The Viability of the Habsburg Monarchy

Author(s): Hans Kohn

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1963), pp. 37-42
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3000385
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THE
THE

VIABILITY
OF
HABSBURG
MONARCHY
BY HANS

KOHN

I findmrryself
in general agreementwith the main thesisand observations
of Professor Peter Sugar's thoughtful and thought-provokingessay.
Thus I hlaveto confine myselfto some reflectionsthat may throw additional light on a complex problem, on the solution of which the fate of
central and central-easternEurope depencded and the nionisolution of
which was mainly responsible for bringing about the two great iEuropean ways of the twentiethcentury.
(1) I believe ProfessorSugar is too pessimisticabout the possibilityof
transformingthe Habsburg Empire in the nineteenth century in a way
that would have satisfied,more or less (and the emphasis is on "more or
less") the nationalities of the multinational empire. Such a transformation would have brought the eighteenth-century
dynasticstate (the state
of the Hatsmacht) into line with the growth of nationalism, and it
would have pointed the wvaytoward the emergence of supranational
formsof political integration,which the need for economic cooperation
and the requirements of securityrender essential in the second half of
the twentiethcentury.
That no such attempt was made in the eighteenth century does not
speak against the statesmanshipof the Habsburgs. The problem did not
arise before the French Revolution. In fact, the Austrian lands and
Tuscany were (for that time!) relatively well ruled by the Habsburgs.
Even Switzerland found it possible to create a modern state-and to use
for the firsttime officiallythe name "Swiss nation"-only in 1848. Until
then,certainlyuntil the H-elveticRepublic imposed by France, Switzerland resembled the ramshackle Holy Roman Empire much more than a
modern state and accepted as "natural" the subjection of some of its
territorial components to others (Unter-tancnlcndcer) within the very
loose confederation. The concept of equality of language, ethnic group,
and class was introduced into Switzerland forcibly by the French
Revolution.
The opportunityfora timelytransformationof the Habsburg Empire
came, as it did for Switzerland, in 1848. It came in both cases after a
civil war or a sequence of revolutions and counterrevolutions,of ideological conflicts,which threatened to destroy the framework of the
MR. KOHN is professorof historyemeritusat the City College of the City Universityof
New Yorkand John Hay Whitneyprofessorof internationalrelations at the Universityof
Denver.

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38

Slavic Review

ancieni regime state. The Swiss, who among the continental peoples
most resemble the Englishiin statesmanship(and that means in a happy
mixture of adherence to tradition and realistic accommodation to
changing circumstances,in a nonmetaphysicalpragmatismwhich avoids
all extremes and satisfiesitselfwith a "more or less"), seized the opportunity and succeeded in creating a Swiss idea bridging the often very
deep cleavages caused by geography,by differencesof language, religion,
ethnic origin, and political ideology, and by the memories of past oppression and arrogant master attitudes. They did it by the willing
application of two fundamental principles-equality, which came to
Switzerland through the French Revolution, and federalism,which the
Swiss adapted afterthe model of the United States.
Switzerland was-except for Scandinavia-the only country on the
European continent where in 1848 the liberal ideas triumphed. Everywhere else absolutism, whetherin a traditional or in a plebiscitaryform,
reasserted itself. In Austria, Francis Joseph, then an inexperienced
youth, poorly prepared for the throne and under the influence of the
haughty and energetic aristocrat Prince Schwarzenberg, followed the
general trend. The great opportunity,offeredby the Kremsier Constitution,based on equality and federalism,which would have established
a new Austria and an Austrian idea, was allowed to pass, a mere episode;
in that respect the fate of the Kremsier Constitution was very different
fromthat of the Swiss Constitution of 1848.1
But more disastrous for the possibility of a supranational Austrian
structure,which Lord Acton had foreseen in 1862,2 was that when the
empire turned toward constitutionalism in the 1860's-a turn then
common to the whole of Europe in one or the other form-it abandoned
the idea of federalism. In the Compromise with the Hungarian nobility
in 1867, the aspirations of the Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croatians, and
Rumanians, who in a large majority were then still loyal to the dynasty,
wveresacrificedfor the purpose of winning the assent of the Magyars to
a common foreignand militarypolicy on the part of what now became
the Dual Monarchy, a policy to which Francis Joseph's real interest
throughout his life belonged. The prenationalist concept of the unity
of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen was made the foundation of a
Magyar nationalist state. The ruling Magyar oligarchy became predominant in its position vis-a-visthe non-Magyar peoples, not only in
the Hungarian kingdom but throughout the Dual Monarchy. The
Compromise was a blow not only to federalism but to equality and
democracy. Until 1918 (and beyond) Hungary and her peoples remained a semifeudal, underdeveloped society. This was not true, by
1910, of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy (perhaps with the ex1

See on SwitzerlandHans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1944), pp. 381 if.,

atnd Nationalism and Liberty: The SzvissExanmple(New York, 1956).

2

Lord Acton,Essays on Freedom anidPozver(Glencoe, 1948), pp. 166 ff.

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The Viabilityof the Habsburg Moriarchby

39

ceptionof Galicia,wherethedynastyarrivedat a similar"compromise"

withthe Polish nobilityat the expenseof the nativepeasantryand of
thenon-Polishpopulation).3
The years1866-67markeda disastrousturnnot onlyin the Austrianl
monarchybut in the historyof all Central Europe. In Prussia Bismarckisintriumphedoverliberalismand turnedit intoa nationalliberalismwhichdiffered
fromWesternliberalismn
as laternationalsocialism
differedfrom Western socialism. Throughout Central Europe the
brighthopesof 1848-49werefrustrated
and thecatastrophes
of 1914and
of 1938-39-bothof whichinvolvedthe end of Austriain its thenprevailingform-werein themaking.
(2) ProfessorSugar perhaps overstressesthe division between the
Germanand thenon-Germansubjectsof theHabsburgEmpire. Such a
divisionwas certainlyvalid in the absolutistcentralizingdecade of the
1850's. It lost in significance
after1867. The reallydominantelement
in theDual Monarchy,thepressuregroupmostsuccessfulin increasing
itssharein thecommunality,
was thenno longerthe Germansbut the
Magyars.Austria-Hungary
lost more and more the characterof a predominantlyGermanstate. The spreadof democracy,literacy,and economic well-beingin the westernhalf of the monarchyafter 1867
strengthened
thenon-Germanic
nationalitiesthereat theexpenseof the
formerpolitical,cultural,and economicpredominanceof the Germans.
losttheirfaithin an
The resultwas thatmanyGermansin themonarchy
Austrianidea as much as many Slavs or othernon-Germanicpeoples
did. In myyouthin Bohemia at the beginningof the centuryI found
at the German Charles-Ferdinand
Universitya deeper loyaltyto the
dynasty,to nas cisari
pan,among the Czech peasantsthan among the
students,who came mostlyfromwhatbecame laterknownas the Sudetenland.
By theend of thenineteenthcenturymanyAustrianGermanslooked
to the PrussianGerman Reich as theirreal home and veneratedBismarck. It was not only German nationalismwhich broughtthem to
abandonAustrianpatriotism-orto indulgein a kindofamalgamof the
close alliance with
two attitudes,made possibleby Austria-Hungary's
t;heGermanReich-it was also thefeelingthatthe Habsburgmonarchy
wasslow-moving,
less"modern'"thanthebrisklyexpanding
lessefficient,
WilhelminianReich. Pan-Germanismhad its origin largelyamong
AustrianGermans,as Pan-Slavismhad its originamongAustrianSlavs.
But whereasthe Russian governmentfrequentlyfavoredPan-Slavism
of theGermanReich
and triedto use it foritspurposes,thegovernment
underBismarckand underWilliam II did not supportPan-Germanism
in Austria. After1879 FrancisJosephwas in his foreignpolicya loyal
ally of Germany,but neitherCrown Prince Rudolph nor Archduke
3 Yet even in Galicia the position of the Ukrainians was incomparably better than the
situationof the Ukrainians and Slovaks in neighboringHungary.

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40

Slavic Review

Francis Ferdinand were, to use an understatement,enthusiastic about

the alliance. German circles in Austria were widely suspicious of Francis Ferdinand and regarded him as "pro-Slav."
The position of many Germans in Austria could be compared with
thatof the Austrian Poles or Italians. They felt part of a larger national
entity the majority of whose people lived outside the Habsburg monarchy. The Austrian Germans had more recent memories of community
with the Germans beyond the border, whereas the Italians of Trieste or
of Trentino had never formedpart of any Italian state, and Polish statehood (with the exception of the Republic of Krakow) had gone out of
existence by the end of the eighteenth century. But the Austrian Germans had been part of the German Bund until 1866 and participated
actively in the National Assembly at Frankfurt am Main. Thus the
situation of the Germans in the Habsburg monarchy was in the age of
nationalism not so fundamentally differentfrom that of the nonGermanic elements.
(3) Perhaps the possibility of overcoming the narrow concept of an
ethnic or linguistic nation-statecan be illustrated by recalling the different attitudes of the Italians in the Habsburg monarchy and of those in
Switzerland. Though geography, economics, and reason favored the
lasting connection of the Italians in Trieste with Austria, they did not
wish to remain in the Habsburg Empire, and their irredentismwas of
the most violent and extremist kind. Yet their connection with the
Habsburgs was ancient. To secure independence from Venetian rule,
the city had placed itself under Habsburg protection in 1382. In the
later part of the nineteenthcenturythe citygrew most prosperous as the
niatural port of the vast Austrian hinterland. However, the Italianspeaking middle class, which was a socially and culturally favored class,
sshoweditself bitterly hostile to the Austrian government, a hostility
which was also directed against the numerous Slavs in and around
Trieste and against the Socialist Party in the city. When Francis Joseph
visited Trieste in 1882, a young man fromthat city,Guglielmo Oberdan
(1858-82), tried to kill the emperor, was consequently executed, and
among Italians extolled as a martyrin the nationalist cause.
On the other hand, the Swiss Italian-speaking canton of Ticino decided in 1798, when asked by Napoleon to join the Cisalpine Republic,
to remain Swiss, although geography, the international situation, and
reason seemed to dictate the opposite course. The population of the
Ticino was neither economically nor culturally prosperous. The canton
is geographically separated from the rest of Switzerland by high mountain ranges, and its riverwaysand all its natural connections lead to the
Lombardian plain. Nevertheless,the large majorityof the Swiss Italians
have faithfullyadhered to Switzerland. Since 1848 Switzerland has
formeda federal democracy in which the federal administration identifieditselfwith none of the ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups, so that

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The Viabilityof the HabsburgMonarchy

41

no feelingof majorityor minorityrelationshipcould powerfullyassert

itself.
(4) But the finaldisintegration
of Austriawas not only due to the
rejectionoffederalismin 1867but-a pointwhichProfessorSugardoes
not sufficiently
stress-toits foreignpolicy. In the Europe of theage of
nationalisma multinationalor a supranationalstatewas mostdesirable
in theinterestofpeace,and since 1918manypeople have forthatreason
and to a growingdegree regrettedthe disappearanceof the AustroHungarianmonarchy.But to havebeen able to fulfillthisfunction,the
monarchywould have had to follow,as Switzerlanddid, a policy of
neutrality.Withoutsucha policy,Switzerland,
in spiteof itsdemocracy
and federalism,
mighthave disintegrated
in 1870 or in 1914. Even in
neutralSwitzerlandthe tensionsbetweenthe German-speaking
and the
French-speaking
populationwerethenrunninghigh.
Austriaunfortunately
did not understandthe need for a policy of
neutrality.FrancisJosephconcludedthe unfortunateCompromiseof
1867because he wishedto gain Magyarcooperationin orderto be able
to resumecompetitionwithPrussiaforGermanleadership.When this
questionwas finallysettledin 1871by Bismarck'striumphoverFrance,
FrancisJosephacceptedthisoutcomeloyallybut did not renouncean
active foreignpolicy. He turned his attentiontoward the Balkans,
OttomanEmpire
claiminga sharein the heritageof the disintegrating
and came there into conflictwith similaraspirationsof the Russian
Empireand of theChristianBalkan nations,each of whichfollowedits
own aggressivenationalistpolicy. The occupationof Bosnia-Hercegovina was a stepin the wrongdirection,and the war whichAustriadid
not survivewas sparkedby an incidentstemmingdirectlyfromthe
actionof 1878.
The occupationof Bosnia-Hercegovina
broughtthe threatof conflict
withRussia and theBalkan Slavsnearerand drovetheDual Monarchy,
intoan alliance withGermany.Through
underCount GyulaAndrassy,
thisalliance, which was favoredby the Magyarsand Germansin the
monarchybut bitterlyresentedby the Slavs,Austria-Hungary
became
the chiefbattlegroundof Pan-Germanand Pan-Slavaspirations.Even
beforethe war of 1914 broke out, the GermanChancellor,Bethmann
thecomingstruggle
Hollweg,in a speechon April7, 1913,characterized
as a conflictbetweenthe Germansand the Slavs. When the war came,
manySlavs,evenmoderateleaderssuchas Thomas Masaryk,fearedthat
a German-Magyar
victoryover the Serbs and Russians might bring
about a generaldeteriorationof the positionof the non-Germanicand
non-Magyar
peoples underHabsburgrule.
Before1914Masaryk,as a discipleofPalacky,believedin an Austrian
federationas a bulwarkagainstPan-Germanismand Pan-Russianism.
In hismostimportantprogrammatic
book The CzechQuestion: Efforts
and LongingsoftheNational Rebirth,whichwas firstpublishedin 1895

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42

Slavic Review

and in a second edition in 1908, Masaryk wrote: "As regards the relation
of the Czech lands to the Austrian state, I regard [Palacky's] idea of the
Austrian state, in spite of all constitutional changes, as a still reliable
guide: it is regrettable,that Palacky . . . himselfabandoned to a certain
degree his idea and recommended a more exclusively Slav national program; . .. I express my political experiences in the words that our policy
cannot be successful if it is not supported by a true and strong interest
in the fate of Austria, . . . by the cultural and political effortto work in
harmonywith the needs of our people for the advancement of the whole
of Austria and its political administration."4
The War of 1914 changed Masaryk's outlook. But the possibility
cannot be rejected that had Austria established a federal regime in 1849
and followed a policy of neutrality, the crown could have become a
symbol of the common interestsof the various peoples who in isolation
were threatened by Russian or German expansionism. The disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy not only offeredthe opportunity for
such expansionism; it proved also that the hostilityamong the various
peoples of the monarchy was not primarily created by the monarchy
according to the famous rule of divide et impera but was deeply rooted
in that extreme nationalism which animated the various peoples before
and even more after 1914-18 and which the monarchy, alas with little.
success,tried to moderate.
4 Ceska otdzka: Snahy a tuzby narodniho ob-ozeni, newvedition by, Zden6k FraInta
(Prague: GovernmentPublishing House, 1924), pp. 179-80.

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