BA SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. ROGER T. SIA, TACIANA U. SIA and JOHN DOE, respondents.

Facts:
On August 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying due course to a Petition for Certiorari filed by BA
Savings Bank, on the ground that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the petition was signed not by the duly
authorized representative of the petitioner, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, but by its counsel, in contravention
of said circular x x x.
A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioner, attached to which was a BA Savings Bank Corporate
Secretarys Certificate,[4] dated August 14, 1997. The Certificate showed that the petitioners Board of Directors approved a
Resolution on May 21, 1996, authorizing the petitioners lawyers to represent it in any action or proceeding before any court, tribunal
or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, among others.
On October 24, 1997, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that Supreme Court
Revised Circular No. 28-91 requires that it is the petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the facts and
undertakings required therein.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 allows a corporation to authorize its counsel to execute a certificate
of non-forum shopping for and on its behalf.
Ruling:
A corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors
and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board of directors. All acts within the powers
of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection; and, except so far as limitations or restrictions which may be imposed
by special charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a
natural person govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the
corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities
as are agents of individuals and private persons.[7]
In the present case, the corporations board of directors issued a Resolution specifically authorizing its lawyers to act as their
agents in any action or proceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency[;] and to sign,
execute and deliver in connection therewith the necessary pleadings, motions, verification, affidavit of merit,certificate of non-forum
shopping and other instruments necessary for such action and proceeding. The Resolution was sufficient to vest such persons with
the authority to bind the corporation and was specific enough as to the acts they were empowered to do.
In the case of natural persons, Circular 28-91 requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. However, such requirement cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like corporations, for the simple reason that they
cannot personally do the task themselves. As already stated, corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized
agents. In fact, physical actions, like the signing and the delivery of documents, may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity,
only by specifically authorized individuals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 43209 with all deliberate
speed. No costs.

EMILIO S. YOUNG, petitioner, vs. JOHN KENG SENG a.k.a JOHN SY, respondent.

Facts:
On September 16, 1996, the herein private respondent John Keng Seng, a.k.a. John Sy, filed a complaint for accounting of general
agency, injunction, turning over of properties, and damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 53, against the
herein petitioner Emilio Young and his wife, Tita Young. The case was docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 96-9508. The private
respondent subsequently filed an Amended Complaint with the same Court. The spouses Young, for their part, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.
On March 6, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 53, issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-9508. The
private respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order was denied by the same court in its Order of April 2, 1997.
On June 23, 1997, John Keng Seng filed another complaint for accounting and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, against the herein petitioner Emilio Young. The case was docketed in that court as Civil Case No. 97-9830. Young
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint fails to state a good, valid and/or worthwhile cause of action
against the defendant. The respondent court denied the Motion to Dismiss in its order of August 19, 1997. The petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order based on the following grounds:
The complainant x x x fails to state a good, valid and/or worthwhile cause of action as against the defendant and that the plaintiff
had fatally failed to comply with the rule against forum shopping, as he has in fact deliberately submitted a false certification under
oath as contained in the complaint in the present suit.
The RTC and CA ruled that the respondent did not violate the rule on forum shopping.
Issue: W/N the respondent violated the rule on forum shopping.
Ruling:
Huwag niyo ng isama to>>>It is said that forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in
one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari. More accurately,
however, forum shopping is the institution of two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to
ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. [12] It is an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets.[13]
To stamp out this abominable practice of trifling with the administration of justice, the Supreme Court promulgated
Administrative Circulars 28-91 and 04-94 which states that the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions<<<<.
The First Case was dismissed because of lack of cause of action. It was thus a dismissal without prejudice; respondent was not
barred from filing a new suit against petitioner involving the same facts, but raising a cause of action arising therefrom. In fact,
respondent actually filed the Second Case, even if he failed to disclose in his certification that he had commenced the First Case
against the same defendant, herein petitioner. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that, whenever possible and feasible, procedural
rules should be liberally construed to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings on their merits.

In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, we said that the rule on non-forum shopping was designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and, therefore, should not be interpreted literally at all times.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be
dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions
under justifiable circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. The trial court is DIRECTED to hear the controversy
and decide it with all deliberate speed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

January 31, 1912

G.R. No. 7317

EMILIA ALZUA and IGNACIO ARNALOT, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
E. FINLEY JOHNSON, defendant-appellee.

Facts:
The complaint charges the defendant, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, with corruption and
misconduct in office of the gravest character. The damages which plaintiff Alzua seeks to recover in this section are alleged to have
resulted from the entry by the court of an alleged erroneous judgment in a former action to which Alzua was a party defendant. The
error which is alleged was committed by the court in entering that judgment, is attributed to the alleged false and misleading
statement of the facts of the case which is set out in the written opinion upon which the judgment of the court was based. The
complaint specifically charges the defendant, the writer of that opinion, with having willfully, maliciously, and in bad faith, perverted
and misstated the facts set out therein for the purpose of deceiving the other members of the court to whom the opinion was
submitted for signature; and is further changed, that this was but one of series of malicious and wrongful acts whereby the
defendant succeeded in deceiving his associates, and induced them to sign the order directing the entry of the alleged erroneous
judgment. As necessary corollary to the surmises, conjectures, and specific charges of wrongdoing set out in the complaint, if these
surmises, conjectures, and specific charges are well founded, the four members of this court whose signatures are attached to that
opinion together with that of the defendant, must have signed the opinion with no personal knowledge of the contents of the record
submitted to them for adjudication, and without having read the briefs of counsel, relying wholly upon the alleged false and
misleading statement of the facts prepared by the defendant as the basis for the judgment which it is alleged was erroneously
entered by the court.
Issue: W/N the facts stated in the complaint constitute a cause of action.
Ruling:
The result then of our inspection of the opinions together with the records in the cases in question is to find that the allegations of
the complaint that the defendant willfully perverted and misrepresented the facts developed in those records, and made false
statements of the facts, knowing them to be false, are not well founded; and that the statements of all the material facts contained in
the opinions in those cases are substantially correct and in substantial accord with the records of the cases wherein those opinions
were entered. It clearly results that the charges of bad faith, of the intent to injure the plaintiff Alzua, of wrongful intervention in the
adjudication of those cases, and of official misconduct in the performance of the duties of the defendant as a member of this court
are not sustained by the allegations touching the preparation of the opinions in those cases by the defendant, and on the contrary,
are directly controverted by the facts well pleaded in the complaint and disclosed by an inspection and review of the records
themselves.

The judgment of the court below, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint without day, should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant.
So ordered.
Additional info>>
The memorandum order which was provisionally amended by the defendant was filed on the day immediately preceding the
adjournment for the court vacation in the year 1907. Counsel for defendant insists that provisional amendment was merely an
attempt to correct a purely involuntary clerical error, which had crept into the judgment in the haste of the adjournment proceedings.
In support of his contention he refers to the above set out minute order dated July 28, 1907, wherein the court expressly declared
that the word "confirmamos" (affirm) was "involuntarily" inserted instead of the word "revocamos" (reverse) in the original
memorandum order. Of course the right and the duty of the defendant and of the court itself to correct an "involuntary" clerical error
should not and would not be questioned under the circumstances. But we have not in any wise rested our decision on this
contention, because while it is true that this court solemnly declared in the minute order that the amendment ratified by it was made
to correct an "involuntary" error of this nature, we do not understand that the plaintiff, by incorporating the record of those
proceedings into his complaint, Formally admits that it was in fact so made. As we understand the admissions of the complaint, they
only go to the verity of the facts disclosed by the records incorporated therein, and not to the truth or accuracy of the reasons
assigned for the entry of the orders, judgments and decrees contained in these records. Accordingly we have wholly disregarded
this contention of counsel for the defendant, and we have based our conclusions on the broader ground of the right of the court to
correct and amend errors of law or fact in its orders and judgments, before such erroneous judgments and orders become final.
G.R. No. L-57821 January 17, 1985
SEGUNDINO TORIBIO, EUSEBIA TORIBIO, and the HEIRS OF OLEGARIO TORIBIO, represented by his widow, ADELA DE
LOS REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance, City of
Zamboanga, DALMACIO RAMOS, and JUANITO CAMACHO, respondents.
Facts:
The present controversy stems from a complaint filed by the petitioners against private respondents Dalmacio Ramos and Juanita
Camacho.
Engracio Francisco and Juliana Esteban were the registered owners of the parcel of land Zamboanga. At the death of said spouses,
they were survived by their ten (10) children who inherited their state in equal pro indiviso shares. Subsequently, the property was
subdivided among the heirs and a portion designated as Lot No. 1943-B was allotted to the Justa Francisco. Justa died and was
survived among by eight (8) children namely: Dionoso, Eufremia, Alfonso, Rafael, Petrona, Olegario, Segundino and Eusebia, all
surnamed Toribio, who eight heirs, Eufremia, Alfonso and Petrona, sold their in the property to Ramon Ledesma. Rafael also sold
his share to Dinisio who, in turn, sold the same to Ramon Ledesma. Thus, the latter acquired four (4) shares out of eight (8) shares,
or a pro indiviso share of Lot 1943-B.
Subsequently, Dionisio sold his own hereditary share in the aforesaid estate of his mother to Juanito Camacho, who by said sale
acquired a 1/8 pro indiviso share of the property.
The three other heirs, petitioners Segundino Eusebia and Olegario alleging that their shares had never been sold nor in any wise
transferred or disposed to others filed a case against herein private respondents for recovery of hereditary rights. How Juanito
Camacho, who was entitled to only a total area of 931 square meters, nor, how one Dalmacio Ramos, Jr., acquired share of the
property was allegedly not known to them.
In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the shares of plaintiffs-petitioners had likewise been sold to Dionisio
Toribio, their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from petitioners to
Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the respondents were evidenced by deeds of sale, xerox copies of which were appended to
and made an integral part of the respondents' partition agreement between the respondents and also a xerox copy of the
respondents' transfer certificates of title.
Issue: Whether or not the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio and appended
to the respondents' answer are merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of their defense which must be denied under oath
by the petitioner.
Ruling:

The proper procedure was for the petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the questioned
deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of petitioners' counsel in not
properly drafting a reply to the answer and an answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause.
The facts of the case and equitable considerations constrain us to grant the petition and to set aside the questioned order of the
respondent court.
As stated earlier, the reason for the rule is to enable the adverse party to know beforehand whether he will have to meet the issue of
genuineness or due execution of the document during trial. (In re Dick's Estate, 235 N.W. 401). While mandatory, the rule is a
discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial
justice. The interpretation should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important,
a just determination of the disputed issues.
An interpretation of a rule of procedure which would not deny to the petitioners their rights to their inheritance is warranted by the
circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated July 20, 1981 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court which took over the cases of the respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners' evidence regarding the genuineness
and due execution of the disputed deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17050

May 31, 1961

ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MACONDRAY & CO., INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees,
MANILA PORT SERVICE and/or MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendants-appellants.
Fatcs:
The Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company commenced this suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the Macondray
& Co., Inc. and/or the Manila Port Service (a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company), as alternative defendants, the sum of
P532.86, representing the damage said to have been caused to a cargo of Holy Scriptures shipped from New York City, U.S.A. on
board the "S.S. Leoville" of the Barber steamship Lines, Inc. (of which the defendant Macondray & Co. is the agent in the
Philippines), consigned to the Bible House, Philippines, and unloaded at the Port of Manila by the Manila Port Service between May
29, and June 2 of 1966. The shipment was insured with plaintiff firm, which paid the corresponding loss and then brought this action
in subrogation of the rights and in interests of the consignee.
The parties submitted the case to the lower court for decision solely on the basis of their stipulation of facts, from which it appears
that on or about April 20, 1956, the American Bible Society of New York shipped to Manila 312 cartons and cases of Holy Scriptures,
on board the "S.S. Leoville" of the Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., consigned to the order of the Philippine Agency, Bible House,
Manila; that said shipment was insured by the shipper with the plaintiff; that as shown by good order tally sheets, out of said cargo,
309 cases and cartons were discharged "complete and in good order" at the Port of Manila from May 29 to June 2, 1956, into the
possession and custody of defendant Manila Port Service in its capacity as arrastre contractor; that the remaining three (3) cases
were discharged on June 1, 1956, apparently in bad order, but examination by marine surveyors showed that their contents were in
good order, except that the cover of one copy of Holy Scripture was slightly torn and pressed on the edge and another copy slightly
soiled on the edge; that on June 6, 1956, the consignee requested for the inspection of 162 other cases, whereupon it was revealed
that all were in apparent good condition but with signs of having been wet; that upon subsequent examination requested on June 9,
1956, the surveyors discovered that another five (5) cases and contents showed signs of having been wet with fresh water and
injured. The damage was placed at P532.86. It is likewise admitted that the responsibility of the Manila Port Service over the
damaged goods started on the dates they were respectively unloaded into its custody, i.e., from May 29 to June 2, 1956.
Upon the foregoing admissions, the lower court rendered judgment, ordering defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad
Company to pay the plaintiff the sum of P532.86, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and
absolving defendant Macondray & Co., Inc. from the complaint.
Issue: W/N the appeal has merit.
Ruling:

There is no merit in the appeal. Here and below, the only issue raised revolves around the question as to when the damage arose to
the cases received in good order by appellants; for if it occurred while the goods were still on board the vessel, then the liability
should attach to the carrier; but if the damage happened when said goods were already discharged by and taken into the custody of
the Manila Port Service, then the latter should answer for the loss. Resolving the question solely upon the stipulation of facts of the
parties, there is no alternative but to hold the appellants liable. It was admitted that, except for three cases noted as received in bad
order (and which are not now in question), the entire shipment was received from the carrier by the appellant Port Service "complete
and in good order" (Stip., par. 2 [a]) and not merely in apparent good condition, as it now urges. Later examination of these goods
upon request of the consignee before taking delivery having showed that contents of some of the cases were actually damaged, but
without any showing when such damage occurred, the inference obviously is that it happened while in the appellants' possession,
since the cases in question were received by it in good order with unloaded from the ship. It may be noted that the questioned
shipment was in the possession of the appellants for about ten days, more or less, prior to its delivery to the, consignee. By law, loss
or damage while in the possession of an obligor is presumed due to its fault in the absence of contrary proof (Civil Code, Art. 265). It
was incumbent upon appellant Port Service to rebut this legal presumption, and it bas failed to do so.
The terms of the management contract entered into by and between the Bureau of Customs and the appellants have nothing to do
with this case, because they were not properly presented in the court low and therefore cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.