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CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
Table
of
Contents
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
efforts
exhibited
a
tilt
towards
cutting
cost
rather
safety.
BP
proudly
states
publicly
about
safety
over
all
other
aspects,
but
the
actions
were
different
from
the
words.
In
1987,
BP
became
privatized
after
government
selling
off
their
shares.
The
privatization
changes
the
motive
of
an
organization
from
public
service
to
profit
maximization.
All
cost
cutting
measures
was
taken
in
order
to
maximize
the
profit.
Privatization
of
the
organization
was
taken
into
consideration
in
order
to
increase
the
productivity
but
it
affects
the
profitability;
making
BP
into
huge
losses
in
early
1990s.
After
Tony
Hayward
succeeded
to
become
new
CEO
in
mid
2007,
his
drive
towards
transforming
the
culture
lead
to
effectual
decisions
regarding
the
operating.
Tony
wanted
to
divert
the
risk
averse,
but
the
transition
from
a
small
organization
into
6th
largest
company;
required
many
mergers,
acquisitions
and
cost
cutting
measures.
Merging
with
different
companies
incubated
different
cultures,
team
leaders
and
think
tanks
into
the
organization.
It
created
difference
of
opinions
and
disruption
in
decision-making
process.
The
reasons
mentioned
and
discussed
earlier,
led
toward
the
biggest
environmental
disaster.
All
these
decisions
seem
significant
but
the
negligence
in
implementation
erupted
with
unexpected
disasters.
At
the
point
of
Deep
Water
Horizon
all
employees
was
deep
rooted
with
curtailing
time
and
money,
this
led
safety
as
a
second
thought.
As
the
rig
was
already
behind
their
schedule
time
due
to
natural
disaster,
Hurricane
Katrina
and
other
management
factors.
The
rig
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
was
costing
BP
$1
million
a
day,
so
some
negligence
towards
safety
arose.
After
testimony
of
related
employees,
it
was
brought
in
the
committees
knowledge
that
top
management
pressured
to
saving
time
and
curtails
cost.
It
showed
a
reason
of
asymmetric
information
that
BP
didnt
had
any
on-site
accident
for
7
years,
which
made
all
employees
including
top
management
to
make
such
decisions.
The
workforce
did
not
believe
that
process
safety
is
core
value
at
BP,
regardless
of
committing
publicly.
The
management
failed
to
deliver
the
message
consistently
and
meaning
worthy.
Deep
Water
Horizon
was
a
multi-operated
venture,
so
the
decision-making
process
was
delayed.
As
there
were
multiple
organizations
included,
just
blaming
BP
for
the
disaster
is
meaningless.
Oilrig
has
different
operations,
which
requires
different
set
of
expertise.
For
every
technical
and
critical
process,
different
organization
was
contacted.
However,
BP
reserved
the
right
to
explore
the
well
and
had
majority
of
shares
in
the
venture,
so
its
name
is
upfront
and
at
stake.
The
oilrig
was
leased
from
Transocean
along
with
the
crew,
having
culture
apparently
different
from
BPs.
It
has
created
difference
of
opinions
and
different
ways
of
tackling
the
issue.
To
provide
the
cementing
formula
another
organization
was
consulted,
named
Halliburton.
The
cementing
is
used
for
securing
the
well
from
blowout;
avoiding
hydrocarbons
reaching
the
rig.
They
conducted
series
of
test
but
were
not
successful.
Under-pressure,
they
provided
the
formula
to
BP
without
having
a
successful
test,
in
hope
of
resulting
positive
in
near
future.
The
acute
mistake
by
Halliburton
led
to
worst
environmental
disaster.
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
The
oilrig
was
using
digital
methods
to
be
in
position.
BP
decided
to
use
GPS
technique,
instead
of
anchoring
method
to
keep
the
rig
in
place.
Under
power
failure,
it
is
impossible
to
accurately
position
the
rig,
as
thruster
will
not
operate.
There
is
high
possibility
of
strong
winds
and
current,
in
the
region
of
Gulf
of
Mexico
where
the
rig
was
operating.
It
may
sometimes
get
difficult
for
the
thruster
to
keep
the
rig
in
position.
If
the
rig
is
offset
from
the
well,
it
will
affect
the
riser
and
may
be
disastrous.
It
happened
after
the
blowout,
that
the
Deepwater
Horizon
was
out
powered
and
it
could
not
keep
in
position.
When
currently
operating
team
was
preparing
for
temporarily
abandonment,
large
quantity
of
hydrocarbons
entered
the
bottom
of
well
undetected.
Multiple
tests
failed
to
disclose
the
breach
of
hydrocarbons
into
the
well.
When
these
hydrocarbons
reached
rig
floor,
found
ignition
spark;
the
blowout
occurred.
Regardless
of
technical
and
management
factor
contributing
towards
blowout,
the
rig
had
many
maintenance
issues.
And
the
rig
had
not
gone
off
water
for
nine
years.
It
may
have
affected
the
performance
and
sustainability
of
the
rig.
Nonetheless
the
rig
used
three
computers
to
control
the
drilling
process.
The
responsible
person
had
frequently
claimed
the
software
issues
with
the
computer
systems.
The
rig
was
using
outdated
computers,
which
would
hand
in
middle
of
the
process
and
the
operator
need
to
use
another
computer,
in
situation
if
being
used
is
unresponsive.
Some
of
the
factors
out
burst
and
frequently
used
by
media
and
other
resources
to
show
the
reason
of
the
blowout;
Centralizers
being
one
of
them.
Centralizers
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
are
special
brackets
that
help
the
riser
to
be
centered.
Halliburton
hired
to
run
simulation
model
to
suggest
cementing
procedure
and
suggest
usage
of
centralizers.
Halliburton
suggested
using
twenty-one
centralizers
due
to
the
length
of
the
riser.
But
Deepwater
Horizon
operators
and
BPs
management
neglected
this
decision,
as
they
proposed
to
use
six
centralizers
that
they
already
had
onboard.
This
pronouncement
was
made
to
reduce
the
cost
and
saves
time,
as
additional
centralizers
would
have
delayed
the
project
10
more
days.
The
series
of
email
went
back
and
forth,
but
the
reply
from
BPs
decision-maker
showed
a
sense
of
negligence
and
irresponsible
behavior.
According
to
study,
cementing
is
one
the
significant
factor
of
blowout
in
Gulf
of
Mexico.
Circulation
of
the
mud
before
cementing
the
well
is
an
industrial
norm.
In
this
case,
it
was
estimated
that
it
would
take
about
6
12
hours
to
complete
the
circulation,
which
was
completed
within
30
minutes.
Cement
bond
log
is
another
potential
factor,
which
records
the
reliability
of
the
cement
job
after
its
pumped
into
the
well.
It
is
a
technical
and
critical
measurability,
Schlumberger,
worlds
largest
oilfield
services
company
was
hired;
but
BP
refused
to
avail
the
services
few
hours
before
the
blowout.
The
refusal
cost
BP
as
a
penalty,
which
was
way
less
than
if
the
process
would
have
carried
out,
so
it
was
considered
desirable
decision
at
that
moment.
In
order
to
stop
the
blowout,
Blow
Out
Preventer
(BOP)
is
used.
It
is
a
device
attached
to
the
head
of
well,
in
case
of
emergency
to
cut
off
the
riser
from
the
rig.
The
BOP
should
have
worked
automatically
in
that
situation
but
due
to
the
power
failure
and
back
up
batteries
did
not
worked
out;
it
failed
to
prevent
the
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
hydrocarbons
reaching
the
top.
The
BOP
used
in
the
Macondo
well
was
never
been
checked
for
the
past
10
years
and
the
back
up
batteries
was
drained
due
to
wrong
wiring.
After
the
chaos
and
oil
could
not
stopped
coming
from
the
well,
the
BOP
was
used
manually.
According
to
CSB,
due
to
high
pressure
within
the
riser,
the
pipe
buckled
up
inside
the
BOP.
The
buckling
process
caused
off
centering
of
the
pipe,
affecting
blind
sheer
ram
inside
the
BOP
to
cut
off
the
well
from
the
rig.
BOP
has
three
prevention
systems
within,
Pipe
ramps
is
used
as
a
temporary
fixture,
but
due
to
high
pressure
and
Oil
and
Gas
was
already
in
the
riser,
and
it
failed.
One
factor
that
maybe
acute
to
consider
but
it
may
have
affected
post
blowout
reaction
of
the
employees.
The
alarms
on
the
rig
were
disabled
to
prevent
any
false
alarm.
If
alarm
system
were
running
as
usual,
they
would
have
gone
off
with
the
high
gas
level
before
the
blowout.
This
simple
act
would
have
safe
the
lives
that
were
lost
that
day.
Some
of
the
issues
discussed
led
to
the
conclusion
that
BP
could
have
prevented
this
environmental
and
economical
disaster,
if
they
would
have
taken
the
decisions
in
favor
of
safety
rather
than
cutting
cost
and
saving
time.
BP
cannot
be
fully
accountable
for
the
disaster;
there
were
other
companies
involved
in
some
of
the
critical
decisions
that
were
made
at
that
point.
Some
of
the
decisions
related
to
this
disaster;
some
how
link
to
decisions
we
make
everyday.
For
instance,
while
you
are
driving
and
approach
a
yellow
traffic
light,
its
your
decision
to
hit
the
gas
or
brake.
Either
way
both
of
the
decision
can
be
dangerous
at
their
state.
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
The
decisions
made
at
that
stage
by
BP
or
other
companies,
reflect
their
corporate
culture
and
practices.
Some
of
the
decisions
were
made
under
pressure,
as
there
were
huge
amount
of
money
at
stake
every
day.
According
to
business
perspective,
BPs
decision
will
be
considered
appropriate
but
they
were
ethically
wrong;
which
led
to
this
disastrous
event.
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
assurances
on
the
design
and
safety
elements.
The
permits
was
issued
to
Exxon
without
required
documentation,
without
strict
compliance
with
industry
and
federal
rules.
The
rules
were
bended
in
favour
of
the
organization
with
immense
resources
and
political
momentum,
(Zygmunt,
2010).
DWH
also
exhibits
same
complacency
and
inapproriate
collusion;
the
regulators
and
regulatees
worked
together
as
a
single
community.
The
lease
was
granted
oversighting
the
depth
of
the
well
and
with
lenient
requirements
for
drilling.
BP
not
even
disclosed
the
geological
data,
in
the
name
of
corporate
policy.
Both
of
the
disaster
were
decades
apart,
but
reveal
same
systematic
failure.
In
both
cases
the
contingency
plan
were
highly
fictious.
There
were
no
demonstarted
technology
to
capture
a
such
blowout,
at
the
Macondo
well.
In
Alaska,
the
Exxon
initial
plan
failed
to
capture
the
oil
and
the
generic
corporte
plan
was
executed.
It
showed
the
negligence
and
unpreparedness
in
respective
cases
by
both
companies.
Government
planning
and
response
to
the
incident
seems
identical
in
1989
and
2010.
In
1989
government
had
limited
expertise
to
supervise
a
massive
oil
spill
in
a
remotely
and
environmentally
sensitive
location.
Lack
of
expertise
led
towards
affecting
the
environment;
which
seems
identical
in
DWH
case.
This
time
government
had
little
expertise
to
stop
the
oil
discharging
from
the
sea
floor
and
million
of
gallons
disperesed
into
the
Gulf
of
Mexico.
Both
incidents
affects
the
environment
badly,
but
EVOS
did
recordidly
more,
(according
to
US
Fish
and
Wildlife
Service).
10
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
The
Exxon
Valdez
grounding
and
oil
spill
occurred
due
to
human
error,
mismanagement
and
perhaps
an
overconfidence
in
vessel
auto
navigation.
Human
error
occurred
to
Captians
irresponsible
behaviour
and
failure
to
provide
navigation
watch
to
third
mate.
The
third
mate
failed
to
maneuver
the
vessel
due
to
stress
and
high
work
load.
The
Deepwater
Horizon
explosion
and
sea
floor
oil
discharge
represented
a
high
risk
engineering
decision
and
management
flaws.
BP
portrays
poor
safety
culture,
which
curtained
up
due
to
incidents
investigation.
BP
was
also
overconfident
in
BOP
used
at
extreme
depth
and
under
unanticipated
extreme
situations.
There
were
less
promising
dissimilarities
as
well,
however.
In
the
20
years
since
Exxon
Valdez,
the
technology
of
media
spin
control
has
grown
exponentially
in
sophistication,
the
political
setting
has
drifted
farther
from
concern
with
science
and
fact
as
congressional
polarization
has
increased.
Both
cases
demonstrates
the
interdependencies
among
regulatory
bodies
as
they
conducted
response
operation.
Both
cases
showed
high
complexity
in
managing
response
operations
and
critical
situations.
Furthermore,
both
incidents
demonstrated
the
interaction
between
lapses
in
human
judgement
ans
massive
consequences
from
the
breakdown
of
large
scale
technical
systems.
Evidently,
both
companies
at
the
time
of
incident
was
operating
to
increase
productivity
as
a
primary
motive
rather
than
safety.
Convincingly
the
safety
measures
and
issues
were
compromised
in
order
to
curtail
cost
and
save
time,
as
both
companies
at
the
time
of
the
unethical
event
behind
their
schedule.
11
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
12
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
to
enhance
sustainability,
reduces
pollution
and
lower
the
cost
of
mitigating
climate
change,
(IEA,
2011).
Wind
Power
is
produced
by
the
energy
of
wind
turning
aerodynamic
blades
mounted
on
a
hub.
The
hub
is
connected
to
a
shaft
that
turns
generator,
which
helps
to
produce
electricity.
Renewable
energy
production
helps
to
stabilizes
the
economy.
The
most
of
the
investment
are
spent
on
materials
and
workmanship
to
build
and
maintain
facilities,
rather
than
on
costly
fossil
fuel
imports.
These
investments
helps
to
create
more
jobs
and
strengthen
the
local
economy.
Renewable
energy
companies
contribute
more
local
tax
revenue
than
fossil
fuel
energy
companies.
In
strong
wind
areas,
farmer
and
other
land
owners
can
lease
their
land
to
wind
or
solar
energy
developer.
It
will
help
the
farmer
to
produce
energy
for
their
farming
use
and
earn
more
money
for
better
standard
of
living,
(Burton,-).
A
small
wind
turbine
uses
less
space
but
can
produce
sufficient
energy
for
farming
and
personal
use.
This
can
be
helpful
in
reducing
farmers
operating
cost
and
in
areas
where
state
governed
electrical
lines
are
not
available.
Renewable
energy
generation
helps
to
reduce
the
negative
effect
on
the
environment.
It
does
not
produce
carbon
dioxide
or
other
chemical
pollutants.
The
positivity
of
using
the
renewable
energy
is
easily
visible
as
of
fossil
fuel
usage.
Usage
of
renewable
energies
can
also
helps
to
avoid
the
environmental
and
economical
disaster
like,
Exxon
Valdez
or
Deepwater
Horizon
Oil
Spill.
13
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
Renewable
energy
sources
can
have
its
own
drawbacks.
One
of
the
negativity
is
that
it
is
not
able
to
produce
large
quantities
of
electricity
that
is
possible
by
traditional
fossil
fuel
generation.
Another
drawback
is
to
rely
on
natural
resources
availabilty.
Some
time
due
to
bad
weather
conditions,
it
may
not
be
possible
to
produce
solar,
wind
or
hydro
power.
This
means
to
create
a
balance
in
to
energy
usage
and
to
avoid
deprevation
of
energy
from
our
lives,
we
need
a
combination
of
traditional
fossil
fuel
and
conservative
renewable
energy
generation.
14
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
REFERENCES
"Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
the
Spill".
Exxon
Valdez
Oil
Spill
Trustee
Council.
Archived
from
the
original
on
June
30,
2007.
Retrieved
October
11,
2010.
15
CSR
Deepwater
Horizon
Report
Exxon
Valdez
Oil
Spill
Trustee
Council,
Oil
Spill
Facts:
Questions
and
Answers,
available
at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.QA;
John
A.
Wiens
et
al.,
Oil
and
marine
birds
in
a
variable
environment,
in
Oil
in
the
Environment:
Legacies
and
Lessons
of
the
Exxon
Valdez
Oil
Spill
318,
320-
321
at
320
(John
A.
Wiens
ed.,
2013).
Skinner,
Samuel
K;
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