PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO.

126351)
FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident
of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a
good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant,
Filomena M. Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros,
in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him,
stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances.
Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St.,
Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly
set on fire by appellant.
At about 4:00 to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of
prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant
Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her
house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a
knife, replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen.
Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquinos query, she returned
immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of
broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she
peeped through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainants house, which
was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag)
and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellants wife who
arrived at the place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.
HELD: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances
taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical
conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial
court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved
and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is
frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate
in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellants intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to
set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainants) which was
burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When
she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to
burn the house of private complainant.
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was
seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in
the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the
barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.
Fourth, appellants actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At
around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness

Lina Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant
arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered,
"So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant,
who got nervous and had to take medications. The following day, appellant threatened
prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would
also burn her house.

People of the Philippines vs Arnel Nocum, et. al.

G.R. No.179041, April 1, 2013
FACTS:
On or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, REYNALDO MALLARI together with
ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING
PANGANDAG took and carried away one Toyota Tamaraw FX valued at more or less Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and [prejudice] of its owner,
Lourdes Eleccion. In the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the
said vehicle, was killed. When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000,
only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain at-large. He pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutions lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of
FX gang, a syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. Mahilac testified that
the FX gang was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. Nocum led the syndicates
criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land
Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte, led the Mindanao operations. Ramos, Posadas
and Mallari were members of the gang.
On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Mallari guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of
Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of the FX taxi and the killing of its driver,
Medel, cannot be negated by Mallaris denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also found that
the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the
accused doing their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal
objective.
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision affirming with modification the ruling of
the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilacs positive identification of Mallari as a
member of the FX gang and his participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of its
driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is
of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari, whose
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the straightforward testimony of the former.
ISSUE:
WON there is a lack of material evidence to justify the accuseds conviction.
RULING:
We find no reason to deviate from these courts evaluation as to Mallaris culpability.
The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of
the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial evidence.

The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly
established by the confluence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was
present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the FX Gang, gathered in
Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous
buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi
driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other conspirators, and head south
towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later, Mallari and his companions
met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa
City. All these show that Mallaris original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that
he accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner.
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well
as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and
reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel and
in killing him.
Mallaris defense of alibi deserves no credence.
Mallaris claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the
time the crime was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety, leads to the reasonable
conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime. Moreover, alibi is
inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported
by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.
Petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE VS MACABANDO
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson. 23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements
have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own
house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during
trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that
damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification
from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned
houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was
used as a residence. That the appellants act affected many families will not convert the crime to
destructive arson, since the appellants act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the
RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but
the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262.
The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The
CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan
filed the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Jojit Garingarao v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 192760 | July 20, 2011 | J.
Carpio

In case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient
to establish the guilt of the accused. A child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. It is
inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3 (b) of RA 7610
provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once
is enough to hold the accused liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.

Domingo vs. Rayala

546 SCRA 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint
for sexual harassment against Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

Rayala, however, posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a)
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, reemployment, or continued employment; or the denial thereof results in discrimination against the
employee.

Issue: Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?

Held: Yes, Rayala committed sexual harassment.

Ratio:

It is true that Section 3, RA 7877, calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But
it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. All of the acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough
that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.

Jacutin vs. People

Dr. Rico S.Jacutin vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002
Facts: Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28
November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City
Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father and petitioner were childhood
friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then
filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able
to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City
Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas,
U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine
oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The
latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city

and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then
started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or
not she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her
father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The
father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a
virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. He
hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend
happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would
be the subject of a research program. She was requested to be back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby
church to seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the office,
petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was
any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the
family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical
examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he was only
kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet
him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together.
Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in.
Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house
to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said
she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether
she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and
lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the
research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He
put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she
exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her
abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his
palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes
or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner
then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and
embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the
research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she
alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then
handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as defined
and punished under R.A. 7877.

Held:The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799,

finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment
defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7
thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it
should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the
appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight.
Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions,
an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner would
not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for
his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of
the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioners
secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of
Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise
been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
Case 6
Catiis vs. CA anent to SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
G.R. NO. 153979
February 6, 2006
Facts: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private
respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a
certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related offenses.
Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint counter-affidavits denying
the charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a
Resolution finding the existence of a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against
private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution was
approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private
respondents and Tafalla before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled
off to the sala of Honorable Judge Lucas Bersamin.
That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding
one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through
corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by means of
fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the following manner, to wit: by
falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing, in a transaction or series of
transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in general to
the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading
successively or simultaneously operating under the following name and style of
Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines
Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or
other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in inducing complainant
and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said
persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14
or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, the accused knowing fully well that the above-named corporations
registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed
nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such
manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and
fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the complainant and other

persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in
general by such corporations/associations.
On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable
cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of the City
Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest
were issued.
A return on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with the
information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all other
accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting
the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private respondents on the same
day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of not
guilty. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on private
respondents motion to fix bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with
the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio.
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier
Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is bailable. In
finding that the accused are entitled to bail.

Issue:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable
despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua?

Held:
The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as
defined under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed
on private respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private
respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00.
The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions

constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment, even, if
they are subsequently proved during trial. A reading of the Information shows that
there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is
correct when he found that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable
in case of conviction.

Fencing; elements .The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been
committed; 2) the accused, who took no par t in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing was derived from that crime; and
(4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. Here, someone
carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December
2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he
bought from Tolentino was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certifi cate of registration and offi cial receipt. But this certainly could not be
true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confi rmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no eff or t to
check the papers covering her purchase. Hence, the decision of the Cour t of Appeals
fi nding Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law is affi rmed. Mel Dimat v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012 .

Case Digest: People v. Tan

G.R. No. 117321 Februar y 11, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO,

accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will
drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that

Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with
fourteen stab wounds.
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited
appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases
reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit
account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused
Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of
Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of
Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. W ith the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP
immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.
Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their
headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the
latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery
cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing
inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed
confession to writing.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator
upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.
HELD: No.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence
against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting
the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins
to operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there
must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the
accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be

"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel."
Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at
the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not
suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if
the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist
on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the
awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

MERALCO vs. Castillo Digest

G.R. No. 182976: January 14, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner, v. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO, doing business under the trade name and style of PERMANENT
LIGHT MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES and GUIA S. CASTILLO,
Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged a
business under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing
Enterprises (Permanent Light).
After conducting an inspection of Permanent Lights electric meter, the petitioner
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) concluded that the meter was tampered with
and electric supply to Permanent Light was immediately disconnected, without
notice to respondents, for one day. However, respondents used generators soon
after the power went out to keep the operations of Permanent Light on track.
Subsequently, Meralco assured respondents in a letter that Permanent Lights
meter has been tested and was found to be in order. In the same letter,
petitioner informed respondents that said meter was replaced anew after it
sustained a crack during testing. However, respondents requested for a
replacement meter. According to them, the meters installed by Meralco ran
faster than the one it confiscated following the disconnection. Subsequently,
Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent Light.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to claim damages for petitioners

act of disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light.

B. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to actual damages for the
supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from the
time the new electric meter was installed.
HELD: Petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: Damages
First Issue:
In Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, the Court treated the immediate
disconnection of electricity without notice as a form of deprivation of property
without due process of law, which entitles the subscriber aggrieved to moral
damages. In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. In this case, to serve as an
example - that before disconnection of electric supply can be effected by a
public utility, the requisites of law must be complied with the Court sustained the
award of exemplary damages to respondents.
Second Issue:
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon competent
proof of the damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be
based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court;
and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.
Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual
damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate damages. Temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but
the same should be reasonable.
In this case, the Court is convinced that respondents sustained damages from
the abnormal increase in Permanent Lights electric bills after petitioner replaced
the latters meter. However, respondents failed to establish the exact amount
thereof by competent evidence. Thus, temperate damages is awarded.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is affirmed.

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals

Posted on February 11, 2009 by danabatnag

Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish.
Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent of all
those involved?

What was construed:

The word any in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcias office. Ramirez taped the
conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript
of the conversation, based on the tape recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done without her
knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the
conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed
because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a
conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the
conversation. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties, Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.
The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

Acts of lasciviousness; elements . The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defi ned in

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements: (1) that the
off ender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any
of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; or (b) when the
off ended par ty is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the
off ended par ty is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the off ended party is another
person of either sex. Salvador Flordeliz y Abenojar v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 186441, March 3, 2010.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
___
Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children.
Avelino would disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking
sprees with friends and return home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to

have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would inflict injure to the latter. He left
his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job
to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda filed for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring
the marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in declaring the
apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological
incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven to exist.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code to declare the marriage null and void.
Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is
reiterated herein in which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Codeas regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.

MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007
Corona, J.
Doctrine:
The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
Facts:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in
sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and
became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and
both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The
trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. The trail court rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty and sentenced him to reclusion temporal and to pay an indemnity of Php. 75,000 and
damages of Php. 50,000.
Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. The CA modified the decision of the trial court. The appellate
court affirmed his conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA
as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was
authorized by law.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since
their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their sweetheart relationship
Held:
No. The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child
abuse cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing

lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.