Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ARAVIND. B.
VIKRAM J. SINGH
-"-lind year, B.A., LLB. (Hons), National Law School of India University.
1 Article 44 of the Indian Constitution that states that "The State shall endeavour
to secure for all the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of
India."
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4. Ibid at 300
5. D.F. Mulla, principles of Mohammedan Law 227 (Sir S. Ragnekar ed., 12th
edn., Calcutta; Eastern Law House, 1944)
6. G.C.V. Subba Rao, Family law in India 440 (7th edn. Hyderabad: S. Gogia and
Co. 1998).
7. Id.
8. M.A. Qureshi, Muslim Law of Marriage and Maintenance 319 (New Delhi:
.Deep and Deep Publications, 1995)
9. Ashutosh Mookerjee, Marriage Sepration and Di~orce 192 (Calcutta: S.C.
Sarkar, 1991).
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7.
A plethora of other progressive decisions followed
these three decisions ". But the common feature of all these
[udqernents was the delicate balance struck between the
religious laws and secular provisions of the Criminal Code!".
Fro mas i t u a t ion
0 f com pie t e j ud i cl a I s elf - res t raj n t
pre-independence, the [udiclal interpretation of Muslim personal
laws.
14 AIR 1980 SC 1730.
15 AIR1981SC1243.
16 This period is usally 3 lunar months from the date of the divorce, as per s.
3(1 )(b) of the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
17 For instance the pronouricements in the cases of Shahzadi Begum v. Abdul
Gaffer, (1981) CrLJ 1523; and Sahida Begum V. Mofizul Haque, AIR 1986 Gau
171.
18 M.A. Quereshi, Muslim Law of Marriage and Divorce (New Delhi: Deep and
Deep, 1992)
19 AIR 1985 SC 945; delivered by a five judge bench of the Apex court headed
by Chandrachud, C.J.
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8.
The judgement of Shah Bano defined a watershed in
personal law issues in India. It has alternately been described
as a "reformist Juggernaut"20 and "a bull in a china ShOp"21,
the jUdgement sparked off
t~.biggest Personal
law controversy
that India had seen till then. It involved a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court on the Muslim personal law of maintenance,
and the question of maintenance to an ex-wife. It involved the
interpretation of s. 1250f the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
the question whether the provision overrides the personal law
of the community. It was a decision based on a number of solid
precedents on the topic as detailed above. But the decision
became the hotbed of debate due to some parts of it being
read to be against the Islamic religion as such. The comments
of Chief Justice Chandrachud regarding the "pious obligation
of the Muslim husband" were taken as the fodder for allegations
of "the destruction of Muslim culture and identity";!2.
9.
As a response to the demands made by a number
of orthodox associations within the Muslim community, the
Parliament passed the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights
20 Ratna kapur, "Feminism, Fundamentalism and the Rights Rhetroic", The Indian
Journal of Social Work 1993 V (1) at 355.
21 Flavia Agnes, Procedure and
~ase Law on Maintenance 144 (Pune:
Majilis,1992).
22 For a detailed account of the protests and their nature, see Sundari Krishna,
"Personal laws and the Constitution", 3 Stud Adv (1991) 65: Zoya Hassan,
"Minority Identy, Muslim Woman's Bill Campagain and the Political Process",
EPW Jan 71989 XXVI (1) at 44.
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10.
The Legislation met with widespread criticism and
condemnation from all quarters>, A representative opinion is
one expressed by Justice Krishna Iyer:
11.
It would be prudent now to examine the judicial
decisions that have followed the enactment of the 1986 Act,
as these represent a fine example of progressive Judicial
Activism by the Courts. In a number of decisions, we can
observe the Courts efforts to give effect to the Constltuticnat
mandates of Gender Equalfty and fair and humane persdl'lal
laws. In Kasam
v~ Janabhaj25 it was held that the Act did not
operate retrospectively as any such repealing clause was
25 2(1987) DMC 15, the Act was held as not affecting previously passed orders
for maintenance.
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"The 1986 act does not degrade the Muslim women's right to
take recourse to the CrPC, as the Act is a Personal Law
subordinate to the CrPC"
12.
A similar reasoning was applied to uphold the
Muslim women's rights in the cases of Shahnaz Bano v. Baboo .
Khan ", Ali v. Sufaria 2 8 and Bashir Khan v. Jamilla Bi 2 9 . A
different reasoning has been followed by a few High Courts when
dealing with the matters of maintenance. S.3 of the Act, which
provided for "fair and reasonable provision as maintenance",
has been interpreted to mean provision of maintenance even
beyond the Iddat period. The leading decision in this case has
been the Andhra Pradesh High Courts pronouncement in
Mohammad Tajuddin v. Qamarunnissa Begum 30 .
13.
The decision of the Calcutta High Court of May 2000
in Sakila parvin v. Haider Ali 3 1, is a recent example of decision
of
26 AIR 1988 Guj. 141.
27 1(1986) DMC 106.
28 (1988) CrLJ 197.
29 (1994) CtLJ 361.
30 AIR 1989 AP 207; th9u9h this decision was overruled by a full-bench of the
same court in Usman Khan v. Fatheimunnisa Begum, AIR 1990 AP 225.
3I The Times of India, 16 June 2000 at 11.
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16.
It is indeed ironic and puzzling that such progressive
development in law has not taken place in India with its strong
democratic institutions and express Constitutional mandates
in this regard. For such a comprehensive and meaningful reform
in Personal Law to be effected, legislative action is. inevitable.
Lessons from the developments in Muslim Personal Law:
18.
A question that frequently raises its head is that of the
form that a UCC would take. Though Art 44 of the Constitution
provides a rough framework, it does not specify the exact from
35 Danial Latifi, "Arrested step towards Islamic Reformation", From the Lawyers
Collective Aug-Sep 1997 v. 12,no.8-9,p.16.
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