Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Stephen Read
Abstract:
Arakawa and Gins are concerned with the configuration of life in intentional-
attentional frames that locate the subject. But the procedures and
technologies of this construction of an ‘Architectural Body’ involve us in a
collective interrelationality and co-construction that takes us beyond cognition
and the subjectivity of points of view and requires we account for the order
and sense already built into our surroundings and the way this is part of our
practical action and inhabitation. This demands we take account of both the
historical dimension and the public ‘objectivity’ of this co-construction. A key to
this publicness and objectivity are the historical technologies that penetrate
deep into our lifeworlds and are even the means to our seeing and knowing
things. The ‘procedures’ and ‘technologies’ of this space are not just means to
control the body but also, as Foucault discovered, means to freeing it, but the
space established is not only one of being and action but also one of
appearance and politics (Arendt). We live immersed in collective and historical
constructions that are power regulating architectures that gather and
coordinate different scales of being and action. We find ourselves in need of a
theory which accounts for the way we live between things and other people.
Such a theory will however not transcend the historicity and contingency of
procedures already performed, actions already taken and the coherencies
and rationalities already embedded in the built surround. This paper explores
these issues of a public order that binds and enables in order to begin to
outline such a theory and fill in some necessary background for further work
on the Architectural Body.
Living in technologies
The basic form of my argument is phenomenological: that we exist corporeally
in coevolving states of knowledge and states of affairs, within perceptual and
empirical horizons that integrate these two dimensions in situ. Situation and
perception are primary and the world discloses itself to us within horizons that
are conditional on our situation and which condition what we may know and
do from such a situation. Versions of this argument also emphasise the idea
that we simultaneously build out from and ‘stabilise’ or ‘objectify’ those states
of knowledge/affairs in our surroundings. Here the principle of homo faber
(Arendt) emerges. Our building of a meaning-sphere or semiosphere
(Lotman) is artifice, architecture and technique. It is also a process in time
rather than a monument in space. And there is a basic publicness about this
which is not about our subsumption to any essence of ‘Mankind’ but rather
about a historical and contingent condition of this being and building between
others, and between the things and their meanings we construct and share
with others. The freedom of movement and of action we experience is
conditioned and constrained by public and material cultures: objective but
historically and contingently produced constructions beyond our individual
seeing, doing or making. These constructions both enable and constrain,
determining what we can and cannot do, but also what we see and cannot
see and even what we see and cannot see as being possible.
It is necessarily difficult to see clearly the conditions of our own seeing. Such
conditions though are central to any real understanding of environing or of the
nature and shape of a material culture. In these circumstances, the
‘architectural body’ we construct and inhabit in our individual techniques and
procedures cannot be taken as being open without some qualification. It will
itself be conditioned by these public and objective constructions: it will
incorporate a shape of the world into which we as bodies are thrown and
which will be the necessary starting point for any procedure for changing that
shape. We move beyond ‘points of view’ and into conventionalisms and
normativities which are the result of the workings of social history on the
spaces of our activities and possibilities. Structures of experience are linked to
the material structures of our ‘exterior’ world rather than to any subjective
‘interiority’. Fields of perception are shaped by public techniques and artefacts
rather than by private perceptions or interpretations, or even by the singular
‘points of view’ given by the geometries of classical optics. And rather than
there being different points of view on the world from simple singular places –
or from universal and displaced points of view for that matter – there are
different technically supported optics on the world (or on different worlds!).
The difficulties of thinking architecture and the urban through simultaneously
human and technical-relational lenses are for the most part due to our own
discomfort with the mixing of categories implied. Technology has been
associated with alienation and the distancing of ourselves from authentic
experience.1 Architecture seems at first to sit in an ambivalent mid-way
position in this argument over authenticity: on the one hand we accept certain
architectures as being part of the authenticity of human experience – witness
Heidegger’s hut – while other, mostly hi-tech or large-scale, architectures and
infrastructures occupy the other pole of alienation from a world becoming
increasingly technical. Peter Sloterdijk hints though at an intrinsically human
nested techno-relational order of the environment in artificial niches or
‘spheres’. We live, according to Sloterdijk, in self-made enclosed ‘spheres’,
these ‘spheres’ referring to the “inner spaces” (Innenräume) we inhabit at all
scales (Sloterdijk).2 In the philosophy of technology also, Don Ihde, and the
1
Heidegger, Jaspers, Ellul and Mumford, all propounded a variant of what
can be called the 'thesis of alienation' More recently Borgmann has done the
same.
2
see Lemmens
rest of the philosophers he calls ‘instrumental realists’3 also acknowledge the
central role of technology in human life. What I am suggesting here is that
technology is integral with the practices and normativities of experience and of
being human.
We don’t just use technologies to access an environment already known or
directly perceived – we rather become environed in the technologies
themselves! We feel a sense of subjection to technology in the London
Underground, where we in a sense inhabit a working diagram of the city with
gates and moving parts which engineer access to any specified place. But this
suggests also we are not just payload here in a technology of conveyance,
but integrated into a rationale and an optic that defines and reveals the city as
perceptual field. There is something bounded and limited but at the same time
complete in the way the system is organised and set up, and in the way we
see and do things through a system like this. This suggests the architectures
and infrastructures we build do more than ‘overcome’ an already constituted
space; they are themselves spaces. But they are immersive spaces and they
also incorporate the places where the shapes and horizons of those spaces
reveal themselves to us. These places are not arbitrary and usually also have
a history both as real places and in terms of their normative relations to other
places. I am thinking here of the way, for example, a stop on the London
Underground relates to another in the same terms that an urban place or
neighbourhood relates to another place or neighbourhood in a larger
construction where all these places together relate to the thing we call
London. We get a sense of these built structures as fundamentally spatial
organisation (rather than subsidiary to and acting on space) and medium,
structured to a rationale and pattern that is historical, normative, and that
supports and is background to specific practices or sets of practices. The
work that is going to be needed to build an idea of a techno-relational
environment out further will prioritise the historical, the contingent and the
empirical over the abstract and theoretical.
To be clearer: the abstractions and the ‘theory’ that are likely to be relevant
are those which have already been embedded in historical-empirical
constructions by way of the purposes and practices they embed and embody.
We will need to understand techno-relationality in its spatial and historical
specificity, in order to understand how we have constructed the worlds we
inhabit, ground and all, and how it may be possible to construct it further to
support practices and mediate experience in the future.
We may attempt, as Soren Riis has for example (Riis, 2010), to look at
architectural technologies one by one for the ways they mediate the human-
world relation. He identifies the ‘transparency’ and ‘natural’ and ‘atmospheric’
qualities of some of these relations, but there is a clear problem if, as I am
going to argue, technologies, architectures and other material infrastructures
may themselves constitute human worlds structured for perception and action.
In this case we clearly cannot start with a ‘world’ as already given. In fact, a
feature of technologies in the human world is that they precisely, and with
3
Ihde mentions Robert Ackermann, Robert Crease, Hubert Dreyfus, Peter
Galison, Ian Hacking, Patrick Heelan, Don Ihde, and Bruno Latour.
intent and purpose, constitute and integrate our worlds at the same time they
enable our practical actions. They seldom if ever act alone, and some may be
foregrounded while others are backgrounded while they are necessary parts
of the human activity being described or investigated. This is particularly true
of architecture where different systems are coordinated precisely so they don’t
appear to us in practice. Arakawa and Gins make a point of subverting some
of this coordination (in the Bioscleve House for example) but this only really
highlights the point that we depend most of the time on a profoundly
integrated – and for the most part invisible and background – organisation to
support our everyday practices. How many times a day do we think of the
floor or pavement we walk on, or the door we may close, or the equipment
that serves to maintain an ambient temperature. A feature of this background
is maintenance and upkeep, and occasional renewal.
An example Riis uses, the Panopticon, is exemplary however of the
‘spheropoietic’ process, realising a world with its own operational logic and
within which parts and wholes make sense in relation to one another. An
engineered spatial organisation and bounding sustains this interior world with
its own internally embodied reason; the guard and the prisoner are parts of
the Panopticon, needed there to complete the circuit of seeing and being
seen. This particular example reinforces the idea we are imprisoned in these
materialised logics – but this is only part of the story, the other side of which is
that it is these sorts of materialised and situated logics which allow us to do
the things we would otherwise be quite incapable of doing – or even perhaps
see the possibility of doing. These bounded inner spaces and architectures
may in fact be the condition of our doing anything human at all.
“Add to the vehicular movement of the water the vertical plane of the houses
which retain, absorb, interpose, or restore the merchandise: that whole
concert of pulleys, chutes and docks effects a permanent mobilisation of the
most shapeless substances. ... [O]bjects interrupt each horizon, glide along
the water and along the walls. It is objects which articulate space. The object
is by and large constituted by this mobility, Hence the defining power of all
these Dutch canals. What we have clearly is a water-merchandise complex; it
is water which makes the object, giving all the nuances of a calm planar
mobility, collecting supplies, shifting them without perceptible transition from
one exchange to the other, making the entire city into a census of agile
goods.” ... “[E]verything is, for the object, a means of procession; this bit of
wharf is a cynosure of kegs, logs, tarpaulins; man has only to overturn or to
hoist; space, obedient creature, does the rest – carries backward and forth,
selects, distributes, recovers, seems to have no other goal than to complete
the projected movement of all these things, separated from matter by the
sleek, firm film of use; here all objects are prepared for manipulation, all have
the detachment and the density of Dutch cheeses: round, waxed prehensible
(Barthes 1972: 6-7) .
La Ville d'Amsterdam, 1690: Jacques Harrewijn.
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