THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159703, March 03, 2008]

CEDRIC SAYCO y VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 23,
2003 Resolution[1] of the Court Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva [2]
(petitioner) for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8294; as well as the August 7, 2003 CA Resolution[3] which denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of
firearms under an Information which reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor II hereby accuses ZEDRIC SAYCO Y VILLANUEVA of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions penalized and defined under Section 1 of Presidential Decree Number 1866
as amended by Republic Act Number 8294, committed as follows:
That on or about January 3, 1999, at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry away one (1)
caliber 9MM marked SIGSAUER P229 with fourteen (14) live ammunitions and with Serial Number AE
25171, without first having obtained the proper license or authority to possess the same.
An act contrary.[4]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty.[5]
On August 2, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the evidence presented has sufficiently established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused Zedric V. Sayco is convicted for violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294. There being no modifying circumstances, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentences the accused to a prison term ranging from THREE
YEARS, SIX MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as minimum, to FIVE YEARS,
FOUR MONTHS and TWENTY DAYS of Prision Correccional Maximum as maximum, and to pay a fine of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS. The firearm (Exhibit A) and the ammunitions (Exhibit B) are forfeited in favor of
the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bais City issued a Decision dated March 14, 2003, affirming the
conviction of petitioner but lowering his penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated August 2, 2002 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 99-001 is hereby affirmed in all respects subject only to the modification with
respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court. The herein accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum [sic].
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review but the same was denied in the May 23, 2003 CA Resolution
assailed herein. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[8] was also denied by the CA in its August 7, 2003
Resolution.
Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues:
I
Whether the lower court erred in convicting the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294,
despite the latters proof of authority to possess the subject firearm.

II
Whether the prosecutions evidence proved the petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[9]
As summarized by the RTC and MTCC, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the following:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, 2002. He declared that on
or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received a telephone
call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside
Abuevas Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to the
aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his
right side waistline. They approached the unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said
firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated
from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked SIGSAUER P299 with 14 live ammunitions with
Serial No. AE 25171. The arrested person was identified as Zedric Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of Binalbagan,
Negros Occidental.
SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA, member of the PNP Bais City, testified on February 26, 2002. He was presented to
corroborate the testimony of Mariano Labe. He further declared that during the incident, they talked to the accused
in Cebuano, but they found out then that the latter is an Ilonggo, so they spoke to him in English.
SPO2 VICENTE DORADO also testified on February 26, 2002. He corroborated the testimony of SPO2 Valentino
Zamora and PO2 Mariano Labe.
The following exhibits were admitted as part of the evidence of the prosecution:
Exhibit A - one (1) 9 mm pistol with serial no. 25171.
Exhibit B - fourteen (14) pieces live ammunition and one (1) magazine placed in a black plastic bag.
Exhibit C - Joint Affidavit of the police officers.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when he
was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same,
specifically:
1) Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property), which reads:
Hqs Field Station 743, 7ISU, ISG, PA, Camp Montelibano Sr., Bacolod City, Philippines, 01 January 1999. I
acknowledge to have received from MAJOR RICARDO B. BAYHON (INF) PA, Commanding Officer, FS743,
7ISU, ISG, PA the following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provision of the accounting law and
which will be used in the office of FS 7431.
QTY

UNIT NAME OF DESCRIPTION

ea

Cal 9mm (SIG SAUER)

2
24

ea
ea

SN: AE 25171
Mags for Cal 9mm pistol
Ctgs for 9mm Ammo

CLASSI- UNIT PRICE

FICATION TOTAL
Pistol

x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-NOTHING FOLLOWS-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
Basis: For use of subject EP in connection with his official duties/mission in the AOR.

NOTED BY:
Nolasco B. James (SGD)

APPROVED BY:

SSg (Inf) PA

RICARDO B BAYHON (SGD)

FS Supply NCO

Major (INF) PA

Commanding Officer

CA Zedric V. Zayco (SGD)

Confidential Agent;[11]
and 2) Mission Order dated January 1, 1999, thus:
Mission Orders
Number: FS743-A-241
TO: CA Cedric V. Zayco
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

DESTINATION
Negros Island
PURPOSE
C O N F I D E N T IAL
DURATION
01 January 1999 to 31 March 1999
AUTHORIZED ATTIRE/UNIFORM
GOA ( )
BDA ( ) Civilian (x)
AUTHORIZED TO CARRY FIREARMS: (x) Yes ( ) No.
Caliber
9mm

Make
Sig Sauer

Kind
Pistol

Serial Nr
AE25171

MR/License Nr
ISG Prop

Nr Ammo
24 rds

VI. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS:

a. For personnel in uniform, the firearms shall be placed in holster securely
attached to the belt. Personnel in uniform without holster and personnel in
civilian attire will ensure that their firearms are concealed unless in actual and
lawful use.
xxxx
RICARDO B. BAYHON
(SGD)
Major (INF) PA
FS 743 Commander[12]
The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held that the Memorandum
Receipt and Mission Order do not constitute the license required by law because they were not issued by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine
Army who is not authorized by law to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms and ammunitions.[13] The
RTC added that, as held in Pastrano v. Court of Appeals[14] and Belga v. Buban,[15] said documents cannot take the
place of the requisite license.[16]
The CA wholly concurred with both courts.
In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and
ammunitions are government property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same
could not be licensed under his name;[17] instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission
Order whereby ISG entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions and authorized him to carry the same
around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he merely acted in good faith when he relied on the
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order for authority to carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a
grave injustice if he were to be punished for the deficiency of said documents.[18]
The Solicitor General filed his Comment,[19] pointing out that good faith is not a valid defense in the crime of illegal
possession of firearms.[20]
The arguments of petitioner are not tenable.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess
or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law.[21] To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution

has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.[22]
There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and ammunitions exist; second, that petitioner
had possession thereof at the time of his apprehension; third, that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-AFP;
fourth, that petitioner lacks a license issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP; and fifth, that
petitioner holds a Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering the subject firearm and ammunitions. Thus,
the issue to be resolved is confined to whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute
sufficient authority for him to possess the subject firearm and ammunitions and carry the same outside of his
residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission
order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license,[23] and an accused who relies on said documents cannot
invoke good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum.
[24]
Petitioner interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence.
However, rather than outrightly dismiss the present petition in the light of existing jurisprudence, this Court finds it
opportune to examine the rules governing the issuance of memorandum receipts and mission orders covering
government-owned firearms to special and confidential civilian agents, in order to pave the way for a more effective
regulation of the proliferation of such firearms and the abatement of crimes, such as extra-judicial killings, attendant
to such phenomenon.
In 1901, the United States Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 175, providing for the organization of an Insular
Constabulary. Section 6 vested in the Chief of the Insular Constabulary the following authority over the distribution
of firearms:
Section 6. The Insular Chief shall prescribe for the Insular Constabulary suitable arms, uniform, and equipment and
shall report to the Commission, through the Civil Governor, his action in this regard, together with a statement of the
cost, to the end that appropriation may be made to defray the cost thereof. The guns, revolvers, and ammunitions
needed to equip the insular and municipal police shall be purchased by the Insular Purchasing Agent on the
order of the Chief of Insular Constabulary, by whom they shall be distributed to the provinces and
municipalities as they may be needed. The Chief of the Insular Constabulary shall keep a record of the guns
and revolvers distributed, by their numbers, to municipalities and provinces x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Firearms owned by the government may therefore be distributed by the Chief of the Insular Constabulary to the
members of the insular and municipal police, with merely a record of the distribution being required.
Shortly, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1780[25] regulating possession of firearms:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, for purposes of sale, to import, buy or otherwise
acquire, dispose of, possess, or have the custody of any rifle, musket, carbine, shotgun, revolver, pistol, or air rifle,
except air rifles of small caliber and limited range used as toys, or any other deadly weapon x x x unless and until
such person, firm, or corporation shall secure a license, pay the license fee, and execute a bond and otherwise
comply with the requirements of this Act and the rules and regulations issued in executive orders by the GovernorGeneral pursuant to the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
but exempted therefrom the following government-owned firearms:
Section 16. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to firearms and ammunition therefor regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Constabulary,
guards in the employ of the Bureau of Prisons, the police force of the City of Manila, provincial prisoners and
jails when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1917 Revised Administrative Code[26] retained the foregoing exemption:
Section 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by peace
officers. - This article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines of the Unites States Army and Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal presidents, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties. (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Macarandang,[27] we interpreted Section 879 of the 1917 Revised Administrative
Code as applicable to a secret agent appointed by a governor as said agent holds a position equivalent to that of
peace officer or member of the municipal police. We reiterated this ruling in People of the Philippines v. Licera.[28]
In People v. Asa,[29] we acquitted a civilian guard from a charge of illegal possession of firearms on the ground that
he acted in good faith in bearing the firearms issued to him by his superior.

Two years later, in People v. Mapa,[30] the Court, speaking through Justice Fernando, overhauled its interpretation of
Section 879, thus:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to x x x possess
any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is
equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the
accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the
power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore
that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
We also abandoned the view that good faith is a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. [32]
On June 29, 1983, P.D. No. 1866 was issued, imposing stiffer penalties on illegal possession of firearms. It also
added the following separate requirement for carrying firearms:
Section 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms and ammunition or
implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - x x x The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal
authority therefor.
xxxx
Section 7. Unauthorized issuance of authority to carry firearms and/or ammunition outside of residence. - The
penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or military, who shall issue authority to
carry firearm and/or ammunition outside of residence without authority therefor.
P.D. No. 1866 was later amended by R.A. No. 8294,[33] which lowered the imposable penalties for illegal possession
of firearm when no other crime is committed. However, neither law amended or repealed Section 879 of the 1917
Revised Administrative Code. Even Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
[34]
left Section 879 untouched.
As matters stand, therefore, Section 879, as construed by this Court in Mapa and Neri, and reinforced by paragraph
6, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is still the basic law on the issuance, possession and
carrying of government-owned firearms.
In exercise of its rule-making authority under Section 8[35] of P.D. No. 1866, the Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary issued The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, which includes the following
provisions salient to the issuance, possession and carrying of government-owned firearms:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - For purposes of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the following terms shall mean and
be interpreted as hereinafter defined:
xxxx
d. Mission Order - is a written directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5
hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified
period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued
or licensed firearm outside of his residence when so specified therein.
e. Permit to Carry Firearm Outside of Residence - is a written authority issued to any person by the Chief of
Constabulary which entitles such person to carry his licensed or lawfully issued firearms outside of residence for
the duration and purpose specified therein.

f. Residence - refers to that place where the firearm and ammunition are being permanently kept. It includes
the office or house where they are kept and the premises of the house enclosed by walls and gates separating said
premises from adjacent properties. For firearms covered bya regular license or special permit, their residence shall
be that specified in the license or permit; and those covered by a Certificate of Registration or a Memorandum
Receipt, their residence in the office/station to which the grantee belongs.
xxxx
Section 5. Authority to issue mission order involving the carrying of firearm. - The following are authorized to issue
mission orders with provisions which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his issued/licensed firearm and
ammunition for the duration of such mission:
a. For officers, men and regular civilian agents of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND)/Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) including members of the ICHDF:
xxxx
(8) Provincial commanders, METRODISCOM commanders, company commanders and their equivalent in the
Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy.
xxxx
Section 6. Specific guidelines in the carrying of firearms outside of residence. - The following specific guidelines
shall be strictly observed in the carrying of firearm outside of residence:
a. Lawful Holders of Firearm Lawful holders of firearm (regular licenses, special permit, certificate of
registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence except when they have been
issued by the Chief of Constabulary a permit to carry firearm outside of their residence as provided for in Section
hereof or in actual performance of duty or official mission under Section 4 and 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 6 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations was later amended to read as follows:
a-1. Mission Order. - x x x No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry
firearms outside of residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantillaof the government agency involved
in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensationfor the services he/she is rendering in the agency.
Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or
special project which specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is
duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and
NBI, or at higher level of command. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ministry of Justice also issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986, further strengthening the
foregoing Implementing Rules and Regulations, to wit:
x x x It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the carrying of firearms by any
person unless the following conditions are met:
1.

That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order.

2.

That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to have a mission order,
i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the AFP officer issuing the mission order. If
mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian
agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and
are receiving regular compensation for services they are rendering. (Emphasis supplied)

Earlier, a Letter Directive dated May 19, 1984[36] was issued to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, prohibiting the issuance
of government-owned firearms to civilians, viz:
4. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1866 which codifies all the laws on firearms and
explosives clarify the following:
xxxx
b. Section 5 identifies the officials/officers of the MOND/AFP who are authorized to issue Mission Orders to enable
AFP officers, men and regular civilian agents carry their firearms in the performance of their duties. Regular civilian
agents are those who are covered by Permanent or Temporary Civil Service attested appointments in the plantilla of
civilian employees. Special or confidential civilian agents or the like are not regular civilian agents and are
therefore violating the law when they carry firearms (personal-owned or government-issued) with Mission

Orders.
c. There are no other laws or AFP regulations authorizing the loan of AFP-owned firearms to private firms and
individuals. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, allude to memorandum
receipts covering government-owned firearms. While said rules do not define the term, we can derive its
meaning from Section 492 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing
Rules and Regulations)[37] to wit:
Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property officer for
official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (MR) which
shall be renewed every January of the third year after issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be
considered in making physical count of the equipment. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the
issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or confidential civilian
agents may be synthesized as follows:
First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any government agency
involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the
requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a
permit to carry the same outside of residence;
Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess governmentowned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment
covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a
regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned
firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and
Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry firearms (whether
private- owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or bearing private-owned
firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the same outside of residence.
Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm
and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him.
Petitioner is a planter[38] who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP.[39]However, as
he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from
said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined under
Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive
the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said
government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof.
Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission
order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian
agent. Worse, petitioner was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the
subject firearm and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time, he was not on an official mission in Bais City
but had merely visited the place to attend to a family emergency.[40]
While this Court sustains the conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms, we re-examine the
imprisonment term to which petitioner was sentenced by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
The MTCC imposed on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment for three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days ofprision
correccional maximum as maximum.[41] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC lowered the penalty to
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision
correccional as maximum.[42] The CA affirmed the RTC.
A further revision of the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applicable to crimes penalized by a special law, to wit:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the

offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 1866 imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for illegal
possession of firearms. R.A. No. 8294 lowered the penalty, as follows:
Section 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, prision correccional in its maximum period ranges from four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day, to six (6) years. As prescribed under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the appropriate penalty that can be imposed on petitioner should keep within said range. Thus, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that petitioner accepted the subject firearm and
ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion that the memorandum receipt and mission order
issued to him legitimized his possession thereof, the appropriate indeterminate penalty is four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day as minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. However, for reasons stated in the text of herein Decision, the
Resolutions dated May 23, 2003 and August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together
with the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City are MODIFIED insofar only as
the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Petitioner Cedric Sayco y Villanueva is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five
(5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005]
VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
43, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitionerVicente
Agote y Matol seeks to annul and set aside the following resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
2991-UDK, to wit:
1. Resolution dated September 14, 1999,[1] dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed by the petitioner against the Honorable Manuel F.
Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to retroactively apply
in his favor Republic Act No. 8294[2]; and,
2. Resolution dated February 8, 2000,[3] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the pleadings on record, the following are the undisputed factual antecedents:
Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged before the sala of respondent judge with Illegal Possession of
Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866[4] and violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826[5] (Gun Ban),
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-149820 and 96-149821, respectively, allegedly committed, as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820
That on or about April 27, 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, knowingly have in possession and under his custody and control, One (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial no.
with four (4) live bullets. Without first having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license therefor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821
That on or about April 27, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without
serial number, with four (4) live ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by then and there carrying the same along V.
Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which is a public place on the aforesaid date which is covered by an election period,
without first securing the written authority from the COMELEC, as provided for by the COMELEC Resolution No.
2828, in relation to RA No. 7166 (Gun Ban).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded 'Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried jointly.
Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases,
separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in
accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim. Case No. 96-149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and to a prison term of
one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun ban).
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294[6] was approved into law.
Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already been
reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law, being favorable to him, should be
the one applied in determining his penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court.
In its order dated July 15, 1999,[7] however, the trial court denied petitioner's motion, saying:
While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed favorable to the accused and therefore should be made retroactive we are also
guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so provide that it shall have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court likewise in
the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: 'The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at
the time of the appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.
Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.
Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.
In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14, 1999,[8] the appellate court dismissed petitioner's recourse
on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since he should have
appealed from the July 15, 1999 order of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the issue involved is a pure
question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its subsequent resolution of
February 8, 2000,[9] petitioner is now with us, submitting for resolution the following issues: (1) whether the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts below erred in not giving Rep.
Act No. 8294 a retroactive application.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the factual findings of the trial court. What he
questions is said court's legal conclusion that Rep. Act No. 8294 cannot be retroactively applied to him.
Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law. As we have said in MacawiwiliGold Mining and Development
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[10]
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the distinction is well-known: there is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged.
Considering that 'judgments of regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to
the Court of Appeals in cases when appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law', while 'appeals from judgments of the [same courts] in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be
brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law[11],petitioner should
have appealed the trial court's ruling to this Court by way of a petition for review oncertiorari in accordance with

Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,[12] pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same
Rules, viz:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. '
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari. ' In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right to
resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the requirements
for the availment of the latter remedy is that 'there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law', [13] the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what petitioner should have done was to take an appeal from the trial
court's order of July 15, 1999 which denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 judgment of
conviction.
Petitioner's case is worse compounded by the fact that even his period for appeal had already prescribed when he
filed with the Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals
that petitioner received his copy of the trial court's order denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20,
1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on August 23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when
petitioner filed his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court.
Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely address the issue raised in this case regarding the retroactivity
of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For
this purpose, then, we shall exercise our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules and 'hold the bull by its
horns' , so to speak. After all, the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice
requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority,[15] we held:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as
expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning 'pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. xxx Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
We shall now proceed to determine whether the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 can be
retroactively applied to this case.
Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession of firearms
under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban, were both committed by the
petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case No. 96-149820, he was
sentenced to suffer a prison term ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to (18)
eighteen years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No.
1866, Section 1 of which reads:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. ' The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)

10

When Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,[16] the penalty for illegal possession of firearms was lowered,
depending on the class of firearm possessed, viz:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. ' The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum periodand a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed
if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be the one
imposed on him. Significantly, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[17] the Office of the Solicitor General
agrees with the petitioner, positing further that the statement made by this Court in People vs. Jayson[18] to the
effect that the provisions for a lighter penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 does not apply if another crime has been
committed, should not be applied to this case because the proviso in Section 1 of said law that 'no other crime was
committed must refer only to those crimes committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and not when the other
crime is not related to the use thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes the possession of the same, like
in the case of election gun ban, as here.
As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect, [19] this Court has pronounced inGonzales
vs. Court of Appeals[20] that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No.
1866. Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For sure, in People vs. Valdez,[22] where the accused was charged with the complex crime of multiple murder with
double frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under two separate informations, this
Court even took a bolder stance by applying Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not be
convicted of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively so as to
aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of subsequent cases.
[23]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Yet, in other cases,[24] although the Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to prevent the
conviction of an accused of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when the said unlicensed firearm was
'used to commit the crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this 'use of such unlicensed firearm
as an aggravating circumstance as provided therein, when the 'use of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the present case takes center stage presenting, this
time, another twist, so to speak. Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of firearms was also charged of
another offense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the unlicensed firearm was not 'used
or discharged in this case. The question then which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the
unlicensed firearm should be actually 'used and discharged in the course of committing the other crime in order that
Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of illegal possession of firearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the accused was charged and
convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In
the more recent case of People vs. Almeida,[26] however, although the accused was acquitted of the separate charge
of illegal possession of firearm for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the following clear
pronouncement:
Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
8294, there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another
crime committed such as, in this case, that of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied)
In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was merely found lying around, together with the
prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being 'used in the commission of an offense.

11

Given this Court's aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can the accused in the present case still be separately
convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation of gun ban, more so because as
in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually 'used or discharged in committing the other offense?
In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam,[27] this Court, interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act No.
8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law, and categorically held:
xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the 'other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable
for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of
the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of
two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that 'no
other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.(Emphasis supplied).
The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent cases of People vs. Garcia,[28] where the
judgment of conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of firearms was set aside there being another
crime ' kidnapping for ransom ' which they were perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,[29] where the
Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No. 8294 in accused-appellant's favor because it would mean his acquittal from
the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,[30] where, in refusing to convict
the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is
favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 should be applied liberally and retroactively in that
appellant must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for
illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering that it would mean petitioner's acquittal of the more
serious offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than violation of the
COMELEC gun-ban resolution. However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam:[31]
xxx Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable
by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
not subject to the Court's review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to
the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by
reading into the law what is not written therein. While we understand respondent People's contention that the 'use of
the firearm seemed to have been the main consideration during the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act
No. 8294, the fact remains that the word 'use never found its way into the final version of the bill which eventually
became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Court's hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived deficiency in the final
version without contravening the most basic principles in the interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned
in favor of the accused. Under our system of government where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches,
only the Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.
As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal
possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually 'used. For sure,
there is, in this case, closer relation between possession of unlicensed firearm and violation of the COMELEC gunban than the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs
in Almeida.

12

WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the
judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821 for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 in
relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED.
Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case No.
96-149821, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84857. January 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, ANTONIO
DELA ROSA Y AVILES, and RODOLFO QUIMSON Y NAVA (At large), accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rodolfo dela Rosa y Aviles appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 38,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of firearms and explosives and imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.[1]
On January 27, 1987, an information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives was filed against
RODOLFO DELA ROSA y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA y AVILES, CRESENCIO REYES y DELA CRUZ
and RODOLFO QUIMSON y NAVA, to wit:
"That on or about the 9th of December 1986, in sitio (sic) Kadampat, Barangay Bolo, municipality (sic) of Labrador,
province (sic) of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovementioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control three (3) homemade gauge 12 shotguns and
fourteen (14) pieces of dynamite explosives, without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same.
"Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866."[2]
All accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 3, 1987. On March 12, 1987, the four accused
withdrew their plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilt. After ascertaining that the plea of guilt was
not made improvidently, the lower court imposed upon them the corresponding penalty. [3] However, on March 19,
1987, the four (4) accused filed a motion withdrawing their plea of guilt. [4] The lower court granted the motion in a
resolution dated March 25, 1987.[5] Thereafter, trial proceeded. However, accused Cresencio Reyes changed his
mind again and pleaded guilty to a lesser offense punishable under the last paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866. The court accepted the plea and sentenced him accordingly. He was utilized as a witness by the
prosecution. The trial proceeded against the three remaining accused.
The prosecution established that in the morning of December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa,
Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson, surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of Sitio Kadampat, Bolo,
Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to lead a new life. They informed him that Benjamin Nano, alias
Kumander Tamang, a member of the New People's Army (NPA), was shot by one of them. The four had with them
a short shotgun (Exhibit A) and a bag containing several sticks of dynamite (Exhibit C to C-7). [6] Kagawad Rigor
offered them breakfast and afterwards went to the police station to report the presence of four (4) surrenderees in his
house. At the police station, Patrolman Gasline Fernandez recorded the report in the police blotter. Cpl. Crispin
Cancino, the station commander, brought along several policemen and proceeded to the house of Kagawad
Rigor. When the group arrived, only Kagawad Rigor and Cpl. Cancino entered the house. The other policemen
stayed outside to secure the area. Inside the house, Kagawad Rigor introduced the surrenderees to Cpl. Cancino and
showed him the short shotgun (Exhibit A) and the bag (Exhibit C to C-7) containing several sticks of
dynamite. Then, all accused, except Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind to guide the police in recovering the
body of Kumander Tamang, were brought to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Headquarters in Lingayen. In
Lingayen, they proceeded at the municipal building and called on Mayor Calixto Pancho. The surrenderees had their
picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters,
where their statements were taken by Cpl. Arsenio Paragas and Cpl. Cipriano Castillo. [7] Meanwhile, the charred
body of Benjamin Nano was recovered by the police in Sitio Tebel Patar.[8]
The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police that there were firearms left buried in Sitio Tebel
Patar. Reyes pointed to the hiding place which was covered by banana leaves. When the banana leaves were
removed, the police unearthed two (2) long barreled shotguns (Exhibits B and D).[9]

13

On the other hand, the three accused contend they were recruited by Kumander Tamang on different dates.
Accused Rodolfo dela Rosa testified that he first saw Kumander Tamang on October 28, 1986 at a relative's
wake. Kumander Tamang asked him whether he owned a piece of land. He said he did not, for he was only a sawali
maker. Kumander Tamang then convinced him to join the New People's Army (NPA). He told Kumander Tamang
he would think it over. On November 1, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and reiterated his offer to
him. Cresencio Reyes was with Kumander Tamang at that time. Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C) while
Kumander Tamang had a shotgun (Exhibit A). On November 10, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and
succeeded in persuading him to join the NPA. Kumander Tamang brought him at a hideout in the mountains of
Sitio Tebel Patar, Labrador, Pangasinan.
On the evening of November 14, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang and Cresencio Reyes,
descended the mountains and proceeded to the house of Antonio dela Rosa, who was Rodolfo's cousin. At that
time, Kumander Tamang was carrying a shotgun (Exhibit A) while Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C). When
they arrived at said place, Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered the house and stayed inside for ten (10)
minutes. When the two came out, dela Rosa was with them. All of them headed for the mountains afterwards. On
November 20, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang Cresencio Reyes and Antonio dela Rosa went to the
house of Rodolfo Quimson. Again, only Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered Quimson's house. They stayed
inside for 15 minutes. When the two came out, Quimson was with them. Afterwards, they returned to their hideout
in the mountains.[10]
On December 8, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Kumander Tamang called them to a
meeting. Kumander Tamang took the bag (Exhibit C) which Reyes always carries and opened it. The bag yielded
several sticks of dynamite. Kumander Tamang told them that at five o'clock in the afternoon they would go down
Sitio Kadampat and assassinate Kagawad Rigor.[11] He then instructed them on how to use the explosives. After the
meeting, they returned to their hut and rested. At two o'clock in the afternoon, they heard a gunshot from the hut of
Kumander Tamang. They rushed outside and saw Reyes holding Kumander Tamang's shotgun. He announced that
Kumander Tamang was dead. He told them it would be better to surrender themselves to the authorities. He
ordered them to gather the shotgun and the sticks of dynamite while he set on fire Kumander Tamang's hut. At five
o'clock in the afternoon, they descended the mountains and headed towards Sitio Kadampat. At 7:00 a.m., the
following day, they reached the house of Kagawad Rigor. They saw the Kagawad sitting by himself on a bench
outside his house. Only Reyes approached the Kagawad, so as not to frighten him. The three others waited by the
roadside. After five (5) minutes, Reyes signalled the three to approach the house. Kagawad Rigor let them inside
the house and offered them breakfast. Reyes placed the shotgun and the bag on top of the dining table. Kagawad
Rigor then left the house and went to the police station. [12] He returned with several policemen. At first, the
policemen pointed their guns at the accused but Kagawad Rigor told them there was no need for they were
surrendering themselves to the authorities. Kagawad Rigor then showed the policemen the shotgun and the bag
containing the sticks of dynamite. The policemen took all the surrenderees to the Municipal Hall, except Rodolfo
Quimson, who was left behind, to lead the police to Kumander Tamang's body. At the Municipal Hall, Mayor
Calixto Pancho greeted and congratulated them for coming back to the fold of law. They had their picture taken
with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters. When an
investigator started to question them, they asked for a lawyer to assist them but the investigator said they would not
need one for they were surrenderees and would soon be freed. Hence, they gave their subscribed statements to the
police. After their statements were taken, the police took them back to the police station in Labrador, where they
were detained. On January 5, 1987, they were transferred to the provincial jail in Lingayen. They denied ever
seeing the two (2) long firearms (Exhibits C and D) which were recovered in Sitio Tebel Patar. They saw said
firearms for the first time when the prosecution presented them as exhibits during the trial. [13]
When trial concluded, the lower court convicted the three (3) accused. Antonio dela Rosa did not
appeal [14] while Rodolfo Quimson escaped [15] from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where he was detained after
the lower court convicted him. Only Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODOLFO DELA ROSA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
EXPLOSIVES, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1866.
We find merit in the appeal.
It is undisputed that accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa and his companions were the ones who surrendered
the subject firearm (Exhibit A) and explosives (Exhibit C to C-7) to Kagawad Rigor. However, Rodolfo dela Rosa
denies that he was in possession of said ammunitions in the manner punishable by law. According to him, his real
intention was merely to turn over the ammunitions, which were owned by Kumander Tamang, to the
authorities. The trial court perceived otherwise. It declared that since Rodolfo dela Rosa joined the New People's
Army (NPA), there is reason to conclude that he provided himself with arms such as Exhibits A, B, C to C-7 and D.
[16]
And since mere possession is sufficient to convict a person for crimes which are malum prohibitum like illegal

14

possession of firearms, appellant dela Rosa must be convicted. It is of no moment that he surrendered the
ammunitions to the authorities.
We fail to see how appellant dela Rosa could be convicted of illegal possession of firearms based on the above
reasoning. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 punishes any person who shall "x x x unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition."(Underscoring supplied) [17]
Broken down into its salient elements, illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof:
(i)

possesses a firearm; and

(ii)

lacks the authority or license to possess it.[18]

In People v. de Gracia,[19] we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under
PD 1866, thus:
"But, is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query
assumes significance for illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, punished by a special law, in which
case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
"When a crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary, it is sufficient that
the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime but he
intended to commit an act, and that act is by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit
the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited
act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must
still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent
to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if
such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent."
In the early case of People v. Estoista,[20] we held that a temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession of firearms is not punishable. We stated therein that:
"The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and
opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule
laid down in the United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is that temporary, incidental, casual or
harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or
carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon
or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment."
Also, in People v. Remereta, [21] where the question posed was whether an accused who stole a firearm could
simultaneously be prosecuted for theft and illegal possession of firearms, we held that transient possession is not
sufficient to convict one under the latter crime, thus:
"While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into possession thereof, the crime of illegal
possession of firearms is not committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. x x x Thus, stealing a firearm
with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft,
but would not justify a charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually use the weapon
would be lacking."
Hence, the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm
either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. [22] It is not enough that
the firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same temporarily and casually or for the purpose of
surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of

15

an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding
circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.[23]
Thus, in People v. Leo Lian,[24] we rejected the argument of the accused that the charge against him should be
dismissed because there was no animus possidendi on his part. In said case, the accused contended that he was on
his way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when he met some of his friends. He then forgot about the
firearm, until the police officer unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording him no chance to surrender it
himself.
In rejecting accused-appellant's claim, Justice Regalado wrote that:
"x x x, the Court finds it hard to believe that appellant still had to hide the firearm in his waist before setting
out to surrender it to the authorities when he could have taken the gun to the town hall in the same bag in
which he found it, in which case it would have been safer and would have avoided detection. In fine, the
indispensable elements of possession without the necessary authority or license and the corresponding
attendance of animus possidendi have both been convincingly established by the prosecution to warrant
appellant's conviction x x x."
That animus possidendi is determinable from the prior and simultaneous acts of the accused is further
exemplified by People v. Lubo.[25] In this case, while accused-appellant pleaded lack of animus possidendi, his
conduct belied the same. Accused-appellant Lubo was found to have secured a "temporary license" for the subject
firearm. Under such circumstance, we held that accused-appellant intended to possess the subject firearm beyond
reasonable doubt.
Coming now to the case before us, it is undisputed that the police officers never really arrested Rodolfo dela
Rosa, for the truth of the matter was that there was no need for such arrest. Dela Rosa and his companions
had surrendered the ammunitions to Kagawad Rigor even before the police arrived. In fact, the police learned of
the surrender because Kagawad Rigor reported it to the police station in Labrador. This is in contrast to People v.
Leo Lian, where appellant Lian merely feigned intention to surrender the firearm which the police found in his
possession. In the case at bar, appellant dela Rosa's intention to surrender the ammunitions was very clear from the
beginning and he was able to execute the same.
Corollarily, the Office of the Solicitor General's contention that dela Rosa was in constructive possession of
the ammunitions is irrelevant for possession -whether physical or constructive- without animus possidendi is not
punishable. Dela Rosa's possession was harmless, temporary and only incidental for the purpose of surrendering the
ammunitions to the authorities. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the first element of animus
possidendi.
Similarly, the records are bereft of sufficient proof that Rodolfo dela Rosa possessed the ammunitions without
authority to do so. Except for the preliminary examination of Pfc. Cipriano P. Castillo conducted by Municipal
Circuit Trial Judge Benjamin N. Abella, [26] the prosecution offered no other evidence during the trial which showed
lack of license. In the preliminary examination, the only relevant question asked by the judge was:
"JUDGE ABELLA
"Q: Did you or the Stn. Commander ask or verify whether any or all of the above-named suspects have any
license to possess the above-mentioned firearms and explosives?
"A: Yes, sir. But they stated that they have no license to possess any of the firearms and explosives which were
recovered from their possession, control and custody."
The Office of the Solicitor General offers the extrajudicial statement of accused Rodolfo dela Rosa [27] that
Kumander Tamang supplied him with explosives and dynamite in furtherance of subversive activities. [28] According
to the Solicitors, the extrajudicial statement is sufficient to prove that the firearms were illegally possessed. The
presumption is erroneous. Aside from the fact that dela Rosa repudiated the extrajudicial statement because it was
uncounselled,[29] the same did not contain any admission that he had no license to possess the firearm. And, even if
it had contained an admission that he had no license, it still would not have sufficed.
In People v. Solayao,[30] the prosecution relied only on the testimonial evidence that accused-appellant
admitted before the police officer who accosted him that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject
firearm when he was asked if he had one. In acquitting the accused-appellant, we stressed that the prosecution has
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license which is a negative averment. [31] The burden is in
consonance with the evidentiary rule that "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends
upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party,
then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." [32] More importantly, the burden placed on the
shoulders of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license is premised on the constitutional

16

presumption of innocence of the accused. [33] Thus, in People v. Solayao, this Court suggested that the prosecution
could have, at the very least, presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused did
not have the license to the gun. But, an extrajudicial admission of the accused, solely, will not suffice.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that for accused-appellant to join the New People's Army and stay
in the mountains without arming themselves is highly improbable. Thus, there is reason to believe that they illegally
possessed the ammunitions to further their subversive activities even prior to surrendering them to the
authorities. We reiterate that mere suspicion will not prove the prosecution's case in court. In a prosecution under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, it is incumbent on the Government to prove both elements of the crime: (1) that the
accused possessed the firearm and (2) that he had not first obtained a license or permit from the appropriate
authorities.[34]
As always, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal
Code which are mala in se or in crimes which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.[35] We find that such
quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa is acquitted in Criminal Case No. L-3616. His
immediate release from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is ordered, except if charged and detained for other
offenses.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
WARPAN, appellant.

vs. WALPAN

LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL

alias

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were
about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision [1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four
charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, [2] all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G.
Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3]was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated
drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located
at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused
wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it
below:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting
with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the

17

following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1)
homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five
(5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of
[a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced
M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from
authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and
other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x
one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill
SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1
RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal
parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine
National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the
attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to
serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus
commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not
accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own
voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover
during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police
officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and
Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2
Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large. [9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. [10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed
upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by
the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a
plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A,
Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21,
Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294,
and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with
Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]

The Facts

18

Prosecutions Version

In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30
p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant.The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe
Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as
presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the
search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to
the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April
22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards
the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the
policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house.There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp.
14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen
saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group,
together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to
observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March
4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 7376). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting
opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol
entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen
surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of
the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 1921).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at
them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence.He went inside the
bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest
appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of
the second floor because there were children.Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his
house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the
second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet
inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2)
more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twentyone (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the
second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and
entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to
the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground
floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil
case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April
28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1)
M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell
of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).

19

Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the
morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy
shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house
about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought
P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant
instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already
smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to
smoke shabu and Locson obliged.He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered
appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his
house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away because
there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near
the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating
what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized
(Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure
officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the
receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination
(TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the
following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1),
another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with
Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5)
days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab,
likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded
aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50)
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the
examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that
appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given
authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]

Defenses Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. [15] Hence, we quote the
pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling
(tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying
taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan
Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather
than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was
alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos
daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio
Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He
said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At
the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me
does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in
Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he

20

did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s]
who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is
very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen,
he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A
policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79
rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines
with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50)
aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins
placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that
the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought
by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not
ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns
that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name
is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided the
place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although
Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did
not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are
plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of
them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night
before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two
packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger
sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office
at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the
younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot
them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed
against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls
Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo
Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing
(their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They
searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan
Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry.When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they
grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad
Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and
just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before
they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.68, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9,
id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything
else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September
24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about
to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed
inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman
searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit
on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained
for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was
released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house
of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and
the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans
wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman
called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone
position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her
husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).

21

Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at
the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her
house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and
poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter
the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons
died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of
traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already
inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the
police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the
house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the
shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things
recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing
the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x
taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he
went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18,
id).[16]

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been
issued for more than one specific offense, [17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. [18] The court a
quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more
than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs.
People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter
shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and
void.[19] (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers
who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police
officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted
on the firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in
his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire
during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants
narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the
firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the
firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the
time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who
intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was
pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search
Warrant.[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a
magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) [24] used by appellant against the police elements, two M14
magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. [25] The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of
the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a
crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure [26] since appellant had not applied for a license to possess
firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]

22

For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the
police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant
evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his
arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by
the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations,
saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado
Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house
where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers
bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its
smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs
are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be
established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its
general reputation among police officers.The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu
from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1
Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants
who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo,
a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other
document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence. [29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted
murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance
was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16,
Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams
all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence
against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is
totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police
officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition
and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering
that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag
containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to
the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned
over to the National Treasury. [30]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

I
The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police
officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between
Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II

23

The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of
the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded]
the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the
police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also
discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea
with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to
sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house. [34] Viewing the site of the
raid would have only delayed the proceedings. [35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant
event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. [36] Here, there is no reason to disturb the
exercise of that discretion.[37]

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. [38] Suffice it to state that the trial
courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. [39] After carefully examining the
records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the
general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon
the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape.SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.
[41]
testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were
fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting
... I will reform that question.

24

Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?

A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam
at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with
Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately
went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of
his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the
raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator
of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, [43] as follows:
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the
second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

25

A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over
to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized
during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for
gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?

26

A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder
nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be]
positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and
traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police
officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the
second element was the prosecutions Certification [47] stating that he had not filed any application for license to
possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. [48] Further, it should be
pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not
be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]

Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is
frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force
was out to get him at all cost.

27

This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but
terribly difficult to disprove. [50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers,
[51]
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much
credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his
claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.
[53]
He testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December
1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was
resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our
house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the
persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house
[are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors
[from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September
24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house
[were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors[] house at
that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house
at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]

Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.

Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he
was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several
occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers
who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to
the prosecutions story.

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

28

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault [55] with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to
enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional.[57] Hence, for the
present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed
and applied in its maximum period.[58]

Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted
him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and
sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied
the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded
prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with
the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of
the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any
public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this
case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited
provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an
aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes

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that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling,
however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to
have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a
person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of
firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. [62] In this case, the plain meaning of RA
8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. [63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted
homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be
applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had
already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. [64] In other words, no longer in
existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained
the specific proviso that no other crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction
of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however,
that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in
the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in
the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an
offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision
mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal
possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, [66] like alarm and scandal [67] or
slight physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily
arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the
result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give
statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature.Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence [70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for
which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for
which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound
discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.

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