IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.

141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones
in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act
of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.
In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c)
to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight
has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to
the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional

per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the

executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of
powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond
the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited
to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:
(1)
Scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation, and;
(2)
Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress, which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own
laws.

Araullo vs. Aquino III

FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art.
VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by
the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I.

II.

No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of

funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III.

No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is

true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of
the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other nonExecutive agencies.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M
for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive

No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution.
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is
it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional
funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the
DAP.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate

realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings These DAP transfers are not
savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end
of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV.

No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money

source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.

V.

Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal

effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may
cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they
have not acted in good faith.

Macalintal vs. COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of
the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1 That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad
can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2 That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress
which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1 There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for nonabsentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his
domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as
a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the
vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and
proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in
Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

David vs. Arroyo

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017)
and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down
the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other
public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor,
was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided
and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest
was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred
that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred
that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take
over power.

PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment

and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents,
GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.
It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful
and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional. The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there
are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional
in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The
SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it

becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been
met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the
assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power
by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws
but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount
to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the
president.

Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time
that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.

The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but

whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Santiago vs. COMELEC

HELD:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement

for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC
set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After
the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to

the Constitution.

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an
enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed;
and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in
the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the
constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and
for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the
respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted
on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of
other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as
to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of
respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations
was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the
petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Atong Paglaum, Inc vs COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not
being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back
to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will
of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people,
in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for
the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor
candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a
national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by
their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section
5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.

Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at
least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the
House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on
the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the
exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require
parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR:
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of
party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of
first party x additional seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state,
all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of
small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat
each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.