Professional Documents
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ORLY TAITZ, )
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Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 10-0151 (RCL)
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v. )
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BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
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Defendant. )
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Defendant, Barack H. Obama, respectfully opposes the motion to intervene, (R.6), filed
by Christopher Earl Strunk. This case involves a challenge to the President’s eligibility for
office. Strunk’s motion should be denied because, like Plaintiff, Strunk lacks standing to seek
the relief sought in this case and has no separate cognizable interest in the outcome of Plaintiff’s
claims. Indeed, Strunk’s claimed interests suffer the same jurisdictional problems as Plaintiff’s
complaint: Strunk cannot show a specific injury fairly traceable to Defendant’s actions and this
Court cannot redress the injuries he claims. Strunk’s claimed interests similarly raise a
nonjusticiable political question, committed in the first instance to the country’s electorate and,
thereafter, to Congress. Finally, to the extent that Strunk seeks to rely on the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), in contrast to Plaintiff, his claims must be dismissed for the simple
Because Defendant’s standing arguments are set forth in detail in his corrected
memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, (R.12-1), the Court is respectfully referred to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). In order to intervene under 24(a)(2), therefore, a movant must demonstrate
both an interest in the transaction(s) at issue and that his interests would be impaired should the
court deny him leave to intervene. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9
(D.D.C. 2007). Among other things, the movant must also establish Article III standing for his
claim, in order to intervene. See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Sierra Club, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (citing Fund for Animals). The movant must also show that he
seeks to vindicate a right or interest that runs to him individually, rather than simply advocating
for the vindication of rights that would accrue to the existing parties to the suit. See Me-Wuk
Indian Community of the Wilton Rancheria v. Kempthorne, 246 F.R.D. 315, 319 (D.D.C. 2007).
Strunk cannot meet these standards. For purposes of the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint,
he is in no materially different position than Plaintiff with respect to his lack of standing and
inability to escape the political question doctrine. (R.12-1 at 6-13.) Nor is Strunk any differently
situated with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for mandamus relief or to seek recusal of the U.S.
The closest Strunk comes to differentiating his interests in the action from those of
Plaintiff is his attempt to tie his interests to the residents of New York State, (R.6 at 11), where
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Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 13-1 Filed 03/02/10 Page 3 of 5
he resides, as opposed to Plaintiff, who lives in California. But in that same paragraph, he makes
plain that his interests are not materially distinguishable from those of any American citizen:
Affirmant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties, in that the Usurper’s
Attorney General and or his agents have not vigorously represented U.S.A. Citizens, the
State of New York Citizens and or any other State’s citizens[.]
Id. There is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between the interests of Strunk as a New
York resident from those of Plaintiff, and Strunk effectively admits that his interests are the same
as every other “U.S.A. Citizen.” Therefore, he cannot meaningfully distinguish his interests from
Plaintiff and for this reason alone, his motion should be denied.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Court might interpret Strunk’s filings as seeking to
vindicate any rights conferred by FOIA, he cannot succeed for the simple reason that the
President of the United States is not an agency for purposes of FOIA. See generally Nat’l
Security Archive v. Archivist of the United States, 909 F.2d 541, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The
Supreme Court has made clear that the Office of the President is not an ‘agency’ for purposes of
the FOIA.”); see also Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Executive
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully asks the Court to deny Strunk’s motion
to intervene.
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Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 13-1 Filed 03/02/10 Page 4 of 5
/s/
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, D.C. Bar # 434122
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/
ALAN BURCH, D.C. Bar # 470655
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-7204, alan.burch@usdoj.gov
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Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 13-1 Filed 03/02/10 Page 5 of 5
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing Opposition to Motion to Intervene to be
served by first class mail addressed to pro se Plaintiff at:
Orly Taitz
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite 100
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688
and on
Christopher-Earl Strunk
593 Vanderbilt Ave., #281
Brooklyn, NY 11238