[G.R. Nos. 132875-76.

February 3, 2000]

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,

accused-appellant.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

RESOLUTION

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when

allowed to leave jail.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation
of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member
of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation
without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the
people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to
be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions
of the U.S. Congress.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose
him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls
this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the
State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government
and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Governmentexecutive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general
law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion
of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for
its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which
states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states,

inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the abovequoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to
the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to
the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be
denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he
fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States penal
system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of

Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail,
for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the
House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati
City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accusedappellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the
NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use
his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of
confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member
of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are
the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any
other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around
an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of
course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as
bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of
temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate
and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is
allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends
to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accusedappellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness,
they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.[10]

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of

constitutional equal protection.

Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a

person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty.
As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty
of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free
action according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of
another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within
limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly
confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.
The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individuals status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as
of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Liban vs. Gordon (2009)

Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter
while Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13, Art.
VI, 1987 Consti: No Senator or Member of the HoR may hold any other
office/employment in the Govt, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including govt-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected).
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or
controlled corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose
their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
Respondent:

Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/c appears to be an action

for quo warranto they do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent.

Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil Procedure: action should be commenced
w/in 1 year after the cause of public officers forfeiture of office respondent has
been working as a Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs

Petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers no claim

that they suffered some actual damage/threatened injury or illegal disbursement of
public funds

If petition is for declaratory relief, SC has no jurisdiction original

jurisdiction in RTC

PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation

Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to
PNRC is not an office/employment
Petitioners: present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning unlawful disbursement
of funds considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other
compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Court has
jurisdiction because it involves a legal/constitutional issue of transcendental
importance.
Issues, Holding & Ratio:

WON petitioners have standing.

SC: NO. The petition is an action for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court
an action for the usurpation of a public office against a public officer who does or
suffers an act which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office). See facts for
petitioners allegations. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office
of respondent.
WON PNRC is a Private or Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation.
SC: PNRC is a Private Corporation.
May 22, 1947 Pres. Manuel Roxas signed RA 95 (PNRC Charter) adhering to
the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. PNRC is:
A non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance
for the most vulnerable w/o consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender,
social status, or political affiliation.
A member of National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement. 7 Fundamental Principles: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality.
Must be autonomous, neutral and independent; not appear to be
instrument/agency that implements govt policy to merit the trust of all and
effectively carry out its mission therefore, it cannot be owned/controlled by the
govt
The Philippine govt does not own the PNRC does not have govt assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the Congress. It is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals/entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors (Sec. 11, PNRC Charter).
The govt does not control the PNRC. Only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC
Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines (Sec. 6,
PNRC Charter). A majority of 4/5 of the PNRC Board are elected/chosen by the
private sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or any subordinate govt
official, therefore, he is not an official/employee of the Philippine Government. Sec.
16, Art. VII of Consti President appoints all officials & employees in the Executive
branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Consti or by law.
President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. The law may also authorize the heads of deparments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint officers lower in rank.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students and foreigners; those contribute to the annual fund campaign of
the PNRC (Sec. 5, PNRC Charter amended by PD 1264).

Judgment: Office of the PNRC Chairman declared not a government office.

Sec. 2(13) of he Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: A
govt-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the govt, and in case of a
stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the
govt. In case of a non-stock corporation, at least a majority of the members must
be govt officials holding such membership by appointment/designation by the
govt.
WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a govt office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec.
13, Art. VI of Consti.
SC: The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office. The President cannot
review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Board and the PNRC
Chairman. Only the PNRC Board can review, reverse or modify the
decisions/actions of the PNRC Chairman.
*The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
1935 (Sec. 7 was in force when PNRC was created by special character on March
22, 1947), 1973 & 1987 (Sec. 16) Constitutions provide that: The Congress shall
not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Govt-owned or controlled corporations may be
created/established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.
Feliciano v. CoA Sec. 16 of 1987 Consti bans private corporations to be created
by special charters, which historically gave individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
PNRC was created through a special charter, however, the elements of govt
ownership and control (e.g. capital assets and operating funds from govt) are
clearly lacking in the PNRC. It therefore cannot be considered a govt-owned or
controlled corporation.
In creating PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation, which is not exempt from constitutional prohibition (Sec. 16 above)
even as a non-profit/charitable corporation.
PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it
corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional Sec. 1-13 are void. Other
provisions remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State
that PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges
set forth in the PNRC Charter. They also implement the Phil. Govts treaty
obligations based on the Geneva Conventions.

Dissent: Nachura, J.
The petition is one for prohibition and petitioners have legal standing as citizens
and taxpayers. The remedy sought is preventive and restrictive, an injunction
against an alleged continuing violation of the fundamental law. They raise a
constitutional issue, w/o claiming any entitlement to either the Senate seat or
chairmanship of PNRC. The Court has full authority and bounden duty to assume
jurisdiction to determine WON other branches of govt have kept themselves w/in
the limits of the Consti & laws and have not abused discretion given them.
PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). Its charter does not
violate the constitutional proscription against creation of private corporations by
special law. PNRC was incorporated under RA 95, a special law. It cannot be
anything but a GOCC. PNRC was not impliedly converted into a private
corporation simply because its charter was amended to vest in it authority to
secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, tax fees, etc.
The use of Sec. 2(13) of Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 by
the ponencia to define a GOCC does not pronounce a definition of a GOCC that
strays from Sec. 16, Art. XII of Consti. It merely declares that a GOCC may either
be a stock or non-stock corporation.
Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter PNRC is officially designated to assist the RP in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions therefore, it is
engaged in the performance of the govts public functions.
PNRC is endowed w/ corporate powers. It administers special funds
contributions of members, aid given by govt, supported by PCSO and LGUs. It
submits annual reports receipts and disbursement to the President.
ANRC (precursor of PNRC) is considered a federal instrumentality immunity from
state taxation, subjected to governmental supervision & regular financial audit,
principal officer appointed by the President but remains an independent,
volunteer-led org. No basis to assume that it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out mission as a National Red Cross Society. Separatists &
insurgents do not consider them as the enemy but as the entity to turn to in the
event of injury.
Considering that PNRC is a GOCC, its charter does not violate the constitutional
provision (Sec. 16, Art. XII).
To declare Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter (creation and incorporation of the org) invalid
and the rest valid is to reach an absurd situation in w/c obligations are imposed on
and a framework for its operation is laid down for a legally non-existing entity. Sec.
2-17 of RA 95 are not separable from Sec. 1 cannot stand independently no
separability clause.

Presumption of constitutionality of law is presumed. There is no clear showing that

the PNRC Charter runs counter to the consti. All reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
Deleterious effects will result if PNRC is declared a private corporation
employees will no longer be covered by the GSIS; it can no longer be extended tax
exemptions and official immunity; and cannot anymore be given support, financial
or otherwise, by the National Govt, LGUs, and PCSO. The Court must not
arbitrarily declare a law unconstitutional just to save a single individual from
unavoidable consequences of his transgression of the Consti even if done in good
faith.
Sen. Gordons continuous occupancy of 2 incompatible positions is a clear
violation of the Consti (Sec. 13, Art. VI). The language in the provision is
unambiguous; requires no in-depth construction. A position held in an ex officio
capacity (a second post held by virtue of the functions of the first office) does not
violate such constitutional proscription. The chairmanship of the PNRC Board is
not held in an ex officio capacity by a member of Congress.
Vote to grant Petition.

a member of the National Assembly (Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs, during his tenure, except that of a prime
minister or member of the cabinet

Sec 13(2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 697

governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a COC, be considered on forced leave of absence from office

Sec 204 (2a) of LGC

assume office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases
provided for in Sec 48 par 1 of this Code
Issues:
1.
WON a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as
Mambabatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise functions of both offices
simultaneously
2.
WON the vice governor who ran for the position of MP but lost can
continue serving and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said
office is vacated
Ruling:
1.
NO
2.
NO.

Adaza vs Pacana, Jr.

Petition: petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
TRO
Petitioner: Homobono Adaza
Respondent: Fernando Pacana Jr.
Ponente: J. Escolin
Date: 18 March 1985
Facts:

30 January 1980 Adaza elected as governor of Misamis Oriental;

Pacana also elected as Vice-Governor of the same province

3 March 1980 Both took oath and assumed office

o
Their terms will expire on 1986

27 March 1984 Pacana filed COC for May 1984 Batasan Pambansa
elections

27 April 1984 - Adaza also filed COC for Batasan Pambansa where he
won

19 July 1984 Adaza took oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa

23 July 1984 Pacana took oath of office as governor

Pertinent laws/provisions:

Sec 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution

Ratio Decidendi:
1.
The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan
Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the government is clear
and ambiguous as stated in Art VIII Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution. A public
office is a public trust; hence, it is created for the interest and the benefit of the
people. A holder of such position is subject to the regulations and the conditions
the law imposes. There is no question that Adaza had taken oath of office as MP
so this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot continue to occupy
the same nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2.
Petitioner asserts that respondent already resigned from the vice
governor posgt by filing candidacy as MP. This is contrary to Section 13 (2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 stating that governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunian or barangay officials shall, upon filing a COC, be considered on forced
leave of absence from office. Respondent falls within the coverage of the
provision since he was part of the sanggunian (Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in LGC) when he filed COC. He was acting within the law when he
reassumed position as vice governor as well as his succession to the governorship
was valid and legal in accordance to Section 204 (2a) of the LGC (powers, duties
and privileges of a vice gov).

Puyat et. al. vs. de Guzman and Acero, et. al.

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
Facts:
International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) held an election for eleven Directors.
Justice Estanislao Fernandez (Assemblyman Fernandez), a member of Interim
Batasang Pambansa, is one of the elected Directors. When a quo warranto
proceeding questioning the election was instituted by the petitioners in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Assemblyman Fernandez appeared
as counsel for the respondents, to which the petitioner objected on Constitutional
grounds - Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provided that no
Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body. Since
SEC was an administrative body and the cited Constitutional prohibition being
clear, Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent.
The SEC found that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for
P200.00 upon request of Acero, one of the respondents. Following the notarization
of the shares purchased, the Assemblyman Fernandez filed a motion for
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in
the matter in litigation. SEC granted the leave to intervene on the basis of
Assemblyman Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares. Because of this order,
the petitioners then filed an instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction.
Issue:
In intervening in the SEC case, is Assemblyman Fernandez, in effect, appearing as
counsel before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision?
Held:
Yes, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in intervening in the SEC case, in effect,
appearing as counsel before an administrative body The Supreme Court (SC)
reversed and set aside the order of the SEC and held that the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion to intervene, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said to be appearing as counsel as he is appearing for the protection of his
ownership shares in IPI in matters of litigation. However, in this case, the SC
found that the shares he owns is merely 10 shares out of 262,843 shares, that he
acquired the said shares after the filing of the quo warranto case, and that even
before his motion for intervention he had already expressed his intention to be the
counsel for Acero group. The SC ruled that there has been indirect appearance
as counsel before an administrative body, and opined that this is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition.

The SC also added that a ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective because all an Assemblyman need to do, if he
wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in
the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

A case for the review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in
ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS
Employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed
the case against the petitioner who was then CID commissioner. The ff are details
of the case filed:
o
Oct. 17, 1988 Petitioner approved the application for legalization of the
stay of certain aliens who arrived in the Philippines in Jan. 1, 1984, knowing that
they are disqualified from the legalization.
o
This violates EO No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens
In view of the said case, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of
suspension for 90 days
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing
the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner bailed.
May 24, 1991 - petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 9928990, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with case. Court
granted, issuing a temporary restraining order.
Jan. 13, 1992 Court lifted the temporary restraining order.
December 1992 to August 1995 new information and testimonies were
admitted by the court
August 22, 1995 Petitioner filed opposition to the motion of prosecution
to suspend her.

January 25, 1996 Sandiganbayan resolved to suspend petitioner as

senator and from any other governmental position she may be holding. Her
suspension was for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend a
senator
HOLDING/RATIO:
YES. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of
an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Sec. 13 of RA 3019 provides for the suspension and loss of benefits. In
Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that treating of the suspension pendente
lite of an accused public officer may no longer be put at issue, having been
repeatedly upheld by this Court.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
It is the courts ministerial duty to issue an order of suspension upon the
determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution
which provides that each-

Section 13 of RA 3019 is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive

measure.
The court takes jurisdiction when there is a grave abuse of authority and
when pertaining to internal affairs of the Congress it respects the separation of
powers unless an infringement of any constitutional provision is involved.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members
of Congress, therefore, the Sandiganbayan had the authority to suspend the
petitioner.
Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections
Facts:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among
others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The
above mentioned resolution was received by respondent COMELEC on May 6,
1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through
the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election
returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed
that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor
Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be
rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in
13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for Chavez votes which
were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned Chavez votes in favor
of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant

x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its

Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a

punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house
of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

petition.
Ruling:
It is quite obvious that petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of
manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the
COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even
pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns he

desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a

regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus Election
code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner relating to the election of
a member of the Senate.

Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the
exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election contest relating to their
respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction

As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not

questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing
the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for
lack of merit.