International Phenomenological Society

Prcis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism

Metaepistemology and Skepticism by Richard Fumerton
Review by: Richard Fumerton
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 905-906
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653732 .
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Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research

Vol. LVIII,No. 4, December 1998

Precis of Metaepistemology and

Skepticism*
RICHARD IFUMERTON

University of Iowa

In the last two decades a great many philosophers have accepted a revolutionary approach to the understanding of epistemic concepts, an approach that, if
correct, should change the very way we think about the history and practice of
epistemology. These philosophers seek to "naturalize" and "externalize" the
concepts of epistemic justification, rationality, and knowledge and, in the
course of doing so, they explicitly or implicitly suggest a new response to
traditional skeptical concerns. If contemporary externalists are correct then
most of the history of epistemology was radically misguided and confused.
While the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology has moved to
center stage, I believe that there remains enormous confusion concerning
what precisely is fundamentally at issue between proponents of the respective
views. Internalists are sometimes associated with the view that epistemic
properties are to be identified with "internal states" of conscious beings. But
internalism is also as often characterized as a view about the necessity of
including "access" requirements in plausible accounts of justification or
knowledge. A good part of my concern in this book is to define clearly the
internalism/externalism
controversy, or more precisely, the internalism/externalism controversies. I argue that "internal state" internalism is
highly problematic as an attempt to characterize what is common to paradigmatic internalist epistemologies. I also argue that strong and weak global
access requirements to conditions constituting justification are likely to generate vicious conceptual regresses, implausibly strong requirements for
justification, or requirements with no bite if one requires only potential
access where the potentiality is logical or conceptual possibility. The heart of
classical internalist accounts of justification, I go on to suggest, involves
two theses. The first is a rejection of naturalistic accounts of fundamental
epistemic concepts. The second is acceptance of a view I call inferential internalism, the view that if one is justified in believing P on the basis of E one

Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM

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905

must be justified in believing both E and that E confirms or makes probable

P.
One of my principal concerns in the book is to explore the implications
of accepting various accounts of internalism and externalism for the way in
which one should understand and respond to the traditional skeptical challenges that over the years have so captured the imagination and attention of
philosophers. Although understanding the connections between metaepistemological views (views about the correct analyses of epistemic concepts) and
approaches to skepticism is my primary concern, I have my own axes to
grind. I argue that there is a version of internalism that alone can understand
epistemological questions in a way that makes their answers relevant to the
kind of philosophical interest and curiosity that gives rise to the questions in
the first place. Externalists may succeed in introducing interesting, clear, and
perhaps, in some contexts, useful ways of understanding knowledge and
justified belief. But we can accept this conclusion without conceding the
philosophical relevance of these concepts.
Convincing philosophers that their way of understanding concepts leaves
them unable to ask questions they want to ask is an uphill battle. Paradigm
internalists and externalists are firmly in their respective camps. The literature
contains all sorts of counterexamples to externalist analyses of epistemic
concepts that may succeed in convincing some but leave others unmoved.
The lines are pretty clearly drawn by now. Both internalists and externalists
know what their views commit them to saying and they are usually willing
to say it. If we are going to convince anyone that there is something wrong
with paradigm versions of externalism, I argue, it may require a more subtle
argument that reveals unacceptable consequences of the views when it comes
to the way in which we would have to engage traditional skepticism. Ironically, I think the ease with which externalists can and should ignore skeptical
challenges at all levels will eventually undermine for many the plausibility of
the framework within which the externalist understands epistemological questions. In short, externalists are committed to allowing the legitimacy of
arguments whose question-begging character will be anathema to philosophers interested in answers to epistemological questions which will satisfy
their philosophical curiosity.
In the course of evaluating the consequences of my own views for skepticism, I argue that the alternatives for avoiding skepticism are stark. Although
there is at least one dialectically attractive position that enables one to throw
back the skeptical challenge, I have strong phenomenologically based reservations about its ultimate intelligibility. I try to convince the reader, however,
that once one understands the source of philosophical interest in epistemology, one should not find unacceptable or even surprising the plausibility of
even fairly radical skepticism.

906

RICHARD FUMERTON

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