifted to the accused who must prove clearly and
convincingly the following elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[if !
supportFootnotes][4][endif]

The appellant asseverates that he was justified in stabbing Tapales

as he was merely defending himself from the formers unlawful and
unprovoked aggression. But the prosecution witnesses are one in
testifying that it was the appellant who mercilessly pursued the
already wounded Tapales, and when the latter fell to the ground,
inflicted several more stab wounds on his person including a fatal
blow to his neck.
Even granting arguendo that the initial act of aggression came from
Entellano (the victim) as claimed by the appellant, we still cannot
sustain his plea of self-defense. As testified by the appellant, he
grappled with Entellano for the knife and was able to take
possession of the same. At this point, it was no longer necessary
for appellant to stab Entellano in order to protect himself. His
subsequent act of stabbing the now unarmed Entellano belies his
claim that he acted in self-preservation and indicates nothing more
than a perverse desire to kill. Thus, this Court held in the case of
People v. So, that [a]fter appellant successfully wrested the knife
from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making
the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Another factor which militates against the appellants claim of selfdefense is the nature and number of wounds suffered by Tapales.
Dr. Pancracio Garay, the Rural Health Physician who examined
Tapales dead body, testified that the same sustained seven (7) stab
wounds in all caused by a sharp bladed weapon.[if !supportFootnotes][9]
[endif] And it is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of a large
number of wounds on the part of the victim negates self-defense
and instead, indicates a determined effort to kill the victim.[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif] The appellant, however, seeks exception to this
rule by pointing out the superficial nature of majority of the wounds
inflicted on Tapales, and the fact that of the seven (7) wounds, only
one (1) was fatal enough to cause his death. We disagree.
Of the seven (7) wounds, five (5) were located in the neck area
suggesting that the appellant struck at Tapales with resolve to
cause serious if not mortal damage to Tapales person. There
certainly was no necessity to inflict such wounds upon Tapales
especially in view of the fact that the latter was not even armed.
The appellants theory of self-defense is therefore overthrown by
the hard reality that the alleged aggressor-the deceased in this
case- sustained seven (7) stab wounds in the hands of the
appellant while failing to inflict upon the appellant even a minor
injury as token of his alleged belligerence and aggression.[if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif]

As an alternative defense, the appellant asseverates that the killing

of Tapales was not attended by treachery which would qualify it to
murder, hence, he should have been convicted of the crime of
homicide only. The appellant bewails the finding of treachery by the
RTC despite the fact that the initial unlawful aggression was started
by the deceased victim, Virgilio Tapales, at the middle of the road in
broad daylight.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] On the other hand, the
prosecution insists that the killing was treacherous because it was

perpetrated while the defenseless Tapales was running away from

the appellant, thereby giving the latter opportunity to stab Tapales
at the back without warning.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] On this issue we
find for the appellant.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Thus, for
treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of
two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] The latter condition is
immediately negated by the fact that the meeting between the
appellant and Tapales was by chance. We have held that:
x x x where the meeting between the accused and the victim was
casual and the attack was done impulsively, there is no treachery
even if the attack was sudden and unexpected and while the victim
was running away with his back towards the accused. As has been
aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for
the attack, x x x; and the means, method and form thereof could
not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the
attack was impulsively done.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of
the attack or from the fact that the victim was stabbed with his back
towards the appellant. In point is the following pronouncement we
made in People v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the
fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does
not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the
purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a
sudden and the victims helpless position was accidental. In fact
from the reaction of Robert in running away from the Escoto
brothers the moment he saw them, we can reasonably conclude
that he was not completely unaware that herein appellant and Willie
posed a danger to him and this necessarily put him on guard, with
the opportunity to prevent or repel a possible assault.[if !supportFootnotes]
[18][endif]

This is particularly true in the instant case where Tapales initiated

the unlawful aggression against the appellant and should therefore
have been forewarned of the possibility of retaliation from him.
Furthermore, although Tapales sustained seven (7) stab wounds,
some of them located at his back, we can not infer from this
physical evidence alone that treachery was initially present in the
case at bar.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] And it is a fundamental rule of
long standing that for treachery to be appreciated, that
circumstance must be present at the inception of the attack, and if
absent and the attack is continuous, treachery if present at a
subsequent stage is not to be considered.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we therefore find
the appellant guilty only of the crime of homicide. Moreover, a
careful scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the trial
court had erroneously failed to appreciate in mitigation of the
appellants penalty the circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty.
Felix Estillore, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
and a witness for the prosecution had in fact testified that the
appellant surrendered to the Police of Inabanga, Bohol after the
stabbing incident.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] The fact that the appellant
chose to surrender to the police authorities of Inabanga and not
Sagbayan where the crime happened is not to be taken against
him. He fled Sagbayan not to hide from the police authorities but to
evade retaliation from the relatives of the deceased. Besides, the
law does not require that the perpetrator of an offense to be entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, must give
himself up to the authorities in the municipality where the offense
was committed. All that the law requires is for the offender to
surrender to the authorities to save the government the trouble and

4
the expense of looking for him in order to arrest him.[if !supportFootnotes]
[22][endif]

Finally, on record is the appellants willingness to enter a plea of

guilty but to the lesser crime of homicide. It only remains to
consider briefly whether the appellants plea of guilty in the form it
was entered constitutes a voluntary confession of guilt before the
court as defined in paragraph 7 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] In People v. Yturriaga[if !supportFootnotes][24]
[endif] where the accused who was charged with murder entered a
qualified plea of guilty by claiming that the alleged qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation did not exist, we said that:
Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence
became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendants
guilt and, what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not
the defendants fault that aggravating circumstances were
erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating circumstances
omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of
the benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could nullify this
mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded
allegations of aggravating circumstances.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED
by convicting the appellant Gregorio Magallanes of the crime of
homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty in his favor, and imposing upon him an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment of
the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO BINONDO, accused-appellant.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

On May 25, 1990, the Honorable Godardo A. Jacinto, Presiding
Judge of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City rendered a
decision in Criminal Case No. CBU-9795, entitled" People of the
Philippines vs. Cecilio Binondo, Rosendo Binondo, Valentina
Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Severino Binondo, and Damian
Soriano". finding Cecilio Binondo guilty of murder and acquitting the
rest of his co-accused as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court finds the accused Cecilio Binondo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to further indemnify
the Heirs of Domiciano Dinopol in the sum of P30,000.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal is hereby
entered for the accused Rosendo Binondo, Valentina Binondo,
Nicolasa Binondo, Damian Soriano, and Severino Dinopol, and
their bail bonds are therefore cancelled.
Costs against Cecilio Binondo.
SO ORDERED. 1
On appeal, the accused-appellant raised the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT'S PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE AND FINDING HIM
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT.
The facts as may be gathered from the records of the case are as
follows:
At about 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23,
1986, prosecution witnesses Maximo Dinopol and his wife Pablita,
who were neighbors of the accused-appellant Cecilio, saw
accused-appellant with seven other persons carrying a naked body
of a dead person into his (Cecilio) yard. The aforesaid witnesses

alleged having heard accused-appellant tell his companions that

they should have nothing to worry about because he will take sole
responsibility for the death of the victim.
On that same evening, accused-appellant brought the head of the
decapitated victim to the police station at the municipal building.
This was received by Pat. Esmeraldo dela Pea who was at the
station during that time although his tour of duty would yet start at
8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. He asked
preliminary questions to the accused-appellant. When the Station
Commander arrived, the latter took over the investigation. After a
brief interview with the accused-appellant, he sent Pat. Franklin
Anion and CHDF Boy Padilla to retrieve the body of the victim
from the house of the accused-appellant. The Station Commander
ordered Rosendo and Valentina, companions of the accusedappellant to bring the air rifle (escopita) and bolo used by accusedappellant to the Municipal building.
Dr. Ferraren, Municipal Health Officer of Ginatilan, Cebu,
conducted the autopsy examination and issued the Medical
Certificate which reads as follows:
This certificates that at about 1:45 o'clock p.m. of February 24,
1986, a human head, severed from its body, identified by Pfc.
Rotillo Sieres of the Simboan Police Force as that of Pat.
Domiciano Dinopol of same force, had been examined by the
undersigned at the Municipal building, Simboan, Cebu, and findings
were as follows:
The accused-appellant Cecilio Binondo declared that he killed Pat.
Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense and presented his version of
what transpired, as follows:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, he,
together with his wife, Valentina Binondo, his son, Rosendo, and
Brgy. Councilman Severino Dinopol went to the house of the
spouses Bilanghilot to drink tuba thereat. They left the house at
about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. When they were near the
Barangay Health Center of Basak, the victim, carrying a gun with
the left hand and a bolo in his right hand, suddenly emerged from
under the mango tree and approached him in an angry mood at the
same time brandishing his bolo as if in an act of charging him,
saying: "Why are you looking for me? What is your purpose? 3
Valentina interceded and tried to pacify Domiciano. To avoid getting
into trouble with the enraged victim, he opted to walk away from
him and proceeded home with his son Rosendo. Severino also
went home ahead of Valentina.
About five minutes after he and Rosendo arrived at their house,
Valentina came gasping for breath telling him to close all windows
and doors because Domiciano was following her and he said he
would kill Cecilio and Rosendo. Right away he secured the front
door, shut off all the lights and got his air gun and bolo to defend
himself and his companions should Domiciano carry out his threat.
He also asked Rosendo to go upstairs to take care of his
(Rosendo) wife and children on the second storey.
Pat. Domiciano Dinopol finally arrived and he tried to force open
the main door but failed. He asked Cecilio to come out: shouting
"Cilio, come out I will break your head. 4 Domiciano went towards
the kitchen door, awaiting the attack by Domiciano.
Domiciano forced open the kitchen door. When he was about to
enter with his head protruding inside the kitchen, Cecilio aimed his
rifle at the head of Domiciano. From a distance of about one and
one half (1-1/2) feet, he fired the rifle. When this happened,
Domiciano was still holding his firearm and his bolo.
After a single shot from the air gun, Domiciano turned his head
towards him and aimed his gun at him. Before Domiciano could fire
his gun, Cecilio attacked him with his bolo, his purpose to let the
latter loosen his hold on his weapons. This was followed by five or
six more strokes on the neck and body to be sure that Domiciano
would drop his weapons. Domiciano finally dropped his weapons
and fell to the floor. Except on the skin of the nape, the head was
almost severed from the body. Knowing of Domiciano having an
amulet which could revive him if his body is doused with water, he
finally decided to cut off his head completely. Immediately
thereafter, he carried the victim's body to the municipal building and
surrendered to the police authorities.

5
The trial court refused to give credit to his plea of self-defense and
convicted him of murder on the basis of his admission of killing
Domiciano Dinopol.
We find this appeal to be without merit and find the defendant's
plea of self-defense as completely incredible.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the
accused admits having killed the victim, but invokes self-defense,
the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and
convincing evidence lies with the accused. To do that, he must rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution were weak, it may not be disbelieved after the accused
admitted responsibility for the killing. 5
Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact. Being so and in the abscence of any showing that
the court a quo failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of
weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the
court below, having seen and heard the witness during the trial,
was in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling
reason, therefore, existed for this court to disturb the trial's court
findings that appellant did not act in self-defense. 6
The accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing
evidence for the court to sustain the claim of self-defense. The trial
court refused to give credence to accused-appellant's story that the
deceased went to his house purposely to kill him. There were no
findings that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression or unjust
provocation.
Even assuming that his story were true, the oral threat made by
Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act
clearly showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute
unlawful aggression. Mere shouting threats and poundings on the
door of the accused-appellant's house were not held by this Court
to constitute unlawful aggression. 7 Furthermore, as the accusedappellant himself testified that he extinguished all sources of light
inside the house, there could not have possibly been any form of
attack which may be said to be immediate and imminent from the
victim upon the person of the accused-appellant. Putting out the
lights inside the house threw the house in total darkness that the
victim could not be in a position to locate him physically.
Not only was there an abscence of unlawful aggression in the case
at bar, but the claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the
physical evidence. The accused-appellant suffered no harm or
injury physically. The number and nature of the wounds inflicted on
the victim proved that if at all, the attack came from the accusedappellant. The victim had no chance to defend himself even if
armed. The medico-legal certificate issued by the municipal health
officer attests to a total of severe wounds all of which were located
on the vital parts of the body. The means employed becomes
unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression head
ceased and the victim no longer posed any threat of further attack,
the accused-appellant continued inflicting injuries on the victim who
fell to the ground helpless. From his testimony it was evident that
when he delivered the blows with his bolo, he was aiming at his
victim's body and not simply on the victim's had hand which he
claimed was aiming the gun at him. 8 It was also clear that he was
aware that his blows were hitting the victim; 9 that his victim was
profusely bleeding; 10 and that even before his victim fell to his
kitchen floor, the victim's weapons had already dropped and he
was
defenseless. 11 What absolutely negated the existence of a
"reasonable necessity of the means employed in repelling the
attack" was the fact that the appellant decapitated the victim. The
claim that the victim possessed an amulet which could revive him
did not justify that last and final act of cutting off the victim's head. A
dead man could not have possibly posed any further resistance or
launch an attack, be it imminent or remote.
Having found the absence of self-defense, what is incumbent upon
us is to determine whether or not there was any attending
circumstance which will qualify the killing to murder.
We hold that the crime committed was murder.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
evidence from the testimony of the accused-appellant himself.

According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim of he was

apprised of the fact that the victim was on his way to their house
and was threatening to kill him and his son. He had enough time to
prepare himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he
would have the advantage of position and could deliver the first
blow without risk to himself from his unwary victim. This he
accomplished by putting off all the lights inside the house and by
positioning himself near the kitchen door where he could not be
seen at once. The accused-appellant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. These facts
established by evidence on record clearly constitute treachery,
which raised the crime to murder.
Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately
or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse, 12 it was likewise qualified to
murder. (Emphasis supplied). No greater outrage, insult or abuse
can a person commit upon a corpse than to server the head
therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any
violence directed towards it cannot be interpreted in any other
manner than an outrage to his corpse.
As regards the mitigating circumstances claimed by the accusedappellant, We hold that the trial court erred in not appreciating
voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. This may be off-set by
the aggravating circumstances of treachery under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant could, not however,
claim incomplete self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim.
However, the killing was accompanied by the qualifying
circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim, thus
constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as
a mere aggravating circumstance which may be set off by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For reasons indicated, and in the light of the applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter, We hold that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the defendant guilty of the
crime of murder as charged. The judgment of conviction is affirmed
subject to the modification that the defendant is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, with
costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

ELISEO ARANETA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-43745 July 3, 1990
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to
have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death
of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused? This
is the focal issue addressed to this Court in this case.
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila,
6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute,
herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner,
Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged
with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to
multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.
After arraignment, with all the accused entering a plea of not guilty,
and the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated
August 30, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Finding accused Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute and Benjamin
Bautista y Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of

6
the crime of homicide and there being proved the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the court sentences each one of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Esteban, Jr.
the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter; the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages; the sum of P169,600.00 by
way of consequential damages and to proportionately pay the
costs.
2) Acquitting accused Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito Boy
Santiago of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio. Their
release is hereby ordered unless there is valid ground for further
detaining them.
The gun of Araneta (Exhibit "P") is hereby confiscated in favor of
the State and ordered delivered right away to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
In the event that accused Araneta and Bautista would appeal, an
appeal bond of P14,800.00 for each of them is hereby fixed.
SO ORDERED. 1
Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista appealed their conviction
to the Court of Appeals.
On February 20, 1976, the appellate court rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court with modification as to the
civil liability of petitioners for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased by decreasing the same from the amount of P169,600.00
to only P43,200.00. 2
Eliseo Araneta, Jr. and Benjamin Bautista filed separate petitions
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
were consolidated per resolution of this Court dated September 6,
1976.
Petitioner Araneta, Jr. submits two legal issues for consideration, to
wit:
I
ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE
DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA CANNOT BE
CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE; BUT, AT MOST, ONLY OF SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES; and
II
ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS AND FINDINGS IN THE
DECISION ITSELF, PETITIONER ARANETA SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED ON THE GROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE AND/OR
DEFENSE OF STRANGERS. 3
Petitioner Bautista assigns the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT ARE NOT CLEARLY CONTRARY TO
LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT IN ITS
FINDINGS INDULGED IN SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES TOTALLY UNCALLED FOR AND COMPLETELY
UNWARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO LAW.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ARE GROUNDED
ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT AND THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE
CONFLICTING STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND
INFLUENCE HAVE EITHER BEEN OVERLOOKED OR
MISINTERPRETED, WHICH OTHERWISE WILL LEAD TO
ACQUITTAL. 4

The facts of this case as found by both the trial court and the
appellate court on the basis of the evidence show the following:
At about a little past midnight of March 22, 1972, while the victim
Manuel Esteban, Jr. and his companions Jaime Roque, Eduardo
Saguil, Jesus Dizon and Charles Go were having a drinking spree
at the mezzanine floor of the Sands Kitchenette, Rizal Avenue,
Manila, a napkin container was thrown to their table coming from a
group of three or four persons, which included the petitioners. The
victim approached the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. after which a
heated argument ensued. Petitioner Bautista pushed the left
shoulder of the victim causing the latter to spin at which time,
petitioner Araneta, Jr. fired his gun with his left hand (his right hand
is atrophied), hitting the victim, who was then in a stooping position,
at the back. Having been shot, the victim drew his gun and fired
indiscriminately hitting Manuel de Guzman, a companion of
petitioner Araneta, Jr. on his left thigh. The bullet which wounded
De Guzman hit the wall and ricocheted, hitting one of the accused
Eden Ng along his umbilical cord. Petitioner Bautista then held the
victim who was bent forward, on his right wrist and poked a gun at
him. At this point, petitioner Bautista suddenly fired his gun hitting
the chest of the victim. Roque and Saguil together with a bouncer
from a nearby Soda Fountain brought the victim to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
We will first dispose of the second issue raised by petitioner
Araneta, Jr. that he should be acquitted on the ground of selfdefense and/or defense of strangers.
The rule is well-settled that an indispensable requirement of selfdefense and defense of strangers under paragraphs 1 and 3,
respectively, of Article 11, Revised Penal Code is unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. 5 This element is not present in
the case at bar.
Petitioner Araneta would have Us believe that the unlawful
aggression emanated from the victim alleging that the latter was
under heavy influence of liquor at the time of the incident, that it
was he who suddenly accosted their group because of the napkin
container thrown at his table and that he was the first to fire the
shot.
For unlawful aggression to be present in self-defense, there must
be an assault or at least a threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind on the person defending himself. 6 In this case, there
was no actual physical assault on petitioner Araneta, Jr. or any
member of his group. Neither was it shown that the victim exhibited
an intimidating attitude that is offensive and positively strong,
showing the wrongful intent to cause an injury. 7 When the victim
approached the group of Araneta, Jr., presumably to confront them
as to the napkin container thrown at their table, he was not yet
brandishing his gun as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. A
mere threatening attitude on the part of the victim will not constitute
unlawful aggression. 8 If there was any unlawful aggression, it
came from the group of petitioner Araneta, Jr. when Bautista
pushed the victim's shoulder after which petitioner Araneta, Jr. fired
the first shot hitting the victim. It was only at this time when the
victim drew his gun and fired indiscriminately. These facts have
been duly established by the evidence for the prosecution.
Petitioner Araneta, as the accused, must establish self-defense by
clear and convincing evidence. 9 He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution,
for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he himself
admitted shooting the victim. 10
There being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
petitioner cannot claim the justifying circumstance of self-defense
to absolve him from criminal liability for inflicting injury upon the
victim. But for what crime should he be held liable homicide or
slight physical injuries?
Per the post-mortem findings report prepared by Dr. Abelardo B.
Lucero, Medico Legal Examiner, Manila Metropolitan Police, the
victim died of "shock and hemorrhage due to multiple (2) gunshot
wounds in the anterior and posterior chest lacerating the
diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen." 11 Dr. Lucero testified that
wound No. 1 located at the anterior right chest is a contact wound
because the muzzle of the gun touched the skin of the body of the

7
victim which is a fatal wound, while wound No. 2 found at the back
of the victim is a slight wound making it possible for the victim to
fire a gun even after sustaining such wound. Per opinion of Dr.
Lucero, wound Nos. 1 and 2 have been caused by bullets of
different caliber, or at least by different firearms, with wound No. 2
inflicted ahead of wound No. 1. The trial court then ruled that
wound No. 2 was caused by the gun of petitioner Araneta, Jr. who
was established to have fired first and that wound No. 1 was
inflicted by petitioner Bautista.
Petitioner Araneta, relying on this finding of the trial court, now
argues that wound No. 2 not being a fatal wound but only a slight
wound would not make him criminally liable for the death of the
victim. He points out that had not petitioner Bautista subsequently
shot the victim during the scuffle for the gun of the latter, the victim
would not have died. He asserts that since there was no conspiracy
established, the liability of petitioner Araneta, Jr. should only be for
the crime of slight physical injuries.
The State through the Solicitor General in opposing the theory of
petitioner Araneta, Jr. argues that the denomination of wound No. 2
as "slight" merely refers to the gunshot wound of entry and that the
medical findings show that the victim died due to shock and
hemorrhage caused by two gunshot wounds wound No. 1 and
wound No. 2. The Solicitor General further contends that since
none of the wounds is "thru and thru" and therefore one cannot be
the wound of entry while the other the wound of exit, the conclusion
becomes ineluctable that the two gunshot wounds, one in front and
one at the back caused the shock, hemorrhage and the laceration
of the internal organs.
Petitioner Araneta, Jr. retorts by saying that the two (2) gunshot
wounds are "thru and thru" thus resulting in four wounds, two of
entry and two of exit; thus, the "two (2) gunshot wounds" which
caused the shock and hemorrhage resulting in the death of the
victim refer to the wounds caused by gunshot No. 1 fired by
petitioner Bautista.
We agree with petitioner Araneta, Jr.
The postmortem findings report details the wounds sustained by
the victim
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
(1) Gunshot wound of entry marked I measuring 1.5 cm. in
diameter surrounded with powder burns located in the anterior right
chest, midclavicular line at the level of the 4th cartilage, 51.6 inches
from the heel. The bullet is directed obliquely downwards to the left
at an angle of 45 degrees posteriorly and came out thru gunshot
wound of exit I-A measuring 0.8 cm. x 0.9 cm. located in the left
lateral chest at the level of the 9th intercostal space 46 inches from
the heel, post axillary line fracturing the right 4th cartilage lacerating
the diaphragm, stomach and spleen. (fatal)
(2) Gunshot wound of entry II measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm. with collar
contusion 56 inches from the heel, preceded by 4 cm. elongated
almost triangular reddish superficial abrasion measuring 0.2. cm. at
its lowest and widening upwards to 0.5 cm. at its base, located in
the left posterior midlateral chest and the bullet came out thru
gunshot wound of exit II-A measuring 1 x 0.9 cm. located in the
lateral posterior left shoulder 59.5 inches from the heel.
The bullet was fired directed obliquely upwards to the left at an
angle of 35 degrees lacerating the skin and subcutaneous tissues
for a distance of 7 cm. and came out thru a rugged everted gunshot
wound of exit II-A, 56 inches from the heel (slight injury).
xxx xxx xxx 12
We can clearly see that there were four gunshot wounds. The
gunshot fired by petitioner Bautista, produced gunshot wound of
entry I located at the anterior right chest with the bullet coming out
thru gunshot wound of exit I-A in the left lateral chest. The second
gunshot fired by petitioner Araneta, Jr. caused gunshot wound of
entry II located in the left posterior midlateral chest with the bullet
coming out thru gunshot wound of exit II-A at the lateral posterior
left shoulder. The bullet fired from the gun of petitioner Araneta, Jr.
only lacerated the skin and subcutaneous tissues, thus, its
classification by Dr. Lucero as a slight injury. The bullet fired from
the gun of petitioner Bautista lacerated the diaphragm, liver, 13

stomach and spleen proving to be fatal to the victim. There can be

no other conclusion except that the "two gunshot wounds" indicated
under the cause of death refer to the gunshot wounds of entry and
exit located at the anterior right chest and the left lateral chest,
respectively, produced by the gunshot fired by petitioner Bautista
which lacerated the diaphragm, liver, stomach and spleen.
The nature of the wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. having
been settled as a slight injury, should he be held responsible for the
death of the victim?
There is no pretension that there was any conspiracy between the
petitioners. There was no concerted action pursuant to a common
criminal design between the petitioners. 14 In the absence of
conspiracy, each of the accused, herein petitioners, is responsible
only for the consequences of his own acts. 15
Thus, in a case where one accused inflicted the mortal wound by
stabbing the victim with a knife while the other two assailants
merely hit the victim with a bamboo on the left arm and the head,
the former was held guilty of murder while the latter was held liable
only for lesiones leves or slight physical injuries. 16 In still another
case where two persons attacked a single victim, one inflicting a
fatal wound hacking the victim with a bolo almost amputating the
left arm completely, while the other also using a bolo struck the
victim just below the armpit causing a wound that would heal in ten
(10) days, the one who inflicted the mortal wound was convicted of
murder while the other only of less serious physical injuries. 17
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight
wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially
contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for homicide. 18
His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he
caused. However, the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a
gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a
gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that
there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of
attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury.
Anent the issues raised by petitioner Bautista, We note that they
involve questions of fact, namely: whether or not he shot the victim
and whether or not he was present at the inception of the shooting
incident which this Court will not ordinarily review. Except in
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, allowed only on questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth in the petition for review on
certiorari, and only when there are special and important reasons
therefore. 19
Petitioner invokes the exceptions that the findings of respondent
court is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures, 20 that
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, 21 and that
there was grave abuse of discretion 22 to justify a review of the
findings of facts of respondent court.
Petitioner Bautista primarily decries the fact that the respondent
court as well as the trial court did not give weight to the negative
results of the paraffin test to which he was subjected to nine (9)
hours after the shooting and instead indulged in speculations,
surmises and conjectures when they concluded that "many things
had happened between the shooting and the time Bautista was
subjected to paraffin test." 23 He contends that the supposition of
the respondent court that the petitioner being a policeman must be
aware that gunpowder can be easily removed by washing the
hands with vinegar, or even with soap and water and knowing such
must have done so, was totally unfounded and unsupported by
evidence.
However, an examination of the records reveals that there are other
circumstances upon which the respondent court based its
conclusion that petitioner Bautista fired his gun, thus
a) The ballistics results show that the gun of appellant Bautista was
newly oiled. Specifically the finding was that it has "traces of thick
oil." Appellant Bautista failed to refute the prosecution evidence that
his gun at the time of his examination in the morning of March 23,
1972, was newly oiled. Neither did he explain the presence of thick
oil in his gun. His obvious purpose of oiling his gun is to remove
traces of gun powder.

8
b) The ballistics test itself shows that one chamber in the gun of
Bautista was found to have smoke rings. Smoke rings, according to
the testimony of the ballistics expert, appears in the chamber of a
revolver whose bullet was fired. Only one chamber had smoke
rings. The other five chambers do not have any. This shows that
appellant Bautista fired only one shot which is in accordance with
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The lame
explanation of Bautista that the said smoke ring is attributable to
the fact that in the month of February he participated in quelling
student demonstrations, fails to explain why, despite the fact that
his gun is newly oiled, said smoke ring was still present at that time.
The obvious conclusion is that because he was racing against time,
Bautista forgot, in his desire to exculpate himself, to clean the inner
chamber of his service revolver. 24
These circumstances are nevertheless of no moment because of
the positive identification of petitioner Bautista as the person who
shot the victim by the prosecution witness Eduardo Saguil.
Petitioner, however, discounts the testimony of Saguil for the
reason that he gave two (2) conflicting statements one before
the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP) given on March 23, 1972
wherein he failed to identify the person who fired the fatal shot and
the other before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on
March 24, 1972 wherein he identified petitioner as the assailant.
This apparent inconsistency in the statements of Saguil was
satisfactorily explained at the trial during his direct and cross
examinations. He testified that he had no choice but to sign the
sworn statements given before the MMP because he was
intimidated by the investigating officers who did not want him to
implicate petitioner Bautista as the person who shot the victim
since petitioner was their comrade. In fact, when he insisted that it
was Bautista who shot the victim, the investigating officer Rolando
Atanacio stopped the taking down of the statement and instead
indicated therein that Saguil refused to continue with the same. It is
for this reason that Saguil together with another prosecution
witness Jaime Roque decided to proceed to the NBI to give another
sworn statement this time disclosing the whole truth.
Petitioner Bautista deplores the fact that the respondent court
chose to give full credence to the testimony of Roque placing the
former at the scene of the incident prior to the actual shooting and
disregarded his version that he merely responded to the crime
scene as a police officer after he heard the shots coming from the
Sands Kitchenette.
Roque affirmatively identified petitioner Bautista as the person who,
during the confrontation pushed the victim on the shoulder making
him spin. Petitioner Bautista on the other hand, alleged that he was
in the vicinity of the crime scene that night of March 22, 1972
because he conveyed his compadre Arsenio Sanchez whom he
accidentally met to take a ride for La Loma. However, Sanchez was
never presented as a witness to corroborate this claim of petitioner.
The trial court properly observed that the non-presentation of
Sanchez is an evidence wilfully suppressed which if presented will
be adverse to Bautista. 25
Petitioner Bautista also capitalizes on the failure of Roque to
identify him and his co-accused in his sworn statement given
before the NBI on March 24, 1972. This failure is explained by the
fact that at the start he did not know their names, but merely
recognized their faces. It was only when the pictures of the
accused were shown that he came to know of their names.
We sustain the trial court's conclusion on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses Saguil and Roque, 26 as it is in a better
position to decide the question, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying. 27 The impressions of the court a quo on this matter is
binding upon Us unless there appears a grave abuse of discretion
or an obvious misapprehension of facts. 28 The trial court noted that
"no evil or bad motive was shown to have existed before the
incident which would prompt Roque and Saguil to testify in the
manner they did if such were not the fact. 29 The absence of
evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal
witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain no improper
motive existed and their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

30

Hence, the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses that

he was at the crime scene at the inception of the incident and
pointing to him as the person who confronted and last shot the
victim together with all the attendant circumstances cannot be
overcome by the mere denials of petitioner Bautista. 31
As We uphold the factual findings of the respondent court, We
therefore rule that petitioner should be held liable for the death of
the victim by inflicting the fatal wound upon him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
20, 1976 affirming with modification the decision of the trial court
dated August 20, 1973 is hereby AFFIRMED as to the conviction of
Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza for homicide, and MODIFIED as
regards Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, who is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted homicide
penalized under Article 249 in relation with Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any other attendant circumstances,
petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for
ten (10) months of prision correccional.
The civil indemnity for the death of Manuel Esteban, Jr. is hereby
increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
Benjamin Bautista is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
damages as herein modified.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines, apellee Vs. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS,
appellant
G.R.No. 148912. September 10,2003

Facts:
A review of a case finding appellant guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt and sentancing him to death.
One evening on a benefit dance there came a conflict wherein the
victim Brgy.kagawad Antonio Baliscan sustained stabbed wounds
from the accused, Timoteo Escarlos, the body was unmoved for
certain minutes until the victims son came and rush the wounded
to the hospital, still the victim died, autopsy conducted revealed that
the victim sustained four (4) stabbed wounds, and of these, two
were fatal, cutting lobes of the lungs; causing the death due to
massive blood loss.
The trial court believed that the prosecutions evidence was
sufficient to convict appellant of Murder qualified by treachery. It
rejected his plea of self-defense because there had been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the
persons who filed a case of malicious mischief against appellant,
said case was filed five (5) months before the instant case
happened.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether or not the Prosecutions evidence is sufficient?

Whether or not the Appellants plea of self-defense
cognizant?

Ruling:
Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence as an issue, the Court nonetheless,
deliberated on it motu propio, because an automatic appeal in a
criminal action opens he whole case for review. Indeed, the
strength of the prosecutions evidence must be passed upon,
especially in cases in which death penalty has been imposed by
the trial court. Carefully examined the evidence for the prosecution
and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were
duly established beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution witness,
son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident, undoubtedly,
the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by

9
appellant is clear and undisputed. He did not deny all the
allegations against him and openly admitted that he killed the
victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration
from criminal liability.
When the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of
proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. The accused
who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has
the onus probandi of proving the elements. The essential requisites
of self-defense are the following:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense .
Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action.
Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of
appellant that the victim, was about to stab him, when the latter had
merely drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just
speculative. When an unlawful aggression that has begun no
longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill
or even to wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the
present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the
extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was
no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense
on the part of appellant. Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the
call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive,
atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel
the Attack. Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he
was not in a position to calculate or determine the effects of his
blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them
in order to save his own life. As correctly held by the trial court, the
nature, the number and the location of the wounds inflicted upon
the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense. The claim
of appellant that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no
moment, inasmuch as the means he employed was glaringly
disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted
in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for the third time,
even when the latter was about to fall.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a
defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without
risk to the aggressor. Treachery requires the concurrence of two
conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution.
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when
the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the
former.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is

held guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual damages,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.]The grant of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.