Nationalism and Kaisertreue

Author(s): Stephen Fischer-Galati

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1963), pp. 31-36
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3000384
Accessed: 04-09-2015 18:34 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Slavic Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

NATIONALISM

AND

BY STEPHEN

KAISERTREUE

FISCHER-GALATI

In his complex and far-reachingstudy ProfessorSugar has raised certain

fundamental questions regarding the Habsburg state system, nationality problems, and the possibilities of reconciliation of conflicting
national and political interestswithin the frameworkof a democratic
federal empire. The greatestsignificanceof his paper lies not so much
in his basic conclusion that the dissolution of the empire could not
have been prevented as in his method of analyzing the intricate problems of this heterogeneous polity. Dissecting "nationalism" as manifested in the several national groups, he reveals its diverse nature and
meaning to the various socio-economic classes comprised therein, and
forcefullybrings out the profound conflictsprevailing among Magyars,
Czechs, Poles, Croats, and other nationalities by relating them to the
broader problems of coexistence within the mnultinationalempire.
This approach is indeed admirably suited for examining the major
historical problems of Eastern Europe. Professor Sugar is commendably concerned with assessing the role of the peasantry, bourgeoisie,
landed aristocracy,church, intelligentsia,and working class in relation
to their class interestswithin the national groups themselves and visa-vis other nationalities and, ultimately, the emperor. Free from the
distortions of Marxist historians who have tried to emphasize class
conflictthroughessentiallysimilar approaches,' the author has seriously
troubled the waters of the "Blue Danube school" of analysts of the
reasons for the decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire.
Professor Sugar has been unable here to investigate the problems
of the several component nationalities with equal intensity but has
charted the course for future detailed studies of nationality problems
both within and outside the Habsburg monarchy. It is therefore intended that this commentary raise certain questions applicable both
to the historyof the Habsburg Empire and, by extension, to those of
the Ottoman Empire as well.
MR. FISCHER-GALATI

is associate Professorof historyat TTWayne

Slate Universit.y.

1 Typical of more respectable Marxist studies are V. iern', Franti4ek August Brauner,

vykonavatel odzaku selskych rebelili (Prague, 1948); V. Bogdanov, "Historijska uloga

drustvenih klasa u historiji nase borbe za oslobodjenje," Racd jugoslave72skeakadeinije
nauke (Zagreb, 1954), pp. 5 ff.;C. Daicoznaoosti i unijetnosti: Odjel filozofijui dcruRtvene
viciu, L. Bainyai,V. Chereste?iu,V. Liveanu, "Lupta revolutionarqa maselor: Factor hotaritor in tinirea Transilvaniei

cu Rominia," Studii, XI (1958), No. 6, 21 if.

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

32

Slavic Review

One of Professor Sugar's fundamental concepts is essential to the

understandiingof the predicaments of the politically underdeveloped
empire: the all-encompassing Kaiscrtrcue precluded democratic reform and the reorganization of the empire on the basis of etlhnicor
individual sovereignty. For not only did Kaisertrecuetranscncidnlationalistic identification(except for political extrelmists)but also, and more
significantly,it was exploited both by the politically active miin-orities
to further their own programs and by Vienna to prevent significant
alterations of the status quo. As long as the masses were faithfulto the
emperor and the several political leaders either regarded the monarch
as benevolent to their interestsor were unable or unwilling to offer
political programs that would undermine the Kaisertrecueof the population, the chances for democratic reform were quite negligible. As
neither democratic
ProfessorSugar points out, the imperial house AwTas
nor anxious to reconcile the conflictingaims of political spokesmen of
the multiparticularisticempire.
The strengthof the Habsburgs ultimately rested in the Kaisetreutc,
the cornerstone of the Hausmacht. The continuity of the empire was
dependent on the maintenance of both. It would be naive to assume
that Francis Joseph and his predecessors were unaware of the nature
and political significanceof the demands of the leaders of the Magyar,
Czech, Slovak, Rumanian, Croat, Polish, and other national groups.2
It was this very awareness and the realization that concessiolnsto one
group or another would merely aggravate the political problems of
the state complex that explained either imperial inaction or general
support or toleration of the policies of the conservative landed aristocracy, whose interests were most closely identified wviththose of tlhe
monarchy. For evidently the empire was essentially a "feudal" empire,
the emperor a "feudal" monarch, and the masses, economically dependent on the landed aristocracy, if free in theory were in a state of
"neo-serfdom" in practice.3 "Democracy" having been extendecd to
the masses in the form of emancipation of the peasantry had then to
be contained by guaranteeing the rights of the landlords. Thus the
emperor,commanding the Kaisertreue of the masses-which if necessary
could be used as an instrumentfor controlling the privileged aristocracy-chose to ignore "radical" political demands voiced by intellectual,
middle-class,or socialist spokesmen or parties of national groups. The
views of a Hodza, Hlinka, Vaida-Voevod, Goga, or even a Masaryk
carried little weight, since Vienna was confident that they wverenot
representativeof the wishes of the population and could not alienate
2 In this respect the Habsburgs differedgreatlyfrom the sultans, who never uinderstood
fullythe plans forreformvoiced by Balkan leaders. On tbis point see A. OteteaI'spelnwtrating analysis of Ottoman policies in Tudor Vlaadimirescu,i rniycareaete)ristoiTnT 'rile
Rornd7neti1821-1822(Bucharest,1945), pp. 239 ff.
3 Dobrogeanu-Gherea's termninology
appears applicable as suggested by L. PAtr5jica111u,
Un veac de frdindintdIri
sociale, 1821-1907(Bucharest,1945),pp. 197 if.

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Nationalismand Kaisertreue

33

the Kaisertrete of the peasantry,bourgeoisie,or the infinitesimal

workingclass.4 If any recognitionwas given to such demandsor consuch
cessionsmade in the area of cultural and linguisticautonomny,
action was takenprimarilybecause it was regardedas politicallysafe
or expcdient. As long as Vienna was able to satisfythe socio-economic
of thearistocracy
and middleclassesand hold out theprospect
demancds
of imnprovement
of the lot of the peasantry,all under the umbrellaof
anid unKaisertreue,
the ernpirewas secure and reformunniecessary
desirable. These considerationsemphasize the essentiallypolitically
as
innocuous nature of nationalismand nlationalisticm-anifestation
such in the Habsburg state system.
It is evident that afterthe Autsgleich
neitherof these phenomena
by themselvesposed a seriousthreatto the stabilityof the monarchy.
the imperial
It mighteven be argued that theyactuallystrengthened
positionby makingthe emperorthe ultimateadjudicatorof disputes
and the ultimatesource of decision and reconciliationof conflicting
interests.In nationaldisunityindeed lay much of the strengthof the
moniarchy.ProfessorSugar has perceptivelydelineated the serious
internal conflictspermeatingall national groups and the resultant
weaknessof nationalistmovementsas such. The only possible anlld
partialexceptionmightbe thatof the dominantMagyarnationality.5
document
However,the Compromiseof 1867 was an ultraconservative
which assuredthe stabilityof the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy.The
Hungarianscould neveraspireto gain morethanlimnited
controlof the
empireand were sufficiently
realisticnot to seek the establishmentof
a Hungarianstatewithouta Habsburg emperor. The Magyararistocracyand its politicalformations
were handicappedin that,unlike the
emperor,theyenjoyedno Kaisertrete;alliance withthe imperialhouse
sharingtheir socio-economicviews was thus essential. The Magyar
leadershipwas securein theknowledgethatVienna would not alterthe
status quo for fear that concessionsto less privilegednationalities
mlightencouragethe formulationof programsof social and economic
reformthatwould demand alterationof the nature of the essentially
agrarian-feudal
empire.
It is, however,indicativeof the weaknessof nationalismin the
monarchythat no underprivilegednational group ever formulateda
trulycomprehensive
programof reformthatwould cut acrossnational
fortheirown people alone. Indeed,
lines or, even more significantly,
4 The political ineptness of the leadership, including that of the working class, is discussed at length in L. Fodor and L. Vajda, Contributie la istoria rnisc&riisindicale din
Transilvania (1848-1917)(Bucharest, 1957); R. Perovic, GradIja za istoriju srpskogpokreta t
Vojvodini 1848-1849 godine (Belgrade, 1952); V. A. Varga, "Contributions a l'histoire dil
mouvemientouvrier de Transylvanie a la fin du XIXe siele," Nouvelles etudes d'histoi're
(Bucharest,1960),pp. 477 ff.
5 Pending furtherinvestigationof mattersrelated to Hungarian nationalismi,wveaccept
ProfessorSuigar'sviewvs
on this con-itroversial
topic as eminentlysound.

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

34

Slavic Review

tlie several leaders of the several nationalities represented narrow

class interests; they themselves and their aspirations were generally
not identified with or supported by the masses.6 As Professor Sugar
indicates, the Prague Pan-Slav Congress and the Kremsier Reichstag
could not formulate common programs because tlhe particularistic
interests of the leaders of the various delegations conflicted beyond
superficial declarations on behalf of Slavic unity. And, remarkably
indeed, this situation did not change significantlyafter 1867. Yet hlow
dangerous a Slavic union transcending parochial interestsand advocating a major program of social and economic reform could have been
to the Austro-Hungarian empire. This raises the fundamental question
whetherany social or political group might have formulateda generally
acceptable course of action and policies that couLld have upset the
balance of power established in 1867 and resulted in drastic transformation of the socio-economic and political bases of the nationality group
itselfor the empire as a whole. In our opinion, presented to underscore
ProfessorSugar's views, the internecine class conflict,aggravated by the
ni-,arrow
views of inexperienced, inept, yet ambitious political leaders
parading under the convenient banner of nationalism, precluded such
a possibilityand consequently tended to perpetuate the staticityof the
imperial order. Even those rare men who did offerprogramsof general
social reform did not speak the lanLguageof the masses either loudly
enough or clearly enough and were in turn not understood by them.
For ultimatelythe changing of the existing order and the establishment
of a basis for democratic federalism required alteration of the socioeconomic structure,a redistribution of the national wealth to satisfy
firstthe needs of the peasantry and, second, those of the rising middle
class.7 Such programs,however desirable, are acknowledged by Professor Sugar to be clearly unrealizable within the self-imposednationalistic
ghettos of the Habsburg monarchy short of either political revolution
by the masses or the development of reformprograms that would transcend particularistinterests,offeralternatives to and thus overcome the
Kaisertreue, and eventually transformthe empire into a supranational
ionfeudal entity. As long as Kaisertreue remained a more powerful
political instrumentthan national political programs,inaction or minor
concessions by Francis Joseph and the ruling oligarchy sufficed. These
considerations must also be taken into account in evaluating the significance of external contacts between national groups in the empire and
independent political formationsof conationals or related nationality
groups beyond the borders of the Habsburg monarchy.
6 On the applicability and extension of these generalizationsto problems of Balkan hlistory,consult the writer's"The Peasantry as a Revolutionary Force in the Balkans" in the
forthcomingissue of the Journal of CentralEuropean Affairs.
7 Inter-estillg
Marxist analyses of these problemnsare conitainecdin Daicoviciu, Banyai,
Chereste?iu,Livean i, "Lupta revolutionarl ...," pp. 91 f.; V. Zacek, Ceclhove a Poldci r.
IS-S (Praguie,1947-48),Vols. I an-dII.

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Nationalismand Kaisertreue

35

ProfessorSugar,limitedin space and concentrating

on othersignificant aspectsof the historyof the Habsburgstatecomplex,has devoted
but passingattentionto this problem. It seems worthpointingout,
however,thatcontactsbetweenleaders of the empire'sSouthernSlav
groupsand the Serbiankingdomor betweenthe Rumaniansof Traisylvaniaand theOld Kingdomdid not in themselves
constitutea source
of dangerto the Habsburgmonarchyany morethanthe aspirationsfor
independenceofthePolishnobility.Surelytheinterests
and policiesof
the Radich brothers,
forinstance,werebut superficially
identifiedwith
those of the Karageorgevichstate and its politicians. Moreover,the
possibilityof politicalunion withthe Serbiankingdomdid not attract
theempire'sSouthernSlavsformanyreasons,not theleastof whichwas
the failureof the Serbiandynastyand governmentto satisfythe socioeconomicdemandsof itsown subjects. Similarly,Maniu, Goga, VaidaVoevod,and otherleadersof the Rumanian peasantryof Transylvania
werethemselves
unsympathetic
towardthepro-Germanpoliciesof King
Carol I and the ConservativePartyof the Old Kingdomand, in anv
event,could hardlyhave aroused mass supportfor a unionistpolicy,
consideringtheneo-serf
statusofthepeasantin Walachia and Moldavia
and the brutal repressionof the peasantrevoltof 1907 in theseprovinces.8Indeed,in thecase ofboththeSouthernSlav and the Rumanian
peasantryof the HabsburgEmpire,union withtheir"brethren"of independentSerbiaand Rumania would havemeantloweringtheirliving
standardsto a thoroughly
undesirablelevel. The massesdid notsupport
theunionisticproclivities
we-re
oftheirself-styled
leaders,who,in effect,
pursuingpolicies aimed at justifyingand safeguardingtheirowvnprecariousexistence.The activitiesofSouthernSlav and Rum-anianpoliticians as such did not alarm Vienna. The monarchy'sapprehensioin
stemmedfromthe possibilit-y
of interinational,
primarilyRussian,supand conflict-ridden
nationalisticmanifestations
inside
portofill-defined
and outsidethe empire;in otherwords,the extensionof imethodsthat
had contributedto the gradual dissolutionof the OttomanEmpire tco
the Habsburg Empire itself. The internationalization
of the controllable nationalityproblemsof the empireand resultingintervention
by
inimicalpowersin the internalaffairsof the monarchyeitherthrough
collaborationwithnationalitygroupsin theempireitselfor conationals
outsidetheconfinesoftheJHabsburg
statesystemcould not be tolerated.
In short,only twvo
phenomenacould underminethe stabilityof the
empirebeyondimperialcontrol: social revolutionby or with the participationofthepeasantmassesor intervention
byoutsidepowersacting
primarilyas supportersof the nationalistic,unionisticaspirationsof
Rumanianand SouthernSlav politiciansoutsideand inside theempire.
8 Much new informationon these topics may be found in M. lonescu, "Despre inseimlniitatea ?i urmarile rascoalei din 1907," Studii, X (1957), No. 9, 7 f.; V. MacleIa, Al/ada

Bosnia (Belgrade, 1946).

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

36

Slavic Review

In Vienna's judgment the formerpossibilitywas precluded by dissension

within and among national groups and lack of political programs that
could upset the Kaisertree, the latter by the alliance with Germany.
The Habsburgs were correct in refusing to undertake significantreformsat home, as reformwould have destroyed the tradition on which
theirHausmacht was based. Moreover, their estimate of the strengthof
the political parties of the multinational empire was vindicated by the
historyof the succession states. Time proved them right in opposing
internationalization of nationality problems.
Thus, as Professor Sugar contends, analyses in terms of possible
democratic-federalsolutions shed little light on the problems of the
non-Germanic societies under Habsburg rule and of the empire itself.
More deservingof attentionare systematicstudies of the several national
groups, particularlyin termsof the political attitudes and aspirations of
their various social classes and of their intranational and international
views and relations. Such studies would permit drastic revisions of traditional interpretations,not only of the historyof the Habsburg Empire
but also of that of Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.89 on Fri, 04 Sep 2015 18:34:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions