Professional Documents
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CASE DIGEST
PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS UNION
and LOURDES A. DE JESUS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 118651. October 16, 1997]
FACTS:
De Jesus is petitioners reviser/trimmer who based her assigned work on a paper note posted by
petitioners. The posted paper is identified by its P.O. Number. De Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by
trimming the cloths ribs and thereafter submitted tickets corresponding to the work done to her
supervisor. Three days later, de Jesus received a memorandum requiring her to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with the intention of cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no trimming. The
memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for thirty days. In her explanation, de Jesus
maintained that she merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O. No. 3853 and admitted that she may
have been negligent, but not for dishonesty or tampering. Nonetheless, she was terminated from
employment.
De Jesus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. The Labor Arbiter held
petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal and were ordered to reinstate de Jesus to her previous position
without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time of her suspension. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declared that the status quo between them should be
maintained and affirmed the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement, but without backwages. The NLRC
further directed petitioner to pay de Jesus her back salaries from the date she filed her motion for
execution up to the date of the promulgation of the decision. Petitioners filed their partial motion for
reconsideration which the NLRC denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of execution?
HELD:
No. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately
executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the
execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of
Article 223, i. e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application
for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or
postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the
NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble
purpose envisioned by Article 223. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or
suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws
should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a
writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an
award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the
employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the
payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is
based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to
report for work or not.
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TRIAD SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES, INC. and ANTHONY U. QUE, petitioners, vs.
SILVESTRE ORTEGA, JR., ARIEL ALVARO, RICHARD SEVILLANO,
MARTIN CALLUENG, and ISAGANI CAPILA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160871 . February 06, 2006]
FACTS:
Respondents were formerly employed by petitioner as security guards. Accordingly, during the
time that they were in the employ of petitioners, they were receiving compensation which was below the
minimum wage fixed by law. They were also made to render services everyday for 12 hours but were not
paid the requisite overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. Respondents likewise lamented
the fact that petitioners failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive leave pay, and
13th month pay. As a result of these perceived unfairness, respondents filed a complaint before the
Department of Labor. Upon learning of the complaint, respondents services were terminated without the
benefit of notice and hearing.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering the petitioners to reinstate the respondents to
their former jobs as security guards, and to pay respondents backwages and to such further backwages as
they accrue until reinstatement order is complied with by the petitioners. Further, petitioners are ordered
to pay separation pay in the event reinstatement is no longer feasible.
As petitioners failed to seasonably file an appeal with the NLRC, the decision of the labor arbiter
became final and executory prompting respondents to file a motion for the issuance of writ of execution
which was thereafter issued. Pursuant to such writ, petitioners funds were garnished and were eventually
ordered released to respondents pursuant to the labor arbiters order.
Subsequently, the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC came up with a computation
of monetary award where it appears that petitioners were liable to respondents for the amount of
P2,097,152.26 representing the latters backwages and separation pay. A 2nd alias writ of execution was
issued by the labor arbiter for the satisfaction of the amount representing the unpaid accrued backwages
including attorneys fees, plus execution fee.
Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals ruled that
backwages payable to respondents should be computed from the date of their termination from their jobs
until actual reinstatement as provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code. As petitioners failed to observe
said pertinent provision of the law, the labor arbiter could not be charged with having committed a grave
abuse of discretion when he issued the assailed order. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employer is liable for the accrued backwages despite payment of separation
pay to the dismissed employees?
HELD:
Yes. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and
reinstatement. These are separate and distinct from each other. However, separation pay is granted
where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable and backwages. Backwages and separation pay are,
therefore, distinct reliefs granted to one who was illegally dismissed from employment. The award of one
does not preclude that of the other.
In this case, the labor arbiter ordered the reinstatement of respondents and the payment of their
backwages until their actual reinstatement and in case reinstatement is no longer viable, the payment of
separation pay. It bears emphasizing that the law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or
separated employee. This, the petitioners failed to heed.
It should be pointed out that an order of reinstatement by the labor arbiter is not the same as
actual reinstatement of a dismissed or separated employee. Thus, until the employer continuously fails to
actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the labor arbiter, their obligation to
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respondents, insofar as accrued backwages and other benefits are concerned, continues to accumulate. It
is only when the illegally dismissed employee receives the separation pay that it could be claimed with
certainty that the employer-employee relationship has formally ceased thereby precluding the possibility
of reinstatement. In the meantime, the illegally dismissed employees entitlement to backwages, 13 th
month pay, and other benefits subsists. Until the payment of separation pay is carried out, the employer
should not be allowed to remain unpunished for the delay, if not outright refusal, to immediately execute
the reinstatement aspect of the labor arbiters decision.
The records of this case are bereft of any indication that respondents were actually reinstated to
their previous jobs or to the company payroll. As the law clearly requires petitioners to pay respondents
backwages until actual reinstatement, petitioners are still liable to respondents for accrued backwages and
other benefits.
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or on motion of an interested party, before the employer may be compelled to admit the employee back to
work or to reinstate him in the payroll, on pain of being liable for the employees salaries. However, at the
time the Courts Decision in San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC was promulgated on July 23, 1998, the
Pioneer case was already the prevailing rule on the matter and should have been read into the case. Thus,
upon its receipt of our July 23, 1998 Decision affirming the NLRC decision, SMC should have immediately
opted either to re-admit petitioners or merely reinstate them in the payroll.
Be that as it may, the retirement age of 60 years already attained by petitioners as early as 1989
for Edmundo Torres, Jr. and 1990 for Manuel Castellano had set in motion the provisions of SMCs
Retirement Plan which is a valid management prerogative. Ultimately, therefore, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the reinstatement of petitioners is no longer feasible. SMC should accordingly take
formal steps, in accordance with its Retirement Plan, to effect petitioners retirement.
Even so, petitioners should not be compelled to return the salaries and benefits already received
by them on account of the order for reinstatement adjudged by the NLRC and affirmed by the Court. In
Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, we held that if an employee was reinstated during the appeal
period but such reinstatement was reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse
whatever salary he received from the employer. Justice and equity require that we apply the same
doctrine to this case.
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choices under Article 223 of the Labor Code, not only by virtue of the statutory injunction but also in view
of the interim relinquishment of management control to give way to the full exercise of the powers of the
rehabilitation receiver. Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent may have opted for actual
physical reinstatement pending appeal to optimize the utilization of resources. Then again, though the
management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide otherwise, not to mention the
subsistence of the injunction on claims.
In sum, the obligation to pay the employees salaries upon the employers failure to exercise the
alternative options under Article 223 of the Labor Code is not a hard and fast rule, considering the
inherent constraints of corporate rehabilitation.
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