Feminism and Liberal Theory

Author(s): Richard C. Sinopoli and Nancy J. Hirschmann

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 221-233
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 FEMINISMAND
LIBERALTHEORY

In herarticleon "Freedom,Recognition,and Obligation:A FeministApproachto

Political Theory,"publishedin the December1989issueof this Review,NancyI. Hirsch-
mannarguedthat a feministmethodologycould breathenew and usefullife into liberal
political theory, relieving it of its structuralsexism. In this Controversy,RichardC.
Sinopoli takes issue with key claimsmade by Hirschmann.In turn, Hirschmannelabo-
rates her case.

In her recent article, "Freedom, This genderbis argumentis, of course,

Recognition,and Obligation:A Feminist
Approach to Political Theory," (1989a)
Nancy J. Hirschmannhas offered a cri-
tique of liberalism and its voluntarist
theory of obligationfrom a feministper-
spective. The gist of her argumentis that
there is a structuralgenderbias in liberal
political thought (at least in the social
contracttradition)derivingfrom a liberal
conception of the self as an abstract,
atomistic individual choosing principles
of justice.This conceptionin turnleads to
an overly voluntaristictheory of political
obligation and of social relations as a
whole.
Hirschmannholds that there is some
relationbetweenthis liberalconceptionof
the self and the formation of male iden-
tity, althoughshe is not clear about what
this relation is. Nonetheless, under her
quasi-Freudianassumptions,this relation
results from an inevitable gender differ-
ence in childrearing.Male babies must
separate themselves from their mothers
moreradicallythanfemalebabiesin order
to forge their own identity. An aspect of
the boy's strugglefor identityis a devalu-
ation of his relationwith his mother,even
a "belittling"of "all relationship"[sic],
and a glorification of separateness (p.
1235, emphasis mine). Such a glorifica-
tion is reflected in the "state-of-nature"
vantage point for choosing principlesof
justicein liberaltheory.
only as good as the psychologicaltheory
on which it rests. And thereis not a con-
sensus in the psychological literature
either on whether females and males
reason differentlyregardingmorals and,
by extension,politics, or on why they do
so when gender differences in moral
reasoning have been observed.' More-
over, if thereis a differencebetweenboys
and girls in terms of separationfrom the
motherin formingthe self, it can only be
a differencein degree. Hirschmannpro-
vides no evidence as to how far apart
women and men are on what must be a
continuum, nor does she establish that
such differencesin a sense of self give rise
to fundamentallydifferentpolitical per-
spectivesbetweengenders.2
Nonetheless, I do not intend to chal-
lenge Hirschmann's psychoanalytic
assumptions-with one notable excep-
tion: she pushes her psychologicaltheory
to the breaking point in claiming not
merely that boys must go to greater
meansto forgea separateidentitybut that
this "escapefrom the body female"entails
a quest for "absolutefreedom from [his
motherland from all 'others'" (p. 1235).
It is hard to imaginewhat "absolutefree-
dom"could mean to an infant or how he
might effect his wishes. Hirschmann
seems intent to draw the gender differ-
ences in the formationof the self as stark-
ly as possible even at the cost of plausi-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 85 NO. 1 MARCH 1991
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85

bility. As one criticof Gilligannoted after "resonance,"between male childrearing

observing the considerable overlap be- and the liberal theory of obligation or
tween men's and women's responses to whetherthereis a causalrelation.Hirsch-
Kohlbergianmoral dilemmas, "We are mann'smore interestingclaimis the latter
not two species:we are two sexes"(Luria and I will treat this as her considered
1986). view.
In any case, there are importantprob- Second, I am not sure whether I am
lems in Hirschmann'scritique of liberal- meant to be persuaded by her case or to
ism even if her psychologicaltheory is ac- treat it merely as an expressionof a femi-
ceptedin full. First,Hirschmann'scritique nist standpoint.Hirschmannclaims to be
fails to account satisfactorilyfor the his- adopting a "feminist standpoint episte-
toricalrecordof the emergenceof liberal- mology" that "rejectsthe idea that episte-
ism. Second, she misrepresentsliberal mology is objective or universal" and
thoughtand politics, in part by confusing holds that it is insteadthe "productof par-
its motivationalappealwith its theoretical ticularsocial relations"(p. 1229). Such a
justification. Finally, she engages in a view calls into question the validity of
most literalversion of the geneticfallacy. any generaltruthclaim. She furtherholds
Liberalinstitutionsare criticizedin terms that "the standpointof oppressedgroups
of the psychologicaldispositionsthat give enables them to see more aspects of the
rise to them and not in terms of their social relations that oppress them" (p.
strengths and weaknesses compared to 1230). Elsewhereshe contends that the
other fundamental conceptions of the psychic development of the self "will
standardsby which politicalcommunities shade one's perceptionand interpretation
should be organized. of truth, or reality" (p. 1232). All this
I must admit,however, to two points of amounts to a kind of weak-kneedNietz-
confusion at the outset regarding the scheanism. Her general position of epis-
nature of the claim Hirschmannis mak- temic relativismis denied as she seems to
ing. First,at times she describesthe theo- recognizeat least two generaltruths:that
retical importanceof her argumentin a there is such a thing as oppressionout of
rather weak way. Thus, she claims that which a privileged standpoint emerges
the liberal conception of liberty (and its and that there are objective features of
voluntarist notion of obligation) "seems social relations to be observed. She then
to coherewith"the "boy'sinfantiledilem- admitstruthand even realityclaims(even
ma" or that there is a "resonance"be- if interpreteddifferently)into the picture
tween them (pp. 1232, 1235, 1238). Else- in a mannerher standpointepistemology
where, she claims to be offering reasons denies as a possibility. Nonetheless,I will
for a structural gender bias of liberal assume that the author intends to per-
theory. Unlike other critics of consent suade those who do not share her stand-
theory (e.g., Pateman1979) she seeks to point intuitively.
presenta treatmentnot of symptomsbut
of the causes of the oft-discussedprob-
lems in a liberaltheoryof politicalobliga- Hirschmann's Critique
tion. These causes are the presumptionin of Liberalism
consent theory of an abstractindividual-
ism that is a peculiarly male standpoint If we take Hirschmannto be arguingfor
and that thereforegives rise to a structural a necessary relation between maleness
genderbias in liberaltheory. It would be and the liberal "disembedded"self, we
helpful to know whether there is -merely face an immediate political theoretical
an interesting seeming coherence, or puzzle. This is that the predominantpre-

222
 Feminismand LiberalTheory
liberal political theories in the Western
tradition,those taughtin standardpoliti-
cal theory curricula,have two things in
common. First, they have been pro-
pounded by males from Plato and Aris-
totle through Augustine and Aquinas;
second, they have tended to conceive of
society as an organic,functionallydiffer-
entiatedwhole. Hirschmann'sdistinction
betweenmale separationand femalecon-
nectednessruns up againstthis fact.
What strongernotion of connectedness
in politics could we ask for than Aris-
totle'sassertionthat a manwithouta polis
must be eithera beast or a god? (1981, 6)
Not only is the Aristotelian self fully
embeddedin a set of social relations of
family, friendship, and community, but
he could not conceiveof a worthwhilelife
outside of these relationships.Much the
same can be said, with suitable adapta-
tion, of the ChristianAristoteliansin the
middle ages. Aquinas, too, adhered to
some notion of a "greatchain of being"
linking humans in light of a common,
teleologicalend.
Hirschmannmust not only explainlib-
eralismin light of malenessbut must also
explain why so many preliberal male
political theorists emphasize connected-
ness over separation. I am not denying
that the political thought of Aristotle or
Aquinas is patriarchical.The case could
be made that they expound merely a dif-
ferent form of gender bias than Hirsch-
mannwants to describein liberalism.But
this is a very differentline of argument
from the one Hirschmannpursues. It is
still a problemthat her describedverities
of male childrearingdo so little work in
explainingthe genesisor fundamentalpre-
sumptions of the two thousand or so
yearsof Westernpoliticalthoughtpreced-
ing liberalism.
Could she explainthe emergenceof lib-
eralism from these preliberal modes of
thoughtin termsof changesin patternsof
childrearing?Perhaps.Thereis nothingin
the psychological theory on which she
223
relies that would preventthis effort.3But
her notion of the forging of the self is so
deeplybiologicalthat it would be hardto
admit of much historicalvariation in it.
Its one fundamentally sociological
assumption, that of the mother as
primarycaregiver,would not help us dif-
ferentiateour cases. Moreover,even if we
found fundamentaldifferencesin child-
rearing practices, it would seem more
plausible to treat these as caused by,
ratherthan causes of, changesin society
at large. Forinstance,insofaras therehas
been a move away from the mother as
primary caregiver over the last twenty
years (a very limited move to be sure),
this is likelybest explainedby suchfactors
as the need for two incomesto maintaina
middle-classliving standardand a chang-
ing perception,broughtabout in part by
the women's movement, about the fair-
ness of dividingup childrearingand wage-
earningtasksin traditionalways. One can
surmise, absent compelling evidence to
the contrary, that the changedchildrear-
ing practices, reflect, rather than.cause,
broaderideologicaland economicshiftsin
the society.
Thereis an equallyperplexingdifficulty
in Hirschmann'sunderstandingof liberal
thought itself. Any student of liberalism
must strugglein identifyingthe common
threadsholding togethersuch a complex
and durable fabric of belief. Several
points Hirschmannmakes, however, do
not fit well with any reasonablerecon-
structionof liberaltheory. First,I suggest
that she conflatesthe motivationalappeal
and the theoreticaljustificationof liberal
political institutions.
Implicitin Hirschmann'sargumentis a
sense that men will be more attractedto
liberal thought because there is some co-
herencebetween the male standpointand
the liberaltendencyto view politicalobli-
gations as voluntary commitmentsjusti-
fied in terms of their acceptability to
asocial individuals. Men have had the
power to enact, and have enacted, these
 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 85

preferencesinto law. The liberaltheoryof much less atomistic theory than Hirsch-
obligation-and, presumably, liberal mann implies. She tends to treatwhat is a
societies-are oppressivebecausethey en- political theory in a rather metaphysical
dorse the male standpointand deny the way. The state of natureis treatedless as
female standpoint. a device for choosing principlesof politi-
Yet if I reconstructHirschmannfairly, cal justicethanas a sort of masculinestate
this is a poor explanationfor the appeal of bliss. Hirschmannwrites, "If no rela-
liberal principlesof justice either had at tions among people are considerednatu-
this philosophy'soutset or (I would sug- ral, they can only be consideredproducts
gest) have at present. It is widely recog- of agreements"(p. 1234). I think she
nized that liberalismemergedlargely out means that liberalsconceive of no social
of the religiouswars plaguingGreatBrit- relationsas natural.Sucha view, she sug-
ain in the seventeenthcentury (e.g., Ash- gests, is requiredby a conceptof libertyas
craft 1984). Liberalvalues of tolerance, absenceof restraintand the "extremelyin-
limited government, and inalienable dividualist view of consent and choice
rightsall emergefroman attemptto deter- endemic to consent theory" (pp.
mine the justifiablelimits of state power. 1234-35).
A most salient question for Locke and Ignoring for the moment Locke's dis-
later liberals was when and under what tinction between liberty and license, it is
circumstancesthe state could compel per- certainlynot the case that he or many (or
sons to conform to some dominant con- any?) of his successorstreatall social rela-
ceptionof the good life, religiousor other- tions as productsof consent (Locke1960,
wise, that they did not share. Social con- 311). Indeed, Locke recognizesa number
tract reasoning is useful in justifying a of natural duties-not the least being
liberalpolity as it asks what form of polit- those of parents toward children and a
ical communityis acceptableto free and universal duty of charity-that do not
equal rational agents with their own emergefrom consent at all (1960, 205-6,
(usually shared)conceptionsof the good 347). They reside, rather,in Locke'scon-
life and certainfundamentalintereststhat ception of natural law and in his work-
cannot be tradedoff against the vital in- manship model, which delimit the treat-
terestsof others. ment that one of God's creaturesowes to
It is not evident and, I suspect, not the others (Dunn 1969). Later liberals-not
case at all that early liberal males were the least being John Rawls-have mir-
liberalbecauseof some inarticulatedper- rored Locke in this distinction, though
ception of a coherence between a male without its theologicalbacking,by distin-
standpoint,an atomisticself, and a liberal guishing natural duties from the obliga-
theory of obligation. Rather,liberalism's tions undertakenby membersof a politi-
appeal derivedin large measurefrom the cal community (Rawls 1971, 114-17).5
capacityof the theoryto justifythe politi- Clearly, there are wide variations in the
cal acceptance of a wide range of rela- conceptions of either natural duties or
tively autonomous religious and other obligationsamong liberal thinkers.None
communities. Early liberals, as well as I can think of, however, holds as extreme
their successors,recognize that the most a view of social relationsas Hirschmann
connectedpolitical communitiescan also attributesto liberalismgenerally.
be the most oppressiveand that justifica- A last word needs to be said regarding
tion of politicalpower requiresa disinter- Hirschmann's conception of rights.
ested, if not necessarilyneutral, vantage Rights, she tells us, serve to divide indi-
point.4 viduals by drawing boundariesbetween
Moreover, Lockean liberalism is a "variousindividuals'needs, desires, and

224
 Feminismand LiberalTheory
wants" (p. 1238). I would suggest that
rights do not divide but recognizean un-
deniable division that exists among per-
sons. Rights-basedtheoriesrecognizethat
we are distinctpersonswith needs, wants,
and desiresand that thereare limits to the
sacrificesof any of these that a commu-
nity can ask, whether to advance some
commongoal or to benefitsome personor
persons more deservingby some perfec-
tionist criteria.
Womenand men can reasonablydebate
what kind of boundaries are necessary
and justified,given what we know about
human experienceand given contrasting
conceptions of liberty, community, and
public good. What we cannot do is wish
away the problem liberal theory has
always attemptedto address-how to dis-
agree agreeably in pluralistic communi-
ties-in the name of a vague notion of
connectedness.If Hirschmannhas other
political principlesto defend, she should
defendthem. And this requiresmore than
claimingthat her standpointissues in and
from superiorclaims to truth. It certainly
requiresmore than attributinga dubious
patrimonyto the principlesshe rejects.
RICHARDC. SINOPOLI
Universityof California,Davis
The apparentbewildermentabout my
"Freedom,Recognition and Obligation"
(1989a) that Sinopoli's remarks convey
can be tracedto threefundamentalerrors
he makes in his readingof my work. He
claimsthat I adopt an essentialistview of
gender. He dichotomizesmy conceptual
categoriesand oversimplifiesmy reading
of liberal obligation theory by utilizing
the very structuralbias that I critique.
Finally,he disregardsthe point that struc-
turalgenderbias is structuralbecauseit is
epistemological.
225
Essentialism
We may most easily dispense with
Sinopoli'scharge that the notion of self-
identity and genderthat I adopt is "inevi-
table" and "deeply biological." Sinopoli
does not indicate where he gets this im-
pression,offeringno textualsupportfrom
my article; but it is a fundamentalas-
sumption that guides his essay.6 In fact,
his claim is overtly contradictedby my
text. I attributea largepartof the problem
of the male model of identity to the fact
that "gender is culturally an exclusive
category" (p. 1230, emphasis added). I
identify "individual development as in
part the product of created institutions,
namely, the social relations of childrear-
ing" (pp. 1231-32). Object relations
theory provides "not . . . an essentialist
statement about how men and women
think"but rather"a theory of power"(p.
1231). Sinopoli's confusion may stem
from the fact that this observation is
followed by an account of women'srela-
tive powerlessnessvia-A-vismen and why
it may be that women'spowerlessnessin
particularis manifestedin a voice of care
and connection. I attributethis voice not
only to powerlessness per se, but to
women's responsesto that powerlessness
in theirvery humanattemptsto strivefor
meaning and integrity in the "activities
. .. to which they have been assigned
child care, nurturance, affection" (p.
1231). This recognition of the historical
constructionof the gendereddimensions
of care contradictsan essentialistaccount
of what women are inevitablylike.
If I took a biological view of gender,
what could be the purpose of using the
highly materialiststandpointapproachto
read object relations theory? Standpoint
epistemologyis basedon experience;if ex-
periences change, so will the resulting
standpoint. It is true that some feminist
theorists have developed what could be
called a feministstandpointbased on bio-
logical experience (e.g., O'Brien 1981);
 AmericanPolitical ScienceReview Vol. 85
but particularlywhen viewed in the con-
text of objectrelationstheory, even these
need to be understoodas culturallymedi-
ated (if not constructed)by patriarchy.
Sinopoli'schargewould make nonsensical
the entire point of calling a standpoint
"feminist,"ratherthan "female"or "femi-
nine"; men can achieve feminist stand-
points (p. 1230; see also Hartsock1984).
But of course,in orderfor this to happen,
men would have to attendto women'sex-
perienceandtheorizefromthatexperience.
Indeed, these argumentscould be seen
as "deeplybiological"only if one viewed
mother-only childrearingitself as inevi-
table. Perhaps Sinopoli believes that
women are "natural"childrearersand
should be restrictedto this activity; but I
clearlydo not sharethis view. And at this
point in the late twentieth century, such
beliefs need to be argued and defended
ratherthan merely assertedor assumed.
Perhapsit is this assumptionthatblinds
Sinopoli to my use of terms such as the
boy or the girl as "abstractionsthat ideal-
ize and representrelationshipsof power"
as I expressedit (p. 1231); he thus ob-
scuresthe significanceof my use of object
relationstheory. Thismay accountfor his
erroneousconclusion that I am attempt-
ing to establisha reductivecausal expla-
nation for patriarchy,blaming men, or
engaging in theoretical "male-bashing."
Feminist standpoint theory does not
maintain that men are the problem and
women are the solutionbut ratherthat the
problem is patriarchy and that we all
shareit. Phraseslike malepsychicdepen-
dence do not necessarilyrefer to the par-
ticularpathologiesof individualtheorists
but ratherto a much more generalepiste-
mologicaland ontologicalenvironment
a "socialpathology"if you will-consti-
tutedby the cultural,social, political,sex-
ual, economic, and interpersonalstruc-
tures of the modem liberal era (see also
Flax1983). Methodologically,then, read-
ing object relationsin light of standpoint
epistemologyhelps us work through the
226
complexways in which our categoriesof
analysis are socially constructed.It helps
reveal the social and historicalforcesthat
go into political theory and into the self-
understandingand epistemology of the
people who createit.
The point, then, is not to provide a
simplisticcausalaccountof liberaltheory
but ratherto understandhow the voice of
care is a voice of powerlessnessand to
look at some of its specificallygendered
dimensions.The rathercartoonlikeimage
of "cause"that informs Sinopoli's com-
plaints distorts the goals of theoretical
enterpriseand prevents interestingques-
tions from being asked;more ominously,
it obliteratesentireclassesof people from
askingthemand frombringingin theirex-
periencesto effectchangein the questions
we deem central to philosophy. A femi-
nist standpointapproachallows women's
experiencesto be broughtto bear on our
understandingof political theory and can
help us see how liberalobligationtheory
is premisedon women'sexclusion.
The reductive tendencies of his criti-
cisms perhapsexplain Sinopoli'smistake
in treating psychoanalytic theory and
moral psychology-which, particularly
as I use them, are interpretivetheories
(see Chodorow 1989, chap. 9, esp.
p. 179, and Gilligan 1982, esp. 2)-as
empirical "sciences."He thus reads into
my work an empirical framework that
does not exist and then criticizesme for
not succeedingat the tasks requiredby
such a framework. For instance, in
response to my discussion of reactive
autonomy, Sinopoli says, "It is hard to
imagine what 'absolute freedom' could
mean to an infant or how he might effect
his wishes." On the most basic level, the
whole point of reactiveautonomy is that
it is formedas the male child leavesinfan-
cy behind; it is with the developmentof
motor skills that the definitionof self as
not-motheris made possible. Freedomin
this context is thus defined by the prob-
lematic conceptionof the emergingadult
 Feminismand LiberalTheory
male self as not-motherand not-female.
Thisreactiveidentityin turnsets the stage
for receptivity to later socializationpat-
terns that encode this false freedom,
which boys can "effect" quite readily
throughgenderdivisions in schools, play
patterns,social roles, and even language.
These social patternsboth assist and fur-
ther encouragehim to see himself as de-
fined in opposition to the mother. So
these differencesare neither natural nor
simpleproductsof socializationbut rather
attest to the deep effects of socially con-
structed childrearingrelations on basic
self-conceptions.
Because of Sinopoli's reductive treat-
ment of these issues, he indefensibly
denies that psychology and socialization
develop in synergistic fashion. In the
(highly unlikely) event that mother-only
childrearingwere the only patriarchalin-
stitutionthat existed in an otherwisesex-
ually egalitariansociety, it is very likely
that boys and girls could learn to view
themselvesas more (though not totally)
equal, just as shared parenting in an
otherwise sexist world will have limited
success in the face of social messagesto
childrenthat contradicttheir initial self-
conceptions. This does not mean that
sharedparentingwill not make important
inroads against gender inequality; nor
does it reducethe significanceof mother-
only childrearing.If humans are socially
constructed,it would be silly to assume
that the constructionstops at age three;
but it would be even sillierto assumethat
it does not start until that age.
On a deeper level, Sinopoli's puzzle-
ment overlooksa very basic point of psy-
choanalytictheory, namely, that much of
this goes on at the unconsciouslevel. In-
deed, as I arguein "Freedom,Recognition
and Obligation,"this is why I find psy-
choanalytictheory to provide such value
as a symbolic language;the unconscious
gainsits most importantexpressionat the
culturallevel, in the symbols and struc-
tures that a culture adopts. Social con-
227
tract theory is one such culturalembodi-
ment of the reactionagainst the mother.
Sinopolibasicallydismissesthe entirehis-
tory of psychoanalytictheory,whichpro-
vides many detailed and highly complex
answers to his question. Certainly, the
wish to challenge,and even ultimatelyre-
ject, psychoanalytictheory is legitimate;
but if Sinopoliwishes to do this, he needs
to accomplishit by strongermeans.
Sinopoli's StructuralGenderBias
Sinopoli'sapparentconfusion in twist-
ing so many aspectsof my argumentmay
be attributableto the fact that he takes
almost everything out of context: he
doesn'tunderstandmy use of genderpsy-
chology becausehe readsit out of the con-
text of standpoint epistemology; he
doesn'tunderstandmy criticismsof liber-
alism because he reads them out of the
context of consent theory; he doesn't
understandthe idea of connectionbecause
he reads it out of the context of political
obligation and feminism. Yet he adopts
his own, unrecognized context in the
process: a context of structuralgender
bias.
This bias is revealed in his claim that
connectionhas played an importantrole
in ancient theory. As Young has pointed
out, the idea of "unity" that ancient
Greece required as a precondition for
political stabilityreliedon the "expulsion
of persons from the civic public in order
to maintainits unity" (Young 1987, 63).
So women, metics, and slaves were all'ex-
cluded from political participationin the
name of order and stability. Other theo
rists (Elshtain1981; Hartsock1984; Okin
1979) have similarlyargued that the so-
called communityin these theoriescomes
at women's expense; it can be called
community only from a patriarchal
perspectives
The identification of connection in
Locke is similarly problematic. Aside
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85
from the fact that I acknowledge the
potential in Locke for a more social
theory (p. 1233), I revealthis to be a con-
flicted and contradictoryfilm covering a
radical individualism.(And contra Sino-
poli, Locke describesparentingrelation-
ships as contractualfor fathers, as chil-
drenprovide"atacit and scarceavoidable
consent to make way for the Father's
Authority and Government" [Second
Treatisep. 360, emphasis original]; that
he does not describechildren'srelationto
mothers as contractual is precisely my
point.) WhileLockewishes to situateindi-
viduals within a social context, namely,
civil society, individuals are social only
becauseof a patriarchalGod: community
consistsin relationsimposedon men (and
women) by the laws of God the Father.
Not only does this notion of community
fit object relation's interpretive frame-
work of male development,8but it also
provides a convenient justification for
women's subservienceto men and their
exclusionfrom politics. While Lockewas
clearlyambivalentaboutwomen, tornbe-
tween a desire to recognizethem as "free
and equal" and the Bible's decree that
their lot was subservience, the depen-
dence of community on God makes
severely problematic any claim that
Locke'stheory embracesconnection. For
these connectionsare not only contrived
but sexually oppressive.
This is carried even further when we
rememberthat my focus is political obli-
gation. For these connections are, of
course, private. It is Locke'sdetermina-
tion to establish consent at the heart of
society-and particularlyof politicalobli-
gation-in spite of his patriarchalconnec-
tion that leads to the public-privatesplit.
This split ensures a political community
of men at the expense of the political
power of women and creates a private
community in the patriarchal nuclear
family at the expenseof the social power
of women. Indeed,the only way that con-
sent theory has been able to operate
228
throughoutmodem historyis throughthe
public-private dichotomy. Consent
theory requires,for successfulimplemen-
tation, a specificframework(i.e., a public
realm totally separate from the private)
within which all actions are conformable
to the model of consent. All things that
cannot fit this framework,that is to say,
nonconsensualobligations,are consigned
to the private realm. Since that is defined
as the realm of the inessential, consent
theoristsdo not have to worry about, or
even include, such activitiesor considera-
tions when thinking about and defining
obligation.
Consent theory's conceptual inability
to allow nonconsensualobligationsis thus
really a fear and refusalto do so; for the
only way it can effectivelydeny suchobli-
gations is to segregatethem in the private
sphere, assign them to a particulargroup
of people (i.e., women, workers, slaves)
and then shut those people off from the
light of publicday, denyingthempolitical
voice and hence silencingthem and their
experiencesaltogether.WhileI fully agree
that the rejection of patriarchy Locke
seeks to achieveis an importanthistorical
move, it is disingenuous to ignore that
this rejection of patriarchy is in turn
premisedon patriarchy,on the subjection
of women to men (see also Pateman
1988).
Without recognizing the role of God
and the public-private dichotomy in
transforming,ratherthan rejecting,patri-
archy, it appearsthat Lockegives impor-
tance to communityand connection;but
(to paraphrase MacIntyre 1988) whose
community?which connection?The his-
tory of thought is full of theorists who
claim to give priority to community,and
some of these are more egalitarianand
woman-inclusivethan others.9But to the
degreethat theoriesand communitiesare
themselves premised on exclusion, they
can only sustain the definition of com-
munity from the perspective of the op-
pressor.
 Feminismand LiberalTheory
A feminist notion of connection seeks
to be more inclusiveand democratic.It is
not "vague" at all-nor is a feminist
standpoint "intuitive"-unless one ig-
nores women's historical experience or
refusesto listen to the voices of powerless-
ness. As I arguein "Freedom,Recognition
and Obligation," it requires mutuality,
recognition,reciprocity,attentionto con-
text and substance,and prioritygiven to
relationshipand connection, all of which
involve a democraticcommunitysuch as I
describeelsewhere.10That project is ad-
mittedly well beyond the scope of this
response, but Sinopoli's objection again
misses the point of my original article,
which was not to detail a fully blown
feministpolitical society but to highlight
women'ssystematicexclusionfrom politi-
cal obligationtheory, to identify that ex-
clusion as a function of structuralgender
bias, to ask why this bias exists, and to ex-
plore how it can be addressed.
The Epistemological Nature
of Gender Bias
Sinopoli is forced into these misread-
ings, I believe, becausehe entirelymisses
my most important argument, namely,
that structuralgenderbias is epistemolog-
ical in character.I make a much more in-
volved argumentthan the assertion that
because men have written political
theory, it ignores women.11 Rather, I
build an account of women's exclusion
that goes beyond individual intent to
understand how those individuals are
socially constructedand hence operatein
a world of meaningthat allows only cer-
tain ideas and views to emerge. It is im-
portantto recognizethat my articletreats
feminismnot just as a political position
but as a methodthat mainstreampolitical
theory needs to utilize. In failing to grasp
this, Sinopoli makes structural gender
bias sound much more conscious-even
conspiratorial-than I argue it is. If one
229
sees the world in termsof separation,one
does not have to figure out ways to dis-
empower those who view the world in
termsof connection;one justplows ahead
with one'svision of realityand constructs
political conceptsfrom there, as Sinopoli
illustrates.
Indeed, Sinopoli proves, rather than
challenges my central point: he is so
enmeshed in the assumptions of liberal
theory that he cannot lodge any sort of
criticismoutside of that framework,and
dismissesout of hand any views that do
not share those assumptions. He thus
faults me for not adoptingthe very cate-
gories of analysis I contest. For example,
Sinopoli claims that I confuseliberalism's
motivational appeal with its theoretical
justification. The point is precisely that
these two are intimately linked. In his
closing sentences,he rejectsmy criticism
of rights on the grounds that "rightsdo
not divide, but recognizean undeniable
division that exists among, persons.
Rights-basedtheories recognize that we
are distinct persons with needs, wants,
and desires"(emphasismine). HereSinop-
oli quiteobviously combinesthe two very
entities he claims he can keep separate.
Simultaneously,he displayshow his epis-
temological bias causes him to miss the
point of my argument,which is precisely
to challenge such universalisticviews as
claims by the powerful to subvert the
excluded.The acceptanceof humansepa-
ratenessas a naturalfact that rights dis-
course does not createbut merely recog-
nizes fits the male model of psychological
development as well as any examples I
provided in my originalarticle.
But again, thesepoints areepistemolog-
ical. The observation that rights further
divide individuals from one another-
that they are defined in opposition to
community-does not mean that the idea
of rightas historicallyconstructedis com-
pletely useless or that feminists should
chuck it out. Rather,the point is to high-
light how we do defineit, that this is a cul-
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85
turally constructed definition, and that
we can preservesome of the qualitiesin-
herentin this definitionof right-such as
individual desire and choice-without
embracingall of it. Thereare many ways
to conceptualizechoice, as a standpoint
approachsuggests. Why has it been de-
fined in thisway, and only this way-that
is to say, as a function of universal,
natural rights-with other sorts of in-
sights obliteratedfrom public institutions
and discoursessuch as politicaltheory A
feminist standpoint approach suggests
that we can relocate choice in its social
context to develop a new concept: one
that is neitheropposed to communitynor
wholly subsumedin it but works from an
understandingof self in relationship,from
defining our individualityin the context
of communities.What this requiresis a
critical understandingof how we have
conceptualizedright; how this concept
containsa genderbias; and how, in order
to addressthe humanimbalancethat this
genderbias reveals, we need to decenter
rights and bring in a notion of responsi-
bility.
It also requiresa nondualisticapproach
to political theory. Sinopoli is obviously
confusedabout standpointepistemology;
he doesn'tknow whetherhe is "meantto
be persuaded"by it-which he connects
to its being "true"-or whether it simply
advocatesindiscriminatelyallowingmore
voices in, which he deemsrelativist.Here
again, we have a clear illustration of
masculinist epistemology, for he draws
this distinctionin a dualist,all-or-nothing
fashion. Becauseit must be eithertrue or
relative,a feministstandpointappearsin-
comprehensible.
But the methodological strength of a
standpointapproachis preciselyits ability
to eschew both the false certaintyof uni-
versal truth and the moral vacuity of
atomistic relativism. Sinopoli's implicit
demand that there must be one single
feminist standpoint before he will be
persuadedignoresthe complexity,depth,
230
and variety of women's epistemological
and political oppression within patriar-
chy. Feminism, as I use the term, is
not a universalideology. Rather,it is con-
stituted by historicallysituatedpositions
and perspectivesthat are influenced by
temporal, material dynamics. These
dynamics in turn shape individuals'
assessmentsand understandingsof their
positions. Presumably-indeed, hope-
fully-feminist standpointswill changeas
society becomes less patriarchal.For we
cannot forget that in the late twentieth
century, any feminist standpointis itself
partiallyinformedby patriarchy;we can-
not achieve a "pure"feminist society or
theory directly from patriarchybecause
women have been partly constructedby
patriarchy.The standpointof careshould
thereforebe seen as a less partialand per-
verseepistemologicalframeworkthat will
lead, through its critical, theoretical
development,to even less partialand per-
verse feministstandpointsin the future.
Thus, feministstandpointmethodology
is not comprehensiblein the simplistic
manner that Sinopoli suggests. In con-
trast, my pluralizationof the term femi-
nist standpoints (p. 1230) encouragesus
to recognizenot only the complexitybut
also the variety in women's experiences
and that this variety is itself empowering:
there can be many feminist standpoints.
The fact that these standpointsare femi-
nist and derivefrom the historicalexperi-
ences of women, limits abstract relativ-
ism; but this does not mean thereis some
universal conception of feminism any
more than it means there is no way to
determine greater and lesser degrees of
genderbias.
It is clearlymy hope that theoristslike
Sinopoli will be persuadedby a stand-
point argument;but his responseprovides
a perfectexampleof preciselywhy it is so
importantto theorizefromfeministstand-
points. According to standpoint episte-
mology, the view of reality affordedby
the more oppressedperson is less partial
 Feminismand LiberalTheory

and perverse than the view of the more thoughit may appearto threatenand dis-
privileged person precisely because the empower them. For in reality, it em-
natureof privilegeis to obscurethe ways powers us all.
it exists at others' expense. So while the NANCY J. HIRSCHMANN
standpointof the oppressedis epistemo-
logically superior, it is politically disad- Cornell University
vantaged.Thus, thoughstandpointepiste-
mology seeks to persuade,feminist theo-
ristsmust also recognizethe politicalreal-
ity of political theory:we may fail to per- Notes
suade precisely because of structural SinopolithanksEmilyGoldman,LarryPeterman,
genderbias. In this, then, it may have to JosephSinopoli, and especiallyMary Jackmanfor
be enough, at least for now, simply to helpful comments and suggestions. Hirschmann
force the discourseof political theory to thanks ChristineDiStefano, Nancy Hartsock,and
JulieMostov for commentingon an earlierdraft of
allow our voices in. For this provides an her response.
enteringwedge for feministsto highlight 1. As Hirschmannnotes, one of her primepieces
our epistemologicalexclusionand to pur- of empiricalevidencefor a genderdifference,Carol
sue our claimsfor inclusionso thatwe can Gilligan'sIn a DifferentVoice (1982), has sparked
have more persuasivepower. By ignoring ever, much debate in the psychologicalliterature.How-
she gives little senseof justhow contestedthis
this politicalreality-by settingup a dual- question is (Baumrind1986; Walker1984, 1986).
istic typology and acceptingsuch dualism Walker surveys and reanalyzesdata in some 50
as the given for his intellectualreason- studies of moral reasoning.His conclusion, chal-
ing-Sinopoli predetermineshis refusalto lenged by Baumrind,is that these studies fail to
displaysignificantsex differencesin moralreasoning
be persuaded:he seeksto makesuchfemi- when suitablecontrolsfor educationand occupation
nist critiques systematically impossible are introduced.Gilligan'swork has been criticized
from the start. sharply on methodologicalgrounds not only for
Yet such a position is self-defeating. omittingsuchcontrolsbut for failingto provideher
Men have insights to contributeto femi- criteria for coding interviewresponsesas indicative
of a "justice"orientation,or "caring"orientation
nism. But the definition of such stand- (Greenoand Maccoby 1986; Luria1986). Hirsch-
points within the parametersof feminism mann cites as empirical evidence only Gilligan's
requiresthat such experiencesbe articu- work and that of her two formergraduatestudents
lated from the perspective of women's at the HarvardGraduateSchoolof Education(John-
ston 1985; Lyons 1983). Given that an audienceof
lives. For instance, Sinopoli's assertions political scientistscannotbe expectedto be familiar
about rights would have to make sense with this literature,it is incumbenton Hirschmann
from the perspectives of women and to indicatethe considerableextent to which she is
otherswho have been excludedfrom, and buildinga theoreticaledificeon a very shakyempiri-
hurtby, the liberaldiscourseof rightsand cal foundation.Sheis, at best, overlyselectivein her
citationof evidence.
not just from the privileged white male 2. Even if such evidence were provided, this
perspectivethat createdrights discourse. would not establish Hirschmann'spsychoanalytic
In this, his defense of liberalismclearly explanation,particularlyas muchof the researchon
fails. Yet the task of theorizing from gender differencehas dealt with adolescents(i.e.,
old enoughto makelearningexplanationsat
others'perspectivesshould not fall exclu- people
least plausible). Indeed, the verificationproblems
sively to feminists, who more obviously for the psychoanalyticexplanationof genderdiffer-
have something to gain from such a ences are formidable,given that this theory attri-
mutualisticstrategy;12 rather,those in tra- butesa greatmanyperceptionsto preverbalinfants.
ditionally privilegedpositions must also at Hirschmannplacesthe developmentof a senseof self
six monthsof age.
take responsibility for such theorizing, 3. In fact, the work of Nancy Chodorow,which
criticallyexaminingtheirown beliefs and providesmuch of the psychologicalframeworkfor
assumptions. They must do this even Hirschmann's piece, is sensitiveto historicalandcul-

231
 American Political Science Review Vol. 85
tural differences in practices of childrearing.
Chodorow warns against the very sort of universali-
zation and polarization of gender experience that
Hirschmann embraces (Chodorow 1989, 100).
4. This is not to say that Lockean liberal tolerance
was universal: it did not include Catholics or
atheists, for instance. On the controversial issue of
neutrality in liberal theory, see Goodin and Reeve
1989.
5. Hirschmann truncates Rawls's account of
natural duties by focusing only on the duty of
justice, which does reside in some limited sense on
consent. The same could not be said of Rawls's ac-
count of such general duties as mutual aid or the
duty not to harm others.
6. Even more inexplicably, he says that I ignore
Chodorow, who "warns against the very sort of uni-
versalization and polarization of gender experience"
that I "embrace." Sinopoli exactly reverses the case.
I completely agree that Chodorow is antiuniversalist
but I am in the extreme minority; the commonplace
criticisms of Chodorow 1978 are that her theory is
essentialist, biological, and ahistorical (see Bart
1984; Bordo 1990; DiStefano 1986; Flax 1990; Gott-
lieb 1984; Harding 1986; Nicholson and Fraser
1990; and Spelman 1988 as only a few examples). In-
deed, the newer essays in Chodorow 1989, which
Sinopoli cites to support his criticism, were obvi-
ously written partly in response to such popular mis-
readings (see also the exchange between Chodorow,
Dinnerstein, and Gottlieb 1984). What is particular-
ly puzzling about his charge is that one of the more
controversial aspects of my work is precisely that I
take Chodorow's theory much further than she
herself explicitly does, to note how we can adopt ob-
ject relations theory without embracing its modern-
ist dangers of "totalization."
7. Hartsock goes further and indeed draws on ob-
ject relations theory to argue that masculine eros
reveals a particularly important and central con-
struction of relationship as domination especially
realized in the literature of ancient Greece. Oedipal
fears of intimacy, fusion, and loss of self are
"memorialized in the construction of the agonal
political world of the warrior-hero (and later the
citizen) as a world of hostile and threatening others
to whom one relates by means of rivalry and com-
petition for dominance" (Hartsock 1984, 252). An
explication of ancient theory is, of course, well
beyond the intended scope of my original essay.
8. As Pitkin (1984) argues in her study of Machia-
velli, overreliance on the father corresponds to a
total mistrust of the mother-woman as a result of
the boy's differentiation, turn to the father, and
positional identification.
9. In my other work, for instance, I have found
Hume to be more accessible to a feminist reading
(Hirschmann 1989b; see also Baier 1987). Certainly,
feminists have found Marx's emphasis on commu-
nity helpful (Hartsock 1984; Sargent 1981).
232
10. See Hirschmannn.d., chap. 6. Seealso Barber
1984, Habermas1979, and Mansbridge1983, for
similararguments.
11. Severaltheoristshave highlightedhow female
political theorists (such as Arendt, Astell, Follet,
Wollstoncraft)have long given muchgreaterpriori-
ty to these issues than have theirmale counterparts
(see Hartsock 1984; Mansbridge1990; Pateman
1988);but this is not the kind of argumentI engage
in here.
12. Nor to peopleof color, lesbians,homosexuals,
or otheroppressedgroups.Whitefeminists,as well,
need to theorizefrom the experiencesof women of
color and to attendto the voices of women of color
more actively and diligently.See Hirschmannn.d.,
chap. 7.
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