MOTION for EXTENSION of TIME to FILE PETITION

Laguna Metts vs CA (strict Rule)

Facts:
LA found respondent employees illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the LA in a
decision. Private respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008. On July 25,
2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The motion
alleged that the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period due to heavy
workload. Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for. CA granted the motion and gave private respondents a nonextendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the
said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.

Issue:

Whether extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed.

Held:
Extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed. The amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-712-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously
permitted such extensions. The rationale for the deletion by amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to
prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. As
the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration. While technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly
procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted. Last pararagraph of Sec 4 Rule 63- 15
days extension allowed for compelling reason

DOMDOM vs SANDIGANBAYAN (Relaxed strict Rule)

Facts:
Office of the Ombudsman charged petitioner with 9 counts of estafa through falsification of documents with
the Sandiganbayan. The Informations were separately raffled and lodged among the 5 divisions of the Sandiganbayan. All
except 3rd division allowed consolidation of cases. Petitioner filed with SC a Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of
the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases against him during the pendency of this petition.
Issue:w/n the petition filed out of time since a motion for extension to file such kind of a petition is no longer allowed
Held:
Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court's sound discretion. No mention
is made in the amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension does not make the filing of such pleading
absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that
"no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed
within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.

REPUBLIC vs ST. VINCENT de PAUL COLLEGE

Facts:
The Republic sought to expropriate parcel of land onwed by St. Vincent . 1 for the Manila Cavite tollgate Project and 2 nd
case was due to free patent.Trial court ruled that the Republic has a lawful right to take portion of the subject property,
with "no pronouncement as to just compensation. After almost 2 years St. Vincent filed a Manifestation contending that it
is entitled to just compensation BUT RTC later on required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent (100%) of the
value of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied .
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA
a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its
Resolution .On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the Republic to show cause why its

petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time. Republic filed answer to pleading. But CA
dismissed petition.
Issue:
whether the CA erred in dismissing the Republic's petition for certiorari for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 077-12-SC.
Held:
Yes. The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would
serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest

Laguna Metts
a strict application of the
general rule that petitions
for certiorari must be filed
strictly within sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration

Domdom
relaxed the rule and
allowed an extension of the
sixty
(60)-day
period
subject to the Court's sound
discretion.

Labao Case
Provided exception to strict application of GR:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure
3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant's fault;
(10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play;
(12) importance of the issues involved;
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all
the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance
a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure
to comply with the rules.

SURETY BOND NOT NECESSARY on CERTIORARI

SANG-AN vs EQUATOR KNIGHTS
Facts:

Jonathan a manager incharge of safekeeping of firearms was temporarily suspended from work pending further
investigation of the 2 missing guns. Pending his suspension, a security guard from Equator was apprehended by
policemen for violating the Commission on Elections' gun ban rule. The security guard stated in his affidavit 7 that the
unlicensed firearm had been issued to him by Jonathan. On May 24, 2001, Jonathan filed with the NLRC a complaint for
illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement. the LA dismissed the complaint.
Jonathan appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC but it sustained the findings of the LA that there had been just cause for
his dismissal. However, it found that Jonathan had been denied his right to due process when he was dismissed . The CA
reinstated the LA's decision dismissing Jonathan's complaint.
Jonathan contends that when Equator filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion by the NLRC, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code.
Issue:
whether the posting of a cash or surety bond is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the CA; and
Held:
A cash/surety bond is not needed in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code only applies to appeals from
the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does not apply to special civil actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. In fact, nowhere under Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.
A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings that resulted in the
judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal prior to an appeal from the judgment, or to a final judgment where there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law or by the rules.

APPEAL from the DECISION of the NLRC

PNB vs VELASCO
Facts:

On March 5, 1996, PNB charged Velasco with "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and/or Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service for the irregular handling of Dollar Savings Account and withheld his allowance and benefits.
On October 2, 1996, PNB exonerated Velasco of the charges of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service but was found guilty of grave misconduct, mitigated by length of service and absence of actual loss to PNB. Thus,
he was meted the penalty of forced resignation with benefits.
Labor Arbiter- No illegal dismissal. Preventive suspension reasonable
NLRC- affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter decision. The NLRC concluded that the falsification of the passbook
shows deceit on the part of Velasco. He took advantage of his position. His motion for reconsideration denied,
CA - by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
According to the CA, the failure of Velasco to present his passbook and a letter of introduction does not constitute
misconduct.the alleged offense of Velasco is not work-related to constitute just cause for his dismissal.
Issue:
whether Velasco took the correct recourse when he elevated the decision of the NLRC to the CA by way of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 43.
Held:
The mode of appeal resorted to by Velasco is wrong because appeal is not the proper remedy in elevating to the CA the
decision of the NLRC. Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit that Rule 43 "shall not apply to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines". Rule 43 provides for appeal from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA by way of petition for review. Petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari is a recourse to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The correct remedy that should have been availed of is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. As this Court
held in the case of Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, "the party may also seasonably avail of the special civil action
for certiorari, where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer". In any case, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National
Labor Relations Commission settled any doubt as to the manner of elevating decisions of the NLRC to the CA by holding
that "the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC".
That the decision of the NLRC is not subject to appeal could have been a ground for the CA to dismiss the appeal
of Velasco. But even assuming, arguendo, that his petition could be liberally treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65,
the recourse should not have prospered.
The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED. 2005cdasia

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS NACINO

Facts:
AMA employed Nacino. HR Supervisior found Nacino absent from his post. HR then filed a formal complaint
against Nacino for false testimony ( may LBM DAW SYA), in addition to the charge of abandonment. Nacino was placed
under preventive suspension for a maximum of thirty (30) was later found Nacino guilty as charged, and was dismissed
from the service Nacino filed a Complaint for Illegal Suspension and Termination before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). Both parties agreed to a voluntary arbitration thereafter, the parties agreed to settle the case
amicably, with Nacino discharging and releasing AMA from all his claims in consideration of the sum of P7,719.81.
On April 1, 2003, Nacino died in an accident. On April 15, 2003, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered the assailed
Decision, 13ordering Nacino's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages and 13th month pay due to AMA's failure
to pay and Nacino withdrew from the Compromise Agreement but AMA failed to file its position paper and to appear
before him despite summons. On May 7, 2003, the Voluntary Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution
AMA filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. On June 23, 2003, the CA dismissed the said petition
because it was a wrong mode of review
Issue:
Wether or not AMA took wrong recourse of Appeal

Held:
Yes, petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an
appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor
Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. The Court noted that the voluntary arbitrator is a government
instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of (BP) 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and,
therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before being elevated to this Court.
Instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal:
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
(c) when the writs issued are null and void;
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
AMA has sadly failed to show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule. SaHIEA
a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
before the CA cannot be treated as such, without the exceptional circumstances mentioned above, because it was filed
way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the Petition for Review.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR CASES BY SUPREME COURT

G&M vs RIVERA
G & M deployed Lorenzo Rivera, respondents husband, to work as equipment driver for its foreign principal in Riyadh 2
years. After working for one more than 1 year, Lorenzo met an accident and died on December 23, 1993.Respondent filed
with the LA a complaint for unpaid for 23 day salary differentials for her late husband further claimed that her husband is
underpaid.
LA ordered petitioner to pay respondent Total P 190,950.00 +10% interest
NLRC- affirmed the Labor Arbiters judgment. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
CA- Petitioner then filed Petition for Certiorari . Sustained NLRC decision.
Issue: W/N CA erred in its decsion
The issues raised are essentially factual. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does
not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials findings rest . As
such, the findings of fact and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even
clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. [3] This is
because it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below; or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses; or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal
which has expertise in its special field. In this case.
Petition DENIED!

EXCEPTION to the RULE on EXHAUSTION of ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

DIOKNO vs CACDAC

VALIDITY of COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

MAGBANUA vs UY
Facts:
As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the SC in Uy v. NLRC, hearings were conducted to
determine the amount of wage differentials due the eight (8) petitioners. As computed, the award amounted to
P1,487,312.69.On February 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.On May 19, 1997,
[respondent] Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed, stating that the
judgment award as computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of [petitioners].Said Manifestation was also
signed by the eight (8) [petitioners]. Together with the Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of [petitioners],
attesting to the receipt of payment from [respondent] and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with their
complaint.On June 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution wherein they confirmed
that each of them received P40,000 from [respondent] on May 2, 1997.On June 9, 1997, [respondent] opposed the
motion on the ground that the judgment award had been fully satisfied. In their Reply, [petitioners] claimed that they
received only partial payments of the judgment award.
Labor Arbiter: issued an order denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution.
NLRC: reversed,holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that
quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy.
CA: held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final judgment. Thus, petitioners validly released

respondent from any claims, upon the voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the
compromise agreement.
Issues
Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise
settlement;Whether or not the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the labor case executed without the assistance
of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid;
Held:

Yes, A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in
order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. The issue involving
the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a final judgment is not novel. Bautista
upheld a compromise agreement that covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final
judgment.
The
Court
noted that
Article 2040
impliedly
allowed
such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should be entered into.
There is no justifi cation to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was
entered into
after
fi nal judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites a
nd principles of

contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid
compromise must havethe following elements: (1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2) an
object certain that is the subjectmatter of the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is
established.

In the present factual milieu, compliance with the elements of a valid contract is not in
issue. Petitioners do not challenge the factual fi nding that they entered into
a compromise
agreement
with
respondent. There are
no
allegations
of
vitiated consent. Instead,
petitioners base their argument on
the sole
fact
that
the agreement was executed despite a final judgment, which the Court had previously ruled to
be allowed by law.
The principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise after final judgment.
Novation, a mode of extinguishing an obligation, is done by changing the object or principal
condition of an obligation, substituting the person of the debtor, or surrogating a third person in
the exercise of the rights of the creditor. For an obligation to be extinguished by another, the law
requires either of these two conditions: (1) the substitution is unequivocally declared, or (2) the
old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment
operates as a novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite. In the
present case, the incompatibility of the final judgment with the compromise agreement is
evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to supersede the former.

2 Yes, The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine
its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is
whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration
for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to annul such
transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their
consent had been vitiated. The law is silent with regard to the procedure for approving a waiver
after a case has been terminated. Relevant, however, is this reference to the NLRCs New Rules
of Procedure:Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the
dispute, the same shall be reduced towriting and signed by the parties and their respective
counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor Arbiter.The settlement shall be
approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into bythe
parties and after having explained to them the terms and consequences thereof.A compromise
agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the
case is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the
complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and conditions of the settlement
and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the agreement is not contrary to
law, morals, and public policy.This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation
conference
during the
initial
stage
of
the litigation.
Such provision should be made applicable to the
proceedings in the
preexecution conference, forwhich the procedure for approving a waiver after final judgment is

not stated. There is no reason to make a distinction between

mandatory/conciliation and those in pre-execution conferences

the

proceedings

in

EUROTECH HAIR SYSTEM vs GO

Facts:
Respondent Antonio S. Go served as Eurotechs operations manager from September 2, 1996 until he was dismissed
onSeptember 27, 1999. In 1999, the company suffered production shortfalls. Eurotech issued memorandums remindering
respondent to improve his performance. Until 1 day, he was given 24 hours to explain in writing why the company should
not terminate his services on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.On September 27, 1999, petitioner Kunack finally
issued respondent a termination letter citing loss of trust and confidence.
The Labor Arbiter- Filed illegal dismissal case. Ruled in favor of GO.
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. [6] Respondents CA- set aside the decision
of the NLRC and reinstated the ruling of LA
Prior to such receipt of CA decision, he had executed a quitclaim in consideration of P450,000. Hence, on July 16, 2003,
the Labor Arbiter issued an Order dismissing with prejudice the complaint for illegal dismissal in view of the said waiver.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and voided for lack of jurisdiction the Labor Arbiters Order
dismissing the case with prejudice.
Issue:
Is the compromise agreement entered into by the parties valid?
Held:
Article 227 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor
standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional
office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties.
Note, however, that even if contracted without the assistance of labor officials, compromise agreements
between workers and their employers remain valid and are still considered desirable means of settling dispute
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver
voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed
voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondents contention, the
employees counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement.
In this case, we find the consideration of P450,000 fair and reasonable under the circumstances. In addition,
records show that respondent gave his personal and specific individual consent with a full understanding of the stakes
involved. In our view, the compromise agreement in this case does not suffer from the badges of invalidity.
The fact that the Order, which dismissed the case in view of the compromise agreement, was issued during the
pendency of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals does not divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. A petition for
certiorari is an original action and does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding. [16] The Labor
Arbiter thus acted well within his jurisdiction. Therefore, the Labor Arbiters Order dismissing the case with prejudice in
view of the compromise agreement entered into by the parties must be upheld.

Note: that the burden of proof in dismissal cases rests on the employer. In the instant case, however, petitioners failed to
prove that respondent was terminated for a valid cause. Evidence adduced was utterly wanting as to respondents alleged
inefficiency constituting a willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him by petitioners.

JPHIL MARINE vs NLRC

FACTS:
Warlito E. Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas, filed on March 4,
2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma complaint against petitioners
manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its then president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal
Norman Shipping Services for unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. Respondent's total claim against petitioners was P864,343.30 plus P117,557.60 representing interest
and P195,928.66 representing attorney's fees
Labor Arbiter - dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit.
the NLRC- reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
During the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, respondent, against the advice of his counsel,
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release
subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without the assistance of a
counsel is proper
HELD:
Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a lawyer is proper. The
Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the
general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal
only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The circumstances of this case indicate that
respondent's counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise
agreement.
Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer cannot be
gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered into with the intent of defrauding
the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of his fees.

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK vs YBAROLA

Facts
Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were hired on June 15, 1977
and June 1, 1983, respectively, by Radio Mindanao Network (RMN). They eventually became
account managers, soliciting advertisements and servicing various clients of RMN.
On September 15, 2002, the respondents services were terminated as a result of RMNs
reorganization/restructuring; they were given their separation pay P631,250.00 for Ybarola,
and P481,250.00 for Rivera. Sometime in December 2002, they executed release/quitclaim
affidavits.
Dissatisfied with their separation pay, the respondents filed separate complaints (which
were later consolidated) against RMN and its President, Eric S. Canoy, for illegal dismissal with
several money claims, including attorneys fees. They indicated that their monthly salary rates
were P60,000.00 for Ybarola and P40,000.00 for Rivera.
Issue
Whether the amounts the respondents received represented a fair and reasonable
settlement of their claims
Ruling
The petitioners insist that the respondents commissions were not part of their salaries,
because they failed to present proof that they earned the commission due to actual market
transactions attributable to them. They submit that the commissions are profit-sharing payments
which do not form part of their salaries. If these commissions had been really profit-sharing
bonuses to the respondents, they should have received the same amounts, yet, as the NLRC
itself noted, Ybarola and Rivera received P372,173.11 and P586,998.50 commissions,
respectively, in 2002. The variance in amounts the respondents received as commissions
supports the CAs finding that the salary structure of the respondents was such that they only
received a minimal amount as guaranteed wage; a greater part of their income was derived from
the commissions they get from soliciting advertisements; these advertisements are the
products they sell. As the CA aptly noted, this kind of salary structure does not detract from the
character of the commissions being part of the salary or wage paid to the employees for services
rendered to the company, as the Court held in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC.
The petitioners reliance on our ruling in Talam v. National Labor Relations
Commission, regarding the proper appreciation of quitclaims, as they put it, is misplaced. While
Talam, in the cited case, and Ybarola and Rivera, in this case, are not unlettered employees, their
situations differ in all other respects.

In Talam, the employee received a valuable consideration for his less than two years of service
with the company; he was not shortchanged and no essential unfairness took place. In this case,
as the CA noted, the separation pay the respondents each received was deficient by at least
P400,000.00; thus, they were given only half of the amount they were legally entitled to. To be
sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be a reasonable one, given especially the
respondents length of service 25 years for Ybarola and 19 years for Rivera. The CA was
correct when it opined that the respondents were in dire straits when they executed the
release/quitclaim affidavits. Without jobs and with families to support, they dallied in executing
the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually forced to sign given their circumstances

AUGUSTIN vs CRUZ- HERRERA

COMPLAINANTS Josephine Solano and 10 others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims and damages against
Podden International Philippines, Inc. (Podden) and respondent Alejandro Cruz-Herrera. They engaged the services of petitioner Atty.
Emmanuel D. Agustin to handle the case upon the verbal agreement that he will be paid on a contingency basis at the rate of 10
percent of the final monetary award.
The complainants, through Atty. Agustin, obtained a favorable ruling before the labor arbiter. No appeal was taken from the judgment.
Hence, on Feb. 2, 1999 a motion for execution was filed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in a resolution dated May
7, 2003 ordered the labor arbiter to immediately issue the corresponding writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision, the total
monetary award of which as of July 20, 1999 reached P3,358,441.84.
On Aug. 6, 2004, respondent Herrera filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the resolution of the NLRC.
During the pendency of the petition or on August 30, 2005, a joint compromise agreement was submitted to the CA. In a resolution
dated September 30, 2005, the CA approved the compromise agreement and entered judgment in accordance therewith.
Displeased, Atty. Agustin with the petitioners name as his co-petitioners, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
assailing the CA resolution contending, among others, that the compromise agreement was unconscionable and executed without his
knowledge and consent. Did this contention find merit?
Ruling: No.
Atty. Agustin ought to be reminded that his professional relation with his clients is one of agency under the rules thereof the acts of an
agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. It is clear that under the
circumstances of this case, Atty. Agustin is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement between
the complainants, Podden and Herrera.
It is settled that parties may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of their lawyer. This precedes from the equally
settled rule that a client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer for he is generally conceded to
have the exclusive control over the subjectmatter of the litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith,
compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorneys intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though
he has agreed with his attorney not to do so. Hence, the absence of a counsels knowledge or consent does not invalidate a
compromise agreement.

Neither can a final judgment preclude a client from entering into a compromise. Rights may be waived through a compromise
agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment that has already settled the rights of the contracting parties provided the compromise is
shown to have been voluntarily, freely and intelligently executed by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment. Additionally, it
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy.
In the present case, the allegations of vitiated consent proffered by Atty. Agustin are all presumptions and suppositions that have no
bearing as evidence. There is no proof that the complainants were forced, intimidated or defrauded into executing the quitclaims

REMEDIES of 3rd PARTY CLAIMANT

YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC erroneously and unlawfully levied certain properties which it claims
as its own. It filed a 3 rd party claim with the Labor Arbiter and recovery of property and damages with the RTC. The
RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, the court dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping and that the
proper remedy was appeal in due course, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed a MFR and argued that the filing
of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a remedy specifically granted to an
owner (whose properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in
which it was not a party). The MFR was denied. Hence, petitioner filed this appeal.

Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case

Held: YES
A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is
afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative
remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative
remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of.

Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.

Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a competent court to recover
ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff.
The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a
subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of such
complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping.