CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

WEEK 1 ASSIGNED CASES

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
FACTS:

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.

In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00.

In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.

RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N Elesios marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
HELD: YES
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as
void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the
Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such
that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest
of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the
possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely

remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition
for Letters of Administration.

G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
FACTS:

September 16, 2001 petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese national, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba,
Pampanga.

September 16, 2004- Kobayashi sought in Japan and was validly granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect to his
marriage with petitioner. He was able to obtain a copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan
and duly authenticated by the DFA, Manila. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of
Manila.

Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner
married Masatomi Y. Ando on September 13, 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga.

In the meantime, Kobayashi remarried on December 27, 2005.

Recently, petitioner applied for renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with husband Ando but she was told at
the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her
husband Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief and impleaded the DFA as respondent wherein she prayed therein,
among others, to declare as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner and husband Ando until otherwise declared by
a competent court.

RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set
forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.

Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to file a direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory
relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage even one that is void or voidable shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was correct in filing a petition for recognition of her second marriage instead of a petition for judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce from the first husband?
HELD: NO

In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for
declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or
evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under
that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of
evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
FACTS:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did
not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus,

filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During the trial, respondent denied having known the supposed husband but recognized the witnesses to the marriage. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, in order to obtain a passport.
RTC granted respondents petition for cancellation of entries in the latters marriage contract.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.
RTC denied the motion. The court held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on
substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35
and 36 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule
108 proceeding.

HELD:
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite
of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.

G.R. No. 176121 September 22, 2014

SPOUSES TEODORICO and PACITA ROSETE, Petitioners,
vs. FELIX and/or MARIETTA BRIONES, SPOUSES JOSE and REMEDIOS ROSETE, AND NEORIMSE and FELICITAS CORPUZ,
Respondents.
FACTS:

The subject is a 152-square meter owned by National Housing Authority (NHA).

NHA awarded the subject lot to petitioner Teodorico Rosete. The respondents objected to the award, claiming that the award of
the entire lot to Teodorico was erroneous.

In 1990, a Declaration of Real Property was filed and issued in Teodoricos name. On March 21, 1991, he made the full payment
of the value of the subject lot in the amount of P43,472 as well as the real property taxes thereon.

In a letter-decision, NHA considered the objections raised by respondents. The original award of 152 sq.m. in his favour has been
cancelled and instead, subdivided and awarded as follows: a)Teodorico 62 sq.m.; b) The Brioneses 40 sq.m.; c) The Rosetes25 sq.m.; d) The Corpuzes-15 sq.m..; and e) easement for pathwalk-10sq.m.

In the same Letter-Decision, NHA likewise informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted accordingly, but his excess
payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees amortizations. His coawardees shall in turn pay
him, under pain of cancellation of their respective awards.

Teodorico protested and sought a reconsideration of the decision, claiming that it was unfair and confiscatory. He likewise
requested that his co-awardees be required to reimburse his property tax payments.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the failure of the respondents to return the overpayment to them would result in unjust enrichment.
HELD: NO
This Court cannot order a refund of Teodorico's overpayments. First of all, NHA - the recipient of the overpayment - cannot be
ordered to make a refund, since Teodorico never prayed to recover from it; in all his submissions - from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and
all the way up to this Court - he consistently sought reimbursement only from his co-awardees, not the NHA. Secondly, the specific
amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record; this being the case, it cannot be determined how much exactly
each of Teodorico's co-awardees owes him. Thirdly, this Court is not a trier of facts; it cannot go out of its way to determine and
analyze from the record what should be returned to Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the matter. Suffice it to state that
petitioners are indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying for the value of the subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over
and above what was awarded to them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that "[w]hoever pays for another may
demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor." They may also recover from the NHA, applying the principle of
solutio indebiti

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ, Petitioners,
vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.
FACTS:

July 25, 2001 respondent, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA
Boutique of Robinsons Department Store in Cebu City. She decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00. Respondent
allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store.

While she was waliking, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however,
insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it at the
Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall.

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of
Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how
much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the employers of respondent narrating the incident but the
latter refused to receive it as it did not concerned the office and it took place while respondent was off duty. Robinsons Human
Resource Department was furnished said letter and the latter conducted investigation for purposes of cancelling the credit card
of respondent. With all these experiences, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for
Damages before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc.

Petitioners admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment but claimed that instead of the cashier issuing the receipt, it was the
invoicer who did it manually. They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who
was arrogant in answering their questions.

RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision and found the preponderance of evidence showing bad faith
in sending the demand letter to respondents employer.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in finding that the letter sent to the employer was made to subject herein respondent to ridicule, humiliation
and similar injury.
HELD: NO

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty,
act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were
able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were
raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting
views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the
shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on
the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the
amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer

not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. Petitioners claimed that after receiving
the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused
respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I cant remember."
Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would
(sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if
she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very certain
that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she
vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very busy.
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the
jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment.
These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not in a
rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her
when they realized the supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer, petitioners intended not
only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To
malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to
liability.

G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner from
manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of respondent.

Respondent alleged that since 1992, it has been manufacturing and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. Petitioner on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal has its office near that of respondent. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of[petitioners
office to respondents office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondents employees had transferred to petitioner,
petitioner had developed familiarity with respondents products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately
copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that if there is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another, the copying thereof
for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers

Respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article
28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case as the parties are
trade rivals and petitioners acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former
employees.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
HELD: YES

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a
right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what
the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor
or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a
private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.

Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the
manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as
petitioner admitted having employed respondents former employees, deliberately copied respondents products and even went to
the extent of selling these products to respondents customers.

Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from
manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ
and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.

G.R. No. 193314 June 25, 2013

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUPAG and RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA. Respondents.
FACTS:

On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10
May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).

Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born
in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.

On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when
she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the
former was overseeing the construction of her house.

COMELEC ruled that petitioner never acquired a new domicile in Baliangao because she never failed to prove her bodily presence
at that place, her intention to remain there, and her intention to never return to her domicile of origin. Hence, respondent
COMELEC disqualified petitioner from running for the position of mayor of Baliangao.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-year residency requirement in
the same municipality
HELD: NO
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and that the statements are in fact
consistent with her claim that she had been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections. She argues as follows:

x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in a different
barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent or contradictory with petitioners assertion and
the witnesses statements that petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas, because petitioner obviously needed a place to
stay while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed. This does not negate the fact that petitioner was
establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few
months (sic) of January 2009.

Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very latest
during the first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that she herself cannot pinpoint the particular date when she established her
legal residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to the declaration of the witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that
Ms. Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been an actual and physical resident of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, after she bought
the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on 9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest
and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential
structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet
established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual
and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.

G.R. No.198878
October 15, 2014
RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB & TEACHERS' VILLAGE, STO. TOMAS PROPER BARANGAY, BAGUIO CITY, represented by
BEATRICE T. PULAS, CRISTINA A. LAPP AO. MICHAEL MADIGUID, FLORENCIO MABUDYANG and FERNANDO DOSALIN,
Petitioners,
vs. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS:

Petitioners filed a civil case of quieting of title with damages against respondent. Petitioners alleged that they are successor and
transferees-in-interest of Torres, the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City which Torres possessed and
declared for tax purposes; that they are in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, and declared their
respective lots and homes for tax purposes.

In May 2000, respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property, claiming that it is the owner of a large portion thereof
by virtue of TCT No. T-631849. Petitioners alleged that said TCT is null and void as it was derived from Original Certificate TCT No.
0-281, which was declared void pursuant to P.D. 1271.

Respondents countered that TCT T-63184 is a valid and subsisting title; that the case for quieting of title constitutes a collateral
attack upon TC T-63184; and that petitioners have no title to the subject property.

RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for quieting of title.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that plaintiffs are without any title to be cleared of or to be
quieted nor can they be regarded as having equitable title over the subject property.

Petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and nullification of respondents TCT. They argue that they have
equitable title over the subject property, having possessed the same for many years and obtained the rights of their predecessor
Torres.
ISSUE: W/N RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for quieting of title.
HELD: NO
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must be present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership."
Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and capable of being enforced in the courts at the
suit of the beneficial owner. Blacks Law Dictionary indicates that the term is used in two senses: first, to indicate the interest of a
beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy
or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the corporations books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is
distinguished from naked ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of
the bare title to property.
Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are no certificates of title in their
respective names. And by their own admission in their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial
court, they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property from the government, through townsite sales
applications coursed through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in
order that the said title would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications pending with the DENR. Thus, petitioners
admitted that they are not the owners of the subject property; the same constitutes state or government land which they would like
to acquire by purchase. It would have been different if they were directly claiming the property as their own as a result of acquisitive
prescription, which would then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating that they were in the process of applying to purchase
the subject property from the government, they admitted that they had no such equitable title, at the very least, which should allow
them to prosecute a case for quieting of title.
In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the subject property lies in the State Thus, as to them,
quieting of title is not an available remedy.
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,
Respondent.
FACTS:

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a complaint against Judge Remegio Rojo for violating the Code
of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.

Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation
and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties marriage. These "package
marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City.

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90
dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected
with a judges official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.

Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was
connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.

OCA found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

ISSUE: W/N a person who notarize the affidavits of cohabitation may solemnize the parties marriage.
HELD: NO
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes
the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have
indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can
notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judges official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the
solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before
performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized,
he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their
marriages]." He notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691

April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch
4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6,
Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative
Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III,
RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS,
Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and
HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.

FACTS:

On July 3, 2007, OCA created a judicial audit team to conduct an audit of branches 2,3,4 and 8 of MTCC Cebu.

The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their
documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who
would go over the couples documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated
several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by
Judge Tormis;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the
payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and
the judge, was paid to the latter. She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the
irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang
Boy";
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the
judge received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to
have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses
if the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;
5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales.
However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and
28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute
marriage solemnization;

6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil
Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation
form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing
money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad." The
excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking
fund" of Branch 9;
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to
get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten
pesos (P10);
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of
Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario. He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates.The respondent judge then inquired about
their ages and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
applications. Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because
these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate
of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage
license.

As a result of said audit, they filed administrative complaint against respondent judges and other court personnel.
In his comment, Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him
by contracting parties. He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of
cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.

ISSUE: W/N the judges and other court personnel are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency
and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
HELD: YES
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were
incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or
superimpositions of entries related to the parties place of residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and
carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when,
from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten
public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization
fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the
payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the
process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not
submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating
their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family
Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the
marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family
Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status
of one party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to
twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were
notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage
license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage
was solemnized.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the
contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the
marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but
reasonably construed The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled

rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other
during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.

A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

FACTS:

In her complaint, Bansig stated that on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie Bunagan entered into a contract of marriage,
as evidenced by a certified Xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the
sister of the legal wife of the respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondents marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998
with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified erox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.

Complainant stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alva, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.

In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint.

After respondents failure to submit comments and to comply with the Show Cause Order, the Court resolved to direct
respondents arrest and detain him for non-compliance with a previous resolution.

Since respondent could not be located, he was declared in default by the IBPp-CBD and ordered that he be suspended in the
practice of law for two years.
ISSUE: W/N the IBP-CBD erred in suspending respondents practice of law for two years.
HELD: YES
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in
the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba
at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage
while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his
first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage with Alba.

G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.

FACTS:

December 28, 1998 respondent file a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity
[which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct."
As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two
daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman.
Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage,
although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couples union was bereft of the mind,
will and heart for the obligations of marriage."

Solicitor General opposed the complaint on the ground that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological
incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.
RTC declared the marriage of respondent and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding that while Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by
themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations."

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological incapacity.
HELD: YES
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b)
juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved).
Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however,
explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it existed
at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform
the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability
of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare
conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report,
also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated.
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually
given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.
After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a
quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as
well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify
the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant
to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these
reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, the instant
petition is hereby granted.

G.R. No. 199402

November 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs. ENRIQUE QUINTOS y BADILLA, Accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused Enrique Quintos was charged with rape allegedly committed against AAA, a mental retardate. AAA was intellectually
disabled, she was 21 years old with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months.

AAA testified that in October 2007, accused, who was her neighbor, went to her house to watch television. Accused followed her
when she went to the bathroom. In the bathroom, accused removed his shorts and underwear, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA did not want to have intercourse with the accused, but she did not tell the accused to stop.1 During the trial, AAA
pointed to a man in yellow shirt as the man who followed her in the bathroom. She identified his name as "Enrique Quintos."

The next day, while AAA was sleeping, accused removed her undergarments, as well as his own undergarments. Accused then
laid on top of her and, again, inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA also recalled that on a different day, accused kissed her and
held her breasts. There was also one Thursday night when accused forced AAA to take his penis inside her mouth despite her
protests.

Accused claimed that he did not rape AAA. He was in a romantic and sexual relationship with AAA. However, he ended this
relationship when he got his now common-law wife pregnant. He insisted that AAAs charges were fabricated because of AAAs
inability to accept that he ended their relationship.

RTC found the accused guilty of two counts of rape.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in finding the accused guilty of rape.
HELD: NO
The intellectual disability of the witness does not make her testimony incredible, especially when corroborated by
other evidence
AAA's mental condition does not makeher testimony incredible as long as she can recount her experiencein a
straightforward, spontaneous, and believable manner. In People v. Monticalvo, this court said the following:

Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court
where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capable and consistently. Rather than undermine
the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone
as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has
not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.
AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed that there were lacerations inher hymen that were
produced by a blunt object. The testimonial evidence is bolstered by the presence of these lacerations. Together, they produce a
moral conviction that accused committed the crimes charged.
The existence of a relationship between accused and the victim does not negate rape
Accuseds argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases wherein the main element is "lack of
consent." Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing carnal knowledge upon another is considered rape, more so
when the victim is incapable of giving consent due to her mental capacity. Even married couples, upon whom the law imposes the
duty to cohabitate, are protected from forced sexual congress.
Rape, as now defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, does not make a distinction with regard to an accused's
relationship with the victim. It only requires that sexual congress be forced by a man upon another person. Moreover, Republic Act No.
9262 recognizes that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may be raped by their husbands, former husbands, coparents, or sweethearts by stating that committing acts of rape against these persons are considered violence against women.
Absence of resistance does not, by itself, establish consent
Accuseds allegation that AAA did notresist his advances was belied by AAAs testimony that accused threatened the lives of
her mother and siblings. This is intimidation that could explain AAAs alleged lack of resistance.
In any case, resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. It need not be shown by the prosecution. Neither is it
necessary to convict an accused. The main element ofrape is "lack of consent."
"Consent," "resistance," and "absence of resistance" are different things. Consent implies agreement and voluntariness. It
implies willfulness. Similarly, resistance is an act of will. However, it implies the opposite of consent. It implies disagreement.
Meanwhile, absence of resistance only implies passivity. It may be a product of ones will. It may imply consent. However, it
may also be the product of force, intimidation, manipulation, and other external forces.
Thus, when a person resists anotherssexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that that person does not
consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of consent. Sexual congress with a person who
expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation. It is
rape. Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may imply consent, there are
circumstances that may render a person unable to express her resistance to anothers sexual advances. Thus, when a person has
carnal knowledge with another person who does not show any resistance, it does not always mean that that person consented to
such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when a man has carnal
knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or intimidation. It enumerates at least four other
circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking advantage of a persons deprived reason or unconscious state; (2)
through fraudulent machination; (3) bytaking advantage of a persons age (12 years of age) or demented status; and (4) through
grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizesthat rape can happen even in circumstances when there is noresistance from the
victim.
Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is unconscious, deprived of reason,
manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or mental age.
[ G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014 ]
CELERINA J. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO T. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:

RTC of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo, had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.

In his petition, Ricardo alleged that a year after they got married on June 18, 1980, they moved to Tarlac City. When their
business did not prosper, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She allegedly applied
in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. Her parents, other relatives and friends did not know the
whereabouts of Celerina. He claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left and he
believed that she had passed away.

Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She
argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a
domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. She also claimed that it was not true
that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he
who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their
children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.

CA dismissed the petition. Hence this petition was filed.

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse
is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death. She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.

In Ricardo's comment, he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be
availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the
subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the
Family Code is the appropriate remedy.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing Celerinas petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently
obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
HELD: YES
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and
the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in
Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents
a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Thus:

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance
is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only
when
all
the
conditions
enumerated
in
the
Family
Code
are
present.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice.
Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
G.R. No. 191566
July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
FACTS:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor Alagon.

August 1994- respondent filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, RTC granted
respondents petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died.

In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina, hence
she filed a complaint charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the case be dismissed on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge
the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
RTC held that the facts alleged in the information that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without
such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon constitute the crime of bigamy.
The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.

ISSUE: W/N the subsequent court judgment declaring respondents first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondents
criminal liability which already attached prior to said judgment.
HELD: YES
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab
initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the
CA heavily relied on the Courts pronouncement in Morigo v. People where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements
of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed
the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second
marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that
a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow respondents
line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.
[ G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014 ]
CELERINA J. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO T. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
Refer to case digest above.22