Rosales v.

Rosales
148 SCRA 69; Feb. 27, 1987
J. Gancayco:
++
Petra Rosales Fortunado
Magna Rosales Acebes

+Antonio

+Carterio Irenea
Macikequerox

FACTS: During the proceedings for the intestate estate of Petra, the CFI declared the following as legal
heirs: Fortunato- ; Magna- ; Antonio: and Macikequerox- . Irenea insisted in getting a share in
her capacity as surviving spouse of the deceased son of Petra, claiming that she is a compulsory heir
under Art. 887.
HELD: NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two:
1

those who inherit by their own right;

those who inherit by the right of representation.

The provisions Art. 980-982, 999 which relate to the ader of intestate succession does not include a
surviving spouse of a child as an intestate heir of the mother-in-law.
Art. 887 [3] refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir but does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is
considered a 3rd person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They
were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved.
These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be

forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.

36.

Baritua vs. CA

The deceased died while driving a tricycle which collided with a bus. The widow executed a
release of claim and an affidavit of desistance discharging the owner of the bus from all
actions/claims arising from the accident for a certain sum of money. The parents of the deceased
thereafter filed a claim for damages against the bus owner. SC ruled that the widow and her son
are the successors-in-interest authorized to receive payment. The parents shall only succeed
when the decedent leaves no legitimate descendants. While the surviving spouse is a concurring
compulsory heir.
Lauro G. Vizconde vs CA
G.R. No. 118449
February 11, 1998
By: Nestor Patrick Seor
FACTS:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz.,
Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael
Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
Estrellita purchased from his father, Rafael, a parcel of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan and
then sold such to Spouses Chiu, for P3,405,612.00. Using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the
Valenzuela property, she bought a new parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St.,
BF Homes, Paraaque. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank. The following year the unfortunate "Vizconde Massacre" came
about.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and
Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein

petitioner, Mr. Vizconde, is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita."
Ramon also alleged that the transfer of the Valenzuela property in favor of Estrellita by her father
was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of
the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to
collation.
The Probate Court nullified the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita, and
declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation, which was sustained by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appealscorrectly sustained the order of the Probate Court
HELD:
NO. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as
well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
FIRST
The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding.
Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the
Civil Code is clear on this point:
SECOND
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the
validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the
transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation
of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
THIRD
The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature.
Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find
nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation.
FOURTH
The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was
conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita.
Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs.Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir" in the Paraaque property.

FIFTH
Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that
the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may still not be allowed as the value of the
Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination
by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.