1

Continuation of Relevant Constitutional Provisions:

Citizenship Reguirement
Secs. 2,7,8 Art XII Consti
Former Natural Born Citizens (Sec 8, Art XII, Consti)
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 46I
HaIiIi v. CA 287 SCRA 465 (1998); GR No. 113539
Republic v. CA and Lapina 235 SCRA 567; G.R. No. 108998
Muller v. Muller 500 SCRA 65 (2006)
Corporations
Sec. 3 Art. XII Consti
Chavez v. Public Estates 384 SCRA 152 (2002)
Director v. IAC and Acme 146 SCRA 509 (1986)

.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983

VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA, defendantappellee.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now
deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null
and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and
the Civil Code.
The order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu dismissing the complaint was
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court certified the appeal to us
since only pure questions of law were raised by the appellants.

The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu alleging among others that they are the heirs of Jose
Godinez who was married to Martina Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910;
that during the marriage of their parents the said parents acquired a parcel
of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D -155) in the name of
Jose Godinez; that their mother died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs
as their sole surviving heirs; that on November 27, 1941, without the
knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for valuable
consideration, sold the aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak
Luen, a Chinese citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in violation
of the Civil Code because the latter being an alien who is inhibited by law to
purchase real property; that Transfer Certificate Title No. 884 was then
issued by the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and
void ab initio since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that
on January 11, 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of
attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who
conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant
Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak
Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are
prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction; that
defendant Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said
parcel of land as the purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez
alone was contrary to law and considered non- existent, so much so that the
alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any
title or interest over said property and defendant Navata had not acquired
anything from said grantor and as a consequence Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1322, which was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the
latter is null and void ab initio,- that since one-half of the said property is
conjugal property inherited by the plaintiffs from their mother, Jose Godinez
could -not have legally conveyed the entire property; that notwithstanding
repeated demands on said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs the said
property she refused and still refuses to do so to the great damage and
prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to engage the
services of counsel in the sum of P2,000.00.1wph1.t The plaintiffs thus

2
pray that they be adjudged as the owners of the parcel of land in question
and that Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of
defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared null and void ab initio; and that the
power of attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 'L322 issued in the name of defendant Navata be
likewise declared null and void, with costs against defendants.

Kwan Pun Ming are residing outside the Philippines, the trial court upon
motion issued an order of April 17, 1967, for the service of summons on
said defendants by publication. No answer has been filed by said
defendants.

On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an answer

claiming that he was not yet the register of deeds then; that it was only
the ministerial duty of his office to issue the title in favor of the defendant
Navata once he was determined the registerability of the documents
presented to his office.

Both parties having agreed to the suggestion of the Court that they
submit their supplemental pleadings to support both motion and
opposition and after submittal of the same the said motion to
dismiss which is an affirmative defense alleged in the complaint is
deemed submitted. Failure of both parties or either party to submit
their supplemental pleadings on or about December 9, the Court
will resolve the case.

On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filed her answer with the
affirmative defenses and counterclaim alleging among others that the
complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the
allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so
that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of
action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged
document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941,
conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which
a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144 (1) of the
Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of
action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only
on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10 year period provided for by law;
that the torrens title in the name of defendant Navata is indefeasible
who acquired the property from defendant Fong Pak Luen who had
been in possession of the property since 1941 and thereafter defendant
Navata had possessed the same for the last 25 years including the
possession of Fong Pak Luen; that the complaint is intended to harass
the defendant as a civic leader and respectable member of the
community as a result of which she suffered moral damages of
P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 expenses of
litigation, hence, said defendant prays that the complaint be dismissed
and that her counterclaim be granted, with costs against the plaintiffs.
On November 24, 1967, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the affirmative
defenses and counter-claim. As the defendants Fong Pak Luen and

On December 2, 196 7, the court issued an order as follows:

On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order missing the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp.
31- 37). A motion for reconsideration of this order was filed by the
plaintiffs on December 12, 196F, which was denied by the trial court in
an order of July 11, 1969, (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The
plaintiffs now interpose this appeal with the following assignments of
errors:
I. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants'
complaint on the ground of prescription of action, applying Art.
1144 (1) New Civil Code on the basis of defendant Trinidad S.
Navata's affirmative defense of prescription in her answer treated
as a motion to dismiss.
II. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
III. The trial court erred in not ordering this case to be tried on the
merits."
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on
the ground that their cause of action has prescribed. While the issue raised
appears to be only the applicability of the law governing prescription, the real

3
question before us is whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of
land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the
property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified
to own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairly clearly how
the question should be resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential
lot acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak
Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461) which also detailed the evolution of the
provision in the public land laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private
or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration of an imperative
constitutional policy. Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend
that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the
facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by
Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely
pro-exhibited.** It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is
concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely
on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now
in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription
was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one
involving simply the application of the statute of limitations.
From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the
Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be
allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak

Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S.
Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the
alien vendee later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in
affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real
property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22, 1940, on the ground that
the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold
title to lands, held:
In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao 49 Qff Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki 49 Off.
Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw
Chee 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360,
the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the
Constitution (Section 5, Article XIII Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44
Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the
courts will not afford protection to either party. (Article 1305, old Civil
Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code) From this ruling three Justices
dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer.
See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Talento vs. Makiki Bautista us. Uy, Rellosa vs.
Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go Bio). supra.
The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of
the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and
because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks
to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book
11, on nullity of contracts, based on a defect in the contract which
invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. (Manresa,
Commentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is
very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory
when it applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above.
In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien
disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to
such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the
latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate

4
and the vendee may hold it against the whole world except as against
the State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature
of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the
vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and
conveyed to him. Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al.,
4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589590; Cross vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall,
[U.S.] 513; 17 Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs. Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332,
6 Law. Ed., 488.)
However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in
the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is
deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the
title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its
conveyance or transfer to him. (Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116,
18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532;
Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470; Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW
782. The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an
alien disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of
the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the
annulment Of his Contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code. ...
Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: ... Persons sui
juriscannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with
whom they contracted; ...
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but, also
urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to
preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a
naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic
corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must
also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by
Filipinos.

Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring
that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the
sale to the latter cannot be impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui
She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or
successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover that which their
predecessors sold to aliens.
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had
occasion to pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to the one in the
instant case. We ruled:
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public
policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it
is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the
ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: (.96 Phil. 447 [1955])
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had
no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise in escapable that
petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962.
By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred
from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86
SCRA 157 [1978])
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
ommission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a

5
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450,
April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35).' (Cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154
[1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful
owner of the property.
In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third
assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the
property is declared the rightful owner.

Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN
and EMILIANO CATANIAG,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the
complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.

Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No. L-630, November 15, 1947; 79

Phil 461
(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private
lands)
Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the
Register of Deeds on the ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land in
this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, the court
rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.
Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.
Held. No. Public agricultural lands mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935
Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court
stated:
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited
to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural
resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.

The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may
no longer be reviewed and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an
alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the entire parcel
has been sold to a qualified citizen.
The Case
These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying
this petition under Rule 45 to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in
CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on September 14, 1993, the dispositive
portion of which states:3
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the
court below dated March 10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit is AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by
the parties. We reproduce them in part, as follows:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving
real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant
appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son,
defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman,
both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen
executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning [,] transferring

6
and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six
parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.

The petition submits the following assignment of errors:

. . . the Honorable Court of Appeals

Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in

Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514
was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee
David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
defendant-appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag,
upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M)
was issued in the latter's name.4
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances between Helen Guzman and David Rey
Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag and claiming
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 5 of
the Civil Code.
In its decision6 dated March 10, 1992,7 the trial court dismissed the complaint. It
ruled that Helen Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not
contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien,
since the purpose of the waiver was simply authorize David Rey Guzman to
dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of
the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the
subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of
redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied
their appeal. Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that
the subject land was urban. Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma,8 andYap
vs. Grageda,9 it further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey
may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more
point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed
on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.
Hence, this petition. 10
Issues

1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in
question is urban, not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners' right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the
Civil Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her
son David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and
void[.] 11
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption
The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated the
determination of the first being a prerequisite to the resolution of the second
shall be discussed together
Subject Land Is Urban
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a
rule, is not reviewable by this Court.12 Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that
findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such as
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions
of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of
facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific
evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or
are contradicted by evidence on record. 13

7
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the
conclusion of the trial court that the subject property is urban land is based
on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in its decision which disposed thus:

granted the right of redemption under Art. 1621. Plainly, under the
circumstances, they cannot invoke it.
Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid

. . . As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national
ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with
residential, commercial or industrial establishments. Lined up along the
Bagbaguin Road are factories of feeds, woodcrafts [sic] and garments,
commercial stores for tires, upholstery materials, feeds supply and spare
parts. Located therein likewise were the Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the
Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment buildings for
commercial purposes and construction firms. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the community is a commercial area thriving in business
activities. Only a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted
that in the Tax Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the
subject land is termed agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to
defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991, the Land
Regulatory Board attested that the subject property is commercial and
the trend of development along the road is commercial. The Board's
classification is based on the present condition of the property and the
community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the tax
declaration.14
No Ground to Invoke
Right of Redemption
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have
indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the
land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits
of no ambiguity in construction:
Art. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of
redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed
one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Under this article, both lands that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption must be rural. If
one or both are urban, the right cannot be invoked. 15 The purpose of this
provision, which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is
to favor agricultural development.16 The subject land not being rural and,
therefore, not agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are

Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the
sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any
question on the constitutionally of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to
her son David Rey.
True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim in which she assigned, transferred
and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property
she had inherited from her husband collided with the Constitution, Article XII,
Section 7 of which provides:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 17 settled the issue as to
who are qualified (and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the
Philippines. Following a long discourse maintaining that the "public agricultural
lands" mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:
Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution,
"natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to

8
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly,
as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is intended to insure the policy
of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec. 2]. Both sections
must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and
the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very
same persons who under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non
transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens . . . . 18
The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of
Appeals, 19 which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines
439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was
owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have
been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also
been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 20
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. 21
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is
consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction
is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." 22
23

Thus, in United Church Board of Word Ministries vs. Sebastian, in which an

alien resident who owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American
non-stock corporation part of his shares of stock in a Filipino corporation that
owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained the invalidity of
such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the American corporation

has passed on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the
defect in the will was "rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property."
The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan. 24 In that case, a residential lot
was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an
extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who
became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to
have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land
has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.
Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco, 25 Godinez vs. Pak
Luen, 26 Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap 27 andHerrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 28 which
similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who thereafter sold the same to a
Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:
. . . [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also
urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to
preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.29
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent
Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands
has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

9
HALILI vs. CA
GR # 113539, MARCH 23, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondents, both American Citizens, inherited real properties
from Simeon de Guzman, who died intestate, located in the Philippines. His
wife, Helen, executed a deed of quit claim assigning, transferring and conveying
to their son, David Rey, all her rights, titles and interests in and over 6 parcels of
land which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon who himself was an AMCIT.
David thereafter sold the land to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag.
Petitioners, the adjoining lots owners, questioned the validity and
constitutionality of the 2 conveyances, i.e. from Helen to David and between
David and Emiliano. They also claimed ownership thereto based on their right
of legal redemption under Art.1621, NCC.
HELD:
The SC ruled that although Helens deed of quit claim -in which she
assigned, transferred and conveyed to David all her rights, titles, and interests
over the property she had inherited from her husband-collided with Sec.7, Art.
XII of the 87 Constitution. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag, a
FILCIT, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served.
Non Filipinos can not acquire or hold
title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession. However, if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12 March 1998, First Division, J.
Panganiban.
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is
deemed cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
If the rationale of the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the
nation's lands
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who subsequently become
Filipino citizens
by naturalization, or the transfer to Filipino citizens.
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR
DE VEGA, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which
he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor
who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land
Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify
the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a
quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the
lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D,
as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of
the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have
opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented
their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby
approves the said application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de
Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now
Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini

10
Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton,
Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree
of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued,
there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road rightof-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the
following ratiocination:

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor.
It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be
public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to
the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the
certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the
land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only
when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title
would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:

In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino
citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner.
For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of
the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large
sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to
confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had
been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was
not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already
have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189,
March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the
High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning
and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time
of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not
Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su,
G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval,
hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out
of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.

The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves

and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bonafide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case,
it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the
confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought
to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the
alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty
had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials
stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the
name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by
means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan"
duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978
(Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in

11
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior
to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino
citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in 1987,
ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo,
p., 27)

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and
argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However,
tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents)
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration."
This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in
possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b],
CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in
respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to
prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application
(on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required
possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of
Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name.
(Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any
transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has
been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or
more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII,
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by
themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest".
Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements
for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest,
the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but

12
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent
spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be
registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents
through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and
continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the
shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the
legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an
imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875
[1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already
been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo,
200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the

foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48
[b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC,
214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land

13
from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41
[1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must
be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set
by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As
such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32
[1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned
from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the
nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to
prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of
the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also
formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only
sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was
presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest
Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected
(CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of
title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the
property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to

register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land
registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the
appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us
on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish
grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that
they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish
grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession
especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or
adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e)
the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could
become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v.
Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since
time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil.
890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

14
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that
(a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled
in both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of
Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the
Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez,
Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public
Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the
lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty
(30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to
prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and
disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture
land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish
their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the
existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon,
supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private
respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by
Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in
such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the
Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died
on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the
said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be
tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in
their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before
such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
because they were American citizens at the time of their application therefor.
Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has
been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application,
as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of
land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof,
acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the
concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessorsin-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now
occupied by respondent Lapias mother.

15
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of
land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the
following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be
a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section
15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant
provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area
of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in
the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban
or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has
been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost
his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form
part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to
June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with
the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must
also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6,
which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing

16
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of
his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such
other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply
in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register
of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the
provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate
of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application for registration has become final that
a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of
Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of
the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of
deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of
title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza,
JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I have to dissent.

The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a
vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to
registration by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco,
which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is Director
of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent
spouses were natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not
settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were
citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in
their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed
that the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when
it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a
transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he
became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law.

17
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the
private respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the
private respondents' name have been complied with. I do not believe so for
there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that
the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should also be
applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to
former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be
so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so with
those who have renounced our country.

both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such
land taken together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national.
(2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the
respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as
Canadian nationals.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I have to dissent.

The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Feliciano, J.: concurring

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin
and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just
before the dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be
stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,
the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here
involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened
sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg.
185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons
who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born
Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become
applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the
respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific
limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which
may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel

of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to
registration by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco,
which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is Director
of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent
spouses were natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not
settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were
citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in
their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.

18
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed
that the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when
it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a
transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he
became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the
private respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the
private respondents' name have been complied with. I do not believe so for
there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that
the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should also be
applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to
former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be
so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so with
those who have renounced our country.

stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,
the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here
involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened
sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg.
185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons
who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born
Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become
applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the
respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific
limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which
may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded
both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such
land taken together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national.
(2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the
respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as
Canadian nationals.
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
DECISION

Feliciano, J.: concurring

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin
and the result reached therein.

This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the
August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute

This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just
before the dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be

19
community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the
Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the
community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in
Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as
the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner.
However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the

house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary
partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of
the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and
the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on
constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house,
the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated
August 12, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller
is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for
the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction
of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount
respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance and development of the
aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the
alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have the
means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds
thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting
the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent.
Should there be profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each
has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower court for reception

20
of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation
and maintenance of the property.

The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of

the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.

SO ORDERED. 8

The petition has merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT
INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT
BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING
RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE
ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION,
CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own
private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondents purpose for filing
an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control
and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the
Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the
said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds
were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent
should be reimbursed of his personal funds.

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation
of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the
Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to
public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino
citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will
be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx

21
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted
his knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12 His
attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot
be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of
equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated
maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity
shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As
expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot
in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever
over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right
or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote
as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to
purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be
reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the
property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may
recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge
her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now

22
inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
(Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent
Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the
Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating
the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent,
decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of
the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the
February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321
affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which
terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and
respondent, as well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller
were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple
resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold
and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at
the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking,
and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MULLER v. MULLER
Supreme Court : First Division

Petitioners: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER

Respondents: HELMUT MULLER

On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which

terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner
and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution.

G.R No. 149615, Date: August 29, 2006

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FC 91

Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired

by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from

23
the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in
Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as
the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner.
However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the
house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary
partition by the parties of the said real property.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed

decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house,
the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to

purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of the house?
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to
reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition
of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in
Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No.
Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the
petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them

and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines
equally, is REINSTATED.
DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony.

In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1
of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5
is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will

be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may

24
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens.

is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including

residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed

to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly

admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition.
His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created
and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent.
Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a
court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant
case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it

G.R. No. 133250: Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI

Corporation
09 July 2002, Land Titles and Deeds
Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore
lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the

25
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC., respondents.

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary
purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was
ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October
29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is
applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until
the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more
or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in
this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September
18, 1982;

26
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and
this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by
the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
(Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during
their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July
17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is
the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits
private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in
the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in
favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a

Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings
of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and
Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29,
1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves
and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land
Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme,
as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register
ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other
than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that
the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was
already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against
their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not
apply.

27
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. CastroBartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the
Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to
said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to
apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only
upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming
it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as
a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has
to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands
as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make
any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public
lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b).
The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public'
(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641,
644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in
1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,

exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident
from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those
'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so
in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected
from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et
de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had

28
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with
the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent. ....

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the

foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was
so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."

xxx xxx xxx

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when
Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which
came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private
lands.

29
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it
did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to
which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc.
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at
the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the
new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows
private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by
a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise
of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the

1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to
doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the
issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in
its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either
the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed
and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,
there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or
owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer
in the dissent in Meralco:

30
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding
to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these
years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition
that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that
context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the

applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels
and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to
Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same
result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone,
by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence
suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the
June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case
of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse
and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in
the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by

31
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby
reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting
to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent
past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal
view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may
prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related
cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982
(when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico
supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act
and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against
corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed
in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the
Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit
of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute
prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public
land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and
progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela
to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which
could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as
sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for
formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

32
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of
such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been
the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of
titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and
notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline
for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on
December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended
to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance.
My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of
justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names
of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and
own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I
would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved.
By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the
realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no
such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are

sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all
that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public
lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess
public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the
law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they
have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the
above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the
natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity
of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be
necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after
the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an

33
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent
in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors,

(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should
be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the

land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that
only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public
domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be

34
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or
defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services
v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if
reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute
is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to
the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred.
One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part
nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used
in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this
is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make
such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d
pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy.
The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the
policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the
June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case
of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse
and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in
the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby
reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting
to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent
past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory

35
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal
view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may
prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related
cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982
(when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the
established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands
takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed
in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act
and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no

"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against

corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed
in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the
Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit
of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute
prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public
land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and
progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela
to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which
could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as
sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for
formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of
such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been
the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of
titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and
notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline
for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on
December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended
to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance.
My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of

36
justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names
of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and
own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority
ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would
characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I
would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved.
By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the
realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no
such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all
that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public
lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess
public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the

law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they
have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the
above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the
natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity
of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be
necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after
the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential

37
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should
be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent
in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title

would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court

actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that
only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public
domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or
defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services
v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if
reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An

38
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute
is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to
the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred.
One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part
nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used
in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this
is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make
such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d
pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy.
The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the
policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY 384 SCRA 152
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was
tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and
sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the
foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and
then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of
the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the
absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda

denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to
AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted
Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose
billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He
also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the
parties.
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all
natural resources are owned by the State and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the
rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further,
it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the
areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the
public domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently
owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and

39
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.