Professional Documents
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imposition of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly intellectual
property rights, including limitations on the rights of farmers to use seeds from the previous
season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food security for farmers unable
to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have been saved from the previous
would also point to the poor transportation infrastructure in these less developed countries, which limits the distribution of
moral.
claims of moralityif
those of conflicting reason. One may even have to
sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical
behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead)
Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the
taken seriouslysupersede
patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral,
one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies ).
That
an action is necessary to save ones life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot
or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or nation. There is a strict
analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the
The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the
The ultimate test always harks to the highest principlerecant or
dieand it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets
rough. I have put aside many questions of detailsuch as the mechanical
problems of distributing foodbecause detail does not alter the stark
conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution
of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high
enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose ones life. But many people cannot accept
the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies,
then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can
adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle
of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity . And though one might not be
sake of being Christian.
highest light.
able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nationfor nations can come and goone might well argue that
unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay one-third of
However, from an
individual standpoint, the human species like the nationis of no moral relevance.
From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpointas indicated above
survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial
whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.
present world populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival.
Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising .
We must refuse to sacrifice one group to prevent a bad consequence
intervening actors mean that our responsibility does not extend to
the efects of the planonly the moral act of feeding hungry people
GEWIRTH 1983 (Alan, philosopher, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, p 230-231)
A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons
is an obligation so fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent
evil consequences from befalling some persons. If such prevention requires an action
whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action must not be
performed, whatever the consequences . One of the difficulties with this important distinction is
that it is unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert from
him some evil consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their
rights if he lets them die when he could have prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral
urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him; but sometimes the only way to prevent the
In such a
case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind
from some other innocent person . 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose
death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person.
of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the sons refusal to tortures his mother to
death does not violate the other persons rights to life and that hes is not morally responsible for their deaths.
The
required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action .
According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some person As
performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person Cs incurring a
certain harm Z, As moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there
intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and
who intends to produce Z or show produces Z through recklessness. The reasons for this removal is
that Bs intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike As
action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may
help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told
that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally
responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the
American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it
was Kings opponents who were responsible because their intervention
operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also
have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had
to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the
rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that
these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks .
Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions.
(David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of
Hunger: Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective, p. 1-2)
Imagine, for a moment, that unknown terrorists have detonated a crude atomic device in
a large urban area. One hundred and fifty thousand people are instantly incinerated, about the same number that died in
the bombing of Hiroshima. Moreover, immediate death is only the tip of the tragic iceberg; hundreds of thousands more
are left with various debilitating injuries and diseases.
atomic device is detonated spreading a similar level of death and destruction to another city.
And then,
after three more days, yet another bomb explodes. Let us take our thought experiment one step further. Imagine, now,
unanimously supported effort would be galvanized, aimed at achieving one goalfinding and eliminating the terrorists.
World attention would be riveted to the crisis; a massive public outcry would
demand effective action and would settle for nothing less than an end to the
threat. Politicians the world over would talk of little else. The above scenario, of course, is fiction. Well,
partly. It is fiction only with respect to the instrument of death and the quality of
the response. In reality, hunger is the weapon, and it claims the lives of more people every three to
four days than died in the bombing of Hiroshima. But the response to this massive crisis is
shocking in its near nonexistence, leading some to refer to hunger as the
silent emergency. Despite its unparalleled infliction of misery , suffering, and death,
hunger is calmly dispassionately accepted within the citadels and cathedrals of power as
simply part of the present world order.
Even if consequentialism is generally good, we must have moral side
constraintssome immoral actions must never be allowed no matter
what the consequences are
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 58-59)
Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone seriously
wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first
place. The fundamental mistake is made there, rather than at the point
where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged to outweigh
its disadvantages, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. If it is not
allowable to do certain things, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, then no argument
about what will happen if one does not do them can show that doing them
would be all right. Absolutism does not, of course, require one to ignore the
consequences of ones acts. It operates as a limitation on utlitiarian
reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be expected to try to
maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him to
transgress an absolute prohibition like that against murder. But when such a conflict
occurs, the prohibition takes complete precedence over any consideration of
consequences. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It requires us to forgo certain potentially useful
military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy
population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means
absolutist intuitions, for they are often the only barrier before the abyss of
utilitarian apologetics for large-scale murder.
The argument that survival outweighs sharing food relies on a
misunderstanding of moral agency and justifies infinite atrocities
because no such agent as the human species exists, we are
responsible only to individuals who are starving
WATSON 1977 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation,
p. 121-123)
it would seem
to be rational to place the right of survival of the species above that of
individuals. Unless the species survives, no individual will survive , and thus an
Given that the human species has rights as a fictional person on the analogy of corporate rights,
individuals right to life is subordinate to the species right to survival. If species survival depends on the unequal
distribution of food to maintain a healthy breeding stock, then it is morally right for some people to have plenty while
others starve. Only if there is enough food to nourish everyone well does it follow that food should be shared equally.
This might be true if corporate entities actually do have moral status and
moral rights. But obviously, the legal status of corporate entities as fictional
persons does not make them moral equals or superiors of actual human persons.
Legislators might profess astonishment that anyone would think that a corporate person is a person as people are, let
alone a moral person. However, because the legal rights of corporate entities are based on individual rights, and because
corporate entities are treated so much like persons, the transition is often made. Few theorists today would argue that the
state of the human species is a personal agent. But all this means is that idealism is dead in theory. Unfortunately, its
Corporate
entities are not persons as you and I are in the explicit sense that we are selfconscious agents and they are not. Corporate entities are not agents at all,
let alone moral agents. This is a good reason for not treating corporate entities even as fictional persons.
The distinction between people and other things , to generalize, is that people are
self-conscious agents, whereas things are not. The possession of rights essentially depends on
influence lives, so it is worth giving an argument to show that corporate entities are not real persons.
an entitys being self-conscious, i.e., on its actually being a person. If it is self-conscious, then it has a right to life. Selfconsciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an entitys being a moral equal of human beings; moral
equality depends on the entitys also being a responsible moral agent as most human beings are.
A moral agent
must have the capacity to be responsible, i.e., the capacity to choose and to act freely with
respect to consequences that the agent does or can recognize and accept as its own choice and doing. Only a being who
knows himself as a person, and who can effect choices and accept consequences, is a responsible moral agent. On these
and they have reciprocal rights. If we care for things, it is because people have interests in them, not because things in
themselves impose responsibilities on us. That is, as stated early in this essay, morality essentially has to do with relations
among people, among persons. It is nonsense to talk of things that cannot be moral agents as having responsibilities;
consequently,
rights.
It is deceptive even to talk of legal rights of a corporate entity. Those rights (and reciprocal responsibilities)
Is there no way to produce enough food to nourish everyone well? Besides cutting down to the minimum, people in the
West might quit feeding such nonhuman animals as cats and dogs. However, some people (e.g., Peter Singer) argue that
mere sentiencethe capacity to suffer painmeans that an animal is the moral equal of human beings. I argue that
because nonhuman animals are not moral agents, they do not share the rights of self-conscious responsible persons. And
considering the profligacy of nature, it is rational to argue that if nonhuman animals have any rights at all, they include
not the right to life, but merely the right to fight for life. In fact, if people in the West did not feed grain to cattle, sheep,
and hogs, a considerable amount of food would be freed for human consumption. Even then, there might not be enough
to nourish everyone. Let me remark that Stone and Singer attempt to break down the distinction between people on the
one hand, and certain things (corporate entities) and nonhuman animals on the other, out of moral concern. However,,
All over
the world, heirs of Gobineau, Goebbels, and Hitler practice genocide and otherwise
treat people as non-human animals and things in the name of the State . I am afraid that the
consequences of treating entities such as corporations and nonhuman animalsthat are not
moral agentsas persons with rights will not be that we will treat national
parks and chickens the way we treat people, but that we will have provided
support for those who would treat people the way we now treat nonhuman
animals and things. The benefits of modern society depend in no small part on the institution of corporate law.
there is another, profoundly antihumanitarian movement also attempting to break down the distinction.
Even if the majority of these benefits are to the goodof which I am by no means surethe legal fiction of corporate
reverence for
corporate entities leads to the spurious argument that the present world
imbalance of food and resources is morally justified in the name of the higher
rights of sovereign nations, or even of the human species, the survival of which is said to be more
important than the right of any individual to life. This conclusion is morally absurd . This is not,
personhood still elevates corporate needs above the needs of people. In the present context,
however, the fault of morality. We should share all food equally, at least until everyone is well-nourished. Besides food,
all the necessities of life should be shared, at least until everyone is adequately supplied with a humane minimum. The
race would survive even equal sharing, for after enough people died, the remained could be well-nourished on the food
this grisly prospect does not show that anything is wrong with
the principle of equity. Instead, it shows that something is profoundly wrong
with the social institutions in which sharing the necessities of life equally is
impractical and irrational.
that remained. But
(David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of
Hunger: Race and Hunger in National and International Perspective, p. 49)
One of the great myths about hunger is that it can be adequately studied objectively. In the academic halls of the great
universities, hunger, when it is not ignored, is turned into a topic, a problem to be investigated. It is subjected to
theoretical analysis, statistical manipulation, and policy review. Scientific papers are delivered at professional meetings,
dissertations are written, and careers are made in the study of hunger. In the corridors of government, hunger, when it is
not ignored, is turned into a topic for partisan debate. Politicians issue position statements, bureaucrats
shuffle papers and people, and technocrats design assistance programs like an architect designs a building. I am not
approaching victim of hunger. Until we are grasped in our innermost core by the wrenching protest of the walking death
until we are pulled into a struggle of solidarity and militant resistance, until
we are ready to burst with an anguished outcry of Stop, this cant go on!
then we cannot understand hunger. We misunderstand hunger when we turn the hungry person into
called hunger,
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its
evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner
of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of
individuals, including the right to life . The purported threat of Communist domination has for over
two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs.
During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy
was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to
elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the
name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has
been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for
the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival
In genetics, the
survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a
forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and
bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical
requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system.
efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a
normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than
easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about
their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its
my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for
survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would
ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The
potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely,
of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a
disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing .
enemies. But
We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic
their apparent lack of objectivity. Take the war in Iraq. How many Iraqi civilians have died as a consequence of the
American invasion? Supporters of the war say 30,000, a number that even President Bush finally brought himself to utter
late last year. Opponents of the war say more than 100,000. Surely there must be a fact of the matter. In practice, though,
for instance, that the higher estimate of 100,000 is the same order of magnitude as the number of Iraqi Kurds that
Saddam Hussein is reckoned to have killed in 1987 and 1988, in a genocidal campaign that, it has been claimed, justified
his forcible removal? ''It is painful to contemplate that despite our technologies of assurance and mathematics of
out the number of man-caused deaths is rarely as straightforward as counting skulls in a mass grave. You can kill people
with bombs, guns and machetes, but there are also more indirect ways: causing them to die of starvation, say, or of
exposure or disease. (The disease need not be indirect -- witness the radiation victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) Of the
nearly two million Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge, for instance, perhaps half were executed outright. By contrast,
in the ongoing civil war in the Congo -- the deadliest conflict since World War II -- 2 percent of the estimated 3.9 million
victims have died of direct violence; the rest perished when their subsistence-level lives were disrupted by the war.
Quantifying man-made death thus means, at the very least, having an idea of the rate at
which people die naturally. And that entails recordkeeping. In 17th-century Europe, registers kept by
church parishes -- dates of baptisms, marriages and burials -- made it possible to gauge the devastation caused by the
Thirty Years' War, which was deadlier for civilians than for soldiers. The last century, strange to say, has not always
that the Chinese leader was responsible for ''well over 70 million deaths,'' which would come to nearly half of the total
greater than x. This utilitarian principle is often invoked, for example, in defense of President Truman's decision to drop
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed between 120,000 and 250,000 Japanese civilians, on the
''What is the moral context in which we should see those killed by violence? There exists a view that one violent death has
the same moral value as a thousand or a million deaths. . . .
committing more than one murder. However, every victim of murder would
claim, if he could, that his death had a separate moral value .'' Source: ''The Twentieth Century
Book of the Dead,'' by Gil Elliot (1972)
Third, the impersonal morality of public institutions, and the moral specialization that inevitably arises given the
complexity of public actions, lead naturally to the establishment of many roles whose terms of reference are primarily
consequentialist. Lack of attention to the context that is necessary to make these roles legitimate can lead to a rejection
of all limits on the means thought to be justified by ever greater ends. I have argued that these are all errors. It is
important to remember that they are moral views: the opinion that in certain conditions a certain type of conduct is
permissible has to be criticized and defended by moral argument. Let me return finally to the individuals who occupy
former public servants who have often done far worse than take bribes.
KENT 2005 (George, Freedom From Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food, p 1)
People have a right to adequate food, and to be free from hunger, as a matter of
international law. The right is articulated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights
of the Child; and several other international instruments. States and the
governments that represent them, and other parties as well, have obligations
to ensure that the right is realized. States that are parties to these
agreements have made a commitment to ensure the realization of the right .
War is particularly unpredictable
FONT AND RGIS 2006 (Joan Pere Plaza i Font UAB Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona Spain Dandoy
Rgis UCL University of Louvain Belgium Chaos Theory and its Application in Political Science IPSA AISP Congress
Fukuoka, 9 13 July 2006 http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers_membres/dandoy-regis/fichiers/dandoy-regispublication18.pdf)
doubts about
governments capacity to cause intended effects through strategy are
reinforced by the chaos theory, given the fact that the strategy results do not
follow plans. The complexity and the contingency preclude controlling causes
well enough to produce desired effects and little connection between the
design and the denouement of strategies is observed . The author stressed that, in this
Betts (2000) observed a useful application of chaos to strategy and international security. In his view,
chaotic nonlinearity is common in war strategies, but neither absolute nor pervasive. If chaos theory meant that no
prediction is possible, there would be no point in any analysis of the conduct of the war (Betts, 2000: 20). Those who
criticize social science approaches to strategy for false confidence in predictability cannot rest on a rejection of prediction
altogether without negating all rationale for strategy. Finally, one should mention that the nonlinear perspective
misrepresents the structure of the problem as the military strategy seeks disequilibrium, a way to defeat the enemy
rather than to find a mutually acceptable price for exchange. More precise but still rhetorical examples of the application
of the chaos theory in the field of the international relations can be found in the example of the spontaneous and mass
revolutions as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 that is considered a massive rupture of chaotic uncertainties and
bifurcations into unpredictable dynamical changes in a political system (Farazmand, 2003:341), similarly to the predictions
(Farazmand, 2003:353). But political scientists do not only use metaphors for describing political and IR phenomena. For
example, Saperstein (1988) studied empirically whether the development of SDI in the United States would lead to
a transition from an offensive to a defensive mode of strategy from ICBM attacks. His complex model appears to be
science field, the transition from predictability to chaos in deterministic mathematical system is possible.
is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the
article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, Major war is obsolete in a way
that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present
Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or footbinding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that
demand for it.
now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once
regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have
was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the
this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one
another. I wouldnt go that far. I dont believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are
no such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in
democracy. Now its true that one important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the
structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists, to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John
Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and the world at the
moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to
a post-Cold War
innovation counteracts the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The
Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common security I mean a regime of negotiated arms
limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by transparency-every state can know
what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of
defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military
forces to make them more suitable for defense and less for attack . Some caveats
defend themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that
are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. Its not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is
certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause, but a consequence, of
the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have
already, for other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War
billion dollars in U.S. corporate holdings In Cubaor one-eighth of the total U.S. investment in Latin
America, making Cuba second only to Venezuela. U.S. firms directly employed about 160,000 workers in
Cuba itself. Americans owned nine of Cubas ten largest sugar mills in 1955, produced 40 percent of the
islands sugar, and controlled 54 percent of the total grinding capacity. Cuban branches of U.S. banks
held almost a quarter of all bank deposits. The telephone service was a monopoly of American Telephone
and Tele graph. The U.S-owned Cuban Electric Company had a virtual monopoly on electric powerand
charged rates even higher than those in the United States. Standard Oil, Shell. and Texaco refined
imported crude ail. Procter and Gamble. Colgate-Palmolive, Firestone. Good1 Goodyear. Coca-Cola, PepsiCola, Canada Dry, and Orange Crus1 all had subsidiaries in Cuba. U.S. citizens, often connected to the
Mafia, also owned many of the islands hotels and ran the thriving gambling casinos and drug trade. A
Over a 35
year period, Cuba exported about 60 percent of its sugar production
to the United States. Cubas economy was not only dependent on a
single crop but on a single customer. Cubas potential to produce
consumer goods for its own people was undercut by the U.S. sugar
quota. Cuba was granted preferred entry into the US. market for some of its sugar, its rum, and its leaf
tobacco; in exchange, Cuba had to open its doors to US. goods. Duties were abolished for
be imported into the U.S. market at the relatively high prices of tJ.S. domestic producers.
flakes to tomato paste; from nails and tacks to tractors, trucks. and automobiles; from thread to all types
of clothing; from goods for Sears and other department stores to accessories for the home, fertilizers and
insecticides for agriculture, and materials and equipment for Industry and construction. A 1934
U.S. sugar quota system made active discouragement unnecessary for the realization of Hulls goal.
between 1952 and 1958 there was a net disinvestment of $370 million and the per capita gross national
product declined. Under the US. quota system Cuba received a comparatively good price for its sugar
(though for only a part of its total production). But there was little prospect that Cubas share of the US.
market would grow. Indeed, throughout the l940s and 1950s, the amount of Cuban sugar purchased by the
But supply failed to keep pace with the growing demand. Overall
agricultural production was handicapped by the flight to the United
States of administrative and technical personnel, an elite unwilling
to adjust to the new changes. The consequent lack of organization
and technical experience on the newly created peoples (arms and cooperatives lowered
production. The Eisen howcr administrations 1960 embargo on most exports to Cuba seriously
disrupted the islands agriculture, which had become dependent on the United
States for farm machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and other
inputs. In addition, the Central Intel ligence Agency fostered acts of
sabotage, including burning fields and slaughtering cattle , Such
sabotage, as well as repeated military attacks culminating In the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961,
forced Cuba to divert scarce human and material re sources into
defense, exacting a toll on production. As if all nus were flot enough, a severe
drought in 1962 rurttier aggravated food production problems (See chapter 9 for further discussion of
production problems in the early years.) In a reversal of the pre- 19i9 pattern, shortages became more
particular began disappearing from city marketplaces. Plantains (cooking bananas) were no longer trucked
Shortages
often triggered more shortages since the lack of one item meant
greater demand for others. By mid-1961. when taro, a usually abundant root crop, became
in daily to Havana bw consumed in the eastern provinces where they were grown.
scarce, people bought out sweet potatoes, putting pressure on the supply of white pota toes, and so on.
The disruption of normal imports further aggravated supply problems, As we discussed in chapter 1, Cuba
had bccome de pendent on the import of large quantities of foodwheat, rice, beans, lard, poultry, dairy
example might seem odd, the fact is that Cuba consumed prodigious quantities of lard, importing about 85
percent of it from the United States.2 In a desperate search for substitute suppliers, the Cuban govern.
ment found to its dismay that not only were prices significantly higher elsewhere (partly due to steeper
transpon costs) but no where outside of the United States could enough lard be found On such short
While many supporters of the Cuban regime blame the U.S. economic sanctions (that the Cubans refer to
as a blockade) against Cuba as the main culprit, almost all of the detractors place the burden on the
inefficiencies of the socialist system. Given the importance of this issue in terms of the hardships it has
represented to the population on the island for more than 40 years, the two points of view deserve careful
analysis. As stated above, for supporters of the Cuban regime, the United States is the culprit. The
following quote is very revealing because it blames the United States for the suffering of the Cuban people
under the rationing system, and because it states (for the first time, to our knowledge) the cost of
administering such a system:
Medical Journal. About what? Hunger. But not the infamy of starving a population.
Thats in poor taste. About hunger as a cure for obesity. The thesis that unites them is
simple: while we ate cabbage as appetizer, main course and dessert the
first person plural is intentional: I experienced this first-hand, we were doing a favor to the nutritionists
and cardiologists of the first world, who then would go around shouting to the four winds that the lower the
body weight, the lower the cardiovascular mortality. A textbook example in real life, declared a Spanish
scientist who wasnt part of the experiment, although what he really wanted to say is: they were dying
women will be drastically reduced. One cant but wonder why they dont also recommend trying bulimia
and anorexia. Although separated by language, both articles have in common a contempt for the Cuban
The Castro
brothers have not only created a theme park so that those who love far off utopia have an island as a
point of reference and place to visit; even before that, they have made Cuba into a giant
laboratory where every human being is a guinea pig.
people, and they remind one of the great achievements of tropical totalitarianism:
The United States imposed an embargo against Cuba almost immediately after the 1960 Cuban revolution.
The American
Association for World Health and the American Public Health
Cuba for its public health system. Cuba of the mid-90's portrayed another image.
This argument rings hollow. First, even if Cuba can buy food elsewhere,
the inclusion of food in the US trade embargo remains in violation of
international law. Second, a small amount of food is donated by US
organisations, 4.10 but that is a poor substitute for removing
provisions that prohibit its sale. Third, although Cuba can buy food
elsewhere, it must often pay higher transportation costs than would
be the case with the nearby USA. Fourth, in 1992, the US Government
ignored the warning of the American Public Health Association that
the tightening of the embargo would lead to an abrupt cessation of
supplies of food and medicine to Cuba resulting in widespread
famines.4 In fact, 5 months after the passage of the Act the worst
epidemic of neurological disease this century due to a food shortage
became widespread in Cuba.12 More than 50 000 of the 11 million
inhabitants were sufering from optic neuropathy, deafness, loss of
sensation and pain in the extremities, and a spinal disorder that
impaired walking and bladder control. 1113 Furthermore, as recently as
November, 1995, WHO reported more people with neurological
disease in Cuba due to malnutrition.14
since the end of the Cold War. Although humanitarian exemptions to most
embargoes exist on paper, they are seldom observed. Most globalised
drugs, as Kirkpatrick points out, are available only from US sources.
More pervasively, transport and market dislocations cause increased
costs for all medicines that are purchased: in Cuba this is calculated
to be equivalent to a 30% surcharge than if there were no embargo.
US and Cuban-American groups claim that it is not the embargo but Cuba's
economic limitations that reduce access to medical supplies. If this were
the case, they would not demand on-site verification or prosecute
pharmaceutical companies that provide humanitarian goods to Cuba.
The burden of proof is not on Cuba that the embargo threatens
health and wellbeing. The chain of events that results in unnecessary
deaths is long and no so-called smoking gun may exist to prove an embargo
to be the sole cause. We did not wait for proof of deaths to act in the
embargo against the regime in Haiti. The USA provided food and medicines
for up to a quarter of all Haitians at the height of that embargo. If an embargo
is the right tool in the USA's fight against Cuba, then the USA should
demonstrate that it is doing everything possible to limit collateral effects
among the general population.
on the Cuban health care system. But since 1992 the number of unmet medical needs patients going
without essential drugs or doctors performing medical procedures without adequate equipment-has
State key
The state is key to take action
Knnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 Rolf is the Human Rights Director
of FIAN International Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN
International (Rolf, Sandra, The Right to Food: A Resource Manual for NGOs,
AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Fulfilment-bound obligations require the state to take necessary
measures to guarantee deprived groups access to adequate food
and food-producing resources. Obligations to fulfil therefore come into
play in situations where individuals and/or communities lack adequate food
or food-producing resources. Part A dealt with people who are vulnerable because their access to food or
The
absence of hunger and malnutrition was identified as the core
content of the right to food. There is every reason to give them priority in the struggle for
the right to food. In most cases, hunger and malnutrition are the results of
povertynot of a general lack of food in a country or area. India, for example, the nation with the
resources is threatened. Part Be now enters the realm of the (already) hungry and malnourished.
largest number of malnourishedhas huge amounts of grain rotting in the godowns, because the starving
people next door cannot buy them. People could, of course, plant food for themselvesbut they lack the
resources: Land, inputs and an agrarian policies supporting small holder agriculture. Instead agribusiness
is about to displace even more peasant farmers. People could, of course, work to earn money. In most
countries, however, jobs providing a decent pay are lacking. Moreover, some people wont be able (or
should not be expected) to work even if they had the chance to do so (the elderly, children, labor-scarce
households)and therefore need transfers. This background is the reason why the following section deals
with income poverty much more than with the general availability of food. General availability of food is, of
there is more
than enough food available in generalbut not for the poor who lack the
land, the capital, the jobs and the state policies which would allow them to feed
themselves. Ultimately the human right to food includes guaranteeing
access to food for each person. For persons and groups who cannot
provide for themselves this implies a states obligation to provide
food orbetterincome which buys whatever is needed most, including food. The right to food
implies moreit implies providing access to land and other resources, and
it requires in addition facilitating policies so that people can make use of
these resources to feed themselves. Human rights are an individual concept. For this
matter judges must eventually be able to adjudicate to an individual
malnourished claimant access to food and resources and provide
immediate relief. This implies the existence of specific transfer programsin terms of land, work,
course, a human rights issue as well, but it is secondary in the current context, as
income and food. These programs are a necessary part of implementing the human right to food for the
largest and most severely affected vulnerable groupthe hundreds of millions of landless and jobless.
Considering the necessity and urgency of the task the state is under
an obligation to organize society-wide sharing of food and
resources.
But, by all reliable accounts, there is presently more than enough food to
feed everyone on our planet and in almost all cases of large-scale
famine more than enough food to meet everyone's nutritional
needs in the very countries or areas sufering famine.i Yet people
continue to starve, to be malnourished, and otherwise to live in absolute poverty. This is
morally appalling - and intolerable.
of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly
intellectual property rights, including limitations on the rights of farmers to use seeds from the previous
season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food security for
farmers unable to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have
international development circles would also point to the poor transportation infrastructure in these less
developed countries, which limits the distribution of food to areas that may be in the greatest need of food
Carrying capacity
Carrying capacity is fundamentally inaccurateproves life
boat ethics are morally wrong
Pefer, 3 Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University
of Arizona in Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, WORLD
HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND RADICAL RAWLSIANISM, Special Issue:
Topics in International Moral Theory, International Journal of Politics and
Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL
[1]Although "carrying capacity" is ambiguous, I believe that on any coherent rendering of the
concept it is demonstrably false that the earth has exceeded its carrying capacity or will do so
in the near future (barring some unforeseen catastrophe), as Garrett Hardin and other Neo-Malthusians
the most devastating argument against the NeoMalthusians' position, however, exposes a crucial blurring of a vital
distinction from which they illegitimately proceed to derive their
conclusion that wealthier countries ought not to aid starving people
in the poorest societies (since they have exceeded their "carrying
capacity"). As William Aiken has elegantly argued, the position often fails to distinguish between the
"biological limit" definition of this expression and the "socio-economic limit" definition. While there
is a strongly established and relatively clear "carrying capacity" thesis in population
dynamics theory within the discipline of biology, this cannot be directly extended
to the "carrying capacity" of humans since human survival and health
are vastly efected by the overall socio-economic arrangements
within which they live: from the local village or neighborhood to international social, economic,
contend.ii Perhaps
and political arrangements. As Aiken states: International purchasing power extends a nation's carrying
capacity because this is not a biological limit it is a complex social, economic and political limit. It is not
fixed by "nature" but by trade practices (for example, protective tariffs, currency exchange rates,
concessionary prices, multinational corporation interests, militarily motivated "loans") by the international
market in terms of who has what to sell (goods, resources, alliances), who wants to buy it, what price you
can get for what you have to sell, and by the influence of international interests on indigenous production
and distribution (for example, neo-colonialism with its emphasis upon the mass production of nonfood
case that mass starvation occurs from a literal lack of food within particular societies. v As they argue,
famines and starvations are not the consequence of lack of food but
of lack of social entitlements to food; i.e. the lack of an adequate entitlement system
to adequate nutrition. In fact, many countries have actually exported significant
amounts of food during the very periods in which starvation was
occurring.vi These facts are extremely important since they disprove Hardin's
argument that we on this planet are now in a "lifeboat" situation and
that "lifeboat ethics" permits (or even requires) those who are fortunate
enough to be in the lifeboats i.e. those in the wealthy countries (or, more accurately, the
wealthy wherever they may live) not to aid the starving, especially the starving
in the worst-of nations.
Food is so basic a
human need that it readily becomes the focus or means of
expression of a whole range of other human concerns, both
beneficent and maleficent. Thus, food habits serve both to strengthen
cultural bonds and to emphasize intercultural diferences: food
supply is an important element of foreign aid, but trade in food can
also be a means of subordination, or even a weapon of war. Food is
essential to the sustenance of life, but it can be a source of disease
and death. The underlying assumption motivating the compilation of this collection of essays is that
adoption of modem biotechnologies which offend the public sense of propriety.
the interrelatedness of such concerns and their centrality to human well-being merits the promotion of an
Consideration of
'food ethics` might thus promote more appropriate ways of thinking
about human well-being and autonomy, and facilitate the practical
and political changes which need to be introduced if we are not only
to achieve a more just global society, but indeed if we are to hand
onto our successors a world which is worth inheriting . Each of the chapter
interdisciplinary approach to food which has an explicitly normative objective.
authors has addressed his subject by first identifying the social, economic or scientific issues and then
proceeding to analyse their ethical dimensions. (The absence of women authors is incidental: none of
those invited to contribute was able to accept.) All authors have concluded their chapters with suggestions
for changes in line with the ethical principles discussed. Readers are not. However, presented with a set of
codes of ethical practice'. Rather, they are encouraged to reflect on the ethical implications of those
aspects of the food industry with which they are most directly concerned, and with their relationships to
other aspects of the food chain, with a view to informing sound ethical judgements. Ethics can be
considered at several levels, from abstruse meta-ethical theory, at one extreme, to codes of practice, at
the other. The aim here is to occupy the middle ground in which ethical theory is applied to practical
concerns: but such insights need to be interpreted more explicitly in the contexts of professional practice.
Nigel Dower considers the question of global hunger from the perspective of people in Western developed
Food trade, being perceived as a largely selfserving activity, might seem to be ethically less worthy than
provision of aid, which ostensibly expresses altruistic motives . In
practice, the complications of both aid and trade undermine this simple
distinction and imply that there is need for close analysis of the
motives and efects of both, if we are to make progress in the
alleviation of world hunger.
by no means unproblematical.
who in the next fifteen years will be malnourished or starving, many dying prematurely of these causes.
reminiscent of Augustine`s question about God and the existence of evil in the world: will it exist because
we cannot prevent it or because we will not prevent it? By will here I do not mean deliberately aim at, of
course, but more modestly *allow to happen because of policies which we know have unwanted but
assessment of the possibility of generous human motivation. Delegates at the United Nations Summit in
Copenhagen (March l995) on "social development` agreed, since they adopted a ten-year plan to meet
the basic needs of virtually every human being on earth. The prediction is based on a number of
assumptions-about food production, new methods of agriculture, new areas of co-operation, inputs from
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and levels of giving by private individuals. Reductions in global
hunger will certainly be seen as the goal of many agents, for example, food scientists and aid officials, but
also the general outcome of other developments, economic and technological. The key question to be
asked is: in addition to the efforts already being made to reduce world hunger, and assumed in the
prediction, by governments, agencies, international bodies, NGOs and concerned individuals, could
much more
could be done and given that it could be done, ought to be done,
Governments, international organisations and businesses could do a lot more. But,
significantly more be done to bring about further reductions? I want to argue that
beyond a small but significant degree of latitude within which officials can work, what they can do depends
upon certain conditions.
Starvation dehumanizes
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He
has published widely in the fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey Centre
for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth Chadwick Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central
Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for
Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb Ghebremeskel
studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry
at the University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle
upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977
he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy
at Sussex University. Food Ethics 1996)//NG
Neither, on its own, shows hunger to be uniquely different from other kinds of evil, but
societies in the past, which by modern standards were not materially affluent, that at least would have
The irony is
that in the modern world, with our extensive knowledge of global
hunger, our extensive communication and transportation systems
and the existence of food surpluses, we do not seem to be able to
replicate the practices of past smaller societies of at least trying to
ensure that everyone has enough of the one crucial thing it is in the
been done, however much uncontrollable diseases may have afflicted and killed many.
hunger
and extreme poverty undermine the proper development and
exercise of rational agency.8 They do so because the very poor are often
subject to coercion and deception (which fails to respect their
rational agency) and more generally because extreme poverty deprives the
poor of real autonomy. This requires us as moral beings to respect
the poor as fellow rational agents in two ways: first, we must not
deceive or coerce them, or be beneficiaries of others (such as multi-national
companies) who deceive or coerce them, and we must take action to
prevent such coercion and deception (via, for example. political action). Second.
we must act so as to enable the poor to develop and exercise their
rational autonomy by appropriate action (political as well as
individual acts of helping) this is what is required by material justice. The difficulty with
this appealing position is that it locates the evil of hunger in the lack or loss of rational agency. Now this
is clearly an important part of what hunger does to the poor (a part
often neglected), but it is equally distorting to omit mention of the
sheer physical sufering, disease, physical malfunctioning and
disability, which are themselves also inherently evil.
Onora ONeill has presented a modern Kantian approach which can be summed up as follows:
literature on the moral aspects of food scarcity tends to be vague, confusing, and often rhetorical. The
fundamental problem as posed by Regan applies as well to food aid decisions: what are the correct moral
principles which might guide the decisions (or actions) of free, rational beings?8 The question has
preoccupied philosophers and moralists since the dawn of civilization, and it is not possible to deal with it
here in any truly satisfactory manner. At the risk of being overly simplistic, however, it could be said that
this fundamental question of normative ethics has been dealt with from two basically different
philosophical approaches: the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist. The former, which is also
called the technological approach, emphasizes the results of an action and regards an action to be wrong
only if its consequences are wrong or harmful to someone. There are at least three types of technological
ethical theories: ethical egoism in which the only consequences that should be taken into consideration
are those for the actor himself; ethical altruism where moral right or wrong depends on consequences to
others (not the actor); and utilitarianism where the consequences to everyone concerned are the
determinant of a moral act. The utilitarian principle calls for the greatest pos- sible balance of intrinsic
good over intrinsic evil for everyone concerned.9 Non-consequentialist theories are often referred to as
balance of intrinsic good as compared to intrinsic evil. Many deontologists, following Kant, have argued
rights are distinguished from legal rights in terms of their univer- sality, inalienability, and equality. Laws
may be unjust, consequent- ly legal justice (enforcement of laws) is different from moral justice. Different
concepts or rights, for example, rights as entitlements or claims, imply a justified constraint upon how
others may act.10 Freedom from hunger is frequently regarded as a basic moral right which is not derived
some satisfaction to the donors, it must be considered as an altruistic act without its reinforcing consequences. According to William Aiken, dire needs create rights. Involuntary deprivation must be
mitigated particularly when the means to do so are available. This right may only be denied if the costs
aid. Aiken responds that the duty to benevolence is overriding, and consequently the right of the starving to be aided takes precedence. Even if failing to help does not violate the right of the starving the
affluent are obligated to do so.12 This emphasis on rights alone sometimes appears to be rather
establishment of freedom from starvation as a moral right without any mechanism of enforcement will
not, in my opinion, help the starving people. Because moral rights, even if established, are difficult to enforce, some writers have focussed on the moral obligations of the affluent to the starving poor.
even have to sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would
preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even
if one is to
be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if
everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save ones life is
no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to
be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to
when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly,
save ones life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake
of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world
contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the
highest principlerecant or dieand it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets
rough. I have put aside many questions of detailsuch as the mechanical problems of distributing food
override the excuse that by doing it one would lose ones life. But many people cannot accept the view
that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then
there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the
principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally
higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of
food to save a nationfor nations can come and goone might well argue that unequal distribution is
necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay one-third of present world
populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint,
unable to lead active and fruitful lives. Food, moreover, is a source of pleasure. No wonder
most people want not just food, but also good food. They want secure and sustainable access to this food
to protect them from the horrifying prospect of hunger and food borne diseases. Access to food on a
strictly individual basis, as was the case for Robinson Crusoe, alone on his desert island, is something that
almost never happens. This is an individualistic myth celebrating the self-made man, who, in reality,
free of oppression does not necessarily affect peoples dignity. This usually not the case for food-related
a point below the minimum human standard and/or keeping them there. Food-related oppression therefore
comes in two different categories. The first category entails concerns acts that destroy peoples access to
food or food-producing resources. The second category refers to acts or omissions that keep people
excluded from food or food-producing resources. These two forms of food-related oppression are described
in the sections that follow.
Resources which would allow people to feed themselves are withheld from them, using the argument that
poor and deprived people make inefficient use of these resources, and that granting them this access such
Excluding
deprived people from the freedom to access food and resources
existing elsewhere in society is an act of oppressionit means
keeping them in a state of deprivation.
moves would lower the overall productivity of society, and slow down growth.
contribution we will review some utopian seeds and dreams by authors stretching from the past to the
third part gives a short reflection on the special problem of justice from a modern philosophical point of
view. But now we introduce with a summary of the contributions to this book into the wide field of real
problems in Food Ethics in a globalized world.
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN 1976). The right to food,
according to the authoritative interpretation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Food Ethics
Bad
Food ethics invite moral regression to the point of
absurdity endangering all of humanity
Hardin, 74 received a B.S. in zoology from the University of Chicago in
i See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, Hunger and Public Action
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, The Political Economy of
Hunger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and Frances Moore Lappe, et al., World Hunger:
Twelve Myths, 2nd ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1998).
ii See Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," in William
Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit. and "Carrying
Capacity as an Ethical Concept," in George Lucas and Thomas Olgetree (eds.), The Moral
Dilemmas of World Hunger (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
iii William Aiken, "The 'Carrying Capacity' Equivocation," in William Aiken and Hugh
LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
iv Ibid., p. 20.
v See the works cited in n. 1, especially Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, op. cit.,
pp. 160-188.
vi See Sen, Poverty and Famines, op cit., p. 161 on Bangladesh's exports during the 1973
famine and pp.131-153 for his analysis of that famine which, among other things, notes
that the United States stopped food aid shipments to Bangladesh on the grounds that
Bangladesh was selling jute (used to make gunny sacks) to Cuba. As Sen states, "only
after Bangladesh gave in and sacrificed its trade with Cuba was the flow of American food
resumed. By then the autumn famine was largely over": p. 136. Although this probably
was a relatively small contributory cause of the starvation that occurred at that time, it
does seem to have been part of the cause, with whatever moral culpability that may
imply.