Intro to Law Digested Cases_1

PANFILO S. AMATAN V. JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO

A.M. NO. RTJ-93-956 SEPTEMBER 27, 1995
FACTS:
1. On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed
by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased in Crim. Case No. H-223
entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias Meon.
2. Complainant contends that the sentence of respondent judge Vicente Aujero is
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.
3. Respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual with
the consent of the offended party to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. The Deputy Court Administrator
recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

G.R. NO. L-30642 (APRIL 30, 1985)

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission.
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages,
pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in
failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the
petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act,
which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:

Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in holding the deposited decision in Criminal
Case No. H-223?

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers
or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

Held:
Under the circumstances of the case, respondent judges erroneous exercise of his
judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. The phraseology of
Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely eliminate possible
misinterpretation. This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same provision
prompted the Department of Justice, on July 31, 1990, or three months after
respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular No.
35, later amended by Circular No. 55 dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting
limitations on the application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent
reached compulsory retirement age on April 5, 1995 after a long period of service in
the judiciary entitles him to a certain measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at
bench stands unique because of the potently absurd result of respondents application
of the law.

RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after
receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded
a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the
lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Intro to Law Digested Cases_2

AYALA CORP VS. ROSA DIANA REALTY
346 SCRA 663 DECEMBER 1, 2000

Facts: In April 1976, Ayala Corp. entered into a transaction with Manuel Sy and Sy Ka
Kieng where former sold a lot in Salcedo Village in Makati. The deed of sale had some
encumbrances contained in the Special Conditions of Sale (SCS) and Deed of
Restrictions (DR), which should be followed by the vendees. The stipulations in the
SCS are:
1) a building proposal must be submitted to Ayala which must be in accordance with
the DR,

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Rosa Diana committed a breach of
contract by submitting a building plan to Ayala complying with the DR and
submitting a different building plan to the building administrator of Makati, which
did not comply with the stipulations in the DR.
Contractual Obligations between parties have the force of law between them and
absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, they must complied with in good faith.
Thus, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside

2) the construction of the building must be completed on or before 1979, and

EBRANILAG, ET. AL. V. THE DIVISION SUPT. OF SCHOOLS

3) that there will be no resale of the lot.

March 1, 1993

The DR specified the limits in height and floor area of the building to be constructed.
However, Sy and Kieng, failed to build a building but nonetheless with the permission
of Ayala, the vendees sold the said lot to the respondent, Rosa Diana Realty.
Respondent Company agreed to abode by the SCS and the DR stipulations. Prior to
the construction, Rosa Diana submitted a building plan to Ayala complying with the
DR but it also passed a different building plan to the building administrator of
Makati, which did not comply with the stipulations in the DR. While the building,
The Peak, was being constructed, Ayala filed a case praying that: 1) Rosa Diana, be
compelled to comply with the DR and build the building in accordance with the
building plan submitted to Ayala; or 2) on the alternative, the rescission of the deed of
sale.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and thus, Rosa Diana was able to
complete the construction of The Peak. Undeterred, Ayala filed before the Register
of Deeds (RD) of Makati a cause of annotation lis pendens. RD refused to grant Ayala
such registration for in the lower court; the case is of personal action for a specific
performance and/or rescission. However, the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
reversed RDs ruling. The appellate court upheld the RDs ruling stating that the case
before the trial court is a personal action for the cause of action arises from the alleged
violation of the DR. The trial court sustained the respondents point saying that Ayala
was guilty of abandonment and/or estoppels due to its failure to enforce the terms of
the DR and SCS against Sy and Kieng. Ayala discriminately chose which obligor would
be made to follow certain conditions, which is not fair and legal. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the lower courts ruling. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Rosa Diana committed a breach of contract

FACTS:
1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high
school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province. All
minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as
Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.

2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of
the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions

3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school
students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's
Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M.
Ganal.

Intro to Law Digested Cases_3

4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
"acts of worship" or "religious devotion only given to God.They consider the flag as an
image or idol representing the State . They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the
State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution
protect against official control

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, PETITIONER.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the
Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

6.
The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for
Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1) in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their
right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship

7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until
further orders.

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and
heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.
ISSUE:

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid

Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:

NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute
the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a
fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among
human rights. It reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents
therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens
to education under the 1987 Constitution.

Although the Court upholds in this decision

nevertheless, that another foreign
invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to
appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to
what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate

Intro to Law Digested Cases_4

child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother.