G.R. No.

155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPOENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN
and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA
CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October
24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several
collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into
two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces,8 his
illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him
was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to
the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall
within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado
and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be
barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would
be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within
the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support
thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so
much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear,
however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon
Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly
omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father. 16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage
did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June
15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether
a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually
lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred
to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and
from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September
8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among
their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the
United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting
from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim
No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the
United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June
1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their
own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie
Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the
local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and
blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in
1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her
report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in
the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary

acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia
filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated
under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February
28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda. 24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the
original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition
was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias
late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the
other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived
together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion
was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate
of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this
Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same
among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of
the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de
dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates,
the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the
decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn
over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on
the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same
oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain
matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the
party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal,
but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical
ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415,
for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and
the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May
11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.28
SO ORDERED.
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the
record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial
justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts decision.
Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-

Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among
themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to
the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositorsappellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and
posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia
Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo
Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50
years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their
reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the
absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting
that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado
as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.

Hence, this recourse.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its

absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the presumption
of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence
need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to
Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts

are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily
relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband
and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered
by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita")
civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof,
no matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado
and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis
as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence,
all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio
and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her natural children.52

illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between
legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That
prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing
before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore,
that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the
portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the
half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed
each other reciprocally?

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between
them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left

no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without

securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir,
he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors report
card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately
not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified
that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado
which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of
the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo

Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in
the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but
only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by
Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We
affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab
intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but
is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must
be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption
is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and
nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of
the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and halfsiblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa
Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados
estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the
late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective
shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall
pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and
to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators,
upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may
be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an
institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita
Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when
Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with
the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not
physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su
testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a
los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la
declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL
CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendantsappellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His
will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941
decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that
decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his
half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3)
Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother,
Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of
Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five
children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose
Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26,
1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That
project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel

The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It
held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties
not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing
that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if
the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be
regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o
morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See
Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as
prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the
estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills
Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants
entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the
legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of
Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that
compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco
entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal
became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October
24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of
two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise
agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh.
D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and
physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and
noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest
the controvery over the Yangco's estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate
estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual
prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in
its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the
project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23,
1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real
property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it
was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that
Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3)
that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had
been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and
laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt
Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover
his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court
found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco,
hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the
trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and
not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco,
dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged
natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio
Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as
Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on
appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the

presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and
over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis
Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a
first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the
probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or
official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and
Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb]
and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold
that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the
complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen
derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to
haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all
successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16
Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's
estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that
"an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by
the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child.

The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of
resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father
or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default
of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who
were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF
PARAAQUE, INC.,respondents.
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.

Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held
not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).

Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil.
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

DE CASTRO, J.:

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of
deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said
deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the
deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James
Bracewen
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in
so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the
properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the
finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and

30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share

thereof with interest of 6% per annum;

II.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT

ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.

(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;

III.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT

GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION.

(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim.

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero
Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late
Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and
accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one
of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles,
(2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of
all the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein
with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership
over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot
succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal
deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These
properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc.
sometime in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private
respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's
complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for
review was filed of the following assignment of errors:
I.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION

ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each
has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles
under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los
limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de
Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba
citada por la espalda la via ferrea delRailroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle
Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918
up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija,
Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However,
for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because
of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the
great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under
a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda
por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con
los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo
Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea
Ferrea de una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and
continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso
Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered
the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own
name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed
the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents
the share of his father,

As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally
because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which
they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the
plaintiff.

appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at
bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the
evidence as to the identification of the lands in question.

Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero
Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He
further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his
father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes,
plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of
representation.

To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to
Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by
adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of
the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description
fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in
Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property
described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades
have already passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period,
many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and
they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28,
1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not
Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the
plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo
in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however
undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty
taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting
that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may
be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this
Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both

Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth

certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this
vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link
connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However,
this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not
that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September
13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo
Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus,
even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely
conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental
requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in
question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in
the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial
evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making
the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate
left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil
Code of the Philippines.)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of
the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

SO ORDERED.

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of
the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;

G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the
properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate
Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by
Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance
of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and
out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation
of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by
Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from
further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo
Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in
CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on
December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of
which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the
facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one
entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the
petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the
declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was

denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the
present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978)
and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece,
who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the
natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the
petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin
who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990
are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and
December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and
executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their
pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They

contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old
Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New
Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992,
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of
the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil
Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the
Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from
other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and

mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this

principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child
to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record
shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and
the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to
the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling
that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are
final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his
order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not
entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the
declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which
declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a
perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already
removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power
retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order
its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the
Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which
has become final and executory, hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective
pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the
request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was
set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives"
in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited
to discuss as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union
were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero
and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973
and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether
petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil
Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the
Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants
illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New
Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely
entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under
Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We
do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code
to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code
provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have
conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of
their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time
does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding
articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by

right of representation and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive
descendants of anotherillegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
succeed in their own right and the latter by right ofrepresentation.
(940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that
the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions
are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may
be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the
legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked

down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110
cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on
Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil
Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine
adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil.,
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former
Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that
an illegitimate child has no right to succeedab intestato the legitimate father or mother
of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the
amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the
instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial
changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the
provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change,
Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should
have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the
subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted
successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with
Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to
be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be
represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate,
his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue,
even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil
Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate
children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate
succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that
the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which
also find support from other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this

principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child
to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4,
Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person
spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third
Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda.That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia definesparientes as "los que estan relacionados por los
vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los
descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz
o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p.
377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of

interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates.
which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not
erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place
legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even
the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation
between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done
away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and
'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children
have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them
by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p.
291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least
amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law
literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took n

On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the
conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided
as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

G.R. No. L-19281

June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO

SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositorsappellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro
Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda
and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a)
that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda
by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that
administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending;
and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and
not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered
that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving
spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining
ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of
law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the
order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone
assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the
Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of
the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites
Art. 996 which provides:

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the

surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent
that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession,
whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession
involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory
construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being
the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his
father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of
the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they
concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse
are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least,
his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the
Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under
this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the
estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and
the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children
or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a)
Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child";
consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get
1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the

singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of
the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child"
is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children"
will not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .
ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth
of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only
legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear,
because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of
"children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning
should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the
widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets
one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the
law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her
only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide
for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain and this we are not called
upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to
enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.

Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.

Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the
only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter
which is purely a legal question.

The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City
in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this
marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia
Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her
husband Simeon Bagsic.

On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second
marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I).
Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.

Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as
his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the
plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs
Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving
no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the
second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months
before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving
behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her
father Geronimo Almanza.

(Rollo, pp. 2-3)

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which
she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:

A.
A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit
bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German
Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by
Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra
Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;

B.
A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino
Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag;
and on the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

C.
A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted
with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the
N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino
Alma; on the S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by
Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra
Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;

D.
A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an
area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by
Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered
by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452,
assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and

E.
A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon,
planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N.
(Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian
Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)

Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic;
and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela
Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they
were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the
expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having
agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts,
accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby
declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in
dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo
Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00
per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are
delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have
become final.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.

(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA

Judge

Record on Appeal, p. 47

From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other
defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to
the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in the
complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half
undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B
and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2

On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006
and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees
to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He
asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested
defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died
on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's
estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that
"should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)

On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was
not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the

parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic
died on May 9. 1945. 3

The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the
trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question
involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the
appellate court certified this case to Us.

We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.
But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or
per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full
blood.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31,
I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by
right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of
the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The
only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to
Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such
distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been
recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30,
1969, 28 SCRA 610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic,
her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing
Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is
not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.

In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an
issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and
the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with
the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-19382

August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris,
Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as
well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to
be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse,
but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an
aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,
Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.

Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is
three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance
with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is
of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.

ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse,
if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the
other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is
true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their
proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009
(Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino
expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children
of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth
degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth
degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis
supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No
costs.

G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature
at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the
presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her
witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure
or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear
or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither
ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A.
Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the
testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership
thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of

said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir
to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after
the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister
of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of
the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law;
(2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of
its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal
heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the
judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested
leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of
the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner
and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies
the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of
succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the
will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors
which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor
Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question
been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit
the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The
Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party
has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin
v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has
been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this
jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of
the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that
the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has
also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already
disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true
that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true,
the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate
child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie,
68 Phil. 128, as follows:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother
who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be
called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie,
but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality
of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a
palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting
parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided
by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children
of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not
extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend
to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry
the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law
by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only
because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure

and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it
contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental
witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix
signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at
the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the
witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first
one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave
it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the
best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he
signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He
finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same
time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will
was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by
the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr.
Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there
was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation
of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure
to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene
Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on
May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory
of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing
could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own
testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz,

Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions,

each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the
foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband
Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she
lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old
and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration.
The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the
will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was
not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among
which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or
fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the
will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public
morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was

in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not
decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be
set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of
the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.