176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual

Citizenship Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo
avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as
an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the
will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is
a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot
also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an
act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should
not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution
simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he
is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained
the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.

Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial

Law on Natural Resources, Constitutional Law
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR., FELIZA SREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL
JR., FELIZA S. IMPERIAL, ELIAS S. IMPERIAL, MIRIAM S. IMPERIAL, LOLITA
ALCAZAR, SALVADOR ALCAZAR, EANCRA CORPORATION, and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS of LEGASPI CITY
G.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999
FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No.
55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are
now the subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on
which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation
conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that
Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from
OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and
Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial,
Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They
contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world
including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself
through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant
therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to
dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the
Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure
to file the appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands.

Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only
by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow
of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government,
specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The
decision of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is
that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit.
This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked
by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secretary.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR,
Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose
Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely
outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation
of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500)
from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The contradictory
views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the
land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise
of any conclusive classification of the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's
reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's
appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be
given due course.
Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner
also alleged that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before
the proper Court, will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the
Government would lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of
the public domain.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes
good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It
has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when
compelling reasons so warrants or when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the
need to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and
granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner Republics
appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courts
discretion must be given due course.

Gamendi vs COA

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma
P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June
22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on
Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on
February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the
expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in
a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February
02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in
Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma
G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or
not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the
term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment
conformably with the constitutional intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in
audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective
February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Audit Enbanc.
On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which
set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize
an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on
Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired
on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto
Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in
disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff.
ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as
they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her

coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February
02, 2000.

FUNA VS. VILLAR

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DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008
to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title
to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a
fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as
such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he
was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed
to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the
appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation
of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs
Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for
the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very
litis mota of the case

ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the
term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has
far-reaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench,
bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow
petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called
non-traditional suitors may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be
it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
reappointment as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if
a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of
seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition,
such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or
the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of
the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of
Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February
2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past
pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the
import of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4
years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set
of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy
in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capac