TAADA VS TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish
in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and
effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that
publication must be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING
The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the laws. The clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new Civil
Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. VS MILITARY SHRINE

SERVICES
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

HELD

DE ROY VS CA
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FACTS
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of
Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was
ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys counsel filed a
motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of
Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing
a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because
said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

HELD
No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.

ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

FACTS
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against
Judge Brillantes. Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living
together in a home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping
on his bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro.
Lupo left the home without confronting Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from
visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children from him. Lupo claims that
Brillantes is married to Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged that
Lupo was not married to de Castro and that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits
having 5 children with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de Castro in 1991 at
California, he believed in all good faith and with all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because her first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines while the second marriage which took place in 1991 was governed by the Family
Code.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.

HELD
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988
regardless of date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code said Art. 15 is given
retroactive effect insofar as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Respondent is the
last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman.

NARZOLES VS NLRC
G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

HELD

CONSUNJI VS CA
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

FACTS
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose
Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

HELD
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable

presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of
res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed
only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under
other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens
Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their known right of the remedies
provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed
her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she
wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

GUY VS CA
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina
Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before
the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled
without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of
Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any
and all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling
that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have
validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of nonforum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

HELD
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily
obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to

protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or
waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It
would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner,
the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even
if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of
heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in
one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

FACTS
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate
civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD
Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the
amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they
would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated.
Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but
its spirit giveth life.

DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Gutierrez dissenting:
No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already
liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage
suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly
removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS
In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong.
However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA. Later, Reyes married
Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was
petitioning that he be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It
was his contention that the divorce decree they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in
the Philippines, hence, despite the divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained
conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared
national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.

HELD
No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American Law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess husband as he is not
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

PILAPIL VS SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE(S)
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

RECIO VS RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

FACTS
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued
a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired
Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single
and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their
conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former
marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first
marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage
was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

HELD
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance
with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree
was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the
fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are
two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely
suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent
procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still
restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that
the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to
produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can
not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare
nullity of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

QUITA VS CA
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FACTS
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried
another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were
blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to
declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case
held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private
respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in
Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes
provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that
she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a
Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered
in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children
moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring
the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the
exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not
declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court
of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of
Arturo.

HELD
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time
of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien
at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys national law. Thus, Fe D.
Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will
be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

PEREZ VS CA
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

FACTS
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The
marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984,
Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil
Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be
intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?

HELD
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a
citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if

a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting
an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
Petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion
for intervention is based.

SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

FACTS
During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20,
1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with
Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimos
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993,
Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue
of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimos estate.

HELD
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.