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Ong vs Diaz
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case
No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties
to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz,
upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts
on the field of DNA analysis.

No pronouncement as to costs.

repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a

perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We
therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its
Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
De la Rosa vs Damian

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:

I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN

IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT
ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.

II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN

IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE
CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE HUSBAND,
CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.

III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR
DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER
FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.

Ruling
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing. In People v. Umanito,citing Tecson v. Commission on
Elections,[if !this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No.

161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the
acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: [i]n case
proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to.

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether

appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be accomplished
through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication
of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the
case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in
controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not,
in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be
more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for
reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to
the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
Appeals[

x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by

fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With
no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage
to father an illegitimate child,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] the intervenorrespondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her
fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was
prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as
one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of
Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif]

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma

Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as
she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They
contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed
when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.[if !supportFootnotes]
[21][endif]

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa

Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption[if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif] of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He
stated under oath [t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction.[if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif] The petition was overtaken by his death on
February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was

survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased
brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia
Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate

child[if !supportFootnotes][58][endif] of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.[if !supportFootnotes][59][endif] She, however, claimed
the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia
only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which
time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

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Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This
draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but
only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged
by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.[if !

supportFootnotes][60][endif] Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:
in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the alleged father (or mother)[if !supportFootnotes][61][endif] by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;
when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. [if !supportFootnotes][62][endif]

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the

record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing.[if !supportFootnotes][63][endif]

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,

compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an

illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment
but a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts. [if !supportFootnotes][64][endif]
Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment
has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent.[if !supportFootnotes][65][endif] On the death of either, the
action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.[if !
supportFootnotes][66][endif] In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground)
must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.[if !
supportFootnotes][67][endif] Did intervenors report card from the University
of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil
Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma
did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his
name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly,
while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who
drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published
in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law.
What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was
fatal to intervenors claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina

Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it
never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death.
We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore
not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]

between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact
of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
by the person claiming its existence.[if !supportFootnotes][68][endif]

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the

estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs
of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are
the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,[if !supportFootnotes][69]
[endif] nieces and nephews.[if !supportFootnotes][70][endif]
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED.
The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

[if !supportLists]1.
[endif]Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973
affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
[if !supportLists]2.
[endif]the intestate estate of Guillermo
Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado.
The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of
Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased
her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados
grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the
identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
share in her estate.
[if !supportLists]3.
[endif]Guillermo Rustias estate (including
its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and
whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are
now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
[if !supportLists]4.
[endif]Letters of administration over the
still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
Rodolfo Fernandez vs Romeo Fernandez
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of
the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa
Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because
the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative
father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however,
that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they
were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They
insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter
of filiation because it could not be collaterally attacked in the
present action but in a separate and independent action directly
impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.

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It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of
extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action
to impugn ones legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the
filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine
Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged
legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that
ones legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents claim
was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses
Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein
they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles
wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, which has a
similar factual backdrop is instructive:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is
that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457
cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170
of the Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to
an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but
an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the
purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property
subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or
not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by
petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court, hence
they are now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling on
Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner
Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses
Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly
passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate
court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even
more weight[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] when the Court of Appeals
affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the
respondent courts evaluation of the evidence presented, thus:[if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif]

The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any

records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11,
1995, it issued a certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of
Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the
National Archives, hence, there is no available information about
the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been born on
November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K. Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for
Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between
him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants Brief). We
do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back
Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it
was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with
Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document
contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written
admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely
executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this
case wherein the public document was executed as an application
for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person,
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public
document are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties
as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein. They
constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts which give rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal
certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish regime
constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the
parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of
the sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in
the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements
made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized
(Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53
Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5
Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are
perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but
they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of
the statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin,
Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4,
p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said
application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove
the veracity of the declaration and statement contained in the said
application that concern the relationship of the applicant with herein
appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive proof of the filiation
of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents
being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the
status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and
continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants Brief). Open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is
meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges
usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing
the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the
child as legitimate, constant attendance to the childs support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his
parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp.
245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in

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Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a
child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a
ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant
presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of
the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10,
1989 stating therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses
having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on
November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits for the Defendants). As
stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity
of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be
argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation
but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was
doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a
certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of
baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged
(Records, p. 148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in
evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In
fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the ExtraJudicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant
Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child
by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose
Fernandez , thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de
Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New
Civil Code which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who
is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the
property in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose
Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of pro
indiviso of the conjugal property and the other half belonged to his
wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was
only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of
Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedents estate
while the share of the conjugal property will still belong to Generosa
as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial courts order
reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to
respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and law since
respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de
Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in
the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the of the
inheritance and the respondents to the other . In effect, pro indiviso
is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., as her share
of the conjugal property estate and of the remaining as share as
heir from her husbands estate. Thus, we find well taken the
petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not
necessarily result in respondents having exclusive right to the
conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court.
Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of
her property without other limitations than those established by law,
[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] which right she exercised by executing a
deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.

Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of Generosa,

to question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the
annulment of contracts may only be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party
obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when
a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise
an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show
detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in
which he had no intervention.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] As we have
discussed above, respondents are entitled to the of the entire
conjugal property, ie., lot and building; however considering that
widow Generosa, during her lifetime , sold the entire building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of
their share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the
interest of respondents as regards their share in the building.
Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the
annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in
declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between
Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the
same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial courts
findings that the deed was prepared and executed under abnormal,
unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly
stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and
simulated because there was no consideration for the sale.
However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner
Eddie Fernandez declaration, that the money he paid for the sale
came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi Arabia
from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by
presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a
mere assertion that it has no consideration.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed
unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of
sale was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden
with both legs amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same;[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] a burden
respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not
presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of
the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of
the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has
in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her undivided
share in the building but also the share of the respondents. We
rule, that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of
the respondents is not null and void as only the rights of the coowner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner
Eddie , a co-owner of the share of the building together with the
respondents who owned the share therein.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorneys
fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual
basis. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such
pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proven.[if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif] Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Courts cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] The
testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he suffered around
P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any documentary

5 of 5
or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners
that the respondent court should not have awarded moral damages
in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorneys fees
should likewise be deleted for lack of factual basis and legal
justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis
to justify the award of attorneys fees, which is in violation of the
proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to
litigate.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is
hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are
entitled to the share of the conjugal lot and building of the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died
childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share
of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title
issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of
Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is
cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the
and shares respectively in the conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees are
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Locsin vs Locsin
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall (a) file
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry;
(b) compile the same monthly and prepare and send any
information required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue
certified transcripts or copies of any document registered upon
payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of
all certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to
the Civil Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each
month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding
month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and
identification in case any information is required; and (g) administer
oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes"[if !supportFootnotes][15]
[endif] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the
Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the
latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil
Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in
the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to
declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his
mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C.
Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and
Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces
vs. Local Civil Registrar[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] that:
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father
of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement
of any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter,
is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis
ours)

The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated

in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] where this
Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father
(who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of
paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by
both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes
of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only
prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry
(from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of
nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was
removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates
of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the
genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What
is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the
coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof
of filiation,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing
before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the
estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the
late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested
person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for
issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.