Lands of Public Domain

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty.
Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 1

PRELIM EXAM COVERAGE - CASES
LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
REPUBLIC v. VILLANUEVA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55289
June 29, 1982
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole,
represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive
Minister,respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge
Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the prohibition in
section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no
private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area".
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol,
Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters
and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the
Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres
Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square
meters owned by the said church (Exh. D).
The said lots were already possessed by Perez in
1933. They are not included in any military reservation.
They are inside an area which was certified as
alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in
1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees
and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land.
The land had been declared for realty tax purposes.
Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).
On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a
corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an
application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged
that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed
the land for more than thirty years. It invoked section
48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides:
Chapter VIII.Judicial confirmation of imperfect or

incomplete titles.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Register Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest
have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No.
1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Direct/r of
Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that
applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to
hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the land
applied for is public land not susceptible of private
appropriation and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land since June 12, 1945.
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of
the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh.
E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation
sole, represented by Executive Minister Erao G.
Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don
Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that
decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to
this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal
should be sustained.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the
Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical
person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable
lands of the public domain, like the two lots in
question, because of the constitutional prohibition
LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 2

already mentioned and because the said church is not
entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b)
which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural
persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of
English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic
Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration
Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs.
Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the
Public Land Law).
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo
(its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are
private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs.
Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not
correct. What was considered private land in
the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a
Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cario vs.
Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41
Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be
registered in this case do not fall within that category.
They are still public lands. A land registration
proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the
land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890,
"all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest. "
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the
right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain
a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo"and
that before the issuance of the certificate of title the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of
the land since it still pertains to the State.
The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside.
The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo
is dismissed with costs against said applicant.
SO ORDERED.
MANILA ELECTRIC v. CASTRO-BARTOLOME
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49623
June 29, 1982
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch
XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:p
This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article
XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or
associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed on ethousand
hectares in area". * That prohibition is not found in the
1935 Constitution.
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation
organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty
percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino
citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in
the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots
with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square
meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value
of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh
application on the grounds that the applicant, as a
private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable
public lands and that the applicant and its
prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp.
65-66, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal
and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to
the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot
No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for
the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos
and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the
Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947,
Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing
and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing

sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the
Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post
on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the
Meralco on August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the1968 cadastral
survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan
AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into
two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate
Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two
street serving as the land's eastern and southern
boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since
1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is
residential in character as distinguished from a strictly
agricultural land. It is not included in any military
reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the
alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision
dismissing the application because in its opinion the
Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of
the said land since under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can
apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to
public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial
court assumed that the land which it seeks to register
is public land.
From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440.
In contends that the said land, after having been
possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos
and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years,
had become private land in the hands of the latter,
and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a
private corporation from acquiring alienable public
land, is not applicable to the said land.
The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section
48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the
Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure
a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the
land.
In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General
counters that the said land is not private land because
the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no
composition title from the Spanish government nor
possessory information title or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912,
September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and

Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November
28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David,
L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo,
L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs.
Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs
of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600,
603).
The Public Land Law provides:
CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
predecessors in interest have been in open,
of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No.
1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public
domain not in possession of the qualifications specified
in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits
of this chapter.
We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco,
the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco,
as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its

registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
pertenecer a los terrenos

susceptibles de enajenacion."
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in

Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which
rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a
pervasive principle of public land law and land
registration law, that"all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest."
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L.
ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).
That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a

pice of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to
be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in
the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was
attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while
his application for confirmation of his imperfect title
was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and
execution sald of the land were void.
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and

Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of
the public domain from time immemorial by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby
the land ceases to be public" and becomes private
property.
That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about
the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors
since time immemorial or even before the Spanish
conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was
possessed before 1880 or since a period of time
"beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation
in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the
Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in
possession of the land since time immemorial.
In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act
No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section
48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26,
1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the
occupant had complied with all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a
certificate of title.
On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508,
510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land,
who have applied for the confirmation of their title,
"teian asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris et de
jure de que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones
necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que
el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser
los verdaderos dueos del terreno in este dejo de
publico
del
Estado
For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect

title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the
Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by
the Public Land Law if they were already private lands.
The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized
in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but
asderecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that
if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of
their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should
the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same
right to register the said land in its name, there being
no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from
selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing
of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning
the confirmation of an imperfect title under section
48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-ininterest are or constitute a grant or concession by the
State; and before they could acquire any right under
such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessorsin-interest should comply with the condition precedent
for the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration
of the land of which they had been in possession at
least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's
immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the
Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is
their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a
person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil.
890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on one

hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of

title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we

should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which
a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b).
The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that
the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented

by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's

application is affirmed. Costs against the petitionerappellant.
SO ORDERED.
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration

proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat
tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented

by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties
pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place
on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public
from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of
the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant
bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private
land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular

investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November
15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh.
'N-l'), during their special session on November 22,
1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the
1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
(a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands
in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
predecessors-in-interest have been
in
open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for

of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in
view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were
cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court,
it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact
that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962,
are members of the national cultural minorities who
had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year
period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public
Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-ininterest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions
of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its
Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is
whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred
to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the
1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind
the prohibition therein against private corporations
holding lands of the public domain except in lease not
exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where
a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned,

had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by
the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-ininterest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of
the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976,
Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The
court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco,
a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco,
as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its
registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we
should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which
a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b).
The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that
the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent,
tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2thru Susi in
1925 3 down
to Herico in
4
1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal
rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak,

in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and
5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
because expressed in more categorical language,
in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and
publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate
of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII
of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired,
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land
in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any
title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of

no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
mentioned,
likeof Lacaste
vs.
Director
of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel
vs.
Court
of
10
Appeals and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular,
affirmative: 11
appears
to
be
squarely
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.

1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessorsin-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the
Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time;
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a

conversion already affected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are
indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in
force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which
came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained
technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land
at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court
has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has
no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.

Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of
vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 117778).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open
to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings
were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and
in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under
either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny
the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest
by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,
and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must
be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line
of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule

and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a
juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for registration in
the name of the Piguing spouses as the original
owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors
(as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all
the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after
all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the
names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold
and own private lands) and granting the applications
for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired
and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the

same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling

of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and reestablished, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation
of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only
tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the
appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
this instance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44237
February 28, 1989
VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF THE
VIRGIN MARY, represented by M.O. Leoncia
Pacquing, R.V.M., respondents.
Elpedio N. Cabasan for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
From the adverse judgment of the Court of
Appeals, 1 affirming in toto that of the Trial Court, 2 the
petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by
certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the factual
determination that she had sold the lot in controversy
to private respondent, and (2) the legal conclusion that
neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitution disqualifies
the corporation known as the Religious of the Virgin
Mary, from acquiring the land in question and
registering it in its name. In light of the time-honored
rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally final, and the doctrine lately laid down by this
Court on the precise legal issue now raised by
petitioner, her appeal must fail.
The controversy at bar arose in connection with
cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of
Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and
adjudication of title to a large tract of land measuring
261.5791 hectares, divided into 1,419 lots, situated in
the City of Iligan. 3
DE OCSIO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably

presented an answer to the petition. She alleged that
she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of
land with specific boundaries comprehended in the
cadastral proceeding: Lot No. 1272, measuring 256
square meters, and Lot 1273 a road lot, measuring 21
square meters; and that as owner, she had been in
possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years, and her
predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years. 4 Title to
the same parcels of land was however claimed by the

Religious of the Virgin Mary.5 In its answer, it averred
that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio
and had been in possession as owner thereof for over
four years, and its possession and that of its
predecessors was immemorial.
Evidence was received on these conflicting assertions
after which the Cadastral Court rendered judgment,
declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established
that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold Lot No.
1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a
deed of sale dated April 12, 1956 (Exhibit 1), and Lot
No. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of
Iligan. The judgment contained the following
dispositive portion, viz: 6
WHEREFORE,
the
court
renders
judgment
adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272, Iligan Cadastre, to
the Religious of the Virgin Mary, a duly registered
domestic religious corporation, the members of which
are all Filipino citizens, with main office in the City of
Manila, but the building existing thereon is hereby
declared to be the property of claimant Victoria Ong de
Ocsio who is hereby ordered to remove Said building
out of the premises within 90 days from date hereof.
The claim of Victoria Ong de Ocsio with respect to said
cadastral lot is dismiss. No pronouncement is made as
to costs.
Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this
decision shall have become final.
As aforestated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
cadastral court's decision in toto. So, too, will this
Court.
Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals
came to the conclusion, after analysing and weighing
the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by
the parties, that Virginia Ong de Ocsio's version of the
facts was not true-that it was another property, not Lot
No. 1272, that she had conveyed to the religious
corporation but that it was indeed Lot No. 1272 that
was subject of the sale and had indeed been
transferred to the latter. Now, findings of fact of this
sort, contained in a decision of the Court of Appeals
are by long and uniformly observed rule conclusive on
the parties and on the Supreme Court, as
well; 7 subject
only
to
a
few
specified
exceptions, 8 none of which obtains here, said findings
may not be reviewed on appeal.
As regards the issue of law raised by her, petitioner
fares no better. Citing Manila Electric Co. v. CastroBartolome, 114 SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v.
Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (1982), in relation to

Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, she
asserts that as the private respondent is a religious
corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act which grants that right only to
natural persons. The cited rulings no longer control.
Current doctrine, first announced by the Court en banc
in Director of Lands v. I.A.C. 146 SCRA 509 (1986), is
that open, continuous and exclusive possession of
alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in
accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jureconverts
the land to private property, and a juridical person who
thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto
confirmed in its name. Virtually the same state of facts
obtained in said case that now obtain here. A private
corporation had purchased the land originally of the
public domain from parties who had, by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest, possessed
and occupied it since time immemorial. It had
thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. In
upholding its right to do so, the court held that the fact
that the proceedings had been instituted by said
purchaser in its own name and not in the name of the
transferors was "xx simply xx (an) accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed." The ruling was reaffirmed in two later
cases, Director of Lands v. Manila Electric Co., 153
SCRA 686 (September 11, 1987), and Republic v.
C.A., 156 SCRA 344 (October 30, 1987) where the
same question of law was raised. In the latter it was
expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of
lands by or in behalf of private corporations do not
apply to public lands already converted to private
ownership by natural persons under the provisions of
the Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong
de Ocsio and her predecessors-in-interest having
possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under the
conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of
ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of
the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary,
confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is,
under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
subject of the petition for review on certiorari is
AFFIRMEDin toto. Costs against the petitioner.
PALOMO v. COURT OF APPEALS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95608
January 21, 1997
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD

PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE
BUENAVENTURA,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO,
LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of
15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the
"Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case
are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the
Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial
park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land
situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province
of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the
Philippine Commission. 1
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
15th Judicial District, United States of America,
ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered
by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo on December 9, 1916; 2 December 28, 3 and
January 17, 1917. 4 Diego Palomo donated these
parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters
which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates
of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 5 to his heirs,
herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937. 6
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title
were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court
of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. 7 The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in
October 1953. 8
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued

Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of
the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was
never released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible
to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon 9 and
introduced
improvements
by
planting
rice,
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses
Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the
parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and
3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank
of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the
then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with
damages against private respondents Faustino J.
Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo
Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who
entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT
3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling
no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines
filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15
parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded
with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of
Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was
dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank
was already paid and the mortgage in its favor
cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was
conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July
31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following
decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan

II-9205 cancelled.
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants

and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for
injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which

affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence
this petition raising the following issues:
Costs against the plaintiffs.
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave

abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the decision of
the lower court.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and

against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the
Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the
Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, 10 169, 173 and
176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds
of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any
and all improvements on the lands in question that are
found therein and introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and
12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4 of Plan II9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is
hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered. 12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no
sufficient proof that the Palomos have established
property rights over the parcels of land in question
before the Treaty of Paris which ended the SpanishAmerican War at the end of the century. The court
further stated that assuming that the decrees of the
Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the
Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties
because these were issued only when Executive Order
No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note
that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of
Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the
relocation survey of the properties stated in his
reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters
covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square
meters fall within the reservation area, 13 the RTC
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates

of title and subsequent transfer certificates of titles of
the petitioners over the properties in question is
contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the
petitioners in the premises in favor of the government
is against our existing law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or
not the alleged original certificate of titles issued
pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in
1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953
pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which
ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the
19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish
and Filipino citizens and the American government had
no inherent power to confiscate properties of private
citizens and declare them part of any kind of
government reservation. They allege that their
predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse
and continuous possession of the subject lands for 2050 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917.
Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial
purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes
was tantamount to deprivation of private property
without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented
copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United
States of America which state that the predecessors in
interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in
continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands
from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in
1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by
discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the
Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether

agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence,
private ownership of land could only be acquired
through royal concessions which were documented in
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant,"
(2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de
Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion
Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained
under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the
petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from
an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance
upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O.
Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917;
Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated
December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916;
Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated
December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of
the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro
Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the
subject lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid
"decisions" of the Court of First Instance, however,
were not signed by the judge but were merely certified
copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the
signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years
prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were
surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year
they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously , in
February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were
surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had
already surveyed the area in preparation for its
reservation for provincial park purposes. If the
petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in
possession of the lands for a number of years prior to
their registration in 1916-1917, they would have
undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these
properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had
no right to include these properties in the reservation
when the question should have been raised 83 years
ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as
they obtained the titles without government opposition,
the government is now estopped from questioning the
validity of the certificates of title which were granted.

As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of
Appeals, the principle of estoppel, does not operate
against the Government for the act of its agents. 15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First
Instance were really issued, the lands are still not
capable of appropriation. The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar
were not alienable lands of the public domain. As
testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau
of Forestry show that the subject lands were never
declared as alienable and disposable and subject to
private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present. 16 Moreover, as part of the reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest
zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, 17 unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in
evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land
inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in
land registration cases. 18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now
come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of
improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears
emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in
force at the time the lands in question were surveyed
for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew
that the subject lands were covered under the
reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution
of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the
blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan
II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct
copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the
Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 19 contains
the following note, "in conflict with provincial
reservation." 20 In any case, petitioners are presumed
to know the law and the failure of the government to
oppose the registration of the lands in question is no
justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.

Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square
meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the
reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with
respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of
Civil Case T-143, 21 were within the perimeter of the
national park, 22 no pronouncement as to damages is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913
be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter
area falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner

Republics petition for review of the decrees of
registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered
on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of the
private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by
them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated
March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared
public land in a decision rendered before the last war
in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the
forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of
Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under
the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS & BERNABE

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and EMILIO
BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ
BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA
BERNABE, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a

reversal of the decision of Respondent Court of
Appeals 1 dated February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No.
50076-R, entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," affirming the
order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated
August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of

First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under
Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061,
concerning a portion of Lot No. 622 Lot Nos. 792,
793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 and a portion of Lot
No. 324 Lot Nos. 791 and 799 more particularly
identified and delineated in the segregation plans of
Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342
and Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to
perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots,
having allegedly acquired ownership and possession
of said parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein Respondents, has always
been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public,
adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for more
than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order
setting the petition for hearing and directing that the
Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof by
furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands
and the Director of Forestry, a copy of said Order
together with Respondents petition by registered mail
(Record on Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an
opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the
petition once the area involved is found to be within the
timberland and therefore inalienable under the
Constitution (Record on Appeal, p. 7). Upon
verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the
area to be the portion of the timberland already

released by the government from the mass of public
forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record
on Appeal, p. 8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed
his opposition to the petition alleging that the land is
still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot
be the subject of a land registration proceeding under
Act
496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have
complied with all the terms and conditions which would
entitle them to a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of
its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on
Appeal, p. 19), reads:
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340,
Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs3340 and their technical descriptions are hereby
APPROVED, and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the
court hereby adjudicates in favor of petitioners Emilio
Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married;
Luz Bernabe, single; Amparo Bernabe, single and
Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and residents of
Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein applied for as follows:
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.
3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the

Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby directed
to issue the corresponding decrees of registration
therefor."
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner

of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. N-124813124818, all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal, pp.
20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of
Lands and the Director of Forestry, through the
Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the
decrees of registration under Section 38, of Act No.
496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of
the lower court, on the grounds that the entire
proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the
Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the
petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings;
that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to
re-open cadastral proceedings are portions of the
public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public
forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only
on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently,
respondents do not have a registerable title to the land
subject matter of the proceedings; and the lower court,
without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of
registerable title to respondents over portions of the
public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the
provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended,
and that under the circumstances, respondents
employed actual fraud in procuring title over the
parcels of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the
Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The trial
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action
or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside
on review of a decree of registration. If the Solicitor
General was not notified of the subsequent hearings, it
was because he delegated his appearance to the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside
or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition states
no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in the
actions having been already transferred to innocent
purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General
even filed the petition for review (Record on Appeal,
pp.
27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance
until the hearing of the merits of the case which was
set for August 16, 1970, respondents filed their answer
to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their
answer, respondents reiterated their grounds in their
motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended
Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that
after having fraudulently secured title over the parcels

of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated
deeds of sale purporting to convey various lots
composing portions of the parcels involved to third
parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious
attempt to remove the parcels of land involved from
the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth, the
aforementioned third parties are not innocent
purchasers for value, being mere dummies of the
petitioners, holding the parcels of land involved only in
trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970,
respondents filed their answer to the Amended Petition
for
Review
(Record
on
Appeal,
p.
56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order
denying petitioners Amended Petition for Review
(Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20,
1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p.
33).
RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT

CONSEQUENTLY THEY LACK THE REQUISITE
THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO ENTITLE
THEM TO A GRANT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING FOR
REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER
THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK
OF NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE
LOTS IN QUESTION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE
STILL SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF
REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE
TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING
ANY ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES
THERETO.
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution of a special
Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.
The governments cause is meritorious.
Hence this petition.
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that

private respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of
the Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, declaring the lot in
question as public land. It must be stressed that said
lot was declared public land by virtue of a court
decision which has become final and as held by the
Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata.
(Republic v. Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is
therefore beyond question that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under
R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision
therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court,

through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to
require the respondents to comment thereon. On May
30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging
that the decision of respondent Court and the
questioned resolution were not rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion
exercised by respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court
resolved to give due course to the Petition and denied
the urgent motion of respondents for leave to file a
supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners
filed its Brief on November 29, 1975; respondents, on
March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March
25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was deemed
submitted
for
decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS BECAME AGRICULTURAL ONLY
ON JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No.

622 was released as an agricultural land for disposition
under Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The lower
court ordered the issuance of the corresponding
decrees of registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec.
48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, providing
for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
which
reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,

of this chapter."
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or
not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be
the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the
aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are
incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v. Director
of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960];
Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968];
Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A
parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89
SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210
[1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689 [1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral
proceedings was at all possible, private respondents
have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private
respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9
months and 20 days possession and occupation of the
lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date
when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban,
Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267,
which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had
been segregated from the forest zone and released by
the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on
Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above
mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents
nor their predecessors-in-interest could have

possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30)
years as disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a
necessary party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its
counsel, the Solicitor-General, should have been
furnished copies of all court orders, notices and
decisions, as in ordinary cases, in order to bind the
government. Failure to give such notice deprives the
State of its day in Court, and renders the decision void.
(Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly
notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of
subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision
itself promulgated by the lower court on December 19,
1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized representative
of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as
shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968. (Record
on Appeal, p. 47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA
426 [1976], the Supreme Court, applying the timehonored principle of agency ruled that the service of
the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must
necessarily be service on the Solicitor-General, and
added that technical transgressions relative to the filing
and service may be brushed aside when the adverse
party (this time the Director of Lands and Forestry and
their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware of the
matter which his adversary would want the court to act
upon. Once it appears that the party is already
informed by one means or another of what he is to be
notified, the required service becomes an empty
gesture and strict observance thereof is considered
waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890
[1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor
General was so apprised of the decision of the lower
court in question as there is no proof that the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the SolicitorGeneral a copy thereof. Furthermore, after the 3rd
Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal from
the decision of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal on
March 21, 1969 manifested that he was withdrawing
the appeal upon the intervention of the District
Forester. (Respondents Brief, p. 44).

It will be observed however that later decisions of the
Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the matter of
giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more recent
case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161
[1985], it was established that the Solicitor-General is
the only legal counsel of the government in land
registration cases and as such, he alone may withdraw
the Governments appeal with binding effect on the
latter. He is entitled to be furnished copies of all court
orders, notices and decisions and as held the
reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be
reckoned from the time the Solicitor-Generals Office is
apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the
time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with
that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor
General in the case at bar, had no power to decide
whether or not an appeal should be made. They
should have referred the matter to the SolicitorGeneral and without copies of court orders, notices
and decisions, having been provided by either the trial
court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to the SolicitorGeneral, the assailed decision has no binding effect on
the government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to
N-124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended
was filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the
same Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record
No. 1097, exactly a year after the issuance of
aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of
actual fraud. (Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening
or review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has
real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived
thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within
one year from the issuance of the decree and (4) that
the property has not as yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser. (Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27
[1972]; Rubico, Et. Al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513
[1969]). It has been held however that the action to
annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be
unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral
and the facts upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
(Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands
a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual
malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private

respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles
over parcels of land of the public domain as it is a
matter of record that the land in question was opened
for disposition and alienation only on July 6, 1965. The
matter was threshed out in the lower court and the
decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Actual malice is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in
pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may
be annulled within one (1) year from entry of said
decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is
true if entered in compliance with a decision suffering
from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due process,
(Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil.
118 [1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that
decided the cadastral case. (Republic v. De Kalintas,
25 SCRA 720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the case
at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having
been shown that the Solicitor-General was not properly
furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed
decision but more importantly, the lower court as
previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the
cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as
amended by R.A. No. 2061.
IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in
question are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well
settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his
guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under
the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner Co., Et Al.,
37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he
cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in
contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is
void, when it covers property of public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of
an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring
supplied). In the case at bar, it will be noted that in
granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower court
counted the period of possession of private
respondents before the same were released as forest
lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to
qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they
were still non-disposable. Thus, under the foregoing

rulings, even assuming that the transferees are
innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands
derived from the titles of private respondents which
were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part
of the public domain, may be cancelled.
lower court rendered judgment in favor of private

respondent De Guzman, to wit
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of
First Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED, because the lots in question still form
part of the public domain. The certificates of title
issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies

the application for registration of the parcels of land
mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for
lack of factual and legal bases;
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. DE GUZMAN
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137887
February 28, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE
GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN,
SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA
ERMITAO, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E.
TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA
ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO
ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FILOMENO
ERMITAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay,
Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect
title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land
located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this

Court as follows:
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves

the petition for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and
containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as
supported by its technical descriptions now forming
parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian
Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De
Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia
Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all
married, of legal age and with residence and postal
addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite,
subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitao,
Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo,
Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and Esmeranso
Ermitao under an instrument entitled "Waiver of
Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of
which are hereby ordered by this Court to be
annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be
issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of
this Court.
SO ORDERED.3
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition
for registration of private respondents over the subject
parcels of land was approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the
following assignments of error
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF
OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN
THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME
REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION
OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT
THE
DE
GUZMANS
HAVE
NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.4
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were
released as agricultural land only in 1965 5 while the
petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by
private respondents only in 1991.6 Thus the period of
occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965
until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only
twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the
required thirty (30) year period possession requirement
under Sec. 14, P.D. 29and R.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the
subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that
(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and
disposable only in December, 1965, however, records
indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao,
appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in
possession of the property, cultivating it and planting
various crops thereon. It follows that appellees'
possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in
1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's possession is
63 years or more than the required 30 years period of
possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been
converted to private property.7
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of
possession prior to the time the subject land was
released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the
pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,8 to wit
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private

respondents had not qualified for a grant under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because
their possession of the land while it was still
inalienable forest land, or before it was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain on
January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private
ownership, and should be excluded from the
computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession in concept of owner required under Section
48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling
in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra

Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
151 SCRA 679).
Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government,
41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry,
17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera,
120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]). (emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case
of Director of Land Management vs. Court of
Appeals9misplaced. There, while the period of
possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest
was tacked to his own possession to comply with the
required thirty year period possession requirement, the
land involved therein was not forest land but alienable
public land. On the other hand, in the case before us,
the property subject of private respondents' application
was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such
date, the same was forest land incapable of private
appropriation. It was not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into
private property, (unless) and until such lands were
reclassified
and
considered
disposable
and
alienable. 10
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as
alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession
thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the
thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord
with the ruling inAlmeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra),
and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain. 11
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding
that private respondents and their predecessors-in-

interest have been in possession of the subject land
for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application
of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable
laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to
them. The fact remains that from the time the subject
land was declared alienable until the time of their
application, private respondents' occupation thereof
was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider
their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the
release of the land as alienable because absent the
fact of declassification prior to the possession and
cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property
occupied by him remained classified as forest or
timberland, which he could not have acquired by
prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with
cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. Possession of the land by
private respondents, whether spanning decades or

centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court
is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex,
sed lex". 12
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and
the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC
Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is
rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for failure of
the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year
occupancy and possessory requirements of law for
confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

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LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty.

Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 1

June 29, 1982

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

Chapter VIII.Judicial confirmation of imperfect or

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 2

June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 3

Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 4

pertenecer a los terrenos

This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in

That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a

The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and

For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 5

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented

The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented

December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 6

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 7

The main theme was given birth, so to speak,

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 8

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.

public to private land, but only confirm such a

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 9

completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 10

Republic of the Philippines

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling

G.R. No. L-44237

February 28, 1989

VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO, petitioner,

DE OCSIO v. COURT OF APPEALS

Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 11

Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (1982), in relation to

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 12

January 21, 1997

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 13

ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan

IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which

Costs against the plaintiffs.

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave

In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and

2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 14

validity of the certificates of title which were granted.

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel) 15

Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner

The undisputed facts are as follows:

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS & BERNABE