XI.

C
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY
HOLDINGS CORP., G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11,
2004 MATA
The special civil action for certiorari and appeal
are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive;
they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is
available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed
remedy of appeal.
Facts:
On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal
Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 49. Later, on February 21, 1998,
petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
Respondents
Lapanday
Holdings
Corporation
(Lapanday),
Macondray
and
Company,
Inc.
(Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 36.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged that it had
entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday
for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service
the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc
however, despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo
had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte
charter hire contracts.
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court
(RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.On March
30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday,
Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions
to Dismiss on the complaint for damages filed by the
Petitioner.
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the
Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency
Law, the trial court opined that upon the filing by
Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the
latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for
Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to
prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed
assignee.
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration(MR), but was denied by the said
court July 26, 1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998(the one
which granted the MD of the Complaint for damages)
and the July 26, 1999( the one which denied the MR)
Orders of the trial court.On January 10, 2000, the
appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the
instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be
treated as one for review as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal
was available. This was later on challenged by the
Respondents via their MRs. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA
opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was
final and thus the proper subject of an appeal,
not certiorari. It averred that even if the Petition could
be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the issues
raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that
should be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Is the petition for certiorari proper?
Ruling:
No.
Supreme Court held thatwhen any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
Further, a writ of certiorari may be issued only
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
The following requisites must concur for
certiorari to prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved
party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review)
and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own
negligence or error in ones choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. Whenan appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is
a final order.It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to
be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of
the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
Its not a PROVREM 2015 1

In this case, the RTC did not rendered a

decision that is in in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the complaint on
the ground that there was no cause of action as per
supported by the facts of the case. Since, it was the
order of dismissal that was questioned, a certiorari is
improper because it can be cured through an appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances that the Supreme
Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of
appeal however, in this case, Petitioner did not show
that the court, order constitutes a despotic, capricious,
or whimsical exercise of power, but it availed certiorari
because the 15-day period within which to file an
appeal had already lapsed. Petition is denied.
Quick digest:
ABC Transport filed Petition for Voluntary
Insolvencyin an insolvency court. Later on, it filed a
complaint for damages against DEF Corporation for
failure to comply the agreement in their contract in
another court. The insolvency case was granted. DEF
Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that there was no cause of action because the
complaint for damages must be filed at the insolvency
court where ABC Transport filed its insolvency case as
provided by the Insolvency Law.
The RTC order
dismissal to the Complaint for damages for lack of
cause of action. ABC Transport then filed a petition for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals over the order of
dismissal of the RTC. As a judge, will you grant the
petition for certiorari?
No.
Supreme Court held that where appeal is
available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of
appeal, including petitions for review, and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in
ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

In this case, the order of dismissal rendered by
the RTC is a final order in which it can avail appeal
within its given period. However, ABC Transport failed
to file an appeal within its required period. Neither had
it appeared that there was an excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction that was exercised by the RTC. Therefore,
the petition for certiorari was improper.
Side Notes:
Discussion of the difference between appeal and
certiorari.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Even if the findings of the court are
incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case,
such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari. On the other hand, where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a
mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA
exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review.
Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and
supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while
a petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in
the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the
action. In contrast, the parties to a petition
for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby
becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).

The following requisites must concur for

certiorari to prosper: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should

be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review
should be filed and served within fifteen days from the
notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners
timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal bycertiorari, the petition
should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice
of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. On the other hand, a petition
for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days
from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was
timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial
of the motion.

An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is

a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to
be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of
the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford
the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors.

Its not a PROVREM 2015 2

XI.F
TOPACIO V. ONG, G.R. NO.
DECEMBER 18, 2008 CABUENAS CLEA

179895,

Principle:
The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by a quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot
be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a
motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista
Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does
not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of
a public officer.
FACTS: Petitioner via the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeks to prevent Justice Ong from
further
exercising
the
powers,
duties
and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
In Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court enjoined
Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all
necessary steps, through appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and
citizenship.
Ong immediately filed with the RTC a Petition for the
amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation
of an entry in his Certificate of Birth. The RTC granted
his petition and recognized him as a natural-born
citizen.
Petitioner implored respondent OSG to initiate posthaste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the
latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan because Ong failed to meet the
citizenship requirement form the time of his
appointment.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:

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deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion
simply because the affected party disagrees
with it. The Solicitor General is the counsel of
the
government,
its
agencies
and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In
the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General
must see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld within the limits set by
law.
2.

Yes.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, the petition partakes of the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to
declare null and void his appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for
being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and
prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo
warranto" aspect of the petition.
Being a collateral attack on a public officer's
title, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, even through mandamus or a
motion to annul or set aside order. In
Nacionalista Party v. de Vera, the Court ruled
that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the
validity of the appointment of a public officer.
. . . [T]he writ of prohibition, even when
directed against persons acting as judges or
other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully
called upon to perform any of the functions of
the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de
facto , the title to the office and the right to act
cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an
intruder takes possession of a judicial office,
the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief
through a writ of prohibition commanding the
alleged intruder to cease from performing
judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition
is an improper remedy by which to determine
the title to an office.

1.

Whether the OSG committed grave abuse of

discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for
quo warranto.

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo

warranto, the petition is, just the same,
dismissible.

2.

Whether the petition for certiorari and

prohibition filed by petitioner partakes of the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
respect to Ong.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal

remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped,
intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised
the public office, and may be commenced by
the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as
the case may be, or by any person claiming to
be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.

HELD:
1. No.
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion,
much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG
in deferring action on the filing of a quo
warranto case until after the RTC case has been
terminated with finality. A decision is not

Its not a PROVREM 2015 3

Nothing is more settled than the principle,

which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v.
Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of
Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto
petition to be successful, the private
person suing must show a clear right to
the contested office. In fact, not even a mere
preferential right to be appointed thereto can
lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed
with the action.
In the present case, petitioner presented no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that
he was never entitled to assume the office of
an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full
exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot
be questioned by any merely private suitor, or
by any other, except in the form especially
provided by law. To uphold such action would
encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to
the courts, thereby causing incalculable
mischief and hindrance to the efficient
operation of the governmental machine.
Petition dismissed.
SHORT DIGEST:
X filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
Justice Y from further exercising the powers, duties and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
X contends that Ong should immediately desist from
holding the position of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of
citizenship. (Y alleged to be a Chinese citizen).
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner partakes of the nature of
a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong.
HELD: Yes.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it
effectively seeks to declare null and void his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the
petition professes to be one for certiorari and
prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto"
aspect of the petition.
Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo
warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy
to determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have
usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised
the public office, and may be commenced by the

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case
may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
XI.G MORABE V. BROWN, G.R. NO. L-6018, MAY
31, 1954 CANETE FRANCIS
PRINCIPLE:
The action of the petitioner is not an action of
injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the
performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo
S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory
injunction is also a mandamus, though merely
provisional in character.
FACTS:
Respondent William Brown had dismissed his
employee, Pablo S. Afuang, because he was one of the
complainants in an investigation conducted by the
petitioner Emiliano Morabe, Acting Chief, Wage
Administration
Service,of
charges
against
the
respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond
the time fixed in Republic Act No. 602.
An original petition filed by the petitioner in the
Court of First Instance of Manila praying that the
respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang,
and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issue for his reinstatement.The court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The respondent presented a petition asking for
the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Pablo S.
Afuang had presented a letter asking excuse or
apology from the respondent for having taken his case
to court. However, his motion was not acted upon and
the case was heard and the parties presented their
evidence.
The CFI rendered judgment finding that the
dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is
unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage
Law, because the fact that he testified at the
investigation is not a valid ground for his dismissal
from the service. The court, however, refused to grant
an order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang
on the ground that this remedy, which it considers
as an injunction, is available only against acts
about to be committed or actually being
committed, and not against past acts;
ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in not ordering the
respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.
HELD:YES.
It is evident that the court a quo erred in
considering that mandatory injunction is preventive in
nature, and may not be granted by the Court of First
Instance once the act complained of has been carried
out.The action of the petitioner is not an action of
injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the
performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo
S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory
injunction is also amandamus, though merely
provisional in character.
Its not a PROVREM 2015 4

In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled

to continue in the service of respondent, because his
act is expressly provided to be no ground or reason for
an employee's dismissal. Section 13 of Republic Act No.
602 states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge or in any other manner to discriminate
against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act.
Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of
his right or privilege to continue in the service of the
respondent, because his dismissal was unlawful or
illegal. Having been deprived of such right or privilege,
it is within the competence of courts to compel the
respondent to admit him back to his service.

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

It is evident that the court a quo erred in
considering that mandatory injunction is preventive in
nature, and may not be granted by the Court of First
Instance once the act complained of has been carried
out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of
injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the
performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo
S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory
injunction is also a mandamus, though merely
provisional in character.

XI.K HERRERA V. BARRETTO, 25 PHIL. 245 TRIXIE

SEE XI.P

In Manila Electric Co. vs. Del Rosario and

Jose,the lower court ordered the Manila Electric Co. to
furnish electric current to Jose, the electric company
having cut the current to Jose's house because it
suspected him of stealing electricity by the use of a
jumper. This Court held that the action was not one of
injunction but of mandamus, as it compelled the
electric company to furnish Jose with electric service. In
the case at bar, the court can also order the
respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang. Were we to
hold that Afuang may not be reinstated because he has
already been dismissed; there would not be any
remedy against the injustice done him, or for him to
return to the position or employment from which he
was unlawfully discharged.

Jurisdiction

Exercise
Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear
and determine a
cause

Where
there
is
jurisdiction of the
person and subject
matter, as we have
said before, the
decision
of
all
other
questions
arising in the case
is but an exercise
of that jurisdiction.

the right to act in a

case. Since it is the
power to hear and
determine, it does
not depend either
upon the regularity
of the exercise of
that power or upon
the rightfulness of
the
decisions
made.

The judgment appealed from is hereby

reversed, and the respondent William Brown is hereby
ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang to the position he
held prior to his dismissal.

of

QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner Morabe filed the original petitionin
the CFI of Manila praying that the respondent be
ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his
reinstatement. The latter was dismissed by the
respondent on the ground that he was one of the
complainants in an investigation conducted by the
petitionerof charges against the respondent that the
latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in
Republic Act No. 602.
The CFI rendered judgment finding that the
dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is
unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage
Law. The court, however, refused to grant an order for
the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the
ground that this remedy, which it considers as an
injunction, is available only against acts about to be
committed or actually being committed, and not
against past acts.
ISSUE:WON the CFI erred in not ordering the
respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.
HELD: YES.

The authority to
decide a cause at
all, and not the
decision rendered
therein, is what
makes
up
jurisdiction.

Facts:
The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari
by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly
acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the
cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the
petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal
President revoked to operate. Respondent judge
apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing
of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to
the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for
certiorari before the higher court against the
respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for
issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.
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Issue: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the

case
at
bar.
Ruling:
No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is
established whether or not the court to which it is
directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once
the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties in a case all decisions exercised within its
jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be
corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has
the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all
matters
arising
in
question.Court
held
that
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power
to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon
the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should
therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and
not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction.
Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct
errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no
matter how irregular or erroneous it is.
XI.L MICROSOFT CORP. V. BEST DEAL COMPUTER
CENTER CORP., G.R. NO. 148029, SEPTEMBER 24,
2002 LAMBAN
PRINCIPLE:
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.

The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari

seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a
petition for review seeks to correct errors of
judgment committed by the court. Errors of
judgment include errors of procedure or
mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court
has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed
in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment.
FACTS:
- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting
to protect its intellectual property rights through filing
a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the
Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against
Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal
Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as
Perfect Byte Computer Center alleging that defendants
without authority or license copied, reproduced,
distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs
owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them
to their customers. Furthermore, it prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
and enjoin defendants from illegally reproducing,
selling and distributing unlicensed software programs
and also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order
for the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence
that can be or may be found at defendants' business
premises.
-The Las Pinas trial court set petitioner's prayer for a
temporary restraining order for hearing but at the
same time denied its application for an ex parte order
ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code does
not expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case,
the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights) AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it,
and that petitioner's application partook of a search
and seizure order available only in criminal cases.
-In the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court petitioner submits that the
court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law
does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of
seizure and impounding of infringing evidence. It
maintains that Sec. 216.2, Part IV, of RA 8293
authorizes such order. It concedes though that while RA
8293 does not expressly mention the provisional and
ex parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, Art. 50 of
the TRIPS Agreement amply supplies the deficiency. It
allegedly resorted to the instant recourse because it
had no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It automatically
invoked the jurisdiction of this Court supposedly
because of the importance of the issue involved. It
bypassed the Court of Appeals on the premise that it
would be useless to first seek recourse thereat as the
party aggrieved by the appellate court's ruling would
nonetheless elevate the matter to this Court. By then,
petitioner surmised, the level of intellectual piracy
would have worsened. Likewise, petitioner presumes
that direct resort to this Court is justified as the petition
involves a pure question of law.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Petition for Certiorari can be
exercised to correct public respondent's evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings.

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2. Whether acts complained of by the petitioner

constitutes error of judgement or error of jurisdiction.
Held:
1. Negative.
- Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.
-The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include correction of public
respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings thereon.
-The petition for certiorari must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because as long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
2. Acts complained of constitutes error of judgement
-Section 19, par. (8), BP Blg. 129, as amended,
provides that Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which
the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds P200,000.00. In the
complaint filed before the court a quo, petitioner
averred that it incurred no less thanP750,000.00 in
attorney's fees, investigation and litigation expenses
and another P2,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.
Clearly, the above amounts fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. Also, the complaint was
properly lodged in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
considering that one of the principal defendants was
residing thereat.
-Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely
abused its discretion in denying its application for the
issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than this
bare allegation, petitioner failed to point out specific
instances where grave abuse of discretion was
allegedly committed. It was never shown how
respondent tribunal supposedly exercised its power in
a despotic, capricious or whimsical manner. There
being no hint of grave abuse of discretion that can be
attributed to the lower court, hence, it could be safely
held that the assailed orders were rendered in the
proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
-Significantly, even assuming that the orders
were erroneous, such error would merely be

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari. As long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected
only by appeal. The distinction is clear: A
petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of
jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to
correct errors of judgment committed by the
court. Errors of judgment include errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court's findings.
Where a court has jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is an exercise of
that
jurisdiction.
Consequently,
all
errors
committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under
Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
Quick Digest of Facts:
- The case involves MICROSOFT CORPORATION fighting
to protect its intellectual property rights through filing
a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the
Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against
Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal
Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as
Perfect Byte Computer Center alleging that defendants
without authority or license copied, reproduced,
distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs
owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them
to their customers with prayer of issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants
from illegally reproducing, selling and distributing
unlicensed software programs and an application for
the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and
impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be
found at defendants' business premises. But the trial
court denied its application for an ex parte order.
-A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed
submitting that the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte
provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of
infringing evidence.
XI.M
CAMPOS V. WISLIZENUS, 35 PHIL. 373
FERNANDEZ
PRINCIPLE:
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends upon the existence of facts,
and
the
court
judicially
considers
and
Its not a PROVREM 2015 7

adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and

decides that the fact exist which are necessary to
give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is
conclusive and cannot be controverted in a
collateral proceeding.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu
requiring it to forward to this court the proceedings had
in a certain election contest between the petitioner
Nemesio Campos and the respondent Teodoro Aldanse,
to the end that such proceeding may be revised by this
court and certain steps taken therein annulled on the
ground that, in taking them, the court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction.
Upon the proclamation by the municipal board of
inspectors of the municipality of Sibonga, Province of
Cebu, declaring the respondent Teodoro Aldanese
elected to the position of municipal president of said
municipality, the petitioner filed a protest against the
election. After the filing of the protest copies were duly
made for service on the various persons receiving
votes for the office of the municipal president. The
service of the notice of protest upon the respondent
Teodoro Aldanese was made by delivering a copy
thereof to one Isidoro Aldanese, a brother of the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese, and who, it is claimed by
the petitioner, was living in the house of the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese at the time. Isidoro
Aldanese acknowledged in writing on the back of the
original notice of protest the fact that he had received
it. A copy of the certificate of service was attached to
the petition and made a part of it as Exhibit.
Thereafter, a motion was made to the court in which
the election contest was pending for the dismissal of
the proceedings on the ground that not all of the
persons receiving votes for the office of municipal
president were notified as required by law and
therefore the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
proceedings. The court, after hearing the parties with
regard to the service of the notice of protest on the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the
facts submitted, no service of the protest had been
made on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese in the
manner requires by law and that, therefore, the court
acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and
accordingly dismissed the protest.
The petitioner contends that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction in dismissing the proceedings and that its
action should be annulled and set aside and that the
court should be ordered to proceed with the contest.
The respondent filed a demurrer to the petition on the
ground, among others, that it did not state facts

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ, and the
question before us arises on that demurrer.
The court said: No proof whatever as to who is "I.
Aldanese" has been presented. It does not appear who
was the person who signed and under what authority
he signed, not even whether he resides in the house of
the respondent. The court, in the absence of proof,
finds that the notice was insufficient. Furthermore, said
notice was not made within the period fixed by law.
While the petition has annexed to it as an exhibit an
affidavit of service of the notice of protest on the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese which shows that the
notice was served in the manner required by law, that
affidavit of service was not made or presented to the
court until after the order had been made dismissing
the proceedings. It was first presented to the court as a
part of the moving papers on the motion for a
reconsideration
of
the
order
dismissing
the
proceedings. The order of dismissal was made on the
19th of July, 1916, at which time the only evidence
before the court as to the service of the notice was that
stated in the order of the court above-quoted. The
affidavit of service was made on the 20th of July on
which date the motion for reconsideration was
presented.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts finding as to jurisdiction is
conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral
proceeding..
SC RULING:
Yes.
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends upon the existence of facts,
and
the
court
judicially
considers
and
adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and
decides that the fact exist which are necessary to
give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is
conclusive and cannot be controverted in a
collateral proceeding.
The rule applies to a case where the proper service of
notice on the candidates voted for was challenged
and the court determined upon the facts presented,
after hearing the allegations of the parties and their
arguments based thereon, that service had not been
made as required by law. Such a determination
involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a
rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends upon the
determination of a question of fact and that question
has been determined by the court after a hearing,
that determination is conclusive and cannot be
Its not a PROVREM 2015 8

attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as

to the fact of service was introduced by the petitioner
and the sufficiency of that evidence was challenged
by the respondent. The petitioner did not take
advantage of the opportunity given him by the
challenge to present other and further evidence in
relation to the service but stood squarely upon the
facts already presented and accepted a decision of
the court thereon. Under such circumstances there
was nothing left for the court to do except to decide
the question upon the facts as they were. The court
did so; and although to say so is unnecessary to a
decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its
finding on the facts as they existed of record at the
time was well founded.
The court acquires no jurisdiction of an election protest
unless the protestant shows to the court that a notice
of protest has been served in the manner required by
law upon all the candidates receiving votes for the
office concerning which the protest was filled and who
were candidates for that office. The absence of such
proof is fatal to the petitioner when the motion is
dismissed on that ground. There is no doubt that the
court would receive an affidavit of service or other
evidence showing that the service referred to was
made in accordance with law if such evidence were
offered at any time before the motion was made and,
probably, even after the motion was made but before
the order of dismissal was entered. In this case,
however, no evidence was offered establishing the fact
of proper service until after the order dismissing the
proceedings was entered, except the evidence referred
to in the order of dismissal and the order denying the
motion for a rehearing. The evidence referred to in
such orders was insufficient to establish the service. In
the absence of provisions in the Election Law stating
how such service should be made the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure relative to that matter control.
It may be added that the determination of a question
of fact on which its jurisdiction depends does not of
itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power to
resolve the question of fact; and its decision is within
its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding
cannot be attacked by certiorari
The demurrer is sustained and the complaint will be
dismissed on the merits, unless the petitioner within
ten days files an amended complaint stating facts
sufficient to warrant the issuance of the remedy.
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
TA was proclaimed as the municipal president of
Sibonga, Cebu. C filed a protest against TA. Notice was
served to TA through his brother IA in the house. TA

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

prayed for the dismissal of the petition since service
was not properly done, thus the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case. The court, after hearing the
parties with regard to the service of the notice of
protest on the TA no service of the protest had been
made on TA in the manner required by law therefore,
the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings
and accordingly dismissed the protest.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts finding as to jurisdiction is
conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral
proceeding..
Yes.
The general rule is that, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends upon the existence of facts,
and
the
court
judicially
considers
and
adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and
decides that the fact exist which are necessary to
give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is
conclusive and cannot be controverted in a
collateral proceeding.
The rule applies to a case where the proper service of
notice on the candidates voted for was challenged
and the court determined upon the facts presented,
after hearing the allegations of the parties and their
arguments based thereon, that service had not been
made as required by law. Such a determination
involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a
rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends upon the
determination of a question of fact and that question
has been determined by the court after a hearing,
that determination is conclusive and cannot be
attacked collaterally. In the case before us evidence as
to the fact of service was introduced by the petitioner
and the sufficiency of that evidence was challenged
by the respondent. The petitioner did not take
advantage of the opportunity given him by the
challenge to present other and further evidence in
relation to the service but stood squarely upon the
facts already presented and accepted a decision of
the court thereon. Under such circumstances there
was nothing left for the court to do except to decide
the question upon the facts as they were. The court
did so; and although to say so is unnecessary to a
decision of this case, we are of the opinion that its
finding on the facts as they existed of record at the
time was well founded.
The determination of a question of fact on which its
jurisdiction depends does not of itself affect the court's
jurisdiction. It has power to resolve the question of
fact; and its decision is within its powers whichever
was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked
by certiorari
Its not a PROVREM 2015 9

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

XI.O ABAD SANTOS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, 67
PHIL. 480 DY
1.

2.

CERTIORARI; CONTROL OF COURT OVER

JUDGMENT THAT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL;
JUDGMENT UPON A COMPROMISE. It is not
claimed that the judgment in question has
become final. In fact, it cannot be so claimed
because the fiscal's motion for reconsideration
thereof was presented five days after its
rendition. Not having become final, the lower
court has plenary control over it and can
modify or set it aside as law and justice
require. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18
Phil., 267; De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila
Railroad Co., 25 Phil., 554, 561.) And the fact
that the decision was rendered upon a
compromise, gives it no greater validity than if
it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on
the same footing as that of an ordinary
judgment which may be opened or vacated on
adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or
absence of 'real consent. (15 R. C. L., 646, 646;
sec. 113, Act No. 190; Yboleon vs. Sison 59
Phil., 281.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTIONAL, QUESTION;
MEANING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Whether or not the grounds alleged by the
provincial
fiscal
in
his
motion
for
reconsideration seeking relief from the effects
of the compromise and from the judgment
rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is
not a question of jurisdiction but one of
judgment which we do not decide here. No
abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners,
and by abuse of discretion we mean such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Long Digest
Facts:
The Province of Tarlac instituted action for the
condemnation of certain parcels of land for the
construction of the Capas-Murcia Diversion road
against herein petitioners Abad. A compromise
agreement was entered into between said province
and the petitioners for the payment to the latter of the
agreed value of their lands. The respondent judge
approved the compromise in a partial decision
rendered by himand ordered the parties to comply with
the conditions therein set forth.
Subsequently, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of
the Province of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of
the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to
the compromise, he acted under the mistaken belief
that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the
appraisal committee of the provincial government, and
that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the
compromise, had no longer any authority to
expropriate the lands, because by virtue of Executive
Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was
declared a national highway under the authority of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The respondent judge acceded to this motion

and, setting aside its decision, ordered the reopening
of the case and authorized the substitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for the Province of
Tarlac as party plaintiff, in accordance with the petition
of the Solicitor-General to that effect. Hence, this
petition.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contend
that the respondent judge was without power to set
aside his partial decision which was founded upon a
compromise duly approved by him. It is not claimed
that the judgment in question has become final.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he set aside his partial
decision based on the compromise agreement entered
into by the parties?
Ruling:
NO.
Not having become final, the lower court has
plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as
law and justice require. And the fact that the decision
was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater
validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It
stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary
judgment which may be opened or vacated on
adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or absence
of real consent.
No abuse of discretion is shown by the
petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Short Digest:
Facts:
Tarlac Province and the Abads entered into a
compromise agreement from which Judge Locsins
partial decision was based. The provincial fiscal moved
for a reconsideration on the ground that the
compromise was entered into under a mistaken belief,
and by virtue of EO No. 71, wherein it removed the
provinces authority to expropriate the questioned
property.
The motion was granted by respondent Judge.
Hence this case, as the petitioners argued that the
former lost his authority to set aside his decision
because it has already been promulgated.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he set aside his partial
decision based on the compromise agreement entered
into by the parties?
Ruling:
No. Not having become final, the lower court
has plenary control over it and can modify or set it
aside as law and justice require. Grave abuse of

Its not a PROVREM 2015 10

discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
1. XI.P LEUNG BEN V. OBRIEN, 38 PHIL 182
VALENCIA
2. HERRERA (SUPRA) TRIXIE
3. XI.R.
NAPA V. WEISSENHAGEN, 29 PHIL. 182
VILLAGANAS
PRINCIPLE:
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method
by which mere errors of an inferior court could
be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now
taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court
maintains jurisdiction, its
errors
can be
corrected only by that method (APPEAL).
FACTS:
An action for the summary recovery of the possession
of
land
was
filed
by
Julian
Larong
and
HermenegildoBayla against Agapito Napa.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (respondent
herein) and ordered delivery of possession.The decision
was rendered on the 14th of April, 1913, and appeal
was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.
The cause having arrived in the Court of First Instance
for determination on the appeal, a motion was made
by the appellee to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that it had not been perfected within the time required
by law. The court entertained this motion, granted it,
and dismissed the appeal.

WEEK 9 (from Certiorari and Appeal distinguished)

have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person, decision upon all
question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its
jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they
may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. A
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss
an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a
justice's court and, therefore, had jurisdiction to
decide every question pertaining thereto. This
being the case, the consideration of the motion
and the dismissal of the appeal as a
consequence thereof are not acts in excess of
jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that
the decision by a court of one of the fundamental
question before it does not, except perhaps in cases
involving a constitutional question, deprive it of
jurisdiction whichever way it may decide.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method
by which mere errors of an inferior court could
be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now
taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court
maintains jurisdiction, its
errors
can be
corrected only by that method. The writ in this
country has been confined to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be
legally used for any other purpose. (Id.)
If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it
was nevertheless appealable, although the
losing party might have been able to rid himself
of it by other means. Having been appealed, it
stands upon substantially the same footing in the
appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned,
as any other judgment of a justice's court and the
jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as
full and complete as it is in any other.

The purpose of this proceeding is to obtain a writ

of certiorari for the revision of the record of the court
below, the revocation of the judgment entered upon
the order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal,
and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON certiorari is proper in this case.
RULING:
NO.
It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance
had jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the
appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not
result in its loss, it having been exercised in
accordance with the established forms and methods of
procedure prescribed by the practice of the country. We
have held in numerous case that a writ of certiorari will
not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to
which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We
Its not a PROVREM 2015 11