HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO J.

HABALUYAS,
petitioners vs. JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPZON ,Manila Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD. and SHUYA NODA, Respondents.
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 82-3305 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Shugo Noda
& Co., Ltd., et al. vs. Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., et al., the plaintiffs
received on October 1, 1984 a copy of the order of September 3, 1984,
denying their motion for execution of a judgment based on a compromise.
On October 16, the fifteenth day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an extension
of twenty days within which to submit their motion for reconsideration.

The Judiciary Revamp Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is designed to avoid
the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the
Rules of Court which were originally intended to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. That is
why (with some exceptions) the record on appeal was dispense with and the
thirty-day period was reduced to fifteen days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned order is reversed and
set aside. No costs.
Victoriano Salazar v Cayetana Salazar
Motion for new trial or reconsideration - Rule 37

On October 23, the plaintiffs filed their motion for new trial and their "notice
of appeal (conditional)".
Petitioners or defendants Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. and Pedro J. Habaluyas
opposed the motion for extension of the time for filing a motion for
reconsideration and they moved the dismiss the conditional appeal
Judge Maximo M. Japzon in his order of April 29, 198 granted the motion for
new trial.
ISSUE: WON the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may
be extended.
RULING: NO
We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial. The
fifteen- day period for appealing or for filing motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended Even under the existing Rules of Court the thirty-day
period cannot be extended (Roque vs. Gunigundo, Adm. Case No. 1664,
March 30 1978, 89 SCRA 178, 182; Gibbs vs. Court of First Instance Manila,
80 Phil. 160,164).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

FACTS:
1907 case on loss and damages between Parties. The court decided in favor
of Cayetana, plaintiff declaring Victoriano in default because no answer was
filed by him. A month after this decision has been rendered, Victoriano filed
a complaint alleging that he has been unjustly deprived of the right of
defense asking the that the judgment by default be annulled and an order of
new trial be given.
Victoriano was undoubtedly cited and served with the complaint in
accordance with law and that this as proven and evidenced by a copy of the
pleading filed by Attorney F.E. Dominguez, presenting Victoriano. However,
victoriano explains that the reason that he did answer the complaint was
because of a compromise agreement between Parties. That Victoriano
engaged the services of his counsel to show the compromise agreement in
court and to do whatever is required by law to end the case. So he believed
that due to this agreement there was no need to answer.
ISSUE:
WON Victorianos erroneous belief is excusable and van be grounds for new
trial

HELD:
Victorianos belief that the case has ended due to the compromise agreement
is technically erroneous but it was, without doubt, excusable and the causes
were reasonable why he did not answer
Rule 37 Sec 1 (then under Sec 513) provides for mistake or excusable
negligence as grounds for new trial. Such belief excusable and having
prevented the plaintiff herein from making a defense that would have been
good and efficacious, SC sets aside the judgment by default and orders a new
trial to ensue.
National Shipyard and Steel Corp. vs. Asuncion
Facts:
On March 31, 1955, Referee Erudito Luna of the Workmens Compensation
Commission rendered a decision ordering the petitioner to pay to Salvador
Asuncion compensation, fees and costs. On April 26, 1955 the petitioner
filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, all
documentary and allegedly not discovered at the opportune time. Finding no
error in the referees decision, the Chief of the Referee Division elevated the
case to respondent Commissioner for review. The latter did not consider the
evidence presented in support of the motion for new trial as newly
discovered within legal contemplation, and accordingly affirmed the decision
of the referee. The petitioner has appealed by certiorari. Respondent
Asuncion was first employed by the petitioner on January 27, 1950, was laid
off on April 30, 1950 due to lack of funds, and was reinstated on January 22,
1951. He worked as rigger and his assignment was to carry steel and other
materials from the landing barges to the bodegas. On December 6, 1951,
while shovelling gravel and sand, he vomited blood and was given first aid
treatment at petitioners infirmary. He was physically examined and referred
to the San Lazaro Hospital for X-ray examination. Found to have pulmonary
tuberculosis in a moderately advanced stage, and upon advice of the doctor,
he was confined in the Quezon Institute from December 17, 1951 until July
11, 1952, when he was discharged as clinically and radiologically improved.
He sought reinstatement, but allegedly for lack of funds, he was not reemployed by the petitioner. The petitioner now contends that had respondent

Commissioner taken into consideration the newly discovered evidence which

shows that respondent Asuncion had already been afflicted with and was
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis as early as January, 1946 (while he
was not yet employed by the petitioner), the decision complained of would
have been greatly changed. The petitioners motion for new trial was based
on newly discovered evidence showing that respondent Asuncion, after
confinement in Quezon Institute beginning December 17, 1951, was released
as cured on July 11, 1952, and that the physical examination made by
petitioners medical officer showed that said respondent was physically fit
for work. Accordingly, it is urged that no compensation and medical
expenses after July 11, 1952 should have been awarded in his favor.
ISSUE: won the respondent commissioner erred in not reconsidering the
newly admit evidence.
Held: The respondent Commissioner did not err in declaring that the alleged
newly discovered evidence could have been produced at the trial if the
petitioner had exercised due diligence, because the records referring to
respondent Asuncion had always been in petitioners possession. Moreover,
the medical finding that respondent Asuncion on July 11, 1952 as clinically
and radiologically improved, was explained by the attending physician in
Quezon Institute as merely meaning improvement in the physical condition.
Indeed, Annex "I" of the motion for new trial shows that as of July 3, 1952,
prior to his official discharge on July 11, 1952, said respondent was still
positive with pulmonary tuberculosis. Therefore, with respondent
Commissioner in his observation that, unless a miracle played an important
part, it is highly inconceivable for said illness to have been completely
arrested or cured within the short span of two weeks.
HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA vs. HONORABLE ULPIANO
SARMIENTO
FACTS:
The private respondents herein were employees of the provincial government
of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of the road and
bridge fund budget.

The provincial board of the province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution

No. 176, series of 1968, which approved the road and bridge fund budget of
the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of
herein private residents, who as a consequence filed a civil case for
prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their reinstatement and
payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their respective
positions previously occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of the
road and bridge fund budget.
Private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow them to
present additional evidence consisting of the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 to which
herein petitioners filed an opposition.
Respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents
seeking to reopen the two cases.
Herein private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order which motion does not contain any notice at all setting the time, date
and place of hearing.
Herein private respondents filed a request addressed to the clerk of court to
set for hearing on November 24, 1969 their aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, expressly stating that a copy of the same was delivered to
the Provincial Fiscal that same day, November 20, 1969.
Herein respondent Judge set aside its order, re-opened the two cases and
allowed respondents to present additional evidence consisting of the budget
and plaintiff of personnel for the fiscal year 1969-70 of the road and bridge
fund to further substantiate the claim herein private respondents that their
items were abolished in bad faith.
Respondent Judge rendered a decision in both cases in favor of herein private
respondents declaring as null and void Resolution No. 176, series of 1968 of
the herein petitioners provincial governor, governor and members of the
provincial board abolishing the positions of herein private respondents, as
well as directing their immediate reinstatement and the payment of back

salaries from July, 1968 until actual reinstatement together with such
amounts as may be necessary to pay the contribution of the province of
Camarines Sur to the G.S.I.S. in connection with the private respondents'
insurance and/or retirement, and the costs.
Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for herein petitioners, received a copy of the
aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970.
On June 8, 1970, the herein petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Enrique A. Amador, filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision, together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of court.
Both the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and said notice of hearing were
personally delivered to and received on the same day June 8, 1970 by the
counsel of herein respondents whose office is in Naga City itself.
Herein private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that
the decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom had been
interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from
their receipt of the aforesaid decision.
In the said motion for execution, herein private respondents expressly
admitted that herein petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration dated
June 6, 1970 of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970, claiming however
that the same motion was "fatally defective, pro forma, and should not be
considered ... because it failed to comply with the mandatory and elementary
provisions of See. 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court; consequently, the filing of such motion for
reconsideration ... did not and should not toll the running of the period for
appeal."
Herein petitioners filed their opposition dated June 17, 1970 to the aforesaid
motion for execution on the ground that they had complied with Sec. 2 of
Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules
of Court; and that their motion for reconsideration is considered as a motion
for new trial.

Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution.

He also issued an order denying herein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the notice accompanying the motion for the reconsideration of the
decision complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
RULING:
NO.
The rule that the requirements of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to
Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith renders any motion as a useless scrap of paper, which
does not merit the attention of the court. Said sections read thus
Sec. 2, Rule 37: Contents of motion for new trial and notice thereof.
The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a
written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 4, Rule 15: Notice. Notice of a motion shall be served by the
applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other
papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a
motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of
on its own motion.
Sec. 5, Rule 15: Contents of notice. The notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, and shall directed the time and place for the hearing of the
motion.
See. 6, Rule 15: Proof of service, to be filed with motion. No motion shall
be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof,

except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or
parties are not affected.
The provisions of the aforequoted rules are clear and are couched in simple
language, understandable to any college student, even if he is not a student of
law. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 require that the notice shall be directed to
the parties concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion, which notice shall also be served to all parties concerned at least
three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion
and other supporting documents. Section 4 of Rule 15 does not state that
such notice shall be directed to the clerk of court, much less to the judge
himself. Neither does it allow that the notice shall be served any time before
or on the day of the hearing, for the rule requires that the adverse parties
should be served with such notice at least three days before the hearing, to
give them an opportunity to contest the motion and be heard thereon. There is
no ambiguity nor vagueness in the rules. Failure to give at least three days
notice prior to the hearing vitiates the notice.
To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections
4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they
are clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of
the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration,
without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period
for appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice
and serves the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to
determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any
period within which to file his reply or opposition.
The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written
notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall
be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for
the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any
qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory
principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt
from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar would be one
step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the

stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon all to the consternation of

the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public
who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when
to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may be ignored.

ISSUE:
WON the stomach trouble of defendant-appellant was sufficient to prevent
him from appearing in court is a question of fact" and that the appellate court
should have retained the appeal.

FERRER VS. SEPENG

RULING:
FACTS:
In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was
set for November 8, 1967. At the hearing, plaintiff-appellee and counsel
appeared while only counsel for defendant-appellant was present. The trial
proceeded and plaintiff introduced his documentary evidence supporting his
claim against defendant, all of which were admitted without objection by
defendant's counsel. After plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel
moved for postponement on the ground that defendant was not present in
court. The trial court denied the motion and declared the case submitted for
decision. On the same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.
Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for
new trial allegedly on the ground of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect"
in that defendant "early in the morning of said November 8, 1967 ... had
stomach trouble and consequently I was not able to go to the court for said
trial" as per defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion.
Plaintiff duly opposed the motion for new trial for several grounds. The latter
alleged that the stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable negligence
since it is merely one which could not physically prevent him from appearing
in court and that the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact
constituting the valid defense which the defendant may prove if given the
chance to introduce evidence;
The trial court per its order of December 14, 1967 denied the motion for new
trial for the reasons stated in plaintiff's opposition. Hence, defendant's appeal
to the appellate court assigning as sole error "that the trial court erred in
denying the motion for new trial."

Defendant-appellant's averment of "stomach trouble belatedly presented after

three weeks, without any specific statement of its nature and gravity was
patently inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction the existence of
"accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against by reason of which his substantial rights have been
materially affected, as required by the Rules of Court.
But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer
from serious stomach trouble which physically prevented him from
appearing and giving his testimony at the scheduled trial, his failure to
submit in addition an affidavit of merits showing the valid defense which he
may prove as against plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to
his cause.
The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for
new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must
be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e. affidavits showing the facts (not
mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or
defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a
new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court
as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is
nil or ineffective. 3
The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his
motion for new trial as required by Rule 37, section 2 was submitted by
defendant-appellant. Such failure is fatal to his cause and is decisive on the
question of law presented by his sole assignment of error.

The Court accordingly rules that the appeal has no merit since the failure to
submit an affidavit of merits is fatal to appellant's cause and the trial court
therefore committed no error in law in denying his motion for new trial.

theory that the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, for which neither a verification of the motion nor an affidavit of merits
was necessary, because the facts and the law invoked in support thereof
appear on record.

Ganaban vs. Bayle

This case was instituted by the heirs of the plaintiff to recover sums of
money from the defendants to whom the deceased entered into several and
different transaction.
- Leon ganaban died intestate in 1952, being single, survived by plaintiffs in
this case his brother and sisterand some niece
- Aug.24 1952, leon delivered to bayle, the sum of 5k for which bayle signed
a receipt, stating that said amount was to be invested in a loan secured by a
mortgage on an agricultural land. Said delivery took place took place and
receipt was signed in the presence of Fernandez who likewise affixed his
signature thereto as a witness. Despite repeated demands bayle did not refund
the money of leonen despite the promise to do so.
Lower court- amunt sought to be collected (25K) is below its jurisdiction, by
reason of ganabans testimony that the 25k would be divided between the
plaintiffs, that the lower court deduced from these circumstances that each
and everyone of plaintiff has different and distinct interest over the estate of
leon. Holding that the claim of each plaintiff is below to the original
jurisdiction of CFI.
MR- denied
ISSUE:WON the MR in this case must be verified or supported by an
affidavit of merits( R.37 sec.2)
RULE:no. inasmuch as said verification and affidavit of merits are not
required by section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court except when the
motion for reconsideration is based either upon "(f)raud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence," none of which was the ground relied upon by
plaintiffs herein. Their motion for reconsideration was predicated upon the

In these three cases, it is clear that the cause of action of each one of the
plaintiffs was distinct, separate and independent from that of the other
plaintiffs, so that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation,
insofar as it was dependent upon the amount involved, should be determined
by the sum claimed by each one of the plaintiffs, not by the aggregate
amount of their claims put together. In the case at bar, plaintiffs herein sued,
as heirs of the deceased Leon Ganaban, to enforce a right of the latter,
thereby setting up no more than one cause of action against the defendant. As
a consequence, the sum total of the judgment prayed for in plaintiffs'
complaint, which lies within the competence of the lower court, not of a
municipal or city court, is determinative of the jurisdiction over the case.

FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO L.

PARAS, as Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN MIGUEL,
Respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, 1the predecessor-in-interest
of the herein petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real
Estate" before the Court of First Instance against private respondent Pablo
San Miguel.
The complaint, sought the partition of Lot No. 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate
respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted
exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543
Subsequently, trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the dismissal of the case
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for "apparent
lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants."

Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, was instituted by the
same Pedro San Miguel against private respondent Pablo San Miguel.
This time, the complaint prayed for the partition of Lot No. 4543 and Lot No.
3269
In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed his answer, pleading therein the defense
of res judicata. For him, the same subject matter and cause of action had
already been litigated upon and resolved in the previous Civil Case.
After preliminary he "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of the
principle of res judicata caring, the respondent Judge issued an order
dismissing Civil Case
Respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but
"insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect
to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and
therefore any record on appeal thereon will be useless, moot and academic
ISSUE: Whether an order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory.
RULING: respondent Judge did not abused his discretion when he issued the
order of December 9, 1974, approving petitioners' corrected record on appeal
"insofar only as Lot 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to
Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "only final
judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental
judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject
of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the
other." The
test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is
this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, if is final." 2 A
court order is final character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved
or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, 3 such that no further

questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The
term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or
direction for future determination. 5 The order or judgment may validly refer
to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch threof. "In
the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order decree has been
held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the
rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy
or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them
until it is reversed or set aside.6The central point to consider is, therefore, the
effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other
hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves
substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7The word
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement
and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy." 8
1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 4300-M on December 10, 1973, is a clear final and appealable
order. The said order is a final disposition of the whole controversy between
the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No. 4543. It is absolute and
conclusive on all questions in regard thereto. 9 The trial court's order is not a
mere narrow acceptance of private respondent's plea of res judicata. It has
more the far-ranging effect of confirming private respondent's claim of
exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, as previously adjudicated in the prior
Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the sole owner of
this specific lot; as a result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or his
succesors-in-interest for that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they
claim is their rightful share thereto. 10 After the issuance of this order,
nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting
claims of the parties over the subject lot have already been resolved. As a
matter of fact, the final order of dismissal cannot even be assailed by
certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners herein have failed to
undertake. 11The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under
litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by
the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a

decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is

reserved for future consideration . 12
2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10,
1973, foreclosing the relitigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the March 19,
1964 order of the then trial Judge, Ricardo C. Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624,
which involves the same lot, dismissing the case for lack of interest to
prosecute. This dismissal order of the said trial Judge has the effect and
consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court since it was neither without prejudice nor based upon
lack of jurisdiction. 13It is worthy to note that the deceased Pedro San
Miguel interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the
subject matter of that Civil Case No. 2624 (Lot No. 4543) eleven years
thereafter, when he commenced Civil Case No. 4300-M, praying for the
partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot No. 4543. This, the deceased Pedro San
Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this particular Lot No. 4543 must reach
a terminal point. The principle of estoppel by judgment, on of the aspects of
the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the re-litigation in another action of a
specific question actually litigated and determined in a former one. 14The
second case, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the
first case, Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, thre
is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be
barred as far as Lot No. 4543 is concerned. Likewise, the judgment in the
first case is a final one rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
merits. 15c
3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee.
This is, however, subject to limitation s. Once the rights of a party-litigant
have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the
party-litigant can no longer litigate the same again. 16A right, question or
fact distinctly placed in issue and directly determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the
same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different
cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as
between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so
long as the judgment in the firs suit remains unmodified. 17Public policy and

sound practice jdemand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law."
18Reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
UNIVERSAL MOTORS V CA & VERENDIA, GALICIA
Issues to be raised on appeal
FACTS:
Respondents bought Mercedes Benz trucks from Petitioners. They defaulted
in payment. They issued a promissory note but they still failed to complete
their payment. After repeated demands, Petitioner filed a complaint for
recovery of unpaid balance. Respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim
admitted the principal allegations of the Complaint, except that they insisted
that their outstanding account was only the amount of P28,911.10 not 74K.
Petition for summary judgment by Petitioner denied. Both parties failed to
appear during the hearing thus Petitioner was allowed to present evid exparte upon motion. Judgment was in favor of Petiitoner.
On April 8, 1968, after re-hearing the case on motion filed by private
respondent Rafael Verendia, the court rendered a decision which reiterated
the first judgment by the court.
CA: reversed trial court. Dismissed the complaint and ordered Universal
Motors to return amount in excess of the amount due to them.MR denied
Petitioner raises the following grounds: CA erred in a) allowing Respondents
to make a complete turnabout by denying liability when they have already
admitted that they are liable b) in allowing change in defense without
amending their pleadings c) not holding respondents estopped d) in
exonerating respondents e) that respondents overpaid petitionr and f)that the
appeal of one of the respondents have inured to the benefit of the other
respondents who did not appeal
ISSUE:

Won the issues presented by Petitioners are within the exceptions where the
Supreme Court can review on appeal the final and conclusive findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals
HELD:
Denied.
Jurisprudence dictates that as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they
are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions, as when the findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; or
the appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court. Absence
any proof that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse
of discretion, such findings must stand for the Supreme Court is not expected
or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.

order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary
period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was
the final order appealable under the Rules.
ISSUE: WON receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration
WON petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.

Neypes vs CA
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC
against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th
day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees
on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that
it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an

HELD: The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
should be deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF
Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal,
he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on
received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then
filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was
what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the
more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again
considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the

final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based
on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners view that the order
dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to
Rule 64(Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is
derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to
criminal cases. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner-lessor, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and private
respondent-lessees, spouses Ernesto and Lorna Reyes entered into a lease
agreement over a parcel of land. Private respondent lessees were given the
right of pre-emption, with first priority to purchase the property if the owner,
herein petitioner, offered it for sale. Intending to have a fire wall constructed,

private respondents allegedly had the property relocated. As a result, they

discovered that the adjacent owner's concrete fence abutted on and
encroached upon 30.96 square meters of the leased property. Private
respondents requested petitioner to make adjustments in order to correct the
encroachment problem. The spouses Reyes claim that despite repeated
follow-up, petitioner has failed to take any action on their demand.
Consequently, they decided to withhold rental payments as "leverage" against
petitioner and to force the latter to make corrections or adjustments in the
area of subject land. Petitioner informed private respondents in a letter of its
intention to sell the leased property. Although the Reyeses conveyed their
interest in buying the property, no deal was finalized. Private respondents
reiterated their desire to purchase the property in response to petitioner's
demand for the payment of P68,000.00 in unpaid rentals for the period
October 1986 to January 1989. In the same letter, private respondents
countered that they intend to pay as soon as the proper correction with
respect
to
the
encroached
area
is
made
by
petitioner.
No agreement was reached. Private respondent spouses filed an action for
specific performance and damages before the RTC. The correction or
adjustment of the encroached portion of the property constituted their first
cause of action. For their second cause of action, the spouses Reyes prayed
that petitioner be compelled to sell the leased premises to them at P1,600.00
per square meter, claiming that there was already a contract of sale between
the parties. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss was not immediately resolved by
the trial court. It later filed its Answer with Counterclaim for rental payments
owed by private respondents. Petitioner also filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings for unpaid rentals on 439.34 square meters of the 470 square
meter leased property. TC denying motion to dismiss insofar as the first
cause of action but granted it for the second cause of action. The following
day, TC rendered partial judgment as regards to the rentals in favor of
petitioner.
Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to
the CA. They raised three issues: the lawfulness of dismissing the second
cause of action; the propriety of holding that there was no contract of sale
between the parties; and ordering the payment of rental arrearages without
any hearing on the merits. Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the case raises only pure questions of law and that respondent
appellate court had no jurisdiction over the same. CA denied motion to

dismiss. CA ruled that the case before it is a single appeal and does not
necessitate multiple appeals even if it involves an Order and a Partial
Judgment. Hence, even if only a notice of appeal was filed without a record
on appeal, the appeal was effectively perfected.
Petitioner insists that this case involves multiple appeals which, therefore,
necessitates the filing of a record on appeal for the perfection of the appeal. It
notes that while the motion to dismiss was granted for the second cause of
action (to compel sale), the case was left to proceed in connection with the
encroachment issue. With the filing of the notice of appeal, the entire records
of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, leaving the trial court
bereft of any record with which to continue trial. Petitioner adds that when a
partial judgment is rendered in the case, the original record of the case should
not be transmitted to the appellate court in case of an appeal from such
partial judgment. Without the records of the case, trial on the unresolved
issues cannot proceed a situation "hardly conducive to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business." It further alleges that as more than
one appeal is permitted in this case, a record on appeal is required and the
period to appeal should be thirty days. In the instant case, private respondents
failed to file the record on appeal, hence, their appeal should have been
dismissed.
Issue: Does this case involve multiple appeals, where a record on appeal is
necessary to perfect the appeal?
Ruling:
The case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are
necessary. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for
recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same
case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
The disputes in the case below for specific performance have arisen from the
demand to make adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is
alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise of the right of preemption and the payment of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of
encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals.

These two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but from
the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals.
There is no ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it involves
an Order granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss and a Partial Judgment
granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The subject matter covered
in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee
relationship, lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant
case would, in effect, be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The conclusion is irresistible that since a case has not been made out for
multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary to perfect the appeal.
GAMIAO VS. PLAN (FULL TXT- di ko na dinigest sobrang iksi)
Certiorari to review an order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch
II, at Cauayan, which dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
Procedurally, counsel for the petitioners invoke Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. Said rule governs ordinary appeals from Courts of First Instance to
the Supreme Court. The correct vehicle is R.A. No. 5440 which was
approved on September 9, 1968 but which, according to Mr. Justice Ramon
C. Aquino, is not well-known to lawyers, especially provincial practitioners.
Accordingly, as part of the continuing legal education of some members of
the bar, quoted hereunder is the pertinent provision of the aforesaid Act, to
wit:
Sec. 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for the procedure governing
petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments mentioned in Section
seventeen of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended
by this Act and the effect of the filing thereof on the judgment or decree
sought to be reviewed. Until the Supreme Court provides otherwise, said
petitions shall be filed within the period fixed in the rules of court for appeals
in criminal or civil cases or special civil actions or special proceedings,
depending upon the nature of the case in which the judgment or decree
sought to be reviewed, was rendered; the filing of said petition shall stay the
execution of the judgments sought to be reviewed; and the aforesaid petitions
shall be filed and served in the form required for petitions for review by
certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts recited in the petition have not been controverted in the comment
which was submitted by the respondents. They are the following:
On September 22, 1979, the petitioners filed a complaint with the respondent
trial court which was denominated as an action for reconveyance, annulment
of deeds of sale and damages. With prior leave, the complaint was amended
on November 21, 1979. The amendment consisted merely in the addition of
three (3) more plaintiffs.
After issues had been joined, the petition recites that "respondent judge
issued the dismissal order motu proprio without conducting a pre-trial
conference of the parties on June 22, 1981, the date set for pre-trial purposes,
and for which this petition likewise seeks from this Honorable [Court] to
declare as void the questioned dismissal order." As aforesaid, this factual
statement remains uncontradicted in the comment of the respondent.
The order which We are asked to set aside was given in open court on June 2,
1981 and reads as follows:
The land according to both parties was originally a public land and that this
land had been disposed by the Bureau of Lands and culminated into a
certificate of title in the name of Santiago Cadelinia against the protest of the
plaintiffs which was dismissed by the Bureau of lands. The law on the matter
is that the Director of Lands has control over the disposition of Public Lands.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed without costs.
Since there is a counter-claim, the court sets the hearing of the same to July
6, 1981 at 8:30 a.m.
Parties are notified in open court.

(2) The error allegedly committed by the respondent Judge is an error of

judgment, which can be reviewed by means of an appeal, and not by
certiorari.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The reasons adduced by the respondents for the dismissal of the petition are
not well-taken for they assume that the instant petition was filed as a special
civil action pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Substantially,
however, counsel for the petitioners has filed a petition pursuant to R.A. No.
5440 albeit he did so unknowingly. It is to be noted that the petition was filed
within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days for civil cases.
Going to the merits of the petition, We have to grant relief for the following
reasons:
1. The respondent judge dismissed the complaint without conducting a pretrial thus violating Sec. 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which stipulates that
a pre-trial is mandatory.
2. The petitioners are not questioning the issuance of the certificate of title to
Santiago Cadelinia although they could have done so. The relief which they
seek is that the certificate of title notwithstanding, Cadelinia and his codefendants have a legal duty to convey the land to the plaintiffs and pay
damages in addition. Thus the ratio of the dismissal order to the effect that,
"The laws on the matter is that the Director of Lands has control over the
disposition of Public Lands." is irrelevant to the claim of the plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the order of the respondent judge
dated June 2, 1981 is hereby set aside; he is directed to conduct a pre-trial as
mandated by the Rules of Court and thereafter to proceed accordingly. No
special pronouncement as to costs.

The respondents, in their comment, pray for the dismissal of the petition for
the following reasons:
(1) For being filed prematurely and/or unseasonably, contrary to the
provisions of Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court; and

GRACE A. BASMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LOIDA B. ATENCIO, Respondent.

FACTS:
In a Memorandum TESDA through its director, Juanito C. Cueva, informed
petitioner Grace A. Basmayor, a computer operator, that she had accumulated
a total of thirty-one and a half days of absence without official leave in
violation of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 41
s. 1998. Accordingly, Regional Director Cueva advised Basmayor to
personally appear before or explain in writing to the TESDA Regional
Office, the reason for her absence, with a warning that failure to take the
proper action within the period would mean her implied resignation, and
consequently she would be dropped from the rolls.
A few days later, Basmayor received another memorandum, from the TESDA
Regional Office informing her that her service in the government shall be
considered terminated.
Basmayor sent a letter-complaint to the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office, charging respondent Loida B. Atencio, Administrative Officer V of
TESDA Regional Office, for falsification of official document, gross neglect
of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
and dishonesty. According to Basmayor, when she went to the TESDA
Regional Office as instructed, Director Cueva was not there. Basmayor
claimed that she called the TESDA Regional Office several times, but
Atencio always informed her that Director Cueva was not around. When
Basmayor called again on October 23, 2000, she was informed that the
director was in Australia. Basmayor now alleges that Atencio has forged the
signature of the TESDA Regional Director in the memorandum, to make it
appear that Director Cueva, who was at that time in Australia, issued the
aforementioned memorandum.
Atencio denied the allegations and explained that Director Cueva instructed
her to issue the memorandum through a facsimile machine. Atencio
submitted a certification by the director that the latter indeed instructed the
former to issue the aforementioned memorandum.
Basmayor's complaint was dismissed by the CSC Regional Office for failure
to include a certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner filed an amended

complaint but was again dismissed for the same inadvertence. Hence,
Basmayor filed an Appeal Memorandum with the CSC Chairman, CSC
Central Office.
On July 18, 2001, Basmayor filed a separate petition before the CSCRO
seeking her reinstatement, which was dismissed in an Order, for lack of
primary jurisdiction. Based on an earlier resolution by the Civil Service
Commission, the CSCRO held that the proper forum for her reinstatement
was the grievance committee of the TESDA.
Basmayor appealed the Order to the CSC Central Office, which dismissed
her complaint against Atencio, and in the Order it dismissed her petition for
reinstatement. The CSC Central Office held that the CSCRO No. XI should
take cognizance of the petition for reinstatement because it was related to the
administrative complaint against Atencio.
Basmayor filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with prayer for
temporary restraining order, assailing the CSC Resolution No. 021559. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright. - the Civil Service
Commission should have been impleaded as a respondent in this case.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission should have been impleaded as
a respondent in this case
RULING: Anent the question of whether or not the Civil Service
Commission should be impleaded as respondent in this case, the correct
procedure, as mandated by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, is not to implead
the lower court or agency which rendered the assailed decision.26 Hence, we
agree with the petitioner that it is not necessary to implead the Civil Service
Commission as respondent in her petition.
WHEREFORE, as contended by petitioner, we rule that the Civil Service
Commission need not be impleaded as respondent pursuant to Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. In any event, there being no other reversible error committed
by the appellate court, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED for lack
of merit.

Annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions - Rule 47

parties; and, abandonment, waiver and unenforceability under the Statute of

Frauds.

Islamic DaWah Council v. CA

CA - denied MR and MD of Petitioners
FACTS:
Sps. Da Silva mortgaged a parcel of land to Petitioner. Sps. Unable to pay
thus the Real Estate mortgaged was foreclosed. Subsequently, parties entered
into a compromise agreement wherein Petitioner shall pay additional
consideration and the Spouses will transfer title of the Lots to Petitioners.
This was acknowledged by the Court and was fully executed upon order of
the court. TCT was now under Petitioners name. This foreclosure is the
subject of this case.
A few months later, Araneta filed with the Register of Deeds an affidavit of
adverse claim in connection with the foreclosure. Araneta seeks to recover
possession of the lots transferred to the Petitioners by Sps. Silva. This was
opposed by the filing of quieting of title by Petitioner.
The heirs of Araneta claim that the lots were only entrusted to Sps. Silva for
some unknown reasons. That Parties have already decided to terminate this
trust agreement by executing a Deed of Sale. the heirs of Araneta alleged that
that the Da Silvas, with the connivance of the Council, executed a purported
promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage the terms and conditions
of which were made very onerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of
the property by virtue of a confession of judgment; and, the Council had
always known of the Araneta's claim of ownership over the land. Due to this
allegation Araneta filed for an annulment of judgment (in the foreclosure
case) with TRO of the transfer of lots to the Petitioner by Sps. Da Silva. This
TRO was opposed by Petitioners through an MR but MR denied. Later on
the Council filed a Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the petition for
annulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council
also invoked the additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the
Aranetas are not valid claimants of the property; lack of legal capacity to sue
because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case; litis pendentia
because of the pendency of the quieting of title case between the same

ISSUE: WON CA erred in hearing the petition for annulment of judgment

since it is already fully executed
WON heirs of Araneta can institute an annulment proceeding over a case to
which they were not parties/ WON they have a cause of action against the
Council
HELD:
DISMISSED.
In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of
the judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the
house and lot subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who
foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a
person who bought the same and finally to another individual in whose name
the Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this
Tribunal.
In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court of Appeals neither
acted without jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the petition for annulment of judgment as would warrant the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari in this case
It is beyond dispute that it is only the Court of Appeals that can take
cognizance of the annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q43746(foreclosure)rendered by the Regional Trial Court
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court
of Appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
expressly provides that:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ... (2)Exclusive

original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts;
(2) Jurisprudence dictates that, There can be no question as to the right of
any persons adversely affected by a judgement to maintain an action to
enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud
and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when

such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised
at the trial which resulted in such judgment. It is therefore clear from the
foregoing that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby