Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR
ANGLO, respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5,
1969 by petitioner, Republic of the Philippines
(Republic, for short), from the resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1969 1
dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G. R.
Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as from the
resolution of the said Court dated November
14, 1969 2 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof
The relevant and essential factual and
procedural antecedents follow. Both
Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de
Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership
over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and 2509 of
the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros
Occidental, subject matter of this litigation.
The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots
were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education
(now Bureau of Public Schools) on
September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further
alleged that the said parcels of land were
already registered under the Torrens System
"before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name
of Meerkamp and Company" in whose favor
Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short)
No. 370 was issued, that said company sold
Page 2 of 38
as the issues involved in both Civil Case No.
264 (6154) for recovery of possession and the
land registration case were Identical, the
parties agreed to a joint trial, this time before
Branch VI I, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia,
presiding, where the civil case was pending.
13
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two
(2) cases, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment on August 3, 1965,
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of
the subject two lots in the name of the then
applicant de Ocampo. On October 1, 1966,
OCT No. 576 was issued in his name. 14
It is admitted by Republic that it received a
copy of the decision on August 13, 1965 15
but no appeal was taken therefrom. However,
Republic later filed with the trial court on
December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief
from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction
Pending Proceeding 16 (petition, for short)
praying, among other things, that de Ocampo
be restrained from enforcing the decision
dated 3 August 1965, and that after the
hearing, an order be issued declaring the
decision to be not yet final add executory, and
granting Republic the right to file a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal within the
period granted, to commence upon receipt of
the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the
Republic's failure to appeal was due to
accident,
mistake
and/or
excusable
negligence, specifically, stating that its docket
clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed
excusable negligence when he inadvertently
attached the copy of the decision to the file of
Page 3 of 38
Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel
was not given notice of de Ocampo's motion
and
the
corresponding
order
dated
September 16, 1965, for the issuance of the
decree of registration and the issuance of the
decree itself by the Land Registration
Commission, in violation of its constitutional
rights to due process", 27 that it has also
been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open
and public owner and possessor, in good faith
and with just title" of the lots "deriving the
fruits and products of said properties and
appropriating them to the purpose and
purposes they were intended for"; 28 that
they were in fact declared for tax purposes;
29 that on April 11, 1927, the lands were
leased for ten (10) years but the lease was
amended several times to extend the same;
30 that on September 17, 1964, Republic's
counsel filed a "Petition for an Order to
Produce the Original Documentary Exhibits
and Submit Same to the NBI for Examination,
31 Which petition was communicated to de
Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and
Garingalao, earlier on September 7, 1964;
that they did not object or state that the
originals were burned or lost; that it was only
on September 28, 1964 that de Ocampo's
lawyers revealed for the first time in their
"Manifestation and Reply" that the purported
originals were burned in the house of Atty.
Gemarino on May 16, 1963; 32 and that the
"supposed originals were fake and their
alleged burning was false and these
pretenses were intentionally resorted to only
to evade the examination of the spurious
documents by the NBI and as camouflage to
hide their fraudulent character. 33
Page 4 of 38
has already been issued in the name of
Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
Page 5 of 38
should be maintained, as argued by
respondents. The issue framed in the
context of the suit's true significance to the
parties involved in this protracted proceeding
and in the light of the value the protagonists
attach to the outcome of the litigation may
be stated thus-Should the government,
represented by petitioner Republic not be
permitted by respondent Court of Appeals to
show that it stands Lo lose thru fraudulent
machinations close to three hundred (300)
hectares of prime sugar land to the private
respondents who have allegedly secured their
titles to these holdings long after the same
parcels of land were already titled in the name
of the original owner, Meerkamp and
Company and, therefore, the trial court's
action in directing the issuance of the title in
the name of respondent de Ocampo is null
and void ab initio and of no legal effect,
simply because petitioner Republic failed to
show in its record on appeal that it was
perfected on time and that it actually filed its
record on appeal six (6) days late?
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very
simplistic approach, which disregards the
substantive merits of the appeal dismissed,
the same on the grounds that the record on
appeal did not show on its face that it was
perfected on time, and, additionally, that even
if it were to be assumed that the motion for
extension of 20 days to file the record on
appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was
still not perfected on time because the record
on appeal was filed November 9, six (6) days
after November 3, 1967, when petitioner's
requested extension expired.
Page 6 of 38
also true that fraudulent misrepresentations
and machinations attended respondent de
Ocampo's application for registration and
likewise prevented Republic from exposing
the fake exhibits, on the basis of which he
secured his title. 62
Page 7 of 38
of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court; it is given only by law, and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection
on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be
waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent, 76 or by win of the parties.
77
In the interest of justice, which is the
paramount consideration in all litigations, and
especially considering the cloud surrounding
the decision of the land registration court, as
aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow
is for respondent Court of Appeals to entertain
Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if
it finds the same to be meritorious, and the
decision appealed from is reversed, the
correct Identity of the lots that were donated
to the then Bureau of Education (admitted by
respondent de Ocampo), as well as those
parcels of land applied for by said respondent
in the land registration case, may already be
ascertained once and for all, in the trial court
below, and in this same proceeding, without
Republic having to resort to relitigation to
prove its claim. Further proceedings will not
prejudice respondents. On the contrary, the
cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT
No. 42217. issued in favor of respondents de
Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be
removed if Republic's claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also
crucial to the issue between the parties, that
respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations in
securing his title, Firstly, there was the
averment in his Answer in Civil case No, 264
Page 8 of 38
respondent, Anglo, has already intervened.
alleging that he bought the same lots from
respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966,
and that TCT No. 42217 was in fact issued to
him. 84 A new party, SalvacionMaraon, also
sought to intervene in the case and filed in
respondent Court of Appeals a motion to
dismiss Republic's appeal before the said
Court. 85
Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et
al. 86 "(W)hen the attention of the Court of
Land Registration is called to the fact that the
same land has been registered in the name of
two different persons, it is the duty of said
court to order an investigation of that fact and
that should be done even without requiring
the parties to show that a fraud has been
committed in during the double registration.
When it is established that the same has
been registered in the name of two different
person the titile should remain in the name of
the person securing the first registration." This
Court further held that " (T)he very purpose of
the Torrens System would be destroyed if the
same land may be subsequently brought
under a second action for registration. 87
3. The foregoing overriding considerations
then the alleged lack of jurisdiction and the
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and
machinations, which, buttressed by strong
evidence, can nullity the second registration
and/or set aside OCT No. 576 issued to
respondent de Ocampo taken in relation
with the procedural and substantive
implications which could and would arise if
the appeal were dismissed, namely, the risk
that the holdings may be transacted to third
parties and the fact that Republic's action to
Page 9 of 38
requested
extension
period,
special
considerations have been shown in the case
at bar for the application of the principle of
substantial justice as set out in the main
opinion of Mr. Justice Santos. Among others,
it should be stressed that the State's record
On appeal was approved as per the trial
court's Order of December 4, 1967 with the
express statement that there was no
opposition from respondents-appellees to its
approval; and that the State's claims, that its
e e preponderantly shows that the trial court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the land
registration application of respondent de
Ocampo filed belatedly after forty-six years
and
with
alleged
fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations since
the lots in question (some 289 hectares of
prime sugar land) were long ago before 1919
already duly registered in the name of the
predecessor-vendor of Esteban Jalandoni
who subsequently bequeathed the same to
the Bureau of Education exclusively for
educational purposes, which were rejected by
the trial court on erroneous grounds, raise a
jurisdictional issue that should properly be
reviewed and determined by the appellate
court.
It should be further stressed that to uphold the
appellate court's peremptory dismissal of the
State's appeal would bar the State from
"seeking again to recover the lots in a
different action that may still be legally
available to it after the appeal is dismissed"
notwithstanding
the
main
opinion's
declaration to the effect 2 since the petitioner
State would be foreclosed by the principle of
res adjudicata from filing still another suit for
the recovery of the lots in question. And the
Page 10 of 38
State itself in its comment of February 13,
1970 on respondents' motion to dismiss (filed
through then Solicitor General, now a
member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix
Q. Antonio) expressly so admitted "that if the
petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the appeal by the Government, then the latter
would have no further remedy. Certainly, to
lose a remedy resulting in unjust deprivation
of one's property cannot be categorized
except as substantial. 3
The precedent if Paulino vs. Court of Appeals
4 what re the Court ordered the giving of due
course to an appeal notwithstanding that the
same was admittedly filed two days beyond
the reglementary period and had been
therefore rejected by the appellate court is
fully applicable to the case at bar. We cited
therein inter alia the demands of substantial
justice and the presence of special
circumstances in this case) for giving due
course to the appeal and reiterated that
"(T)he
underlying
principle
in
the
administration of justice and application of the
rules is substantial justice and fair play. As
restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of
Appeals, 5 (W)e cannot look with favor on a
course of action which would place the
administration of justice in a straight-jacket for
then the result would be a poor kind of justice
if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial
orders, such as the one subject of this
petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless
a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may
warrant. What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party-litigant is to be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
Page 11 of 38
remand of the case to the trial court so that
the State can amend its record on appeal and
appeal from the lower court's decision of
August 3, 1965, dismissing its complaint for
recovery of the possession of the disputed
land and ordering the registration thereof in
the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo. The
appeal from a judgment denying relief under
Rule 38 includes the review of the judgment
on the merits (Sec. 2, Rule 41, Rules of
Court).
The ultimate issue is whether the land already
registered as patrimonial property of the State
(for the use of the Bureau of Public Schools),
as allegedly shown in TCT No. 6014, can still
be registered in the name of another person.
My answer is that it cannot be done because
section 46 of Act 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. The
action to recover possession of registered
land does not prescribe.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
This case illustrated graphically once more
'the correctness of the Court's turning away
from and setting aside of the rigid material
data rule in the perfection of appeals and its
adoption, in the interest of substantial justice
as against mere technicality, of the liberal rule
since the leading case of Berkenkotter vs.
Court of Appeals 1 that "the mere absence of
a formal order granting the motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal
should not be fatal to the petitioner if the
record on appeal filed within the requested
notwithstanding
the
main
opinion's
declaration to the effect 2 since the petitioner
State would be foreclosed by the principle of
res adjudicata from filing still another suit for
the recovery of the lots in question. And the
State itself in its comment of February 13,
1970 on respondents' motion to dismiss (filed
through then Solicitor General, now a
member of this Court, Associate Justice Felix
Q. Antonio) expressly so admitted "that if the
petition is dismissed, thereby sustaining the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the appeal by the Government, then the latter
would have no further remedy. Certainly, to
lose a remedy resulting in unjust deprivation
of one's property cannot be categorized
except as substantial. 3
The precedent if Paulino vs. Court of Appeals
4 what re the Court ordered the giving of due
course to an appeal notwithstanding that the
same was admittedly filed two days beyond
the reglementary period and had been
therefore rejected by the appellate court is
fully applicable to the case at bar. We cited
therein inter alia the demands of substantial
justice and the presence of special
circumstances in this case) for giving due
course to the appeal and reiterated that
"(T)he
underlying
principle
in
the
administration of justice and application of the
rules is substantial justice and fair play. As
restated by the Court in Obut vs. Court of
Appeals, 5 (W)e cannot look with favor on a
course of action which would place the
administration of justice in a straight-jacket for
then the result would be a poor kind of justice
if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial
orders, such as the one subject of this
petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless
Page 12 of 38
a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may
warrant. What should guide judicial action is
the principle that a party-litigant is to be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities.
As in the case of Carco Motor Sales, Inc. vs.
of Appeals, 6 wherein we also set aside the
appellate courts dismissal of an appeal for
failure to file.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of the Second Division of
January 28,1987 and another motion to refer
the case to and to be heard in oral argument
by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the
motion to refer the case to the Court en banc
is granted but the motion to set the case for
oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention
that the filing fee must be assessed on the
basis of the amended complaint cite the case
Page 13 of 38
ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff
through another counsel with leave of court
filed an amended complaint on September
12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and
Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was
maintained. After this Court issued an order
on October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee in the present
case and other cases that were investigated,
on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed
plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by
stating the amounts which they are asking for.
It was only then that plaintiffs specified the
amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of
damages were specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case,
the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the
amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the
damages alleged in the original complaint as
it did not consider the damages to be merely
an or incidental to the action for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. 8
An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff
with leave of court to include the government
of the Republic as defendant and reducing
the amount of damages, and attorney's fees
prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was
considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis
Page 14 of 38
and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.
The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as
it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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Page 15 of 38
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays
that this Honorable Court render judgment:
1. Ordering defendants China Banking
Corporation to reconstitute Savings Account
No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr.Gan Bun Yaw
in the amount of P900,000.00 with interest
from December 8,1977 or ordering them both
to pay her the principal and interest from
December 9, 1977, jointly and severally.
2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral
and exemplary damages of not less than
P50,000.00.
3. Ordering both defendants to pay her
attorney's fees equivalent to twenty percent of
all amounts reconstituted or payable to her,
but not less than P50,000.00.
She prays for such other and further relief
to which she may be entitled in law and equity
under the premises. [Emphasis supplied] (pp.
11-13, Rollo)
For the filing of the above Complaint,
petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as
docket fees.
Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank,
respectively, moved for the dismissal of the
Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan,
joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the
said Complaint from the record for alleged
non-payment of the required docket fees.
On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge
issued the questioned Order granting the
"Motion to Expunge Complaint." He
explained:
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Page 16 of 38
Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration
of the said Order having been denied, she
asks for its review, more properly for a Writ of
Certiorari.
The Petition is anchored on two grounds,
namely:
1. The doctrine laid down in the
Manchester case was incorrectly applied by
respondent Judge; and
2. Respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he ordered the
Complaint expunged from the record although
petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.
During the pendency of this case,
respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging,
among others, that petitioner is an impostor
and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun
Yaw, since the real Mrs.Gan Bun Yaw (Ng
Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as shown by a
Certificate issued on 27 April 1989 by, and
bearing the seal of, the An Hai Municipal
Government.
This allegation was, however, denied by
petitioner
in
her
"Sur-rejoinder
to
Manifestation" filed on 12 August 1989, to
which respondent Gan has countered with a
Reply on 9 September 1989.
We resolved to give due course to the
Petition and dispensed with the submittal of
Memoranda, the issues having been
thoroughly threshed out by the parties.
Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law,
we grant the Petition.
Page 17 of 38
original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint, is patently
absent in this case. Petitioner demonstrated
her willingness to abide by the Rules by
paying the assessed docket fee of P
3,600.00. She had also asked the lower Court
to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said
Court did not heed her plea.
SO ORDERED.
VIUDA
DE
ORDOVEZA,
vs.
Page 18 of 38
Rules 23 and 24 of the Supreme Court are
pertinent to the consideration of the present
petition. The rules read as follows:
23. Motions for extension of time for the filing
of briefs must be presented before the
expiration of the time mentioned in Rules 21
and 22, or within a time fixed by special order
of the court. No more than one extension of
time for the filing of briefs shall be allowed,
and then only for good and sufficient cause
shown, to be demonstrated by affidavit.
24. If the appellant, in any civil case, fails to
serve his brief within the time prescribed by
these rules the court may, on motion of the
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its
own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or
the appeal.
1. The first contention of the petitioner rests
on the theory developed in his argument that
upon the failure of the appellant to file her
brief within the time prescribed by the rules of
the court, her appeal became, ipso facto,
dismissed. Consequently, he argues that at
the expiration of the period of fifteen days
from March 20, 1936, the Court of Appeals
lost jurisdiction of the case, and had,
therefore, no power to reinstate the appeal.
This view finds no support in the rules of this
court. Rule 24 above transcribed clearly
indicates the contrary view when it says that
upon failure of the appellant to file his brief
within the period prescribed by the rules, the
court "may", on motion of the appellee and
notice to the appellant, or its own motion,
dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.
The use of the word "may" implies that the
matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests
within the sound discretion of the court, and
Page 19 of 38
vacancy through approval of the Personnel
Requisition form.
x xx
Page 20 of 38
3. Absence of the mandatory written
explanation required under Sec. 11, Rule 13,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to explain why
personal service upon the respondents of
copies of the petition was not resorted to.
The foregoing defects warrant an outright
dismissal of the instant petition.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the
Appellate Court in a Resolution dated
December 10, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
alleging that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in dismissing its petition for review on
mere technicalities.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Section
5, Rule 7 of the same Rules[8] provides that it
is the plaintiff or principal party who shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading that he has not commenced
any action involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
Here, only petitioners counsel signed the
certification against forum-shopping. There is
no showing that he was authorized by the
petitioner company to represent the latter and
to sign the certification.
In Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we held
that the petition is flawed as the certificate of
non-forum shopping was signed only by
SO ORDERED.
Page 21 of 38
sale of the copra derived from the third
harvest of coconuts from the same land, and
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of
Litigation. 3
This decision became final on February 2,
1978.
On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a
second case, docketed as Civil Case No.
2589, with the CFI of Surigao del Norte,
Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the
incomes earned from the same land from
1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978
until the said land was delivered to the
plaintiff. 4 At the pre-trial conference held on
July 10, 1978, the counsel for Bayang
admitted that as of January 25, 1978, Biong
had already surrendered possession of the
land in question to Bayang. 5 On August 16,
1978, Biong filed a motion for summary
judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense
of res judicata raised in his answer dated April
12, 1978, insofar as it related to the incidents
concerning the case prior to January 25,
1978. 6 An opposition to this motion was duly
filed by Bayang. 7
The trial court, after considering the
arguments of the parties, granted the motion
and rendered a summary judgment on
October 30, 1978. 8 The said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals, and
Bayang is now before us in this petition for
review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
His assignment of errors raises two basic
submissions, to wit:
Page 22 of 38
that Biong had vacated the said property as of
January 25, 1978. 12 This means that from
1970 to the date the respondent surrendered
the property in 1978, Biong was presumably
collecting and enjoying the income therefrom
to the exclusion of the petitioner.
Civil Case No. 1892 was commenced in
November 1969 and was finally decided only
on February 2, 1978. The private respondent
entered the disputed property in 1970 and left
it only in 1978. For about seven years,
therefore, the petitioner made no move at all
to amend his complaint to include a claim for
the income supposedly received by the
private respondent during that period.
Under Rule 10, Section 6, of the Rules of
Court.
Sec. 6. Matters subject of supplemental
pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such
terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental
pleading
setting
forth
transactions, occurrence or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented. If the court
deems it advisable that the adverse party
should plead thereto, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor.
In the case of Jalandoni v. Martin-Guanzon,
13 this Court declared through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes:
As to the value of the plaintiff's share in the
products of the land during the time that the
former action was pending (which are the
damages claimed under the second cause of
action), their recovery is now barred by the
Page 23 of 38
proper time and in the proper proceedings,
and he cannot do it now. Whatever right he
might have had is now deemed waived
because of his neglect.
Nemodebetbisvexare pro unaeteademcausa.
This has to be so if litigants are to be spared
the annoyance, anxiety and expense that
could otherwise be inflicted upon them
endlessly by capricious, malicious or
vindictive suitors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss and
the appealed decision is affirmed. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32958
November 8, 1930
Page 24 of 38
contract on the part of the defendant herein,
and to obtain the specific performance of the
said contract and after due trial of that action,
judgment was entered therein in favor of the
plaintiff herein and against the said
defendant, the Manila Gas Corporation, for
the sum of P26,119.08, as the damages
suffered by this plaintiff by the defendant's
breach of said contract from July, 1920, up to
and including September, 1923, with legal
interest thereon from November 23, 1923,
and for the costs but the court refused to
order the said defendant to resume the
delivery of the coal and water gas tar to the
plaintiff under said contract, but left the
plaintiff with its remedy for damages against
said defendant for the subsequent breaches
of said contract, which said decision, as
shown by the copy attached hereto as Exhibit
G, and made a part hereof, was affirmed by
our Supreme Court on March 3, 1926;
IX. That after the defendant had willfully
and deliberately violated its said contract as
herein-before alleged, and the plaintiff
suffered great damage by reason thereof, the
plaintiff claimed the right to off- set its
damages against the balance due from it to
said defendant on account of the purchase of
said land from the defendant, and
immediately thereupon and notwithstanding
said defendant was justly indebted to the
plaintiff at that time as shown by the judgment
of the Court Exhibit G, in more that four times
the amount due to it from the plaintiff, the said
defendant caused to be presented against the
plaintiff a foreclosure action, known as the
Manila Gas Corporation versus Blossom &
Company, No. 24267, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and obtained judgment
Page 25 of 38
that month and that on November 1, 1926, it
desired to take the entire output of
defendant's coal gas tar, but that the
defendant refused and still refuses to make
such deliveries unless plaintiff would take all
of its water gas tar production with the desired
quantity of coal gas tar which refusal was a
plain violation of the contract. That on
January 29, 1927, and in accord with Exhibit
C, plaintiff notified the defendant in writing
that within ninety days after the initial delivery
to it of its total coal gas tar production or in
February, 1927, it would require 50 per cent
of its total water gas tar production and that in
April 1927, it would require the total output of
the defendant of both coal and water gas tars,
and that it refused to make either of such
deliveries.
It is then alleged:
XIV. That as shown by the foregoing
allegations of this complaint, it is apparent
that notwithstanding the plaintiff in this case
has at all times faithfully performed all the
terms and conditions of said contract, Exhibit
C, on its part of be performed, and has at all
times and is now ready, able and willing to
accept and pay for the deliveries of said coal
and water gas tars required by said contract
and the notices given pursuant thereto, the
said defendant, the Manila Gas Corporation,
does not intend to comply with its said
contract, Exhibit C, and deliver to the plaintiff
at the times and under the terms and
conditions stated therein the quantities of coal
and water gas tars required by said contract,
and the several notices given pursuant
thereto, and that it is useless for the plaintiff to
insist further upon its performance of the said
Page 26 of 38
way of thinking, as fair as could be estimated.
He went to tremendous pains in figuring out
the details upon which he based his decision.
Unfortunately, I cannot agree with his legal
conclusions and the report is set aside except
wherein specifically approved.
x xxxxxxxx
XXIII. The trial court erred in refusing to
sustain plaintiff's seventeenth exception to the
finding and conclusion of the referee that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant only the following sums:
Water gas tar (Exhibit Ref. 21)
P38,134.60
Coal gas tar (Exhibit Ref. 22) 16,547.33
Overcharges on deliveries (Exhibit Ref. 23)
2,219.60
Page 27 of 38
or a total of
56,901.53
Page 28 of 38
plaintiff any coal and water gas tar
whatsoever under the said contract Exhibit A,
since the said month of July 1920.
"9. That owing to the bad faith of the said
Manila Gas Corporation, defendant herein, in
not living up to its said contract Exhibit A,
made with this plaintiff, and refusing now to
carry out the terms of the same, be delivering
to this plaintiff the coal and water gas tar
mentioned in the said Exhibit A, has caused
to this plaintiff great and irreparable damages
amounting to the sum total of one hundred
twenty- four thousand eight hundred forty
eight
pesos
and
seventy
centavos
(P124,848,70);and that the said defendant
corporation has refused, and still refuses, to
pay to this plaintiff the whole or any part of the
aforesaid sum.
"10. That the said contract Exhibit A, was to
be in force until January 1, 1929, that is to say
ten (10) years counted from January 1, 1929;
and that unless the defendant again
commence to furnish and supply this plaintiff
with coal and water gas tar, as provided for in
the said contract Exhibit A, the damages
already suffered by this plaintiff will
continually increase and become larger and
larger in the course of years preceding the
termination of the said contract on January 1,
1929."
In that action plaintiff prays for judgment
against the defendant:
"(a) That upon trial of this this cause
judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for the sum of
P124,8484.70), with legal interest thereon
from November 23, 1923;
Page 29 of 38
In Pakas vs. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y., 211;
77 N. E., 40; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1024, the
syllabus says:
Upon refusal, by the seller, after partial
performance, longer to comply with his
contract to sell and deliver a quantity of
articles in installments the buyer cannot keep
the contract in force and maintain actions for
breaches as they occur but must recover all
his damages in one suit.
And on page 1044 of its opinion, the court
say:
The learned counsel for the plaintiff
contends that the former judgment did not
constitute a bar to the present action but that
the plaintiff had the right to elect to waive or
disregard the breach, keep the contract in
force, and maintain successive actions for
time to time as the installments of goods were
to be delivered, however numerous these
actions might be. It is said that this contention
is supported in reason and justice, and has
the sanction of authority at least in other
jurisdictions. We do not think that the
contention can be maintained. There is not as
it seems to us any judicial authority in this
state that gives it any substantial support. On
the contrary, we think that the cases, so far as
we have been able to examine them, are all
the other way, and are to the effect that,
inasmuch as there was a total breach of the
contract by the defendant's refusal to deliver,
the plaintiff cannot split up his demand and
maintain successive actions, but must either
recover all his damages in the first suit or wait
until the contract matured or the time for the
delivery of all the goods had arrived. In other
words, there can be but one action for
Page 30 of 38
And on page 150 of the opinion, the court
says:
It is enough to show the lack of merit in the
present contention to point out as an
inexorable rule of law that, when Kneval's
contract was discharged by his total
repudiation thereof, Watt's claims for
breaches and damages therefor constituted
an indivisible demand, and when the same, or
any part of the same, was pleaded, litigation
had and final judgment rendered, such suit
and judgment constitute a bar to subsequent
demands which were or might have been
litigated." (Bucki, etc., Co. vs. Atlantic, etc.,
Co., 109 Fed. at page 415; 48 C. C. A., 459;
Cf. Landon vs. Bulkley, 95 Fed., 344; 337 C.
C. A., 96.)
The rule is usually applied in cases of
alleged or supposed successive breaches,
and consequently severable demands for
damages; but if the contract has been
discharged by breach, if suit for damages is
all that is left, the rule is applicable, and every
demand arising form that contract and
possessed by any given plaintiff must be
presented (at least as against any given
defendant) in one action; what the plaintiff
does not advance he foregoes by conclusive
presumption.
Inn Abbott vs. 76 Land and Water Co. (118
Pac., 425; 161 Cal., 42), at page 428, the
court said:
In Fish vs. Folley, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 54, it was
held, in accord with the rule we have
discussed, that, where the defendant had
covenanted that plaintiff should have a
continual supply of water for his mill from a
Page 31 of 38
Plaintiff contends that such deliveries were
made under and in continuation of the old
contract.
Page 32 of 38
basis of raw materials. The charge for
deliveries during 1926 were too high. In this I
agree with entirely with the referee and adopt
his findings of fact and calculations. (See
Referee's report, p. 83) The referee awarded
for overcharge during the period aforesaid,
the sum of P2,219.60. The defendant was
trying to discharge plaintiff from buying tars
and made the price of raw material appear as
high as possible.
That finding is sustained upon the theory
that the defendant broke its contract which it
made with the plaintiff for the sale and
delivery of the tars on and after April, 1926.
After careful study of the many important
questions presented on this appeal in the
exhaustive brief of the appellant, we are
clearly of the opinion that, as found by the
lower court, the plea of res judicata must be
sustained. The judgment of the lower court is
affirmed.
It is so ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
G.R. No. L-16797
Page 33 of 38
An examination of the first complaint filed
against appellant in the Court of First Instance
of Manila shows that it was based on
appellants'
having
unlawfully
stopped
payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had
issued in favor of appellees; while the
complaint in the present action was for nonpayment of the balance of P96,000.00
guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for
P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not
covered by the security; and since the
mortgage was constituted on lands situated in
Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for
its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two
causes of action being different, section 4 of
Rule 2 does not apply.
On the second assignment of error: the
stipulation in the mortgage contract that the
obligation for P96,000.00 was to be
without interest, payable within ninety (90)
days from this date, provided that in case of
default it shall bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum,
clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated
twelve per cent in case of default being
nothing more than a penalty, designed to
induce the debtor to pay on or before the
expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence,
there was no call upon the court to set
another due date.
Finding no error in the judgment appealed
from, the same is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
Page 34 of 38
alleged illegality of the aforesaid dacion en
pago resulting from: [1] the supposed
unilateral and unsupported undervaluation of
the assets of Pioneer Glass covered by the
agreement; [2] the self-dealing indulged in by
DBP,
having
acted
both
as
stockholder/director and secured creditor of
Pioneer Glass; and [3] the wrongful inclusion
by DBP in its statement of account of P26M
as due from Pioneer Glass when the same
had already been converted into equity.
Thus, with respect to said first cause of
action, respondent Hofilea prayed that the
SEC issue an order:
1. Holding that the so called dacion en
pago conveying all the assets of Pioneer
Glass and the Hofilea personal properties to
Union Glass be declared null and void on the
ground that the said conveyance was tainted
with.
A. Self-dealing on the part of DBP which
was
acting
both
as
a
controlling
stockholder/director and as secured creditor
of the Pioneer Glass, all to its advantage and
to that of Union Glass, and to the gross
prejudice of the Pioneer Glass,
B. That the dacion en pago is void because
there was gross undervaluation of the assets
included in the so-called dacion en pago by
more than 100% to the prejudice of Pioneer
Glass and to the undue advantage of DBP
and Union Glass;
C. That the DBP unduly favored Union
Glass over another buyer, San Miguel
Corporation, notwithstanding the clearly
advantageous terms offered by the latter to
Page 35 of 38
As far as respondent Union Glass and
Container Corporation is concerned, its
inclusion as a party-respondent by virtue of its
being an indispensable party to the present
action, it being in possession of the assets
subject of the dacion en pago and, therefore,
situated in such a way that it will be affected
by any judgment thereon, 3
Page 36 of 38
Inasmuch as the private respondents are
not
shareholders
of
the
petitioner
condominium corporation, the instant cases
for collection cannot be a 'controversy arising
out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members
or associates; between any or all of them and
the corporation, partnership or association of
which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively,' which controversies
are under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, pursuant to Section 5 [b] of P.D.
No. 902-A. ...
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's judgment penned by
Mr. Justice Escolin setting aside the
questioned orders of respondent SEC and
ordering that petitioner Union Glass be
dropped from SEC Case No. 2035 for lack of
SEC jurisdiction over it as a third party
purchaser of the glass plant acquired by the
DBP by dacion en pago from Pioneer Glass,
without prejudice to Hofilea filing a separate
suit in the regular courts of justice against
Union Glass for recovery and cancellation of
the said sale of the glass plant in favor of
Union Glass.
I concur also with the statement in the
Court's opinion that the final outcome of SEC
Case No. 2035 with regard to the validity of
the dacion en pago is a prejudicial case. If
Hofilea's complaint against said dacion en
pago fails in the SEC, then it clearly has no
Page 37 of 38
Although a jurisdictional issue is raised and
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the case, nevertheless,
the petitioners are guilty of laches and
nonexhaustion of the remedy of appeal with
the Securities and Exchange Commission en
banc.
The petitioners resorted to the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition because
they assail the orders of mere SEC hearing
officers. This is not a review of the order,
decision or ruling of the SEC sitting en banc
which, according to section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A (1976), may be made by
this Court "in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court."
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court used to allow
review by this Court of the SEC order, ruling
or decision. Republic Act 5434 (1968)
substituted the Court of Appeals for this Court
in line with the policy of lightening our heavy
jurisdictional burden. But this Court seems to
have been restored as the reviewing authority
by Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
However, section 9 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Law returned to the
Intermediate Appellate Court the exclusive
jurisdiction to review the ruling, order or
decision of the SEC as a quasi-judicial
agency. The same section 9 granted to the
Appellate Court jurisdiction in certiorari and
prohibition cases over the SEC although not
exclusive.
In this case, the SEC seems to have
adopted the orders of the two hearing officers
as its own orders as shown by the stand
taken by the Solicitor General in defending
Page 38 of 38
should decide the motion en banc. The
hearing officer ruled that the remedy of Union
Glass was to file a timely appeal. Hence, its
second motion for reconsideration was denied
by the hearing officer. (This ruling is a
technicality which hinders substantial justice.)
It is clear that Union Glass has no cause of
action for certiorari and prohibition. Its
recourse was to appeal to the SEC en banc
the denial of its first motion for
reconsideration.
There is no question that the SEC has
jurisdiction over the intra-corporate dispute
between Hofilea and the DBP, both
stockholders of Pioneer Glass, over the
dacion en pago.
Now, does the SEC lose jurisdiction
because of the joinder of Union Glass which
has privity with the DBP since it was the
transferee of the assets involved in the dacion
en pago?
Certainly, the joinder of Union Glass does
not divest the SEC of jurisdiction over the
case. The joinder of Union Glass is necessary
because the DBP, its transfer or, is being
sued regarding the dacion en pago. The
defenses of Union Glass are tied up with the
defenses of the DBP in the intra-corporate
dispute. Hofileas cause of action should not
be split.
It would not be judicious and expedient to
require Hofilea to sue the DBP and Union
Glass in the Regional Trial Court. The SEC is
more competent than the said court to decide
the intra-corporate dispute.