Review

Author(s): Robert F. Terwilliger

Review by: Robert F. Terwilliger
Source: Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 3 (AUTUMN 1968), pp. 570-574
Published by: The New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969926
Accessed: 24-08-2015 09:23 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The New School is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

570

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

Necessityis a situationwhich is complete and in which I findmyself

involved"(p.345).
Volition is a difficultarea to investigatephenomenologically. Ricoeur has shownmostof the problemsand a concreteway to approach
them. It is readily understandablehow he could aspire to build a
philosophyfromthis basis. In addition, studentsof the work of Alfred Schutz will find much complementationand confirmationof
Schutz'stheoryof action in Ricoeur's theoryof volition.
Lester Embree
New York
LENNEBERG, ERIC H., Biological Foundations of Language. New
York: JohnWileyand Sons,Inc., 1967.
A psychologistonce engaged in a collaborative effortwith a
philosopher,at the end of which he remarked:"Well, the psychology
may not be much but the philosophyis great!" To this,the philosopher replied: "Funny, I was about to say just the opposite."
Given the universal tendencyto underestimatethe value of contributionsto one's fieldof specializationand to overestimatecontributions to areas in which one has little knowledge,I must still make
the following evaluation: ProfessorLenneberg's biological treatise
seems quite stimulating,while his psycholinguistictreatiseis much
less so.
ProfessorLenneberg sets himself the task of showing certain of
he is concernedwith
thebiological correlatesof language. Specifically,
the issues of why man alone has fully developed language, why it
is that language developmentfollows the apparentlysimilar pattern
which it does in most children,and- more generallyand importantly
- what sorts of biological structuresare required to account for
language, and what evidence can be marshalled for the existenceof
any such structures. That there are biological bases of language
probably needs no proof. That there are no specific,precise biological structuresunderlyinglanguage is perhaps less well known,
but is amply and substantiallydemonstratedin this work. The
biological data which are of most significance,however, are those
whichshow the patternsof brain maturationand specialization,which
Lenneberg uses to try to establish a correlation between brain
developmentand language development.
It is Lenneberg'scontentionthat much of the nature of language
can be properlysaid to be species specificor instinctual. If one
could demonstratea correlationbetween changes in brain structure

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

BOOK

REVIEWS

571

and changesin language behavior,one would, of course,have strong

evidence in favor of an hypothesiswhich claimed that the genetic
determinationof brain structurewas of primarycausality in determining the nature of language behavior. While this is a somewhat
bowlderized version of Lenneberg's hypothesis,it does express a
crucial aspect of the work, namely that "The biological properties
of the human form of cognition set strict limits to the range of
possibilitiesfor variations in natural languages." (p. 375) Such a
correlationbetweenbiology and behavior does clearlyexist. Certain
fundamentalbrain changes appear to take place during the period
in which language is developing. And certain terminal states in
brain development seem to be reached at or about the time at
which language reaches its most mature state- around puberty,say.
In the latter case, typicallywe find that the brain has a dominant
hemispherewhich is contralateralto the hand and/or eye of preference for the individual. Thus, for most adults, the left hemisphere
is dominant. Moreover we find that a) evidence from brain injury
suggeststhat language is dependent upon this dominant hemisphere
and will be destroyedto the extent that the hemisphereis injured,
and b) that in cases of complete dominant hemispherectomythe
if not impossible. Prior to puberty,
relearningof language is difficult,
this hemisphericaldominance does not seem to be found; at least
it seems possible to retrainlanguage in brain injured young people.
Now this is the typical case. But it is by no means universal.
There are cases of right-handedindividuals who are not left-hemiwho
spheredominant. And thereare cases of lefthemispherectomies
relearnedlanguage. The correlationis, in other words, not perfect.
This, by itself,is perhaps not too damaging- the demonstrationof
the correlationitself is worthyof merit, even though not perfect.
However, it should be noted that inferencefrom the locus of an
injury to the symptomis not as clear as it might seem. Goldstein
argued thatthe existenceof an injuryin a specificlocus and a particular symptomdid not indicate that the locus controls the symptom.
It mayin factinteractwithalmostthe entirebrain and the disturbance
of that interactionmay produce the symptom. Logically the same
argument holds even when dealing with an entire hemisphere
it
less
to
of
fallacious
although appears
language
place the control
in a hemisphererather than in some smaller specificcortical area.
(Coincidentally,Lenneberg makes direct referenceto Goldstein only
once in a ratherlengthytome.)
Given the evidence on structuralmaturation and its correlation
with the development of language behavior, Lenneberg wishes to

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

572

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

infer that 1) since all normal human beings have similar structures,
thereforeall human cognitive functioningis similar, and 2) since
language is a type of cognitive functioning,thereforeall human
languages are similar. Human cognitivefunctioninghe sees as being
the use of transformations.Similarities between things are seen
because one can be transformed
into another. And, followingChomsky,linguisticutterances and languages- are similar to the extent
that they can be transformedinto one another. In addition to the
structuralevidence, the basic transformationalnature of cognition
implies that languages will be basically similar: ". . . the outer form
of languages may vary with relativelygreat freedom,whereas the
underlyingtype remains constant." (p. 375)
The logic here appears hopelessly stretched. Consider firstthe
notion. It is a fact that certain simple geometrical
transformational
formswhich are seen as similar may be transformed(formallyor
mathematically)into one another. Moreover,we can even see that
can take place and- if we wish- can explain to
this transformation
ourselvesthe perceivedsimilarityby appealing to thisformalproperty
of the forms. (In passing,Lenneberg obeys the unfortunatepsychological habit of dealing with simple sensory material when he is
forcedto talk about the real world. This has its merits,but it ignores
the fact that one of the wonderfulthingsabout language is that it
permitsus to talk about and deal with thingswhich are not simple
sensorymaterial. A cat can deal with simple formsand brightnesses;
it can not deal with democracy.) We can leave aside for the moment
the fact that it was he himselfwho imposed the transformation
after
he saw the similarity,that looking alike is the grounds for finding
a transformation,
not the other way around. But assuming "unconscious transformations,"
if you will, what do theyexplain? I submit
that it is little, for the very reason that they can explain nearly
everything. To be specific,d'Arcy Thompson's illustrationsof the
formal similaritiesamong species of fish (which Lenneberg cites),
while of interest,in themselvestell us little about the fish; we do
not know how theybehave, where they live, whetherthey are good
to eat, or what have you. Or, to return to simple forms,topology
can be made from a circle to a torus.
shows that a transformation
This mathematicalidentitymay be of some interest,but if it were
this I was reactingto, how would I know which to dip in my coffee?
could be writtenfor nearly any pair
I suspect that a transformation
a
of stimuli. Hence, without good deal more specificationabout the
one must express some reservations
nature of these transformations,
as to whethertheyunderlie all cognitiveprocesses.

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

BOOK

REVIEWS

573

Now it is true that all natural languages can be transformedinto

one another- i.e., translated. Could this fact, or even a yet to be
lead to the concluproven fact of cognitionbeing transformational,
sion that with regard to languages ". . . the underlyingtype remains
constant/'? In fact, what does it mean to say that all languages
are of the same underlyingtype? It has the ring of an hypothesis
that is not open to any meaningfulempirical test. The only possible
meaning which can be given to it is this: the hypothesisthat the
nature of one's native language influencesone's cognitive processes
is false. That is, any theoryof linguisticrelativitysuch as that of
B. L. Whorf is false. Yet the statementis still not clear. If the
then
"nature of cognitiveprocesses" is defined as transformational,
it is clear that,by definition,no language can influencethis nature.
This thereforerendersthe statementresoundinglytrivial. If, on the
otherhand, the nature of a language affectswhat one cognizesabout,
then perhaps we have a testable hypothesis. Space does not permit
an evaluation of it here. But it is fair to point out that Lenneberg
does scant justice to it. His evaluation is restrictedonly to language
which deals with simple sensorymaterial- the very idea in which
one might expect language to have its least cognitive effects. If
language does affectcognitionin this lattersense,as I suspectit does,
then, either Lenneberg is wrong or is again trivial. That is, the
underlyingsameness of languages representseither a) the fact that
theyare all languages,b) that theyare translatableinto one another,
or c) that the brain functionsunderlyinglanguage are similar but
that this similarityis so far removed from the behavior of life of
the individual speakers of the language that it is of no use in any
behavioral explanation.
The transformational
notion of cognitionessentiallyseems to suga
gest highly subjective theoryof language- because the individual
is a "transformer"he can himself "create" language. Of course, a
theory,
subjectiveapproach could have suggestedthe transformational
as the followingindicates: "Communicationis a social phenomenon,
whereas naming is an intrapersonalone; the intrapersonalprocess
may become a social one by virtue of enormous similaritiesbetween
the cognitivefunctioningof all individuals and an apparent specific
motivationin humans to interactsocially." (p. 336) One can- perhaps- forgivethe apparent overlookingof the social nature of language acquisition, indeed of the social nature of the very world in
which man lives. But we cannot overlook the logical implications
of such a notion- namely that it is perfectlypossible, even likely,
that individuals will develop individual, idiosyncratic,private Ian-

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

574

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

guages. By this I do not mean codes of natural, social languages.

I mean, rather, that it implies that one can apparently name an
experiencewhich is totallyprivate since, accordingto Lenneberg,all
that is necessaryfor naming is present in the individual. If it is
possible for him to refuteWittgenstein'selaborate argumentto the
contraryin the Philosophical Investigations,all well and good. But
without such a refutation,the evidence for this sort of language
behavior seems slim indeed.
The scientistwho attemptsto understandlanguage has beforehim
the choice of several levels of analysis: the biological and the behavioral, the individual and the social. No account of language can
be completeor correctwithoutthe proper balance being met between
these several approaches, for they are all necessaryto understand
language. While the scientistis free to select one for critical study,
he must beware that over-emphasison but one of a set of interrelated
processesmay yield a distortedor incoherentpicture of the phenomenon in whichhe is interested.Lenneberg'semphasison the biological
has produced a synthesisof data which the studentof language can
ill affordto ignore, and hypotheseswhich can be fruitfullyargued.
But in the end this emphasishas led to a distortionof language, for
it has been at the price of the othernecessarylevels of understanding.
Robert F. Terwilliger
The Graduate Faculty,
New School for Social Research
POWDERMAKER, HORTENSE, Strangerand Friend: The Way of
an Anthropologist. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1966, $6.50.
This book by a reallyintrepidfieldworkeris a welcome addition to
the growingliteraturewhich deals with the personal factorin anthropological fieldwork. It mightbe called the author'sautobiographyof
herselfas a participantobserver. A book of this kind requires not
to the nuances of an alien culturebut also to oneself
only a sensitivity
in the role of field worker. An extremelysensitiveperson such as
Dr.
John Seeley can turn such a work into a tour de force. Though
Powdermaker'sanalysis does not attain the depths of insightwhich
would put her in Seeley'sclass, her book is an importantwork which
should stimulateotherinvestigationsof the same kind.
The authorsetsforherselfthe taskof "standingoutside and observout
ing one anthropologist(herself). . . stepping into societies and

This content downloaded from 14.139.86.99 on Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:23:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions