January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Criminal Law
1. Revised Penal Code
Acts of lasciviousness; elements. The elements of acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows: (1) That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done under any
of the following circumstances: a. By using force or
intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended
party is another person of either sex. People of the
Philippines v. Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122,
January 15, 2014.
Complex crime of carnapping with homicide; when
present; proof required. To prove the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof
not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also
that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and
the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of
Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special
complex crime because the carnapping was merely an
afterthought when the victims death was already fait
accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple
carnapping. People of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y
Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.
Damages; when awarded when death occurs due to a
crime. It is enshrined in jurisprudence that when death
occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages. There being no aggravating circumstance since
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the award of P75,000.00 as
moral damages should be decreased to P50,000.00. Such
an amount is granted even in the absence of proof of
mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.
Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is correct. The
amount of actual damages duly proven in court in the
sum of P60,100.00 is likewise upheld. Finally, the
Supreme Court imposed interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on all damages from the date of finality of this
ruling until fully paid. People of the Philippines v. Joel
Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014.
Homicide; guilt beyond reasonable doubt; nonidentification and non-presentation of the weapon. The
non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon
actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of
the conviction primarily because other competent
evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly
and positively identified and incriminated Ricardo as the
assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond
reasonable doubt of Ricardos guilt for the homicide did
not require the production of the weapon used in the
killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its findings
on the culpability of Ricardo the trial court clearly looked
at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record
and the evidence. For sure, the weapon actually used was
not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was
based on other evidence proving his commission of the
crime. Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014.
Justifying circumstance; defense of a relative; requisites.
In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in
favor of accused Ricardo, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation
was given by the person attacked, that the person
making the defense took no part in the provocation. Like
in self-defense, it is the accused who carries the burden to

prove convincingly the attendance and concurrence of

these requisites because his invocation of this defense
amounts to an admission of having inflicted the fatal
injury on the victim. Ricardo Medina, Jr. y Oriel v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014.
Murder; elements. To be convicted of murder, the
following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the
attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing
neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. People of the
Philippines v. Joel Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092,
January 15, 2014.
Personal property; concept of. In Laurel v. Abrogar, the
Supreme Court (SC) reviewed the existing laws and
jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of
personal property in civil law as anything susceptible of
appropriation. It includes ownership of telephone
services, which are protected by the penal provisions on
theft. SC therein upheld the Amended Information
charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against
PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was
engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined. SC reasoned that since PLDT encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone
calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities, the use of these communications facilities
without its consent constitutes theft, which is the unlawful
taking of telephone services and business. SC then
concluded that the business of providing
telecommunications and telephone services is personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and
that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction
penalized under said article. Furthermore, toll bypass
operations could not have been accomplished without the
installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT
telephone lines. World Wide Web Corporation, et al. v.
People of the Philippines, et al./Planet Internet
Corporation v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company,G.R. Nos. 161106/161266, January 13, 2014.
Qualifying circumstance; treachery; when present. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even
when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on
the lateral part of his body while he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where
they had a shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken
that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle,
his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the
side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers
who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way
for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing
of his body both from the people seated in the side car
and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial courts
finding of treachery was affirmed. People of the
Philippines v. Joel Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092,
January 15, 2014.
Rape; failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not
negate rape. AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and does
not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be
remembered that accused Pareja threatened to kill her if
she told anyone of the incidents. The failure of
complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of
time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the
authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that
she was not sexually molested and that her charges
against the accused are all baseless, untrue and
fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an

indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape

never complain or file criminal charges against the
rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather
than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders
making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.
People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, G.R.
No. 202122, January 15, 2014.
Rape; lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape
defies constraints of time and space. The courts take
judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters,
copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the
presence of other persons around them. Considering the
cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples
perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing
modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of
family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it
would be almost impossible to copulate with them around
even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible
for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be
awakened while the sexual assault is being committed.
One may also suppose that growing children sleep more
soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by
adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no
merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape
in a room where other people are present. There is no rule
that rape can be committed only in seclusion. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no
respecter of time and place, and rape can be committed
in even the unlikeliest of places. People of the Philippines
v. Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122, January 15,
2014.
Rape; testimonies of child victims are given full weight
and credit. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of
child victims are given full weight and credit, because
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Here, AAAs
testimony is not only consistent and straightforward, but
is further corroborated by other evidence. People of the
Philippines v. Roel Vergara y Clavero, G.R. No. 199226,
January 15, 2014.
Rape; two modes of committing rape. The enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of
sexual violence on sex-related orifices other than a
womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the
crimes expansion to cover gender-free rape. The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of
rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the
traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape
through sexual intercourse. Thus, under the new
provision, rape can be committed in two ways: 1. Article
266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual
intercourse, also known as organ rape or penile rape.
The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is
carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. 2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to
rape by sexual assault, also called instrument or object
rape, or gender-free rape. It must be attended by any
of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to
(d) of paragraph 1. People of the Philippines v. Bernabe
Pareja y Cruz, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014.
Statutory rape; elements. Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d)
is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant
considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of
the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.
The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the
childs consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil. In the case at bar,
the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable

doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of

AAA in the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when AAA
was just nine years old. People of the Philippines v. Roel
Vergara y Clavero, G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014.
Theft; elements. For theft to be committed in this case,
the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
taking by petitioners (2) of PLDTs personal property (3)
with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.
Here, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue
with categorizing the earnings and business as personal
properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, the
Supreme Court has already held that the use of PLDTs
communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft of its telephone services and business. World Wide
Web Corporation, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et
al./Planet Internet Corporation v. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company,G.R. Nos. 161106/161266, January
13, 2014.
2. Special Penal Laws
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; lapses in the
strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 must be explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds. The Supreme Court recognized that
under varied field conditions the strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not
always be possible, and it ruled that under the
implementing guidelines of the said Section noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. SC
added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
justifiable cause. In the present case, the prosecution
did not bother to offer an explanation for why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence was not
made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the
police station, as required by the Implementing Rules in
case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the
seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the
presence of Beran. Indeed, the very identity of the subject
shabu cannot be established with certainty by the
testimony alone of P03 Sia since the rules insist upon
independent proof of its identity, such as the immediate
marking thereof upon seizure. People of the Philippines v.
Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15,
2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; mandatory
nature. The chain of custody rule requires that there be
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the object seized was picked up to the time it was offered
in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
it would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the
possession of the witness, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. People of the Philippines v.
Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15,
2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; marking of
evidence in seizures covered by search warrants
distinguished from marking of evidence in warrantless
seizures such as a buy-bust operation. Concerning the
marking of evidence seized in a buy-bust operation or
under a search warrant, vis-a-vis the physical inventory
and photograph, it must be noted that there are
distinctions as to time and place under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. Thus, whereas in seizures covered by search
warrants, the physical inventory and photograph must be
conducted in the place of the search warrant, in
warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, consistent with the
chain of custody rule. It needs no elaboration that the

immediate marking of the item seized in a buy-bust

operation in the presence of the accused is indispensable
to establish its identity in court. Here, none of the buybust team attested that they saw P03 Sia take custody of
the confiscated shabu, and later mark the sachet at the
DAID-WPD office. Even granting that P03 Sia did mark the
same sachet at the precinct, breaks in the chain of
custody had already taken place, first, when he
confiscated it from Beran without anyone observing him
do so and without marking the subject sachet at the place
of apprehension, and then as he was transporting it to the
precinct, thus casting serious doubt upon the value of the
said links to prove the corpus delicti. Moreover, the
records also show that P03 Sia submitted the sachet to
the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining
how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight.
People of the Philippines v. Joselito Beran y Zapanta, G.R.
No. 203028, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; when
relaxed. There are occasions when the chain of custody
rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized
items immediately after seizure and confiscation is
allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than
at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the
presence of an accused in illegal drugs cases. However,
even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement
would not suffice to sustain the conviction in this case.
There was no categorical statement from any of the
prosecution witnesses that markings were made, much
less immediately upon confiscation of the seized items.
There was also no showing that markings were made in
the presence of the accused in this case. Lito Lopez v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; links to be
established. The links that must be established in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. Lito
Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653.
January 29, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs;
elements. The elements of illegal possession of drugs are:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. P/Insp.
Fajardo testified as to the recovery from the appellant of
another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the
latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This
search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic
sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for
shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply
corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account
dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both police
officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets
of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant. People
of the Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No.
200304, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs;
penalties. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in
this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should
be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of
prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed
by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the
proper imposable penalty. No fine was imposed
considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a
fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. People of the

Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No.

200304, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. To
secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements
should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee, in a
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, what is material is
proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. In the case
at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2
Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was
legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998
to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer,
positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to
her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big
brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise
identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained
the markings she placed thereon after the same were
seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory
examination, the white crystalline powder contained in
the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. People of the
Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No.
200304, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; penalties.
Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that
when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this
case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attended the appellants violation of
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial
courts imposition of reclusion perpetua. The
P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. People of the
Philippines v. Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, G.R. No.
200304, January 15, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale or possession of drugs;
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be independently
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled
that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal sale
or illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the evidence of
the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself,
must be independently established beyond reasonable
doubt. In People v. Pagaduan, the Supreme Court ruled
that proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs demands that
unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the
corpus delicti, the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. The prosecution must establish by
records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the
exhibit, from the time it came into the possession of the
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, and all the way to the time it
is offered in evidence. In the instant case, from the
testimony of P03 Sia it is clear that the apprehending
operatives did not, immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the illegal item, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and an elected
public official, notwithstanding that they were supposed
to have been conducting a planned sting operation.
Worse, the prosecution did not bother to explain why they
failed to observe them, although they knew these
procedures were intended to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the item seized. Moreover, none of
the other witnesses of the prosecution could corroborate
the culpatory narrative of P03 Sia at any of its material
points to create the successive links in the custody of the
seized drug. People of the Philippines v. Joselito Beran y
Zapanta, G.R. No. 203028, January 15, 2014.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of

dangerous drugs; chain of custody; corpus delicti. In both
cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must show the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug in order to establish the corpus
delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself. The chain of
custody rule comes into play as a mode of authenticating
the seized illegal drug as evidence. It includes testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony
of every witness who handled the evidence from which a
reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence
presented in court is one and the same as that seized
from the accused. This step initiates the process of
protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted
searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence and on allegations of robbery or theft. Lito Lopez
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs; chain of custody; effect of failure to
mark. Failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity
of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties. Failure
to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized
from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution
evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. The
Chemistry Report, containing a description of the items
seized, does not show or make any mention of any
markings made on all the items seized. As a matter of
fact, during the trial, PO3 Desuasido seemingly could not
readily identify the plastic sachets he allegedly seized
inside petitioners house. The conflicting testimonies of
the police officers and lack of evidence lead to a
reasonable conclusion that no markings were actually
made on the seized items. Lito Lopez v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs; chain of custody; marking. The rule
requires that the marking of the seized items should be
done in the presence of the apprehended violator and
immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the
ones offered in evidence. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
seized contraband is immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence
serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus
of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed at the
end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Lito Lopez v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188653. January 29,
2014.
February 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Criminal Law
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Aiding or abetting; Unsolicited Commercial
Communications; Child Pornography. Aiding or abetting
has of course well-defined meaning and application in
existing laws. When a person aids or abets another in
destroying a forest, smuggling merchandise into the
country, or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers, his action is essentially physical and so is

susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.

These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the
tests of common sense and human experience. If such
means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what
sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress
otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy
will be threatened and with it, all liberties. What is more,
as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel
are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence
of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their
level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section
5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section
4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. Jose
Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al,
G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.
Conspiracy; direct proof. While direct proof is not essential
to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action, and community of interests,
records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how the
particular acts of petitioners figured into the common
design of taking out the subject volume and inserting the
falsified documents therein. It would be a stretch to
conclude that the act of Castro of inviting Atibula to
Atienzas party, without any other proof of Castros
participation, was instrumental or, at the very least,
reasonably connected to Atienza and his own alleged
participation in the above-stated crimes. Hence, the
prosecutions theory of conspiracy does not deserve any
merit. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.
Conspiracy; existence of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a
common design to commit a felony. People of the
Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833,
February 5, 2014.
Conspiracy; totality of the factual circumstances doctrine.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of
the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime,
usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the
factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. People of the Philippines
v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833, February 5,
2014.
Consummated homicide; elements. The crime of homicide
is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3)
the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide
or infanticide. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5,
2014.
Cyberlibel; only the author of the libelous statement or
article penalized. Cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal
Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) of R.A.
10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes similar
means for committing libel. But the Supreme Courts
acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.
Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of
when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted.
The culture associated with internet media is distinct from
that of print. The internet is characterized as encouraging
a freewheeling, anything goes writing style. In a sense,

they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the

readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered
by the networking site as well as by the speed with which
such reactions are disseminated down the line to other
internet users. Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The
Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11,
2014.
Damages. The Supreme Court (SC) noted that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals did not award actual
damages. In lieu thereof, the SC awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00, as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved. This award is
adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may
be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of
indemnification. In addition, all damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of the judgment until fully paid. People of the
Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias Fred, G.R. No.
195525, February 5, 2014.
Frustrated homicide; elements. The crime of frustrated
homicide is committed when: (1) an accused intended to
kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance
for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
present. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
Intent to kill. The petitioners intent to kill was clearly
established by the nature and number of wounds
sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill
in crimes against persons may consist, among other
things, of the means used by the malefactors; the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.
Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
Libel; elements. The elements of libel are: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There is
actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes
the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. The reckless disregard standard used here requires a
high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme
negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. Jose
Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al,
G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.
Murder; penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no other aggravating circumstance
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
Court of Appeals correctly held that the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two
indivisible penalties. It must be emphasized, however,
that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of R.A. 9346 which states that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended. People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo
Gunda Alias Fred, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014.
Political offense doctrine; concept. Under the political
offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as common offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished

separately from the principal offense, or complexed with

the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient
and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al,
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.
Qualifying circumstance; treachery. There is treachery
when the offender commits a crime against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. People of the
Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias Fred, G.R. No.
195525, February 5, 2014.
Rape; conviction solely on the testimony of the victim.
Appellant questions the weighty trust placed by the trial
court on the singular and uncorroborated testimony of
AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, the
Supreme Court reminded appellant that it is a
fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that
the accused may be convicted based solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. People of the
Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19,
2014.
Rape; conduct of the victim immediately following the
alleged sexual assault. The conduct of the victim
immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of
utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of
the charge of rape. In the case at bar, the actuations of
AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of
one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human
behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers mother,
and worse, to live with her abusers entire family in one
roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape. It goes
against the grain of human experience for a woman who
has been robbed of her honor and chastity not to seize an
opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.
People of the Philippines v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora,
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014.
Rape; one count for each separate act of sexual assault.
The appellant, citing People v. Aaron, insists that he
cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite
the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a
single criminal intent. However, it appears from the facts
that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis
into the private part of AAA. The three (3) penetrations
occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5)
minutes wherein the appellant would rest after satiating
his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be
clearly inferredfrom the foregoing that when the appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a
single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent.
Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is
indubitable. The three insertions into AAA were in
satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality.
Therefore, the appellants conviction for three counts of
rape is proper. People of the Philippines v. Manolito
Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.
Rape; credibility of victims testimony. It is
jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is
sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility
needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the fate of the accused in a rape case, ultimately and
oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the victims
testimony. People of the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R.
No. 202976, February 19, 2014.

Rape; damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a

finding of rape is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in
the exercise of sound discretion. The award of moral
damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in
rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such award. In addition, the award of exemplary
damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if
there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying. In this case, since the qualifying circumstance
of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the
commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v.
Manolito Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February
26, 2014.
Rape; elements. The elements of rape (under paragraph
1, subparagraph a of Article 266-A) are as follows: (1) that
the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is
accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.
People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No.
199268, February 12, 2014.
Rape; elements. The elements necessary to sustain a
conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation,
or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of
age or is demented. People of the Philippines v. Felimon
Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014.
Rape; impregnation not an element of rape. With regard
to appellants first point, the Supreme Court (SC) agreed
with the statement made by the Court of Appeals that it is
not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA
gave birth ten (10) months after the alleged sexual
assault as there may be cases of long gestations. In any
event, SC dismissed appellants contention as immaterial
to the case at bar because jurisprudence reveals that
impregnation is not an element of rape. It is wellentrenched in case law that the rape victims pregnancy
and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining
whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused,
or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim against the latters will or without
her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim
in a truthful manner. People of the Philippines v. Mervin
Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.
Rape; force or intimidation need not be irresistible in
rape. The force and violence required in rape cases is
relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that
the force or intimidation be so great or be of such
character as could not be resisted it is only necessary
that the force or intimidationbe sufficient to consummate
the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it
should be viewed from the perception and judgment of
the victim at the time of the commission of the crime.
What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such
degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim
into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in
the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death. People of the Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.
Rape; inconsistencies in the victims testimony. Anent the
inconsistent statements made by AAA in her testimony
which were pointed out by appellant, the Supreme Court
agreed with the assessment made by the Court of
Appeals that these are but minor discrepancies that do
little to affect the central issue of rape which is involved
in this case. Instead of diminishing AAAs credibility, such
variance on minor details has the net effect of bolstering
the truthfulness of AAAs accusations. A few discrepancies

and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses

referring to minor details and not in actuality touching
upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses because they discount the
possibility of their being rehearsed testimony. People of
the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February
19, 2014.
Rape; penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. As it was properly alleged and proved
that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his
evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
of rape. People of the Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014.
Rape; physical evidence. Absence of external signs or
physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape
since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the
crime. And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is of
the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. In the case at bar, the prosecution
failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim.
In fact, contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA was
dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical
certificate revealed no telltale sign of the prosecutions
allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed
escape from appellant. People of the Philippines v.
Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February
12, 2014.
Rape; physical resistance not an essential element of
rape. It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim
becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to
think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently
held by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential
element of rape and need not be established when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter
submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace
because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did
not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of
her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape
victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity
with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of
a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently. People of the
Philippines v. Manolito Lucena y Velasquez, G.R. No.
190632, February 26, 2014.
Rape; sweetheart theory. For the sweetheart theory to be
believed when invoked by the accused, convincing
evidence to prove the existence of the supposed
relationship must be presented by the proponent of the
theory. For the [sweetheart] theory to prosper, the
existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by
convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such
evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no
probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there
should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if
none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship
such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. In the
present case, although it is a person other than the
accused who is claiming to be the victims sweetheart
and the father of her child, such an assertion must
nonetheless be believably demonstrated by the evidence.
The defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that
AAA and Jackie Gucela had any kind of romantic or sexual
relationship which resulted in AAAs pregnancy. People of
the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February
19, 2014.
Rape; three guiding principles in rape prosecutions. The
three guiding principles in rape prosecutions are as
follows: (1) an accusation of rape is easy to make, and
difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove;
(2) bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with

utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the

prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
So, when a woman says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime
of rape was committed. In a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the rape
victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may
issue upon the sole basis of the victims testimony. This is
because no decent and sensible woman will publicly
admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public
contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. People of
the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268,
February 12, 2014.
Self-defense; elements. By invoking self-defense, the
petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the
acts for which they were charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated
them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to
the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated
killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by
the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the burdens the
petitioners carried, the most important of all is the
element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an
actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense
to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey
Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462,
February 5, 2014.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule. There are
links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buybust situation, namely: first, the seizure and marking,
if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court. In this case, the
prosecution established clearly the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. People of the
Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No.
190621, February 10, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; marking.
Appellants contention that the marking of the seized
sachets of shabu should have been made in his presence
while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police
station fails to impress. It is clear from the earlier cited
Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. 9165 that in a buy-bust situation, the marking of the
dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the
violator in the nearest police station or the nearest office
of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse
buy-bust situation from search and seizure conducted by
virtue of a court-issued warrant. It is in the latter case
that physical inventory (which includes the marking) is
made at the place where the search warrant is served.
Nonetheless, non-compliance with the requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y
Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; when
substantial compliance is allowed. The failure of the
prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the

required physical inventory and photographed the objects

confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful
arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence
the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the
implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that
there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not
been preserved. What is crucial is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for
they will be used in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. People of the Philippines v.
Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621,
February 10, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; drug den. A drug den is a lair or
hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in
any form or are found. Its existence may be proved not
only by direct evidence but may also be established by
proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of
the general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers. In this case, this fact
was proven by none other than the testimony of PO2
Martinez, the poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu
had told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the same to
which the latter responded by requiring the former to pay
a rental fee of P10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed
PO2 Martinez to enter his house and directed him to
proceed to one of the rooms located at the right side of
the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw
three other persons already sniffing shabu. People of the
Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19,
2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of drugs;
elements. With regard to the offense of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
People of the Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R. No. 198452,
February 19, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. In a
successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
like shabu, the following elements must be established:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug in evidence. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs merely requires the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens
the moment the exchange of money and drugs between
the buyer and the seller takes place. People of the
Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No.
190621. February 10, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; chain of
custody. To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the identity of the prohibited drug seized from the
accused must be proved with moral certainty. The
prosecution must establish with such measure of
certitude that the substance bought or seized during the
buy-bust operation is the same substance offered as
evidence in court. Proof of the chain of custody from the
time of seizure to the time such evidence is presented in
court ensures the absence of doubt concerning the
integrity of such vital evidence. This requires as a
minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator and (2)
immediately upon confiscation. People of the Philippines
v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna, G.R. No. 200915, February
12, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; chain of
custody. The Supreme Court has ruled that immediate
marking could be made at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. Here, however, the
evidence is unclear as to where the responsible police

officer marked the seized substance and whether it was

done in Merlitas presence. In fact, it is also not clear from
the evidence which police officer did the marking since
P02 Mallari and P02 Flores gave conflicting testimonies on
this point.This uncertainty concerning a vital element of
the crime warrants overturning the judgment of
conviction. Besides, neither P02 Mallari nor P02 Flores
testified that they conducted a physical inventory and
took photos of the article that was seized from Merlita. In
fact, their joint affidavit of arrest made no mention of any
inventory taking or photographing of the same. And they
did not bother at all to offer some justification for the
omission. People of the Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y
Costuna, G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; drug pushers
sell to any prospective customer, in any place and at any
time. The Supreme Court (SC) had occasion to show the
unacceptability of the contention of the appellant that the
testimony of the poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical,
contrary to reason and highly incredible for no person
who is engaged in an illegal transaction would leave the
door of the house open after such transaction. In case
after case, SC observed that drug pushers sell their
prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a
stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even
in the daytime. Indeed, the drug pushers have become
increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openlydefiant
of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing
familiarity between the buyer and the seller or the time
and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and the delivery of the
prohibited drugs. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Rom,
G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride; penalty. Originally,
under Section 15 of R.A. 6425, the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1683, the penalty was amended to life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty
thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in
Republic Act No. 7659, where the penalty was changed to
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. People of
the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No.
189833, February 5, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; possession of drugs is prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi. Definitely,
the records do not show that the appellant had the legal
authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets
of shabu. Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous
drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused
to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi, which the appellant in this case miserably
failed to do. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R.
No. 198452, February 19, 2014.
Dangerous Drugs Act; transport defined. Morilla and
Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means to carry or convey from one place to another. It
was well established during trial that Morilla was driving
the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was
driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a
special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by
proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge. People of
the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No.
189833, February 5, 2014.

March 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on

Criminal law
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Conspiracy; liability of conspirators. Assuming that the
prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who
inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion,
Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the others
with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately
killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally
liable as co-principals by direct participation. Since about
15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one
helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head,
and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead, there
is no question that the accused took advantage of their
superior strength. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the
decision of the lower courts finding accused Erwin guilty
of murder. People of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y
Bautisa, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014.
Rape; rape victim with a mental disability either deprived
of reason or demented. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two
circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman
with a mental disability is considered rape, to wit:
paragraph 1(b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason; and paragraph 1(d) when the offended party is
demented. Under paragraph 1(d), the term demented
refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition
of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked
decline from the individuals former intellectual level and
often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the
other hand, under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of
reason has been interpreted to include those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No.
205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; when rape victim is deprived of reason but not
demented. Since AAA is mentally deficient, she should
properly be classified as a person who is deprived of
reason, and not one who is demented. Hence, carnal
knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under
subparagraph (b) and not subparagraph (d) of Article 266A(1) of the RPC, as amended. Nevertheless, the erroneous
reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Information will not
exonerate Ventura because he failed to raise this as an
objection, and the particular facts stated in the
Information were protestation sufficient to inform him of
the nature of the charge against him. From the foregoing,
all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual
congress between the rapist and his victim, and the
latters mental retardation. People of the Philippines v.
Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; exact date of rape incident not an essential
element. AAAs failure to recall the exact date of the first
rape and the number of times she was sexually assaulted
by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not militate
against her credibility since rape victims are not expected
to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the
dates, number of times and manner they were violated.
This is especially true in the case of AAA who obviously
cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have
the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her
life and complain immediately that she had been sexually
assaulted. AAAs testimony was clear that every time
Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against
revealing the offense. Given AAAs mental condition, it
can well substitute for violence and intimidation enough
to cow her into submission. The Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was
sexually abused is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. Indeed, the precise time of the
crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As
such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need
not be accurately stated. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to
the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds

for acquittal. Hence, the allegation in the information,

which states that the rape was committed on or about
March 24, 2005, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of
Ventura in the said case. People of the Philippines v.
Ernesto Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.

probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement

of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged. People of the
Philippines v. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25,
2014.

Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or

consent not necessary. Statutory rape is committed by
sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual
act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary
as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering
that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed
when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the
law presumes that the victim does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent
to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the
crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the
burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the
identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse
between the accused and the complainant. People of the
Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No. 207819,
March 12, 2014.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private

persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be
indicted. The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone. People of the Philippines v. Henry
T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.

Statutory rape; elements; proof of force, intimidation or

consent not necessary. A judicious review of the records
of this case would reveal that the aforementioned
elements of statutory rape are present. First, the
presentation of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth showing
that she was born on July 25, 1998 has proven that she
was below 12 years of age when the three (3) rape
incidents happened on December 26 and 27, 1996, and in
June 2000, respectively. Second, the prosecution proved
that Cadano indeed had carnal knowledge of AAA on
three (3) separate occasions through the latters positive,
categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as corroborated
by the medico-legal report. People of the Philippines v.
Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No. 207819, March 12,
2014.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Alias; defined. An alias is a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to
the real name by which he was registered at birth or
baptized the first time, or to the substitute name
authorized by a competent authority; a mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish
him, but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a
name that is different from the individuals true name,
and does not refer to a name that is not different from his
true name. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,
G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g); private
persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be
indicted. The only question that needs to be settled in the
present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information. Respondent contends that by
reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such,
prosecution against respondent may not prosper. The
Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held that, it is true
that by reason of Secretary Enriles death, there is no
longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the
death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death
did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who
allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found

Chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court has time and

again spoken on the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. People of the Philippines v.
Freddie Ladip y Rubio, G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody rule; buy-bust situation. From the
testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the
drugs seized from the accused from the moment he was
arrested, during the time he was transported to the police
station, and up to the time the drugs were submitted to
the crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses
also identified the seized drugs with certainty when these
were presented in court. With regard to the handling of
the seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or
glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the
integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in
court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt
that the evidence seized from the accused at the time of
the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. In short, there is no
question as to the integrity of the evidence against the
accused. People of the Philippines v. Freddie Ladip y
Rubio, G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. The following links
must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turn over by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn
over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized
from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the
Philippines v. Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a.
Jojit, G.R. No. 199689, March 12, 2014.
Chain of custody; buy-bust situation. After a careful
scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
the Supreme Court found glaring inconsistencies affecting
the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from
Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3
Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to
who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu

were marked lead the court to question whether the two

plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very
same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful
markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized
shabu at a very early stage. To recall, the first crucial link
in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the
illegal drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer,
received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in
exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did
not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu.
Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with
Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned
over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator,
SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buy-bust
team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang
who put the marking NBT on the said sachets of shabu.
However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buybust team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a
member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put the
marking NBT on the plastic sachets upon the teams
return to the police station. To complicate things even
further, P/SInsp Tulauan, the Forensic Chemist, also
declared before the trial court that the marking NBT on
the two plastic sachets of shabu were made by SPO3
Nelson B. Tamaray, the duty officer who received the
specimens at the crime laboratory. On cross-examination,
P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that
SPO3 Tamaray had claimed making the marking on the
sachets of shabu. Herein, the prosecution is completely
silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite
having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of
shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately
mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of
the same to another police officer. This lapse in procedure
opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the
identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino
during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the
trial court, especially considering that three different
people, during the interval, supposedly received and
marked the same. People of the Philippines v. Hermanos
Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. Jojit, G.R. No. 199689,
March 12, 2014.
Illegal use of aliases. On the issue of the alleged use of
illegal aliases, the Supreme Court observed that
respondents aliases involved the names Eugenio
Gonzalez, Eugenio Gonzales, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,
Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado, Eugenio C.R.
Gonzalez, Eugenio J. Gonzalez, and per Limson
Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez. But these names
contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family
name in one instance. The records disclose that the
erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of
the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left
unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant,
however, is that such names were not fictitious names
within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such
names were not different from each other. Considering
that he was not also shown to have used the names for
unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the
public, the dismissal of the charge against him was
justified in fact and in law. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio
Juan Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty; procedure lapses in handling of shabu negates
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts erred
in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in the
performance that a police officer enjoys in the absence of
any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce
him to falsify his testimony. The regularity of the
performance of the police officers duties leaves much to
be desired in this case given the lapses in their handling
of the allegedly confiscated shabu. The totality of all the
procedural lapses effectively produced serious doubts on
the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially
in the face of allegations of frame-up. The Supreme Court
had previously held that these lapses negate the
presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity

affects the whole performance and should make the

presumption unavailable. Indeed, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by
itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It should be
noted that the presumption is precisely just that a
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this
case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. People of the
Philippines v. Jerry Caranto y Propeta, G.R. No. 193768,
March 5, 2014.
R.A. 3019; Section 3(e); proof of the extent of damage is
not essential. The third element of the offense that the
act of the accused caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the functions of the accused was
established here. Proof of the extent of damage is not
essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough
and not merely negligible. In the present case, the
prosecutions evidence duly proved that petitioners, using
their official positions, by dishonesty and breach of sworn
duty, facilitated the approval and release of government
funds amounting to P20,000,000 supposedly for the
purchase of combat clothing and individual equipment
(CCIE) items of PNP personnel. However, the recipients of
the P20,000,000 turned out to be fictitious PNP personnel,
and up to now the P20,000,000 remains unaccounted for.
Thus, petitioners should be made liable for their deceit
and misrepresentation and should compensate the
government for the actual damage the government has
suffered. Danilo O. Garcia and Joven SD. Brizuela v.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
197204, March 26, 2014.
R.A. 9165; Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165;
inventory and marking of seized items in warrantless
seizures. From a cursory reading of Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be
gleaned that in cases of warrantless seizures, as in this
case, inventory and marking of the seized item can be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending authorities, whichever is practicable, and
not necessarily at the place of seizure. As held in People
v. Resurreccion, marking upon immediate confiscation
does not exclude the possibility that marking can be done
at the police station or office of the apprehending team.
Thus, in the present case, the apprehending team cannot
be faulted if the inventory and marking were done at their
office where appellant was immediately brought for
custody and further investigation. Indeed, the fact that
the inventory and marking of the subject item were not
made onsite is of no moment and will not lead to
appellants exoneration. People of the Philippines v.
Manuel S. Aplat, G.R. No. 191727, March 31, 2014.
December 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Criminal Law
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Falsification of public documents; falsification of local
budget preparation forms. To warrant the suspension of a
public officer under section 13 of R.A. 3019, he must be
charged with an offense (1) under R.A. 3019, or (2) under
Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property. Admittedly,
petitioner in this case was not charged under R.A. 3019.
Neither was he charged under Title Seven, Book II of the
RPC as the crime of falsification of public documents
under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, Book
II thereof. The relevant question now is whether
falsification of public documents is considered as fraud
upon government or public funds or property. To address
the issue, the Supreme Court (SC) cited Bustillo v.
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner therein was charged with
falsifying municipal vouchers which, as used in
government, are official documents. He asserted the said
offense does not involve fraud or property; hence, his
suspension finds no basis in section 13 of R.A. 3019. In
construing the term fraud as used in section 13 of R.A.

3019, the SC held in said case that the same is

understood in its general sense, that is, referring to an
instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when
involving misrepresentation. And since vouchers are
official documents signifying a cash outflow from
government coffers, falsification thereof invariably
involves fraud upon public funds. In the same vein, the
act imputed against petitioner constitutes fraud upon
government or public funds. Hadjim Hashim Abdul v.
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 184496, December 2, 2013.
Kidnapping for ransom; elements. In proving the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution has to show that:
(a) the accused was a private person; (b) he kidnapped or
detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her
liberty; (c) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d)
the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. All
these were proven in the criminal case on review. The
testimony of Alejandro and Marvelous sufficiently
established the commission of the crime and the accusedappellants culpability. Maca was positively identified by
Marvelous as one of the men who collared her, Marelie
and Mae by the bedroom, tied them up and brought them
to the mountains of Bagyangon. He was also identified as
the one who left the group when they were on the
mountains to buy food after Con-ui refused. Con-ui, on the
other hand, was identified by Alejandro as the one who
was addressed by one of the abductors with the
statement, why did it take you so long in coming back?
We were already tired of waiting for you. Con-ui was also
identified by Marvelous as the one who took the key to
the drawer, opened it and took the money in it. Their
testimony also established the fact that they were
deprived of their liberty when they were all hogtied and
forcibly brought out of the house and into the mountains.
That the deprivation of their liberty was for the purpose of
extorting ransom was confirmed by Alejandro who
testified that the abductors asked him for money and
even let him off so he can come up with the P300,000.00
ransom. People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Con-U and
Ramil Maca, G.R. No. 205442, December 11, 2013.
Libel; privileged communication. No libel was committed
in this case. The Court of Appeals (CA) acquitted Muoz of
libel because his statement constitutes privileged
communication. In libel, the existence of malice is
essential as it is an element of the crime. The law
presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is
referred to as malice in law. There are few circumstances
wherein malice in law is inapplicable. Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) states the instances when
malice is not presumed. Jurisprudence supplements the
enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. Borjal v. CA and
Guingguing v. CA hold that in order to justify a conviction
in libel involving privileged communication, the
prosecution must establish that the libelous statements
were made or published with actual malice or malice in
fact the knowledge that the statement is false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
Elizalde S. Co v. Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr., G.R. No. 181986,
December 4, 2013.
Libel; privileged communication. In this case, the Court of
Appeals (CA) declared that the libelous remarks are
privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the
fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of
Munoz statements were fair comments. Consequently,
malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the
burden of proving that Munoz acted with malice in fact.
The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that
essentially require a review of the CAs factual and legal
findings. However, the Supreme Court cannot, through
the present petition, review these findings without going
against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to
factual matters, and without violating Munoz right
against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is
essentially anchored on questions of fact. Elizalde S. Co v.
Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr., G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013.

Qualified theft; elements.The elements of qualified theft

punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows: (1) there
was a taking of personal property; (2) the said property
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the
consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent
to gain; (5) the taking was accomplished without violence
or intimidation against person, or force upon things; and
(6) the taking was done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave
abuse of confidence. Delia Ines Ringor v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013.
Qualified theft; elements.All elements for the felony of
qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 308
of the RPC are present in this case. As to the first
element, the prosecution was able to establish that the
petitioner, as part of her duty as sales clerk/agent of PCS,
received the payment from LACS in the amount of
P66,860.90 for the merchandise delivered to it and that
she failed to remit the same to Ingan. The second, third
and fifth elements of qualified theft were likewise
established by the prosecution; that the amount paid by
LACS, taken by the petitioner without authority and
consent, belongs to PCS, and that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, or force upon things, is not disputed.
Anent the fourth element, intent to gain on the part of the
petitioner was likewise established. Intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from
the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation. Intent to gain on the part of the petitioner is
readily apparent from the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses. Particularly, Ibarra, Ingans brother, testified
that the petitioner told him and his sister that she lost the
money she collected from LACS. At first, the petitioner
claimed that she was robbed. Later, she changed her
story and claimed that she lost the money when she rode
a mini-bus. Curiously, once Ingan discovered that her
story did not check out, the petitioner no longer reported
for work. The foregoing circumstances, coupled with the
fact that the petitioner took the money paid by LACS and
failed to remit the same to PCS, clearly evince intent to
gain on the part of the petitioner. As regards the sixth
element, the petitioner claims that the prosecution failed
to show that there was grave abuse of confidence on her
part. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the
felony of qualified theft, must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the appellant and the offended party that might
create a high degree of confidence between them which
the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of
confidence is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner,
as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to
Ingan the payments which she collected from the
customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take
the money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in
PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS,
the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence
reposed on her by PCS. Delia Ines Ringor v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013.
Rape; elements.For the charge of rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, to prosper,
the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished
this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. In
the present case, the prosecution established the
elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the RPC.
First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
AAA was straightforward when she testified that the
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Her
testimony was supported by Medico Legal Report No. M257-01 dated April 29, 2001, reflecting the victims nonvirgin physical state. It has been previously held that
when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that
there has been carnal knowledge. Second, the appellant
employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust.

AAA categorically testified that she resisted when the

appellant pulled her inside his house. She also recalled
that she cried when the appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina. Nonetheless, she was helpless and afraid to
make further noise because the appellant threatened to
kill her. These facts sufficiently indicate that the
appellants acts were against AAAs will. People of the
Philippines v. Rogelio Manicat y De Guzman, G.R. No.
205413, December 2, 2013.
Rape; rape charge doubtful only when the delay or
inaction in revealing its commission is unreasonable and
unexplained. Jurisprudence states that a rape charge
becomes doubtful only when the delay or inaction in
revealing its commission is unreasonable and
unexplained. Those conditions do not obtain in the case
at bar since, during the trial, AAA testified that she did
not tell anyone in her boarding house about what
happened to her right after the terrible encounter with
appellant because she was afraid of her father. This
candid statement from the victim not only discloses a
plausible justification for the delay but it also further
manifests her youth or immaturity which is a personal
circumstance that has never prevented the Supreme
Court from upholding the credibility of a witness. Instead,
such a condition has been considered as a cornerstone of
a testimony that is worthy of belief. People of the
Philippines v. Dalton Laurian Jr. y Pugsot, G.R. No. 199868,
December 11, 2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. Consented or
unconsented sexual intercourse with a woman below 12
years of age is punishable as rape. As such, proof of force,
threat, or intimidation is unnecessary in cases of statutory
rape, they, not being elements of the crime. When the
complainant is below 12 years old, the absence of free
consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes
that a woman below this age does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent
to the sexual act. In order to successfully convict an
accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove the
following: 1.The age of the complainant; 2.The identity of
the accused; and 3.The carnal knowledge between the
accused and the complainant. People of the Philippines v.
Ferdinand Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11,
2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. The first element was
established by the prosecution upon the presentation and
submission to the court of a Certification from the Office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City dated
August24, 2004 stating that AAA was born on September
10, 1996. Hence, she was only 6 years old when the rape
was committed in February 2003. The second element
was clearly satisfied when AAA positively and consistently
identified Banzuela as her offender. As regards the third
element, it is instructive to define carnal knowledge in
the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code: Carnal
knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual
intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina
be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime
of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans
penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ
or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating
the sexual act. This element was proven when AAA
detailed in open court how Banzuela forcefully inserted
his sex organ into her genitalia in February 2003 and how
she felt pain during her ordeal. People of the Philippines v.
Ferdinand Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11,
2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; in connection with a
contract or transaction. In issuing the questioned
resolution, the Sandiganbayan applied the restrictive
meaning of the term transaction as used in section 3(b) of
R.A. 3019 adopted in Soriano Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. In
Soriano Jr., the Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that the
investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a
contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term

must be construed as analogous to the term which

precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner. The State here argues that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying
the interpretation of the term transaction in Soriano Jr.
considering that the term transaction should be construed
more liberally. The SC did not give credence to the States
position. It held that it does not help the State any that
the term transaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019
is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and
liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or
punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and
forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or
against the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally
against the party sought to be charged. Hence, the SC
ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or
whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for
failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation
of section 3(b) of R.A. 3019. People of the Philippines v.
Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third Division
Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo and
Enest Escaler/People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third Division Hernando
Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo, Enest Escaler
and Ramon Castillo Arceo, Jr., G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No.
189063, December 11, 2013.
Evidence; non-compliance of chain of custody rule does
not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the
dangerous drugs. In this case, the Supreme Court found
that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti. As
a result,the State was unable to discharge its basic duty
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Although the prosecution witnesses averred that
the physical inventory of the seized items was recorded in
the police blotter, it did not bother to present a copy of
the same with the required signatures or submit some
valid justification for the omission. What is more, both
PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding
whether they photographed the seized items. In fact, they
failed to produce any such photograph. This is either
sloppy police work or utter refusal to comply with what is
required of them. The prosecution should not have filed
the case absent proof of compliance with what the law
requires. The Supreme Court (SC) has of course held that
non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided
in section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not
necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous
drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. Here, however, the buy-bust team
did not bother to show that they intended to comply with
the procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable
reason or consideration. Accordingly, despite the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, the SC stressed that the step-by-step procedure
outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law,
which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. Due to the gross disregard of the
buy-bust team of the procedural safeguards mandated by
section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR, and its failure to give
justifiable reasons for it, the SC, thus, concluded that the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti have been
compromised. People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand
Bautista y Sinaon, G.R. No. 198113, December 11, 2013.
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. In
prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, the
following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified as a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. All the elements in the prosecution
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established
in this case. First, the two plastic sachets containing
shabu subject of the case for the illegal possession of
drugs were found in appellants pocket after a search on
his person was made following his arrest in flagrante

delicto for the illegal sale of shabu. It must be

remembered that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
warrant. Second, appellant did not adduce evidence
showing his legal authority to possess the shabu. Third,
appellants act of allowing the poseur-buyer to choose
one from among the three sachets and putting back into
his pocket the two sachets of shabu not chosen clearly
shows that he freely and consciously possessed the illegal
drugs. Hence, appellant was correctly charged and
convicted for illegal possession of shabu. People of the
Philippines v. Jay Montevirgen y Ozaraga, G.R. No.
189840, December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs; buy-bust
operation; elements.What determines if there was,
indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation
is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor, which the
prosecution has satisfactorily established. Here, the
prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of
corpus delicti. PO1 Montefrio positively identified the
appellant as the person who sold to him one plastic
sachet of shabu worth P100 in a buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers in this case. PO1
Montefrio also identified in court the plastic sachet of
shabu he bought from the appellant. The testimony of
PO1 Montefrio was in turn corroborated by the testimony
of PO3 Antonio, a member of the buy-bust team who also
categorically pointed to the appellant as the person whom
he saw PO1 Montefrio bought illegal drugs from. To
further prove that a buy-bust operation was actually
conducted, the prosecution also presented the testimony
of P/Insp. Calabocal, the forensic chemist assigned to the
case. P/Insp. Calabocal testified that he dusted the P100
bill buy-bust money with ultraviolet fluorescent powder
prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation. After the
operation, he again examined the P100 bill buy-bust
money, as well as the living persons of PO1 Montefrio and
the appellant for the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent
powder. He stated that he found traces of said powder on
the hands of both PO1 Montefrio and the appellant, which
in this case meant that the P100 buy-bust money was
indeed passed on from PO1 Montefrio to the appellant.
People of the Philippines v. Roselito Taculod y Elle, G.R.
No. 198108, December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs; buy-bust
operation; elements. For an accused to be convicted of
illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the
following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses
the said drug. To prove the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, PO1 Montefrio testified that when he
bought shabu from the appellant, the latter took out from
his pocket four plastic sachets. The appellant gave one
sachet to PO1 Montefrio and put the rest back in his left
pocket. After the arrest of the appellant, PO1 Montefrio
relayed this information to PO3 Antonio and the latter
ordered the appellant to empty the contents of his
pocket. The appellant then brought out the three
remaining plastic sachets of shabu, which PO3 Antonio
marked accordingly. PO3 Antonio gave similar account of
the events that led to the discovery and seizure of the
three remaining plastic sachets of shabu. Both police
officers also identified the said items in court. People of
the Philippines v. Roselito Taculod y Elle, G.R. No. 198108,
December 11, 2013
Illegal sale of shabu; elements.In every prosecution for
the illegal sale of shabu, under section 5, Article II of RA
9165, the following elements must be proved: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug in evidence. In this case, all the elements for the
illegal sale of shabu were established. PO3 Ruiz, the
poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person
he caught in flagrante delicto selling a white crystalline
substance believed to be shabu in the entrapment
operation conducted by the police and MADAC operatives.
Upon receipt of the P200 buy-bust money, appellant
handed to PO3 Ruiz the sachet containing 0.04 gram of
white crystalline substance which later tested positive for
shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust
transaction.People of the Philippines v. Jay Montevirgen y
Ozaraga, G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs; elements; corpus delicti.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs, like shabu, is committed
upon the consummation of the sale transaction which
happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. If a police officer goes through the operation as
a buyer, the crime is consummated when he makes an
offer to buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is
an ensuing exchange between them involving the
delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer. In
any case, the successful prosecution of the offense must
be anchored on a proof beyond reasonable doubt of two
elements, to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of
the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the
payment for the thing. What is material is the proof
showing that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the thing sold as
evidence of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines v.
Erlinda Mali y Quimno a.k.a. Linda, G.R. No. 206738,
December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs; elements; corpus delicti.
The confluence of the above requisites is unmistakable
from the testimony of the poseur-buyer herself, PO1
Montuno, who positively testified that the illegal sale
actually took place when she gave the P100 marked
money to the accused-appellant in exchange for the
shabu. The straightforward testimony of PO1 Montuno
about the details of her transaction with the accusedappellant passed the objective test in buy-bust
operations. It is clear from her narration that the following
elements occurred: the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration and the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale. People of the Philippines v.
Erlinda Mali y Quimno a.k.a. Linda, G.R. No. 206738,
December 11, 2013.
Sexual abuse under R.A. 7610; elements. The recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information
that was filed against Roallos clearly makes out a case for
the offense of sexual abuse under section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under section
5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows: 1. The accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; 2. The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and 3. The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age. The Information that was filed against
Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards
AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the
cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA, at the
time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was
only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual
abuse under section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are
set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.
Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013.
November 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Criminal Law
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy. Appellant conspired with his co-accused in

killing the victim. They ganged up on the victim and took
turns in stabbing and mauling him animated by the
same purpose and criminal intent to kill. Such unity of
mind and purpose is shown by the twelve stab wounds
and several abrasions found on different parts of the body
of the victim that led to his instantaneous death. The
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that while there
may be no evidence of an appreciable time that these
persons agreed on the criminal resolution prior to the
incident, the stabbings were not separate but were
geared towards the consummation of the same end to
attack and kill the victim. Appellants positive
identification by Candelada as one of those persons who
stabbed the victim makes him criminally responsible as
principal by indispensable cooperation. People of the
Philippines v. Basilio Villarmea y Echavez, et al, G.R. No.
200029, November 13, 2013.
Murder; imposable penalty; damages to be awarded.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;
(3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages. The heirs of the victim are likewise
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, in view of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, is likewise proper and in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. Moreover, while actual damages cannot be
awarded since there was no evidence of actual expenses
incurred for the death of the victim, in lieu thereof, the
sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby
granted, by way of temperate damages as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the [victim] suffered pecuniary
loss although the exact amount was not proved. In
addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of the decision
until fully paid. People of the Philippines v. Andy Zulueta,
a.k.a. Bogarts,G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013.
Qualified theft; grave abuse of confidence. To warrant the
conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for
qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the
information and proof that there existed between the
offended party and the accused such high degree of
confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted
to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words,
where the accused had never been vested physical
access to, or material possession of, the stolen goods, it
may not be said that he or she exploited such access or
material possession thereby committing such grave
abuse of confidence in taking the property. Without the
circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and
considering that the use of force in breaking the door was
not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held
accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 309 of the RPC. Ryan Viray v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013.
Qualifying circumstance; advantage of superior strength.
Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the
qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength. It must be shown that the aggressors combined
forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority
in strength. When appreciating this qualifying
circumstance, it must be proven that the accused
simultaneously assaulted the deceased. Indeed, when
assailants attack a victim alternately, they cannot be said
to have taken advantage of their superior strength. In this
case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched
Claro first. He was already about to escape when he was
struck by appellant on the head with a beer bottle. Thus,
the attack mounted by the unidentified persons had
already ceased when appellant took over. Also, the fact
that Claro would have been able to escape showed that
the initial attack was not that overwhelming, considering
that there were three of them attacking. Clearly, there
was no blatant disparity in strength between Claro, on the
one hand, and appellant and his companions on the other.

People of the Philippines v. Javier Canaveras, G.R. No.

193839, November 27, 2013.
Rape; consent; failure of victim to shout for help is not
consent. The failure of AAA to shout for help should not
be taken against her. People react differently when
confronted with a shocking or startling situation. Some
may show aggressive resistance while others may opt to
remain passive. The failure of AAA to shout for help and
seek assistance should not be construed as consent, or as
voluntarily engaging in an illicit relationship with the
appellant, as implied by the defense. It would be recalled
that appellant poked a knife at AAAs neck. Such threat
of immediate danger to her life cowed AAA to submit to
the carnal desires of the appellant. However, immediately
after appellant left, AAA lost no time in seeking the help
of her sister-in-law and in reporting the incident to the
police authorities. In fact, the police authorities were able
to apprehend appellant because AAA immediately
reported the incident to them. People of the Philippines v.
Jonas Guillen y Atienza, G.R. No. 191756, November 25,
2013.
Rape; consent; minor victims act of crying indicates lack
of consent. As an element of rape, force, threat or
intimidation need not be irresistible, but just enough to
bring about the desired result. In the present case, AAA
testified that she cried when the appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina. As a child of tender years, she
could not reasonably be expected to resist in the same
manner that an adult would under the same or similar
circumstances. Nonetheless, AAAs act of crying during
the rape is sufficient indication that the appellants act
was against her will. AAA also revealed that the appellant
threatened to kill her parents if she disclosed the incident
to anyone. People of the Philippines v. Natalio Hilarion y
Laliag, G.R. No. 201105, November 24, 2013.
Rape; conviction based on rape victims testimony alone.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it comes to
evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the
trial judge who is in a better position to observe the
demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of
witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the
truth. Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in
the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for
acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of
the appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of
a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by
minor inconsistencies in her testimony. People of the
Philippines v. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318,
November 27, 2013.
Rape; inconsistencies in the testimony of a minor rape
victim. With regard to the inconsistencies on the part of
AAA, it bears stressing that victims do not cherish
keeping in their memory an accurate account of the
manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, an
errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be
expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting
details from an experience as humiliating and painful as
rape. Furthermore, rape victims, especially child victims,
should not be expected to act the way mature individuals
would when placed in such a situation. Verily, in this case,
minor inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA are to be
expected because (1) she was a minor child during her
defloration; (2) she was to testify on a painful and
humiliating experience; (3) she was sexually assaulted
several times; and, (4) she was examined on details and
events that happened almost six months before she
testified. People of the Philippines v. Doney Gaduyon y
Tapispisan, G.R. No. 181473, November 11, 2013.
Rape; proof of healed hymenal lacerations is immaterial
in rape. Anent appellants contention that AAAs healed
hymenal laceration does not prove rape, the Supreme
Court found the same to be irrelevant and immaterial.

Hymenal laceration, whether fresh or healed, is not an

element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination
is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. The fact of
rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of AAA alone. People of the Philippines v.
Jonas Guillen y Atienza, G.R. No. 191756, November 25,
2013.
Rape; rape through sexual intercourse and rape through
sexual assault distinguished. Rape can be committed
either through sexual intercourse or through sexual
assault. In rape through sexual intercourse, carnal
knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. This is also referred to as
organ rape or penile rape and must be attended by
any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs
(a) to (d) of paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. There must be evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators penis touched the
labia of the victim or slid into her female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his
conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. On the other
hand, in rape by sexual assault, the perpetrator, under
any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. It is also called instrument or object
rape, also gender-free rape, or the narrower
homosexual rape. People of the Philippines v. Doney
Gaduyon y Tapispisan, G.R. No. 181473, November 11,
2013.
Rape; statutory rape; proof of victims age is required.
While AAAs mother, BBB, testified that her daughter was
six (6) years old at the time of the rape, it had not been
previously established that the certificate of live birth or
other similar authentic document such as the baptismal
certificate or school records have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable. Even AAAs own testimony on
cross examination that she was six (6) years old at the
time of the incident would not suffice to prove her
minority since her age was not expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. Age is an essential element of
statutory rape; hence the victims age must be proved
with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. People
of the Philippines v. Natalio Hilarion y Laliag, G.R. No.
201105, November 24, 2013.
Theft; penalty when amount of property taken not
established. If there is no available evidence to prove the
value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed
to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on
the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty
corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00. Since
the amount of the property taken was not established by
an independent and reliable estimate, the courts may fix
the value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case or impose the minimum
penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. Ryan Viray v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013.
Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In
this case, the victim Labando was totally unaware of the
threat. He was merely sitting on the bench in front of a
sarisari store eating bananas when appellant, without any
provocation or prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on
his chest, piercing the right ventricle of his heart thus
causing his instantaneous death. The stabbing was
deliberate, unexpected, swift and sudden which
foreclosed any escape, resistance or defense coming from
the victim. People of the Philippines v. Andy Zulueta,
a.k.a. Bogarts,G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013.

Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits

any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense that the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done swiftly and
unexpectedly, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. There
was treachery in the case at bar. The victim was utterly
defenseless, unarmed and taken by surprise by the
sudden and unexpected attack from his assailants. The
numerical superiority of the assailants also gave him no
opportunity to retaliate. People of the Philippines v. Basilio
Villarmea y Echavez, et al,G.R. No. 200029, November 13,
2013.
Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof that tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. Treachery is appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance when the following elements are
shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or
manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the
means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender. People of the
Philippines v. Javier Canaveras, G.R. No. 193839,
November 27, 2013.
Treachery; absence of premeditation. Treachery involves
not only the swiftness, surprise, or suddenness of an
attack upon an unsuspecting victim, rendering the victim
defenseless. It should also be shown that the mode of
attack has knowingly been intended to accomplish the
wicked intent. It means that the accused must have made
some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner that
would insure the execution of the crime or render it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to resort to
self-defense or retaliation. The mode of attack, therefore,
must have been planned by the offender and must not
have sprung from an unexpected turn of events. Thus,
treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just
triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the
accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or
when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. In this
case, there was no time for appellant and his companions
to plan and agree to deliberately adopt a particular
means to kill Claro. Even the choice of weapon, a beer
bottle readily available and within grabbing range at the
table as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent
to harm came about spontaneously. People of the
Philippines v. Javier Canaveras, G.R. No. 193839,
November 27, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

BP 22; civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case.

With respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is
explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is
deemed included and that a reservation to file such
separately is not allowed. The rule is that every act or
omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil
liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on
the principle that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. If the accused, however, is not found to be
criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will
not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the

accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to

him. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Purification F. Felipe,G.R.
No. 199067, November 11, 2013.
BP 22; civil liability despite acquittal. If the judgment is of
acquittal, the imposition of the civil liability will depend on
whether or not the act or omission from which it might
arise exists. A person acquitted of a criminal charge,
however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof
beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required
for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In
order to be completely free from civil liability, a persons
acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the
offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable
doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since
this does not mean he did not commit the act complained
of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute
the offense charged. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Purification
F. Felipe,G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013.
BP 22; elements. The essential elements of the offense of
violation of BP 22 are the following: (1) The making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment. Here, the first
and third elements were duly proven in the trial. Of the
three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to
prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP
22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds which, however, arises only after it is proved that
the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and
that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for
its payment. Accused was acquitted because the element
of notice of dishonour was not sufficiently established.
Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil
liability arose, which was the making or the issuing of the
subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal
from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on
reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v.
Purification F. Felipe,G.R. No. 199067, November 11,
2013.

clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,

or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person. People of the
Philippines v. Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan, G.R. No.
181473, November 11, 2013.
R.A. 7610; sexual abuse; elements. In Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. 7610, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below
eighteen (18) years of age. This paragraph punishes
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
People of the Philippines v. Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan,
G.R. No. 181473, November 11, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drug Act; chain of custody;
procedural requirements. The law excuses noncompliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with section 21 will remain unknown, because
appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers
alleged violations of sections 21 and 86 of R.A. 9165 were
not raised before the trial court but were instead raised
for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant
least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time
on appeal. People of the Philippines v. Marilyn Santos, et
al., G.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013.

R.A. 3019; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; causing

undue injury. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 requires the
prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas
caused undue injury to the government or gave him
unwarranted benefits. The Supreme Court has always
interpreted undue injury as actual damage. What is
more, such actual damage must not only be capable of
proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A finding of undue injury cannot be
based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The element of
undue injury cannot be presumed even after the
supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved
as one of the elements of the crime. Here, the majority
assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of P30,000.00
monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to
the Government. The record shows, however, that the
P247,500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident
Auditor disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave
benefits. Dr. Roger R. Posadas and Dr. Rolando P. Dayco v.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
168951 & G.R. No. 169000, November 27, 2013.

R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drug Act; where non-compliance

with mandatory chain of custody rules may be excused.
Non-compliance with section 21 does not necessarily
render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible
because what is essential is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Moreover, despite the
seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural
rule at issue, a perusal of section 21, Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 reveals
the existence of a clause which may render noncompliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to
the prosecution of drug offenses. Essentially, section
21(1) of R.A. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of
the seized drugs to be used in evidence must be
complete and unbroken. In the case at bar, appellants
argument that the arresting officers involved were not
able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines
stated in section 21(1) did not absolve her because,
notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case
were duly preserved and the chain of custody of said
evidence was shown to be unbroken. People of the
Philippines v. Marissa Castillo y Alignay, G.R. No. 190180,
November 27, 2013.

R.A. 7610; sexual abuse; coverage. R.A. 7610 defines and

penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse.
Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious conduct
means the intentional touching, either directly or through

R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drug Act; sale of illegal drugs;

elements. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu,
the following essential elements must be established: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,

coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of

corpus delicti. The seemingly incompatible statements of
PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male did not destroy their
credibility. Brushing aside the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
Supreme Court found that the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution duly established the fact that appellants sold
to PO2 Aninias, the poseur-buyer, six heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets that contained white
crystalline substance that later tested positive for shabu.
Thus, the elements of the crime charged had been
sufficiently established. People of the Philippines v.
Marilyn Santos, et al, G.R. No. 193190, November 13,
2013.
October 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on
Criminal Law
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; concept; proof of conspiracy need not rest on

direct evidence. Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and
Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy,
insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly
established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact
that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue
operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano. On
the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on
the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the
negotiation for the ransom money. The Supreme Court
held otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those
apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation,
the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently
established that he was one of the four people
apprehended when the police intercepted the Tamaraw FX
at the Nichols Tollgate. Likewise, the testimony of Police
Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and
Evad were two of those who were arrested during the
rescue operation. It has been held that to be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
the execution; he need not even take part in every act or
need not even know the exact part to be performed by
the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Once
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. Further, proof of the conspiracy need not
rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from
the collective conduct of the parties before, during or
after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. The testimonies, when taken
together, reveal the common purpose of the accusedappellants and how they were all united in its execution
from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving
that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants
kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the
kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in
guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were
those present when the ransom money was recovered
and when the rescue operation was conducted. Seeing
that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad
was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the
proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators. People of the Philippines v.
Halil Gambao, et al, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.
Murder; treachery. The Supreme Court (SC) found that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly
appreciated by the lower courts. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. The SC has ruled
that treachery is present when an assailant takes
advantage of a situation in which the victim is asleep,
unaware of the evil design, or has just awakened. It has
been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed
by the defense, that the victims were sleeping when they
were shot. To be precise, it was Emeterio who was asleep
when he was shot, considering that the women were able

to cry for help before the rapid firing that silenced them.
In any case, it was clear that the women were in no
position to defend themselves, having been rudely
awakened by the shooting of their companion. The fact
that they shouted for help also showed their loss of hope
in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from long
firearms. Thus, it has been established that appellants
killed Emeterio, Porferia and Analiza. Appreciating
treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the crime is
properly denominated as murder. People of the
Philippines v. Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luage and Wilfredo
Toledo, G.R. No. 190862, October 9, 2013.
Rape; delay in reporting the crime. The failure of AAA to
report her ordeal is not unique in her case. Many victims
of rape would choose to suffer in silence rather than put
the life of their loved ones in danger. It is well entrenched
that delay in reporting rape cases does not by itself
undermine the charge, where the delay is grounded in
threats from the accused. Delay in revealing the
commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily
render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the
victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only
when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it
work to discredit the complainant. People of the
Philippines v. Florentino Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842,
October 9, 2013.
Rape; medical examination as corroborative evidence; the
examining physician is expected to testify only on the fact
that he examined the victim and on the results of the
examination. The Supreme Court did not give credence to
appellants imputation that the examining physician was
unsure as to what caused AAAs hymenal lacerations. It
must be stressed that the examining physician was
presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the
victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus
expected to testify on the nature, extent and location of
the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found,
among others, that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations.
This refers to the location and nature of the wounds
suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected
to establish the cause of such lacerations with
particularity because he has no personal knowledge of
how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on AAA.
He could only surmise that the lacerations could have
been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding
or the insertion of [a] hard object into the vagina of the
victim such as the penis. In any case, a medical
examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a
rape charge. In fact, an accuseds conviction for rape may
be anchored solely on the testimony of the victim. At
best, the medical examination would only serve as
corroborative evidence. People of the Philippines v.
Marciano Cial y Lorena, G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. Rape of a minor under 12
years of age is statutory rape. The elements of statutory
rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or
is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge
of the victim. Neither the use of force, threat or
intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation
of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the
employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory
rape. In statutory rape, there are only two elements that
need to be established, to wit: 1) carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12
years of age. In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily
established the fact of carnal knowledge. It is likewise
beyond dispute that AAA was only 11 years of age at
the time she was raped. Her Certificate of Live Birth
showed that she was born on November 26, 1992. The
lower courts therefore correctly held appellant guilty of
the crime of statutory rape and imposed upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. People of the Philippines v.
Rodolfo De Jesus y Mendoza, G.R. No. 190622, October 7,
2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; a

45% difference in the reported weight of the drugs from
the time of the arrest to the time of the receipt by the
laboratory for testing implies tampering of evidence. The
Court of Appeals said that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs does not appear to be unbroken. The
Supreme Court (SC) held otherwise. The PDEA report to
the Provincial Prosecutors Office, the booking sheet and
arrest report, the Certificate of Inventory, and the
laboratory examination request all put down the seized
shabu as weighing 0.4 gram. The forensic chemist
reported and testified, however, that the police actually
submitted only 0.2204 gram of shabu for laboratory
testing, short by 0.1796 gram from what the police
inventoried. It therefore suffered a loss of 45% or nearly
half of the original weight. The prosecution has three
theories: only two chemists served the entire region
giving rise to possible error; the police and the crime
laboratory used different weighing scales; and the failure
of the laboratory to take into account the weight of the
sachet container. But these are mere speculations since
none of those involved was willing to admit having
committed weighing error. Speculations cannot overcome
the concrete evidence that what was seized was not what
was forensically tested. This implies tampering with the
prosecution evidence. Hence, because of the
compromised evidence, the SC did not affirm the
conviction of Pornillos. People of the Philippines v. Jovi
Pornillos y Hallare, G.R. No. 201109, October 2, 2013.
September 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code;

elements. In order to constitute estafa under Article
315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be
the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that
the offender must be able to obtain money or property
from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the
check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his
money or property were it not for the issuance of the
check by the offender. The essential elements of this
crime are the following: (a) a check is postdated or issued
in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover
the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. People of
the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943,
September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code;
what the law punishes is fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the
Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the
goods to Caada because of the postdated check the
latter had given to him; and that the check was
dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In
that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was accused Wagas who had
defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray
expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the
person with whom he was transacting over the telephone.
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not
personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and
to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that
he had talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly,
the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash
this type of check was payable to the bearer and could
be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas
had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody
else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated
it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not
himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction
and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who
signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada. It

bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as

charged, must have used the check in order to defraud
the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.
Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because
he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The
proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been
Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check. Thus, considering that the
circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the
person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt demanded in criminal cases. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943,
September 4, 2013.
Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such a determination and the
actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below
based their finding of evident premeditation on the
entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense
made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going
to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as
well as the telephone call made by the victim to his friend
Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind,
however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and
positive evidence of outward acts showing a
premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are
indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. Settled
is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot
be considered. It must appear not only that the accused
decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution but also that this decision was the result of
meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted
that the lapse of time from the moment the victim was
fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient
for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No.
187731, September 18, 2013.
Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental
disability of the victim. Knowledge of the offender of the
mental disability of the victim during the commission of
the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by
death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be
alleged in the Information since a crime can only be
qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In
this case, appellants knowledge of the mental disability
of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of
rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As
found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental
retardation of AAA. Appellant testified that he knew
AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her
relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In
fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house
was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA.
He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally
retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA
was easily noticeable to the trial court from the answers
she gave to the questions propounded to her in the
course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court
stressed that from the filing of this case until its appeal,
appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and
even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy.
Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability
at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the
crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of
qualified rape. People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing,
G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.

Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a

defense. In an effort to secure his exoneration from the
charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were
bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal
lacerations. The Supreme Court held that the lack of
lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not
negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even
if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical
evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to
establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the
context used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal
knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual
intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina
be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.
Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer
any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it
was clearly established that he did succeed in having
carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been
repeatedly held that the medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and
not essential to a conviction. People of the Philippines v.
Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4,
2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant
faults the Court of Appeals (CA) when it imposed on him
the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He
claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense
and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to
establish such fact. He avers that his defense is denial as
found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was
confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness
who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic
death of the victim. It was he who supplied the necessary
evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding
of Dr. Bernales that there are more than one assailant in
view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the
victim, appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who
killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor the
victim could be resurrected from their graves to
controvert appellants version of the story. Besides, in the
Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants coaccused, he stated therein that appellant acted in selfdefense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More
important, in his Answer to the administrative complaint
filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed selfdefense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated
the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA
committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of
proving the elements of self-defense. People of the
Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731,
September 18, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense;

elements. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that
the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding
him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For
the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the
following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when
the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest
partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense;
elements. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan,
certain established rules, regulations and policies of the
Commission on Audit and those mandated under the
Local Government Code of 1991 were knowingly
sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled

CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment

for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery
an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest
partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement
or acquisition of supplies or property by local
government units shall be through competitive public
bidding. The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he
is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just
the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS
representative that there was already a negotiated
contract a representation or misrepresentation he
willfully believed in without any verification. As a
Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can
only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding.
As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has
been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act
in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To
do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very
least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own
initiative and without authorization from the Provincial
School Board. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense;
elements. The same thing can be said about the act of
petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft
knowing that such documents would cause the
withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the
corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable
Domestic Letter of Credit. It must be noted that any
withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
must be accompanied by the appropriate document
evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales
invoice, petitioner made it possible for CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire
P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the
records would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16
April 1997, contains the signature of the accused as
customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase:
Received and accepted the above items in good
condition. The significance of the customers signature
on the invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing
the payment to the seller. This is all that the LBP needs in
order to release the money alloted for the purchase.
Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a
year after when delivery of the items was made on a
piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The
Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that
petitioner deserves to be exonerated. On the contrary,
evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of
Antique and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed
through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain
of custody. The chain of custody rule is a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the
Supreme Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence
presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it
is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which
was done in the police station, was made in the presence
of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is
already a gap in determining whether the specimens that
entered into the chain were actually the ones examined
and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to
duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take
photos of the seized items pursuant to the law. There is
nothing in the records that would show at least an
attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither
was there any justifiable reason propounded for failing to
do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting
testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast
doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs.
The material inconsistency of who actually received the
specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of
doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the chain of

custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the

specimens seized from the accused were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually
offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of
the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of
the Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado, G.R. No.
194948, September 2, 2013.
August 2013
1.

Revised Penal Code

Crime of Open Disobedience; elements. The Municipal

Trial Court (MTC) did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable
cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the
records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the
integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience.
While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial
or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Frias position
as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements
of the crime evidently remain wanting. To elucidate, the
second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that
there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior
authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and
issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is
undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch
203s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, since
it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made
within the scope of a superior authoritys jurisdiction, it
cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of
the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist.
Proceeding from this discussion, the third element of the
crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal
justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment,
decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot
equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there
would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or,
conversely, disobey. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and
Aseoche, et al v. Atty. Josejina C. Fria, G.R. No. 183014,
August 7, 2013.
Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the
accused prior to final judgment; effect of death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction on his civil
liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code states that, Criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Given the
foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December
11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Supreme
Court (SC) of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still pending
and unresolved. The SC ruled upon Amistosos appeal
only because it was not immediately informed of his
death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders
the SCs Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though
affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual.
Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the
SC still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. People of the
Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No.
201447, August 28, 2013.
Rape; the absence of laceration and semen; complete or
full penetration of the complainants private parts not
necessary. With regard to the results of the medical
examination, the Supreme Court ruled that the absence
of laceration and semen does not preclude the fact that
rape has been committed. In the crime of rape, complete
or full penetration of the complainants private part is not
at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen
essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at the

very least the introduction of the male organ into the

labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of
the male organ into the labia majora of the complainants
vagina, consummates the crime. Likewise, the absence of
semen in AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding
of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is
immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not
an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the
absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due to a
number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the
semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina or the
washing of the vagina immediately after sexual
intercourse. People of the Philippines v. Apolinario Manalili
y Jose, G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013.
2.

Special Penal Laws

Ill-gotten Wealth; E.O. No. 1, Series of 1986; the mere

holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not
necessarily make the holder a close associate of Marcos.
There are two concurring elements that must be present
before assets or properties can be considered as ill-gotten
wealth, namely: (a) they must have originated from the
government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
and close associates by illegal means. As can be gleaned
from the above, evidentiary substantiation of the
allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and
by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere
holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not
necessarily make the holder a close associate within the
context of E.O. No.1. Indeed, a prima facie showing must
be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth
by virtue of a close association or relation with President
Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one
served during the administration of President Marcos as a
government official or employee. In this case, the
Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as
the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of
First Lady Marcos, and mentions several other
circumstances that indicated her close relationship with
the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she
was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary, but a mere
member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the
assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and
acquired well within the legitimate income of their
businesses. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of
the Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the Republic was
able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an
employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos
administration, and did not establish her having a close
relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her
position or employment in order to amass the assets
subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could
not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the
Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, et al, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The
Supreme Court here held that while there were indeed
five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer,
there were still more broken links in the chain of custody.
In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of
the seized items from the buy-bust team to the police
investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he
placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected
shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the
specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before
the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. Still
another broken link was that involving the transfer of the
drug specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory.
P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for laboratory
examination and drug specimens were first received by
PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then
called her to physically receive the same. However, P/Sr.
Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was
SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely
relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2
Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it was

indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to

the crime laboratory. In view of the evident breaks in the
chain of custody, very serious doubts arise as to the
identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case.
Apparently, there can be no absolute certainty if the
sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very
same drugs handed by accused-appellant, or, later on,
the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and
eventually presented before the trial court. Accusedappellant was thus acquitted of the crime charged. People
of the Philippines v. Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta, G.R.
No. 191071, August 28, 2013.
Illegal Sale Of Dangerous Drugs; elements. For the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the
following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is
material is the proof that the transaction actually took
place, coupled with the presentation before the court of
the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti. The
prosecution duly established the identity of accusedappellant as a drug seller or pusher, through the
testimonies of PO2 Ibaez, the poseur-buyer, and PO3
Allauigan, as back-up officer. PO2 Ibaez testified that it
was to accused-appellant that he handed the marked
Php100.00 bill for the shabu that he bought on March 23,
2007; and that accused-appellant was the one who took
out of his coin purse a plastic sachet containing shabu.
Both PO2 Ibaez and PO3 Allauigan identified accusedappellant as the one they arrested during the buy-bust
operation. Indeed in the instant case, all the elements
constituting the illegal sale of dangerous drug are
present. The sale of shabu was consummated. The
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are mere minor matters, which do
not detract from the fact that a buy-bust operation was
conducted. People of the Philippines v. Ryan Blanco y
Sangkula, G.R. No. 193661, August 14, 2013.
RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime
charged under section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: 1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan
correctly found the concurrence of the three elements.
First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is
undisputedly a public officer. Second, the failure of
petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which
the canal was to be built because of his unfounded belief
that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable
negligence. In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly
admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to check the
ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet he
concluded that it was public land based solely on his
evaluation of its appearance, i.e. that it looked swampy.
Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was
established. The cutting down of her palm trees and the
construction of the canal were all done without her
approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from
the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use
of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant
did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers
dirtied her private property by using the canal
constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and
waste disposal site. Antonio B. Sanchez v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013.
July 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Bigamy; elements. The elements of the crime of bigamy

are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he

contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that

the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. James Walter P. Capili v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013.
Bigamy; bigamy committed even if second marriage is
subsequently declared void. In the present case, it
appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were
present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999, during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. Notably, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
second marriage for being bigamous does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the
accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy,
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was
still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him
until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that
the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede
the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
James Walter P. Capili v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
183805, July 3, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b); elements. The crime
charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code. Its elements are as follows: (1)
that money, goods, or other personal properties are
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2)
that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or a denial of the
receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
that there is a demand made by the offended party on
the offender. Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa
committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though that obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property. Fernando
M. Espino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188217,
July 3, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b); elements. This at
least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of
the Informations. First, personal property in the form of
the checks was received by the offender in trust or on
commission, with the duty to deliver it to Mr. Banaag.
Even though the accused misrepresented the existence of
a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was obliged
by KN Inc., the injured party, to deliver the check and
account for it. Second, the accused rediscounted the
checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting
resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by
someone who was not the payee and therefore not
lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this wrongful
encashment prejudiced KN Inc., which lost the proceeds
of the check. When accounting was demanded from the
accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse. His
series of acts precisely constitutes estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b). Fernando M. Espino v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013.
Malversation of public funds; elements. The elements of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the

Revised Penal Code are: 1. that the offender is a public

officer; 2. that he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. that those
funds or property were public funds or property for which
he was accountable; and 4. that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment
or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Major Joel G. Cantos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
184908, July 3, 2013.
Malversation of public funds; presumption that missing
fund or property have been converted to personal uses.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in
its decision convicting petitioner of malversation of public
funds The Supreme Court (SC) noted that all the abovementioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a
public officer occupying the position of commanding
Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center, PSG.
By reason of his position, he was tasked to supervise the
disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and other
Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG personnel,
which are indubitably public funds for which he was
accountable. Petitioner in fact admitted in his testimony
that he had complete control and custody of these funds.
As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner
failed to rebut the legal presumption that he had
misappropriated the fees to his personal use. In
convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the
presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which states that the failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing fund or property to personal uses. The
presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if
petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an end
and the prima facie case is effectively negated. In this
case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima
facie evidence of guilt. He failed to explain the missing
funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon
demand. His claim that the money was taken by robbery
or theft is self-serving and has not been supported by
evidence. In fact, petitioner even tried to unscrew the
safety vault to make it appear that the money was
forcibly taken. Moreover, petitioners explanation that
there is a possibility that the money was taken by another
is belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel
cabinet was forcibly opened. The SC also took note of the
fact that it was only petitioner who had the keys to the
steel cabinet. Thus, the explanation set forth by petitioner
is unsatisfactory and does not overcome the presumption
that he has put the missing funds to personal use. Major
Joel G. Cantos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
184908, July 3, 2013.
Self-defense; elements; unlawful aggression. Accusedappellant Vergara claims self-defense. The following are
the essential elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. A person who
invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must
prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most
important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be
proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful
aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.
People of the Philippines v. Garry Vergara y Oriel and
Joseph Incencio y Paulino, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013.
Self-defense; elements; unlawful aggression. In the
present case, the element of unlawful aggression is
absent. By the testimonies of all the witnesses, the
victims actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression
to warrant the use of force employed by accusedappellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had
been walking home albeit drunk when he passed by

accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of

any untoward action from him to warrant the treatment
that he had by accused-appellant Vergaras hands. As
succinctly stated by the trial court: The victim was just
walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor
provoking the appellants into a fight. Appellant Vergara
was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the
life of the victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from
the wounds sustained by the victim. It is thus clear that
there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, the act of accused-appellant Vergara of taking a
knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful selfdefense. People of the Philippines v. Garry Vergara y Oriel
and Joseph Incencio y Paulino, G.R. No. 177763, July 3,
2013.
Treachery. The Supreme Court ruled that treachery was
correctly appreciated by the lower courts. A treacherous
attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any
opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack. The
existence of treachery is not solely determined by the
type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was
deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime,
and to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may
be properly appreciated against the accused. Here, the
Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant.
The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed
victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
victims the chance to fend off the offender. People of the
Philippines v. Regie Labia, G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013.
Treachery. The Supreme Court found that the acts of
accused-appellant Vergara constituted treachery
qualifying the crime committed to murder. Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Here,
accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with
the victim, threw his arm around the victims shoulder
and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally
unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number
and severity of the wounds received by the victim
indicated that he was rendered immobile and without any
real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly
raising his arm to ward off the attack. People of the
Philippines v. Garry Vergara y Oriel and Joseph Incencio y
Paulino, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013.
Treachery. The killing committed in this case is neither
parricide nor infanticide and the same was attended with
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In
this case, treachery is evident from the fact that the
victim could not have been aware of the imminent peril to
his life. He was unprepared for the sudden, unexpected
and unprovoked attack on his person when appellant
stabbed his back with a knife then swiftly run away.
Clearly, appellants execution of the killing left the victim
with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. People
of the Philippines v. Joemari Jalbonian alias Budo, G.R.
No. 180281, July 1, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; conspiracy to

defraud the Government. As found by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners acts not only show gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, but, when taken together, also
show that there was conspiracy in their wilful
noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the
government. In order to establish the existence of
conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in the execution of
an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.

Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It is

enough that there be proof that two or more persons
acted towards the accomplishment of a common unlawful
objective through a chain of circumstances, even if there
was no actual meeting among them. As found by the
Supreme Court, a cash advance request cannot be
approved and disbursed without passing through several
offices, including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that
they would have us believe that they were not in
conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed
and approved by them in a course of 30 months, without
their noticing irregularities therein that should have
prompted them to refuse to sign the vouchers. Clearly,
they were in cahoots in granting the cash advances to
Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the
government of such a large sum of money that should not
have been disbursed in the first place, had they been
circumspect in performing their functions. Not only were
petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they
were also unified in not reporting the negligence of their
cohorts because of their own negligence. Cesa himself
admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash
advances, yet he signed the vouchers. He also failed to
inform the other officials that they should not sign the
vouchers and tolerated their negligence when they
affixed their signatures thereto. Petitioners, through their
admissions before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there
were irregularities in the vouchers; still they failed to
correct one another, because they themselves signed the
vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein. Benilda
N. Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines/ Alan C. Gaviola v. People of the Philippines/
Eustaquio B. Cesa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
189343/ 189369/ 189553, July 10, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; undue injury to the
government; elements. The essential elements of the
crime defined in section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, are: 1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions. There is no
question regarding the presence of the first requisite
considering that at the time the subject appointments
were made, both petitioners were faculty members and
holding administrative positions in UP Diliman. What
petitioners dispute is the existence of the second and
third requisites. In Criminal Case No. 25465, the
information charged that petitioners willfully, unlawfully
and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to Dr. Posadas
in appointing him as TMC Project Director, in violation of
the prohibition against multiple positions and the rule on
non-retroactivity of appointments, thereby causing undue
injury to the Government. Roger R. Posadas and Dr.
Rolando P. Dayco v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000, July 17, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; undue injury to the
government; modes of commission. In Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court (SC) explained that
there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference. The accused may be charged under either
mode or under both. The use of the disjunctive term or
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Here, petitioners were charged with
committing the offense under both modes. Upon the
entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was
convinced that petitioners were guilty of causing undue
injury to the Government. The SC sustained the decision
of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for
causing undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr.
Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident bad faith. In
this case, that petitioners acted in evident bad faith was
duly established by the evidence. It was recalled that the

Memorandum of Agreement was executed on September

18, 1995 and became effective upon the signature of the
parties. Between that date and the China trip scheduled
in the first week of November (the invitation was dated
July 30, 1995), Dr. Posadas could have already appointed
the Project Director and Consultant as indeed the
retroactive appointment was even justified by them
because supposedly project activities have already
started by September 18, 1995. And yet he waited until
the China trip, so that in his absence, the designated OIC
Chancellor, Dr. Dayco, would be the one to issue the
appointment. Apparently, Dr. Posadas appointment by Dr.
Dayco in an OIC capacity was preconceived. Dr. Roger R.
Posadas and Dr. Rolando P. Dayco v. Sandiganbayan and
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000, July
17, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; proof of
chain of custody. The prosecution carried the burden of
establishing the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs
that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the
night of June 16, 2004. It should establish the following
links in that chain of custody of the confiscated item: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. People
of the Philippines v. Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy Oniza
y Cabarle, G.R. No. 202709, July 3, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; prosecution has burden of proving
justifiable cause for non-compliance with chain of custody
rule. Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception
with respect to the first required linkimmediate seizure
and marking of the seized items in the presence of the
accused and others namely, that (a) there must be
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the
procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved. Here, the
prosecutions own evidence, as recited by the lower
courts, is that the police officers did not make a physical
inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a picture
of the same in the presence of the accused, someone in
the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative,
and any elected public official. All that Officer Albarico
could say is that his companion, Officer Jiro, marked the
plastic sachets with the initials of the accused already at
the police station and then turned over the same to the
desk officer who prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination. Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer
any sort of reason or justification for their failure to make
an inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately
after their seizure in the presence of the accused and the
other persons designated by the law. Both the lower
courts misapprehended the significance of such omission.
It is imperative for the prosecution to establish a
justifiable cause for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements set by law. People of the Philippines v.
Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy Oniza y Cabarle, G.R. No.
202709, July 3, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody rule; safeguard
against police abuse and extortion. The procedures
outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not merely empty
formalitiesthese are safeguards against abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. The
accused were therefore absolved of the charges against
them because of the police officers outright failure
without any justification to abide by the law governing the
conduct of seizure operations involving dangerous drugs.
People of the Philippines v. Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy
Oniza y Cabarle, G.R. No. 202709, July 3, 2013.
The Ombudsman; the right of the Ombudsman to
intervene in a case involving the enforcement of its
decisions even though it is not itself a party to the case.
Petitioner in this case, the Office of the Ombudsman,
prayed that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)

which denied its Motion for Intervention be reversed and

set aside. The Supreme Court held that the assailed
Resolution is patently erroneous, and that granting the
Office of the Ombudsman the opportunity to be heard in
the case pending before the lower court is of primordial
importance even though it (the Ombudsman) is not itself
a party to the case. Since its power to ensure the
enforcement of its decision was in danger of being
impaired in the case before the lower court, the Office of
the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its
right to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently
erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsmans motion
for intervention. Office of the Ombudsman v. Ernesto M.
De Chavez, et al, G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013.
April 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of

the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint
purpose, concerted action and community of interest.
Spouses Betty and Monico were among the ten accused
convicted by the trial court for kidnapping a certain Albert
Yam for ransom. Although Betty and Monico did not
participate in actually abducting Albert, it was in their
abandoned house where Albert was brought to by the
eight other accused. Also, Betty and Monico twice visited
the safehouse where Albert was brought, with Betty
serving food for Albert and Monico assisting the latter in
climbing up and down the stairs. The Supreme Court
considered them as co-conspirators. In a conspiracy to
commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place
where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary
consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, it can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of
the kidnappers. Alberts detention was accomplished not
solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the
presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the
circumstance of being put in a place where escape
became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and
Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert
because they knowingly and purposely provided the
venue to detain Albert. The spouses ownership of the
safehouse, Monicos presence therein during Alberts
arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Bettys visits to
bring food reasonably indicate that they were among
those who at the outset planned, and thereafter
concurred with and participated in the execution of the
criminal design. The conviction of Betty and Monico was
affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Betty Salvador y
Tabios, et al, G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013.
Rape; the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim. The accused was charged
and convicted for raping his 13-year old daughter. On
appeal, the accused reiterated his defense that the
testimony of the victim was highly incredible and illogical.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the contention of the
accused. The victim was able to describe in detail how
accused mounted her, undressed her, and successfully
penetrated her against her will, one night in April 1998.
The testimony being frank, probable, logical and
conclusive, the Court gave credence to it. There is a
plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a
rape case by holding that when a woman declares that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and,
where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the
accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to concoct a story which would put her own
father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the
rest of the family, including herself, to a lifetime of
shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit
to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a
minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. Hence, the
Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the accused.

People of the Philippines v. Edmundo Vitero, G.R. No.

175327, April 3, 2013.
Robbery with homicide; all felonies committed by reason
of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
felony of robbery with homicide. The accused were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after
accosting sisters AA and BB along a street in Olongapo
City one evening, taking the bag of AA which contained
money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused
argued that robbery was not sufficiently proved and that
they should only be convicted for homicide. The Supreme
Court ruled that in robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take
place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. The actions of the three accused, from the
deprivation of the AA of her personal belongings by one
of the accused to the stabbing of the victim BB by the
other two accused are clear and indubitable proofs of a
concerted effort to deprive AA and BB of their personal
belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the
said robbery, stabbed and killed victim BB. People of the
Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No.
201449, April 3, 2013.
Self-defense; no self-defense where there is no unlawful
aggression. The accused alleged that he stabbed the
victim out of self-defense, i.e., after the latter took hold of
a soldering iron, but was nonetheless convicted for the
crime of homicide. That the victim indeed attempted to
attack him using the soldering iron was however belied by
two witnesses of the prosecution. The Supreme Court did
not give credence to the allegation of self-defense and
affirmed his conviction. For the first element of unlawful
aggression to be present, jurisprudence dictates that
there must be an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. It
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger not merely threatening and intimidating action.
It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life. Having failed to prove that
the victim attacked him with the soldering iron, the
accused cannot be said to have acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim. Sergio Sombol v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 194564, April 10, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

P.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law); presentation of sales

invoice or receipt provides proof of a legitimate
transaction which is disputable. The accused was
charged with violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, after he was found, in a buy-bust
operation, to have possessed 13 of the 38 Firestone tires
stolen from the owner AA. In his defense, accused alleged
that he bought the tires from a certain store named Gold
Link, as evidenced by a sales invoice issued in his name.
The Supreme Court ruled that the defense of legitimate
transaction is disputable and has in fact been disputed in
this case. The validity of the issuance of the receipt was
disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold
Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and
to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was
unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under
section 5 of P.D. 1612. Jaime Ong y Ong v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 190475, April 10, 2013.
R. A. 6426; Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; the crime of
unlawful sale of marijuana necessarily includes the crime
of unlawful possession thereof. The accused invoked on
appeal his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him because
the trial court convicted him for the crime of unlawful
possession of marijuana under section 8 of R.A. 6426,
although the information had charged him for unlawful

sale of marijuana under section 4 of R.A. 6426. The

Supreme Court held that the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana implied prior possession of the marijuana. As
such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the
crime of illegal possession. The right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was not violated simply because the
information had precisely charged him with selling,
delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thus, he had been
sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to
account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. People of the Philippines v. Chad
Manansala y Lagman, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; chain of custody must
be proved for a charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
to succeed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of the accused where the prosecution failed to prove the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs alleged to have
been sold by the accused to the poseur buyer. Although
the police officer testified that he had marked the sachet
of shabu with his own initials following arrest of the
accused, he did not explain, either in his court testimony
or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had
been done in the presence of the accused, or done
immediately upon the arrest of the accused. Nor did he
show by testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of
the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and
who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the
police station, and, still later on, to the laboratory. Given
the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of
shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no
assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence
was the same article that had been the subject of the sale
by the accused. The indeterminateness of the identities of
the individuals who could have handled the sachet of
shabu after the police officers marking broke the chain of
custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence to the trial court. People of the
Philippines v. Alberto Gonzales y Santos aka Takyo, G.R.
No. 182417, April 3, 2013.
R.A. No. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; presence of the
barangay captain or any elected official not required
during the buy-bust operation, but only during the
physical inventory conducted immediately thereafter. The
accused argued on appeal that the trial court failed to
consider the procedural flaws committed by the arresting
officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied
in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among
others, accused alleged that the barangay captain, was
not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was
only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items
shortly after his arrival at the scene of the buy-bust
operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to
whether the drugs allegedly seized from the accused
were indeed recovered from them. The Supreme Court
ruled that it is enough that the barangay captain is
present during the physical inventory immediately
conducted after the seizure and confiscation of the drugs
and he signs the copies of the inventory and is given a
copy thereof. Also, the barangay captain, not only
positively identified both accused, but also identified the
items contained in the inventory receipt. Such testimony
clearly established compliance with the requirement of
Section 21with regard to the presence and participation of
the elected public official. People of the Philippines v.
Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir,
G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where noncompliance
of the chain of custody rule is justified. The accused
argued that the chain of custody of the illegal drug, which
was confiscated upon her arrest, was not strictly followed.
Specifically, the illegal drug was marked only in the police
station, not in the place where the buy-bust operation
took place. The prosecution explained that the police
officers did not have the opportunity to mark the illegal
drug in the place where accused was arrested because
the latter had become hysterical and had caused a
commotion. The Supreme Court ruled that while the

procedural guidelines laid out in section 21(1), Article II of

R.A. 9165 were not strictly complied with, the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in
evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance
with the chain of custody rule. The arresting officer was
justified in marking the seized plastic sachet of shabu at
the police station, instead of at the scene of the buy-bust
operation because he had no choice but to immediately
extricate himself and the accused from the crime scene in
order to forestall a potentially dangerous situation.
Thereafter, the arresting officer turned the illegal drug
over to the investigating officer, who then had it tested in
the Crime Laboratory Office of the Manila Police District.
Substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the
chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the
seized drug items inadmissible. The conviction of the
accused was affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Lolita
Quesido y Badarang, G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where seized items
deemed admissible in evidence despite failure of
arresting officers to comply strictly with the procedural
requirements relative to the seizure and custody of the
drugs. The accused argued on appeal that the trial court
failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the
arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as
embodied in section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A.
9165. Among others, accused allege that no photograph
was taken of the items seized from them. In dismissing
the appeal of the accused, the Supreme Court held that
even if the arresting officers failed to take a photograph
of the seized drugs as required, such procedural lapse is
not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible
in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as
in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected. People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y
Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir, G.R. No. 199219,
April 3, 2013.
March 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Rape; medical examination of victim not indispensable to

prove rape. An inconclusive medical report does not
negate the finding that the accused (Penilla) raped AAA. A
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in
a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of
the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely
corroborative in character and not an indispensable
requirement in proving the commission of rape. People of
the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No.
189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; moral character of the victim is immaterial.
Accused Penillas insistence that he was then a virile
young man of twenty-three years, lusted after by a
separated and older woman, loses significance in light of
the dictum that in rape cases, the moral character of the
victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed not only
against single women and children but also against those
who are married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant.
Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. Correlatively
and more importantly, the libidinousness of the victim
here, AAA, which is not accepted as a common attribute,
should have been proven outside of the incident on the
midnight of 22 October 1999. People of the Philippines v.
Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20,
2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as
a defense. Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that
AAA did not cry for help given that the area where they
lived was densely populated, the houses thereat were
literally only divided by thin walls, and any commotion

could easily be heard. Penilla likewise points out that AAA

did not put up a fight. In this regard, Penilla asseverates
that the prosecutions story was silent on any physical
struggle suggestive of rape. The Supreme Court found no
credence in Penillas arguments. People of the Philippines
v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20,
2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as
a defense. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and
the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear.
Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not
make voluntary the victims submission to the
perpetrators lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the
sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused; it is not an essential
element of rape. Rape victims react differently. Some may
offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a
weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at
least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife,
much more poking it at her, as in this case, is sufficient to
bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose
upon the private complainant the burden of proving
resistance. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y
Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when the delay of the victim in reporting the
commission of rape unavailing as a defense. Relying on a
tired defense, Penilla insists that AAA belatedly reported
to the barangay authorities that she had been raped. For
Penilla, this delay belies her cry of rape. The Supreme
Court disagreed. Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with
holdings that delay in revealing the commission of a
crime such as rape does not necessarily render such
charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may
choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement
to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is
unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the
complainant. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y
Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Qualified Theft; determination of imposable penalty.
Perusal of the records of this case would show that the
trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article
310 (Qualified Theft) which is two degrees higher than
those specified in Article 309 (Penalties for Theft). The
Supreme Court held that this is erroneous considering
that the penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply
only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances
is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article
309. In this case, the amount of the timber involved is
P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods should be imposed in its maximum period plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos
in excess of P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus, the
correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere
between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty is one degree lower than that
prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty
should be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Efren S. Almuete v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
179611, March 12, 2013
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be issued

for an indefinite period. The Court of Appeals (CA), via its
September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the freeze order
over the Ligots various bank accounts and personal
properties until after all the appropriate proceedings
and/or investigations being conducted are terminated.
By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars the
Ligots from using any of the property covered by the
freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture
proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall
have been adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are
suspected of committing. These periods of extension are
way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order
which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and
criminal trial courts can very well handle the disposition
of properties related to a forfeiture case or to a crime
charged and need not rely on the interim relief that the
appellate court issued as a guarantee against loss of
property while the government is preparing its full case.
The term of the CAs extension, too, borders on inflicting
a punishment to the Ligots in violation of their
constitutionally protected right to be presumed innocent
because the unreasonable denial of their property comes
before final conviction. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al
v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the AntiMoney Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6,
2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be made
effective for more than six months unless extended by
the court upon motion of the Republic. A freeze order is
both a preservatory and preemptive remedy and meant
to have a temporary effect; it was never intended to
supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedy which means, the remedy is an
adjunct of or an incident to the main action of asking for
the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court
where the petition is filed is precisely available. Thus, as a
rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by
the CA for a period not exceeding six months. Before or
upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should
have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the
property owner with the proper courts and accordingly
secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed
the necessary information. Otherwise, the property owner
should already be able to fully enjoy his property without
any legal process affecting it. However, should it become
completely necessary for the Republic to further extend
the duration of the freeze order, it should file the
necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month
period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to
file an appropriate case and justify the period of extension
sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to
the resolution by the CA, which must resolve this kind of
motion for extension with reasonable dispatch. Ret. Lt.
Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R.
No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of
freeze order. Based on section 10 of R.A. 9160, as
amended by R.A. 9194, there are only two requisites for
the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte
by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) and (2) the
determination of probable cause by the Court of Appeals
(CA). Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of
freeze order. The probable cause required for the issuance
of a freeze order refers to such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or
cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a
money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has
been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be
frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offense. In other words, in
resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the
CAs statutorily-guided determinations focus is not on the
probable commission of an unlawful activity (or money

laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has

already determined to exist, but on whether the bank
accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought
to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal
activities enumerated under R.A. 9160, as amended.
Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency
of the relation between an unlawful activity and the
property or monetary instrument which is the focal point
of section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. Ret. Lt. Gen.
Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R.
No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of
freeze order. From AMLCs verified allegations in its ex
parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, it can
be gleaned that Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that his
income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet,
the Ombudsmans investigation revealed that the bank
accounts, investments and properties in the name of Lt.
Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than
P54,000,000.00. Since these assets are grossly
disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligots income, as well as the
lack of any evidence that the Ligots have other sources of
income, the CA properly found that probable cause exists
that these funds have been illegally acquired. Ret. Lt.
Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R.
No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu; elements. To
secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the
prosecution must prove the presence of the following
essential elements: (a) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
the thing. It is necessary to establish that the transaction
or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the
corpus delicti as evidence. PO1 Bernardo gave a detailed
account of the transaction commencing from the
introduction made by the confidential informant between
him, as the poseur-buyer, and accused-appellants to the
time the sale was consummated until the latter were
arrested and several additional plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substances, which later tested for shabu,
were found in their possession six from Zenaida and one
from Myrna. That the sale actually took place and that
several sachets were recovered from the accusedappellants were clear from the testimony of PO1 Bernardo
in court. The credibility of PO1 Bernardo was put to test
on cross-examination but his statements were consistent
all throughout that the Supreme Court was convinced that
his testimony, supported by evidence, was reliable.
People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Soriano y Usi, and
Myrna Samonte y Hiolen, G.R. No. 189843, March 20,
2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
elements. The only elements necessary to consummate
the crime of illegal sale of drugs is proof that the illicit
transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In
buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the sellers receipt of the marked
money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction
between the entrapping officers and the accused. Unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper
motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit. The
Supreme Court has held that when police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are
inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity accorded
to them in the performance of their official duties. People
of the Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No.
184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
elements. In the present case, there is no contention that
the members of AIDSOTF who conducted the buy-bust
operation were motivated by ill will or malice. Neither was
there evidence adduced to show that they neglected to

perform their duties properly. Hence, their testimonies as

to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserve full faith
and credence. Respondent judge harps on the fact that it
was the CI who had personal knowledge of the identity of
the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills,
and the subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear
from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other
arresting officers that they conducted the buy-bust
operation based on the information from the CI. However,
the arrest was made, not on the basis of that information,
but of the actual buy-bust operation, in which
respondents were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the
investigative work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal
sale was consummated in their presence, and the
elements of the sale the identity of the sellers, the
delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor were
confirmed. That the CI initially provided this information
or tip does not negate the subsequent consummation of
the illegal sale. People of the Philippines v. Judge Rafael R.
Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; presentation of an informant not
required for the prosecution of drug cases. Respondent
Judge Lagos erred in requiring the testimony of the CI.
Respondent judge based his ruling on a 2004 case, People
v. Ong, the facts of which purportedly mirror those of
the present case. However, the Supreme Court (SC) held
that there is no basis for this conclusion, as Ong involved
a conviction based on the lone testimony of one
apprehending officer, Senior Police Officer (SPO1)
Gonzales. The SC found then that SPO1 Gonzales was
merely the deliveryman, while the CI was the one who
acted as the poseur-buyer. In this case, one of the
witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team member
who also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the
actual sale transaction. His testimony was a first-hand
account of what transpired during the buy-bust and thus
stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in
flagrante delicto. Requiring the CI to testify is an added
imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential doctrine,
since the SC has long established that the presentation of
an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug
cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since
it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with
that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and
who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale
and delivery of the prohibited drug. Informants are
usually not presented in court because of the need to
hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services
to the police. Except when the accused vehemently
denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,
or there are reasons to believe that the officers had
motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it
was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the
informants testimony may be dispensed with, as it will
merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers
eyewitness accounts. In the present case, the fact of the
illegal sale has already been established by testimonies of
the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not
have characterized the CIs testimony as indispensable to
the prosecutions case. People of the Philippines v. Judge
Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; failure of the police to strictly
comply with chain of custody rule excused where integrity
and evidentiary value of the drugs seized are preserved.
As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with
the provisions on chain of custody under section 21 of
R.A. 9165, it is settled that the failure to strictly follow the
directives of this section is not fatal and will not
necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In
the present case, the succession of events established by
evidence shows that the items seized were the same
items tested and subsequently identified and testified to
in court. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the

petitioner were not compromised. Moreover, the police

officers explained during trial the reason for their failure
to strictly comply with section 21 of R.A. 9165. Benedicto
Marquez y Rayos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
197207, March 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; liberal application of chain of
custody rule observed where school personnel took initial
custody of dangerous drugs. The antecedents of this case
involve a unique feature in the sense that the person who
had initial custody of the dangerous drugs was not a
police officer or agent, but a guidance counselor a
person who was not expected to be familiar with the
niceties of the procedures required of law enforcers in the
initial handling of the confiscated evidence. Contrary to
the petitioners claim, Bagongons failure to mark the
seized sachets should not in any way weaken the
prosecutions case, more so since she was able to prove
that she was also the person who handed the seized
sachets to the police when the latter arrived. Drug
peddling in schools is prevalent; the scenario attending
this case is likely to be repeated many times. To impose
on teachers and other school personnel the observance of
the same procedure required of law enforcers (like
marking) processes that are unfamiliar to them is to set a
dangerous precedent that may eventually lead to the
acquittal of many drug peddlers. The evidentiary value of
the seized specimen remains intact as long as the school
personnel who had initial contact with the drug/s was able
to establish that the evidence had not been tampered
with when he handed it to the police, as in this case.
Benedicto Marquez y Rayos v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013.
February 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; joint purpose and design. Conspiracy may be

deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated; orinferred from the acts of
the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of
interests.Proof of a previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime is not essential, but the fact that the
malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same
objective suffices. In this case, the prosecution decisively
established a community of criminal design among
Alvarico, Reyes, and appellant Pondivida. While there is
no evidence of any previous agreement among the
assailants to commit the crime, their concerted acts
before, during and after the incident establish a joint
purpose and intent to kill. As attested to by accusedappellant, they all went to the intended victims house
bearing firearms. Accused-appellant himself knocked on
the door. After failing to locate Udoy and Bagsik, and
discovering that Gener was the latters brother, they then
engaged in a lengthy conversation, as they circled around
a nearby well outside the house.Accused even admitted
to shouting the name Bagsik over and over.They all
asked Gener to step outside and speak withthem. Upon
his refusal, appellant Pondivida, together with Alvarico,
entered the house through an upstairs window. Alvarico
fired at George who was at the stairs. Reyes, from his
vantage point at the front door, also shot at George.After
fleeing the scene, appellant Pondivida admitted that he
met with Alvarico in Novaliches. Alvarico gave him
money, and the latter thereafter boarded a bus headed to
Olongapo City. Their acts together were indicative of a
common purpose, which was murder. People of the
Philippines v. John Alvin Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969,
February 27, 2013.
Conspiracy; elements. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.
Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need
not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or
inferred from their acts. Here, accused PO2 Valdez cannot
avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by coaccused Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused

were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to

achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was
manifest not only from their going together to the betting
station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their
joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing
successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by
Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the
other. It was also significant that they fled together on
board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved
their common purpose. To be a conspirator, one did not
have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part performed by
his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2
Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved
through their acts that were indicative of their common
purpose and community of interest. People of the
Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R.
No. 175602, February 13, 2013.
Murder; elements. To hold the accused liable for murder,
the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed;
(2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is
neither parricide nor infanticide. All elements were
established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution
in the present case. First, it is undisputed that Emmanuel
died from a gunshot wound sustained on October 10,
2005. Second, Jaymart was positively identified by
eyewitness Edwin as the one who shot and killed
Emmanuel. Although Jaymart attempts to attack Edwins
credibility, it was not lost upon the Supreme Court that
the lower courts gave full faith and credence to Edwins
testimony. Third, the killing of Emmanuel was attended by
treachery. There is treachery when the attack against an
unarmed victim is so sudden that he had clearly no
inkling of what the assailant was about to do. In this case,
Emmanuel was sitting down before a table, busily writing,
when Jaymart came up behind him and, without warning,
shot him at the back of the head. Evidently, Emmanuel,
who was unarmed and unaware, had no opportunity at all
to defend himself. And finally, the killing of Emmanuel
constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide. All told, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Jaymart
was responsible for the murder of Emmanuel. People of
the Philippines v. Mark Joseph R. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713,
February 20, 2013.
Estafa; syndicated estafa; elements. The elements of
syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. In
other words, only those who formed and manage
associations that receive contributions from the general
public who misappropriated the contributions can commit
syndicated estafa. Gilbert Guy, et al, however, are not in
any way related either by employment or ownership to
Asia United Bank (AUB). They are outsiders who, by their
cunning moves were able to defraud an association,
which is the AUB. They had not been managers or owners
of AUB who used the bank to defraud the public
depositors. The present petition involves an estafa case
filed by a commercialbank as the offended party against
the accused who, as clients, defrauded the bank.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused
should only be charged for simple estafa. Rafael H. Galvez
and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia United Bank/Asia United
Bank v. Gilbert, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al v. Asia Untied
Bank, G.R. Nos. 187919/G.R. No. 187979/G.R. No. 188030,
February 20, 2013.
Homicide; intent to kill. The intent to kill, as an essential
element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or
simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The evidence

to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means
used; the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after
the killing of the victim. Accuseds intent to kill was
simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun,
he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied right
upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his
house to ask for help. Nonetheless, accused continued to
shoot at the victim three more times, albeit
unsuccessfully. These belie the absence of petitioners
intent to kill the victim. Edmundo Escamilla y Jugo v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188551, February 27,
2013.
Rape; elements of statutory rape; carnal knowledge of a
female without her consent is the essence of statutory
rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the
victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b)
the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the
use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the
females deprivation of reason or being otherwise
unconscious, nor the employment on the female of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is
necessary to commit statutory rape. People of the
Philippines v. Tomas Teodoro y Angeles, G.R. No. 175876,
February 20, 2013
Rape; elements of statutory rape; full penile penetration
of the females genitalia is not required. Full penile
penetration of the females genitalia is not likewise
required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of a
man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. The
Supreme Court here declared that the findings of the
lower courts on the commission of the two counts of
statutory rape by Teodoro were well founded. AAAs
recollections given in court when she was only eight years
old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of her
ordeals at his hands. She revealed details that no child of
her very tender age could have invented or concocted.
The only rational and natural conclusion to be made by
any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to
her. People of the Philippines v. Tomas Teodoro y Angeles,
G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013
Self-defense; elements. To successfully claim self-defense,
the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of
the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of
his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability
provided that the following circumstances concur: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.The most important among all the elements is
unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. Simon A. Flores v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
Self-defense; elements; burden of evidence is shifted to
the accused. Generally, the burden lies upon the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he
was in fact innocent. If the accused, however, admits
killing the victim, but pleads self-defense,the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any
vestige of criminal aggression on his part. In this case,
Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of
Jesus by shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify
his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By
interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the
authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him
to prove that the killing was legally justified under the
circumstances. Simon A. Flores v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.

Self-Defense; elements; number of gunshot wounds on

victim negative unlawful aggression. In this case, Flores
failed to discharge his burden. The Supreme Court agreed
with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative value of evidence on record.
As noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence,
both testimonial and documentary, were crowded with
flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility.
Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that
unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the
same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the
shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the
perceived threat to Flores life was no longer attendant.
The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus
abdomen and buttocks. Indeed, the nature and number of
the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate
the claim of self-defense by the accused. Records show
that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the
different parts of his body. According to Dr. Ruben
Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim, the
latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to
laceration of the liver. If there was any truth to Flores
claim that he merely acted in self-defense, his first shot
on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall
on the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the
attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But Flores
continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of
gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the Supreme
Court found it difficult to believe that Flores acted to
defend himself to preserve his own life. Simon A. Flores v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27,
2013.
2.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Alibi; physical impossibility must be proved. For Jaymarts
alibi to prosper, he must prove that not only was he
somewhere else when Emmanuel was killed, but also that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was
when the rime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places. Where there is the least chance for the
accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of
alibi must fail. Although Jaymart claimed that he was in
Divisoria from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on October 10,
2005, Jaymart himself admitted that it would only take a
five-minute tricycle ride to get from Divisoria to Parola,
where Emmanuel was shot. People of the Philippines v.
Mark Joseph R. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713, February 20,
2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; offenses under
section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Braza challenges the sufficiency
of the allegations in the second information because there
is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury
suffered by the government. He then argues that the
facts under the second information are inadequate to
support a valid indictment for violation of section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC)
has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public
official violates section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or
(2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference.The accused may be charged
under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term
or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of
section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other words, the presence of
one would suffice for conviction. It must be emphasized
that Braza was indicted for violation of section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 under the second mode. To be found guilty under
the second mode,it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of
his official,administrative and judicial functions. The
element of damage is not required for violation of section
3(e) under the second mode.In the case at bench, the
second information alleged, in substance, that accused
public officers and employees, discharging official or
administrative function, together with Braza,
confederated and conspired to give FABMIK Construction
and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. unwarranted

benefit or preference by awarding to it Contract J.D. No.

06H00050 through manifest partiality or evident bad
faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and
compliance with the requirement for qualification contrary
to the provisions of R.A. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act. Settled is the rule that private
persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Considering that all the elements of the offense of
violation of section 3(e) were alleged in the second
information, the SC found the same to be sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction. Isabelo A.
Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (1st Division),
G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013.
Appeals; an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused applicable to those who did not appeal if the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable to them.
Based on section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
accused Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the
application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite
the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder
due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of
the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to
him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit
of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly
unfair, considering that the Supreme Court had found the
two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly
assault against the victims, warranting their equal liability
under the principle of conspiracy. Moreover, the benefits
of the said provision extended to all the accused,
regardless of whether they appealed or not. People of the
Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R.
No. 175602, February 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; buy-bust operations; distinction
between entrapment and instigation. A buy-bust
operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a
legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is distinct
from instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not
predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or lured or
talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is
legal, instigation is not. In entrapment, prior surveillance
is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation
legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is
accompanied to the target area by the informant. Also,
the presentation of an informant as a witness is not
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution
of a drug-dealing accused in view of the need to protect
the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested
through his efforts. Only when the testimony of the
informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining
the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his
security be disregarded. Here, the police officer, who
acted as a poseur-buyer, asked the accused if he could
buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with
the former, receiving the marked bill from the police
officer and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from
his pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to
sell the shabu without much prodding from the police
officer. There is no question that the idea to commit the
crime originated from the mind of the accused. Also, the
informants testimony as a witness against the accused
would only be corroborative of the sufficient testimony of
the police officer as the poseur-buyer; hence, such
testimony was unnecessary. People of the Philippines v.
Noel Bartolome y Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6,
2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; buy-bust
operations. The chain of custody of the seized drugs in a
buy-bust operation is sufficiently established when there
is proof of the following: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized

from the forensic chemist to the court. The failure of the

police officers to make an inventory report and to
photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as
required by Article II, section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A.
9165, are not automatically fatal to the prosecutions
case, as it was able to trace and prove the chain of
custody of the same. People of the Philippines v. Linda
Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth Dela Vega y Bautista, G.R. No.
177158, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; procedure. The
buy-bust team in this case did not observe the procedures
laid down in section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 9165. They did not conduct a physical
inventory and no photograph of the confiscated item was
taken in the presence of the accused-appellant, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. In fact, the prosecution failed to
present an accomplished Certificate of Inventory. Further,
the circumstances obtaining from the time the buy-bust
team was organized until the chain of custody
commenced were riddled with procedural lapses and
inconsistencies between the testimony and the
documents presented as evidence in court so much so
that even assuming, that the physical inventory
contemplated in R.A. 9165 subsumes the marking of the
items itself, the belated marking of the seized items at
the police station sans the required presence of the
accused and the witnesses enumerated under section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
9165, and absent a justifiable ground to stand on, cannot
be considered a minor deviation from the procedures
prescribed by the law. There being a gross, systematic,
or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties is overturned. People of the Philippines v. Jose Alex
Secreto y Villanueva, G.R. No. 198115, February 27, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain and custody; requirements;
cases where non-observance may be excused. Although it
appears that the buy-bust team did not literally observe
all the requirements under section 21, Article II of R.A.
9165, like photographing the confiscated drugs in the
presence of the accused, of a representative from the
media and from the Department of Justice, and of any
elected public official who should be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of it, the
same may be excused because the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized shabu was preserved.
Immediately upon the arrest of the accused, Police Officer
Paras marked the plastic sachet containing the shabu with
the accuseds initials of NBB. Thereafter, Paras brought
the sachet and the contents to the ADSOU, where his
superior officer, Insp. Cruz, prepared and signed the
request for the laboratory examination of the contents of
the marked sachet. P02 De Ocampo handcarried the
request and the evidence to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
SPO 1 Bugabuga of that office recorded the delivery of
the request and the marked sachet, which were all
received by Chemist Dela Rosa. In turn, Chemist Dela
Rosa examined the contents of the marked sachet, and
executed Physical Sciences Report No. D-1 03 8-03
confirming that the marked sachet contained 0.06 gram
of shabu. In this regard, the accused did not deny that
Paras and Chemist Dela Rosa affirmed the sequence of
custody of the shabu during the trial. The Supreme Court
ruled that this chain of custody of the shabu was firm and
unbroken. People of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y
Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; substantial
compliance may be sanctioned. Defense suggests that
the non-marking of the seized illegal drug at the place
where the same was confiscated is enough to exonerate
the accused-appellant. The reason is that this allegedly
places in doubt the authenticity of the drug delivered to
the crime laboratory for examination. However, the
Supreme Court found that the prosecution has properly
established the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at
least from the time it came into possession of the police
officers, during its testing in the laboratory to determine

its composition and up to the time it was offered in

evidence. The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so
much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the
evidence are removed. As long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending police officers, substantial
compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of
custody is sanctioned. People of the Philippines v. Saiben
Langcua y Daimla, G.R. No. 190343, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items should be
preserved. Failure to strictly comply with section 21 of
R.A. 9165, which outlines the procedure on the chain of
custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous
drugs, will not render an arrest illegal or the items seized
from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is
crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved for they will be used in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In
the case at bar, the Supreme Court found that the
prosecution was able to establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had
been maintained. P/Insp. Salazar, who was one of the
apprehending officers, marked the seized items in front of
accused Manalao and the other apprehending officers.
P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer,
thereafter signed a request for the laboratory
examination of the seized drugs, which was received by
Forensic Chemist Mag-abo, together with the items
enumerated therein. She then testified in open court on
how her examination confirmed that the seized items,
which she submitted in court, tested positive for shabu.
Besides, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered or meddled
with, the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence
had been preserved and that the police officers who
handled the seized drugs had discharged their duties
properly and with regularity remain. The burden to
overcome such presumptions lies on Manalao, and the
Supreme Court found that he failed to do so. People of the
Philippines v. Malik Manalao y Alauya, G.R. No. 187496,
February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous
drugs; elements. When prosecuting an illegal possession
of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. Mere
possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is
punishable under R.A. 9165. Since accused Manalao failed
to adduce any evidence showing that he had legal
authority to possess the seized drugs, then he was
correctly charged with its illegal possession. The Supreme
Court has time and again looked upon the defense of
denial with disfavor for being easily fabricated. Since
accused failed to give anything more than his bare
assertions, his defense of denial must necessarily be
rejected. People of the Philippines v. Malik Manalao y
Alauya, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous
drugs; elements. In prosecuting cases for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug. The above elements
were all duly established by the prosecution. After De
Jesus was validly arrested for the illegal sale of drugs, he
was searched and frisked, pursuant to section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, or the provision on searches
incident to lawful arrest. Upon such search, De Jesus was
found to be in possession of eight heat-sealed sachets of
shabu, an item identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug. De Jesus failed to show that he had authority to
possess them. Moreover, mere possession of a prohibited

drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or

animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of satisfactory explanation.People of the
Philippines v. Victor De Jesus y Garcia, G.R. No. 198794,
February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous
drugs; elements. To prosecute illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, there must be a showing that (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. As an incident to the
arrest, Galido was ordered to empty his pockets which led
to the confiscation of another plastic sachet containing
illegal drugs. The defense presented no evidence to prove
that the possession was authorized by law, the defense
being non-possession or denial of possession. However,
such denial cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by the police officials.For the defense position to
prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that government
officials have performed their duties ina regular and
proper manner. Galido failed to present any evidence that
the police officials were distrustful in their performance of
duties. He even testified that prior to the arrest; he did
not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with the police
officers nor was he acquainted with any reason that they
carried a grudge against him. Thus, the Supreme Court
upheld the ruling of the lower courts convicting Galido of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. People of the
Philippines v. James Galido y Noble, G.R. No. 192231,
February 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous
drugs; elements; admissibility of evidence. In a
prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1)
that the accused is in possession of the object identified
as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. Accused
concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a
standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and
PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him
stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. He believes
such meticulous search was unnecessary because, as
Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when
petitioner walked past through the metal detector and
hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial
security check. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that
prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport
security officers found in the person of accused the
marijuana fruiting tops, an illegal substance, contained in
rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the
airports pre-departure area. Accuseds reluctance to
show the contents of his short pants pocket after the
friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana,
and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the
arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or
material subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants
pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana)
seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.
Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
elements. The elements necessary to successfully
prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. The prosecution must establish that
the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took place
together with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in evidence. In this
case, the prosecution was able to establish the above
elements. Accused Manalao was positively identified by
PO1 Solarta, who knew him even before the operation, as
the one who sold the seized shabu subject of this case to
the poseur-buyer. Manalao was caught in flagrante delicto

in the entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of

Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Moreover, the corpus delicti of
the crime was also established with certainty and
conclusiveness. People of the Philippines v. Malik Manalao
y Alauya, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. As found
by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another and (2) knew that what was
sold and delivered was a prohibited drug;and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drugs. Manifest on record is thatthe
buy-bust transaction between the police operatives and
Diwa was unequivocally established by the prosecution,
and it was so found by both lower courts. After being
identified by the informant, Diwa was approached by PO3
Galvez for the purchase of marijuana.Diwa, after
ascertaining the quantity to be purchased and accepting
the marked money from PO3 Galvez, handed him a
portion of marijuana from the bunch wrapped in
newspaper, contained in the yellow SM Supermarket
plastic bag. The contents thereof were sent to the
Physical Sciences Division, and after examination,
confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous drug. People of
the Philippines v. Magsalin Diwa y Gutierrez, G.R. No.
194253, February 27,2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu. To establish
the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the
consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and of the payment for the thing. It simply requires
the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. If a police officer goes through the operation as
a buyer, the crime is consummated when the police
officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the
accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them
involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
police officer. Should the accused raise the defense of
frame-up and extortion, the same must be established
with clear and convincing evidence because the fact that
frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders
such defenses hard to believe. In this case, the accused
merely put up self-serving denials. If indeed the accused
was merely a victim of frame-up and extortion, there was
no reason for him and his brother not to have formally
charged the police officers with the severely penalized
offense of planting of evidence under section 2915 of R.A.
9165 and extortion. Therefore, the Supreme Court
rendered the defenses of frame-up and extortion
implausible. People of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y
Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of
illegal sale merely consummates the selling transaction,
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. As long as the police officer went through
the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by
seller, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to
the former, the crime is already consummated. In this
case, the prosecution has adequately proven all the
elements constituting sale of illegal drug. This is evident
from the testimony of PO1 Domingo, who identified in
open court the white crystalline substance contained in
the plastic sachet as the one handed by Langcua to him
during the buy-bust operation. The substance yielded
positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, as evidenced by the Chemistry Report
given by PSI Cayabyab. People of the Philippines v.
SaibenLangcua y Daimla, G.R. No. 190343, February 6,
2013.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. Section 21(1) of

R.A. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. This procedure
underscores the value of preserving the integrity of the
confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and
laboratory equipment. It puts into focus the essentiality of
the confiscated articles as the corpus delicti that the
State must establish during the trial, as a means of
avoiding the commission of abuses by the lawmen in their
enforcement of the laws against illegal drug trade. In this
case, the members of the buy-bust team substantially
complied with the requirements. To shield the operation
from suspicion, they first saw to the certification of the
buy-bust bill by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City pursuant to their then standard operating procedure.
After arresting Tapere, they lost no time in bringing him
and the confiscated sachets (marked and identified as
AT-1 to AT-4, inclusive) to the PDEA office, where Team
Leader SPO2 Englatiera immediately prepared and signed
the request for laboratory examination. Due to the
lateness of the hour, PO1 Margaja, another member of
the team, brought the request and the sachets to the PNP
Crime Laboratory on the next day, and the request and
the sachets were received in due course. Sr. Police Insp.
Jabonillo of the PNP Crime Laboratory subjected the
sachets to examination, and confirmed the presence in all
of them of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. She also gave the weights of the contents of the
four sachets in her Chemistry Report No. D-083-02 dated
September 4, 2002. Her report was approved by her
superior, Police Supt. Sabong of the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory. Based on all the foregoing, there was a
conscious effort exerted by the buy-bust team to ensure
the proper incrimination of Tapere. People of the
Philippines v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R. No. 178065,
February 20, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
elements. To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu as
defined and punished under section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt the following: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of
the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the
payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires
simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. In short, the Prosecution must show that the
transaction or sale actually took place, and present in
court the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.
People of the Philippines v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R.
No. 178065, February 20, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs;
elements. In the case at bar, the State has conclusively
established the concurrence of the foregoing elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Firstly, the members of
the buy-bust team identified Tapere as the person with
whom Salgado had contracted on the purchase of the
shabu. Secondly, the subject of the sale was one plastic
sachet of shabu that the PNP Crime Laboratory later on
confirmed in due course to contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. It is of no consequence
that three other sachets of shabu recovered from Taperes
possession at the time of his arrest were also presented
as evidence during the trial, or that the Prosecution failed
to specify which of the four sachets was the sachet
involved in the transaction between him and Salgado
because what is decisive is that one of the four sachets
was definitely the subject of the transaction between
Tapere and the poseur buyer. Thirdly, the consideration of
the sale was P100.00, and the actual payment of that
amount through the P100.00 bill bearing serial number
YU859011 covered by the public prosecutors certification
ensured the identification of it as the consideration. And,
fourthly, the Prosecutions witnesses fully described the
details of the consummated sale of shabu between Tapere
as seller and Salgado as buyer. People of the Philippines v.

Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R. No. 178065, February 20,

2013
January 2013
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy. Appellant questions the lower courts finding

of conspiracy between her and co-accused. She claims
that she merely accompanied Espiritu in going to the RFC
Food Court and had nothing to do with the transaction. As
a matter of fact, the shabu was not even found in or
recovered from her possession. It just so happened that
she was in the area during the delivery of the drugs. The
argument did not persuade the Supreme Court. There is
conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be
proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony
subject of the agreement of the parties. Conspiracy may
be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting
of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
before, during and after the commission of the felony to
achieve a common design or purpose. The existence of
conspiracy in this case was clearly established not only by
the prosecutions evidence but also by appellants very
own testimony. As can be gleaned from appellants
testimony as well as from the testimony of Carla as to
what transpired during the actual buy-bust operation,
appellant acted in common concert with her co-accused
in the illegal sale of shabu. She cannot therefore isolate
her act of merely accompanying Espiritu to the RFC Food
Court or carrying the shabu since in conspiracy the act of
one is the act of all. To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution
of the conspiracy. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta
M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
Extinction of criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto
upon death of accused. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. It is also settled that upon the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal. While appellant Florencio died way back on
February 7, 2007, the said information was not timely
relayed to the Supreme Court (SC), such that the SC was
unaware of the same when it rendered its December 14,
2011 Decision. It was only later that the SC was informed
of Florencios death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the
Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this
development, it therefore became necessary for the SC to
declare Florencios criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto, to have been extinguished by his death
prior to final judgment. The judgment of conviction is thus
set aside insofar as Florencio is concerned. People of the
Philippines v. Florencio Agacer, et al, G.R. No. 177751,
January 7, 2013.
Instigation; distinguished from entrapment. Appellant
raises the defense of instigation to gain her acquittal. She
argues that the government, through the PAOCTF
operatives, induced her to commit the offense when they
repeatedly approached and asked her to sell them shabu.
The Supreme Court was unswayed. Instigation means
luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no
intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. It differs
from entrapment which is the employment of ways and
means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In
instigation, the criminal intent to commit an offense
originates from the inducer and not from the accused who
had no intention to commit and would not have
committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In
entrapment, the criminal intent or design originates from
the accused and the law enforcers merely facilitate the

apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes.

Instigation results in the acquittal of the accused, while
entrapment may lead to prosecution and conviction.
Here, the evidence clearly established that the police
operatives employed entrapment, not instigation, to
capture appellant and her cohorts in the act of selling
shabu. It must be recalled that it was only upon receipt of
a report of the drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from
the confidential informant that a buy-bust team was
formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu were made.
Also, appellant testified that she agreed to the transaction
of her own free will when she saw the same as an
opportunity to earn money. Notably too, appellant was
able to quickly produce a sample. This confirms that she
had a ready supply of the illegal drugs. Clearly, she was
never forced, coerced or induced through incessant
entreaties to source the prohibited drug for Carla and PO3
Cario and this she even categorically admitted during
her testimony. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta M.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
Mitigating circumstances; minority of accused may be
proved on appeal. Appellant Franklin is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklins
Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on
December 20, 1981; hence, he was merely 16 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2,
1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is
a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the
accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of
the law in extending such leniency and compassion is that
because of his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact
that his minority was not proved during the trial and that
his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our
consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely
affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
People of the Philippines v. Florencio Agacer, et al, G.R.
No. 177751, January 7, 2013.
Murder; elements. To be convicted of murder, the
following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the
attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing
neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. People of the
Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo,
G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Murder; evident premeditation. The SC, however held
that, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
Such could only be appreciated if there was evidence to
show the following: (1) the time when the offender was
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination
and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. None, for any such
circumstance, was offered in the instant case. The
testimony of Romeo, save from the statement that the
appellants were whispering to each other before they
placed their arms on Pablos shoulder, was confined to
the acts that caused the death of the victim. People of the
Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo,
G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Murder; treachery. Appellants maintain that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not attendant in the
commission of the crime considering that there was no
element of surprise when Pablo was attacked. Pablo had
the opportunity to defend himself. Appellant Benjamin, in
his Supplemental Brief, further argued that even if there
was suddenness of the attack, Pablo could have chosen to
retreat. The Supreme Court (SC) was not convinced. The
SC has time and again declared that the essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape, and that it may still exist even if the

attack is frontal so long as the same is sudden and

unexpected. In this case, it was clear that the elderly
victim had no inkling of the impending danger against
him. The attack was sudden notwithstanding the prior act
of placing the assailants arms on the shoulder of the
victim because such was done in a friendly manner.
Records would show that Pablo was fifty-seven (57) years
old at the time of his death. Admittedly, ones thought
processes and reflexes slow with age that Pablo did not
readily understand the intentions of the appellants. The
attack was, therefore, clearly sudden and unexpected.
People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and
Abundio Binondo, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Penalty; Information must allege qualifying circumstance
of victims mental retardation; privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of accused. Under Article 266-B
in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. However, when rape is committed by an
assailant who has knowledge of the victims mental
retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But this
circumstance must be alleged in the information being a
qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty to
death and changes the nature of the offense from simple
to qualified rape. In the case at bench, while appellant
categorically admitted that he knew AAA to be suffering
from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to
allege this fact in the information. As such, even if it was
proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. Thus, appellants conviction is only for
simple rape for which he should be meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. People of the Philippines v. Rey
Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
Penalty; privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of
accused considered. Nonetheless, a reasonable ground
exists in this case that calls for the modification of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower
courts upon the appellant. The Supreme Court found
merit in appellants assertion that he was a minor during
the commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon
order of the trial court, the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon,
Northern Samar, brought before it their office records,
particularly appellants Certificate of Live Birth containing
the fact of birth of the latter. Appellants Certificate of
Live Birth shows that he was born on 23 February 1985.
Indeed, at the time of the commission of the crime
charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17
years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article
68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. People of the Philippines
v. Rey Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30,
2013.
Rape; absence of injuries on genitalia of victim not a
defense. The accused argues that the findings of old
healed vaginal lacerations during the physical
examinations disproved the charges against him,
stressing that the old healed lacerations, being indicative
of the lapse of three months from the time of the alleged
sexual assault to the time of the medical examination,
belied AAAs claim of being raped on April 13, 1999,
which was but only two months prior to the medical
examination. He insists that the finding that her genitalia
showed no fresh laceration or hymenal injury suffered in
the previous seven days was inconsistent with BBBs
claim about being raped nine hours prior to her physical
examination. The Supreme Court held that the arguments
of the accused are unwarranted. The essence of rape is
the carnal knowledge of a female either against her will
(through force or intimidation) or without her consent
(where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).
Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male
having bodily connections with a female. As such, the
presence or absence of injury or laceration in the
genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has
been committed or not. Such injury or laceration is
material only if force or intimidation is an element of the
rape charged; otherwise, it is merely circumstantial
evidence of the commission of the rape. Verily, a medical

examination and a medical certificate, albeit

corroborative of the commission of rape, are not
indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape. The
accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of the
victims credible, natural and convincing testimony. This is
no less true when the rape victim testifies against her
own father; unquestionably, there would be reason to
give her testimony greater weight than usual. People of
the Philippines v. Pedro Buado Jr., y Cipriano, G.R. No.
170634, January 8, 2013.
Rape; assessment by the trial court of the credibility of
the victims testimony respected. Ultimately and
frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges on
the credibility of the victims testimony. The Supreme
Court has consistently relied on the assessment of such
credibility by the trial court, because the factual findings
of the trial court, particularly those bearing on such
assessment, are the product of the trial judges peculiar
opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of
the witnesses while they personally appear and testify
during the trial, as contrasted with the dependence by the
appellate courts on the mute pages of the records of the
trial. This consistent reliance proceeds from the reality
that the trial judge is in the best position to detect that
frequently thin line between truth and prevarication that
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus,
an appellate court will not disturb the credence the trial
court accorded to the testimonies of the witnesses unless
the trial court is shown to have overlooked or arbitrarily
disregarded facts and circumstances of significance in the
correct resolution of the case. Here, the Regional Trial
Court as the trial court and the Court of Appeals as the
intermediately reviewing tribunal did not overlook or
disregard any fact or circumstance of significance.
Instead, they correctly appreciated the evidence, and
rightly concluded that the accused committed the rapes
of his own daughters.They regarded and accepted AAA
and BBB as credible witnesses whose recollections about
their fathers lecherous acts deserved the fullest faith and
credence. The trial records entirely supported the lower
courts findings in favor of the credibility of AAA and
BBBs recollections. Indeed, AAA and BBB deserved the
credence accorded to them, for they were reliable in their
recollection of their ordeals at the hands of the accused.
People of the Philippines v. Pedro Buado, Jr., y Cipriano,
G.R. No. 170634, January 8, 2013.
Rape; delay of victim in reporting of rape not a defense.
Accused-appellant tries to undermine the credibility of
AAA as a rape victim. He contends that the belated
filing of the Complaint, AAAs act of still returning to
their house even after she was allegedly raped therein by
the appellant, her failure to shout and offer resistance
during the rape, and the several material inconsistencies
between her affidavit and her open court testimony,
tainted her credibility. The Supreme Court (SC) disagreed.
Indeed, there was no prompt revelation of what befell
AAA. But this is, according to the SC, not enough reason
to discredit her. A delay in reporting a rape case for two
months or longer, as in this case, cannot be taken against
the rape victim. Long silence and delay in reporting the
crime of rape have not always been construed as
indications of a false accusation. A rape charge becomes
doubtful only when the delay or inaction in revealing its
commission is unreasonable and unexplained. In this
case. AAAs delay in filing the Complaint is not without a
valid reason. She was cowed by appellants threats which
hindered her from immediately reporting her painful
ordeal to the authorities. People of the Philippines v.
Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013.
Rape; elements; lone testimony of victim, if credible, is
enough to sustain a conviction. BBB positively identified
the appellant as the person who grabbed her and
removed her short pants and panty while she was in her
room, and who thereafter inserted his penis into her
vagina. The Supreme Court then stressed the lower
courts observation that BBB, who was just nine years old
when she testified, spoke in a clear, spontaneous and
straightforward manner. She never wavered in identifying
the appellant despite the defenses gruelling cross-

examination. The SC thus found her testimony credible. A

young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as
serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow
the examination of her private part, and subject herself to
the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her
motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
The SC further held that where no evidence exists to
show any convincing reason or improper motive for a
witness to falsely testify against an accused, the
testimony deserves faith and credit. Moreover, the lone
testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is
enough to sustain a conviction. People of the Philippines
v. Patricio Rayon Sr., G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013.
Rape; lack of resistance of victim. Neither does AAAs
alleged failure to shout and offer resistance during the
incident deserve credence. Contrary to appellants
assertion, the records show that AAA tried to resist his
advances but was not successful because he is bigger
and stronger than her. In any event, the law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance especially when, as in this case, intimidation is
exercised upon the victim who submitted herself to the
advances of her assailant because of fear for her life.
People of the Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No.
189355, January 23, 2013.
Rape; minor inconsistencies in testimony of rape victim.
Anent the inconsistencies between AAAs affidavit and
her testimony in open court as pointed out by the
appellant, the SC found that the same are not material
and refer only to minor details. The alleged contradictions
as to whether appellant is her uncle or step-father and
whether it was she or her friend who revealed her ordeal
to her mother are inconsequential matters that will not
affect the determination of whether appellant is innocent
of the crime charged or not. People of the Philippines v.
Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013.
Rape; principles guiding appellate courts in review of rape
convictions. In reviewing rape convictions, the Court has
been guided by three principles, namely: (a) that an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult
for the complainant to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving only
two persons, the rapist and the victim, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (c) that the evidence for the Prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. People of the Philippines v.
Pedro Buado, Jr., y Cipriano, G.R. No. 170634, January 8,
2013.
Rape; special qualifying relationship of victim with the
accused should be proved. The crime committed in this
case is simple rape only in view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove with clarity the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship. While the information
alleges that AAA is the step-daughter of the appellant,
there is nothing on record to support the same. The stepfather step-daughter relationship as a qualifying
circumstance presupposes that the victims mother and
the accused are married to each other which, however, is
not obtaining in this case. Hence, the Court of Appeals
affirmance of the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
imposed upon appellant by the Regional Trial Court is
proper. People of the Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan,
G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013.
Treachery; definition. The Supreme Court (SC) here held
that appellants act of suddenly stabbing Florendo while
he was innocently cycling along Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constitutes the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In this
case, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and

swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift

turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect
himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without
risk to his own person. Thus, the SC sustained the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v.
Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603,
January 16, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous

drugs; narcotics substance constitutes corpus delicti. Sale
or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven
without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug.
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic
substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People
of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Nacua, et al, accused;
Reynaldo Nacua, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 200165,
January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous
drugs; strict compliance with rules on chain of custody
required. Given the unique characteristic of dangerous
and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily susceptible to tampering,
alteration, or substitution, either by accident or otherwise,
there must be strict compliance with the prescribed
measures to be observed during and after the seizure of
dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the
custody and transfer thereof for examination, and at all
times up to their presentation in court. Such measures
are described with particularity under section 21(1) of
Republic Act No. 9165 and section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9165. Moreover, in People v. Coreche, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the marking of the seized drugs
must be done immediately after they are seized from the
accused and failure to do so suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity
of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo
Nacua, et al, accused; Reynaldo Nacua, accusedappellant, G.R. No. 200165, January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous
drugs; strict compliance with rules on chain of custody
required. In this case, there was a total disregard of the
requirements of law and jurisprudence. The prosecution
even admits that the police officers acquired the sachet of
shabu presented in court against accused-appellant in a
mere test-buy operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague,
and PO1 Anion. The police officers, after supposedly
buying the sachet of shabu from the Nacua couple for Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the residence of the Nacua
couple, without recovering the marked money or effecting
the couples arrest. The police officers brought the sachet
of suspected shabu all the way back to their police
station, and only there marked the said item, without the
presence of the accused and/or other disinterested
witnesses. While the Supreme Court (SC) allows for
relaxation of the rules in some cases, there must be
compelling and justifiable grounds for the same and it
must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items have been properly preserved. However,
such conditions are not present in the instant case. Firstly,
the prosecution did not offer any explanation as to why
the police officers failed to strictly comply with the
established procedure for the custody of the suspected
shabu. The SC thus surmised that the operation on
September 2, 2005 was only meant to be a test-buy, so
that the police officers could secure a search warrant for
the house of the Nacua couple. There was no original
intention to arrest and charge the Nacua couple for the
shabu purchase that day. Surprisingly and inexplicably,
however, the prosecution chose to indict the Nacua
couple for the test-buy conducted on September 2,
2005, rather than for the result of the search conducted
on September 21, 2005 at the house of the Nacua couple

which purportedly yielded more shabu and related

paraphernalia and led to the arrest of the couple.
Secondly, the prosecution failed to show that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the sachet of suspected shabu
allegedly bought from the Nacua couple during the testbuy operation has been properly preserved from the
time said item was transmitted to the crime laboratory up
to its presentation in court. No evidence was offered to
show as to how the said specimen was kept and by whom
after its forensic examination throughout its presentation
in court. With reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of
the corpus delicti, the acquittal of accused-appellant of
the crime charged is in order. People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo Nacua, et al, accused; Reynaldo Nacua,
accused-appellant, G.R. No. 200165, January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody rule. The accused
argues that the NBI operatives failed to observe the chain
of custody rule in dangerous drugs cases. The Supreme
Court did not agree. The alleged failure of the
apprehending team to inventory and photograph the
confiscated items immediately after the operation is not
fatal to the prosecutions cause. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Here, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs had been preserved as there is evidence
to account for the crucial links in the chain of custody of
the seized shabu, starting from its confiscation to its
presentation as evidence in the Regional Trial Court.
People of the Philippines v. Hong Yen E and Tsien Tsien
Chua, G.R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013.
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; elements. The
elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as
follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. The
evidence on record clearly established that appellant
Chua was in possession of the plastic bags containing
prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. Applying
section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a disputable
presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and
its contents. It may be rebutted by contrary proof that the
accused did not in fact exercise power and control over
the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The
burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to
explain absence of animus possidendi. Here, Chua failed
to present evidence to rebut the presumption. People of
the Philippines v. Hong Yen E and Tsien Tsien Chua, G.R.
No. 181826, January 9, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; buy-bust operations or
decoy solicitations are valid. A police officers act of
soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the decoy solicitation, is
not prohibited by law and does not invalidate the buybust operation. In People v. Legaspi, the Supreme Court
pronounced that in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs,
any of the following will not exculpate the accused: (1)
that facilities for the commission of the crime were
intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act
was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer
seeking to expose his criminal act; or (3) that the police
authorities feigning complicity in the act were present
and apparently assisted in its commission. Hence, even
assuming that the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked
her to sell them shabu, appellants defense of instigation
will not prosper. This is especially true in that class of
cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence
of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police
officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or instigation of
the police officer. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta
M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; elements. In the
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the two
essential elements are: (1) the identity of the buyer and

the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Hence, evidence that establishes both elements by the
required quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, must be presented. Here, the said elements were
duly proved by the prosecution. Carla and P/Chief Insp.
Dandan positively identified appellant and her co-accused
as the sellers of the contraband who sold the same in
exchange for the marked money. The item was seized,
marked and upon examination was identified as shabu, a
dangerous drug. The same was subsequently presented
in evidence. Moreover, Carla provided a detailed
testimony as to the delivery and sale of shabu. Thus, the
Supreme Court (SC) found no reason to doubt the above
testimony of Carla. Aside from the fundamental rule that
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
prosecution witnesses are accorded respect considering
that it is the trial court that had the opportunity to
observe their conduct and demeanor, the SC noted that
appellant herself corroborated the prosecutions account
of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta M.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
RA 7832; 48-hour prior notice of disconnection of
electricity required; damages awarded for improper
disconnection of electricity. The Court of Appeals here
held that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected
the electricity of Permanent Light. The appellate court
upheld the validity of the provision in petitioners service
contract which allows the utility company to disconnect
service upon a customers failure to pay the differential
billing. It however stressed that under section 97 of
Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the
right of a public utility to discontinue its service to a
customer is subject to the requirement of a 48-hour
written notice of disconnection. Petitioners failure in this
regard, according to the appellate court, justifies the
award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents.
The Supreme Court (SC) took note of Resolution No. 9521, or the Standard Rules and Regulations Governing the
Operation of Electrical Power Services, of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) which superseded and revoked
Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission
adopted on November 27, 1941. Section 48 of ERB
Resolution No. 95-21, reads: SEC. 48. Refusal or
Discontinuance of Service. Service may be discontinued
for the non-payment of bills as provided for in Section 43
hereof, provided that a forty eight (48)-hour written
notice of such disconnection has been given the
customer. True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21
expressly provides for the application of the 48-hour
notice rule to Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However,
petitioner Meralco, through its Revised Terms and
Conditions of Service, adopted said notice requirement in
cases where disconnection of service is warranted
because (1) the consumer failed to pay the adjusted bill
after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct
amount of energy consumed, (2) or for failure to comply
with any of the terms and conditions, (3) or in case of or
to prevent fraud upon the Company. Considering the
discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased
Inspectors, petitioner Meralco could have disconnected
electricity to Permanent Light for no other reason but to
prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the
Revised Terms and Conditions of Service vis--vis Section
48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, petitioner is obliged to
furnish respondents with a 48-hour notice of
disconnection. Having failed in this regard, the SC found
basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of respondents for the unceremonious disconnection
of electricity to Permanent Light. Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) v. Atty. P.M. Castillo, doing business under the
trade name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing
Enterprises, et al, G.R. No. 182976. January 14, 2013.
RA 9262; violence against women and children; leniency
in favor of accused due to ambiguity of the law
inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that it cannot
construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
leniency because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that
would necessitate any construction. While the degree of
physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the

Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient

justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the
former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely
impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose
violent act/s physically harm women with whom they
have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their
children with the end in view of promoting the protection
of women and children. Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego
v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, etc., et al,
G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013.
RA 9262; violence against women and children; crime of
violence against women; elements. Petitioner here insists
that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its
proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only
slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code
which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court. The Supreme Court (SC) did not give credence to
this argument. In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the SC
enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit: (1) The offender has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman; (2) The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment against
the woman; and (3) The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego v. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, etc., et al, G.R. No. 193960,
January 7, 2013.
RA 9262; violence against women and children; crime of
violence against women need not be a consequence of an
existing or present dating relationship. Notably, while it is
required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman for RA 9262 to be
applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence
be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the
law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the
rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the
punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the Regional Trial
Court, it is immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed. Consequently, the SC did not
depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioners assertion that the act of violence should be
due to the sexual or dating relationship. Karlo Angelo
Dabalos y San Diego v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Angeles City, etc., et al, G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013.