Montemayor v Araneta university foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48076 February 12, 1980
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID,
MARTIN CELINO, MARCELO C. AMIANA, THOMAS P.G. NEILL and MEMBERS OF
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL, and FELIX MONTEMAYOR, respondents.
Marcelo C. Aniana and Thomas P. G. Neill for petitioners.
Felix Montemayor in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, C.J:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel A. Argel reopening a case motu proprio precisely
intended to give defendants, now petitioners, the opportunity "to ventilate more fully their
defenses" is assailed in this certiorari proceeding. For a fuller understanding of this
litigation, it must be mentioned that in an earlier case, Montemayor v. Araneta
Foundation, 1 private respondent, plaintiff in the action for damages in the sala of respondent
Judge, was unable to obtain a reversal of a decision of the Secretary of Labor finding his
dismissal as professor in Araneta University, now petitioner, justified. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, but he was unsuccessful. In the resolution of this Tribunal denying such
motion, it was specifically pointed out: On the question of the injury to his reputation arising
from the dismissal of his petition for certiorari, it should be made clear that the only issue
before this Court in this proceeding is whether or not the actuation of an administrative official
in the enforcement of the Labor Code could be stigmatized as a denial of due process. The
conclusion reached by this Court after a review. of the records is that it could not be so
considered. That was all that was decided. The decision reached by respondent public official
to grant clearance to private respondent Araneta University Foundation was thus upheld. That
is the import of the decision. In contemplation of law, it is not strictly accurate to state that
there was a finding on the part of this Court that immorality was proven against the petitioner.
All that is signified by the decision sought to be reconsidered is that the procedure followed
resulting in this clearance for his dismissal cannot be characterized as tainted by a denial of
procedural due process. That was the issue before us. That was what was passed upon and
decided. 2
There was no ruling then on the question of whether or not the procedure followed by
petitioner Araneta University Foundation, defendant in that case, and the other
petitioners, members of its Board of Trustees, amounted to a denial of due process and
could thus be the basis of a suit against them. It would follow then that the matter is not
foreclosed as contended by petitioners. The complaint makes that clear. Its first cause of
action reads: "1. Plaintiff [private respondent Felix Montemayor] is the head of the
Humanities and Psychology Department of the Araneta University Foundation, a holder
of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Madrid University, Spain, and has been a
professor for almost thirty (30) years prior to his present designated position, in various
reputable schools and universities; 2. On February 27, 1974, in a meeting of the faculty

members, defendant Fr. Romeo Pelayo ridiculed, embarrassed and besmirched plaintiff's
honor and reputation by uttering the following uncalled for and contumacious phrases, to
wit: 'There is a faculty member of the school of Arts and Sciences who seduces and
pollutes the male students of the Araneta University Foundation; 3. As a result of the
defamatory epithets hurled by Fr. Romeo Pelayo the herein plaintiff filed on March 19,
1974, a case of Grave Oral Defamation against defendant Fr. Romeo Pelayo before the
Provincial Fiscal's Office of Rizal and after preliminary investigation, the corresponding
information was filed against said defendants before the Municipal Court of Malabon,
Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27062 for Grave Oral Defamation 4. On April 17,
1974, defendant Fr. Romeo Pelayo, in order to have leverage and possible defense in
the criminal case, filed with defendant Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., in his capacity as President
of the Araneta University Foundation an administrative case on alleged immorality; 5.
Based on the alleged complaint by defendant Fr. Romeo Pelayo, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr.
appointed a panel of investigators consisting of three (3) persons namely, defendants
Dean Tomas David, as Chairman, Dean Martin Celino, as member, and Atty. Marcelo
Amiana, as member; 6. Plaintiff after a notice of the alleged administrative case, filed a
Bill of Particulars on the alleged charges of Fr. Romeo Pelayo which are too general and
manifested his desire to be represented by counsel as he is not in a position to crossexamine whatever witness that may be presented against him, which requests were all
turned down under the claim that in an administrative case under the charter of the
Araneta University Foundation is not allowed; 7. Instead, the members of the
Investigating Committee, through feelers, emissaries, and the very members of the Board
of Investigators, pressurized plaintiff to withdraw the criminal case against defendant Fr.
Romeo Pelayo as the same will not project a good image of the Araneta University
Foundation, or else, he will lose the administrative case and defendant Fr. Romeo Pelayo
will have a valid defense and will will win the criminal case for Grave Oral Defamation 8.
Plaintiff refused to withdraw the criminal case due to his injured feelings and besmirched
honor and reputation and as a result thereof, the Investigating Committee created by
defendant, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., proceeded and on the basis of affidavits. without
granting plaintiff the right to be assisted by counsel and the right of confrontation,
rendered a recommendation, the dispositve portion of which reads, as follows: After a
careful review of the evidence on hand, the undersigned hereby imposes upon Prof. Felix
Montemayor the penalty of demotion in rank by one (1) degree of four (4) grades with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same act in the future will be the basis of more
severe penalty, which recommendation was edopted as a decision by defendant Dr. Juan
Salcedo, Jr., and affirmed by the members of the Board of Trustees of the Araneta
University Foundation; 9. The decision issued against the defendant is a nullity having
emanated from a kangaroo court and the proceedings are in violation of the due process
clause 10. Defendants particularly Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., and Fr. Romeo Pelayo have an
axe to grind and together with their co-defendants acted in collusion and through concert
of action have rendered knowingly an unjust judgment and are liable under Art. 32 of the
New Civil Code; 11. As a result of the penalty imposed, plaintiff suffered actual damages
by way of reduction of his monthly salary in the amount of [four hundred pesos]
(P400.00) since the month of June, 1974 and will continue to suffer the same amount of
damages unless and until the whole decision which is a mockery of justice and of fair
play has been declared null and void, 12. [Reference is here made to his dismissal and
subsequent administrative proceeding sustaining it, which was unsuccessfully assailed in
the Montemayor v. Secretary of labor decision]. 3 For the other three causes of action, the
same facts were stated but moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and lawyers fees in the sum of P50,000.00 were
sought. 4
As could be expected, the answer disputed the allegation that there was a denial of due
process, asserting that private respondent "was given all the chances and/or
opportunities to have a lawyer to defend himself and as proof of this, his lawyer, Atty. E.B.
Garica filed a Motion with the said investigating panel, xerox copy of said Motion
consisting of six (6) pages is hereto attached as Annex 'A' which forms an integral part of

this Answer; ... 5In the order now assailed, respondent Judge set forth the following basis for
his actuation: "The Court holds that, in order that it could make an in. intelligent finding of its
own, as to the alleged commission of the sexual advances, (immorality) the Court must be
informed as to the surrounding circumstances that would establish the alleged immorality
committed by the plaintiff herein. This is not a case where it could be bound blindly by the
findings of another administrative investigating body, especially there is no transcript of those
proceedings wherein the Court may see for itself, if the defendant confronted his accusers, or
that he was given the opportunity to confront them. 6 Precisely, the order as set forth at the
outset, would give petitioners "a enhance for the defendants to ventilate more fully their
defenses particularly the allegation of immorallity, the justification of plaintiff's dismissal. 7
Without expressly referring to it, the reliance in this certiorari proceeding to show an
alleged grave abuse of discretion is on the doctrine of the law of the case. Thus: "The
Honorable Supreme Court as above-mentioned decided that Montemayor was afforded
the procedural due process of law. ... To the mind of Petitioners, the presentation of the
witnesses against Montemayor in Civil Case No. 3365 is a surplusage. If petitioners were
to present the witnesses in said Civil Case, then they would be under estoppel later on to
invoke the very doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the Montemayor case itself,
that he (Montemayor) was given his day in Court during the administrative investigations
conducted at respondent University. 8
As set forth at the outset, petitioners should have paid greater attention to the explicit
language used in the resolution of this Court in Montemayor v. Secretary of Labor 9 of
December 29, 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration. To reiterate: "All that is signified
by the decision sought to be reconsidered is that the procedure followed resulting in this
clearance for his dismissal cannot be characterized as tainted by a denial of procedural due
process. That was the issue before us. That was what was passed upon and decided. 10 That
is insofar as the Secretary of Labor is concerned.
There was therefore no exculpation of petitioners, the private parties involved. There is
then no legal bar to an action to damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code which clearly
grants the right to damages on the part of the offended party for violation of constitutional
rights. It would be a dimunition of the judicial power vested in a court of justice, if, under
the circumstances, the trial judge were denied the opportunity to hear the evidence that
could have sustained such a claim for damages. That is all that is implied by the order
now challenged. Clearly then, there was no abuse of discretion much less a grave abuse
thereof, that would justify the grant of the writ prayed for. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed issued for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ.,
Aquino, J., concur in the result.

Ateneo v Ca
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56180 October 16, 1986

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ROMEO G. GUANZON and TERESITA
REGALADO, respondents.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Mirano, Mirano & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J.,
Dean of Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline,
College of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the
cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son
of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first
year student of the university with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12,
1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini who I think comes from Bacolod, was
asking for "siopao." I was at the counter and I told him that the "siopao"
had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr.
Guanzon started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing
presence of other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he told me
that was none of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going to
give back his money without any contempt. (sic) He retorted that he did
not like to accept the money. He got madder and started to curse again.
Then he threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then
he actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his
fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I
got hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell
arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I
could not tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I
was hurt.
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the
investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his
parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without
giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent
and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son
causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified
the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to
good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student
to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has
the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to
be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so
indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.

After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay
them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was
initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution
issued by the appellate court, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for
reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to
reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having
become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks us to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five on
the following grounds:
ONE
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WERE NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE
DISCIPLINE CASE AGAINST THEIR SON, JUAN RAMON GUANZON.
TWO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE ERRONEOUSLY
RULED THAT THE RESORT TO JUDICIAL REMEDY BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULE ON FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATION ACTION OR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES.
THREE
THE FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
DIVISION OF FIVE ARE TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, OR ARE CONFLICTING, OR CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
In reversing its own decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the findings of the
Director of Private Schools affirmed by the Minister of Education and the findings of the
lower Court to the effect that due process of law was not observed by the petitioner when
it dismissed the private respondents' son Juan Ramon. The resolution invoked the rule
that findings of facts by administrative officers in matters falling within their competence
will not generally be reviewed by the courts, as well as the principle that findings of facts
of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its split decision are not sustained by the facts
on record.
The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and
administrative tribunals is correct if treated as a general principle. The general principle,
however, is subject to well established exceptions.

We disregard the factual findings of trial courts when-(l) the conclusion is a finding
grounded on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of the parties
or the evidence presented. (Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514; Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734; and Bacayo v. Genato, 135 SCRA 668).
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies.
By reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific
matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, we ordinarily accord respect if not
finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this
rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; where the
procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. (International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117
SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio v.
Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
The Court of Appeals ruled that Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process.
We fail to see what, in the records, made the respondent court reverse its earlier and
correct finding that there was due process.
The original decision, penned by then Associate and now Presiding Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco reviews the facts on record to show that the procedures in the expulsion case
were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate.
The decision states:
First, after the slapping incident which happened on December 12, 1967,
Fr. Welsh in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Discipline upon
receipt of the letter-complaint (Exh. 2) of Carmelita Mateo conducted a
preliminary inquiry by interviewing the companions and friends of Juan
Ramon Guanzon who were also at the cafeteria. They confirmed the
incident in question. (Exhs. 5, 6, 7 and 9).
Second, Fr. Welsh, finding that there was probable cause against Mr.
Guanzon, prepared a memorandum to the members of the Board of
Discipline dated December 16, 1967 (Exh. 8) and delivered a copy each
to Fr. Francisco Perez, Dr. Amada Capawan, Mr. Piccio and Dr. Reyes.
Third, on December 14, 1967, Mr. Guanzon was fully informed of the
accusation against him when Fr. Welsh read the letter-complaint of
Carmelita Mateo and he admitted the truth of the charge. (tsn., pp. 38-39,
May 9, 1970; Exh. 4).
Fourth, Fr. Welsh also sent separate letters to Rev. Antonio Cuna,
Student Counselor of the College of Arts and Sciences dated December
18, 1967 and Rev. James Culligan, Director of Guidance of the College of
Arts and Sciences dated December 18, 1967 seeking any information for
guidance in the action of the Board of Discipline regarding the case of Mr.
Guanzon. (Exhs. 10-11)

Fifth, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline set on December

19, 1967 was posted at the Bulletin Board of the College of Arts and
Sciences and also at Dormitory Halls (tsn., pp. 21-22, July 21, 1970) The
Secretary of the Dean of Discipline personally notified Mr. Guanzon of the
meeting of the Board on December 19, 1967, he was told to seek the
help of his guardians, parents and friends including the student
counsellors in the residence halls and College of Arts and Sciences. (tsn.,
p. 18, July 21, 1970)
Sixth, despite notice of the Board of Discipline on December 19, 1967,
Mr. Guanzon did not care to inform his parents or guardian knowing fully
well the seriousness of the offense he had committed and instead he
spoke for himself and admitted to have slapped Carmelita Mateo. He then
asked that he be excused as he wanted to catch the boat for Bacolod City
for the Christmas vacation.
Seventh, the decision of the Board of Discipline was unanimous in
dropping from the rolls of students Mr. Guanzon (Exh. 12) which was
elevated to the office of the Dean of Arts and Sciences, Rev. Joseph A.
Galdon, who after a review of the case found no ground to reverse the
decision of the Board of Discipline. (Exh. 13) The case was finally
elevated to the President of the Ateneo University who sustained the
decision of the Board of Discipline (Exh. 21-A, p. 6) A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the President of the Student Council in behalf
of Mr. Guanzon (Exh. 15) but the same was denied by the President of
the University.
Eighth, when the decision of the Board of Discipline was about to be
carried out, Mr. Guanzon voluntarily applied for honorable dismissal. He
went around to the officials of the university to obtain his clearance and
this was approved on January 8, 1968. (Exh. 3, tsn., p. 58, May 6, 1970)
Ninth, Mr. Romeo Guanzon, father of Juan Ramon Guanzon arranged for
full and complete refund of his tuition fee for the entire second semester
of the school year 1967-68. Juan Ramon was never out of school. He
was admitted at the De la Salle College of Bacolod City and later
transferred to another Jesuit School.
From the above proceedings that transpired it can not be said that Juan
Ramon Guanzon was denied due proems of law. On the contrary, we find
that he was given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully informed of
the charge against him and to be confronted of the witnesses face to
face. And since he chose to remain silent and did not bother to inform his
parents or guardian about the disciplinary action taken against him by the
defendant university, neither he nor his parents should find reason to
complain.
xxx xxx xxx
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the
waitress and his slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh did not stop with the admission. He
interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan
Ramon who were present during the incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty-Fr.
Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry

professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College.
There is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality
insofar as this disciplinary investigation is concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping
incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan
Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present
his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of
administrative due process were met.
We do not share the appellate court's view that there was no due process because the
private respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the
proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with
Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of the incident. He was fully
cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the
December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and
assistance from his guardian and/or parents.
In the natural course of things, Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious
matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them
about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation,
was not the fault of the petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university,
as stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident.
Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence
presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
While it may be true that Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened
to her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard
box top, this did not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly
shows that the altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language
"bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal on
the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of
Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the
investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo
prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at Juan Ramon. The
incident was in public thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was
"unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the
university, specifically under the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic
regulations (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from the college.
The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid
ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245).
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and
Sciences Handbook containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969
catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and
academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo
Halls of the petitioner university one of the provisions of which is as follows: under the
title "Dining Room"-"The kitchen help and server should always be treated with civility."

Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely because of her service to
boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate
court's ruling on due process.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its
pending appeal from the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the
Philippines. It argues that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages
filed in the lower court was premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover
damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a
purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be done.
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA
553; Limoico v. Board of Administrators, (PVA), 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v. Ramonte,
129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided in the
Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.
There was no need to await action from Malacaang.
This brings us to the final issue which is whether or not the private respondents are
entitled to damages. There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was
afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations
applicable to all students guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before
the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which
was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City and later
transferred to another Jesuit school Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the
second semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo Guanzon,
Juan Ramon's father.
It is unfortunate of the parents suffered some embarrassment because of the incident.
However, their predicament arose from the misconduct of their own son who, in the
exuberance of youth and unfortunate loss of self control, did something which he must
have, later, regretted. There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the
college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive decision had been
rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary process was set up to protect the
privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no indication ot malice,. fraud, and
improper or willful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appellate court's resolution
dated January 26, 1981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellate court's decision
dated March 15, 1979 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Alampay, J., took no part.

Alcuaz v PSBA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No.76353 September 29,1989
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS,
MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHEILA
DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO,
ZENNY GUDITO, EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA, GABRIEL MONDRAGON,
JOSE MARIA PACKING, DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO
RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO, CAROLINA SARMIENTO, FERDINAND TORRES,
RICARDO VENTIGAN and other students of the PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) similarly situated,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch
(PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board
of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, in his capacity as VicePresident for Admission and Registration, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, in his capacity
as Officer-in-Charge, MR. RAMON AGAPAY, in his capacity as Director of the Office
of Student Affairs and MR. ROMEO RAFER, in his capacity as Chief Security of
PSBA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision in the instant
case which prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to file a
motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on the pronouncement that
x x x. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts"
required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that
after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with intervening teachers.
Such being the case, charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is
time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between
the contracting parties. x x x (p. 12, Decision, italics supplied).(p. 874875, Rollo)
with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious practice of
management to arbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply because their
contracts of employment have already lapsed.
The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members, namely Mr. Asser
(Bong) Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the Investigating
Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M. Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued
permanent appointments (not mere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of
the School himself. The appointment of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986
(p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim.
It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous statements on the
matter.

In a recent Decision, 1 this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically enunciate the
precept that full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory service shall
be considered permanent (par. 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus,
having attained a permanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause
and after due process.
Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo having
stayed in the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA,
for brevity) for three and one-half (3 1/2) years (in a full-time capacity) may be deemed a
permanent faculty member provided, of course, the services rendered have been
satisfactory to the school. However, because the investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo
had participated in the unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed
satisfactory.
In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA
for two and one-half (2 1/2) years and one and one-half (1 1/2) years respectively, to
them a permanent status cannot be accorded for failure to meet the minimum
requirement of three (3) years set by the aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of
equal importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter of appointment had been
extended only to Mr. Tamayo and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for reconsideration,
except insofar as We have made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the
tenure of full-time teachers and professors, is hereby DENIED.
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete
their education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their
right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a
part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies,
demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without
resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands
the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into
degenerate license.
SO ORDERED.
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., Except for the general statement that students' enrollment is limited
to per semester, I concur.
Regalado, J., took no part.
Cortes, J., Concurring and dissenting in a separate opinion.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, JJ., Join in Mme. Justice Cortes' concurring and
dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Like Mr. Justice Sarmiento, I am also disturbed by the ruling of the majority sustaining the
disciplinary action taken against the students for what, I consider a valid exercise of their
freedom of expression. The circumstance that the demonstrations were attended by
some disorder is not in my view sufficient justification for the curtailment of their right,
much less for their punishment. And I do not agree either that the sanctions may be
sustained because some of the students were academically deficient, for the truth is that
they were denied re-enrollment not because of such deficiency but because of the
demonstrations. Surely, freedom of expression is not only for the intelligent.
I also have my misgivings about the ruling of the Court that a student's enrollment is from
semester to semester and may be terminated at will by the school after each period. I
submit that when a student is enrolled for a particular course, the implicit understanding
is that he is entitled to remain in the school until he graduates, subject only to the usual
academic, financial and other reasonable requirements.

For these reasons, I must also dissent.

Non v Dames
G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE
DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA,
SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and
DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional
Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC.,
represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of
Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners
Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down
in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353,
May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the
school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused
readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the
school is deemed terminated.
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding
semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to
the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in
the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this case but the
authority of the school regarding admission of students, save as a matter
of compassionate equity when any of the petitioners would, at the
least, qualify for re-enrollment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February
24, 1989 in this wise:
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas
S.J., and that really there must be a better way of treating students and
teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme Court,
the Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.
But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353, May
2, 1988; that of the termination at the end of the semester, reason for the
critical comments of Joaquin G. Bernas and Doods Santos, who both do
not agree with the ruling.
Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their
failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses that "they
were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16,
and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were
represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the
date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued
their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically
coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right
to be present in their classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester
of school year 1988-89. Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission
of students whose scholarship and attendance are
unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students
whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required
to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which
among others uniformly reads:

In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College

and of my privileges as student of this institution, I hereby
pledge/ promise under oath to abide and comply with all
the rules and regulations laid down by competent
authorities in the College Department or School in which I
am enrolled. Specifically:
xxx xxx xxx
3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College, which
I represent and see to it that I conduct myself in such a
manner that the college wig not be put to a bad light;
xxx xxx xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement
which tend to cause confusion or disrupt the normal
appreciation of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for
mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a mere privilege and not
a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in
view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with
the Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission
Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and Tangonon
vs. Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of
merit, the motion for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated
August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo pp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the Court, which resolved on
April 10, 1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition. The Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition and
set the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing.
After considering the comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court of
Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify the case back to the Supreme Court
considering that only pure questions of law were raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the
Court en banc on August 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional.
On September 14, 1989, the Court en bancaccepted the case and required respondents
to comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to
reply. As reply, they filed a pleading entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents
filed a rejoinder entitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To this petitioners filed a "Rejoinder
to Reply."

The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt
from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written
contracts" required for college teachers are for "one semester." It is thus
evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer
has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is
untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no more
contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into
another contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the
original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts
for the parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).
[At 161 SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students,
who were barred from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades,
but it added that "in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the
absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when
this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time." [At 161
SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers in Alcuaz. The students
did not move for reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had been
transferred, denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29,
1989, but added as an obiter dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of
students to complete their education in the school or university of their
choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their
freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies,
demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully,
and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic
freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold
otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.
The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of contract" doctrine
enunciated in the decision provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7)
members of the Court * disagreed with the Second Division's dismissal of the students
petition, a definitive ruling on the issue could not have been made because no timely
motion for reconsideration was filed by the students. (As stated above, the motion for
reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar as it
allowed schools to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of

termination of contract, shall be made in this case where the issue is squarely raised by
petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of
a school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the
fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented
by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school.
Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in
student protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next semester. This is
a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-avis the right of school officials to discipline them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order
dated August 8, 1988;Rollo, pp. 1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict
between students' rights and the school's power to discipline them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to
education, and there is such denial when students are expelled or barred
from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and
peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without
abiding with the requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable
for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic
language against school authorities during a student rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . [Order of
February 24, 1989; Rollo, p. 13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of
the rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in
the 1973 Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended
[Art. III, sec. 81, the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the
Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court inPeople
v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right to speech and assembly to overturn a conviction
for sedition. It said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
attain by force or outside of legal methods any of the
following objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or
municipal government or any public official, from freely
exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any
judicial or administrative order.

But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of

speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances" guaranteed by the express
provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine Bill."
xxx xxx xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense
the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a
delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous
occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who
took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercise in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the
leading case of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359,
the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en bancdecision, declared:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.
They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the
freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do
not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While therefore, the
authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass
actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University. They sought and were granted
by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science (VMAS) the place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated but at the respond floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their

opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with

the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched
toward the Life Science building and continued their rally. It was outside
the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration,
giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities
and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic
employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the
noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they
should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on
September 9, 1982, they were informed through a memorandum that they
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding
of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamuswith damages against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National
Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated
par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their
holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of
the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. . . . [At
pp. 363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a oneweek suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc
decisions of the Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135
SCRA 706, the Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be
a basis for barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from
acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court
allowed the non-enrollment of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency,
with the following caveat:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher learning"
includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what
circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it
has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It
cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise
their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it
does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
[At p. 711.]
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985,
137 SCRA 94, a case arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the
Court rejected "the infliction of the highly- disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment
and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the
cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be
attributed to them. [At p. 98].

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699,
respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise
continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings
that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests that led to the
stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless
to discipline students. This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it
echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 514: "But conduct
by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time,
place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech."
Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for
the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms
of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in
the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the (VMAS)
building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the
period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the
"concerted activity [referring to such assembly went on until 5:30 p.m."
Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At pp. 370371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As
stated in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed
and sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes." [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have
escalated not only because of political events that unfurled but also because of the
constantly raging controversy over increases in tuition fees. But the over-eager hands of
some school authorities were not effectively tied down by the ruling inMalabanan. Instead
of suspending or expelling student leaders who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a
new variation of the same stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the students

readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, their alleged misconduct of

"illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass actions directed against the
school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority
given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a
school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate
courses," which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one
semester, has already expired.
The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph
137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to
protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e.
collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before
examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was
enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his
tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer. This is
the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees,
which in its totality provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses,
and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers
or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of
classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school
fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be
charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws
within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second
week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended
classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he
withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the
transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be
charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of
attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be
enrolled for only one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is
dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual
recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is
expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university
upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable
regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified
for enrolment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course
without prejudice to his right to transfer.

This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the
"Education Act of 1982." Section 9 of this act provides:
Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and
subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and
pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up
to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or
violation of disciplinary regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion, he
cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan
v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized
the institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a
female lay student has a clear legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to
admit her for theological studies leading to a degree. InTangonan, the issue was whether
a nursing student, who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing
subjects, may compel her school to readmit her for enrollment.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that
the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized
to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and
assembly, for otherwise there win be a violation of their right to equal protection [At p.
711]
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent
cases of Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13,
1989, and Licup v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both
decided by the First Division of the Court.
We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues
in the present case.
In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close
down the school because of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the
school and its faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no clear legal right to
demand the reopening of the school.

On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were
afforded procedural due process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus,
the Court stated:
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that
they were deprived of due process of law and that the investigation
conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appear
from the record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately
established in an appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and
partiality is not supported by the record. . . .
Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract" theory in Alcuaz,
impliedly rejected it, to wit:
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their
education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue
its academic freedom and in the process has the concommitant right to
see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails
to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual
right; and the court should not review the discretion of university
authorities. (Emphasis supplied.)
7. The Instant Case.
To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989,
quoting from their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners
eight (8) have incurred failing grades, to wit:
a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause
the submission of Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to his re- enrollment
and to his continuing as a student of Mabini;
b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has
incomplete grades in four (4) subjects as well as no grades in two (2)
subjects;
c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete
grades;
d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take
CMT 1 1 to 22. He is already enrolled at Ago Foundation;
e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;
f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the
incomplete grade in one (1) subject;

h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete
grades in five (5) more objects and has no grade in one (1) subject.
[Rollo, p. 79.]
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)
b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non- readmission.
(The Answer indicates only 8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)
c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
d) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the
cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a
February 1988 student rally. (The crux of the matter, as shown even in the
Answer.)
e) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for
disciplinary action. (In effect, admitted in the Answer;
even Alcuaz required due process.)
f) Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies a clear case of
discrimination against petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An
equal protection question.)
g) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of
residence which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which
they have already lost one-and-a-half school-years in itself punishment
enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano,
Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused
re-enrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in
the manner expressed inGuzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it
would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because
of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the
school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which
were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to
possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a
violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two
failures, namely, Rex Magana, Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly,
their failures cannot be considered marked academic deficiency within the context of the
Court's decision in Villar.

Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito
Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents'
enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only one semester or through the
course of several semesters of study in the school. Neither are the academic standards
of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not these students are
academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to
set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondent school's action as to
petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago
Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in
respondent school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been
taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with
the Court's ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary
proceedings in connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that
could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set
forth inGuzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due
process have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed
upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules
and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions
have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or
re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four
(4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions
that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent
school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of
Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August
8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is
ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so
minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non,
Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records
(Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

PASEI v Drilon

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS
D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it
is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in
violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor
and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines,"
the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to
govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For
all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the
expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import
a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives
for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the

Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is
not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary
yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot,
however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence
to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the
Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their
part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it
is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question
its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the
Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically
given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at
bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length
shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the
Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality,
the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment
ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with
a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for

unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons
within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to
workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal
protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law
that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property
rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says:
"Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize
its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for
favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their
status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory
legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of
denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection
to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has
hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers
and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are
authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads
of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other
senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and
duly accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR
SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if
they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to
serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the
provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries
where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the

Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards
to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right.
The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"
"as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the
Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The
petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel,
but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid
qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature,
but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The
right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns
the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just,
and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have
adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case,
the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the
lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an
indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to
the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise,
like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez
faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business
of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain
profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a

result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to
its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent.
We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to
warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

Rutter v Esteban
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3708

May 18, 1953

ROYAL L. RUTTER, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN, defendant-appellee.
Susano A. Velasquez for appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J.Esteban two parcels of land
situated in the city of Manila for the sum of P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright,
and the balance of P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7,
1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per
annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same parcels
of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been
registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage duly
annotated on the back thereof.
Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the
interest that had accrued there-on, and so on August 2, 1949, Royal L. Rutter instituted
this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance due, the interest
due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint also
contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law.
Placido J. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up a defense the
moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar
obligation contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim
with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a

consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342,
payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years from the
settlement of his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and this period has
not yet expired.
After a motion for summary judgment has been presented by the defendant, and the
requisite evidence submitted covering the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not
yet demandable under the moratorium law. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration
wherein he raised for the first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the
motion was denied. Hence this appeal.
The only question to be determined hinges on the validity of Republic Act No. 342 which
was approved by Congress on July 26, 1948. It is claimed that this act if declared
applicable to the present case is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairement of the obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1,
Constitution of the Philippines).
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or
any subsequent aggreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall not due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of
the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; and
section 3 of said Act provides that should the provision of section 2 be declared void and
unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the provisions of
Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by Executive Order No.
32, dated March 10, 1945, relative to debt moratorium, shall continue to be in force and
effect, any contract affecting the same to the contrary notwithstanding, until subsequently
repealed or amended by a legislative enactment. It thus clearly appears in said Act that
the nullification of its provisions will have the effect of reviving the previous moratorium
orders issued by the President of the Philippines.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of
recent enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western
civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices
generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its
essence is the application of the sovereign power" (58 C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote 87). In
the United States, may state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during times of
financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war" (41 C.J., p.213).
Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war
suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable time, . . . whether they
suspend the right of action or make dilatory the remedy" (12 C.J., p 1078). The laws were
declared constitutional. However, some courts have also declared that "such statutes are
void as to contracts made before their passage where the suspension of remedied
prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable in duration" (12C.J., 1078). The true test,
therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the determination of the
period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the fact that
it impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This
argument, however does not now hold water. While this may be conceded, it is however
justified as a valid exercise by the State of its police power. The leading case on the
matter is Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U. S., 398, decide by the
Supreme Court of the United States on January 8, 1934. Here appellant contested the

validity of charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota of 1993, approved April 13, 1933, called
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of Minnesota
as an emergency measure. "Although coceding that the obligations of the mortgage
contract was impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment
was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police
power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic
emergency which the legislative had found to exist". This theory was up-held by the
Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the following
pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which
the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter
that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect." . . . . Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairement presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional
prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive
recognition in the decision of this Court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner

otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the
performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious
practices. . . .
. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
end.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed to destroy the limitation to be construed so as to destroy the reserved
power in its essential aspects. They must be construed to harmony with each
other. This principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to
adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the
denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow that conditions may not
arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within
the range of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the
community. It cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be
so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to

the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by great public calamity such as

fire, flood, or earthquake. See American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 55 L.
ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200. The reservation of state power appropriate to such
extraordinary conditions may be deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as
is the reservation of state power to protect the public interest in the other situation
to which we have referred. And if state power exists to give temporary relief from
the enforcement of contracts in the present of disasters due to physical causes
such as fire, flood or earthquake, that power cannot be said to be nonexistent
when the urgent public need demanding such relief is produced by other and
economic causes (78 L.ed. 426, 428-429.)
This decision elicited several comments. One came from the Harvard Law Review. It
said: "Forsaking its well-trodden of the new mortgage moratory laws meet its scrutiny,
and in so doing announced an elastic concept of the contract clause which, if not newly
formulated, at least received such unequivocal expression that it bids fair to revolutionize
a tradition of constitutional interpretation. . . . The court rested its decision on the ground
that laws altering existing contracts constitute an impairment within the meaning of the
contract clause only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment. Application of this 'rule of reason was justified on the theory
that all contracts are made subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of
the state, and that therefore statutes which validly exercise this reserved power, rather
than impairing the obligations of an existing contract, are comprehended within them" (47
Harvard Law Review, pp. 660, 661-662).
But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in
the determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach
upon the enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted that the application of
the reserved power of the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security
of the people should be limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a
legitimate purpose. If these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of
the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would
assert itself. We can cite instances by which these bounds may be transgressed. One of
them is that the impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right.
The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by
making the remedy futile (W.B. Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L.ed. 1298, 1301-1303).
Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the
alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing contract must
not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly
pursuing (Bronson vs. Kinziel, I How, 311, 317; 46 Har. Law Review, p. 1070). In other
words, the Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the police
power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can
only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the
constitutional provision against impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of
Lincoln vs. Smith 277 N.W., pp. 762, 769). As justice Cardozo aptly said, "A different
situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a
shadow . . . The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in
combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are
seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that
give attractiveness and value to collateral security (W.B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295
U.S. 56, 62). In fine, the decision in the Blaisdell case is predicated on the ground that
the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of
the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act
No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war

and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their
losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said
obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law
is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonabled time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized buy their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation
conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have
suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the
debt moratorium should be continued in force (section 1).
But we should not lost sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and
would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain languaged
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before
they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. while the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent
when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation
of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States (Home Building and Loan
Association vs. Blaisdell, supra).
There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court of the United States declared
the moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the constitution because the
period granted to debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated
emergency. One of them is W. B. Worthen Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435; 78 L.
ed., 1344, 1347. Here the Legislature of Arkansas passed na act providing for an
exemption, "without limitation as to amount or restriction with respect to particular
circumstances or relations, of all moneys paid or payable to any resident of the state
under any life, sick, accident or disability insurance policy, from liability for the payment of
the debts of the recipient", and an attempt was made to apply the statute to debts owing
before its approval. The court held that "such an exemption, applied in the case of debts
owing before the exemption was created by the legislature, constitutes an unwarranted
interference with the obligation of contracts in violation of the constitutional provision",
and cannot be sustained even as emergency legislation, because it contains no limitation
as to time, amount, circumstances or need (supra, 292 U. S., pp. 426-432).
The other case is W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh (supra). Here certain Municipal
Improvement Districts organized under the laws of Arkansas were empowered to issue
bonds and to mortgage benefit assessments as security therefor. One of these districts
acted upon the powers thus conferred. Some of the bonds were in default for
nonpayment of principal and interest. So an action was brought by the bond-holders to
foreclose the assessment upon the lots of delinquent owners. These bonds and
mortgages were executed under the statutes then in force. Later the legislature of
Arkansas passed three acts making changes in the remedies available under the former
statutes, which changes were attacked as an unconstitutional impairment of contracts.
The court sustained this view holding that the "changes in the remedies available for the
enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when the public welfare is invoked as an
excuse, be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation

or reason or in a spirit of oppression. . . . A State is free to regulate the procedure in its

courts even with reference to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the
time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reversed; by a different
situation is presented when extensions are so piled up to make the remedy a shadow."
The third case is Louisville joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed
1593. This case presented for decision the question whether subsection (s) added to
section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act by the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48
Stat. at L. 1289 U. S. C. title 11, sec. 203, is consistent with the Federal Constitution. The
court said that it is unconstitutional if applied to farm mortgages already existing, holding
that "property rights of holders of farm mortgages are unconstitutionally taken, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, by a statute (Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75(s) Frazier-Lemke Act of
June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at L. 1286) applicable only to debts existing at the
time of its enactment which provides that a farmer whose farm is mortgaged, and who
has failed to obtain the consents necessary to a composition under the Bankruptcy Act,
may, upon being adjudged a bankrupt, if the mortgagee assents, purchase the
mortgaged property at its them appraised value by agreeing to make deferred payments
of stated percentages of the appraised value over a period of six years, with interests at 1
per cent per annum, or, if the mortgagee refuses his assent to such purchase, may
obtain a stay of all proceedings for a period of five years, during which he shall retain
possession of all or any part of his property, under the control of the court, provided he
pays a reasonable rental therefor, and that at the end of five years he may pay into court
the appraised price thereof, or, if a lien holder shall request a reappraisal by the court, the
reappraised price, whereupon the court shall, by an order, turn over full possession and
title of the property to the debtor, and he may apply for his discharge."
In addition, we may cite leading state court decisions which practically involved the same
ruling and which reflect the tendency of the courts towards legislation involving
modification of mortgage or monetary contracts which contains provisions that are
deemed unreasonable or oppressive. Some of those which may be deemed
representative follows:
1. Pouquette vs. O'Brien, 100 Pac. 2nd series, 979 (1940). The Supreme Court of
Arizona held unconstitutional a 1937 statute authorizing courts to extend for a period of
not longer than two years all actions or foreclosures of real estate mortgages, and a 1939
statutes authorizing the courts to extend foreclosure proceedings not later than March 4,
1941.
2. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph Arp et al., 283 N.W. 441, 120
A.L.R. 932 (1939). The Supreme Court of Iowa declared unconstitutional the Moratorium
Acts enacted in 1933, 1935 and 1937, providing for extension of the 1933 Moratorium Act
covering a period of six years.
3. First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith et al., 227 N.W. 762 (1938). The Supreme Court of
Nebraska declared unconstitutional the Nebraska Moratorium Law as reenacted,
extending the benefit of the remedy to a period of six years, as being repugnant to the
contract clause of the Constitution.
4. Milkint vs. McNeely, Clerk of court, et al., 169 S.E. 790 (1933). The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia declared unconstitutional certain acts of legislature enacted in
1932, extending the period of redemption three years beyond the one-year period then
allowed by statute, being an impairment of contract as to sales made prior to enactment
thereof.
5. Haynes vs. Treadway, 65 Pac. 892 (1901). The Supreme Court of California declared
unconstitutional a statute which extends the right of redemption from six months twelve

months being a substantial impairment of the obligation contracts if applied to a mortgage

already executed.
6. Swinburne vs. Mills, 50 Pac. 489 (1879). The Supreme Court of Washington declared
a statute unconstitutional in so far as it provides that, on a decree for foreclosure of a
mortgage executed before the act was passed, the debtor shall be entitled to have the
order of sale stayed for one year, as being an impairment of the obligation of contract.
These cases apply with added force in this jurisdiction considering the conditions no
prevailing in our country. We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can
see it and feel it as we gaze around to observe the wave of reconstruction and
rehabilitation that has swept the country since liberation thanks to the aid of America and
the innate progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit have worked wonders
in so short a time that it can now be safely stated that in the main the financial condition
of our country and our people, individually and collectively, has practically returned to
normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by local dissidence and the sporadic
disturbance of peace and order in our midst. Business, industry and agriculture have
picked up and developed at such stride that we can say that we are now well on the road
to recovery and progress. This is so not only as far as our observation and knowledge
are capable to take note and comprehend but also because of the official
pronouncements made by our Chief Executive in public addresses and in several
messages he submitted to Congress on the general state of the nation. To bear this out,
it would suffice for us to state some of those public statements which we deem to be
most expressive and representative of the general situation. We quote:
We have balanced our national budget. We shall again have at the end of the
current fiscal year a sizeable surplus. . . .
We have greatly improved the economic and financial conditions of the country.
Through the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, loans amounting to P90,480,136
have been granted for the recontruction and rehabilitation purposes. . . .
We have set up the Central bank to expand our credit, stabilize our currency and
provide a new source of financing for the agricultural and industrial development
of the nation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The commitment thus far made is not only a favorable sign ushering in finally
the implementation of our plans of economic development, but a significantly
successful test of the solvency of our foreign credit, for it was accepted only after
a thorough examination of our resources and development plans by a board of
economists of international authority (Pres. Quirino's "State-of-the-Nation"
Message of the Joint Session of Congress on Jan. 24, 1949, 45 Off. Gaz., Ja.,
1949).
We have strengthened, . . . our internal and external finances. Six years ago, we
were a country prostrate from the destruction of war. . . . today, we can say that
our people not only have returned to their prewar activities, but . . . have
progressed and prospered far beyond what they ever dreamed of before the war.
. . . Three years ago the national income stood at four billion pesos; today it is
over seven billion pesos. . . . The government income has been steadily rising
from 60 million pesos in 1946 to approximately 600 million pesos today, also a
progress in six years.

xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The ravages of war are fast disappearing, and instead, what beautiful vistas
unfold themselves before our eyes at this moment in our immediate
surroundings. Compare this beautiful view with that of the past and all that we
have accomplished in scarcely six years of struggle, sacrifice, determination, and
bold decision. (Applause.) We have brought this nation out of the paralysis of
destruction into economic normalcy and financial stability. . . .
. . . Our external finances have greatly improved, and . . . our pesos is one of the
most stable currencies in the world today. (Applause.) I repeat, our pesos is one
of the most stable currencies in the world today.
All these find grateful reflection in a better-sheltered, better-clothed, better-fed,
and healthier population that has grown from 18 million to 20 million in a half
dozen years, in a school enrollment that has doubled since the outbreak of the
last war from less than 2 million to over 4 million young students in the public
schools, and in democratic processes that are gaining in vigor and permanence
with each passing year" (Address of his Excellency Quirino, President of the
Philippines, on the occasion of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the
independence of the Philippines, July 4, 1952, Luneta, Manila, 48 Off. Gaz., pp.
3287-3289).
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as
the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way
open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation
and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
should be declared null and void and without effect. And what we say here with respect to
said Act also holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with
greater force and reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no
limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and
effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is need to make this pronouncement in view
of the revival clause embodied in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or
invalid.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from will be reversed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P4,800 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent annum from August 27, 1942, until
its full payment, plus 12 per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay this judgment as
stated, the properties mortgaged will be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied
to its payment in accordance with law. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Pablo, J., concurs with the dispositive part.

People v Marti
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section
21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for
the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect
the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to
his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no
longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x
2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages
before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready
for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of
the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn,
pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the

Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the
NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by
Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana
leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the
said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE
THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure
and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues
that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article
III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill
v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by
virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling
earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2],
Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with
the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37
SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon.
Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or
other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may
an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien,
from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . .
. (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court
there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was
not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling
and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking
attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the
search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892
(1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938
(1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there
said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a

private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight
and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it,
he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require
exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted
in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both
instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that
NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp.
119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business.
Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified
without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State
of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and
where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and
seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in

his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed,
as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the
essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles
of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced
in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search
warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985]
and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner
as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is
directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill
of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through
private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental
as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while
under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the
case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being
no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by
Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the
accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the
accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written
statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof
by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court
and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under
custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second
assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe
that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila:
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the
packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German
national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated.
An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a
man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose
and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first
ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the
cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages
and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo,
p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of
the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in
the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland
(TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA
651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full
name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the
assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Wilson v Layne
FOURTH AMENDMENT - UNREASONABLE SEARCH
Case: Wilson v. Layne
Issue: Does the State violate the Fourth Amendment by allowing media representatives to
accompany police officers during the execution of search and arrest warrants in private
homes?
Facts: Armed Deputy United States Marshals and Montgomery County Police Officers in
possession of arrest warrants entered a private dwelling in order to effectuate the arrest of
suspect Dominic Wilson. As part of a media ride-along program, a Washington Post
photographer and reporter were present in the home. Unbeknownst to the officers, the home
was that of the suspect's parents, and the suspect was not present. The attempted arrest was
conducted in the early morning hours. The suspect's parents (petitioners) were roused from
bed in their nightclothes. The suspect's father was physically restrained. The officers departed
when they realized they had the wrong home. Petitioners sued the officers under Bivens and
42 U.S.C. 1983. The District Court denied respondents' motion for summary judgment
which was based on a claim of qualified immunity. An interlocutory appeal was taken to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the en banc court ultimately
upheld the defense of qualified immunity, refusing to reach the Fourth Amendment issue.
Holding: It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officers to bring
members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of the third parties in the home is not in aid of the execution of the
warrant. Since this Fourth Amendment violation was not clearly established in 1992, the
officers who executed the warrant were entitled to qualified immunity.
Reasoning: Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court on the Fourth Amendment
issue, based his decision on the primacy of common law and Fourth Amendment respect for
the privacy of the home. "In 1604, an English court made the now famous observation that
'the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his defense against
injury and violence as for his repose.' . . . William Blackstone noted that 'the law of England
has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his
castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.' . . . The Fourth Amendment
embodies this centuries-old principal of respect for the privacy of the home." Rehnquist noted
that the officers had an arrest warrant and "were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson
home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson." It was important to the
Court that the presence of reporters was not related to the "objectives of the authorized
intrusion." The reporters did not aid in the execution of the warrant or assist the law
enforcement officers in any way. The media presence had nothing to do with the arrest of
Dominic Wilson, which was the sole reason the police were in the house. The Court was
careful to note that where third parties can aid in the execution of a warrant, their presence
inside the home does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. It gave as an example the
case of someone who officers need in order to identify property to be seized. The Court
rejected a number of justifications for the policy of allowing the media to accompany officers
in the execution of warrants, most of which were based on alleged benefits to the public and
the public's right to know. To the Court, these claims ignored "the importance of the right of
residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment." Rehnquist noted in footnote two
that the presence of the media constituted the Fourth Amendment violation, not the presence
of the officers who were rightfully in the home. "We have no occasion here to decide whether
the exclusionary rule would apply to any evidence discovered or developed by the media
representatives." This suggests that had the police themselves discovered evidence of a crime
and charged the suspect's parents, no challenge to admissibility of the evidence would have
lied.
Other Opinions: Justice Stevens dissented from the portion of the Court's opinion holding
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." He argued, inter alia, that every federal appellate judge who had considered the
question of media presence at searches had found a Fourth Amendment violation.
Comment: It is important to remember that the Court's holding applies not only to the
media, but also to any third parties whose presence does not aid in execution of the warrant.

Burgos v Chief of Staff

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS
MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.
Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief
Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates,
substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos,
Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition.
The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June
28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use

the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution
of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation,
the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners
had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search
warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of
the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the
court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to
mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In
the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable
stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7,
1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after
the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of
the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at
first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years
had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter
of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the
printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope
that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come
to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We
find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that

they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting
the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he
is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow
the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has
used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of
the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the abovequoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed
been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct
places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of
Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search
warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly
keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which
states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended
and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places
sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col.
Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent
than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied
for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place
that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and
when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in
the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit
in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his copetitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may
be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him.
In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that
may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and
seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to
be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles
and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under
the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
"machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are
considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal
provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the
filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not

have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant
may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used
as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or
his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment
in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez
case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"

and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP
665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427
with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets,
cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence
in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press,
when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the
policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the
voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground
that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted
authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by
the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly
be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no
less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to
sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum

offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and
all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion
of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983,
Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities
and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

People v Molina

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129051. July 28, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO

MOLINA y FLORES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The present case is one for murder brought before us on automatic review, the
capital punishment of death having been imposed by the trial court. Accusedappellant, Romeo Molina, was indicted for the crime of murder allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1995 at barangay D Alarcio,

municipality of Laoac, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit and stab
DOMINGO FLORES with the use of a stone and knife, inflicting to said
victim the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Contusion + lacerated wound 0.5 cm. over the left eyebrow
- Contusion + lacerated wound V-shape over the right parieto temporal area
- Contusion + lacerated wound over the occipital area
- Deep lacerated wound 2 cm. over the ant. neck area
- (+) Subcuteous emphysema base cervinal area
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Depressed Fracture over the occipital bone with minimal bleeding
- Linear fracture over the right parieto tempral bone
which injuries being mortal caused the death of said Domingo Flores to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code. [1]
On arraignment, accused-appellant with the assistance of counsel entered a plea
of not guilty and after trial, Judge Joven F. Costales of Branch 45 Regional Trial Court
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered the decision[2] now under review, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
ROMEO MOLINA y Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise
known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been committed with
the attendant aggravating circumstance of dwelling and hereby sentences
him with the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be executed pursuant to
Repbulic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law and to pay the
heirs of the victim DOMINGO FLORES in the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.

Finally, it is said:
Dura lex, sed lex, translated as The law is harsh, but that is the law!
SO ORDERED.[3]
The facts, as culled from the evidence of the prosecution are as follows:
On July 14, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Domingo Flores was
asleep in his house in DAlarcio, Laoac, Pangasinan. His daughter, Melanie, who was
then listening to the radio, was the only one in the household still awake at that
time. Hearing a sound, she saw accused-appellant, her fathers cousin, barging in
through the kitchen door and going straight to her fathers room. She peeped through
a curtain and saw accused-appellant hitting her sleeping father on the head with a
stone the size of a fist and afterwards stabbing him in the neck and eyebrow with a
knife. She was able to recognize her uncle as her fathers assailant because there was
a lamp near her fathers head at the time of the attack. Afraid that she too would be
harmed, Melanie did not immediately come to her fathers aid and instead watched as
accused-appellant made good his escape. It was only after Molina had left that she
hastened to call her grandfather, Eufrosinio Flores, who lived nearby.[4] Responding to
Melanies cries, Eufrosinio found his son on the bed soaked in his own blood. As
Eufrosinio lifted his son onto his lap, Domingo, fatally wounded and bleeding, told
his father that it was his insan Romy who stabbed him. Hours later, Domingo died
from his injuries while being transferred to another hospital. [5] Post-mortem findings
revealed that the cause of his death was severe intracranial bleeding secondary to
skull fracture and blood loss due to a stab wound on the neck.[6]
On his part, Molina interposed the defense of alibi to exculpate himself from
liability. According to him, on July 14, 1995, he left his house in Cabilaoan, Laoac,
Pangasinan at around three oclock in the afternoon to borrow the plow of his uncle,
Martin Molina, who lived in Manaoag, Pangasinan. When he was returning home
after getting the plow, he met the victim Domingo Flores and Orlando
Fernandez. Suddenly and without any provocation, the two who appeared drunk at the
time, took turns mauling him. Thereafter, he hailed a tricycle and told the driver to
take him to the Don Amadeo Perez, Sr. Memorial Hospital in Urdaneta, Pangasinan
where his injuries were cleaned and treated. The attending physician, Dr. Noel
Obedoza, recommended that Molina be confined but the latter refused, saying he had
no money.
According to the accused-appellant, he stayed in the hospital waiting area up to
eleven oclock in the evening of July 14, 1995 until a nursing attendant in the said
hospital, Alejandro Duyag, took pity on him and brought him to the latters house
where he spent the night. Molina claimed that he has since stayed with Duyag for
about a month as he did not want to go home for fear that his attackers would harm
him again. During his stay with Duyag, he worked for the latter as farm
helper. Accused-appellant further denied having had anything to do with the death of
Domingo Flores, claiming that he only learned of the killing more than a month
later. He likewise said that prior to July 14, 1995, there was no bad blood between
him and the victim. In fact, he said, Domingo was like a father to him and he saw no
reason why the victims family would make any false accusations against him.[7]

To corroborate the foregoing testimony of the accused-appellant, the defense

presented Dr. Noel Obedoza[8] and Alejandro Duyag, Sr.[9] Moreover, the policeman who prepared
the investigation report based on the police blotter entry regarding the killing of Domingo Flores and
the investigating officer assigned to the case were likewise called as witnesses to establish certain
inconsistencies in the initial statements of Melanie and Eufresinio. [10]

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
states that:

Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxx.
In the case at bar, the identity of Domingo Flores killer is not unknown. The
records show that accused-appellant was positively identified as the assailant, not only
by Domingos daughter Melanie, who witnesses the stabbling, but also by the victim
himself while the latter was in the throes of death.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declaration have already been
established in a long line of cases. Thus, in the case at bar, the victims ante-mortem
statement is entitled to much probative weight since it has been proven that: (1) at the
time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious
of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to
testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a
criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.
Indeed, a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person
who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Thus,
it has been held that when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood
is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth.[11]
Accused-appellant attempted to exculpate himself from liability by pointing out
certain inconsistencies between the sworn statements and the testimonies of Melanie
and Eufrosinio. In Melanies sworn statement, she said that she saw accusedappellant stab her father that fateful night of July 14, 1995. However, she testified in
court that she saw Molina hit her father twice in the head with a stone before stabbing
him on the left eyebrow and neck. Eufresinio, on the other hand, averred in his sworn
statement that Domingo, making his dying declaration, pointed to Molina as his
assailant, in the jeepney while the victim was being brought to the hospital; in his
testimony, however, Eufresinio clarified that the dying declaration was made while
they were still in Domingos house right after the latter was stabbed.

To our mind, these inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the said
witnesses. For one, accused-appellant himself admitted in open court that prior to
July 14, 1995, there was never any bad blood between him and Domingo and that he
saw no reason why the latters family would make false accusations against
him. Moreover, the alleged discrepancies may well be due to the fact that at the time
the sworn statements of the witnesses were taken, they were still in a state of grief and
shock, which explains why they were not able to relate accurately the events that
transpired on the night of the killing. Likewise, it should be noted that the sworn
statements of the said witnesses were prepared by police investigators and
misapprehension by the latter of the facts related by the witnesses cannot be
discounted. In any case, the records bear out the fact that during the trial, both
Melanie and Eufresinio were able to clarify their averments in their respective sworn
statements and despite the gruelling cross-examination, they managed to consistently
and credibly maintain their version of what actually happened.
It should be reiterated that discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and
his testimony in court do not necessarily discredit him because it is a matter of
judicial experience that affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate.[12] Besides, as the lower court cited, the testimonial discrepancies
could have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tends to
strengthen, rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearse
testimony.[13] Furthermore, as this Court has time and again observed, it is when the
testimony appears totally flawless that a court may entertain misgivings on its
veracity. In fact, certain minor variances in the details of a witness account, more
frequently than not, can be badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood, and they
often bolster the probative value of the testimony.[14]
Moreover, well entrenched is the rule that inconsistencies and discrepancies in
the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral
matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details,
the same do not impair the credibility of the witness where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant, as in the
case at bar.[15]
With respect to the accused-appellants defense of alibi, suffice it to say that
denials and alibis, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving and deserve no probative weight especially in light of the testimonies of
credible witnesses who have positively identified the accused as the assailant. In
addition, it has been held that for an alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely
that the accused was somewhere else,[16] as Molina claimed in this case. Accusedappellant himself admitted on the witness stand that from the hospital where he was
treated for his injuries, he could have easily taken a tricycle ride to get to the victim's
house.[17]
This Court has had occasion to rule that alibi is one of the weakest defenses an
accused can invoke, and the courts have always received it with caution, if not
suspicion, not only because it is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather
easy to fabricate.[18]

As to the manner in which Molina killed the victim, the same was undoubtedly
attended by treachery since the accused attacked Domingo while the latter was asleep
and unable to defend himself. There is alevosia where the attack was sudden and
unexpected, rendering the victim defenseless and ensuring the accomplishment of the
assailants evil purpose without risk to himself.[19]
Likewise, the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly
appreciated by the trial court, considering that Molina purposely entered the victims
abode with the intention to kill him. Article 14 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party
and the latter has not given any provocation, the same is considered an aggravating
circumstance. As Viada puts it, The home is a sort of sacred place for its owner. He
who goes to anothers house to slander him, hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty
than he who offends him elsewhere.[20]
It should be emphasized that for dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, there must have been no provocation on the part of the victim. The
provocation contemplated here is one that is sufficient and immediate to the
commission of the crime. In other words, the invasion of the privacy of the offended
partys house must have been the direct and immediate consequence of the
provocation given by the latter as where, for example, the accused and the victim
quarelled in front of the latters house and the accused, in a fit of rage entered the
victims house and proceeded to stab him. [21] Such is not the situation in the case at bar
because the killing in the victims house occurred at least six hours after the accuseds
mauling.
There is, however, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense
to offset the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling. As the records show,
accused-appellant was treated for injuries he sustained when he was mauled in the
afternoon of July 14, 1995 and the prosecution did not offer anny rebuttal evidence to
deny the allegation that Domingo was one of the men who beat up Molina. Indeed,
that accused-appellant was mauled for no apparent reason by someone who looked up
to as a father understandably engendered a strong feeling of vengeance on his
part. Sadly, however, he chose to take the law into his own hands to sate his thirst for
revenge.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
convicting the accused for murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty is reduced from death toreclusion perpetua, the generic aggravating
circumstance of dwelling having been offset by the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.